Needed: Preparation for Coalition War
Abstract
It is a tribute to the Army's resilience as an institution that it has bounced back so vigorously from the trauma of the Vietnam War. Yet there remains one enormous gap in this process of optimizing forces for the NATO mission--there still is not adequate provision for the special requirements of coalition war. These requirements entail far more than combined command arrangements and adequate provision for liaison -- important as these are. They mean more than overcoming the language barrier. They involve harmonization of doctrine, tactics, and procedures, compatibility of forces and logistics, interoperability if not standardization of equipment, munitions, and communications, even training and operating together--in short, all the interfaces indispensable to fighting effectively alongside allies. While the NATO commands and NATO's own bureaucracy have naturally focused on the special requirements of an effective coalition posture, their halting efforts over the last 25 years have been frustrated by the fact that NATO is less a supranational institution than a classic alliance of sovereign states with fourteen different, largely incompatible national force postures. At a conservative estimate, it could take 20 years to create an optimal coalition posture from the present mess. But it won't be achieved at all unless all the problems outlined herein are addressed seriously and consistently. Since the U.S. Army has the most to gain and most to lose among the U.S. services, it should point the way by analyzing the lessons of the past, developing a coherent doctrine for coalition warfare, and then pressing for the decisions needed to carry it into effect.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1976
- Accession Number
- ADA037892
Entities
People
- R. W. Komer
Organizations
- RAND Corporation