
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THE ARAB ELITE WORLDVIEW:

A Report on a Study of Arab Perceptions of Regional Security Issues



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THE ARAB ELITE WORLDVIEW:

A Report on a Study of
Arab Perceptions of Regional Security Issues

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This interim report describes a series of approaches to the use of systematic content analysis of public media to derive new analytical perspectives on foreign perception. The report reviews media output on Middle East security issues, focussing on options advanced to resolve or attenuate these conflicts for the brief period from March to May 1975. In addition, the report identifies the priorities, interests, and perspectives of the media surveyed, and describes the development of a new tool in media analysis.

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PREFACE

This interim report--which takes the form of a "sampler" of content analysis products additional as well as preliminary to findings on this research--has benefitted from the support of a number of individuals, only some of whom have been directly involved as project staff. Several of these people have contributed a not inconsiderable amount of their own time and effort to develop, refine, support, or implement the research.

The project was originally conceived by Paul A. Jureidini and R. D. McLaurin. Dr. McLaurin, who served as project director, reviewed the researc regularly, provided guidance in system development, and contributed to the final report. Jon Cozean has been the principal investigator during the pilot phase of the research. Suheila Haddad and Alaeddin Hreib read and coded the newspapers, as well as helping Mr. Cozean refine the codes. Mrs. Haddad also contributed to the final report. Throughout the project, Phillip P. Katz contributed a substantial portion of his personal time. Others who contributed directly were Captain Humber, USN, and Colonel Dandridge, USA, both of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-3); Aureller Cabiness, Joan Flood, and Sharon Harvin of AIR; and Chuck Wagner, who, as a consultant to AIR, developed the Dimension of Editorial Direction, a highly valuable methodological advance.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The role of the media in foreign policy--both as an actor and as an observer--has long been a subject of study in academic circles. Most attention, however, has focused on media's role as an actor--on its ability to influence public opinion, or, as Lenin noted, to mobilize the masses.[1] Much less attention has been given to the media's role as a mirror of policy formulation.[2] Yet, there are strong indications that the press, when carefully analyzed, can provide important clues about foreign policy formulation--especially in countries with government-controlled media.

Recent events in the Middle East provide useful examples of the media's role in foreign relations. When Secretary of State Kissinger's so-called "step-by-step" diplomacy failed in March 1975, he stated that the negotiations had become deadlocked because both sides had taken public positions from which they felt they could not retreat.[3] Yet, in a widely quoted article in *Foreign Affairs*, Stanley Hoffman observed that, "President Sadat, who has a way of hiding behind the smoke screen of countless interviews, in each one of which he says something different so as to maximize his freedom of maneuver, is clever enough not only to tie the size of his concessions to the willingness of Israel to move on other fronts--Syria and the PLO--as well, but also to suggest that his concessions will take the form of assurances, not to Israel, but to Kissinger."[4]

Meanwhile, newspaper correspondent John K. Cooley of the *Christian Science Monitor* noted that, "There has been a noticeable shift in the tone of Arab comment about United States policy since the collapse of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's latest mediation efforts between Israel and Egypt."[5]

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[1]Mark W. Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union* (N.Y.: Pegasus, 1970), pp. 20, 34, 36.

[2]Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), 1963.

[3]"Kissinger's Peace Mirage," *Newsweek*, March 31, 1975, p. 40; *al-Hayat* (Beirut), 23 March 1975, p. 1.

[4]"A New Policy for Israel," LIII, No. 3 (April 1975), p. 409.

[5]"Arab World Veering Slowly Away from U.S.," March 28, 1975, p. 2.

These observations raise some interesting questions:

1. Did Israel and Egypt actually take public positions from which they could not back away?

2. If so, is Stanley Hoffmann incorrect in his assumption that Sadat was taking numerous positions on various issues in order to maximize his freedom of maneuver?

3. Have the Egyptians and Israelis been consistent in their policy positions over time?

4. If not, what changes have occurred? when? and in what direction?

5. Has there in fact been a change in tone by the Arab press toward the United States? If so, when? to what degree? and for how long? And, finally,

6. How do elite Middle Eastern newspapers differ with respect to the amount and direction of news coverage pertaining to foreign policy and military security in the area?

The most precise way to answer these and similar questions is by a systematic analysis of the news media over time. The purpose of this project was to determine the feasibility of conducting such a study.

OBJECTIVES OF MIDDLE EAST STUDY ON ELITE PERCEPTIONS

As part of a short but broad study of leading security issues in the Middle East, a pilot study was established to glean from key Arab newspapers--representing various opinion sectors--elite perceptions on several key issues. The aspects to be examined are the degree and meaning of shifts in elite perceptions of:

- whether, when, and on what terms agreements with Israel should be negotiated;
- Arab military capabilities;
- intra-regional threats to the countries and groups represented; and,
- the politico-military strategies these groups should follow.

In addition, the pilot study would determine whether a systematic approach, such as content analysis, would be preferable to the more traditional research methods, such as are being used in other parts of the program.

METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED FOR PILOT PROJECT

To analyze Middle Eastern newspapers on a comprehensive basis, a computer-assisted content analysis approach was employed for collecting and processing the data. The system that most closely matched the needs of this study was the Foreign Media Analysis Subsystem (FMA) of the PSYOP Automated Management Information System (PAMIS).[6]

As a research tool, content analysis has several advantages over traditional research techniques. First, this approach is nonsubjective and verifiable. Thus, research findings may be replicated by independent researchers. Second, because *all items* in a given source and time frame are measured, the analysis is not colored by the inclusion or omission of certain items. Such selectivity would in itself reflect subjective judgment. Third, because the findings are recorded in numerical and coded form, they can be adapted for computer processing as well as statistical and trend analysis, thereby offering historical perspective in an expeditious manner.

The use of a computer in this study also provided a number of advantages. The computer is basically a high-speed clerk. It has the ability to handle huge quantities of data. It examines material systematically, while simultaneously seeking out patterns, relationships, and combinations that might otherwise escape the attention of an analyst. In addition, the computer has an "institutionalized" memory that is not dependent on private files or the memory of an individual analyst. The data, once inserted into the system, will be available for study and application for decades to come. Finally, the computer is capable of high-speed computations and processing. Complicated, detailed analysis is possible in a matter of minutes. Furthermore, the computer can conduct multiple linear regression studies, analysis

[6]This system was developed originally as a PSYOP information system to provide a computer data base of statistical information from publications and radio broadcasts of selected foreign countries.

of variance, factor analysis (orthogonal and oblique), to name a few. Almost any statistical tool from the simple mean to the most complex factor analytic scheme can be adapted for computer usage. In short, computer technology encourages:

1. the development of stringent rules, procedures, and methodology for data collection, analysis, and reporting;

2. the organization and reduction of statistical data;

3. finding relationships and patterns; and

4. hypothesis-testing through modeling and simulations.

The advantages of content analysis and computer technology have been combined in the FMA system. During the past five years, this system has developed an extensive set of codes for content analysis of newspapers. With some additional modifications relative to the specific needs of this study, FMA became an ideal tool for studying Middle East newspapers.

Modifications made in the basic FMA system consisted of the addition of new codes and the expansion of the "information source" category in order to shed more light on the "who" portion of Lasswell's famous definition of communications ("who says what to whom through which channel with what effect").

Expansion of Codes

Approximately one month was devoted to developing and testing codes applicable to the Middle East study. This included special attention to the international politics of oil, to military matters in the region (including the role of foreign military powers), to international stress and tension in the region, to diplomacy and negotiations, and to the Palestinian problem. Because of the wide scope of this study, it was later decided--following an initial test period--to eliminate the Palestinian and the general economics categories from the pilot study. (The Palestinian aspect of Arab-Israeli security perceptions will be considered in the final report on this task, however.) Considerable time was spent developing the "information source" category. Specifically, this revision generates additional data on (a) who was being quoted in a particular story; (b) his country; and (c) which wire

service was being used. Once compiled, such data make possible a number of useful correlations. For example, what personalities are most associated with what types of stories? Do editors choose different wire services (and thus, perhaps unknowingly, a particular "slant") for various types of stories? In time, it would be possible to pinpoint the information sources (such as a government official) that are most closely watched and/or quoted in the Middle East. In addition, such information also indicates the information sources (personalities, newspapers, magazines, and wire services) that are most influential in the Middle East.

Selection of Media

The next step was to select key newspapers that would represent key views of the Middle East elite. The choice was finally narrowed to three: two from Lebanon and one from Egypt. These three publications have a number of common characteristics: (a) all are written in Arabic; (b) all are highly regarded for their broad coverage of news and opinion from the Middle East; and (c) all enjoy a wide circulation, are widely read, and are frequently quoted in other publications.

Two of the newspapers used in the study (*al-Hayat* and *al-Nahar*) are published in Beirut, Lebanon. With the highest literacy rate of any Arab country, Lebanon has 96 newspapers (of which 40 are dailies). Such a large number of newspapers in a country with such a small population (2.5 million) indicates that Lebanese journalism is highly competitive. To survive there, a publication must accurately reflect the reading tastes of the public or the view of its "sponsors."[7] Of equal significance is the fact that while most of the Middle East press is owned by the state, the Lebanese press is privately owned and financed by individuals or groups who represent special religious, political, and economic views.[8] Hence, the Lebanese press is colored by the particular groups to whom it caters. Perhaps most significant

[7] A number of Lebanese newspapers are funded by foreign interests.

[8] Religion continues to play the most important role in Lebanese politics. The constitution carefully divides power among the various religious communities according to the following hierarchy: the Christian community (among whom the Maronites are the largest group), the Sunni Muslims, and the Shi-ah Muslims.

is the fact that Lebanon--alone among Middle East countries--enjoys press freedom.[9] Finally, the Lebanese press retains special significance because of "....Beirut's status as by far the most important base for foreign correspondents covering the Middle East."[10] Thus, it could be argued that Lebanon's more prestigious papers provide an elite platform for news and opinion of the entire Middle East. The largest and most important papers in Lebanon are *al-Nahar* and *al-Hayat*.[11]

Al-Nahar

Established in 1933, *al-Nahar* has the largest circulation (74,500 daily), number of pages (averaging 14 a day), and amount of space devoted to international news. Since 1948 it has been owned and operated by Ghassan Tueni, who is a graduate of the American University of Beirut (A.B.) and Harvard University (M.A.) with a specialty in foreign affairs.[12] In coverage, *al-Nahar* is independent, though generally pro-Western on issues not directly involving the Middle East. Indeed, at times it is even sympathetic to Western positions on the Middle East, as long as the positions on the issue do not overly conflict with widely held Arab World views. Because of its generally balanced viewpoint, the newspaper is highly regarded in the region. It is widely circulated throughout the Middle East and read by subscribers around the world. There are some unconfirmed reports that *al-Nahar* is planning to begin publication soon of a special U.S. edition in New York.

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[9] "Freedom of the press, along with freedom of expression and association, is guaranteed, within the limits of the law, by Article 13 of the Constitution." *The Middle East and North Africa, 1974-1975*, 21st ed. (London: Europa Publications, 1975), p. 506. The legal limitations which exist stem from the basic press laws of 1948 and 1958. These give the Minister of Interior the right to license all periodicals, withdraw a license for reasons of non-publication or inadequate circulation, and subject all journalists to a tribunal of discipline. Following the Lebanese civil war of 1958, press freedoms were extended with the abolishment of the right of the government to detain journalists pending investigations. In addition, channels of appeal were provided for those accused of violating government press requirements.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 507.

[11] *Ibia.*, p. 506.

[12] *Who's Who in Lebanon*, 2d. ed., (Beirut: Les Editions Publitec, 1966), p. 403.

Al-Hayat

Established in 1946, *al-Hayat* has a daily circulation of 37,800. Its size (averaging eight pages a day) and coverage of international news are less than *al-Nahar*. In editorial coverage, the newspaper is generally independent and non-Communist.[13] *Al-Hayat's* editor, Mrs. Salma Kamel Mrowa, studied political science at the American University of Beirut and the University of Michigan.

Al-Ahram

The third newspaper selected for this pilot study is published in Cairo, Egypt. Despite widespread illiteracy, Egypt's relatively large population (38,000,000) supports a well-developed press. Indeed, Cairo is the largest publishing center in the Middle East. Unlike that of Lebanon, however, the press in Egypt is heavily controlled by the government. All newspapers there were placed under the authority of the Revolutionary Command Council by Gamal Abdul Nasser in 1954. In 1960, Nasser shifted control of the press to the Arab Socialist Union. Thus, since 1954 the Egyptian newspapers have reflected or deferred to the official government line. Although Egyptian newspapers are administered separately and do compete with one another, they are all owned by the Egyptian government. In February 1974, the Sadat regime eliminated direct censorship of the press, except for matters relating to the armed forces. As a result, foreign correspondents and local editors are no longer required to submit their reports for prior approval--except those dispatches relating to the military. Despite Egypt's liberalized press controls, *al-Ahram* remains the semi-official voice of the Egyptian government. The newspaper boasts a circulation of 400,000; in size it averages 12-14 pages a day. It is the oldest Arabic-language newspaper in the nation, having been founded in 1875. While several pages are devoted to world news each day, most of its coverage centers on local events. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the newspaper was edited by Mohammed Hassanein Haikal, a close friend of Abdul Nasser. This special relationship did not last, however, and Haikal is now retired. With the loss of Haikal

[13] *Editor and Publisher International Year Book*, 54th ed. (N.Y.: Editor and Publisher Co., 1974), p. 305.

(who held relatively pro-Western sympathies), the impact and influence of *al-Ahram* has declined somewhat. Currently, the newspaper is controlled by its director, Ihsan Abd al-Quddus, and the editor, 'Ali Hamdi al-Gammal, both of whom have extensive backgrounds in journalism, but lack the political insights of Haikal.

Coding the Newspapers

Actual coding of the newspapers was conducted for a six-week period, following the required "shake-down" period to test the revised coding system. In addition, reports on the Middle East published by the *New York Times* were followed by traditional research methods in order to make a simple comparison of the Middle East and North American perspectives. Unfortunately, time did not permit a statistical analysis of *Times* coverage for comparative purposes. The time period covered in the pilot study was March-May 1975. Because of limited time available for the pilot study, coding of *al-Hayat* and *al-Nahar* was limited to a two-month period, while *al-Ahram* was coded only for the month of May. While the data base from such a small time frame was too narrow to provide information for trend analysis or projections, it did permit a relatively complete view of newspaper coverage during March, April, and May of 1975. In total, some 1,535 records were fed into the data base. In addition, abstracts of 622 articles from the three Arabic-language newspapers were entered into the system.

Summary of Events During Period Under Study

Between March and May, the Arab press focused on the following major news events:

1. Arab-Israeli conflict and the related issues, including discussions and negotiations. (This included Kissinger's peace mission.)

2. Inter-Arab diplomacy and contacts. (This included summit conferences, messages, letters, visits, discussions, and Sadat's trip to Kuwait, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan.)

3. Arab-Arab disputes. (This included the Syrian-Iraqi dispute over the Euphrates River; the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border dispute, and the Kurdish problem.)

4. Arab foreign relations with non-Arab states.

5. Military assistance, sales, grants, debts.

6. The economy, particularly the politics of oil.

INITIAL FINDINGS OF PILOT PROJECT

The final input was sent to the computer on Monday, June 23. The first batch of findings was returned the following day, and the remainder (mainly a printout of abstracts) was completed one day later. Despite the relatively small data base (while more than 2,000 record entries were compiled during six-week pilot coding period, a study involving data based on a full year will be much more useful), the findings were valuable because they show the potential of the system when operated over a longer time span.

Rather than present a complete analysis of the data compiled in the pilot project, this interim report will focus on the highlights as well as provide a sampling of the kinds of analysis that are possible with this system.

During the pilot phase of this media study, the major objective was to examine the general content of three Middle East newspapers. As a result, it is now possible to describe in detail the emphasis that each newspaper places on international news, both political and military. Further, the study provided a useful view of the "editorial slant" exhibited by each of the publications. The next phase of the study, which began on July 1, 1975, will focus on one major topic: the Israeli-Arab dispute. This part of the project will examine the shifting views of both sides on the acceptability of various security-settlement options.

For the analyst, the FMA system offers a powerful analytic tool for gauging elite Arab perceptions. With adequate data, it will be possible to answer the following types of questions:

- Military matters:
  - -- What is the likely reaction to U.S. security assistance programs in the Middle East? Is the reaction the same for large programs as for small programs?
  - -- What would be the likely reaction to a show of military force in the region? Does an aircraft carrier have more impact than another type of weapon system?
  - -- What types of security assistance projects cause the most negative/positive reaction in the Middle East?
  - -- What would be the likely response to U.S. military maneuvers in the area? What types generate the most hostility? Which, the least hostility?
  - -- Which U.S. officials are most closely watched by the elites of the Middle East? The Secretary of State? Secretary of Defense? The President?
- Security-Settlement Issues:
  - -- Has there been a pattern of change in the Saudi position on question of returning Jerusalem to Arab control as a *sine qua non* for settlement?
  - -- Will the Syrians accept the presence of a long-term U.N. force in the Golan Heights as a condition of Israeli withdrawals? Has there been any change in the Syrian position over time?
  - -- Do the Syrians believe Israel perceives (or misperceives) the Syrian position on the Golan Heights to require total return of all control to Syria?
  - -- Under what conditions--and when--do Syrian views toward a partial settlement (step-by-step approach) change? What factors seem to bring about a change?

-- What differences are there between the Saudi and Syrian views of what the Palestinians should or would accept from the Israelis in the course of a settlement? Are there other views?

-- Is Sadat continuing to support the U.S. approach for a settlement? Has there been any particular pattern in his views on the subject?

-- Will the Soviets soon restore arms aid to Egypt? Is there any trend in Egyptian views on the matter?

-- What do government personnel changes mean in terms of a Middle East settlement?

-- How will the Palestinian role in Lebanon be affected as a result of the recent clashes? Will it affect settlement possibilities?

While such questions can, and indeed are, answered by traditional research methods, the use of systematic content analysis can provide new and useful dimensions, particularly through the use of trend analysis and projections. Providing such new dimensions is the goal of this study.

CHAPTER 2. REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

The security issues that were addressed by media during the March-May 1975 period included the following subjects: (1) the Arab-Israeli conflict (including Egyptian-Israeli, Syrian-Israeli, Palestinian-Jordanian-Israeli, Lebanese-Israeli, and Jerusalem problems), (2) the Iran-Iraq conflict, (3) the Iraq-Kuwait dispute, (4) the Syria-Iraq problems, (5) the political cold war between Egypt and Libya, and (6) a set of interrelated troubles in the Persian Gulf affecting Iraq, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Oman.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Of all regional problems, clearly the dominant issue was the Arab-Israeli conflict. In foreign affairs issues, coverage of Israel, for example, surpassed that of all Arab countries except Egypt in *al-Ahram*. This was parallel to *al-Nahar* and *al-Hayat*, where Israeli coverage was greater than that accorded to any Arab country except Egypt and Saudi Arabia. (See Table 1 and Figure 1.) Similarly, *al-Hayat*, *al-Nahar*, and *al-Ahram* all relied extensively upon Israeli sources for news: only Egypt and, and in the case of *al-Nahar*, Lebanon were more frequent regional source countries. (See Tables 7 and 8.) The amount of space devoted to the Arab-Israeli issue far outstripped that accorded to any other regional security problem. Indeed, it surpassed all other regional problems together.

As the introduction suggests, the Arab-Israeli conflict can be disaggregated into several analytically (even if not practically) discrete issues. The aspect receiving the greatest coverage from March to May 1975 was the Egypt-Israel front. There are, of course, several reasons for this preeminence. First, Egypt is the largest and most politically important of Israel's enemies. Second, Egypt is the acknowledged (except by Iraq and Libya) leader of the Arab cause. Third, the Egyptian front is much larger and the issues at this stage more complicated than (though not as difficult as) the Syrian-Israeli front. Finally, March was the period in which U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attempted to bring about a second-stage preliminary disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel, and although

the accord was never achieved, the March-May period was dominated by the negotiations and the after-effects of their failure.

The major subject, then, throughout the March-May 1975 period was the progress, apparent failure, then renewed hope for the so-called step-by-step diplomacy associated with U.S. mediation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The effort for a second-stage disengagement on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts was undertaken in March. That such an agreement was not likely to be achieved in the Golan became clear very quickly. Syria demanded a 60-kilometer withdrawal across the front from Mt. Hermon to Lake Galilee (Tiberius).[1]

From the outset it was evident that Hafez Assad's position was not very flexible. With very little to give Israel in return, and without the empty miles of the Sinai as a buffer, any Syrian advance (or Israeli retreat) in the Golan is viewed with concern in Israel. The tenuous state of the Israeli coalition[2] provided scant opportunity for the cabinet to "lead the way," either. Moreover, Assad had come under attack earlier in the month from the "rejection" element for his willingness to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel once territorial differences and the Palestinian question were resolved.[3] Those familiar with the complex setting of Syrian foreign policy[4] understand the pressures unleashed by a forthcoming public posture toward Syrian talks with Israel, particularly when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is itself suspicious of such talks (as was the case in March).

Before the Kissinger mission got underway, the Kuwaiti parliament condemned any attempt to internationalize Jerusalem. Indeed, negotiations on this subject between Arab leaders and Secretary Kissinger were denounced in advance, and internationalization itself called an "act of aggression against the Arab world."[5] Given the fact that the Kissinger mission was explicitly designed to develop an agreement for second-stage withdrawal on one or more

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[1] *Al-Hayat*, 16 March 1975, p. 6.

[2] See Abraham R. Wagner, *The Impact of the 1973 October War on Israeli Policy and Implications for U.S. Defense Policy* (Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research, 1975).

[3] *Al-Nahar*, 3 March 1975, p. 10 notes the Iraqi attack.

[4] See R. D. McLaurin and Mohammed Mughisuddin, *Cooperation and Conflict: Egyptian, Iraqi, and Syrian Objectives and U.S. Policy* (Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research, 1975), Chapter 4.

[5] *Al-Nahar*, 3 March 1975, p. 1.

fronts, this Kuwaiti view may seem a non sequitur. Yet, in a sense, even this parliamentary interjection helped to set the parameters in the interstices of which the mission operated.

Al-Ahram quoted Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi as saying that Egypt believed a second-stage disengagement would have been a constructive step on the road to Geneva.[6] Although one may view that as a candid statement that Egypt expected to benefit from the new disengagement, in fact Sadat, like Assad, has little to offer Israel in interim accords. Such an agreement, which could only have been seen as a gain for Egypt, would have enabled Sadat to demonstrate that he had not "sold out" Syria or the Palestinians (by continuing to work for a further Golan disengagement, for Israeli withdrawal, and for the establishment of a Palestinian entity) while at the same time providing him greater domestic insulation for the concessions he anticipated in Geneva.

As the negotiations proceeded, Sadat misread the Israelis. He underestimated the effects of Prime Minister Rabin's precarious hold on leadership, and overestimated Israel's understanding of his own needs, objectives, and latitude. Believing the Israeli leadership understood he could not "give" a great deal at that stage, he assumed Tel Aviv's demands were simply a bargaining posture. Both sides remained relatively close to their original positions.

Sadat indicated that he must have a withdrawal to the Sinai's strategic passes and oil fields; Rabin, that he must have an end to the state of war between the two countries, pledges of non-resort to force, and the passage of Israeli ships and cargos through an opened Suez. The disagreement, as presented to Arab audiences, embraced timing (as to both implementation and duration, and affecting the end to belligerency, and the agreement itself), space, and interposition (the duration and continuity of the United Nations force), as well as substance. That is, the parties differed on:

1. the final lines of the disengagement;
2. the duration of the disengagement agreement;
3. whether Egypt would terminate the state of belligerency between the two countries;

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[6] *Al-Hayat*, 23 March 1975, p. 1.

4. implementation date of the disengagement;
5. duration of the U.N. presence;
6. the means of withdrawing the U.N. force;
7. limitations on Egyptian propaganda against Israel;
8. relaxation of the boycott;
9. use of the Suez Canal by Israeli flag vessels; and
10. Egypt's role in the case of a Syrian-Israeli war.[7]

Secretary Kissinger has stated, as we noted above,[8] that Egypt and Israel had made statements from which neither could back away, statements that were not amenable to compromise. It is true that some of the issues raised above are dichotomous--*viz.*, points 3, 9, and possibly 10. Of these subjects, the central point at issue was the question of Egyptian belligerency (and the related problem of guarantees not to resort to force). Until the occupied territories may be returned, and possibly until a Palestinian entity may be created, neither Sadat nor any other Egyptian leader can meet Israeli demands. Use of the Suez Canal by Israeli flag vessels is not of economic importance, but has some significant political payoff in the views of some senior Israeli leaders. The question of Egyptian participation or non-participation in Syrian-Israeli general hostilities follows along the lines of the belligerency issue. As the negotiations proceeded, the Egyptian media were used to make it clear that the belligerency question could not be resolved under these circumstances. While the justification may be taken as form, the form in this instance is based upon substance.

> Any new agreement should be a military one dealing with military arrangements specifying the type of withdrawal and how to regulate it. This agreement should be signed by military men of the two sides within the framework of the Geneva Conference.[9]

In other words, Cairo sought to preserve the military character of a second-stage disengagement. Since both sides viewed--at least officially--the

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[7] *Ibid.*, 19 March 1975, p. 6; *ibid.*, 15 March 1975, p. 6; *al-Nahar*, 22 March 1975, p. 1.

[8] See page 1, above.

[9] *Al-Ahram*, 15 March 1975, p. 1; *al-Hayat*, 16 March 1975, p. 6.

disengagement as a step toward, not a substitute for, the Geneva Conference, the distinction between interim maneuvers to relax tensions and fundamental political change appears valid. It is, in our view, likely that Egypt sought to convince Israel of its sincerity on this point as soon as the issue surfaced.

What of the other issues, then? On each, there was substantial room for compromise. The final lines of the second-stage disengagement in the Sinai should include Abu Rudeis and the Mitla and Gidi passes, Egypt demanded. Even granting there may have been little room for maneuver on this demand itself--Sadat may indeed have painted himself into a corner--there were numerous aspects of timing available to be manipulated. In addition, the presence and use of international forces offered additional possibilities for negotiation regarding timing.[10] In order to highlight the limitless possibilities open for negotiation in this regard, while still protecting its bargaining position, the Egyptian government noted that it "rejects the idea of a gradual withdrawal over a long period, *although it believes that a withdrawal from the oilfield areas and the passes will require more time than the earlier agreement--40 days....*"[11] Thus, rejecting gradual withdrawal, Egypt gave notice that it was in fact acceptable.

As it became clear that the Kissinger mission was in serious danger of failing, the Egyptian leaders began to offer new areas for compromise and to soften their stands in other areas. Thus, while Egypt would not end the state of belligerency, Egypt was prepared to (1) renounce force as a means to settle the conflict; (2) renounce its use as long as the provisions of any agreements remain in force and are respected by both sides; (3) stretch the period of implementation of the disengagement for "a period not to exceed months."[12] At the same time, Egypt indicated that the U.N. Emergency Force mandate would probably not be renewed if no disengagement agreement was achieved.[13]

It is clear from the foregoing that Sadat and his confidantes felt Egypt needed the disengagement agreement and made every effort they considered

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[10] See *al-Hayat*, 15 March 1975, p. 6; *al-Nahar*, 27 March 1975, p. 1

[11] *Al-Ahram*, 15 March 1975 (emphasis added).

[12] *Al-Ahram*, 22 March 1975, p. 1; *al-Hayat*, 23 March 1975, p. 6.

[13] *Al-Hayat*, 22 March 1975, p. 6.

possible to bring about such an accord. The inflexibility on Egypt's part was restricted to the state of belligerency *per se*, and the withdrawal of Israel from the passes and oilfields in the Sinai. The public media record demonstrates conclusively that Sadat attempted to communicate his willingness to consider all other issues negotiable and even to use other issues to mitigate the effects of his two firm demands.

That the Egyptians were surprised at the outcome of the mission is clear; until the 20th or later, theyseemed to think a breakthrough would occur. Reactions to the failure of the mission appeared contradictory. On the one hand, President Sadat announced that the Suez Canal would open on June 5, in any event, and that Egypt would accept renewal of the U.N. Emergency Force mandate--but for three months only. On the other hand, Sadat formally requested reconvening the Geneva Conference, supported putting Soviet-Egyptian relations in their "proper place," and served notice that but two alternatives remained for the realization of necessary Egyptian objectives--the Geneva Conference and war.[14] Clearly, then, the intended message was that Egypt is being reasonable but is becoming impatient.

For the duration of the period, the spotlight ceased to focus exclusively on Egypt. Yet, the post-March 1975 environment, though diffuse, has seen some major developments. No important changes took place on the Syrian-Israeli front except that fighting did *not* break out, even on a limited basis, following the failure of the Kissinger mission.[15] That an absence of limited or general hostilities has characterized the Golan front should not be taken to suggest that Syrian leaders have altered their views from the first disengagement accord period, when firing continued throughout the negotiations. On the contrary, the Syrians feel the approach to Israel must include "brinkmanship," i.e., the proximity (threat) of conflict, that will increase Israeli and Western incentives to reach an "acceptable" (to Syria) peace.[16]

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[14] *Ibid.*, 24 March 1975, p. 6 and 30 March 1975, p. 6.

[15] Syria has already indicated the prerequisites of a second-stage disengagement should one be attempted in the Golan: the hills surrounding Quneitra. See *al-Hayat*, 15 March 1975, p. 1.

[16] See *al-Ahram*, 6 May 1975, p. 5.

Throughout the period from March to May 1975, the Syrian leadership felt it demonstrated a dogged interest in peace, but not "peace at any price." The open acceptance of Security Council Resolution 338 and the consequent acceptance of Resolution 242 (of November 1967) on which it is based; the willingness to participate in the Kissinger mission; Syrian readiness to take part in the Geneva Conference; and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the United States--all these were seen as evidence of Syria's peaceful intentions. At the same time, Syrian leaders issued several "hints" about a future peace. President Hafez Assad has indicated his willingness to end the state of war between Syria and Israel.[17] Although--due to attacks from the "rejectionists"--he has been ambiguous regarding Syria's readiness to sign a peace treaty with Israel,[18] it is likely that Assad would be willing to sign a treaty as long as he was accompanied by the Egyptians and Lebanese and, preferably, the PLO. For some time, the Syrians have intimated they will go along with whatever the PLO accepts on the Palestinian issue, and they have made it reasonably clear that their expectation, like that of the PLO, is that a Palestinian entity will be created out of the West Bank and Gaza strip.[19]

What the Syrian and Egyptian leadership both fear is the slow degeneration of the current settlement momentum into the "no-war, no-peace' situation that existed prior to the 1973 war.[20] Much of the effort of Sadat and Assad has been expended in finding various means of preventing the return to a no-war, no-peace state. Thus, prior to the meeting of Presidents Ford and Sadat in Salzburg, Austria, in June, Sadat worked assiduously to broaden both his support and the pressure on the status quo: he worked with European leaders,[21] made renewed overtures of potential friendship to the USSR,[22] and

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[17] *Al-Nahar*, 10 March 1975, p. 1.

[18] Cf., e.g., his *Newsweek* interview, on the one hand, and his later statement in *al-Nahar*, 10 March 1975, p. 1.

[19] See *al-Hayat*, 19 March 1975, p. 1; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Realities of the Middle East*: A Report by Senator George S. McGovern, 94th Congress, 1st Session, May 1975, p. 18. Cf. McLaurin and Mughisuddin, *Cooperation and Conflict*.

[20] See especially the article by Ihsan Abd al-Quddus, *al-Ahram*, 16 May 1975, p. 1.

[21] E.g., *al-Ahram*, 28 May 1975, p. 1.

[22] *Al-Ahram*, 30 March 1975, p. 1. Moreover, positive references to the Geneva Conference served the same purpose, since the USSR firmly supported the Geneva approach.

concentrated on rebuilding Arab solidarity through visits and discussions with the PLO.[23]

The Jordanian-Israeli dispute is now united with the Palestinian-Israeli problem as a result of decisions reached at the Rabat Conference of 1974. Lebanese-Israeli problems arise as a result of the overall Arab-Israeli conflict. No new options were advanced during the period to deal with Lebanese-Israeli tensions.

The last elements, then, in the Arab-Israeli conflict are the Palestinian and Jerusalem problems. Since the Rabat Conference, all Arab states including Jordan recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people on the West Bank (of the Jordan River). From March to May, Egypt entered and left a difficult period with both the Palestinians and the Syrians, who initially (i.e., in March) objected to disengagement on one front.[24] After the failure of the Kissinger mission, however, and clearly by the end of the period, relations had greatly improved. Ihsan Abd al-Quddus, editor of *al-Ahram*, wrote in late April that existing conflicts should not prevent a unified stand at Geneva, but that neither should the Arab governments go to Geneva unless they are unified both within and outside the conference.[25]

In this connection, Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinians worked to improve their cooperation in late April and early May. In late April, the governments of Egypt and Syria announced the formation of a permanent committee to coordinate the countries' policies toward Israel. The Syrian-Palestinian joint command was party to the planning for this permanent committee.[26] A central issue throughout this period was the question of Palestinian representation at Geneva. The Soviet Union wanted Jordan to participate, but the government of the Hashemite Kingdom reaffirmed that irrespective of Jordanian participation or non-participation the PLO must represent the Palestinians.[27]

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[23] *Al-Ahram*, 20 May 1975, pp. 1,5; *ibid.*, 18 May 1975, p. 5; *ibid.*, 6 May 1975.

[24] For this reason, Egyptian officials went to some lengths to tie, both conceptually and procedurally, possible withdrawals on the Sinai front to improvements in the overall Arab situation, to progress on the Palestinian problem, and to similar withdrawals on the Syrian-Israeli front. See, e.g., *al-Hayat*, 30 March 1975, p. 1.

[25] *Al-Hayat*, 26 April 1975, p. 6.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] *Ibid.*, 16 March 1975, p. 6.

The universal Arab agreement that the Palestinians must participate in the Geneva Conference was qualified by the Soviet Union, which envisaged three stages of the Conference: Israeli withdrawal, guarantees of the rights of the Palestinians, and security guarantees for all Middle East states. The first stage, in this view, could be held without Palestinian participation.[28] The Soviet proposal suggests to the analyst the division of the Conference into working groups not all of which require Palestinian participation. However, more likely to offer a circumvention of the Israeli objection to Palestinian participation is the membership of PLO representatives as part of the Syrian delegations in the context of the "joint command."

Al-Ahram (Ihsan Abd al-Quddus) took note of the fact that "many people" felt King Hussein should represent the Palestinians on the theory that he stood for the "reality" that Israel occupied in 1967. The PLO could recognize this role, and Hussein, in turn, would turn over such lands as he secured from Israel to the PLO. Al-Quddus also noted the possibility that Syria could represent the Palestinians on the basis of the joint command.[29]

Throughout the period from March to May, the PLO continued to indirectly but clearly indicate its willingness to accept as the territory for a new Palestinian state the West Bank and the Gaza strip and as a neighbor to this Palestinian Arab state, the Jewish State of Israel.[30] More detailed issues--such as the likely annexation of parts of the West Bank by Israel, the fortification of or other limitations on the new state, and the like--were not addressed.

Jerusalem, on the other hand, was frequently adverted to. The late King Feisal of Saudi Arabia demanded that there be no bargaining regarding Jerusalem. The city must be regained by the Arabs, and it must be returned

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[28] *Al-Nahar*, 24 April 1975, p. 14.

[29] *Al Ahram*, 16 May 1975, p. 1.

[30] See above and *al-Hayat*, 19 March 1975, p. 1. The PLO representative in London is quoted proposing the coexistence of two states--Palestinian and Israeli--in Palestine.

to its previous condition.[31] We have already noted that the Kuwaiti parliament condemned any attempt to internationalize Jerusalem and any negotiations in that regard.[32] Following the death of King Feisal in late March, the references to Jerusalem diminished. Indeed, perhaps the strongest words on Jerusalem from March to late May were those of Lord Caradon who called[33] for an undivided Jerusalem of two sister cities, one Arab, one Israeli. Although remarks made after the period covered by this interim report reasserted a strong Arab position on Jerusalem, the observation appears to offer itself that Jerusalem is negotiable. Probably, following the death of Feisal, his successor, Khalid, who does not feel as strongly about Jerusalem, did not press the point as much as Feisal had. However, after consultations with Muslim groups, he seems now to be trying to assure them of the continuity of Saudi policy. Moreover, the fact that late May and early June, like March, was a period in which an Egyptian-Israeli second-stage agreement was being reconsidered, suggests that the reemergence of the Jerusalem issue may be another part of Arab negotiation posturing. Certainly, Jerusalem is the single issue through which the Saudis can play a significant role and have a key influence on Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.

THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT

Iranian-Iraqi relations, long characterized by friction and even recently by conflict, had been materially improved by March as a result of an agreement reached with the mediation of Algerian President Houari Boumedienne. While the details of the accord had yet to be negotiated, the two governments had already turned the most significant corner in their relations--at least for the present--by the meeting of minds of their leadership.

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[31] *Ibid.*, 26 March 1975, p. 6. Note that about a week earlier, King Hussein had also been equally adamant and explicit both on the impossibility of a peace without the return of Jerusalem and on the strife caused by Israeli changes to the character of the city and particularly by Israel's establishment of settlements in the area. *Al-Nahar*, 16 March 1975, p. 14.

[32] *Al-Nahar*, 12 March 1975, p. 12.

[33] *Al-Hayat*, 26 April 1975, p. 1. Cf., the interview with Lord Caradon in *al-Ahram*, 26 May 1975, p. 5.

March to May 1975, then, was a period in which the bureaucracies of Iran and Iraq began to work out together the details necessary to implement the accord reached by their leaders. By the end of spring 1975, the Iraq-Iran controversy had given way to the Syrian-Iraqi dispute. Consequently, the newspaper articles dealing with the Iran-Iraq conflict addressed, in fact, the progress made in implementing a settlement. They were, for the most part, not detailed. Substantial concessions were made by Iraq on the Shatt-al-Arab aspect of the conflict, and, in turn, major benefits were realized by Iraq in terms of border security and, as a result, in cooperation in handling the Kurdish problem.

The implications of the Iran-Iraq settlement extend well beyond the territory of the two principals, however. *Al-Hayat* and *al-Nahar* wasted little time in adverting to regional and Gulf security ramifications of the cooperation of these former enemies. An article in *al-Hayat*[34] noted that Iran and Iraq agreed on the need for cooperation in regional "collective security" and in keeping the area free from foreign intervention. *Al-Nahar* specifically referred to the two countries' discussions of security cooperation in the Gulf.[35] Thus, the independent newspaper (*al-Nahar*) and the Saudi-sponsored newspaper in Beirut both noted the Gulf aspect of the improvement in Iran-Iraq relations. Because the discussion of foreign intervention clearly refers to the superpowers, because Iran and Iraq are both involved (in disparate ways) in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and because Saudi Arabia also aspires to a major role in Gulf matters, resolution of the protracted conflict between Tehran and Baghdad will have an important impact on the entire Middle East and Persian Gulf region.

The issue of superpower presence in, influence on, and actions directed toward the Persian Gulf is too great for consideration here.[36] Yet, it is

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[34]30 March 1975, p. 8.

[35]30 April 1975, p. 1.

[36]See Emile A Nakhleh, *Arab-American Relations in the Persian Gulf* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975); Nakhleh, *The U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf: Bahraini Elite Perceptions* (Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research, forthcoming); and R. M. Burrell, *The Persian Gulf* (New York: The Library Press, for Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1972).

clear the Saudis, in particular, do not view with relish the concept of joint Iranian-Iraqi security control of the Persian Gulf. The Saudis have long been suspicious of Iran, and Iraq has been an active supporter of revolutionary groups in the Arabian Peninsula that the Saudis have helped fight. Similarly, while a strong U.S. military pressure in the Gulf may no longer be popular, especially in the context of suggestions that American forces might, under some admittedly very unlikely circumstances, be forced to intervene to ensure the continued supply of petroleum to the industrialized West at "acceptable" prices, still less attractive to the Saudis is the image of a long-term Soviet preponderance in the region. Such an image may well be congruent with the Saudi reading . (At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the Iranian leadership would not wish to contribute to such a situation either.)

THE IRAQ-KUWAIT DISPUTE

Since 1961, when Kuwait achieved true independence, a dispute over status or land has simmered between Kuwait and Iraq. Initially, Iraq claimed all of Kuwait. More recently, the Iraqi claim has centered on certain Kuwaiti territory along the border with Iraq. The history of the Iraq-Kuwait controversy is essentially that of a power vacuum. Iraq is a large, powerful state; Kuwait, a small, weak--but very rich--one. Kuwait's strategy for survival has been "generosity," sharing its wealth with other Arab countries, buying allies, as it were. Whether this strategy can continue to reap the benefits so far accruing to Kuwait is open to doubt: Iraq is wealthier, and others' beneficence may greatly overshadow Kuwait's. Since, however, Kuwait's sole major resource will continue to be oil, and its wealth the major strategic weapon in Kuwait's arsenal, the small emirate has little choice in strategy. Its likely course will be to search for the optimum mix between three tactics: (1) continued generosity, (2) increased military capability to prolong and heighten the cost of an invasion, and (3) appeasement. A fourth ingredient is visibility or, in other words, the greatest degree of internationalization possible. Thus, Algeria and Egypt were both involved in the search for a solution to the border dispute through mediation during the time covered. No new solutions were advanced, and,

indeed, Kuwait's difficulty in maintaining visibility (salience) was clear in the minor coverage given this conflict in both *al-Hayat* and *al-Ahram*. *Al-Nahar* scarcely mentioned the issue at all.

SYRIAN-IRAQI TENSIONS

Syria and Iraq have had a recent history checquered with both disputes and cooperation of the highest order.[37] The most important issue in the current friction is itself in dispute. Iraq claims damage to Iraqi agriculture by the operation of the high dam at Tabqa on the Euphrates. Syria, on the other hand, maintains that Iraq is merely exaggerating a minor issue. Indeed, Syria is not at fault, according to Damascus: Turkey is. Both countries recognize the Turkish dams on the upper Euphrates are a major source of the problem. Certainly, the recent tension antedates Iraq's complaints about the effects of the dam.[38] During the period under study, no substantive discussions are found in the surveyed media that suggest options. Various Arab leaders are attempting to mediate the dispute, but neither of the Ba'th regimes seems to be inclined to reduce the level of polemic. The conflict concerns the Euphrates' waters only at the surface; beneath lies the hostility of two Ba'th regimes and Iraq's determination to bring down the Syrian Ba'th. *Al-Nahar* seemed to be speaking for a substantial portion of the Arab world when, in an Abu al-Nasir editorial, it criticized the parties to the dispute for their approach to the disagreement.

THE PERSIAN GULF

This chapter will not deal with the Egyptian-Libyan conflict,[39] but will consider media treatment of the complex of rivalries that dominate the Persian Gulf area.

No new options were advanced in the surveyed press concerning any of the Persian Gulf issues. The March-May period did witness the attenuation of

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[37] For a discussion of this history, see McLaurin and Mughisuddin, *Cooperation and Conflict*, chapter 4.

[38] However, long before the dam was completed, Iraq protested that its operation would adversely affect Iraq.

[39] See below, Appendix 1, however.

Iraqi-Saudi hostility, however. A report on the establishment of boundaries in the disputed Neutral Zone area was signed by officials of both countries, and economic and cultural relations were expected to improve.[40]

The long-standing Dhofar insurgency has been based on support from the USSR, Iraq, and Libya. In the conflict, the government of Oman, in turn, has benefitted from the support of Saudi Arabia, and from personnel and equipment from the United Kingdom, Iran, and Jordan. As the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) feared,[41] it appears that Iraq may be reducing or ceasing its support of PFLO following a settlement to the Iran-Iraq conflict and the improvement of Iraqi-Saudi relations. At the same time, a special commando unit of 650 men was designated to join the Omani and the 3,000 Iranian personnel in Dhofar, it was announced.[42] In addition to sending the first (non-Omani) Arab military force to join in the counter-insurgent campaign, Jordan transferred 31 Hawker Hunter aircraft to Oman. In sum, the end of the PFLO may well be in view.[43]

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[40] *Al-Hayat*, 20 March 1975, p. 8.

[41] *Ibid.*, 18 March 1975, p. 6.

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] *Al-Nahar*, 2 and 8 March 1975, p. 12 (in each).

APPENDIX 1. *AL-AHRAM'S* VIEW OF WORLD POLITICS--MAY 1975

by Phillip P. Katz

This summary attempts to assess media perceptions of Middle East international politics based on a survey from news items, editorials, communiques, and feature stories published in *al-Ahram* during May 1975.[1] A total of 293 news items and articles about Middle East politics and its interaction with the world were selected by computer for analysis. Space allocated by *al-Ahram* to Egypt and the ten foreign countries that received the most coverage is given in Table 1. A computer printout of countries that received the most critical treatment is listed in Table 2. Table 3 provides a rank order of favorable coverage of those countries.

This survey compares the intensity, tone, and characteristics of communication in *al-Ahram* concerning the following key countries in the Middle East--Egypt, United States, Israel, Soviet Union, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, and Iraq. It describes semi-official Egyptian attitudes and interests concerning four important events:

President Sadat's Visit to Four Arab States
Arab Unity
Preparations for Sadat-Ford Talks
Introduction of Soviet Arms to Libya

Table 1. Space Allocated to Egypt and Top Ten Foreign Countries (*al-Ahram*, May 1975)

Country	Items	Amount Square Centimeters	Percentage Total Space	Percentage Foreign Space
Egypt	140	35,429	34	-----
United States	81	14,865	14	23.99
Israel	49	8,445	8	13.63
Iraq	20	4,024	4	6.49
Kuwait	11	3,954	4	6.38
Soviet Union	29	3,090	3	4.99
Libya	17	2,583	2	4.17
Syria	19	2,200	2	3.55
Jordan	9	1,940	2	3.13
Yugoslavia	11	1,822	2	2.94
Lebanon	16	1,490	1	2.26

[1] See page 7 above for a description of *al-Ahram* and its role.

Table 2. Rank Order of Critical Coverage

RANK ORDER COVERAGE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, AREAS, BLOCS
BY TITLE - CRITICAL COVERAGE

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN - EGYPT
TITLE OF PUBLICATION - AL AHRAM (CAIRO)

RANK	COUNTRY/AREA/BLOC	MAY 75 SPACE CM2	PERCENT
1	ISRAEL	7,362	44.73
2	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	5,178	31.46
3	LIBYA	1,635	9.93
4	UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	1,210	7.35
5	JORDAN	230	1.40
6	WORLD WIDE	215	1.31
7	SYRIA	185	1.12
8	NETHERLANDS	145	.88
9	IRAQ	140	.85
10	EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY	100	.61
11	ARAB COUNTRIES	45	.27
12	SAUDI ARABIA	.15	.09
	TOTALS	16,460	100.00

Table 3. Rank Order of Favorable Coverage

RANK ORDER COVERAGE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, AREAS, BLOCS
BY TITLE - FAVORABLE COVERAGE

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN - EGYPT
TITLE OF PUBLICATION - AL AHRAM (CAIRO)

RANK	COUNTRY/AREA/BLOC	MAY 75 SPACE CM2	PERCENT
1	ARAB COUNTRIES	3,270	22.97
2	IRAQ	2,934	20.61
3	JORDAN	1,005	7.06
4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	1,017	7.16
5	YUGOSLAVIA	975	6.85
6	MIDDLE EAST	774	5.44
7	AUSTRIA	700	4.92
8	UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	605	4.27
9	KUWAIT	423	3.46
10	SYRIA	430	3.02
11	NETHERLANDS	406	2.85
12	EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY	350	2.46
13	NORWAY	240	1.69
14	PALESTINE	235	1.65
15	IRAN	195	1.37
16	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	180	1.26
17	WORLD WIDE	90	.63
18	LEBANON	90	.63
19	ISRAEL	80	.56
20	HUNGARY	70	.49
	TOTALS	14,234	99.99

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Table 4 provides a Dimension of Editorial Direction (E_d) showing the overall tone (i.e., favorable, neutral, or critical) for a selected list of governments reported in the May issues of *al-Ahram*. The E_d considered the variables of space and editorial tone in order to present the reader with a comprehensive rank order of *al-Ahram's* editorial attitudes toward governments and issues. Israel and Libya were the principal villains on the negative side of the index. There was only a nine-point difference in the Egyptian newspaper's editorial policy toward the United States as compared to the Soviet Union. Lebanon was on the positive side of the index by only six points. The editors of *al-Ahram* ranked Iraq with the highest positive score.

Table 4. Dimension of Editorial Direction
(*al-Ahram*, May 1975)

Country	Total Coverage CM^2	Raw Score [2]	Refined Index Score [3]
			-1.00 ← Most Critical
Israel	8,445	-0.98	-0.96
Libya	2,583	-1.00	-0.63
United States	14,865	-0.67	-0.28
Soviet Union	3,090	-0.33	-0.19
Saudi Arabia	105	-1.00	-0.19
			← Neutral
Lebanon	1,490	+1.00	+0.06
Syria	2,200	+0.39	+0.11
Kuwait	3,945	+1.00	+0.12
Jordan	1,940	+0.65	+0.45
Iraq	4,024	+0.91	+0.69
			+1.00 ← Most Favorable

Overview of Egypt's Role

Approximately 26 percent of *all* editorials, articles, or news items and 34 percent of *al-Ahram's* space (in May 1975) articulated the issues and activities of President Sadat and his government concerning Middle East

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[2]The data in this column establishes the initial interval scale (ranging from +1 to -1) which measures the relative amount of favorable vs. critical coverage.

[3]The refined index score reduces the "power" of the values established in the raw score column by taking the amount of neutral and total coverage into consideration.

politics.[4] The information contained below provides a statistical overview of the distribution of subject categories about events and actions of the government in Cairo (based on square centimeters of allocated space) as reported in *al-Ahram*.

• International Political Discussions and Negotiations.	38 items	34 percent of space
• Official Visits and Protocol. . . .	37 items	23 percent of space
• Arab Unity and Political Strategy .	27 items	23 percent of space
• Foreign Policy (Other).	23 items	10 percent of space
• International Trade	6 items	8 percent of space
• Military Strategy	3 items	1 percent of space
• Egyptian Military Assistance to Arab World.	3 items	1 percent of space
	140 items	100 percent of space

A major event during May was Sadat's visit to four Arab countries (Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria) in preparation for his meeting in Salzburg, Austria, with President Ford in June. Initially, the Cairo newspaper emphasized that the purpose of Sadat's trip was to foster Arab solidarity on political issues in the Middle East. From a detailed analysis of *al-Ahram* it appears that the trip was planned for several reasons: first, for overall psychological impact; second, to mend fences in inter-Arab disputes; third, to strengthen Egypt's position in Middle East politics; and, finally, to attempt political accommodation with Syria. Once the trip got started (after May 12), *al-Ahram* communiques emphasized that a major purpose of the Egyptian President's trip was to mediate inter-Arab disputes and border problems.

Sadat's journey appeared to have produced very little in the form of concrete evidence in the way of Arab unity. Space in *al-Ahram* devoted to the subject of a "common political strategy" primarily contained generalities and slogans concerning Arab solidarity. Examples are:

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[4]See PAMIS, FMA File, "Index to Selected Data from the Foreign Media Analysis System Master File," pp. 5-11, 22 June 1975. See also PAMIS, FMA File, "Media Directed to Domestic Audience," *al-Ahram* (Cairo), Theme Country and Other Country reports, National Military Command Support System Center, Room BF685, Pentagon, 21 June 1975.

The *al-Ahram* data set that was used for this report contained a total of 293 records; however, the analysis involved 255 items as "other country" entries and 293 items as "theme country" entries. The total space analyzed consisted of 48,044 square centimeters (cm^2) as "other country" and 56,026 as "theme country" entries.

- Sadat trip to four Arab countries made "great progress" toward achieving agreement on Middle East issues.
- One unified position to face any threat or challenge.
- (The trip) strengthened the Arab position vis-a-vis the Geneva Conference.

An analysis of feature articles, news items, and communiques on the subject of foreign policy discussions and negotiations revealed that 80 percent of the space involved interaction on the part of Egypt with non-Arab governments. The majority of the space (51.2 percent) reported foreign policy discussion between Egypt and the United States. Additional space allocated to foreign policy discussions focused on relations between Egypt and the following governments:

Yugoslavia.	15 percent of total space
Austria	8 percent of total space
Kuwait.	6 percent of total space
Iraq.	6 percent of total space
Syria	5 percent of total space
Norway.	3 percent of total space
Jordan.	3 percent of total space

Almost 40 percent of the *al-Ahram* space about official state visits and the associated protocol emphasized Egyptian interaction with one country--*Kuwait*. Other governments that received significant coverage, in rank order of space allocated, were:

Iraq.	14 percent of total space
Syria	12 percent of total space
United States	9 percent of total space
Jordan.	8 percent of total space
Netherlands	5 percent of total space
United Arab Emirates. . . .	5 percent of total space
Yugoslavia.	2 percent of total space
Austria	2 percent of total space

Significant in its *absence* was Egyptian interaction with Saudi Arabia. During all of May, *al-Ahram* published only four very cryptic news items concerning the political interaction of Saudi Arabia with Jordan, Syria, and the United States.

Perceptions of the United States' Middle East Policy

The United States ranked first in total space allocated by the editors of *al-Ahram* to foreign countries. (See Table 1.) Almost 24 percent of the space and over half of all *al-Ahram* articles about foreign governments reported or described United States interactions in Middle East politics. Data in tables 2 and 3 show that overall 32 percent of the space was *critical* of United States actions and policies, and only 7 percent of the allocated space applauded the actions of Washington. The scope of subjects that were emphasized in *al-Ahram* concerning the United States was:

• Political Discussions and Negotiations	20 items	37 percent of space
• Political Strategy	23 items	29 percent of space
• Role of U.S. Congress	8 items	17 percent of space
• Visits and Protocol	8 items	5 percent of space
• Military Strategy	6 items	4 percent of space
• Weapons Systems (Performance)	2 items	4 percent of space
• Foreign Military Assistance	5 items	2 percent of space
• Other	9 items	2 percent of space
	81 items	100 percent of space

Egyptian preparation for the Sadat-Ford Salzburg meeting was the major thrust and theme of *al-Ahram* space allocated to U.S. foreign policy discussions and negotiations. As early as May 4 it was emphasized that

> "this meeting will help move the Middle East negotiations again. . . .this meeting will be the most important of recent political-historical meetings."[5]

Throughout the month there were increasing emphasis, expectations, editorial comment, and analysis about the Ford-Sadat meeting. A lesser amount of *al-Ahram* space was devoted to the Kissinger-Gromyko Vienna talks. The majority of the articles concerning United States political strategy in the Middle East emphasized the need for Washington to follow an "even-handed policy"--the editorial emphasis pleaded for "a clear statement from President Ford on his Middle East policy."

[5]See *al-Ahram*, May 4, page 1, item 9.

The letter from the United States Senate in support of Israel was received in Egypt with great displeasure. It was given page-one coverage. *Al-Ahram* emphasized its concern over the senatorial letter with the following headlines:

- "America's policy in the Middle East is threatened with failure, as it has failed in Vietnam."
- "Hot debates in the National Assembly regarding the letter of 76 American Senators to President Ford."
- "The direction of Congress leads to the isolation of America." (Mr. Mar'i)
- "Congress is inflicting failure in advance upon the Ford mission." (Mr. Fahmi)
- "The direction of the American Senators is harmful to peace in the Middle East."

During the last week of May there was an increase in the number of *al-Ahram* articles and editorials featuring such subjects as

U.S. Role in Middle East Settlement
U.S. Policy Role in Middle East
Clear U.S. Position in Middle East
Analysis of Ford-Sadat Meeting
Overview *U.S. Foreign Policy*[6]

It is significant that (during May 1975) only 10 percent of the space in *al-Ahram* about the United States concerned military subjects. Seventy-five percent of the military space was critical of U.S. actions and policy. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was severely criticized for the tone of his statements in regard to "the use of force in the face of a new oil embargo."[7] Moderate coverage was given to United States military assistance to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

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[6]See *al-Ahram*, May 28, p. 5, item 1. For abstract see PAMIS, FMA File, Clear-Text Abstracts, media title *al-Ahram*.

This article analyzed U.S. international policy. One point emphasized was that "Ford shaped his formula for the Salzburg meeting on the basis of guarantee of the limit acceptable by the Zionists for the existence of Israel and withdrawal from most lands occupied in 1967 in exchange for maximum guarantee of American petroleum interests. In contrast, Sadat's formula is based on minimum guarantee from Israel with a total withdrawal and establishment of a Palestinian national authority, in exchange for a guarantee of the limit acceptable by the Arabs with respect to American petroleum interests. The gap is wide between the two formulas. ...Most likely each side will adhere to its own formula, and the Salzburg meeting might make small practical steps in the way of a peaceful solution....and enter the Geneva conference with a relative feeling of security--otherwise there is no escape from a fifth war."

[7]See *al-Ahram*, 20 May 1975, p. 5.

Egyptian View of Israel

The editors of *al-Ahram* ranked the government of Israel second, based on the quantity of total space allocated to foreign states. Over 13 percent of the foreign space appertained to the Jewish state; 87 percent of this space was critical of the actions or policies of the government in Tel Aviv and/or interactions with other states. Israel received the most negative treatment as compared to all other states with a dimension of editorial direction score of -.96 (see Table 4).

With the exception of the senatorial letter supporting Israel, little emphasis was given to Israeli-United States relations or interactions. Less than 5 percent of the space concerned U.S.-Israeli relations, and less than 4 percent of the space was devoted to direct Egyptian-Israeli subjects.

The information listed below provides a statistical view of the variety of subject categories emphasized in *al-Ahram* pertaining to Israel (based on square centimeters of space).

- Arab Political Strategy vis-a-vis Israel. . . . . 35 percent of total space
- U.S. Congress Support for Israel. . . . . 30 percent of total space
- Arab Military Strategy vis-a-vis Israel. . . . . 9 percent of total space
- Israeli-Lebanon Military Actions . . . . . 9 percent of total space
- Foreign Relations (Other) . . . . 4 percent of total space
- Economic Strategy . . . . . 4 percent of total space
- Policy Toward Minorities and Domestic Politics . . . . . 4 percent of total space
- U.S. Military Assistance. . . . . 2 percent of total space
- Jordan Defense Arrangements vis-a-vis Israel. . . . . 2 percent of total space
- Other . . . . . 1 percent of total space

Approximately 70 percent of the Israeli coverage was about international political policy subjects. The overall Arab position or strategy vis-a-vis the Tel Aviv government received significant media attention. Arab terms and conditions for boundary settlements were articulated. It should be noted

that only 21 percent of the space (about Israel) reported military actions or discussed military subjects. Most of the space about the Israeli armed forces depicted attacks on the civilian population of Lebanon. However, an equal amount of space explained the overall Arab military strategy vis-a-vis Israel. The economic agreement concluded between Tel Aviv and the European Common Market was most severely criticized.

Perceptions of the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union ranked fifth, with almost 5 percent of the total foreign coverage. Overall, 41 percent of the space about the USSR was neutral in tone, and an almost equal amount (39 percent) was *critical* of the Soviet government and its actions in regard to Middle East politics.

On 2 May, *al-Ahram* reported in great detail President Sadat's concern and displeasure with costs, deliveries, and other aspects of Soviet-Egyptian arms arrangements. In the same issue, Ihsan abd al-Quddus, in his weekly editorial (on page 1), articulated Egypt's position in regard to the need for a *balance* between the roles of the United States Government and the Soviet Union in Middle East politics. The editorial emphasized that "Egypt must be completely self-reliant in determining its own position (vis-a-vis the United States and the Soviet Union)."

The data below set forth the relationship of various subject categories pertaining to the USSR, based on the amount of square centimeters of space and the number of articles or news items allocated by the editors of *al-Ahram* to the Soviet Union.

• Foreign Military Assistance.	12 items	43 percent of space
• Political Strategy	4 items	22 percent of space
• Weapons System Performance	1 item	15 percent of space
• Political Discussion and Negotiations	6 items	11 percent of space
• Military Bases	2 items	5 percent of space
• Other.	4 items	5 percent of space
	29 items	100 percent of space

Approximately 63 percent of *al-Ahram's* coverage of the Soviet Union concerned military subjects. Starting on 15 May, the thrust of the coverage

was focused on the Soviet arms deal with Libya. All was critical of Moscow. Typical headlines were:

- "Libya Grants Soviet Union Land, Air, and Naval Bases"
- "Four Billion Dollars Value of Arms Deal"
- "Soviet Experts to Libya in all Military Aspects"
- "Arms Deal Includes 2000 Tanks"
- "World Concern Over Agreement"

The Egyptian government's distress and concern about the Soviet-Lybian arms arrangement was apparent from both the scope and tone of *al-Ahram's* coverage.

In regard to the United States, negotiations between Gromyko and Kissinger occupied a significant amount of space. The need for Egypt to obtain a balance between United States and Soviet support was a point emphasized by the editors of the Cairo newspaper.

Perceptions of Iraq and Kuwait

The actions and activities of Iraq and Kuwait received an equal amount of high coverage (see Table 1) in *al-Ahram*. Overall, the editorial tone was highly favorable toward both Arab states. The data below compare the percentage of space devoted to various subjects in the pages of the Cairo newspaper concerning Iraq and Kuwait.

	KUWAIT	IRAQ
• Official Visits and Protocol.	69 percent	22 percent
• Political Strategy and Talks.	28 percent	31 percent
• Territorial Disputes.	1 percent	8 percent
• Foreign Economic Exchanges.	1 percent	39 percent[8]
	100 percent	100 percent

The above data show that the major media emphasis concerning Kuwait, and to a lesser extent Iraq, was President Sadat's trip and the protocol associated with his visit. Extensive photographic coverage was given to Sadat's visits with the rulers in Baghdad and Kuwait. The editors of *al-Ahram* emphasized in major headlines that:

- "Sadat arrives at Baghdad on the first visit by an Egyptian President to Iraq."

[8]This statistic represents two feature articles concerning economic cooperation between Egyptian-Iraqi industry.

- "Sadat's visit to Iraq strengthened the relations between the two countries."
- "The realization of Arab economic integration began for the first time in an effective manner on the road to complete unity." (re. Iraq)
- "....Kuwait will soon undertake a concentrated effort to support Egypt, particularly in the economic fields."

The territorial dispute between Iraq and Kuwait received modest attention; the Euphrates water dispute and other frictions between Iraq and Syria were covered extensively.

Perceptions of Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon

The governments of Syria and Jordan ranked seventh and eighth in *al-Ahram's* coverage of foreign states and were allotted approximately an equal amount of space (see Table 1). Since Lebanon was not on Sadat's travel itinerary, it received somewhat less attention in the Cairo media. The information below compares the subjects emphasized in *al-Ahram* concerning the three countries bordering Israel. The data represent the percentage of square centimeters of space for each subject relevant to each country.

	SYRIA	JORDAN	LEBANON
• Arab Unity and Political Strategy.	45 percent	56 percent	47 percent
• Official Visits and Protocol.	40 percent	32 percent	----------
• Military Hostilities--Israel.	----------	----------	53 percent
• Arms Sales (United States). . .	----------	12 percent	----------
• Inter-Arab Disputes	14 percent	----------	----------
	100 percent	100 percent	100 percent

Al-Ahram's coverage about Arab political strategy (and the Sadat-Ford summit) primarily focused on the interaction of Egypt with Syria and Jordan in regard to Middle East politics. The Syrian-Iraqi dispute received considerable attention in the Cairo newspaper. It was emphasized that the "relations between the two countries are passing through a difficult period due to the Euphrates dispute." The coverage of Israeli-Lebanon military actions emphasized complaints (by Lebanon) to the United Nations Secretary General and civilian casualties and fatalities.

Conclusions

This survey is a "snapshot" of perceptions of Middle East international politics based on a survey of almost 300 editorials, feature stories, news items, and communiques published in the semi-official Egyptian daily newspaper--*al-Ahram*--during May 1975. The major findings are:

United States. On balance, the media "snapshot" presented a cooperative and somewhat positive tone toward the role of the United States Government in interacting with Arab states. The vast amount and moderate tone of the coverage allocated to the forthcoming summit meeting in Salzburg suggests a serious desire that United States-Egyptian cooperation succeed and that Washington should continue to interact with the Arab states in a search for peace in the Middle East.

Soviet Union. The Soviet-Libyan arms arrangement added insult to injury when considering Sadat's stated unhappiness with Soviet-Egyptian arms pacts. Soviet military interests and assistance to Libya received sensational and dramatic media coverage. It is probable that this issue was being exploited by Sadat in order to satisfy domestic psychological programs.

Egypt. Sadat's visit to the four Arab states produced very little concrete evidence of Arab unity concerning Middle East politics. The trip was profitable for psychological purposes; it was also helpful in establishing President Sadat's role as a possible arbitrator of inter-Arab disputes. The need for Egypt to obtain a balance between support from the United States and the Soviet Union was emphasized in a significant number of *al-Ahram* editorials and feature stories.

APPENDIX 2. COMPARISON OF MIDDLE EAST NEWSPAPERS: EDITORIAL SALIENCE

by Charles H. Wagner

As a research tool, content analysis normally provides very general findings before focusing on more highly detailed observations about a particular topic. In this way, each subsequent step not only generates more information than the preceding step, but there is also less danger that the perspective of the "forest" might become confused with the "trees." A special effort was made in this pilot project to develop a general measure[1] which would make it possible to express--in a single statistic--the amount of coverage (or space) given to news reports about a particular country in a newspaper in addition to the overall tone (i.e., favorable, neutral, or critical) of that coverage. Such a statistical measure not only provides a comprehensive[2] statement of editorial perspective, but it also permits precise inter- and intra-newspaper comparisons. Information of this type is particularly important, since one of the newspapers (*al-Ahram*) used in the pilot study is a semi-official Egyptian government publication, one is a conservative (especially Saudi-influenced) medium, and one is a leading Lebanese newspaper relatively free of direct control. It is obvious, of course, that *al-Hayat* and *al-Nahar* would differ in coverage from *al-Ahram*. The key questions are *how much* do they differ, and in what direction.

To provide answers to these questions, a comprehensive statistic measuring both tone and space (which we define as salience) was developed. This "Dimension of Editorial Direction" (E_d) is based on the following formula:

$$\frac{F - C}{F + C} \times \left(1 - \frac{N}{C} \right) \times T$$

Where F is the amount of favorable coverage in square centimeters, C is the amount of critical coverage in square centimeters; N is the amount of neutral coverage in square centimeters, and T is the amount of total

[1] A measure seeks to assign a value, rank, or symbol to a category of phenomena; frequently, the value so assigned attempts to express a distance or interval from other like-values.

[2] It would be comprehensive in that it would express both tone and amount of coverage.

coverage (i.e., F + C + N) in square centimeters.[3]

The following two tables summarize the findings derived from the Dimension of Editorial Direction formula for *al-Ahram* and *al-Hayat*. In tables 1 and 2, E_d (and E_n) value findings have been listed in rank order fashion, with the most negative values (indicating critical coverage) listed at the top of the tables and the most positive (favorable coverage) values listed at the bottom. Findings, to be sure, are based on a small data base. With this caveat in mind, however, the following observations are offered as an exmaple of the kinds of conclusions obtainable through this method.

The E_n values highlight a number of major saliency differences and similarities between *al-Hayat* and *al-Ahram*. Overall, *al-Ahram's* coverage

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[3]The first part of this formula (involving F and C) establishes an interval scale (ranging in values from +1 to -1), which measures the relative amount of favorable versus critical coverage of a country in a specific newspaper--excluding a consideration of neutral coverage and the amount of total coverage. This scale of values we call the index of editorial direction (I_d); a value of -1 on the I_d scale would indicate completely critical coverage of a country and vice-versa. The second part of the formula $(1 - \frac{N}{T})$ reduces the "power" of the values established in the first part (i.e., the I_d scale) by taking the amount of neutral coverage into consideration. When the percentage of neutral coverage of a specific country is high relative to the percentage of favorable and/or critical coverage, then the index of direction values are reduced--i.e., they approach the value of zero. (The zero point on the I_d scale, as well as on the scale we are presently developing, represents the point of completely neutral coverage.) Hence, the first two parts of the formula in combination give one a "refined" index of editorial direction (R_d). Like the I_d, the R_d is also an interval scale having the same range of values as the I_d. In the third part of the equation, R_d is multiplied by the amount of total coverage in order to "weight" the significance of R_d in terms of the amount of newspaper space upon which it was based. The resulting statistic is, of course, the dimension of editorial direction (E_d).

The E_d provides an excellent method to make intra-newspaper comparisons. Nevertheless, inter-newspaper comparisons of E_d values are subject to difficulties. For example, a larger newspaper (in number of pages) is likely to have more coverage of all countries; therefore, all its computed E_d values are likely to be larger than a smaller newspaper. Also, different time periods covered (i.e., in length) as between two newspapers could cause differences in E_d values. The E_d, then, must be adjusted in order to make valid inter-newspaper comparisons. This adjustment is accomplished by normalizing all E_d values--i.e., finding out what percentage a particular E_d value represents in terms of the sum of all E_d values for a particular newspaper. The resulting statistic is represented as E_n.

Table 5. Editorial Personality of *al-Hayat*

COUNTRY	TOTAL COVERAGE CM^2	I_d	R_d	E_d	E_n
ISR	27,857	-.86	-.57	-15878.4	-.237
USA	25,123	-.52	-.27	- 6808.9	-.099
LIB	2,215	-.94	-.73	- 1616.9	-.024
JOR	4,834	+.59	+.14	+ 692.2	+.010
IRQ	9,374	+.16	+.10	+ 932.8	+.014
PAL	1,224	+.96	+.89	+ 1093.4	+.016
USR	6,828	+.48	+.20	+ 1392.2	+.-21
SYR	12,750	+.88	+.28	+ 3602.7	+.054
EGY	29,789	+.54	+.26	+ 7639.3	+.114
SAU	48,270	+.96	+.56	+27423.5	+.409
			TOTAL	67080.3	

Table 6. Editorial Personality of *al-Ahram*

COUNTRY	TOTAL COVERAGE CM^2	I_d	R_d	E_d	E_n
ISR	8,445	-.98	-.86	-7281.0	-.399
USA	14,865	-.67	-.28	-4158.9	-.227
LIB	2,583	-1.0	-.63	-1635.0	-.108
USR	3,090	-.33	-.19	- 601.9	-.032
SAU	105	-1.0	-.14	- 15.0	-.001
LEB	1,490	+1.0	+.06	+ 90.0	+.004
PAL	235	+1.0	+1.0	+ 235.0	+.013
SYR	2,200	+.39	+.11	+ 244.9	+.014
JOR	1,940	+.65	+.45	+ 864.9	+.047
IRQ	4,024	+.91	+.69	+2794.0	+.153
			TOTAL	17921.5	

is far more critical (75 percent of all E_n values) than *al-Ahram's* coverage (35 percent of all E_n values). Interestingly, however, the critical coverage in both newspapers was focused almost completely on three countries--Israel, the United States, and Libya, in that order. The major difference between the two newspapers in their coverage of these three countries was, of course, one of degree and not direction. Although coverage of Israel, the United States, and Libya loaded high on negative E_n values in both newspapers, these three loadings accounted for much more of the total E_n variance in *al-Ahram* (73 percent) than in *al-Hayat* (35 percent). Overall, then, *al-Ahram* E_n values indicated 38 percent more critical coverage of these three countries than did those of *al-Hayat*. The reasons for this editorial difference seem apparent to even the casual observer of current Middle Eastern foreign affairs. Egypt was directly involved (i.e., as a direct party to conflict or efforts to reduce conflict) with these three countries, and since *al-Ahram* is a semi-official government paper, these countries had greater salience for *al-Ahram* than for *al-Hayat*. The latter, while apparently sympathetic to the Egyptian position vis-a-vis these three countries, was much more interested in matters closer to home.

Apart from their basic agreement in editorial direction toward Israel, the United States, and Libya, the two newspapers are greatly dissimilar in their views (E_n values) toward Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and mildly dissimilar in their views toward Syria and Jordan. *Al-Hayat* was very supportive of Saudi Arabia (E_n = +.409)--a fact which is explained by the high level of financial aid given to *al-Hayat* by that country; *al-Ahram* largely ignored Saudi Arabia.

Al-Ahram's relatively favorable coverage of Iraq (E_n = +.153) as compared with Syria (E_n = +.014) is of particular interest in view of the fact that Syria and Egypt have traditionally been allies--if for no other reason than they both have had to confront Israel to defend their Arab nationalist positions--while Iraq and Syria have been experiencing border dispute difficulties.

APPENDIX 3. SOURCES AND COVERAGE

SOURCES

Content analysis as a method of observing public media should logically proceed from observations about media subjects and tone to more discreet observations such as editorial technique. For example, one element of editorial technique that can be analyzed and quantified is an examination of the attribution of the "information sources" used by editors or writers to add prestige or credibility to message content. An "information source" can be foreign or domestic; it can be an established institution or a person. In this analysis, the sources of information used in two Lebanese newspapers (*al-Hayat* and *al-Nahar*) have been categorized and coded to reflect the following:

- Commercial news services. Reuters, United Press International, and the Associated Press are examples of these services.
- Government officials. This category includes high functionaries of an established government or members of its bureaucracy speaking in their official capacity (even if on a not-for-attribution basis).
- Head of government. Clearly, this is a more specific element of the previous category. It includes presidents, prime ministers, or monarchs.
- Newspapers or periodicals. The *Times* of London, *Time* (magazine), and the *Christian Science Monitor* are examples.
- Political leaders. In this category fall members of political organizations and insurgent groups.
- Journalists. Staff, foreign correspondents, and contributers--these and others (syndicated columnists) make up this category.

In addition to the type of information source, the national origin of the source was specified.

A structured, regular analysis of the sources of information used in public media should provide analysts with overall insights of editorial policy, information techniques and individual style of printed and electronic media. A comparison of the "information sources" used in *al-Hayat* and *al-Nahar* follows.

Statistical data from 793 feature articles, editorials, and news items appearing in *al-Hayat* and 449 items appearing in *al-Nahar* are shown in tables 7 and 8. A computer analysis of the 1242 items disclosed that the sources of information for the two publications were distributed as shown below.

Information Source	*al-Hayat*	*al-Nahar*
News Services	38 percent	37 percent
Government Officials	29 percent	23 percent
Head of Government	14 percent	13 percent
Newspapers and Periodicals	10 percent	06 percent
Journalists	----------	09 percent
Political Leaders	----------	08 percent
Other	11 percent	----------

(Figures do not total 100 percent due to rounding)

News Services

Al-Hayat favored Reuters as a commercial news source: almost 33 percent of all its wire service sources were attributed to this United Kingdom source. In addition, an analysis of the 793 articles revealed the majority of the "multiple" (more than one news service mentioned)* category included Reuters as a source of information. The Egyptian news services ranked next, far behind, followed by commercial news organizations from the United States and France. In *al-Nahar*, American and French commercial news sources were quoted in almost eight out of ten instances. Egyptian, Syrian, and Soviet wire services were used occasionally. No mention was made of Reuters.

* See Table 7, line 3.

Table 7. ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION SOURCES
AL HAYAT – MARCH-MAY 1975

Information Source Country	Percent Total	Type of Information Source			
		Wire Service **37.86***	Government Official **28.69***	Head of Government **13.6***	Newspaper **9.76***
EGYPT	17.75	12.50	25.00	10.86	33.33
UNITED STATES	15.68	09.37	23.95	08.69	06.06
MULTIPLE	13.31	35.15	–	–	–
UNITED KINGDOM	13.01	32.81	01.04	–	03.03
ISRAEL	09.46	–	14.58	13.04	27.20
SAUDI ARABIA	08.57	03.12	13.54	23.91	–
LEBANON	05.91	–	07.29	13.04	–
SOVIET UNION	02.95	00.78	03.12	06.52	09.09
FRANCE	02.95	03.90	04.16	02.17	–
JORDAN	02.95	–	–	17.39	03.03
SYRIA	07.39	02.34	07.29	04.34	24.24
	99.93%	99.97%	99.97%	99.96%	99.85%

* Percent per type source of total information sources.

Table 8. ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION SOURCES
AL NAHAR – MARCH-MAY 1975

Information Source Country	Percent Total	Type of Information Source					
		Wire Service **33.0***	Government Official **23.0***	Head of Government **13.0***	Newspaper **06.0***	Journalist+ **9.4***	Political Leader **7.7***
UNITED STATES	39.0	51.51	43.47	08.33	16.66	09.00	89.00
EGYPT	15.0	09.09	17.39	33.33	33.33	–	11.00
LEBANON	16.0	–	04.34	08.33	33.33	91.00	–
FRANCE	12.0	27.27	13.04	–	–	–	–
ISRAEL	06.0	–	08.69	08.33	16.66	–	–
SYRIA	06.0	06.06	08.69	16.66	–	–	–
USSR	03.0	06.06	04.34	–	–	–	–
JORDAN	03.0	–	–	25.00	–	–	–
	100.0	99.99%	99.96%	99.98%	99.98%	100.00%	100.00%

\+ Includes staff correspondents and writers.
** Percent for attributable sources of total information sources.

Government Officials

Statements of cabinet members and other high government officials from Egypt and the United States were given equal attention by the editors of *al-Hayat*. A somewhat lesser amount of coverage was attributed to officials from Israel and Saudi Arabia. Syrian and Lebanese functionaries ranked third as sources of information quoted in *al-Hayat*. The editors of *al-Nahar* gave very high coverage to statements made by the U.S. secretaries of Defense and State. A lesser amount of attention involved attribution from functionaries of Egypt and France. Minimum coverage was given to statements of officials from the Soviet Union.


Head of Government

When the writers and editors of *al-Hayat* selected statements of national leaders to support its messages, Saudi Arabia ranked first with almost 24 percent of the total for this information source. Since the Saudi government is the primary funder of *al-Hayat*, this is not surprising. The leaders of Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and the United States received a respectable amount of coverage. On the other hand, the president of Egypt and the king of Jordan were quoted most frequently by the editors of *al-Nahar*. A significant number of articles were attributed to the president of Syria. Both newspapers gave some attention to statements of the president of the United States and the prime minister of Israel.

The data in tables 7 and 8 represent a limited (three-month) view of *al-Hayat* and *al-Nahar*, and, consequently, these data should only be considered as tentative.

In both newspapers, the leading information sources were Egypt and the United States. U.S. wire services were a major news source for *al-Nahar*, but the Western orientation shows through clearly in the sources of both newspapers: all major information sources are either Western, Egyptian, or, in the case of *al-Nahar*, Lebanese. The major differences between the newspapers' sources are France, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Lebanon is a key source for *al-Nahar*, but much less important for *al-Hayat*. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, plays a greater role in the latter's sources. The Soviet Union is a minor source for both newspapers.

Figure 1. A COMPARISON OF AL NAHAR AND AL HAYAT COVERAGE OF SELECTED COUNTRIES, MARCH-MAY, 1975



COVERAGE

The same foreign policy articles were considered from the point of view of coverage. *Al-Nahar* gave greater coverage to the United States (in terms of regional foreign and military policy considerations) than to any other country. (See Figure 1.) *Al Hayat*, on the other hand, in the same type of article, covered Saudi Arabia even more heavily. Greater concentration on Saudi Arabia is congruent with expectations, since *al-Hayat* is subsidized by Saudi Arabia. *Al-Nahar's* American focus is explained both by the newspaper's Western orientation and, in this case, by the central role the United States played in the Middle East during the period covered. In general, both newspapers covered other countries to similar degrees. Egypt dominated coverage of Arab states (except Saudi coverage in *al-Hayat*, as noted), followed in descending order by Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Libya. Saudi Arabia and Israel received equally prominent coverage in *al-Nahar*, i.e., more than any other regional states except Egypt. The Soviet Union enjoyed an attention level no higher than that of Iraq, while even in *al-Hayat* the United States' coverage fell behind only that of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel.

Military Matters

Figures 2 and 3 provide graphic portrayals of the coverage by *al-Hayat* and *al-Nahar* of the United States and Israel, respectively. In addition, they break down coverage to focus on military subject matter.

Of the space devoted to the United States by *al-Nahar* and *al-Hayat*, less than ten percent dealt with domestic politics, economic strategy, and other non-foreign-policy-related areas. In both newspapers, approximately 85 percent of the coverage concentrated on foreign policy and political discussions and negotiations. In *al-Nahar* and *al-Hayat*, seven and eight percent of the U.S. coverage, respectively, dealt with military subjects.

In view of the similarity in coverage of the United States by category, the differences between the newspapers' treatment of U.S. military matters are surprising. Bringing together the military assistance, arms grants, and arms sales categories, 74 percent of *al-Nahar's* military coverage of the United




Figure 2. COVERAGE OF UNITED STATES BY AL-NAHAR AND AL-HAYAT, MARCH-MAY 1975




Figure 3. COVERAGE OF ISRAEL BY AL-NAHAR AND AL-HAYAT, MARCH-MAY 1975

States in the Middle East concerned these aspects, while only 49 percent of *al-Hayat's* coverage focused on these issues. In both newspapers, it was the dyadic U.S.-Israel relationship that predominated the coverage. In *al-Nahar*, 69 percent of the combined sales-grants-assistance category covered Israel. In *al-Hayat*, the proportion was even higher: fully 82 percent of this multiple-category combination was devoted to the Israeli portion of U.S. military affairs. Some attention in both newspapers also was given to U.S. military sales and assistance to Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Figure 3 analyzes *al-Nahar's* and *al-Hayat's* treatment of Israel along the same dimensions used for the United States. Differences between the newspapers are greater in almost every category with respect to Israel than with respect to the U.S. While *al-Nahar* concentrated on arms transfers, *al-Hayat* focused on Israeli border violations and military strategy.

APPENDIX 4. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF ARAB PERCEPTIONS, MARCH-MAY 1975

Major events covered in the Arab press concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict during the period under study--March 1 through May 31, 1975--focused on three major topics: the Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-Arab conflicts and attempts at cooperation, and Arab relations with the rest of the world. A single overview of these relationships is provided in Figure 4.

The topic receiving most attention--by far--was the Arab-Israeli conflict, which, for the purposes of this appendix and in view of its intensity, can be divided into several inter-related sub-conflicts and attempts at conflict reduction, including (1) Arab-Israeli relations, (2) Arab state interactions with respect to the conflict; (3) interactions involving the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); (4) Arab state relations with the great powers; and (5) Israeli relations with the great powers. Figure 4 graphically demonstrates that the overriding concern during the period from March to May was the Egypt-Israel aspect of Arab-Israeli relations.


ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Israel-Egypt

The most important development in Arab-Israeli relations involved attempts by Egypt and Israel to continue their step-by-step approach to peace which made use of American mediation efforts through the "shuttle" diplomacy of U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger. This effort, which began in early March, had reached a state of impasse by March 22. Israel insisted on an Egyptian promise of non-belligerency in return for strategic Sinai passes and Egyptian oil fields in Sinai. Egypt, for its part, felt that it could offer a pledge to refrain from opening hostilities so long as progress toward an overall settlement was being made. Israel countered by offering a lesser amount of territory--a proposition which Mr. Sadat refused. At this point, talks were broken off amid mutual accusations by the conflicting parties.

Figure 4. DIGRAPH OF MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS, MARCH-MAY 1975

by Charles H. Wagner



In a surprise announcement, Egyptian President Sadat said on March 30 that Egypt would reopen the Suez Canal on June 5, despite the failure of the Kissinger talks. The effect of the announcement was to keep alive Egypt's moderate position and commitment to a peaceful approach to and eventual resolution of differences with Israel--particularly since the announcement was coupled with a three-month renewal of the U.N. cease-fire agreement. However, Israeli ships were to be barred from Suez transit, since a second-stage agreement had not been negotiated.

Other Arab states raised various issues concerning a possible settlement with Israel. Although he preferred the Geneva Conference approach, Syrian President Hafez Assad was reported on April 9 to be ready to demilitarize the Golan Heights, if Israel would return them. Saudi Arabian oil minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani hinted at an easing of the Saudi position on Jerusalem by suggesting that "Jews should have a right to worship there too." The statement represented a clarification of an earlier remark by the new Saudi leadership (following the assassination of King Faisal on March 25) to the effect that the Saudis regarded the "liberation of Jerusalem" as a "basic necessity." Some Arab nations (including Iraq and Libya) preferred no diplomatic dealings with Israel. As Figure 4 shows, Jordan and Lebanon have to some extent been pushed aside from the central Arab-Israeli issues.

Israel-Lebanon

With frequent clashes--both major and minor--along the border, relations between Israel and Lebanon remained tense. The Arab media tended to focus largely on Israeli raids against Lebanon. Typical headlines noted: "A State of Alert and Tension in the South; Israeli Concentration in Preparation for an Aggression on al-'Arqub; Wide Clashes Between the Fedayon and the Enemy";[1] "Extensive Israeli Military Movements on the Borders";[2] and "Israel Bombs al-'Arqub and Hasbaya."[3]

[1] *Al-Hayat*, April 5, 1975, p. 1.

[2] *Al-Hayat*, March 25, 1975, p. 1.

[3] *Al-Nahar*, April 5, 1975, p. 1.

ARAB STATE INTERACTIONS OVER THE CONFLICT

Egypt-Syria

Egypt's attempts to reach a bilateral accommodation with Israel brought criticism from various sectors of the Arab world, including Syria, the PLO, and, to a lesser extent, Iraq and Jordan--who were concerned that Egypt's removal from the conflict would damage their position vis-a-vis Israel. After the Egyptian-Israeli impasse of March 22, however, Egypt promptly began a fence-mending operation. On March 23, for example, Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi called for the reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference with great power participation. The minister further said that Egypt would ask Syria to join her in this request, since Syria had feared Egypt might seek a separate agreement with Israel. Attempts at coordinating their positions were begun at the Riyadh tripartite summit. On May 13, Egyptian President Sadat began a ten-day tour of Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. By May 18, Sadat, speaking from Syria, asserted that he had won a mandate to speak for the Arab World (not just Egypt) during his forthcoming talks with U.S. President Ford in Salzburg, Austria, on June 1. In fact, it became apparent to the Egyptians that there could be no unified Arab position at Geneva; hence, Sadat was once again willing to accept American mediation efforts--the effect of which was, at least, to keep American pressure on Israel to modify its bargaining position.

INTERACTIONS INVOLVING TH E PLO

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other Arab guerrilla movements continued their efforts for political survival. Israel maintained its opposition to the possibility of a West Bank Palestinian state led by the PLO. On April 16, for example, Israeli Minister Without Portfolio Galili said that while Israel was ready to listen to Palestinian views in order to reduce enmity, the Israelis would negotiate only with the government of Jordan and never with the PLO. Palestinian guerrilla organizations in Lebanon came under attack by right-wing Christian Phalangists in a series of incidents bordering on civil war.

ARAB-ISRAELI INTERACTIONS WITH GREAT POWERS

Israel-U.S. and Egypt-U.S.

Despite the failure of the Kissinger mission, Egypt's relations with the United States continued to improve, while Israeli relations with the United States were, at best, cool. Although both President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger avoided public statements that blamed Israel for the collapse of negotiations, informal remarks and "leaked" diplomatic notes by the United States accused Israel of not being sufficiently flexible in the negotiations. In private remarks, for example, Kissinger said that Israel was making a strategic error in not arriving at a bilateral agreement with Egypt, since Israel would not be forced to face combined Arab states at the Geneva talks. Furthermore, Kissinger warned that the Middle East was near a flash point that might well arrive by July unless new diplomatic initiatives were undertaken. In order to break the diplomatic logjam, the American leadership began to exert some pressure on Israel. A few days after the collapse of negotiations, President Ford ordered a "total re-examination of U.S. policy toward the Middle East." This review would include "all aspects of all countries." What this re-examination was to mean became clearer when U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger held a press conference on April 1 in which he stressed that: (1) the United States would be reluctant to enter any new arms commitment to Israel during the period of the policy revision, although existing commitments would be honored by April 1; (2) in reaction to a renewed oil embargo, "the reaction of the United States would be far more severe this time than last time"; (3) while the United States reaffirms Israel's right to exist, the policy of re-examination would seek to provide answers to what Israeli borders should be and how Palestinian representation should be handled; and (4) the United States would seek to determine how best to support Arab states and decrease Soviet influence--all within a situation containing risks of a new outbreak of fighting.

The prospects of a re-evaluation of the traditionally close U.S.-Israeli ties received widespread attention in the Arab press. Typical headlines in *al-Nahar* read: "New York Times Quoting Sources in Jerusalem: The Gravest

Crisis since 1956 between America and Israel,"[4] "Javits after his Talks with Rabin: There is no Actual Crisis Between America and Israel; However, Eban Announces: the Situation is Graver than People Think."[5]

The United States policy review toward Israel permitted Sadat to continue his plan to maintain a dialogue with the United States. The prospects of closer Egyptian-United States ties were alarming to Israel. On April 27, for example, Israeli diplomats expressed fears that the arms balance would shift in favor of the Egyptians, who were to receive 48 Mig-23s. Israel was seeking $2.5 billion in military aid from the United States--including F-15s, stand-off missiles, remote-controlled aircraft, and guided bombs. (Israel seemed particularly sensitive to increased Arab capabilities to hit Israeli cities with Soviet-built SCUD missiles. On April 5, for example, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin suggested the possibility of a pact with Egypt and Syria to spare major population centers in case of renewed war.) When the request for military aid was sidelined by the U.S. policy review, Israel warned that it would have no new proposals for Egypt, at least until the United States completed its policy reassessment and resumed consideration of Israel's arms request.

Mr. Rabin further warned the Ford administration that its policy review would have the support neither of Congress nor of the American people. Israel, meanwhile, said it would conduct an opinion poll in the United States in order to further evaluate such public opinion. In addition, the Israeli prime minister stated that any Israeli concessions to U.S. pressure would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and would invite demands for even more concessions. Finally, efforts by the Ford administration to persuade Israel to follow a new policy were considerably undercut by a May 22 letter (signed by 76 U.S. senators) that urged President Ford to grant economic and military aid to Israel. This letter, of course, became a major topic at the Egyptian national assembly meeting and was read with great displeasure in Arab capitals. Following the Senate letter, Israel

[4]March 29, 1975, p. 14.

[5]April 8, 1975, p. 12.

announced on May 26 that it had decided to ignore the U.S. request for new peace proposals--partly because Israel felt Egypt should make the first concessions, but also because the Israelis felt that the U.S. Congress would not demand Israeli concessions. Meanwhile, Israeli officials again suggested that another limited step in the Sinai would be the best approach to peace.

Egypt-USSR

In addition to the strain in U.S.-Israeli relations, Egypt and the Soviet Union were also experiencing difficulties. The Soviets, for their part, were not enthusiastic about Egypt's "U.S. connection" in her negotiations with Israel--a connection which was maintained even after the collapse of the negotiations. On May 1, the Soviets rejected an Egyptian request to reschedule repayment of Cairo's debts to the Soviet Union. Especially upsetting to the Egyptians, however, was the arms deal concluded between Moscow and Libya, which came shortly after the Soviets had denied a similar arms deal with Egypt. However, the Soviets did agree to an Egyptian request (on April 7) to help resume the Geneva Conference. The tone of Soviet-Egyptian relations was seen in the Arab press: "Egyptian Foreign Minister in Moscow; Gromyko: Developing the Relations Depends on the Egyptian Leadership."[6] "Fahmi in a Flight Conversation: The Circumstances which Prevented the Development of the Egyptian-Soviet Relations are Removed."[7]

Israel-USSR

As Soviet relations with Egypt remained cool, the Soviets scaled down their press attacks on Israel, and began trying to get various Arab states to agree on a common position for the Geneva Conference. The lines of the Soviet conception of a peace settlement became clearer on April 24, when Foreign Minister Gromyko said that the Soviet Union would be willing to help guarantee the independent existence of Israel as part of an overall

[6] *Al-Nahar*, April 20, 1975, p. 7.

[7] *Al-Hayat*, April 24, 1975, p. 8.

peace settlement. Headlines in *al-Nahar* reported the events, noting: "Gromyko Offers Israel Clear Securities for its Existence if it Relinquishes the Occupied Lands and Moves in the Road of Peace; The Americans Show Their Concern and the Israelis Study the Speech Carefully."[8] This guarantee would depend on the liberation of "all Arab lands" and the creation of a Palestinian state. By May 22, however, the USSR (after talks with leaders from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the PLO) had given up trying to forge a common Arab approach to the Geneva Conference. On May 20, Kissinger and Gromyko agreed to put off the Geneva Conference, since both felt that it might well end in failure.

OTHER ARAB STATE INTERACTIONS

Iraq-Iran

On March 7, the Shah of Iran announced that the long-standing feud between Iraq and Iran had been successfully negotiated. Iran would agree to cease its support of Iraq's Kurdish minority (which had been waging an intermittent civil war against Iraqi government control) in exchange for unspecified transit rights or boundary changes in the Shatt al-Arab.

Iraq-Syria

The Syrian government most certainly viewed the Iranian-Iraqi agreement with alarm, since the elimination of Iraq's Kurdish problem would give Iraq a freer hand to pursue its rivalry with Syria. Differences between the two countries are both ideological and substantive. The major difficulty is currently a Syrian dam on the Euphrates which the Iraqis claim infringes on their riparian rights. Syria has traditionally been reliant on Egyptian support against both Israel and her Arab rivals; hence, it was not surprising that Sadat's fence-mending visit to Syria in May (alluded to earlier) was successful. Typical headlines noted: "The Mediation of King Khalid between Syria and Iraq Approaches Success; Sadat and Hussein Participate in the Mediation in View of the Graveness of the Situation."[9]

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[8] April 25, 1975, p. 12.

[9] *Al-Hayat*, April 28, 1975, p. 1.

Egypt-Libya

Egypt and Libya continued their acerbic war of words which developed when their agreement to integrate politically failed in 1973. A sample of the hostile rhetoric was to be found in Sadat's May Day speech in which he denounced as lies the Libyan accusations that Sadat had used Libyan aid for personal gain and said that the level of Saudi and Algerian aid to Egypt put Libya to shame. Egypt frequently complained about what it regarded as an anti-Egyptian propaganda campaign conducted by Libya. In addition, Libya's mistreatment of Egyptian nationals was also a sore point. Egypt was particularly upset over the fact that the Soviet Union had concluded major new arms agreements with the Libyans in mid-May, while Egypt's request for more Soviet arms had been denied. Typical headlines read: "Mustafa Amin: There is no Hope for Improving Relations with Libya as long as Qaddafi is in Government";[10] "The Permanent Committee at the National Assembly Discusses the Egyptian-Libyan Relations; Qaddafi's Personality is Fluctuating--and his Decisions and Behavior are Conflicting."[11]

U.S.-Saudi Arabia and OPEC

Apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict, the activities of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) dominated the news on Arab foreign relations. Of major concern was the assassination of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia on March 25. The transition of power, however, proved to be smooth, and no immediate foreign policy changes were made by the Saudis. Nevertheless, on April 1, the U.S. Secretary of Defense did warn of a severe reaction by the United States in case of another oil embargo. Noted *al-Nahar* in a typical headline: "U.S. Ambassador in Riyadh: 80 Percent of the Americans are Against an Invasion of Arab Oil Fields and News of the Threats are Damaging to our Relations with Saudi Arabia."[12] In a move with significant political overtones, three OPEC members (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran) decided (by April 18) to end the practice of relating oil prices to the U.S. dollar; instead, they decided to link oil prices to the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDR) formula for establishing international monetary values.

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[10] *Al-Nahar*, April 27, 1975, p. 12.

[11] *Al-Ahram*, May 1, 1975, p. 5.

[12] March 13, 1975, p. 10.

A great deal of contention arose between OPEC and the United States over a conference of oil producing and oil consuming nations to be held in Paris. When the preliminary conference was called to order with 30 nations (including Third World representatives) in attendance on April 9, discussions soon broke down over the conference agenda. OPEC countries insisted that talks about oil prices be linked to prices of manufactured commodities, a position which the United States would not support. After the impasse in the talks, there were several mutual accusations and a few threats. For example, Saudi oil Minister Yamani warned, on April 21, that oil prices would go up, unless the Paris talks were resumed.

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