

AD-A037 528


ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
TOTAL FORCE - FACT OR RHETORIC.(U)
JAN 77 W TROESCHEL

F/G 5/9

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

| OF |
ADAO37528



END

DATE
FILMED
4-77

ADA 037528

2.51

STUDENT ESSAY

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

5 JANUARY ~~1976~~ 1977

TOTAL FORCE
FACT OR RHETORIC?

BY

COLONEL WALTER TROESCHEL, JR.
CORPS OF ENGINEERS

DDC
MAR 31 1977

CORRESPONDING COURSE

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA



AD NO. _____
DDC FILE COPY

LIBRARY
MAR 11 1977
ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) 6 Total Force - Fact or Rhetoric,		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED 9 Research Project <i>sept.</i>
7. AUTHOR(s) Troeschel, Walter, Jr., COL <i>Troeschel, Jr.</i>		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS 12 27p.
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE 11 5 Jan 77
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 21
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Department of Defense established a Total Force Policy which is producing some encouraging and positive results in the Army Reserve Components. However, some senior officials apparently perceive actions which mitigate against the credibility of statements indicating a heavy reliance on the Reserve Components for future threats. Are current efforts, or actions, lending credence to, or mitigating against this policy? What are the perceptions of senior officials with Reserve Component responsibilities? Does evidence suggest that these perceptions are illusions, or realities? To answer these questions, and determi		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

if any shortcomings exist, ten senior officials at Department of Defense, and the two principal associations concerned with Army Reserve Component matters were interviewed. Using their responses to several questions, and other published data, it was determined that after six years, problems persist with the Total Force Policy. The need for better understanding by the Department of Defense, the public and the Congress, of the Reserve Components is a primary problem. Other problems are discussed and resolutions of some are suggested.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

USAWC ESSAY


7 JAN 1977

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

TOTAL FORCE
FACT OR RHETORIC?

by

Colonel Walter Troeschel, Jr.
Engineer



US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
5 January ~~1976~~ 1977

AUTHOR: Walter Troeschel, Jr., COL, EN
TITLE: Total Force - Fact or Rhetoric?
FORMAT: Essay
DATE: 5 January 1977 PAGES: 21

Department of Defense established a Total Force Policy which is producing some encouraging and positive results in the Army Reserve Components. However, some senior officials apparently perceive actions which mitigate against the credibility of statements indicating a heavy reliance on the Reserve Components for future threats. Are current efforts, or actions, lending credence to, or mitigating against this policy? What are the perceptions of senior officials with Reserve Component responsibilities? Does evidence suggest that these perceptions are illusions, or realities? To answer these questions, and determine if any shortcomings exist, ten senior officials at Department of Defense, and the two principal associations concerned with Army Reserve Component matters were interviewed. Using their responses to several questions, and other published data, it was determined that after six years, problems persist with the Total Force Policy. The need for better understanding by the Department of Defense, the public and the Congress, of the Reserve Components is a primary problem. Other problems are discussed and resolutions of some are suggested.



TOTAL FORCE - FACT OR RHETORIC?

Events concerning the US Reserve Components during, and subsequent to the Vietnam Conflict, have caused the US Congress, the public, and numerous military leaders, to wonder about the Department of Defense "TOTAL FORCE" planning contingency in the event of hostilities. What is Total Force? Is it another administration cliché? Is it real and in being? Or is this another bureaucratic smoke screen puffing from that five sided puzzle palace on the Potomac River - The Pentagon?

BACKGROUND

In early 1971, during the 1971 Congressional appropriation hearings, Melvin R. Laird, then Secretary of Defense, explained a Total Force Concept when introducing the DOD budget. This concept presented in his statement to the House¹ and repeated at the 1972 budget hearings² was:

In defense planning, the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence emphasizes our need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of Free World Security. These Free World military and related resources -- which we call "Total Force" -- include both active and reserve components of the U.S., those of our allies, and the additional military capabilities of our allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs.

A PERCEPTION PROBLEM?

This Total Force concept received mixed reviews. Some looked at this concept as "it's about time"³, because the Reserve Components received only token mobilization requirements in the Vietnam Conflict.⁴ Others construed Total Force to mean that the Defense Department was buckling under Congressional and Public pressure "to reduce the defense budget"⁵ in order to put more dollar resources into U.S. social and environmental needs. This author criticized the U.S. failure to maximize the use of Reserve Component forces in Vietnam and related that failure to the political arena.⁶ Extensive Reserve Component use in Vietnam might be construed as total mobilization by the opposing forces resulting in a "do or die" theme, and/or "it might result in a commitment from which the U.S. would find it difficult to extricate."⁷ Obviously, the fear of escalation beyond the confines of Vietnam was very real to many. However, the U.S. policy of retaliation in stages in Vietnam resulted in the extensive use of the draft for manpower needs, while continuing to expend dollar and manpower resources to maintain considerable Reserve forces at home.⁸

This expenditure of resources to maintain uncommitted Reserve forces became economically questionable to the Congress, the Public, and both Active and Reserve military leaders. But the equipment, training facilities, and active

assistance being provided the Reserve Components, especially by the Army, left little doubt in the minds of many Reserve Component members as to their status. They knew that the Army Reserve Components were poorly equipped, and modern equipment was being withdrawn from units, or diverted to replenish combat losses in the Vietnam Conflict.⁹ Later the same situation developed during the Middle East conflict in 1973. Actions such as these, result in Total Force perception problems within the Army Reserve Components, or the feeling that they are relegated to "second class citizens" status compared to the active component.

This perception was often stressed by Reserve members. "They (DOD) say that the Reserve forces are in being to support the active forces in the event of conflict - yet, they take our equipment for newly created units manned by draftees, or they use it to satisfy foreign military sales commitments." It is ironic that the Vietnam period was the first time in U.S. history that only token Reserve force commitments were made for a major U.S. commitment. Coupling the U.S. policy of escalation, public dissatisfaction with the duration of the war, the cost in U.S. personnel and dollars, unfilled social needs, and the apparent lack of U.S. administration will to win policy -- the country faced a domestic crisis by the late 1960's.

However, the use of Reserve forces to augment/support the Active forces is not new. The "Militia" has been used during times of external political stress and conflict since this Nation was born.¹⁰ In 1948, President Truman spoke of this total force concept, when in a statement he said...

If the standing forces of the Regular establishments are to be kept small as in the tradition of the United States, the civilian Reserve must always be ready as part of the trained nucleus around which a citizen Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and Air Force can be built if the need ever arises. The Reserve and Regular forces must therefore work together in effective team work with Regular services providing the equipment, the training facilities, and the expert guidance needed by the Reserve personnel devoting their best efforts to keeping our national defense establishment in a constant state of readiness.¹¹

This statement by President Truman, and past experience, caused members of the Reserve Components to wonder about "the real intent and support of the DOD in announcing a Total Force Concept". In fact, many prominent Guardsmen and Army Reservists subsequently often referred to Total Force as "lip service"¹² or "Total Farce."¹³ It was August 1973 before James R. Schlesinger, then Secretary of Defense, actually promulgated a Total Force Policy.¹⁴

It is this three and a half year transition period from concept to policy, the often expressed and implied "lip service" comments by persons working with, or in, the Army Reserve

Components, and the knowledge of the author about the Army Reserve Components for the last twenty years, that resulted in a look at how Total Force is perceived in 1976. To determine this perception today, several senior civilian and military officials involved in Reserve Component activities within the Defense Department, and the Army Reserve/Guard Associations, were interviewed. These interviews were used to verify the comments and perceptions related above, and to determine these officials' perception of Total Force as it pertains to the Army Components today.

In establishing a common denominator, most of the ten officials interviewed were asked about their concept of Total Force. While the answers were not uniform, they were similar. Major General Pilcher, USAR, Retired, stated...

It's all the U.S. Armed Services combined into the proper mix of units, with a reliance on Reserve Component units to fill out the force necessary to meet future contingencies. It's really a reliance on limited well trained active forces with immediate dependence upon the Reserve Components for support and backup.¹⁵

General Pilcher, as well as most of the interviewed officials, also indicated some problems with this policy. A major shortfall expressed is that the lack of a viable selective service demeans the system - they believe total force must include an immediate draft capability to provide a sustaining manpower base.¹⁶ By innuendo, Major General W. Stanford Smith, Military Executive, Reserve Forces Policy

Board, Department of Defense, supported a viable selective service system by stating that "leaders are continuing to place too much reliance on the Individual Ready Reserve¹⁷ -- even the Defense Manpower Report said that some of the 30-60 day deployment goals for the Reserve Components are unrealistic."¹⁸

Major General Blakefield, a former Army Readiness Region Commander supporting Army Reserve component training, in an interview a few days before his retirement took a slightly different approach to the meaning of total force:

I don't like the phrase. It has been used indiscriminately without a total understanding of its meaning. ... -- we're all one and the same -- or team. This means we train together, and that we operate, and live together upon mobilization. It's a spirit; consequently, everyone must realize that any distinction between the military components should be erased. My earnest thoughts are that all people will accept it, not just the military. Everyone must understand what this total force policy means. It's a total commitment to a great responsibility that's just not recognized and completely understood by industry, the public, the military and Congress.¹⁹

One of the interesting aspects of these interviews was the response by officials concerning "lip service". Every one of these officials stated that at one time they felt the Reserve Components were generally getting "lip service". However, their perception today has changed significantly.

Their comments were very positive and favorable about the Department of Army; but were much less positive about the Defense Department. Major General Francis S. Greenlief, Executive Director, National Guard Association, stated that "DOD in developing the total force policy really only gave lip service, because they spent very little in resources. However, on the Army side, the farsightedness of General Abrams did provide additional resources in the STEADFAST²⁰ program -- which have made a tremendous impact on training."²¹

Major General Henry Mohr, Chief, Army Reserve, believes that lip service is still the order of the day at the higher levels of the Defense Department, principally in budgetary considerations, and that there is a lack of understanding of what it takes to make total force work.²² He still sees DOD in an acquiescence role, and that their proposals are often not in the best interests of the Reserve Components and total force. General Mohr used the DOD adverse cost initiatives in the last budget cycle as an example.²³ However, General Mohr does not believe that the Secretary of Defense is aware that his staff is giving him bad advice. Other officials, off the record, stated that they are not sure who the culprits are -- the Defense Department, or the Office of Management and Budget, or both -- for the lack of meaningful support for the Reserve Components and total force.

CONGRESS - AN UNDERSTANDING PROBLEM?

In order to focus on these perceptions, how the total force policy is working at various levels of Government was discussed to determine if the interviewed officials perceived any needs, or shortfalls in the policy. Considering Congressional supportive actions on the Reserve Component budgets for 1976, and 1977, it is not surprising that their comments about total force at the Congressional level were generally favorable. One official, in referring to adverse Reserve Component budget actions by DOD, specifically stated that "It took Congress and their feelings and understanding of total force to negate those OSD actions". However, a number of the officials believe that a large segment of Congress does not really understand the Reserve Components and what their capabilities and limitations are.

Some people over on the Hill think its just a bunch of fat people going to meetings.²⁴ At the Congressional level the problem is broader than just the Reserve Components. There is primarily an education requirement of a large percentage of the total Congress concerning national defense. The education problem developed after the 1974 elections, and became more acute after the 1976 elections.²⁵ As far as Congress is concerned, their reaction is more emotional than logical. However, they've given us relatively good support, but it does not come from well informed logic, it comes from constituency interest. There is a need for better understanding of the economy of using Reserve Component forces.²⁶

Another official put Congress in a slightly different

perspective. "I believe we need to trust them (Congress). To do that we have to have a good flow of information so that their decision process when looking at manpower, equipment, and construction for a total force family is well understood.²⁷ This perception is reinforced by Mister Will Hill Tankersley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. "As far as Congress is concerned, we have to have a better understanding than we had before ... I have confidence that it can be done, but we are not going to get dollars for people and equipment unless ... it is supportive and valid ... Congress will pay, but they want first class merchandise."²⁸

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - PLUS OR MINUS?

In discussing DOD support of total force, one official stated that in the last few years he has seen some plusses and minuses with the Reserve Components. "The 50,000 enactment²⁹ communicated a serious interest to Congress and the Public -- that is -- the Reserve Components are a part of the active force in future crisis situations."³⁰ He, and others, also thought that the meeting Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had with the top reserve component secretaries and civilian chiefs in 1976 indicated a positive trend.³¹ However, many believed that these positive actions, by DOD, did not offset the effect of the adverse cost initiatives directed at the Reserve Components through the Program Budget Decision process for FY 77, that the overall Reserve

Component level of representation at DOD is insufficient, and that meaningful communication and understanding of the Reserve Components does not generally exist within OSD. Major General J. Milnor Roberts, National Executive Director, Reserve Officer Association, summed these feelings when he said ...

Actions by OSD in recent years have created an impression of an adversary relationship concerning the Reserve Components ... Normally, a proponent Agency will be an advocate of its subordinate elements ... their attitude (DOD) seems to be -- where can we cut or delete the Reserves -- not how can we help or build them up ... the (Reserve Component) maintenance of personnel strength problem (visualized in 1971) is an example of Defense displaying a disgraceful attitude.³²

This generally negative perception of DOD is further amplified by the beliefs that: They (DOD) are trying to cost everything out to save at the expense of the Reserve Components, which are really the least costly of the components;³³ The Reserve Components are getting the leftovers (equipment);³⁴ The DOD proposal to eliminate the federal military leave policy is contrary to the DOD employer support for the Guard and Reserve program, started in 1972, and would have nullified several years of profitable effort;³⁵ If the Reserve Components are really part of our defense in meeting worldwide threat contingencies, how can DOD tolerate the present poor equipment status (60% of dollar requirements) of the Army Reserve Components? Their real motivation shows in this area.³⁶

While not encompassing solutions to all the problems reiterated above, a key element of most perceptual problems is understanding. This was aptly portrayed by Mister William Clark, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Reserve Affairs), when he discussed this perception problem.

DOD could make the general assessment that initiatives need to come from the Army first - keep in mind DOD concern about using resources to the optimum - I believe the Army has been weak in budget submissions to really tell our story. There are probably few people in DOD and the services with a negative view, because most believe in Total Force - that is those in leadership positions - so any expression of dissatisfaction is as much ours (Army) as theirs (DOD) (fault).³⁷

THE ARMY RELEGATED ITS RESPONSIBILITY?

Everyone interviewed agreed that the Army, for the first time, is actively working with the Reserves, and providing meaningful assistance resources. Major General Blakefield, expressing his personal opinion, summed this consensus when he stated:

Previously, the active component relegated their responsibility to the Reserve Components. They only gave half based treatment. On 1 July 1973 the first serious intent manifested itself by the Army (Active) devoting assets - that is dollars, people, and material - to accomplish the mission (STEADFAST Program). Prior to that date, the Army only devoted minimum effort to the Reserve Components.¹⁸

However, all of the senior officials also stated that there is still a need for the Army to improve its management of the Reserves. Their emphasis for improvement is directed at: (1) A need for more infusion of people with Reserve experience within the Department of the Army, especially at intermediate management levels - better quality of Active Component officers assigned to Reserve duty (Captains, Majors, Lieutenant Colonels) - make more use of Reserve officer expertise at all levels; (2) A need for people developing doctrine and structure, instructing at service schools, serving on study groups, and assigned to duties directly related to the Reserves, to obtain a better understanding/perception of the Reserves - their strengths/weaknesses - capabilities/limitations - military/civilian roles - time/dedication/geographical factors - and how Active Component thoughts/actions affect the Reserves in their environment.

While enunciating some of the foregoing, Mister Clark also stated that the lower cost of maintaining forces in the Reserve Components versus the Active Component is just beginning to be appreciated, and that:

The Army still has a long way to go ...
I think we have a validity of policy role to look at - we have to be careful in considering the risk in Total Force ...
economics are pushing in this direction of reliance on Reserve Components because of lower dollar costs. (However) we have not honestly, and in a realistic manner,

assessed the resources to make the policy effective ... (also) the adding of resources reaches a point on the effectiveness curve where the readiness point will drop off disproportionately to the resources added (law of diminishing returns) ... (but) I am doubtful if we can meet the goals without putting additional resources into the Reserve Components.³⁹

However, a basic problem appears in the present measurement process, and that is the determination of readiness. The readiness status, a units capability to perform its mission, is determined by the use of the same guidelines and evaluation procedures for both the Active and the Reserve Components. Yet with a capability of 38 or 39 training days in the Reserve versus the year-round capability of the Active Component, one cannot reasonably expect the result to be mirror images. Generally, an active unit is expected to maintain a fully ready status of C1.⁴⁰ Therefore, is it reasonable to expect a Reserve unit to attain an equal readiness status? Compounding an answer is the need for some Reserve Component units to deploy immediately in a crisis situation. It is this early need for Reserve units that complicates the readiness problem.

Both the Active and the Reserve Components are in competition for dollar resources to maintain a needed organizational structure for contingency threats. If the Reserve Components can provide equally ready units then the need for a large standing Active Army may not be as great. As the cost of maintaining Reserve forces is much less than maintaining active

forces, this would appear to be a very cost effective approach to national defense. Most of the interviewed officials were concerned at such an approach, and firmly believe that over reliance on the Reserve Components is unrealistic. This is because there is a need for both active professional soldiers in units deployed and in strategic reserve, and the Reserve Component in sustaining and backup force roles.⁴¹

It is this dual need for both components that is resulting in a true commitment for Total Force by the Army. This commitment is real and being enhanced by the Army's senior officials. But, like all proclamations by a large organization, it takes time to filter down through the ranks.⁴² Meanwhile, some trivial rules, regulations, and acts continue to give some Reservists a feeling of discrimination: Poor facilities (housing) at annual training, and/or different standards of adequacy; Limited post exchange, commissary and medical privileges; A feeling that an active duty member is looking down his or her nose at the Reservist.⁴³

The last item could portray a superiority attitude or an insecurity problem. It could also portray an inferiority complex and a degree of "military paranoia" by either Active or Reserve. But it is more likely another perception problem aggravated by a lack of understanding. The full time Active Army member is a professional soldier, and inherently considered

an expert in a specific field of endeavor. Conversely, the citizen-soldier has a civilian endeavor, and a military pursuit too. While the Reservist may not be the full-time professional that his Active Army counterpart is, the schooling and training provided by the Army surely places the Reservist far above a handyman role.

This part-time role of the Reservists leads to another perception problem expressed by General Roberts: "The only real problem at Department of the Army is that there is some indication of a lack of confidence in the ability of the Reserve to supervise and manage the Reserve." Another official apparently perceived the same problem, but addressed it from a different point of view.

A lot of our Reserve Commanders attention to matters is not always the best. The full reliance on the Reserve Components requires an assessment of all the Commanders. This means their ability to spend the time to keep abreast of current doctrine, schooling, and provide the proper leadership. I consider this a major shortcoming, because, today in the Reserve Components, to do your job almost requires a full time/funded Commander, unless he has somebody else just underneath him that is full time.⁴⁴

Several other officials also referred to full time manning. Four officials specifically referred to the Defense Manpower Commission Report and one of the findings in the area of manning - The Air Reserve Components are manned full time at

20-25%, have a high state of readiness, and cost out at about 60% of a similiar function in the regular Air Force. Two of these officials stated that such a full time selected manning (15-20%) in the Army Reserve would provide units with a high readiness capability. While not specifically addressing full-time manning of Reserve units, General Weber, Chief, National Guard Bureau, in discussing Total Force in the Army and the impetus to increase the Army Reserve Components readiness stated, "There is a significant up trend in progress in all aspects - training, operational guidance, and doctrine."⁴⁵

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

Total Force, and the Army Reserve Components in particular, has been perceived differently at various levels. This resulted in the disclosure of several problem areas, and how some specific problems could be resolved. However, to determine if there were other areas that need to be addressed; each official was asked to name those three things, in order of importance, that need to be accomplished to immediately enhance the readiness of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Several of the officials opted to identify a fourth problem area. However, all of the responses can be categorized in order of consensus importance in these six areas: (1) Recruiting and retention; (2) Equipment; (3) Structure stability; (4) Training; (5) Leadership; (6) Mobilization procedures. While many of these problems are

presently being addressed by the Department of the Army, a brief discussion of each appears appropriate.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

The need to stabilize the present personnel turbulence problem and provide a more effective, efficient recruiting organization with the necessary incentives to recruit and retain people. Coupled with the unit personnel problems is the need to provide sufficient numbers of individuals in the Ready Reserve to meet Active, and Reserve Component, replacement/filler needs in a mobilization. In addition, there is a further need to establish creditability with Congress and the public in order to obtain quality people in the quantity necessary to sustain the Reserve. Concurrently, we must develop quality assurance systems to insure that retained individuals are those that can make significant contributions to national defense.

EQUIPMENT

The need to equip the Reserve Components, as well as the Active Component, with the proper equipment with which to deploy and fight. This is especially needed for early deploying units. The present long term procurement schedules for certain items, especially communications - electronics, indicates it will be 1982 before many Reserve units are properly equipped.

The need for, and effect of, foreign military sales on production and delivery of equipment, coupled with dollar constraints on procurement is not fully understood by the Reserve Components. This lack of understanding for the capability, or desire, of the Department of Defense to provide needed equipment is a major cause of some of the skepticism surrounding Total Force, and the poor readiness condition in many Reserve Component units.

STRUCTURE STABILITY

There is a major need to make less frequent Reserve structure reorganizations. Reorganizations create turmoil, personnel instability, and degrade readiness. There is a need to periodically review/analyze the force structure to ascertain that assets are provided for wartime requirements. At the same time, ineffective and untrainable units must be eliminated, or their inhibiting factors resolved positively. In sum, the Army planning process must be a pragmatic approach to determine the most effective type units suitable for placement in the Army Reserve Components - units that can be trained and equipped. This will result in a cost effectiveness determination before making changes in the Reserve structure; will provide honest appraisals as to type units, and their location; and will permit the units time to train to obtain optimum readiness.

TRAINING

There is a continuing need to insure that Reserve Component training is interesting, challenging, and meaningful, since the limited training time available (37-39 days per year) must be productive. Training also directly reflects on the ability to recruit and retain Reserve personnel. There are still too many instances of training not being well organized, managed, or conducted. Training and Doctrine Command has developed many new aids for training in the audio visual, simulator/device, and publication areas for both the individual soldier and the unit. Making effective use of the technological progress in training requires better day-to-day management, the planning, preparing and conduct of Reserve training. This requires: (1) More full time personnel support to obtain better individual and unit training programs; (2) Overcoming often encountered reluctance, at all levels, to accept innovative approaches to training because it requires extra effort; (3) Providing training media on obsolete Reserve equipment, until new equipment is issued; (4) Understanding and providing for a continuing requirement for the Reserve Components to acquaint military and civilian officials, with the unique environment and complexities of the Reserve Components.

LEADERSHIP

It is essential that the Reserve Components have good

leaders; but this should not be based on one particularly good performance, or because one has been around a long time, and is dedicated. The Reserve must eradicate the myth of annual get togethers for friends. Leaders must be identified, given responsibilities, and required to do the job.


We need to get rid of the ineffective commanders - the over-aged - the undertrained, or those with the inability to take the time to train. We need commanders with Army War College - we need staff officers with leadership experience and with Command and General Staff College, and those that don't meet the requirement, or don't do it, should be summarily removed from the program. We just haven't been ruthless enough. We've made excuses - we've blessed them - we put our arms around them, but we're really hurting ourselves. Leadership is there, but not in the right positions. We have to find this leadership and put these people in places of responsibility.⁴⁶

MOBILIZATION

Technology and the limited resources for National defense have changed the Army. Today, the Army needs the capability to mobilize the Reserve Components quickly and move them rapidly. There is no time for all units to go to a mobilization station and train for eight or nine months. However, the present plans for mobilization - training, manning, equipping and moving units - are outdated and inadequate. The partial Army mobilization exercise conducted from 9 November to 9 December 1976 substantiated the need for a complete overhaul of the Department of Defense mobilization system.

THE QUESTION - ARE THE PROBLEMS GOING TO BE RESOLVED?

It is apparent that after over five years of "Total Force" there is still a need for emphasis before this policy is completely accepted and in existence. The perception today is that Total Force is starting to achieve a semblance of reality in the Army, still showing signs of being only a concept at the Department of Defense, obtaining limited support by the Congress, and generally not understood by the public. However, the Army is continuing to move out in support of Total Force, and is recognizing that the Reserve Components are a reservoir of potential power at reduced costs in relationship to active forces. This interest is reflected by a recent article titled, "Priority Attention Due for Reserves" in the Army Times newspaper, and summed in the statement, "the major difference is that (Secretary of Army) Hoffman has told the Army Staff that in Fiscal Year 1978 the Army wants to put its money where its mouth is."⁴⁷ But as previously indicated the wheels of progress in bureaucracy turn slowly, therefore, a feeling of slowness appears justifiable. Especially, when one considers the three years of Army impetus in Reserve Component readiness equates to about four months in real time with the Reserve units. The questions now are: Will solutions to problems be attained; and will this interest in Total Force continue under the new administration assuming office on 20 January 1977?


WALTER TROESCHEL, JR.
Colonel, GS

FOOTNOTES

1. US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1971, Pt. I, p. 19.

2. US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1972, Pt. III, p. 29.

3. Author observations as USAR Liaison Officer to Headquarters, First US Army, Fort Meade, Maryland, January 1969 to July 1971.

4. Stanley R. Resor, Statement of the Secretary of Army before the subcommittee for Defense Appropriations, House Committee for Appropriations, 1971, Pt. I, pp 13-14.

5. Author perception of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird testimony on 17 Nov 69 about impact of pressing US domestic needs on DOD budget at House Subcommittee for Department of Defense Appropriation hearings for 1970, Pt. I, p. 361.

6. Author question to, and response of, General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, US Army, Speaker, Command and General Staff College Class, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Spring 1967. (Cited with special permission of General Johnson.)

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid and generally expressed military and public opinion during the Vietnam period.

9. Stanley R. Resor, Statement of the Secretary of Army before the Subcommittee for Defense Appropriations, House Committee for Appropriations, 1969, p. 509.

10. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, "Employer Support of Guard and Reserve", Department of Defense Commanders Digest, Vol. 19, No. 3, January 29, 1976, p. 2.

11. "Truman Urged 'Total Force' 28 Years Ago", The Officer, July 1976, Vol. XXX, No. 7, p. 15.

12. "Lip Service", an expression often heard by the author.

13. Duane L. Corning, MG, ARNG, President, National Guard Association, in speech at National Guard Association Conference, Washington, D. C., quoted by Army Times, 6 September 1976, p. 12.

14. Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1975, Department of Defense.

15. Interview with Milton A. Pilcher, MG, USAR, Retired, former Commander, 310th US Army Theater Army Logistics Command, Bal Harbour, Florida, 1 July 1976.

16. Ibid.

17. "Individual Ready Reserve", a shrinking pool of trained officers and enlisted persons who are not members of the Army Reserve Component units, with a military obligation, who may be mandatorily assigned to military units in the event of a mobilization.

18. Interview with W. Stanford Smith, MG, USAR, serving on active duty as Military Executive, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Department of Defense, Washington, 9 August 1976.

19. Interview with William H. Blakefield, MG, USA Retired, former Commander, US Army Readiness Region III, Fort Meade, Maryland, 21 July 1976.

20. "STEADFAST", an Army term used to refer to the Reorganization of the Army in July 1973 which applied resources to assist the Army Reserve Components in improving their readiness.

21. Interview with Francis S. Greenlief, MG, ARNG, Retired, Executive Director, National Guard Association, and former Chief, National Guard Bureau, Department of the Army, Washington, 11 August 1976.

22. Interview with Henry Mohr, MG, Chief, Army Reserve, Department of the Army, and former Commander, 102d US Army Reserve Command, Bal Harbour, Florida, 1 July 1976.

23. "Adverse Cost Initiatives", a reference to the President's Budget for FY 1977 in which not one initiative intended to improve RC readiness was introduced, but several proposed initiatives and budget cuts were proposed, and were considered adverse by many officials concerned with Army Reserve Component readiness. These adverse DOD budget actions were reversed by the Congress.

24. Greenlief.

25. Interview with J. Milnor Roberts, MG, USAR, Retired, National Executive, Reserve Officers Association, former Chief, Army Reserve, Department of the Army, Washington, 4 August 1976.

26. Interview with William Clark, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Army for Reserve Affairs, Department of the Army, Washington, 9 August 1976.

27. Smith.
28. Interview with Will Hill Tankersley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington, 4 August 1976.
29. "The 50,000 Enactment", a law which went into effect in 1976 which authorizes the President to mobilize up to 50,000 Reserve Component personnel for up to 90 days.
30. Smith.
31. "Washington Report - Rumsfeld Hosts Reserve Chiefs", Guardian, Vol. XXX, No. 7, July 1976, p. 10.
32. Roberts.
33. Pilcher.
34. Interview with Merrill E. Evans, MG, USAR, Commander, 88th US Army Reserve Command, Bal Harbour, Florida, 30 June 1976.
35. Smith.
36. Greenlief.
37. Clark.
38. Blakefield.
39. Clark.
40. "C" ratings are numerical scores of one to four to indicate readiness. C1 being at a high state of readiness, C2 and C3 to lesser degrees, and C4 as not ready.
41. Mohr, et. al.
42. All interviewed officials.
43. Evans, Mohr.
44. Pilcher.
45. Interview with Vern D. Weber, MG, USA, Chief, National Guard Bureau, and former Director, Army National Guard, Washington, 17 September 1976.
46. Blakefield.
47. Larry Carney, Reporter, Army Times byline, "Priority Attention Due for Reserves," Army Times, Washington: 20 September 1976, p. 4.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Blakefield, William H., MG (Retired), Former Commander, US Army Readiness Region III. Personal Interview. Fort Meade: 21 July 1976.
2. Carney, Larry. Reporter. "Priority Attention Due for Reserves." Army Times. Washington: 20 September 1976, p. 4.
3. Clark, William D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Army for Reserve Affairs, Department of Army. Personal Interview. Washington: 9 August 1976.
4. Corning, Duane L., MG, ARNG. "Annual Report of the President," National Guard Association of the United States. Washington: 30 August 1976.
5. Department of Defense. Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board Fiscal Year 1975. Washington: 24 October 1975.
6. Department of Defense. "The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force." Washington: September 1975.
7. Evans, Merrill E., MG (USAR), Commander, 88th US Army Reserve Command, and former President, Senior Reserve Commanders Association. Personal Interview. Bal Harbour: 30 June 1976.
8. Greenlief, Francis S., MG (Retired). Executive Director, National Guard Association of the United States, and former Chief, National Guard Bureau, Department of Army. Personal Interview. Washington: 11 August 1976.
9. Johnson, Harold K., General, Chief of Staff, US Army. U.S. Army in Vietnam. Lecture. Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1967. (Cited with special permission of General Johnson.)
10. Laird, Melvin R.. Statement of the Secretary of Defense before Department of Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 17 November 1969.
11. Laird, Melvin R. Statement of the Secretary of Defense before Department of Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. Washington: US Department of Defense, 4 March 1971.

12. Laird, Melvin R. Statement of the Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 15 March 1971.
13. Laird, Melvin R. Statement of the Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 15 February 1972.
14. Mohr, Henry, MG. Chief, Army Reserve, Department of Army. Personal Interview. Bal Harbour: 1 July 1976.
15. Mohr, Henry, MG. Chief, Army Reserve, Department of Army. Speech, Milwaukee: Fall Convention, Reserve Officers Association, 5 November 1976.
16. "NGA President Hits Funds Cut." Army Times. (Washington), 6 September 1976, p. 12.
17. Pilcher, Milton A., MG (Retired). Former Commander, 310th Theater Army Area Command (USAR). Personal Interview. Bal Harbour: 1 July 1976.
18. Resor, Stanley R. Statement of the Secretary of Army before Department of Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, (1971, pt. 1, pp. 13-14).
19. Roberts, J. Milnor, MG (Retired). Executive Director, Reserve Officers Association, and former Chief, Army Reserve, Department of Army. Personal Interview. Washington: 4 August 1976.
20. Rumsfeld, Donald H. "Employer Support of Guard and Reserve." Department of Defense Commanders Digest, Vol. 19, No. 3, January 29, 1976, p. 2.
21. Smith, W. Stanford, MG. Military Executive, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Department of Defense. Personal Interview. Washington: 9 August 1976.
22. "Structural Stability: Requisite for Readiness." CARnotes, Vol. 7, No. 3, June 1976.
23. Tankersley, Will Hill. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Department of Defense. Personal Interview. Washington: 4 August 1976.
24. "The Guard and Reserve In The Total Force." Department of Defense Commanders Digest, Vol. 18, No. 20, November 13, 1976.

25. Todd, Becky. "General Thinks Readiness Essential for Reserves." Interview with MG Willard Scott, Commander, US Army Readiness Region VI. Fort Knox: Louisville Courier-Journal, 25 July 1976, p. 10.
26. "Truman Urged 'Total Force' 28 Years Ago." The Officer, Vol. LII, No. 7, July 1976, p. 15.
27. US Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel. Reserve Call-Up. Hearing, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975.
28. "Washington Report - Rumsfeld Hosts Reserve Chiefs." Guardian, Vol. XXX, No. 7, July 1976, p. 10.
29. Weber, La Vern D., MG. Chief, National Guard Bureau, Department of Army, and former Director, Army National Guard. Personal Interview. Washington: 17 September 1976.
30. Wilson, George C. "Reserves Face Crisis In Manpower." Washington Post, 30 July 1976, p
31. Witek, James E., LTC. "Total Force." Soldiers, Vol. 31, No. 8, August 1976.