Qualitative Constraints on Conventional Armaments. Volume II. Main Report and Appendices.
Abstract
Recent arms control negotiations have emphasized constraints on nuclear armaments and forces and, when they have dealt with conventional armaments, have tended to focus on quantitative limitations. With rapid advances in technology, increased ability to pay for modern weapons in areas such as the Middle East, and increased availability of modern weapons for export, several conventional arms competitions have taken on distinct qualitative dimensions as well as quantitative ones. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency therefore requested this study to (1) review past attempts to negotiate qualitative constraints as well as quantitative; (2) examine evidence of particularly intense qualitative competition and the apparent motivations for qualitative weapons improvements; (3) investigate feasible forms of control over qualitative weapons improvements; and (4) assess US security interests in supporting or promoting qualitative constraints in areas such as the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and Latin America. The report is published in two volumes. Volume I, the Summary, is a condensation of the Main Report, contained in Volume II. Volume II also includes supporting appendices. References to documentary sources are omitted from the Summary. Complete documentation is provided in the Main Report and its appendices.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jul 01, 1976
- Accession Number
- ADA034814
Entities
People
- George R. Bieber
- Michael V. Mcclary
- Robert A. Gessert
- William W. Cover