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# HOST PRESS COVERAGE OF SOVIET NAVAL VISITS TO ISLAMIC COUNTRIES, 1968 - 73

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By: HEIDI S. PHILLIPS

June 1976

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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**Introduction** . . . . . 1

**Findings and Conclusions** . . . . . 4

**Findings** . . . . . 4

**Conclusions** . . . . . 6

**Algeria** . . . . . 7

**Press coverage of first official naval visit, April 1966** . . . . . 7

**Press coverage of subsequent port visits** . . . . . 8

**Conclusion** . . . . . 10

**Morocco** . . . . . 11

**Press coverage of first official naval visit, October 1968** . . . . . 12

**Press coverage of subsequent port visits** . . . . . 12

**Comparative coverage of non-Soviet visits** . . . . . 13

**Conclusion** . . . . . 14

**Iraq** . . . . . 15

**Press coverage of first official naval visit, May 1968** . . . . . 15

**Press coverage of subsequent port visits** . . . . . 16

**Somalia** . . . . . 19

**Press coverage of first official naval visit, April 1968** . . . . . 19

**Press coverage of subsequent port visits** . . . . . 21

**Depth of Somali press coverage of Soviet naval visits** . . . . . 22

**Comparison of client and non-client press coverage** . . . . . 23

**Press coverage** . . . . . 23

**Treatment of first visits** . . . . . 24

**Non-clients** . . . . . 24

**Clients** . . . . . 24

**Politization of visits** . . . . . 25

**Conclusion** . . . . . 25

**Appendix A: Description of national press** . . . . . A-1

## INTRODUCTION

This study of the domestic press has found that examination of host press coverage of Soviet naval visits<sup>1</sup> reveals information often not available from other sources about host-country and Soviet treatment of visits.

Four countries within the Islamic world – Algeria, Morocco, Iraq and Somalia – were selected as the principal host countries of the investigation. They offer differing governmental forms, international alignments and orientations, and levels of development. This provides a basis for a cross-national comparison of the data collected, in order to identify differences and similarities in occurrence of coverage, or in type and length of coverage, between Soviet client and non-client states.<sup>2</sup> Further, in each country selected for this study, Soviet desire to expand naval presence was either known or suspected. Finally, the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean regions account for the bulk of Soviet port visits.

Some information concerning Soviet naval visits to Tunisia and Syria is also included. Though insufficient material exists to enable these countries to be included as primary cases, the limited information available supports and adds depth to the findings for the principal countries.<sup>3</sup>

The six-year period 1968-1973 was selected because of the availability of data and the intensification of Soviet naval visits to the four countries in the period.

In all, 11 newspapers from the six countries were examined (see table 1). A brief discussion of each is to be found in appendix A. Five factors were considered in selecting newspapers for examination: political orientation, degree of government control, city of publication, circulation, and language. Every effort was made to choose the most widely influential newspaper which was representative of the society (the ruling elite if not the general population). Because they failed to meet these criteria, no communist party newspapers were included. In several cases, circulation figures appear low for a main, capital city daily (particularly in Somalia). This is a result of, and reflects, the economic conditions and literacy levels of the country in question. It is also true, however, that a single newspaper is read by several individuals and in many cases is read aloud in coffee houses and on street corners.

Somali newspapers for 1973 and Iraqi newspapers for May 1968 and December 1973 are not available. For visits during these periods, information from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and the BBC *Summary of World Broadcasts* has been used.

<sup>1</sup>A visit is defined broadly as the entrance of an unspecified number of warships simultaneously or in close succession into one or more ports of a given country for a brief period (usually four to seven days).

<sup>2</sup>The term "Soviet client" means (1) that the third world nation in question depends on Soviet aid for all or most of its military strength, and (2) that its general foreign policy positions coincide in most, though not all, essentials with those of the U.S.S.R. Most importantly, client states are those third world states that are most likely to receive Soviet support (including military support) in times of crisis. However, client states are to be distinguished from communist states not only by the nature of their regimes, but also by the lesser degree to which they are (if at all) militarily allied with the U.S.S.R. through mutual defense treaties.

<sup>3</sup>The first Soviet naval combatant visit to Tunisia did not take place until May 1974. The first visit to Syria occurred in September 1957, and by 1968 the Soviets enjoyed routine access to Syrian ports.

**TABLE 1**  
**NEWSPAPERS CONSULTED**

<u>Country</u>	<u>Newspaper<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>City of publication<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Circulation<sup>c</sup></u>
Algeria	<i>el-Moudjahid</i>	Algiers	French	80,000
	<i>es-Shaab</i>	Algiers	Arabic	25,000
Morocco	<i>L'Opinion</i>	Rabat	French	50,000
	<i>Le Petit Marocain</i> ( <i>Le Matin</i> after 1971)	Casablanca*	French	43,000
Tunisia	<i>L'Action</i>	Tunis	French	40,000
	<i>al-Amal</i>	Tunis	Arabic	30,000
Iraq	<i>al-Jumhuriyya</i>	Baghdad	Arabic	25,000
	<i>ash-Thawrah</i>	Baghdad	Arabic	70,000
Syria	<i>al-Baath</i>	Damascus	Arabic	26,000
Somalia	<i>Sawt as-Somal</i>	Mogadiscio	Arabic	1,500
	<i>Oktubar Star</i>	Mogadiscio	English	n.a.
	<i>Najmat Oktubar</i>	Mogadiscio	Arabic	n.a.

<sup>a</sup>All newspapers listed are dailies.

<sup>b</sup>Capital city unless otherwise noted by \*.

<sup>c</sup>Circulation figures are taken from the newspaper and have been compared with figures found in the American University's *Area Handbook* on each country.

In each country considered by this study there exists a system of comprehensive government control of the media.<sup>1</sup> This is especially true in Iraq, Algeria and Syria and somewhat less true in Morocco, Tunisia and Somalia. Except for the Moroccan *L'Opinion* and the Somali *Oktubar Star*, each newspaper is *an*, if not *the*, official government organ.

For each port visit, the domestic daily press was reviewed for the period one week prior to the first day of the visit through one week following the last day of the visit. When coverage was found, it was examined in terms of length of coverage in column-inches, inclusion of photographs, and type of coverage (i.e., editorial, news release, feature article, etc.). The texts of the articles

<sup>1</sup>Raymond B. Nixon, in his study of freedom in the world press, rates the countries considered here as follows: Algeria, 6; Morocco, 5; Tunisia, 5; Iraq, 7; Syria, 7; Somalia, 6; where 9 indicates a controlled press system, no qualifications, and 1 indicates a free press system, no qualifications. See Raymond B. Nixon, "Freedom in the World's Press: A Fresh Appraisal with New Data," *Journalism Quarterly*, winter 1965, pp. 3-14 and 118-119. Raymond Gastil rates the countries as follows: Algeria, 6; Morocco, 4; Tunisia, 5; Iraq, 7; Somalia, 6; where 7 indicates a controlled press, no qualifications, and 1 indicates a free press system, no qualifications. See Raymond Gastil, "The New Criteria of Freedom," *Freedom of Issue*, Jan-Feb 1973, pp. 2-5. Taking into account the differences in ranges, the relative standings remain similar. Morocco is relatively more open than the other states in both scales. Iraq and Syria are relatively less open than the other states in both scales. Algeria and Somalia are in between although closer to Iraq and Syria, on both scales.

were translated so that the information included could be used in this paper.<sup>1</sup> Further, whenever possible, official U.S. diplomatic reporting was used to provide supplementary data and to check the objectivity of the newspaper examined.

The dates of visits, and the total number by country (which is given below), were taken from CNA's automated Soviet port visit file.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Total no. of Soviet port visits, 1968-73</u>	<u>Total no. examined</u>
Algeria	42 <sup>a</sup>	42
Morocco	9	9
Iraq	14	11
Somalia	36	24

<sup>a</sup>Includes visits during 1966 and 1967.

<sup>1</sup>Russian and Arabic words are transliterated as they most commonly appear in the English language.

## FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

### FINDINGS

- Between the periods 1968-70 and 1971-73 the number of visits increased by over 90 percent while the proportion covered by the press declined from about 40 percent to under 10 percent (see table 2).
- All official visits<sup>1</sup> have been covered by the press, whereas only 10 percent of other types of visits have been (see table 3).
- Except for official visits, when a visit is reported by the local press, coverage is usually limited to the dates of the visit, and advance notice or follow-up comments are rare.
- Soviet port visits to a country follow a consistent pattern. Business and unofficial visits<sup>2</sup> of warships have not been made before the first official visit. First visits usually include a cruiser (Iraq, Somalia, Morocco and Syria) and often include submarines (Morocco and Algeria). Ships larger than destroyers are seldom used for subsequent visits, and when they are, the visit may coincide with other political events.
- In-port activities are highly formalized and are uniform among all countries examined, client and non-client alike. In this respect, the chief difference is that the Soviets interact more with the local population of client states.
- In each country examined Soviet targets appear to be local governmental elite groups (particularly in Iraq and Somalia). Among these groups, Soviet interaction with police, military and naval groups is a primary focus.
- During port visits to client states, Soviet activities are more politically pointed. Policy statements are made which are more openly supportive of the Arab cause in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and more openly anti-West. In non-client states, statements emphasize cooperation and friendship between the Soviet Union and the host nation.
- In Iraq and Somalia, the tone of the coverage is far more enthusiastic and favorable than it is in Algeria and Morocco.

<sup>1</sup>An official (goodwill) visit (usually to the main port or capital city) is primarily diplomatic, involves formal protocol and publicity, and serves to support general Soviet foreign policy objectives.

<sup>2</sup>A business visit is primarily operational. Objectives are crew rest, ship maintenance, replenishment and refueling. An unofficial (friendly or courtesy) visit is diplomatic like the official visit, but more low-key. Soviet contacts with the host country's political and military elites are usually at the city or local levels. The Soviets use these visits, at least in part, to provide logistic support for the ships.

**TABLE 2**  
**TRENDS IN VISITS AND COVERAGE,**  
**FOUR-COUNTRY AGGREGATION**

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of visits</u>	<u>No. covered</u>	<u>Percent covered</u>
1968	8	3	38
1969	13	6	46
1970	<u>12</u>	<u>4</u>	33
1968-70	33	13	39
1971	15	0	0
1972	20	3	15
1973	<u>28</u>	<u>2</u>	7
1971-73	63	5	8

**TABLE 3**  
**PRESS COVERAGE OF VISITS, BY TYPE OF VISIT**

	<u>No. of visits<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>Percent covered</u>
Algeria		
Official	2	2
Other <sup>b</sup>	40	5
Morocco		
Official	3	3
Other	6	1
Iraq		
Official	3	3
Other	11	3
Somalia		
Official	4 <sup>c</sup>	4
Other	32	0
Total		
Official	12	12 (100%)
Other	89	9 (10%)

<sup>a</sup>Includes five pre-1968 visits to Algeria.

<sup>b</sup>"Other" includes unofficial and business visits, and special operations visits other than those reported as official.

<sup>c</sup>Three December 1969 visits are counted here as one.

## CONCLUSIONS

While timing of the visits may be largely the choice of the Soviets, or a shared decision of host and visitor, host nations retain significant control over the event itself and, in all probability, shape it to their own purposes rather than to Soviet preferences.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, it appears that client states, moreso even than non-client states, may be exploiting the Soviet naval visits for their own purposes as much as the Soviets are attempting to gain advantage with the host country. In Iraq and Somalia, it appears that at certain times, the host governments encourage wide publicity of a port visit, and popular contact. Yet, in the greater number of cases, visits go unreported. Furthermore, in Morocco and Algeria, noticeably greater coverage given Western naval visits, as observed in Morocco, and lack of coverage afforded special operations<sup>2</sup> visits, such as the Soviet transport of Moroccan troops to Syria via Algeria, suggest at least selective governmental guidance rather than general indifference on the part of the press. Of course, the scant coverage may indicate, however, that, over the years, naval visits become so routine that the Soviet naval presence is not perceived as newsworthy.

The country's receptivity to Soviet naval visits may not depend solely on whether the country is a Soviet client. Its attitude toward the presence of foreign navies in its region and its geographic location and level of economic development and political sophistication may also influence its treatment of Soviet port visits.

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<sup>1</sup>One example of this is the press coverage afforded first Soviet combatant visits. In Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, these visits have been played down in the press. First visits to Iraq, Somalia and Syria, on the other hand, have been highlighted in the press.

<sup>2</sup>A special operations visit is associated with a particular diplomatic event or political initiative.

## ALGERIA

Algeria has been the most frequently visited of the four primary countries under study. As judged by number of press articles, these visits have received the smallest amount of coverage of the four nations studied. During 1966-73<sup>1</sup> the Soviet navy made 42 port visits to Algeria. Source material was available for examination of all visits. Only seven visits received coverage in the press examined (see table 4). All seven occurred before 1971.

**TABLE 4**  
**INCIDENCE OF VISITS AND PRESS COVERAGE - ALGERIA**

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of visits</u>	<u>No. examined</u>	<u>No. covered</u>
1966	2	2	2
1967	3	3	3
1968	5	5	0
1969	4	4	1
1970	7	7	1
1971	8	8	0
1972	6	6	0
1973	7	7	0
Total	42	42	7
1974	1 (through 30 Apr)	1	1

### PRESS COVERAGE OF FIRST OFFICIAL NAVAL VISIT, APRIL 1966

The first official Soviet naval visit to Algeria was made during 25-29 April 1966 to the port of Oran (see table 5). The squadron consisted of a submarine tender (flagship), a destroyer, two submarines and one support vessel. The visit was not followed in *el-Moudjahid*, but did receive one-day coverage (26 April) in *as-Shaab* and four-day coverage in an Oran French-language daily, *La Republique*.<sup>2</sup> According to *as-Shaab*, Algerian naval arm commander Ben Moussa accompanied the Soviets in a formal call at second military region headquarters on 25 April. In-port activities as reported in the press included a reception on board the flagship attended by municipal and local FLN officials, a visit to the North African glass works, and a luncheon given by the second military region. The theme of the visit, as reflected in statements made by Soviet officers, was Soviet-Algerian solidarity and friendship. Soviet seamen went ashore on two days for shopping and sightseeing, but otherwise Soviet-local interaction appeared minimal. No national level authorities were involved. In view of this low-keyed reception, and considering the near simultaneous visit of a Soviet-Algerian goodwill mission,<sup>3</sup> it appears that the government of Algeria wanted to downplay

<sup>1</sup>The period 1966-67 was included to allow study of the first official Soviet naval visit. Of the four countries under review, only Algeria was visited by the Soviet navy before 1968.

<sup>2</sup>*La Republique* carried notices on 25, 26(2), 27 and 28(2) April.

<sup>3</sup>This mission, which arrived in Algeria from Tunis on 15 April, received only one brief mention in the press prior to 26 April, when it departed.

**TABLE 5**  
**NUMBER AND LENGTH OF ARTICLES ON VISITS COVERED – ALGERIA**

<u>Visits covered</u>	<u>No. of notices<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>Total column-inches</u>
26-29 Apr 1966 <sup>b</sup>	n.a. <sup>c</sup>	n.a.
10-14 Nov 1966	2	64.5
14-19 Aug 1967	1	3
14-19 Sep 1967	1	2
14-21 Nov 1967	1	4
13-18 Apr 1969	2	10
8-13 May 1970 <sup>b</sup>	2	18
16-21 Apr 1974 <sup>b</sup>	2	26

<sup>a</sup>Notice and column-inch statistics were compiled from *el-Moudjahid*. For 1971-73, *ar-Shaab* was also examined. During this period no Soviet naval visits were reported in the press.

<sup>b</sup>Official visit.

<sup>c</sup>*El-Moudjahid* is not available for examination. Information used was taken from secondary reports of coverage as found in *ar-Shaab*.

the visit's import. This is supported by the paucity of media coverage and the choice of Oran rather than the capital city, Algiers, for the first official visit.<sup>1</sup>

By comparison it is interesting to note that the visits of three hydrographic ships to Algiers (12-16 May 1966) for what appears to have been a business call, received wider press coverage than had the first official visit.<sup>2</sup> A long (24 column-inch) article in *el-Moudjahid* on 13 May outlines the ships' vital statistics and informs the reader that the character of their mission "is far more scientific than military."<sup>3</sup> It is reported that a delegation of the Algerian navy visited the ships and that the Soviet crews visited Algiers and its environs.

#### PRESS COVERAGE OF SUBSEQUENT PORT VISITS

*10-14 November 1966.* The second Soviet warship visit to Algeria received more and higher-level attention. In November of 1966 a squadron composed of a guided-missile destroyer, two submarines, and two support vessels, under the command of a rear admiral, visited the port of

<sup>1</sup>An interesting behavioral comparison is to be found in the 20-25 March 1966 visit of five Soviet naval vessels to Port Said, Egypt. In this instance, the port visited was not the main port, Alexandria, but Port Said. Reception was kept low-key, and publicity was "discreet" and "local." It has been suggested that this pattern indicated the intention of the Egyptian government to "gradually accustom its people to regard such visits as routine." See George S. Dragnich, "The Soviet Union's Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to the June War of 1967," CNA Professional Paper 127, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup>This is the only one of the nine visits of Soviet oceanographic and space research vessels to Algeria during 1966-73 to receive coverage in the domestic press.

<sup>3</sup>This assertion is especially interesting since one does not normally associate visits of hydrographic ships with a military function. It may indicate a concern of the Algerian government that Soviet naval visits not be construed as an indication of Algerian concessions to the U.S.S.R.

Algiers. *El-Moudjahid* reported the visit in three news articles consisting mainly of photographs of the ships.<sup>1</sup> The visit was characterized as a "courtesy visit" by *el-Moudjahid*. While this visit received wider attention, the quality of the coverage is quite similar to the first combatant visit to Oran. In neither case was the visit the subject of feature or editorial comment.

*14-19 August 1967.* The following August, four Soviet ships visited the port of Algiers on what, according to Radio Algiers, the Soviets labeled a "technical and provisioning call."<sup>2</sup> *El-Moudjahid* carried a solitary three-column-inch announcement of the Soviet sailors' shore leave.<sup>3</sup> Their activities consisted of purchasing souvenirs and "mixing with the population."<sup>4</sup> No other information concerning the visit or its purposes was included.

*14-19 September 1967.* One month later six Soviet ships arrived in Algiers for a five-day visit. This visit received a slight two-column-inch notice of arrival which included the number and types of ships involved.<sup>5</sup> No information concerning type or purpose of visit was given in the press.

*14-21 November 1967.* On 15 November *el-Moudjahid* carried one article announcing the arrival of five Soviet ships to Algiers for a one-week visit, described as a courtesy call. There was no additional coverage.

*13-18 April 1969.* In April of 1969 the Soviets paid their first warship visit to the eastern Algerian port of Annaba (Bone). This visit received two notices in *el-Moudjahid*. It was reported that the squadron, under the command of Rear Admiral Golata, was on a "friendly" visit. Further, the article reported the 15th April meeting of Golata and officers of his staff with high-ranking military personnel of the fifth region, at which time there was an exchange of token gifts. On 16 April the chief of the military region, Cdr. Mohamed Abdelghani, accompanied by a number of his staff officers, visited the Soviet squadron and toured the cruiser *Murmansk* and three other ships. There is no mention of meetings between Soviet naval officers and Algerian political or military elites at the national level. Upon departure, Commander Abdelghani received a 17-gun salute.<sup>6</sup>

*8-13 May 1970.* In May 1970 the Soviets paid their first official visit to Algiers. On 8 May *el-Moudjahid* announced the arrival of four ships under the command of Vice Admiral Leonenkov. In a nearly identical notice published 9 May, *el-Moudjahid* announced in-port activities, including a reception by civil and military authorities and the customary wreath-laying ceremony at El-Alia cemetery. Thus, it was not until four years after the initial combatant visit to Algeria that the U.S.S.R. conducted its first official visit to the Algerian capital.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*El-Moudjahid*, 10 Nov 1966, p. 10; 13-14 Nov 1966, p. 3; and 15 Nov 1966, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>Radio Algiers in French, 2200 GMT, 15 Aug 1967, in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, pt. IV, 18 Aug 1967, p. A-6.

<sup>3</sup>*El-Moudjahid*, 16 Aug 1967, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 16 Sep 1967, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 16 Apr 1969, p. 3; 19 Apr 1969, p. 4.

<sup>7</sup>By comparison, in Egypt the time lag was less than one year from a friendly visit to Port Said (September 1965) to an official visit to Alexandria (August 1966).

Given the grand scale of Soviet press treatment of maneuver Okean, it is interesting to note that *el-Moudjahid* made no mention that these ships were part of the maneuvers.

*16-21 April 1974.* On 16 April 1974 *el-Moudjahid* announced an official friendly visit of a Soviet warship squadron to Algiers. The next day, *el-Moudjahid* carried a follow-up story with a standard description of receptions of and for high-ranking military and local Algerian dignitaries. But in addition, this article included a short discussion of the ships' specifications: displacement, complement of men, speed, and home fleet of each vessel. This is the first observed statistical account of visiting Soviet combatants. The diplomatic importance of this, the first official naval visit to Algiers in four years, is underscored by the fact that the three SovMedFlt units involved were commanded by a rear admiral, V. I. Akomov.<sup>1</sup>

### CONCLUSION

The lack of press coverage of visits since 1969 that were not official coincides with the escalation in Algerian support for mutual superpower naval withdrawals from the Mediterranean,<sup>2</sup> as well as with the routinization of Soviet naval visits to Algerian ports. Of the five visits covered in the Algerian press that were not official, all occurred before 1970. Four of these visits were to the port of Algiers and the fifth was the first Soviet warship visit to the port of Annaba. Soviet warships, including submarines, have regularly visited Annaba, site of the former French naval base of Mers-el-Kebir, since 1971. (None of these visits has received press mention.) Visits of warships to Algiers and Oran are comparatively less frequent. Since the Algerian government is outspoken on the issue of a mutual superpower naval standdown in the Mediterranean, it is logical that their policy would be to play down close cooperation with the U.S.S.R. on port utilization.

<sup>1</sup>Moscow TASS in English, 1852 GMT, 14 Apr 1974.

<sup>2</sup>The author is indebted to her colleague Mr. George S. Dragnich for providing data on reactions of Mediterranean coast states to superpower naval activity in the region. Algeria first explicitly called for the withdrawal of all foreign naval forces from the Mediterranean in December 1969.

## MOROCCO

The Soviet navy paid nine combatant visits to Moroccan ports during 1968-73 (see table 6). Between 1971 and 1973 there was a significant increase in warship visits – from none in 1971 to three each in 1972 and 1973. Press sources for all nine visits were examined. Only four visits – three to Casablanca and one to Safi – were covered by the Moroccan press examined. These four included the first visit (15-20 October 1968), the 6-11 May 1970 visit, the 20-25 April 1972 visit, and the 25 September to 1 October 1972 visit to Safi. As seen in table 7, three of the four visits covered were official visits, and the fourth (May 1970) was a special operations visit held in conjunction with maneuver Okean. The May 1970 visit was the sole visit reported by the Moroccan press that was not official. The remaining five visits, to Safi and Tangier, were not reported in the press examined.<sup>1</sup> None of these five was an official visit.

TABLE 6

### INCIDENCE OF VISITS AND PRESS COVERAGE – MOROCCO

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of visits</u>	<u>No. examined</u>	<u>No. covered</u>
1968	1	1	1
1969	1	1	0
1970	1	1	1
1971	0	—	—
1972	3	3	2
1973	3	3	0
Total	9	9	4

TABLE 7

### NUMBER AND LENGTH OF ARTICLES ON VISITS COVERED – MOROCCO

<u>Visits covered</u>	<u>No. of notices<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>Total column-inches</u>
15-20 Oct 1968 <sup>b</sup>	n.a. <sup>c</sup>	n.a.
6-11 May 1970	2	30.5
20-25 Apr 1972 <sup>b</sup>	1 <sup>d</sup>	33
25 Sep to 1 Oct 1972 <sup>b</sup>	n.a. <sup>c</sup>	n.a.

<sup>a</sup>Le Petit Marocain unless otherwise noted with text.

<sup>b</sup>Official visit.

<sup>c</sup>Information used was taken from a secondary report of coverage.

<sup>d</sup>Notice published in L'Opinion.

<sup>1</sup>The Soviets paid three warship visits to Morocco in 1973. None of these was reported in the press examined. This dearth of publicity is interesting in view of the Soviet navy sealift of Moroccan troops to Syria prior to the October War. *Washington Post*, 22 Apr 1973, p. A6.

## PRESS COVERAGE OF FIRST OFFICIAL NAVAL VISIT, OCTOBER 1968

The first official Soviet combatant visit to Morocco was made during 15-20 October 1968 to the port of Casablanca (see table 7).<sup>1</sup> Domestic press sources for this visit were unavailable, but other sources indicate that the visit received routine coverage<sup>2</sup> in *Le Petit Marocain* and the Casablanca daily *La Vigie*.<sup>3</sup>

The squadron of five ships – a guided-missile cruiser, a guided-missile destroyer, two submarines and an oiler – was commanded by Vice Adm. Boris Petrov. In-port activities included courtesy calls on Moroccan defense minister General Mezian and deputy chief of general staff of the armed forces General Drissa. There was a wreath-laying ceremony at the mausoleum of King Mohammad V. A reception given by Admiral Petrov on board the cruiser *Groznyy* was attended by provincial authorities including ranking representatives of the Casablanca municipal council and foreign diplomatic representatives. It is significant that neither the port governor nor the governor of Casablanca prefecture attended the principal Soviet reception, which suggests that the Moroccan government sought to downplay the visit. The ships were open to the public, but local authorities discouraged visits. Soviet requests for an open-air downtown band concert, a program of ship visits by local school children, and other activities which appeared of potential propaganda value were rejected. Further, port authorities, through procedural red tape, prevented most Moroccans from visiting the Soviet ships. This indicates that the government took a correct but decidedly cool approach to the visit, which received far less ballyhoo than the Soviets desired.

## PRESS COVERAGE OF SUBSEQUENT PORT VISITS

6-11 May 1970. In 1970, the Soviets paid a single naval visit to Casablanca. On 7 May, *Le Petit Marocain* reported the "technical" (presumably business) visit of three Soviet naval vessels – a guided-missile destroyer, a destroyer and an oiler. In total, the visit received only two notices in this newspaper, totaling 30.5 column-inches, including a 10-column-inch photograph.

The commanding officer of the Soviet squadron was Capt. V. Zoub. The main in-port activities consisted of receptions given by city and local authorities and officials of the military district. During one of the receptions Captain Zoub exchanged gifts with the governor of the maritime administration. Maritime and city officials and members of the admiralty visited the destroyer, but the ships were not open to the general public. The press noted that the ships had participated in major maneuvers of the Soviet fleet in the Atlantic Ocean prior to the port visit.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This was the first Soviet combatant visit of any type.

<sup>2</sup>"Routine coverage" is basic news reporting (dates, places, persons involved, etc.), with no editorial comments or feature articles.

<sup>3</sup>Moscow TASS International Service in English, 0831 GMT, 15 Oct 1968, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) *Daily Report, Middle East & Africa*, 15 Oct 1968, p. T1. *L'Opinion* noted on 22 October that port authorities had refused to allow Moroccans to board the Russian ships. The Moroccan government had scheduled the Soviet visit to end two days before the visit of the king and queen of Belgium and two days before the visit of a Belgian naval unit. These upcoming visits dominated the local press while the Soviets were in port.

<sup>4</sup>*Le Petit Marocain*, 7 May 1970, p. 5.

In reporting the Okean maneuvers, in conjunction with a port visit, Morocco was unique among the countries studied. Moscow, announcing the "Soviet sailors' friendly visit" to Morocco, commented that the visit occurred following the completion of the ocean [Okean] naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean.<sup>1</sup>

20-25 April 1972. The second official Soviet naval visit was practically identical in format to the first one four years earlier. In April 1972, four Soviet vessels visited Casablanca. This visit, listed by the Soviets as an "official, friendly" visit, received coverage in *L'Opinion*, in an article of 33 column-inches, 18 of which were in the form of a photograph. The text reports the squadron as including a guided-missile destroyer, a submarine, an escort, and an oiler. Ship pendant numbers were included in the article. The squadron was commanded by Capt. (1st Rank) I. M. Kapitanets. The captain is reported to have described the purpose of the visit as consolidation of "the amicable relations between the two countries."<sup>2</sup>

In-port activities included a luncheon given by the Soviet ambassador to Morocco and a reception given by the Moroccan navy. The captain held a reception on board the destroyer for national dignitaries. Guests included Mohammad Aziz, deputy commander of the Moroccan navy and of the general staff of the Moroccan armed forces, and national defense minister Gen. Mohammad Qufkir. The ships were opened to the public and the local Soviet community for a five-hour period. A TASS report set the turnout at 4,500 persons<sup>3</sup> (the Moroccan press did not comment on attendance).

25 September to 1 October 1972. The first visit of a Soviet combatant to Safi - 25 September to 1 October 1972 - was reported in *Le Matin* but not *L'Opinion*. *Le Matin* reported the "courtesy visit" of a solitary guided-missile destroyer in a one-paragraph article. In-port activities included a short period of shore leave and a reception held in honor of the ship's captain and officers by the provincial governor.

#### COMPARATIVE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET VISITS

The May 1970 visit received two notices totaling 30.5 column-inches. The April 1972 visit received one notice of 33 column-inches.

These statistics gain significance when compared with the depth of coverage of naval visits by other countries. The April 1971 visit of the French helicopter carrier *Jeanne D'Arc* received wide coverage (231 column-inches, 90.25 column-inches of photographs) over 13 days. The March 1971 operational visit of the U.S.S. *Springfield* with ComSixthFlt Adm. Isaac Kidd aboard received a total of 87 column-inches, including 34 column-inches of photographs. The April 1971 visit of the Italian destroyer escort *La Carabiniere* received a total of 112 column-inches (35.5 column-inches

<sup>1</sup>Moscow in Arabic to the Arab world, 1700 GMT, 12 May 1970, in *FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union*, 13 May 1970, p. A34.

<sup>2</sup>*L'Opinion*, 25 Apr 1972, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup>Moscow TASS International Service in English, 1208 GMT, 25 Apr 1972.

of photographs). The May 1971 visit of the Iranian destroyer L.I.S. *Artemiz* received 46 column-inches of coverage (18 column-inches of photographs). Even the August 1971 visit of the Argentine cruiser *La Argentina* received 43 column-inches of coverage (including 25 column-inches of photographs). Both the May 1970 and the April 1972 Soviet visits received less coverage than did any of these other naval visits during the same period. Table 8 shows the comparative coverage of the French, U.S., Italian, Iranian, Argentine, and Soviet visits.

**TABLE 8**  
**COMPARATIVE COVERAGE OF SOVIET AND NON-SOVIET VISITS**  
(As reported in *Le Petit Marocain*)

<u>Visit</u>	<u>Length of visit (days)</u>	<u>No. of notices (days)</u>	<u>Total column-inches</u>
Soviet navy vessels (4) May 1970	5	2	30.5
U.S.S. <i>Springfield</i> Mar 1971	6	5	87
French helicopter carrier <i>Jeanne D'Arc</i> Apr 1971	7	10	231
Italian escort <i>La Carabiniere</i> Apr 1971	4	4	112
Iranian destroyer L.I.S. <i>Artemiz</i> May 1971	6	1	46
Argentine cruiser <i>La Argentina</i> Aug 1971	3	1	43
Soviet navy vessels (4) Apr 1972	1	1	33

## CONCLUSION

A trend in Moroccan official views on foreign naval activities in the Mediterranean is not easily discernible. While Rabat has on occasion called for mutual U.S. and U.S.S.R. naval withdrawals from the Mediterranean, it has not mounted a steady campaign as Algeria has. This may be due to geographical location; Morocco more properly belongs to the Atlantic than to the Mediterranean, given her coastline and location of major ports. Thus, Morocco's low-key approach to Soviet naval visits probably does not reflect special concern for great power naval rivalry in the Mediterranean but rather a need to express solidarity with her neighbors. It would seem from the greater press welcome accorded the Western navies that Morocco is signaling a one-sided policy favoring a Western naval presence in proximity to its shores.

## IRAQ

During 1968-73, the Soviet navy paid 14 warships visits to Iraqi ports. The Iraqi press covered six of these visits (see table 9). Of the three visits covered which were not official, all occurred before 1971 (see table 10). Press sources for the 11-19 May 1968, 8-10 December and 18-24 December 1973 visits were not obtainable; the first and last mentioned visits are known to have been reported. Certain information concerning 1968 and 1973 visits was available through other, including Iraqi, sources, and this information was used.

**TABLE 9**  
**INCIDENCE OF VISITS AND PRESS COVERAGE – IRAQ**

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of visits</u>	<u>No. examined</u>	<u>No. covered</u>
1968	1	0	a
1969	3	3	2
1970	1	1	1
1971	1	1	0
1972	2	2	1
1973	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>a</u>
Total	14	11	6

<sup>a</sup>The Soviet visits in May 1968 and 18-24 December 1973 were reported in the domestic press, but this press was not available for examination. None of the other five visits in 1973 was covered.

**TABLE 10**  
**NUMBER AND LENGTH OF ARTICLES ON VISITS COVERED – IRAQ**

<u>Visits covered</u>	<u>No. of notices</u>	<u>Total column-inches</u>
11-19 May 1968 <sup>a</sup>	n.a. <sup>b</sup>	n.a.
15-18 Feb 1969	1	8.75
14-19 Jun 1969	1	5
27-31 May 1970	2	18
11-16 Apr 1972 <sup>a</sup>	2	12.5
18-24 Dec 1973 <sup>a</sup>	n.a. <sup>b</sup>	n.a.

<sup>a</sup>Official visits.

<sup>b</sup>Newspapers are not available for examination. Information used was taken from secondary sources (as cited).

### PRESS COVERAGE OF FIRST OFFICIAL NAVAL VISIT, MAY 1968

The Soviets' first official naval visit to Iraq came in May 1968 (see table 10). The Iraqi newspaper *al-Manar* announced the upcoming visit on 21 April, saying that the Soviet squadron

would include "rocket-launching destroyers."<sup>1</sup> The squadron of two warships (a guided-missile destroyer and a cruiser) and one support vessel arrived in Umm Qasr 11 May for an eight-day visit. (This was part of the same squadron that visited Somalia in April 1968, and these visits were part of the first Soviet goodwill combatant cruise in the Indian Ocean.) The commanding officer, Rear Admiral Khovrin,<sup>2</sup> and his senior officers met with minister of state and acting defense minister Maj. Gen. Hammudi Mahdi and army chief of staff Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Faysal al-Ansari. The admiral was received by President Abd-ar-Rahman Arif. The ships were visited by the commander of the Iraqi naval forces, the governor of Basra and the director general of Iraqi ports and were open to the public for a short period. There was no report of the number of visitors to the ships.<sup>3</sup>

In his reported statements Admiral Khovrin pledged Soviet support for the just struggle against Zionism. He further stated that the Soviet Union is working for world peace and seeks sincere friendship with no ambitions attached.<sup>4</sup>

Sources indicate the press afforded the visit continuing and favorable coverage. In an editorial statement, *ath-Thawrah* (official organ of the ruling Arab Socialist Union) reported that the visit "represents a political action of extreme importance on the domestic, Arab, and international levels." The editorial attributes special significance to the visit "in view of the British decision to withdraw militarily from the Arab Gulf before the end of 1971."<sup>5</sup> The domestic press further compared the Soviet visits with U.S. warship visits, which were described as "carrying out espionage, instigating aggression, and suppressing peoples fighting against imperialism." The press editorially expressed the hope that comprehensive Soviet-Arab cooperation would continue.<sup>6</sup>

#### PRESS COVERAGE OF SUBSEQUENT PORT VISITS

1969. In 1969, the Soviets paid three warship visits to Iraq. Two of these were reported in the local press. The February 1969 unofficial visit of a guided-missile cruiser and a destroyer received one news article 8.75 column-inches long. *Al-Jumhuriya* reported that the fleet was welcomed by the provincial governor, the director general of the Iraqi port authority, and the commanding general of the Iraqi naval forces.<sup>7</sup> The ships were visited by provincial officials, labor representatives and representatives of the National Student Union. At one point during on-board ceremonies, the squadron commander, Lt. Col. (sic) Igor Astilov, asserted that the Soviet Union sided with the Arab countries in their just position on the question of Palestine.

<sup>1</sup>Moscow TASS International Service in English, 2146 GMT, 12 May 1968.

<sup>2</sup>Then deputy commander, Soviet Pacific fleet; now commander in chief, Black Sea fleet.

<sup>3</sup>A TASS report published in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 19 May 1968, indicated that hundreds of Iraqi workers, peasants and students visited the ships daily.

<sup>4</sup>The tenor of these statements is consistent with the observed pattern in the statements made during the Soviet naval port visits. In client states the struggle against Zionism is a main theme.

<sup>5</sup>Beirut RNS in Arabic, 1600 GMT, 17 May 1968.

<sup>6</sup>Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 1722 GMT, 20 May 1968.

<sup>7</sup>*Al-Jumhuriya*, 17 Feb 1969, p. 4.

The second 1969 visit reported by the press occurred in June and was made by a guided-missile destroyer and an oceanographic research vessel. *Al-Jumhuriya* carried one, five-column-inch article describing the visit as "friendly."<sup>1</sup> Those present at a reception in the port hall included the commander of Iraqi naval forces and the director general of the Iraqi port authority, it was reported.

27-31 May 1970. The sole Soviet naval visit to Iraq in 1970 (27-31 May) was covered by the domestic press. *Al-Jumhuriya* carried news articles on 20 and 30 May (of six and 12 column-inches, respectively). The commander of the naval units, Capt. Igor Voronokov, met with local dignitaries and high-ranking Iraqi naval officers. On at least two occasions, the captain stated that the people of the Soviet Union supported the Arab people's struggle against Israel and imperialism. Statements made by Iraqi officials asserted the Iraqi government's intentions of strengthening relations between the two countries. The governor of Basra, the director general of the Iraqi port authority, and other officials visited the ships. Interestingly, the Iraqi press did not report that this visit was part of maneuver Okean.

11-16 April 1972. In 1972, two Soviet warship visits occurred. One, 11-16 April, was reported in *al-Jumhuriya*.<sup>2</sup> This visit, described as "friendly" by *al-Jumhuriya* and as official by the Soviet Union,<sup>3</sup> followed by one day the departure from Iraq of Premier Alexey Kosygin and a high-ranking delegation of economic and military specialists. Their visit, at the invitation of President Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr, coincided with the initiation of direct national oil production from the northern, ar-Rumahlah fields,<sup>4</sup> which Soviet aid helped to develop, and also with the 25th anniversary of the socialist Ba'th party. On 9 April, a Soviet-Iraqi treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed. It was in this environment that on 11 April the Soviet naval units entered the port of Umm Qasr.

As in the earlier visits, the in-port activities began with a welcoming ceremony — here attended by the commander of Iraqi naval forces, representatives of the Ba'th party of Basra, and the Soviet military attache in Baghdad and consul in Basra. In remarks following a meeting with the governor of Basra, the Soviet commander confirmed "the profound friendship between the people of Iraq and the Soviets, and its development in remarkable form since the 17 July revolution." The Soviet officer praised the revolutionary government's efforts to exploit the Iraqi natural resources.<sup>5</sup>

The port visit, while receiving favorable notice, was not highlighted in the press. This is particularly interesting in view of the fact that other Middle Eastern newspapers published comments on the visit's import. *L'Opinion* published a front-page notice of the visit on 22 April.

<sup>1</sup>*Al-Jumhuriya*, 15 Jun 1969, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>On 11 April *al-Jumhuriya* published a four-column-inch article (p. 2) announcing the Soviet arrival. The following day it carried a nine-column-inch article (p. 3) reporting in-port activities.

<sup>3</sup>Tarkhanov, I., Col. of Justice, and Ovanesov, Captain (1st Rank), "Naval Representatives of the Soviet Union," table II, *Morskoi sbornik*, no. 7, 1974.

<sup>4</sup>The Iraqi government nationalized the oil industry one month before this visit.

<sup>5</sup>*Al-Jumhuriya*, 12 Apr 1972, p. 3.

The article observes American dissatisfaction with the visit, which is reported to be the first penetration of Soviet warships in the Persian Gulf since the withdrawal of British forces the previous December.<sup>1</sup>

18-24 December 1973. Of the six combatant visits in 1973,<sup>2</sup> only one was publicized. However, press sources were not available for this visit, which occurred 18-24 December. Some information concerning the visit was available from Soviet sources. The three-vessel squadron, commanded by Capt. V. Aseyev, entered the port of Umm Qasr on what TASS labeled an official friendly visit.<sup>3</sup> The visit could also be seen as a counter to the just completed annual CENTO naval exercise which took place in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea.

<sup>1</sup>The account is, of course, inaccurate. Soviet warships visited Iraq initially in 1968. This report would appear to be more an expression of Moroccan perceptions of U.S. attitudes than an actual U.S. position on the visit.

<sup>2</sup>The 3-12 April 1973 visit of four Soviet naval vessels to Umm Qasr went unreported in *al-Jumhuriya*. However, it was noted in at least one other Middle Eastern country. The Beirut daily, *an-Nahar*, reported on 6 April hints of visits by four Soviet ships in Iraq. The visit coincided with the 2-11 April visit of Adm. Sergey Gorshkov, commander-in-chief of the Soviet navy, and a high-ranking military delegation to Baghdad during the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border dispute. Admiral Gorshkov's visit, also coincidental with the first anniversary of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty of friendship and cooperation, received banner headlines and extensive coverage over a 10-day period (*al-Jumhuriya*, 2, 4, 5-10, 12 Apr 1973). The lack of press reference to the visiting Soviet ships is particularly glaring since Gorshkov visited the ports of Basra and Umm Qasr (Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic, 1900 GMT, 7 Apr 1973) in at least one of which Soviet naval units were present during his visit.

<sup>3</sup>Moscow TASS International Service in English, 1134 GMT, 18 Dec 1973.

## SOMALIA

From 1968 through 1973, the Soviets made 36 naval visits to Somali ports. Sources were examined for all visits through 1972, a total of 24 visits. Of these, only five received coverage in the domestic press (see table 11). There were no press sources available for the 12 visits of 1973. However, it is probable that only one of these, 15-20 March, received any domestic press notice.<sup>1</sup>

**TABLE 11**

### INCIDENCE OF VISITS AND PRESS COVERAGE – SOMALIA

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of visits</u>	<u>No. examined</u>	<u>No. covered</u>
1968	1	1	1
1969	5 <sup>a</sup>	5	3
1970	3	3	1
1971	6	6	0
1972	9	9	0
1973	12	0	<u>n.a.<sup>b</sup></u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>5</b>

<sup>a</sup>Three of these five visits were undertaken by a single Soviet squadron moving between three Somali ports in December. The two other December visits were not covered in the domestic press examined.

<sup>b</sup>Secondary sources indicate that the Somali press did cover at least one Soviet combatant visit in 1973; however, the 1973 press was not available for examination.

During 1971-73 a total of 27 warship visits were made (largely resulting from the Soviet acquisition of naval port facilities at Berbera during this period). Only the March 1973 visit to Mogadiscio, an official visit, received mention. Indeed, as seen in table 3, during the whole period from 1968 through 1973, visits that were not official received no press coverage, while every official visit did.

#### **PRESS COVERAGE OF FIRST OFFICIAL NAVAL VISIT, APRIL 1968**

The first Soviet warship visit to Somalia began on 17 April 1968 (see table 12). The three-unit squadron of the Soviet Pacific Fleet entered the port of Mogadiscio on an eight-day official goodwill visit. (This was part of the same squadron that visited Iraq in May 1968, and these visits were part of the first Soviet goodwill combatant cruise in the Indian Ocean.) This visit

<sup>1</sup>The probability of this is supported by the absence of any domestic press coverage during the preceding two years. More importantly, in every instance prior to 1973, when a port visit received domestic coverage – press or broadcast – the FBIS *Daily Report* made note of it. Since 11 of the 12 1973 visits received no FBIS notice, it is unlikely that any of the 11 received Somali press coverage. FBIS *Daily Report*, *Soviet Union*, on 14, 16 and 20 March printed Somali radio reports of the March 1973 port visit.

TABLE 12

NUMBER AND LENGTH OF ARTICLES ON VISITS COVERED - SOMALIA

<u>Visits covered</u>	<u>No. of notices<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>Total column-inches</u>
17-25 Apr 1968 <sup>b</sup>	6	163
1-12 <sup>c</sup> Dec 1968 <sup>b</sup>	6	126.26
17 Apr to 6 May 1970 <sup>b</sup>	1	26.5
15-20 Mar 1973 <sup>b</sup>	n.a. <sup>d</sup>	n.a.

<sup>a</sup>Notice and column-inch statistics were compiled from *Sawt as-Somal*, *Oktuber Star*, and *Najmet Oktuber* (as cited).

<sup>b</sup>Official visits.

<sup>c</sup>Three December 1968 visits are considered here as one visit.

<sup>d</sup>Newspapers are not available for examination. Information used was taken from secondary sources (as cited).

received wide coverage in *Sawt as-Somal* (163 column-inches) over a nine-day period.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet squadron, decorated with the Order of the Red Banner, and under the command of Rear Adm. Nikolay Khovrin, fired a 21-gun salute as it entered port. The squadron was welcomed by a Somali delegation composed of the vice president of the General Assembly, the ministers of defense, transportation and communication, justice, and religious affairs, the commander of the police force and numerous senior government officials. The party toured the cruiser.<sup>2</sup>

During the on-board reception, Admiral Khovrin emphasized the deep friendship between the two countries, saying that the warships had come 9,000 miles to undertake a friendly visit to the Republic of Somalia. He also spoke briefly of the operational ability of the cruiser - asserting its self-contained capacity to operate in any weather with great success.

In-port activities included shore leave for the crew. The warm reception they apparently received was the subject of several remarks by Admiral Khovrin. In an interview with the Somali News Agency he stated that the crew was delighted by the manner in which they had been received and the genuine spirit of affection from the Somali people. In an editorial article on 25 April, *Sawt as-Somal* reports, "We witnessed the Soviet sailors and their commanding officers to be a special group - and what characterized their visit to the city was propriety, decorum, and respect for the citizens." The crew also attended National Theater performances, and participated in two soccer games and other sporting events with police and army teams. The ships were open to the public on 20 April and *Sawt as-Somal* reports that over 1,000 people appeared. This visit was, at least on the surface, a model Soviet port visit, enthusiastically reported by the public press.

<sup>1</sup>*Sawt as-Somal*, 18 Apr 1968, p. 4; 21 Apr 1968, pp. 1, 3; 24 Apr 1968, p. 1; 25 Apr 1968, p. 2; 26 Apr 1968, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 21 Apr 1968, p. 1.

## PRESS COVERAGE OF SUBSEQUENT PORT VISITS

*1-12 December 1969.* The second warship visit to receive domestic press coverage occurred in December 1969, less than two months after a coup d'etat which replaced a pro-U.S. government with leaders from the Soviet-trained national army. On 1 December, four ships entered the port of Berbera for a period of two days. It is interesting to note that in the initial announcement of the visit, it was stated that the visit was in accordance with "previous agreements," which indicates that the Soviets were quick to seize upon the opportunities of the recent change of government.

Then on 7 December, after being joined by an oiler, the units moved to Mogadiscio and to Chisimao. Once again, Admiral Khovrin commanded the squadron, which included a guided-missile cruiser and a guided-missile destroyer.

*Oktuber Star* followed the visit closely, although no mention is made of the destroyer's visit to Chisimao.<sup>1</sup>

On 7 December, the day of his arrival in Mogadiscio, Admiral Khovrin, accompanied by the Soviet ambassador, paid a courtesy call on the president of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, Maj. Gen. Muhammad Siad Barre, and token gifts were exchanged. On 8 December *Oktuber Star* carried a front-page editorial welcoming the Soviets and expressing the belief that the visit would contribute to further consolidation of friendly ties between the two countries. A 10 December editorial recalls Soviet assistance for "national liberation from racist and colonialist regimes and for the struggle against Israel." On 10 December the newspaper also carried an article announcing the arrival of a large Soviet delegation to begin negotiations for an agreement on economic-technical cooperation.<sup>2</sup>

In-port activities included a football game, a wreath-laying ceremony attended by the highest-ranking national officers, and a farewell reception attended by the vice president of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, Maj. Gen. Jama' Ali Khorshel. This visit was undoubtedly a pointed display of support for the new, radical Somali leaders.

*17 April to 6 May 1970.* Four months later, when the Soviet navy returned (17 April 1970), the visit received one article in *Najmat Oktuber*.<sup>3</sup> Two warships, commanded by Capt. V. Korostelov, arrived in Mogadiscio on what was described in the press as a "friendly" visit. It should be noted that this visit coincided with Somali charges that they were about to be invaded by Ethiopia. In fact, the government was threatened by internal dissidents, attempting a coup.<sup>4</sup> The Soviet navy probably remained in port to bolster the Siad Barre regime and forestall its overthrow.

Once again, in-port activities included a sporting event between the crew and an army team. The Soviet ambassador accompanied the ships' crews to a reception given by Major General

<sup>1</sup>*Oktuber Star*, 2 Dec 1969, p. 1; 4 Dec, p. 4; 8 Dec, p. 1; 10 Dec, pp. 3-4; 13 Dec, pp. 2-4; 14 Dec, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 10 Dec 1969, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup>*Najmat Oktuber*, 17 Apr 1970, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup>See James M. McConnell, "The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean," CNA Professional Paper 77, Aug 1971, p. 11.

Khorshel. The crew also met with the president of the Supreme Revolutionary Council and numerous other high-ranking national officials. The level of contact indicates that this visit was of more import than a "friendly visit." Diplomatic contact at the national level is usually reserved for official visits, and the crisis environment in Mogadiscio at the time also suggests that more than a routine visit was occurring.<sup>1</sup>

*15-20 March 1973.* After 1970, the only visit that is believed to have been covered in the Somali press was the 15-20 March 1973 visit of a cruiser and minesweeper to Mogadiscio.<sup>2</sup> The squadron, on an "official friendly visit,"<sup>3</sup> was under the command of Rear Admiral Kruglyakov. Activities included an on-board reception for high-ranking officials and all foreign ambassadors in Somalia. This was the first time that the Western diplomatic corps had attended receptions aboard a Soviet ship visiting the countries examined in this paper.

#### DEPTH OF SOMALI PRESS COVERAGE OF SOVIET NAVAL VISITS

Of those visits reported since 1968, intensity of coverage has decreased as well as occurrence (see table 12). The first visit, in April 1968, received coverage on six days over a nine-day period, totaling 163 column-inches. The second group<sup>4</sup> of post-coup visits, received coverage on six days over a 12-day period, totaling 125 column-inches. This rather intense coverage for a subsequent visit is perhaps the result of the Somali government's desire to take advantage of Soviet support and Soviet-Somali friendship following the government shakeup. A second visit in a stable period would probably have been less publicized, as in other countries examined. The 16 April to 6 May 1970 visit received a single notice of 26.5 column-inches. This visit may have been treated in such low-key fashion because of the crisis atmosphere prevailing in Mogadiscio at the time. Too open a reliance on foreign support might have hurt the Siad Barre regime more than it would have helped at that point.<sup>5</sup> It would be surprising if the 15-20 March 1973 visit to Mogadiscio, for which source data is unavailable, received more than nominal domestic press coverage.

<sup>1</sup>This is further supported by the fact that the 25 April to 6 May 1970 visit of two Soviet warships to Berbera - concurrent with the naval visit to Mogadiscio - received no press coverage.

<sup>2</sup>Mogadiscio Domestic Service in Swahili, 1500 GMT, 16 Mar 1973, and Mogadiscio Domestic Service in Somali, 1400 GMT, 18 Mar 1973.

<sup>3</sup>Tarkhanov and Ovanesov, op. cit.

<sup>4</sup>Three visits during 1-12 December 1969 are considered here as one visit.

<sup>5</sup>This may also account for the fact that the 25 April to 6 May 1970 naval visit to Berbera received no publicity.

## COMPARISON OF CLIENT AND NON-CLIENT PRESS COVERAGE

### PRESS COVERAGE

One way to compare press coverage of Soviet port visits by client and non-client states is to examine the total number of visits covered in the press as a percentage of the total number of visits which occurred. One might assume that client states would cover more visits and give greater depth of coverage per visit covered, than would non-client states. However, when the comparison is made, this assumption is not borne out (see figure 1). In each country coverage drops off sharply after the first few visits. In total, all states appear to cover port visits at about the same rate, regardless of respective client/non-client relationship to the Soviet Union.




FIG. 1: SOVIET PORT VISITS COVERED IN DOMESTIC PRESS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PORT VISITS, BY COUNTRY

## TREATMENT OF FIRST VISITS

### Non-Clients

Examination of initial combatant port visits to Algeria and Morocco shows that in both cases the visits were played down in the national press, receiving almost no national publicity in Algeria and only routine coverage in port city newspapers in Morocco. Further, the Soviets' reception was decidedly cool and lacked the participation of national level leaders. In short, coverage of initial visits reflects a government desire to play down the import of Soviet visits.<sup>1</sup>

In further support of this, it is interesting to note that in May 1966, less than one month after the first Soviet naval combatant visit to Algeria, three Soviet oceanographic research vessels visited Algiers. This visit was accorded sympathetic coverage in *el-Moudjahid*. Coverage included discussion of ships' specifications, mission, and capabilities and notice of receptions and crews' shore leave.

Similarly, in July 1968, two months prior to the first Soviet warship visit to Morocco, a Soviet merchant marine training vessel, *Tovarich*, made a visit to the port of Tangier. The local press attended a press conference given by the ship's captain. Then, on 12 August 1968, a Soviet vessel, described in the local press as a scientific research vessel of the Moscow Academy of Sciences, arrived in Casablanca for a 10 to 14 day visit. These two visits together could be interpreted to represent an orchestrated effort to prepare to Moroccan population for the first combatant visit, which occurred in October. In any event, there is a strong contrast in press reaction between Soviet combatant and non-combatant visits to Morocco and Algeria.

### Clients

Initial combatant visits in Iraq and Somalia stand in sharp contrast.<sup>2</sup> In Iraq, press coverage of the first visit was continuous and favorable. The presence of numerous national authorities, including the president, was noted. This was also true in Somalia, where the initial Soviet visit was greeted with enthusiastic, continuous press reportage and the Soviet visitors were met and entertained at the highest levels of government. Soviet interaction with the populace differed widely from that in Algeria and Morocco. In Iraq, activities during the Soviets' first visit included large public receptions on board the ships, and in Somalia, they included sports events, newspaper interviews, and ship tours.<sup>3</sup> In general, it can be said the official visits receive greater and more favorable treatment in client states.

<sup>1</sup>As in the cases of Algeria and Morocco, official reaction to the initial Soviet combatant visit to Tunisia (27-31 May 1974) was low-keyed. Press coverage is reported to have been "modest but complete." The usual courtesy calls occurred, the Soviet sailors were granted shore leave, a Tunisian navy soccer team defeated the ship's team, and receptions were held aboard ship and at the Soviet ambassador's residence. Official visitors to the ship included Foreign Minister Chatti. A Soviet request to arrange a parade through downtown Tunis was denied as a result of opposition by the Tunisian military.

<sup>2</sup>This contrast is also observable in Syrian press treatment of the initial Soviet combatant visit (21-30 September 1967). This visit was accorded continuing sympathetic coverage in the Syrian press. The Aleppo newspaper *as-Shaab* carried articles on 21 September (six column-inches), 23 September (18 column-inches), 26 September (12 column-inches), 27 September (eight column-inches), and 30 September (28 column-inches). Press coverage of the visit totaled 72 column-inches over the nine-day period.

<sup>3</sup>In Syria, in-port activities during the initial combatant visit (21-30 September 1967) included basketball and soccer contests, in addition to receptions and luncheons. See *as-Shaab*, 23 Sep, p. 1; 26 Sep, p. 2; 27 Sep, p. 4; and 30 Sep, p. 2.

## **POLITIZATION OF VISITS**

The Soviets were more open in Iraqi and Somali ports, interacted more widely with the population and made policy statements in support of specific, rather than general, foreign policy objectives. In Somalia and Iraq, Soviet naval officers talked about "national liberation" and the Arab-Israeli dispute, while statements made in Morocco and Algeria dealt in terms of "friendship, understanding, cooperation," etc.<sup>1</sup>

## **CONCLUSION**

These differences may not just reflect political orientation vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. and varying attitudes toward a Soviet naval presence. They may also reflect the relatively greater political sophistication and level of economic development of the two Mediterranean countries. At the same time, Iraq and Somalia may have had a greater need to broadcast the appearance of solidarity and friendship with the U.S.S.R., reflecting the greater reliance of these two countries on Soviet aid and cooperation.

The key here may be Algeria. If it were only a matter of varying degrees of political orientation vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R., one could reasonably expect that Somalia and Iraq would afford Soviet visits comparatively equal and the most favorable press coverage, that Moroccan press coverage would be relatively neutral, and Algerian press coverage would fall somewhere in between. In reality, two distinct groups formed. The Algerian press, like that of Morocco, afforded, at best, neutral and limited coverage to Soviet naval visits, despite the fact that, of the four countries, Algeria ranks first in number of known port visits by the Soviet Navy. This would indicate that factors other than international political alignment played an important role in determining publicity accorded the Soviet naval visits.

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<sup>1</sup>Soviet in-port statements in Tunisia and Syria followed this client/non-client pattern. In Syria, emphasis was placed on Western imperialism; in Tunisia, on friendship and mutual understanding.

## APPENDIX A

### DESCRIPTION OF NATIONAL PRESS

#### Algeria

The Algerian government owns and operates, directly or indirectly, all communications media. News material is gathered and distributed by the Algerian Press Service, the national news agency. The leading daily is the French-language *el-Moudjahid*, the official government organ, published by the Ministry of Information and Culture. *As-Shaab*, an Arabic-language daily, is published by the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN). It is the oldest independent daily. The Library of Congress retains both newspapers on a continuing basis.

#### Morocco

Government control of the press in Morocco is significant. *L'Opinion*, the French-language daily, published by the opposition Istiglal party, is often the target of government action. *Le Petit Marocain*, with a circulation of 43,000 in 1965, was an important Casablanca daily during the protectorate. The government suspended its publishing license in November 1971. The Maghrib Arab Press, the official national news agency, provides the bulk of domestic and foreign news to the various media. The Library of Congress retains *L'Opinion* on a continuing basis.

#### Tunisia

Both the French-language daily *L'Action* and the Arabic-language daily *al-Amal* are regarded as official newspapers of the ruling Destourian Socialist Party (PSD). Government control of the news is strong. The official news agency, Tunis-Afrique Presse, receives, edits, and disseminates international news. All journalists are licensed by the government. France's Agence France-Presse is the largest foreign news service, and others include Reuters, UPI, and TASS. The Library of Congress retains both newspapers.

#### Iraq

*Al-Jumhuriya* (The Republic) is one of five dailies published in Iraq by the Organization of Press and Printing under the Ministry of Culture and Guidance, and is the only Iraqi newspaper retained by the Library of Congress on a continuing basis. Although it has a daily circulation of only 25,000 (*ath-Thawrah*, the organ of the Arab Socialist Union has a circulation of 70,000), *al-Jumhuriya* is regarded as the government's spokesman and is considered the most important paper. Further, nearly 90 percent of the material appearing in any one of the five main dailies originates with the Iraqi News Agency daily bulletin of domestic and foreign news. The agency derives its domestic material from government departments. International coverage is provided by Reuters, Middle East News Agency, AP, TASS, and the New China News Agency. A shortage of newsprint causes most papers to be limited to eight pages, with 25 to 33 percent of available space used for advertisement. *Al-Jumhuriya* usually consists of 12 pages.

#### Somalia

Through 1969, *Sawt as-Somal*, the Arabic-language daily, was owned by the governing political party, the Somali Youth League. At that time it could be described as nationalist, neutralist, and moderate. *Najmat Oktober* is an Arabic-language daily published since the 1969 coup. There are no accurate circulation figures, although it is extremely unlikely that daily circulation exceeds 1,500. *Oktober Star*, an English-language newspaper, was published sporadically and ceased publication after the 1969 coup, according to most sources.

#### Syria

*Al-Baath* (The Renaissance), circulation 26,000, is one of the two largest Damascus dailies (the other being *ath-Thawrah*, circulation 20,000) and the only newspaper retained by the Library of Congress on a continuing basis. Since the Baath party takeover in 1963, newspapers have been published under the auspices of that party, affiliated organizations and various government ministries. Strict government control is the rule. There are indications that censorship regulations were eased somewhat after the takeover of Lt. Gen. Hafiz Asad in November 1970.

Information presented here compiled from *Area Handbooks* for the individual countries, prepared by the foreign area studies division of the American University, Washington, D.C. Individual volumes consulted are as follows: Algeria (1972), Morocco (1972), Tunisia (1970), Iraq (1971), Somalia (1970), and Syria (1971).