Qualitative Constraints on Conventional Armaments. Volume I. Summary,
Abstract
This study is an investigation of the desirability and feasibility of placing qualitative constraints on conventional arms competitions by means of negotiated arms control agreements. Using an inductive and empirical approach, the study develops a conceptual structure for determining whether US arms control policy should pursue such constraints in particular situations. Past experience in arms control and the principal issues involved are surveyed with attention to qualitative aspects, and the evidence of the present importance of and motivations for qualitative weapon improvement is reviewed, adducing examples in five areas of arms competition. The utility of qualitative constraints is discussed in terms of identifiable objectives; feasibility conditions are indicated and the basic forms of control are specified and analyzed. Possible types of agreement embodying desirable and feasible constraints are examined and illustrated by four candidate agreements in major areas of arms competition. Conclusions are presented indicating the circumstances under which qualitative constraints would be both desirable and feasible. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jul 01, 1976
- Accession Number
- ADA034809
Entities
People
- Robert A. Gessert
- William W. Cover