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
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A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR 1965-1972

Editor: Thomas C. Thayer

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Volume 1

**THE SITUATION
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<p>This twelve volume set includes every article printed in the fifty issue series of the <u>Southeast Asia Analysis Report</u>. The SEA Analysis Report represented a month-by-month analysis of Vietnam War activity including forces and manpower, VC/NV operations, Allied ground, naval and air operations, RVNAF, casualties and losses, population security, war costs and inflation and construction and port operations in South Vietnam. → (cont on p. C)</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(A) 403116</p>			

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A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR: 1965-1972

THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

VOLUME 1

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A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR: 1965-1972

Contents of the 12 Volumes

- Volume 1 - The Situation In Southeast Asia
- Volume 2 - Forces and Manpower
- Volume 3 - Viet Cong--North Vietnamese Operations
- Volume 4 - Allied Ground and Naval Operations
- Volume 5 - The Air War
- Volume 6 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)
- Volume 7 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)
- Volume 8 - Casualties and Losses
- Volume 9 - Population Security
- Volume 10 - Pacification and Civil Affairs
- Volume 11 - Economics: War Costs and Inflation
- Volume 12 - Construction and Port Operations in South Vietnam

A Systems Analysis View of The Vietnam War: 1965-1972

Volume 1

THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Volume 1 contains the following --

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Page</u>
1. <u>SOUTH VIETNAM</u> --		
A. <u>The Situation</u> (Also see Forces - Redeployments - Vol. 2)		
III Corps Preliminary Assessment	Nov 67	1
The Situation In South Vietnam	Jan 69	20
The Situation In South Vietnam: Overview	Nov/Dec 70	40
Military Region I		45
Military Region II		55
Military Region III		69
Military Region IV		75
The Situation In MR IV	Jun/Jul 71	86
Security Situation In Southern MR I	Jun/Jul 71	99
Battle Prospects In The MR 2 Highlands	Nov/Jan 72	104
B. <u>Trends</u> (Also see HES Trends - Volume 9)		
The War In Vietnam - Post Tet	Jun 68	114
Lulls In Vietnam	Nov 68	119
Trends In 1968	Jan 69	122
Trends In Vietnam: First Quarter 1969	Apr 69	128
Trends In Vietnam: Second Quarter 1969	Jul 69	134
The Current Lull In Combat	Jul 69	140
Indicators of Enemy Activity Levels In Vietnam	Nov/Dec 69	144
Indicators of Enemy Activity Levels In Vietnam	Jan 70	151
Comparison of Enemy Activity Levels With Prior Years	Apr/May 70	154
Tempo Of Activity In South Vietnam	Mar/Apr 71	161
Tempo Of The War	May 71	163
Winding Down The Air War	Aug/Oct 71	165
Winding Down The War	Aug/Oct 71	167
2. <u>CAMBODIA</u> ; <i>and</i>		
Cambodian Armed Forces	Apr/May 70	171
The War In Cambodia	Jan/Feb 71	177
The War In Cambodia	Mar/Apr 71	190
The War In Cambodia	Jun/Jul 71	233
The War In Cambodia	Nov/Jan 72	250
3. <u>THAILAND</u> *		
US Military Programs In Thailand	Feb 67	271
Incidents In Thailand	Jun 67	273
Thai Military Gets Larger Role In Counter-Insurgency	Oct 67	278
Thai Military Role In Counter-Insurgency: A Rebuttal	Nov 67	280

A Systems Analysis View Of The Vietnam War: 1965-1972

INTRODUCTION

This volume, plus the other eleven volumes in the series, contains every article ever printed in the Southeast Asia Analysis Report (a few additional papers not printed in the report are occasionally included, too.).

Fifty issues of the Southeast Asia Analysis Report were published from January 1967 through January 1972 by the Southeast Asia office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). The Report had two purposes. First, it served as a vehicle to distribute the analyses produced by Systems Analysis on Southeast Asia. It thus provided other agencies an opportunity to tell us if we were wrong and to help prevent research duplications. We solicited and received frequent rebuttals or comments on our analyses which sharpened our studies and stimulated better analysis by other agencies. Second, it was a useful management tool for getting more good work from our staff -- they knew they must regularly produce studies which would be read critically throughout the Executive Branch.

The first page of the Report stated that it "is not an official publication of the Department of Defense, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), or comparable officials." The intent was solely to improve the quality of analysis on Southeast Asia problems -- and to stimulate further thought and discussion. The report was successful in doing precisely this.

We distributed about 350 copies of the Report each month to OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), the Military Departments, CINCPAC, and Saigon, and to other interested agencies such as the Paris Delegation, AID, State Department, CIA and the White House Staff. Most copies circulated outside OSD were in response to specific requests from the individual person or agency. Our readership included many of the key commanders, staff officers, and analysts in Washington and in the field. Their comments were almost always generous and complimentary, even when they disagreed with our conclusions. Some excerpts appear below:

"I believe the 'SEA Analysis Report' serves a useful purpose, and I would like to see its present distribution continued." (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 31 May 1968)

"We used a highly interesting item in your May Analysis Report as the basis for a note to the Secretary, which I've attached." (State Department, 28 June 1967)

"We were all most impressed with your first monthly Southeast Asia Analysis Report. Not only do we wish to continue to receive it, but we would appreciate it if we could receive 4 (four) copies from now on." (White House, 9 February 1967)

"Ambassador _____ has asked me to tell you that he has much appreciated and benefited from the studies and analyses of this publication." (State Department/White House, 24 January 1969)

"Congratulations on your January issue. The 'Situation in South Vietnam' article was especially interesting and provoking." (State Department, 24 January 1969)

"I let Ambassador _____ take a swing at the paper. He made several comments which may be of interest to you. Many thanks for putting us back on distribution for your report. Also, despite the return volley, I hope you will continue sending your products." (MACV-CORDS, 17 June 1968)

"As an avid reader (and user) of the SEA Analysis Report, I see a need for more rounded analyses in the pacification field and fewer simplistic constructs." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 17 April 1968)

"The SEA Programs Division is to be commended for its perceptive analysis of topics that hold the continuing concern of this headquarters... The approach was thoughtfully objective throughout and it was particularly pleasing to note a more incisive recognition of factors that defy quantified expression." (Commander, US Army Vietnam-USARV, 29 November 1967)

"In general, I think it is becoming the best analytical periodical I've seen yet on Vietnam (though there's not much competition)." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 21 April 1967)

"Statistical extrapolations of this type serve an extremely useful purpose in many facets of our daily work." (CIA, 6 February 1967)

"One of the most useful Systems Analysis products we have seen is the monthly Southeast Asia Progress Report.... Indeed it strikes many of us as perhaps the most searching and stimulating periodic analysis put out on Vietnam." (President of The Rand Corporation, 22 October 1969)

In November 1968, 55 addressees answered a questionnaire about the Report: 52 said the report was useful, 2 said it was not, and 1 said, "The report does not meet an essential need of this headquarters;" nonetheless, it desired "to remain on distribution" for 7 copies. From 48 questionnaires with complete responses, we found that an average 4.8 people read each copy -- a projected readership of 500-950, depending on whether we assumed 1 or 2.4 readers of copies for which no questionnaire was returned.

Readers responding to the questionnaire reported using the Report for the following purposes:

Information	42%
Analysis	31%
Policy Making	11%
Briefings	7%
Other	9%
	<u>100%</u>

In addition, readers reported about equal interest in each of the seven subject areas normally covered in the Report.

VC/NVA	18%
Air Operations	20%
RVNAF	17%
Pacification	13%
Friendly Forces	12%
Deployments	12%
Logistics/Construction	8%
	<u>100%</u>

There was some negative reaction to the Report. Concern was expressed about "the distorted impressions" the Report left with the reader and its wide dissemination which "implies its acceptance by the Secretary of Defense, giving the document increased credibility."

Given the way in which the Southeast Asia Analysis Report was used, the important responsibilities of many of its readers, and the controversial aspects of the report, I decided to include in these twelve volumes every article ever published in a Southeast Asia Analysis Report. This will allow the users of these volumes to arrive at their own conclusions.

Thomas C. Thayer
February 18, 1975

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NOVEMBER 1967

SPECIAL REPORT

III Corps - A Preliminary Assessment


A preliminary analysis of the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) in South Vietnam indicates that definite progress has been made against the enemy there. Population security is up and VC/NVA base areas are penetrated regularly (although few have been neutralized). As a result of manpower shortages, the enemy is being forced to refill his VC units with NVA personnel to cover losses. Moreover, terrorist activities and incidents against hamlets are declining; and the allied capability to put pressure on the enemy is higher than ever.

The friendly force build-up has reached the point where there is one allied military person for every 14 civilians in III CTZ. Nevertheless, the enemy can still maintain a high rate of disruptive incidents, can mount large military actions against friendly forces, and retains his rural organization and infrastructure intact.

The analysis shows a continuous pattern of friendly forces, friendly operations, and VC/NVA incidents concentrated heavily in the five populous provinces surrounding Saigon. Conversely, most of the VC/NVA forces are located outside those provinces. The most active provinces in III CTZ today are the ones which have been areas of continuous and heavy communist involvement since the war against the French.

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June 67

III CORPS - A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

The III Corps Tactical Zone of South Vietnam contains about one-third of South Vietnam's population, and with the IV CTZ, comprises the "heart-land" of the country. It contains Saigon, the nerve center of all South Vietnamese and allied activities. It also contains the enemy's southern headquarters and some of his most important base areas (including War Zones C and D) from which he has launched his effort to control the critical provinces surrounding Saigon.

A preliminary assessment of III CTZ is presented below, based on data available in Washington. The analysis is far from complete. We plan to continue it for two purposes: (1) to develop a comprehensive, balanced assessment of trends in III CTZ; (2) to develop a systematic method of assessing the situation in the other three CTZ's, the VC/NVA military regions, and other groupings of provinces.

Much of the III CTZ analysis remains to be done. These preliminary findings are published for the sole purpose of soliciting comments and suggestions to help us take all relevant factors into account as the study progresses.

Forces in III CTZ

Table 1 shows that total friendly forces in III CTZ increased 50% in the 18 months between December 1965 and June 1967, primarily due to the US-FW force build up. By June 1967 34% of all friendly forces and 25% of the VC/NVA forces were located in III CTZ. (Retrospective data about the VC/NVA force structure is not available for a sufficient period to allow comparison of the friendly and enemy force build ups.)

TABLE 1

	<u>FRIENDLY FORCES BUILD UP^{a/}</u>			<u>1967</u> June
	<u>1965</u> Dec	<u>1966</u> June	<u>Dec</u>	
Strength (000's)				
US/FWF	68.2	106.0	160.4	167.7
RVNA ^{b/}	186.4	201.4	204.3	208.2
Total	254.6	307.4	364.7	375.9
Maneuver Battalions				
US/FWF	12	21	39	31
RVN	43	51	53	53
	55	72	92	84

a/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary, Table 104.

b/ Includes Regular, Regional and Popular forces.

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Table 2 shows that three fourths of the US and Vietnamese ground forces are located in the five provinces surrounding Saigon (henceforth called Saigon provinces). The proportion of friendly ground strength in the Saigon provinces declined from 75% to 70% during 1966, but increased again to 73% in early 1967.

TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF FRIENDLY GROUND FORCES - III CTZ
 (Average During Period - in Thousands)

	1965 2 Half	1966 1 Half	1967 2 Half	1967 1 Half
<u>US ARMY STRENGTH</u>				
Saigon Provinces ^{a/}	31.2	62.8	89.2	129.8
Outer Provinces ^{b/}	2.7	4.6	11.3	21.3
Total	33.9	67.4	100.5	151.1
<u>ARVN STRENGTH</u>				
Saigon Provinces ^{a/}	29.9	32.4	32.1	33.0
Outer Provinces ^{b/}	7.9	10.4	13.3	13.5
Total	37.8	42.8	45.4	46.5
<u>RF/PF STRENGTH</u>				
Saigon Provinces ^{a/}	24.8	25.6	27.0	27.8
Outer Provinces ^{b/}	18.2	25.1	37.5	35.7
Total	43.0	50.7	64.5	63.5
<u>TOTAL</u>				
Saigon Provinces ^{a/}	85.9	120.8	148.3	190.6
Outer Provinces ^{b/}	28.8	40.1	62.1	70.5
Total	114.7	160.9	210.4	261.1

^{a/} Gia Dinh, Binh Duong, Bien Hoa, Long An, Hau Nghia
^{b/} Tay Ninh, Binh Long, Phuoc Long, Binh Tuy, Long Khanh, Phuoc Tuy.

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The distribution of VC/NVA forces is significantly different. Only about one-third of the III CTZ enemy forces are located in the Saigon provinces. Tay Ninh, an outer province, contains 23% of all the VC/NVA forces in III CTZ.

Allied Operations and Results

Table 3 shows that the number of large operations by allied forces decreased sharply in 1967, primarily because RVNAF operations dropped to half their former rate. Overall since June 1965, III CTZ has accounted for about 30% of the large operations in South Vietnam, but this dropped to 23% in 1967. Despite the downward trend in operations, the reported battalion days of operations quadrupled in the past 2 years. Large unit contacts with the enemy have increased the past year (earlier data is not available), but only half as fast as have battalion days of operation.

The number of small unit contacts does not show a clear trend, although the 3rd quarter 1967 rate is up and comparable to the 2nd half 1965 rate. III CTZ has accounted for 18% of the small unit contacts in South Vietnam since June 1965, with its share decreasing to 14% in 1967.

After 1965, the monthly average of attack sorties has been reasonably constant. In 1966, III CTZ accounted for 30% of SVN attack sorties, compared to 26% in 1967. B-52 sorties varied considerably.

Table 3 summarizes allied force activity in III CTZ since mid-1965. Activity during 1967 has declined relative to country-wide activities as a whole.

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TABLE 3

ALLIED OPERATIONS - III CTZ
(Monthly Average)

	1965	1966		1967	
	2H	1H	2H	1H	3Q
<u>Battalion and Larger Operations</u>					
US - FW	15	31	29	22	18
RVNAF	<u>117</u>	88	<u>98</u>	48	<u>49</u>
Total	<u>132</u>	119	127	<u>70</u>	<u>67</u>
<u>Battalion Days of Operation</u>					
US - FW	57	259	442	1039	846
RVNAF	<u>458</u>	<u>548</u>	<u>610</u>	<u>1075</u>	<u>1348</u>
Total	<u>515</u>	<u>807</u>	<u>1052</u>	<u>2114</u>	<u>2194</u>
<u>Days of Contact^{a/}</u>					
US - FW	N/A	N/A	111	167	191
RVNAF			<u>51</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>30</u>
Total			<u>162</u>	<u>199</u>	<u>221</u>
<u>Small Unit Contacts</u>					
US - FW	123	87	73	69	121
PVNAF	<u>124</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>105</u>
Total	<u>247</u>	<u>151</u>	<u>168</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>226</u>
<u>Air Operations</u>					
Attack	2187 ^{b/}	3450	3615	3855	3315
B-52	N/A	186	109	159	79
Ordnance (Tons)	N/A	6330	7000	10300	6000
Tons per sortie		1.7	1.9	2.6	1.8

a/ Not reported until August 1966. A contact is an action which results in the application of firepower by either VC or friendly forces. A day of contact for a large unit operation is credited for each 24 hour period in which contact during that operation was made.

b/ 4th quarter 1965 only.

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The location of most large unit operational activity fits the distribution pattern for allied forces. Table 4 shows 75% to 80% of all large unit operations, days of contact and battalion days of operation took place in the five provinces around Saigon which contain 75% of the friendly forces and 23% of enemy forces. A comparison of the 2nd quarter 1966 and 3rd quarter 1967 data indicates that:

1. The proportion of large operations occurring in the Saigon provinces compared to the outer provinces decreased slightly (from 79% to 74%).
2. The proportion of battalion days of operations in the Saigon provinces increased from 63% to 93%, with both RVNAF and US increasing sharply.
3. The reported days of contact in the Saigon provinces increased from 76% to 90%, primarily due to the rise in US days of contact.
4. The proportion of attack sorties in the Saigon provinces increased from 44% to 55%.

Thus, while the statistics are ambiguous and probably not consistently reported over time, the only trend evident in them points to a greater concentration of effort in the Saigon provinces, rather than a moving out into the hinterlands where the VC/NVA forces are reportedly located.

TABLE 4

DISTRIBUTION OF ALLIED OPERATIONS - III CTZ

	1966			1967			1E Mo. Avg.
	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	
<u>Bn and Larger Operations</u>							
Saigon Provinces ^{a/}	75	83	78	46	33	43	60
Outer Provinces ^{b/}	20	26	26	17	11	15	19
Total	95	109	104	63	44	58	79
<u>Bn Days of Operation</u>							
Saigon Provinces ^{a/}	578	567	833	1334	1694	1964	1162
Outer Provinces ^{b/}	334	308	321	581	372	157	345
Total	912	875	1154	1915	2066	2121	1507
<u>Days of Contact</u>							
Saigon Provinces ^{a/}	133	114	111	118	160	184	136
Outer Provinces ^{b/}	41	37	44	42	29	21	36
Total	174	151	155	160	189	205	172
<u>Attack Sorties</u>							
Saigon Provinces ^{a/}	1600	2100	1700	2000	1800	1800	1800
Outer Provinces ^{b/}	2000	1800	1600	2200	1700	1500	1800
Total	3600	3900	3300	4200	3500	3300	3600

^{a/} Gia Dinh, Bien Hoa, Hau Nghia, Long An and Binh Duong.

^{b/} Binh Tuy, Long Khanh, Binh Long, Tay Ninh, Phuoc Long, and Phuoc Tuy.

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As a result of allied operations in the III CTZ, the VC/NVA are reported to have lost 28,000 killed (body count) since June 1965. Application of the MACV died of wounds factor (.35 times body count) would add another 11,000 killed, for a total of about 39,000 or about 55% of the current VC/NVA order of battle estimate for III CTZ (Table 5). Since June 1965, III CTZ has accounted for 20% of the VC/NVA killed in South Vietnam. The rate for 1967 is 22%, indicating that III CTZ's proportion of VC/NVA KIA has risen slightly relative to the country as a whole, despite its lesser portion of the operations and air strikes. The III CTZ Chieu Hoi defector rate has increased sharply in 1967, and III CTZ is the only region which has already doubled its 1966 rate. As expected, most of the defectors come from the Saigon provinces.

TABLE 5

VC/NVA LOSSES - III CTZ
(Monthly Average)

	1965		1966		1967	
	2H	1H	2H	1H	3Q	
<u>Killed</u>						
KIA ^{a/}	652	688	1052	1862	1098	
DOW ^{b/}	228	241	368	652	384	
Total Killed	880	929	1420	2514	1482	
<u>Chieu Hoi Defectors</u> ^{c/}						
Saigon Provinces		158	193	678	422	
Outer Provinces		171	97	226	149	
Total		329	290	904	571	

a/ Source: Table 3B, OASD/SA SEA Statistical Tables

b/ DOW is estimated by .35 times KIA.

c/ Total Chieu Hoi.

Despite the increased losses during 1967, the VC/NVA strength, as currently reported, has only decreased by 2,400 men (Table 6). Unfortunately, many of the figures which go into that total have not been changed since May 1966, and are generally acknowledged to be inaccurate, so it is difficult to judge the impact of the losses on the force structure. However, MACV estimates that the enemy has been able to recruit only 560-725 men per month during 1967 in III CTZ. This means that most of the VC/NVA losses, if replaced, probably were replaced by NVA personnel infiltrated from NVN. By late May 1967, MACV estimated that about 25% of the personnel in VC units in III CTZ were NVA replacements, even though they are counted as VC in the OB.

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TABLE 6

ENEMY CONFIRMED BATTALIONS/STRENGTH - III CTZ ^{a/} ^{b/}
(End of Period - Retrospectively Adjusted)

	1966	1967		
	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q
<u>Maneuver Battalions</u>				
NVA	12	9	9	9
VC	34	34	34	34
Total	46	43	43	43
<u>Confirmed Strength</u>				
NVA	8.4	7.5	7.8	7.7
VC	65.0	63.5	63.3	63.3
Total	73.4	71.0	71.1	71.0

^{a/} Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary, 23 October 1967.

^{b/} Data based on VC/NVA Order of Battle changes.

In addition to the losses inflicted on the enemy, allied operations penetrated the major VC base areas. In June 1967 MACV reported that, of the 22 base areas in III CTZ, one was permanently neutralized, seven were partially neutralized and the remaining 14 were still in operation. Eleven of the 22 base areas were penetrated during June.

VC/NVA Activities

The VC/NVA reacted vigorously to the introduction of US forces, almost doubling their incidents during the second half of 1965 and sustaining them at a high rate ever since. Table 7 shows steadily rising attacks, declining sabotage incidents, terror incidents up sharply since June 1966, greatly increased anti-aircraft fire, and a sharp decline in reported propaganda incidents. Thus, the mix of incidents has changed towards attacks, terror and AA fire.

III CTZ has consistently accounted for about 25% of the total incidents in South Vietnam. (As noted above, III CTZ also accounts for 25% of the VC/NVA forces in SVN.)

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TABLE 7

VC/NVA INCIDENTS - III CTZ
(Monthly Average)

	1965		1966		1967	
	<u>1H</u>	<u>2H</u>	<u>1H</u>	<u>2H</u>	<u>1H</u>	<u>3Q</u>
Attacks	14	13	19	29	44	53
Sabotage	62	113	68	30	10	19
Terror ^{a/} a/	301	497	623	18	41	52
Harassment				468	487	372
Sub-Total	<u>377</u>	<u>623</u>	<u>710</u>	<u>545</u>	<u>582</u>	<u>496</u>
AA Fire	48	95	117	161	242	154
Propaganda	32	68	34	6	7	7
Total Incidents	<u>457</u>	<u>786</u>	<u>861</u>	<u>712</u>	<u>831</u>	<u>657</u>

Source: SEA Statistical Tables, OASD/SA, SEA PRO.

a/ Terrorism and harassment counted together through first half 1966.

Assassinations continue at a high rate (Table 8), particularly in the Saigon provinces. Assassinations in the outer provinces during the first half of 1967 jumped sharply, perhaps an indication of the need for increased VC/NVA coercion to counteract allied pressure.

TABLE 8

ASSASSINATIONS

	1966		1967	
	<u>1H</u>	<u>2H</u>	<u>1H</u>	<u>3Q</u>
Saigon Provinces	169	192	155	181
Outer Provinces	39	37	29	97
Total	<u>208</u>	<u>229</u>	<u>184</u>	<u>278</u>

Source: Monthly Saigon Airgram report: "VC Assassinations and Abduction of GVN Personnel and Civilians."

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The VC/NVA reaction to increased allied activity also shows up in the types of objectives against which their incidents are directed. As Table 9 shows, incidents against military targets more than doubled beginning in 1966, with the proportion allocated to the Saigon provinces in 1967 dropping to 66% from 74% in 1966.

TABLE 9
TARGETS OF VC INCIDENTS

	1965		1966		1967
	<u>1H</u>	<u>2H</u>	<u>1H</u>	<u>2H</u>	<u>1H</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Saigon Provinces	693	1130	2515	2541	2527
Outer Provinces	284	328	871	888	1308
Total	<u>977</u>	<u>1458</u>	<u>3386</u>	<u>3429</u>	<u>3835</u>
<u>Hamlets</u>					
Saigon Provinces	168	224	117	55	25
Outer Provinces	176	187	71	44	25
Total	<u>344</u>	<u>411</u>	<u>188</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>50</u>
<u>LOC's</u>					
Saigon Provinces	335	604	712	477	444
Outer Provinces	285	323	180	162	221
Total	<u>620</u>	<u>927</u>	<u>892</u>	<u>639</u>	<u>665</u>

SOURCE: NMCS - VCJSA computer file.

Table 9 also indicates that incidents against hamlets have declined sharply and consistently since the end of 1965, possibly a favorable trend reflecting increased security. Incidents against lines of communication (LOC) rose sharply in late 1965 and early 1966 and then returned to early 1965 levels. In all cases, most of the activity takes place in the Saigon province

Thus, the VC/NVA have reacted to increased allied activity by increasing their activities, showing their capability to maintain those activities at high levels, and adjusting the mix in response to the new threats posed by increased allied activity.

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Population Security

In III CTZ, population security has improved markedly. Table 10, based on a retrospective view of the GVN/US population security statistics, shows an increase in secured population of 1.9 million people between December 1964 and September 1967; VC controlled population decreased .3 million. Half (.9 million) of the gain in secured population resulted from population increases in the cities of Saigon and Vung Tau, which now account for about half of the population under government protection in III CTZ. Of the remaining population, the secure portion increased from 36% in December 1964 to 72% in September 1967; the VC controlled portion fell from 17% to 8%.

Refugees account for most of the country-wide increase in secure population, but this is not true in III Corps. From June 1965 to September 1967, 1.2 million people have been added to the Secure category. Approximately 15% of this increase (184,000 people) can be attributed to natural population growth; about one-fourth (fewer than 300,000 people) were official refugees, moving from VC or Contested areas to Secure areas. The remaining increase of about 526,000 people probably consisted of people moving to urban areas to obtain higher paying jobs, and people living in hamlets secured during the 2-year period.

TABLE 10

RETROSPECTIVE SVN POPULATION SECURITY SUMMARY ^{a/}
(By Corps Area, In Thousands)

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Sep</u>
<u>III Corps</u>				
Secure	2526	3733	4499	4441
Contested	1376	756	504	597
VC	487	466	360	225
Total	<u>4389</u>	<u>4955</u>	<u>5363</u>	<u>5263</u>
<u>SVN Total</u>				
Secure	6783	8972	10305	11095
Contested	6021	3984	3873	3634
VC	<u>3335</u>	<u>3586</u>	<u>2777</u>	<u>2300</u>
Total	<u>16139</u>	<u>16542</u>	<u>16955</u>	<u>17029</u>

^{a/} Data based on GVN/US population security system reported in MACV "Monthly Report of Revolutionary Development Progress: Hamlet, Population, and Area Control," adjusted using methodology described in SEA Analysis Report, October 1967, pp. 26-27, on a corps-by-corps basis.

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Table 11 shows summary population security data for 1967 based on the nine security indicators of the new Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). It confirms the upward trend in population under allied protection. (It also shows that 92% of the VC controlled population in III CTZ lives in the Saigon provinces.) Despite the different criteria used in the GVN/US retrospective data shown in Table 10, the corps-wide HES data in Table 11 agrees to within 130,000 people in all categories. All provinces but one (Binh Tuy) increased in number of people living in Secure areas between March 1967 and September 1967. (Data prior to March in the HES is considered less reliable, and will not be used in this analysis.)

TABLE 11

HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM

POPULATION SECURITY--III CTZ ^{a/}
(Population in Thousands)

	<u>March</u> <u>1967</u>	<u>June</u> <u>1967</u>	<u>Sep</u> <u>1967</u>
<u>Saigon</u>			
Secure	2204.9	2204.9	2204.9
<u>Saigon Provinces</u>			
Secure	1468.4	1621.2	1622.8
Contested	419.7	393.1	349.4
VC	273.7	282.0	271.6
Total	<u>2161.8</u>	<u>2296.3</u>	<u>2243.8</u>
<u>Outer Provinces</u>			
Secure	640.5	666.1	680.4
Contested	105.7	117.9	121.5
VC	24.7	25.8	22.2
Total	<u>770.9</u>	<u>809.8</u>	<u>824.1</u>
<u>Total III Corps</u>			
Secure	4313.8	4492.2	4508.1
Contested	525.4	511.0	470.9
VC	298.4	307.8	293.8
Total	<u>5137.6</u>	<u>5311.0</u>	<u>5272.8</u>

- a/ Based on the first nine indicators (Security Indicators) of HES. Counts as "Secure" all A, B, and C security hamlets (Security Score greater than 2.50) plus GVN-protected non-hamlet population. Counts as "Contested" all D and E security hamlets (Security Score from 1.00 to 2.49), planned and non-evaluated hamlets, and all contested non-hamlet population. Counts as "VC" all VC-controlled hamlets, and VC-dominated non-hamlet population.
- b/ The population base changes evident in the table result from continually improving population counts as the HES developed. The impact of the changed base upon the security estimates is not yet clear and will be the subject of further analysis.

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One way to gain insight into what changes have occurred at the hamlet level is to examine changes in ratings given on each of the nine security indicators from March to the present (Table 12). As of August 1967, there were 2112 hamlets reported in all of III Corps; of these, 1634 hamlets (including VC) can be compared between the two months (376 were not rated in March, and another 102 were not rated in August). Of 14,706 opportunities for a change in security indicator ratings (1634 times 9), 3202 (22%) changes took place. Of these, 1831 (57%) represented improvements and 1371 (43%) indicated regressions in hamlet security.

The largest number of improvements occurred in the indicator measuring VC political and subversive activities affecting the hamlet (primarily terrorism and taxation). These improvements occurred despite the fact that the indicator measuring the viability of hamlet VC infrastructure was the only indicator to show noticeably more regressions than improvements. These observations suggest that the VC are less able or willing to commit subversive acts even though they may be having more success in evading efforts to root out the infrastructure.

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TABLE 12

III CORPS HES SECURITY INDICATOR CHANGES
MARCH TO AUGUST, 1967

<u>HES Indicator Title</u>	<u>No. of Hamlets Showing Improvement</u>	<u>No. of Hamlets Showing Regression</u>	<u>No. of Hamlets Remaining the Same ^{a/}</u>
VC Village Guerrilla Units	167	113	1354
VC/NVA Provincial Main Force Units in District	221	149	1264
VC Military Incidents Affecting Hamlets	206	205	1223
VC Political and Sub- versive Activities-- Hamlet Infrastructure	166	184	1284
VC Political and Sub- versive Activities-- Village Infrastructure	185	170	1279
VC Political and Sub- versive Activities-- Activities Affecting Hamlet	337	156	1141
Hamlet Defense Plan and Organization	170	171	1293
Friendly External Force Assistance	185	101	1348
Internal Security Activities	<u>194</u>	<u>122</u>	<u>1318</u>
Total Observations	1831	1371	11504

^{a/} Includes hamlets where ratings for one (but not all) indicators were missing in either March or August (less than 1% for any one indicator).

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Revolutionary Development - Hamlet Program

The Revolutionary Development (RD) program is falling far behind its scheduled 1967 goals in III Corps. Over 200 hamlets were targeted for RD work during 1967. By 30 September, only 37 hamlets had been "completed" -- i.e., an RD team had presumably finished its tasks of raising the hamlet's status toward specified goals. Most of these were completed during August or September, in time to give the RD teams a chance to move on to their "second semester" hamlets.

The HES (see Table 13) shows that the average scores of RD hamlets rose relative to the scores of the non-RD hamlets. The average score on all 18 HES indicators in the target hamlets increased from 2.61 to 2.92 between March and September 1967 (2.5 - 3.5 equals a "C" grade). In five provinces RD hamlets progressed much better than non-RD hamlets. In three, non-RD hamlets progressed better. Three provinces showed no difference. The scores of the rest of the HES rated* hamlets in III CTZ remained fairly steady, averaging 2.82 in March and 2.85 in September.

TABLE 13

III CTZ: RD HAMLET VS NON RD HAMLET TRENDS

<u>RD HAMLETS</u>	<u>MARCH 1967</u>	<u>JUNE 1967</u>	<u>SEPT 1967</u>
	<u>Hamlets</u>	<u>Hamlets</u>	<u>Hamlets</u>
HES Total Score: A	0	0	0
B	19	41	49
C	105	123	114
D	72	51	59
E	14	11	4
VC	5	6	5
Other ^{a/}		0	1
Total	<u>215</u>	<u>232</u>	<u>232</u>
Avg Score	2.61	2.86	2.92
<u>NON-RD HAMLETS</u>			
HES Total Score: A	1	0	1
B	243	269	283
C	550	563	542
D	338	301	344
E	58	59	61
VC	379	353	439
Other ^{a/}		290	209
Total	<u>1569</u>	<u>1835</u>	<u>1879</u>
Avg Score	2.82	2.87	2.85

^{a/} Non-evaluated, abandoned or planned hamlets.

* VC hamlets are not rated by HES.

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RD Cadre Program

The III CTZ has only 69 RD cadre teams at present, less than one for every three RD target hamlets. Over the past nine months, the average strength per team has averaged 47 men, 12 men short of the programmed 59-man team concept. Losses of cadre to all causes are averaging 19 men per team per year, or a 40% per year attrition rate for the program. Of all losses, 74% are desertions or discharges; only 5% are killed in action. About 30% of all III CTZ cadre field personnel will desert or be discharged this year.

Elections

The VC attempted to disrupt the presidential elections, reportedly with little effect on the outcome. In III CTZ, about 76% of the registered voters went to the polls. (The region's average was low compared to the rest of SVN because only 71% of Saigon's registered voters went to the polls.)

Dzu, the runner up and "peace" candidate, may have received VC support in several III CTZ provinces. He received a heavy vote in every province with a substantial VC controlled population (Hau Nghia, Binh Duong, and Long An), winning in two and losing by only 100 votes in Long An. Dzu also won in Tay Ninh province, even though only 1.6% of its population is reportedly under VC control; however, Tay Ninh contains War Zone C and the VC/NVA headquarters in South Vietnam. On the other hand, each of the foregoing provinces is a heavily contested area suffering from high rates of military operations, air strikes and VC/NVA incidents, so Dzu's intensive provincial campaign as the peace candidate may have generated his heavy support. The Thieu ticket won in all other provinces.

In a comparison of registered voters with the numbers of people secured, Table 14 permits some interesting observations. Approximately 50% of the population is estimated to be of voting age. Even if we assume that all of the adult secured population is registered, Table 14 shows that voter registration exceeds the voting age population under GVN protection in every province but Tay Ninh. In 7 out of 11 provinces, more votes were recorded than the assumed number of voting age persons under GVN protection. This could suggest that much of the population in contested or VC areas voted and the VC could not (or did not choose to) stop them; they may even have urged them to vote for Dzu or against Thieu. On the other hand, it could reflect significant vote frauds, or indicate that the population data are inaccurate, or that more than 50% of the population is of voting age.

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TABLE 1:

1967 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (People in 000)

	Population		Electorate		%	
	Total	GVN Secure ^{a/}	Registered	Voted	Registered of Secure	Voted of Secure
Bien Hoa	367.7	311.7	179.4	138.0	58	44
Binh Duong	227.4	147.5	113.1	84.9	77	58
Binh Long	76.4	41.5	28.2	23.2	68	56
Binh Tuy	59.6	48.1	27.1	23.2	56	48
Gia Dinh	1037.6	704.5	562.1	424.9	80	60
Hau Nghia	201.8	88.5	63.4	49.7	72	56
Long An	414.0	117.9	75.3	62.4	64	53
Long Khanh	140.4	120.4	61.2	49.4	51	41
Phuoc Long	46.2	28.6	21.0	18.4	73	64
Phuoc Tuy	124.7	78.7	50.8	43.5	65	55
Tay Ninh	304.9	295.1	130.4	107.4	44	36
Saigon	2204.9	2204.9	766.4	546.6	35	25
Vung Tau	69.1	69.1	35.8	29.7	52	43
Total III Corps ^{b/}	5274.7	4256.5	2114.2	1601.3	50	38

a/ A, B, C hamlet population plus GVN dominated non-hamlet population from HES.

Perspective


The pattern of heavy concentration of forces and activities in the populous provinces surrounding Saigon is not surprising in view of the history of the III CTZ area. At the time of the Geneva Conference in 1954, the Viet Minh already controlled much of Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, and Long An. War Zone D and the "Iron Triangle" in Binh Duong province were equally important Viet Minh strongholds in 1954. Each of these provinces contains significant VC/NVA areas and population today. Each has a high rate of VC/NVA incidents and allied operations. Each gave Dzu a heavy vote.

After the cease fire in 1954, the VC quietly built up their capability until 1957, when they began using terrorism to cut Saigon off from the Delta. The Delta gateway province of Long An was one of the hardest hit as the VC began to assassinate village officials. By 1961, according to Bernard Fall, the "arc of insurgency" (Figure 1) around Saigon was complete, with all roads leading from Saigon subject to harassment and attack. This accords with the guerrilla strategy of isolating the central government from the people and destroying lines of communication, a strategy which worked very well against the French.

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Figure 1 ^{a/}

The Arc of Insurgency Around Saigon



REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM
1962-63

^{a/} Bernard Fall, The Two Vietnams, p. 354, Praeger, 1967.

Thus, the III CTZ has been the scene of heavy VC efforts and involvement from the very beginning. Much of the population in the area has deep roots in the VC movement. Thus the reported progress of population security in III CTZ may be illusory or temporary, particularly since the VC/NVA infrastructure remains largely intact.

The data does, however, show that definite progress has been made in III Corps. Population security is up. VC/NVA base areas are penetrated regularly even though few have been neutralized. The enemy is having manpower problems. Terrorist activities and incidents against hamlets are declining. The allied capability to put pressure on the enemy is higher than ever before.

Nevertheless, it is disquieting to realize that, despite the presence of one friendly military person for each 14 civilians in III CTZ*, the VC/NVA are still capable of maintaining a high rate of disruptive incidents, can mount large military actions against US-FW-RVN forces (as in Loc Ninh recently), and retain their rural organization and infrastructure intact.

*If we exclude the Saigon population, there is one military ground troop for every 8.5 civilians in the five critical provinces surrounding Saigon.

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Summary

This paper assesses the present status of the war in Vietnam. It is based primarily on research undertaken to produce the Southeast Asia Analysis Reports throughout 1968 and presents the major themes that emerge from those reports. Our analysis indicates that:

1. Military victory is not just around the corner in Vietnam. We continue to face a tough and tenacious foe who has the resources to maintain the 1968 war tempo almost indefinitely.

2. The VC/NVA have maintained and may well have expanded their political and administrative influence even in the relatively secure areas of South Vietnam. In September 1968, about 65% of the total SVN population was subject to active enemy political and administrative influence (this included 81% of the rural population).

3. Despite the US troop buildup and intensive air strikes against North Vietnam, the enemy has increased his combat forces in South Vietnam every year since 1964, improved the quality of his armaments, and increased the combat intensity of the war.

4. The basic US strategy of attrition has not worked in Vietnam. We have attempted to impose unacceptably high casualties on enemy combat units in South Vietnam and to limit the replacement of these losses by bombing infiltration routes in North Vietnam and Laos. Both of these tactics have been relatively unsuccessful. First, we have been unable to impose unacceptable casualties because the enemy has the strategic initiative in Vietnam which enables him to control both his casualties and US casualties within a wide range. Second, our bombing campaign failed to limit NVN infiltration primarily because of ample external support from the Communist Bloc nations, a highly efficient and redundant logistic system, and relatively small supply requirements in South Vietnam. In short, the US bombing campaign had no observable effect on the size of VC/NVA forces or the intensity of the fighting in South Vietnam.

5. Pacification is illusory in Vietnam. A village that is pacified today may well be VC tomorrow; hamlets pacified in 1965 have to be repacified in 1968; and about two-thirds of the South Vietnamese population is exposed to strong VC influence and control at least one month out of the year.

6. Our Vietnamese Allies have a long way to go to provide for their own defense. While the RVNAF combat capability improved significantly during 1968, they are still incapable of standing alone against the combined VC/NVA threat. Programs are under way to modernize and improve the Vietnamese military forces, but it may be 2-3 years before they are capable of providing their own defense.

January 13, 1969

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First, we examine the status of the enemy's military and political forces and the impact of our operations against them. We then examine the friendly forces, focusing on the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, their weakness and strongpoints, and our effort to improve them to the point where they can assume the largest share of the fighting. Finally, we assess the pacification program.

Status of Enemy Forces

Since 1965 the Allied forces (presently about 1.6 million men) have attempted to destroy a Viet Cong and North Vietnamese force in South Vietnam officially numbering about 265,000 armed men. Despite a series of allied tactical victories and heavy enemy casualties, the war continues, and at least on the surface, the enemy is stronger today than he was in 1965. Despite the US troop buildup and intensified air strikes against North Vietnam, enemy units have improved the quality of their armaments, increased the combat intensity of the war, developed the political infrastructure, and continue to pose a serious threat throughout South Vietnam.

Basically, the enemy operates on two distinct but intimately related levels; the military war and the socio-political struggle. The VC/NVA have developed a specialized force structure and a different strategy for each area, but they clearly recognize that success or failure in one area will largely determine the results in the other. In particular, they have concentrated on winning the socio-political conflict, while at least holding their own in the main-force military war. They realize that battlefield success would be of limited value unless they also succeed in the political sphere. But political success coupled with a military stalemate may win in the long run.

Communist revolutionary doctrine has long recognized the need for popular support (or at least passive compliance) from the rural population, and the VC/NVA have devoted enormous resources to the political struggle during the last decade. To a large extent, their success in this "other war," a war for the support of the people, has allowed them to survive and operate effectively in Vietnam, despite the tremendous US and GVN military pressure.

To illustrate the importance the enemy places on local population control, during 1968 the VC/NVA allocated over two-thirds (69%) of their total civilian and military forces in SVN (about 360,000 men) to local control activities. The Allied forces devoted some 720,000 men to this activity, outnumbering the enemy infrastructure two to one, but representing only 43% of the total Allied effort.

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MANPOWER ALLOCATION - Dec 1968
(000s)

<u>US/GVN/PW</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% Total</u>	<u>VC/NVA</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% Total</u>
<u>Local Control</u>			<u>Local Control</u>		
RF/PF	392		Self Defense	120	
Civil Service	154		Infrastructure	110	
National Police	86		Local VC	110	
RD Teams	48		Other	20	
Other	40		Sub-total	360	69%
Sub-total	720	43%			
<u>Military Forces</u>	960	57%	<u>Military Forces</u>	160	31%
<u>Total</u>	1680	100%	<u>Total</u>	520	100%

Three principal observations emerge from analysis of the enemy socio-political struggle in Vietnam. First, while Allied forces have focused on winning the main-force military war, the VC/NVA have concentrated on expanding their political influence throughout SVN. In January 1967, about 58% of the total SVN population (9.5 million) and 74% of the rural^{1/} population (7.7 million) lived under an active VC infrastructure that was at least equal in size to the GVN's presence. By September 1968, the figures were up to 65% (11.3 million) and 81% (8.9 million) respectively. While considerable uncertainties exist with data of this kind, the basic conclusion is clear: VC/NVA political control in South Vietnam has not declined and it may well have increased in recent years.

Second, the VC/NVA political efforts in Vietnam are concentrated at the "grass roots" village and hamlet level while the GVN infrastructure is heavily centralized at the national and regional level. Our analysis indicates that about 94% of the enemy infrastructure operates in local hamlet, village, and provincial organizations; only 68% of the GVN effort is at this level. While the GVN infrastructure outnumbers the VC/NVA almost 30 to 1 at the national level, it has only a 1.8 to 1 edge over the enemy at the hamlet/village/province level. More important, at the cutting edge of the political war in Vietnamese hamlets and villages, the VC/NVA have a 2 to 1 manpower advantage over the GVN in terms of their administrative structure.

^{1/} Population in villages of less than 20,000 people.

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It now appears that the VC/NVA are making concerted efforts to expand their administrative apparatus and control still further, perhaps in anticipation of a cease-fire or decline in combat intensity. Since the Tet offensive they have established numerous Peoples Liberation Committees at every level that are designed to serve as full fledged local governments in VC-controlled and contested areas. About half (1100) of Vietnam's villages reportedly have such committees already, a number about equal to the villages having GVN elected officials. This trend is expected to continue.

Finally, the VC/NVA have maintained an active but largely covert infrastructure program throughout the "relatively secure" areas of South Vietnam, thus nullifying Allied pacification efforts. In August 1968, about half (47%) of the total relatively secure population and 64% of the secure rural population lived with an active VC infrastructure, up from 32%/46% in January 1967. As discussed in a later section, the presence of this infrastructure forces the GVN to "pacify" the same villages and hamlets year after year. With their political infrastructure intact, the VC/NVA can rebuild guerrilla units, organize the people (or at least maintain a hold over them), and conduct a psychologically effective terror campaign despite the presence of Allied military forces.

In short, the enemy infrastructure remains the major obstacle to permanent Allied progress in pacification and population control.

The Anti-Infrastructure Program

The GVN and the VC/NVA each have programs designed to eliminate the other side's infrastructure. Our analysis indicates that, at least until recently, the VC/NVA operations have been far more successful than GVN programs. The Phoenix program of the Allies, which began in 1968, appears to have increased VC/NVA infrastructure "eliminations" significantly, but the current attrition rate (12% per year at best) is not high enough to cripple the enemy's political strength in Vietnam's rural areas. Moreover, there is some question as to how much of the increase is real and how much results from greater emphasis on reporting.

The VC have long had an organized anti-infrastructure campaign designed to selectively harass, kidnap, and assassinate government officials and their civilian supporters. Their operations have increased dramatically since the introduction of US troops in 1965. Total 1968 assassinations of GVN officials and employees were nearly five times higher than the 1965 total and assassinations of civilians were more than nine times 1965 assassinations. Abductions of officials and employees almost tripled between 1965 and 1968 and abductions of civilians doubled.

1/ Including elected or appointed chiefs, department heads, assistants, and administrators.

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A new reporting system recently developed by MACV indicates that the previous official numbers represented only about 60% of the reported attrition of GVN officials and civil servants as a result of enemy terrorist acts. But even MACV's new reporting system still understates the number of assassinations and abductions, because many officials are not assassinated in the strictest sense but are killed by VC paramilitary activities. However, using the new MACV figures, we estimate the VC/NVA assassinated at least 1300 GVN employees and officials and 7500 civilians in 1968. They abducted another 330 government employees and 15,000 civilians, most of whom were indoctrinated, threatened, and released.

Despite the large number of assassinations and abductions, the risk to the average GVN official or employee remains low. For example, at the 1968 rates only .5% of the 260,000-man GVN infrastructure will be assassinated. However, this significantly understates the impact of the VC campaign of terror. The unwillingness of GVN officials to travel in the countryside or spend the night in villages indicates the VC campaign is successful despite the low individual risk. Besides eliminating the best (and worst) government officials, the VC/NVA use assassinations and abductions as a psychological tool to influence the behavior of other employees and the civilian population. Selective terror and harassment can be very effective in demoralizing the general populace and destroying faith in the GVN.

The GVN anti-infrastructure campaign (Phoenix) is carried on by 80,000 National Police and 6000 men in Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), supported by regular military units when required. These forces are primarily directed by Phoenix/ICEX intelligence centers, which collate intelligence collected by regular military and civilian intelligence operations.

The Phoenix program goal for 1968 was to "eliminate" kill, capture, or rally) 16,000 members of the Viet Cong infrastructure, about 14% of their 111,000-man strength. Based on actual results through October, we should "eliminate" about 13,000-14,000 VC in 1968. These reported eliminations probably overstate the actual infrastructure losses, first because part-time VC (or suspected VC sympathizers) are included, and second, because the statistics are not adjusted to account for innocent civilians that are later released or actual VC that escape or are released (the GVN judicial and prison systems are poorly equipped to handle the large number of detainees). However, if we assume the Phoenix-reported eliminations are accurate, at the 1968 rates we will eliminate 14-15% of the village and hamlet level VC infrastructure (most of whom will be replaced), but only 3% of the province level VC infrastructure and less than 1% of the VC's leadership above the local level.

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7

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PHOENIX ELIMINATIONS - 1968

<u>Level</u>	1968 <u>Eliminations^{a/}</u>	<u>Phoenix Definitions</u>	
		<u>1968 Strength</u>	<u>% Eliminated</u>
Provincial	324	10,000	3.2
District	1,500	17,000	8.8
Village	5,100	37,000	13.8
Hamlet	5,976	40,000	15.0
Other ^{a/}	372	7,000	5.3
Total	<u>13,272</u>	<u>111,000</u>	<u>12.0</u>

a/ The "other" category of eliminations as reported by Phoenix includes COSVN and Regional Cadre eliminated as well as lower-level specialized cadre such as city committees, special zone cadre, etc.

Enemy Military Forces in SVN

There are three important points about the enemy military forces in SVN. First, enemy combat strength has increased every year since 1964 in spite of extremely heavy casualties (350,000 KIA since 1964). MACV estimates that about 162,000 VC/NVA combat troops were in SVN by December 1968,^{1/} 3 times more than the 54,500 in December 1964.

Second, the military conflict has rapidly become a North Vietnamese war. The additional combat soldiers in SVN are North Vietnamese Army regulars, not local Viet Cong; NVA troops increased from about 4% of the total enemy combat forces in 1964 to 77% by December 1968. The number of Viet Cong troops in SVN increased 25% from 52,100 in 1964 to 66,200 in 1966, but VC strength has declined gradually since then to its present level of about 37,000.

Finally, the Viet Cong guerrilla strength peaked in 1966 (at about 126,000 men) and then steadily declined to about 65,000 troops by December 1968. Unfortunately, the guerrilla estimates are very uncertain, and this makes it difficult to estimate overall enemy strength in Vietnam. Guerrilla units play an important role in enemy military and political operations in SVN, but we have little hard evidence on how many guerrillas exist or whether their strength is increasing or declining, not to mention who they are or where they are located.

1/ MACV-CINCPAC agreed estimate as of November 30, 1968.

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Enemy Combat Capability. Our Vietnam military strategy (find, fix, and destroy the enemy) assumes that Allied forces are superior to the VC/NVA forces because of our greater combat manpower, firepower, mobility, and support. In terms of total armed men, the Allies outnumber the enemy about 6 to 1 at the end of 1968, (1.6 million to 265,000), but they had only a slight (1.3 to 1.0) advantage over the enemy in terms of combat troops on offensive operations. This is because about 72 (or 24%) of the allied maneuver battalions are tied down protecting base areas, lines of communications, and pacification operations. Conversely, the enemy's small logistic and defensive requirements and reliance on the local populace leave most enemy main force units free for offensive operations. As a result, Allied forces committed to offensive operations only slightly outnumber the VC/NVA troops in maneuver battalions; in terms of rifle platoon manpower, the two sides are nearly equal.

Past experience indicates that the enemy tries to fight in a way that nullifies the Allied advantages in manpower mobility, firepower, and support. One way he does this is to mass his forces to exploit favorable tactical situations while tying down most of the Allied forces through small attacks and harassments against our bases and cities. The cost in enemy lives is high, but it prevents the Allies from turning their resource superiority into a decisive military advantage.

The Strategy of Attrition - US Effort Against VC/NVA Military Forces.

The basic US strategy to defeat the VC/NVA military forces in Vietnam has been a strategy of attrition which assumes we can destroy the enemy's troops and supplies faster than he is able, or is willing, to replace them. In South Vietnam, we have undertaken aggressive operations in an attempt to impose unacceptably high enemy casualties; in North Vietnam and Laos we have attempted to limit the replacement of these losses of men and materiel by destroying trucks, hopefully killing significant numbers or at least slowing them on the trip south.

The strategy of attrition has not worked. During four years of intensive combat in South Vietnam and unprecedented bombing of NVN and Laos, the enemy has more than doubled his combat forces, successfully sustained high casualty rates, doubled the level of infiltration, and increased the scale and intensity of the main-force war. Two principal factors combined to defeat the strategy of attrition.

Strategic Initiative. First, and most important, the enemy has the strategic initiative in Vietnam. Like a criminal in the city, he decides when and where he will strike. If the climate gets too "hot" he merely lies low for awhile. His intelligence superiority allows him to select the time and location of over 80% of the fire fights in Vietnam, and when the fighting becomes too intense he can break or avoid contact by retreating to base camps in SVN or sanctuary areas in Laos and Cambodia.

CONFIDENTIAL

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The evidence that supports this is an extremely strong relationship between enemy-initiated attacks and VC/NVA combat deaths. More significantly, the relationship between his attacks and US combat deaths is even stronger. On the other hand, changes in the levels of US and RVNAF operations have little impact on either enemy or US casualty rates; there is little relationship between losses and the number or scale of Allied operation. Regardless of the tempo of Allied activity, the VC/NVA lose large numbers of men and inflict high US casualties only when they decide to stand and fight. This enables them to control casualties on both sides within a wide range, and thus to prevent the allies from inflicting unacceptable losses on them.

These tactics work well, and within limits, the enemy can dramatically reduce (or raise) casualty rates on both sides. The cyclical "combat lulls" in SVN stem largely from this strategic environment. For example, after intense fighting and heavy casualties during the first half of 1968, the VC/NVA sharply reduced their combat deaths to 6650 in July, about one-third the average during the Jan-June 1968 period.^{1/} To achieve this, the VC/NVA had to pay a high price in terms of lower Allied casualties; the friendly KIA in July totaled about 1700, only half the average monthly figure during the first six months of 1968.

The ability to control casualties is an integral part of the overall enemy strategy in Vietnam. His attacks are designed to have the maximum psychological impact by inflicting heavy Allied casualties and projecting an aura of country-wide strength. If the enemy does control casualty rates and, as indicated below, is not limited by manpower or logistical shortages, then the mere notion of winning the war by attriting the enemy force is untenable, at least at present force and activity levels.

External Support. The second principal factor working to defeat the Allied strategy of attrition is the external manpower and materiel provided by North Vietnam and the Communist Bloc nations. Without this support, the military war would have slowed down or ended long ago; with it, the VC/NVA can continue to fight almost indefinitely.

The war has imposed enormous demands on the North Vietnamese economy and labor force. North Vietnam has relied primarily on external Communist aid and economic austerity at home to meet the steadily increasing military requirements of the war in the South and the bombing-induced difficulties in the North. The Soviet Union, Communist China, and Eastern European nations provide the bulk of the combat equipment and materiel used by enemy units in South Vietnam. The cost of this support to North Vietnam is negligible. As the next few pages indicate, our interdiction campaign has failed to stop the movement of these supplies to SVN.

^{1/} Using MACV's method of excluding 10,000 questionable KIA during Tet.

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In addition to ample supplies and equipment, North Vietnam has enough manpower to continue the high casualty and infiltration rates they sustained during 1968. The war has undoubtedly strained the NVN labor force, but most of the labor requirements have been met through normal population growth, a loan of 40,000 Chinese workers (many of whom have returned to China since the bombing halt in NVN), and a large pool of unemployed and underemployed North Vietnamese.

Approximately 120,000 physically-fit males reach the draft age each year in NVN, and prior to 1968, they have more than offset the infiltration requirements for South Vietnam (90,000 infiltrators in 1966 and 82,000 in 1967). About 250,000 men appear to have infiltrated in 1968, but even this level can be maintained by tapping the large pool of non-military manpower available in NVN. For example, there are about 1.8 million physically-fit males in North Vietnam aged 15 to 34; only about 875,000 men (45% of the total) are in the NVN regular (475,000) or para-military (400,000) armed forces. By contrast, over 80% of the physically-fit males under GVN control are in the military. Even if NVN losses (killed, died of wounds and deserted) continue at the 1968 rates, the available manpower pool of North Vietnamese could continue to fight almost indefinitely. (On the other hand, analysis of the GVN manpower pool indicates it would be exhausted in about 6 years at first half 1968 GVN loss rates.)

The Bombing Campaign. We attempted to choke off this vital flow of external support by bombing North Vietnam and Laos. The principal objectives of our bombing campaign were, first, to limit the flow of men and supplies into SVN thus reducing the enemy's military capabilities, and second, to increase the cost of the war to North Vietnam, thereby providing an incentive to negotiate a settlement. To be effective in reducing the enemy's combat capability, the bombing campaign would have to reduce the flow of troops and supplies below the enemy's required level in South Vietnam. To bomb Hanoi into a settlement, our air strikes must raise the cost above what Hanoi is willing to pay.

There is considerable disagreement about the value of the NVN bombing campaign. Our analysis indicates the air strikes failed to achieve either of the two objectives listed above. Others hold that the bombing raids were an integral part of our military strategy, and reduced Allied casualties by reducing the VC/NVA force and activity levels in South Vietnam. Much of the controversy and disagreement about the value of bombing North Vietnam centers on issues which cannot be resolved by statistics and are subject to personal interpretation. However, a number of points are generally accepted as valid.

First, the bombing did not limit infiltration of men and materiel to levels below the enemy's needs in South Vietnam. Merely destroying large quantities of materiel is not enough; it is not how much we destroyed that counts but how much actually reached the VC/NVA forces in SVN. Most of the materiel destroyed was not destined for SVN at all, and the small amount

CONFIDENTIAL

28

CONFIDENTIAL

The second major point on which there is general agreement is that the bombing did not significantly raise the monetary cost of the war to North Vietnam. Our bombing was ineffective in this regard because production facilities outside of NVN were not targetable and ample external aid was available from the Communist Bloc nations. During 1965-68 US air strikes destroyed capital stock, military facilities and current production worth about \$770 million. But during this same period of time North Vietnam received about \$3 billion in foreign economic and military aid from her Communist Allies. What the North Vietnamese were unable to produce themselves (guns, missiles, ammunition, trucks, food, etc.) or was destroyed by US air raids (cement, POL, steel, etc.) was imported from abroad. In terms of total economic and military resources available to support the war, North Vietnam is better off today than in 1965.

COSTS AND BENEFITS TO NVN (1965 - 1968)

<u>Costs (\$ million)</u>		<u>Benefits (\$ million)</u>	
Destroyed Capital Stock	215	Foreign Economic Aid	1210
Lost Current Production	400	Foreign Military Aid	1845
Destroyed Facilities	153		
Total Cost	<u>768</u>	Total Benefit	<u>3055</u>

The cost of the bombing to the North Vietnamese people, however, was severe, and the individual citizen suffered many hardships. While the total supply of goods in NVN increased, individual standards of living declined. Food is rationed and consumer goods are scarce. Air raid warnings disrupted their lives and forced many to leave their homes. Moreover, CIA estimates that approximately 52,000 North Vietnamese civilians were killed by US air strikes.

Still, there is no evidence to suggest these hardships have reduced North Vietnam's willingness to continue the conflict. (To the contrary, it may have hardened their attitude and rallied them behind the government's program. Some evidence indicates that support for the war in the North has slackened since the bombing halt.) Whatever their feelings about the war, the North Vietnamese people have lacked either the will or the means to make any dissatisfaction evident.

The major controversy over our bombing campaign centers on issues which will never be definitively or quantitatively resolved. There is general agreement about what we destroyed, how much it cost us and the enemy, and what

CONFIDENTIAL

fact it had on VC/NVA activity in South Vietnam. But there is reasonable disagreement over several other issues related to the bombing. First, and most important, we are unable to predict enemy intentions. We don't know what the North Vietnamese response would have been: (1) if there had been no bombing campaign (would they have infiltrated more troops or fewer troops?) and (2) if we had halted the air strikes before November 1968 (would they have taken advantage of the pause?).

While there is some uncertainty on these points, we believe that North Vietnam has always had the manpower and logistic capability to support larger combat forces and activity rates in SVN if desired. Infiltration levels were determined by North Vietnamese intentions and plans for military operations in South Vietnam, not by the US bombing campaign. North Vietnam carefully planned its force and activity levels in South Vietnam, and their programmed forces and combat levels were always well within their manpower and logistic capabilities. North Vietnam could have infiltrated additional troops or fought more intensely despite our bombing.

The psychological impact of a bombing halt on the VC/NVA as well as the Allied forces is impossible to assess. It was generally agreed prior to the halt that the initial impact on Allied morale in SVN would probably be adverse, but little sign of this is evident. If the bombing halt stimulates meaningful peace negotiations in Paris, the long-range effect on Allied morale will undoubtedly be favorable.

The effect of the halt on North Vietnam is still subject to interpretation, a reasonable case can be made that the bombing actually strengthened North Vietnamese resolve. This was undoubtedly true during the World War II bombing raids on Hamburg and London where we were able to analyze the impact in some detail. Moreover, there is indication that morale and support for the war in NVN has declined significantly since the bombing stopped.

Status of Allied Forces

The table below shows Allied military forces in Vietnam since 1965. US troops increased rapidly from less than 25,000 in January 1965 to approximately 544,000 today. During the same period the total GVN strength almost doubled, from 567,200 in January 1965 to 985,000 in January 1969. Finally, about 62,000 troops are in Vietnam from Korea, New Zealand, Thailand, Australia, and the Philippines.

CONFIDENTIAL

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ALLIED FORCES IN VIETNAM

	<u>Jan 1965</u>	<u>Jan 1966.</u>	<u>Jan 1967</u>	<u>Jan 1968</u>	<u>Jan 1969</u> ^{1/}
<u>Total US</u>	23.3	184.3	385.3	486.6	544.2
<u>South Vietnamese</u>					
Regular	250.0	302.6	322.9	342.9	418.4
RF/PF	264.3	268.6	300.0	300.2	431.0
CIDG	21.5	28.4	34.7	38.3	51.4
National Police	<u>31.4</u>	<u>52.3</u>	<u>58.3</u>	<u>73.4</u>	<u>84.4</u>
Total GVN	567.2	651.9	715.9	754.8	985.2
<u>Third Nation</u>	<u>.5</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>52.6</u>	<u>59.4</u>	<u>62.4</u>
<u>Total Allies</u>	591.0	858.6	1153.8	1300.8	1592.2

SOURCE: OSD Southeast Asia Statistical Summary.

1/ Planned figures from SEA Deployments Program #6 through Change #33.

The primary role of US troops in Vietnam is military; their major mission is to destroy the enemy's main force units, protect US bases, and provide air and artillery support to other Allied forces. On the other hand, the primary mission of South Vietnamese Armed Forces (RVNAF) has been to provide territorial security and to support the pacification program. ARVN, the regular Army of the Republic of Vietnam, is presently the best equipped and most effective fighting branch of the RVNAF. ARVN has recently begun to assume a larger share of the main-force war throughout SVN and particularly in IV Corps, which normally has only two US brigades.

The paramilitary Vietnamese Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF) are supposed to provide security for the population in conjunction with the other Allied forces, but they have generally been ineffective because of severe leadership, firepower, supply and motivational difficulties. The 62,000 Third Nation troops operate autonomously in specific geographical areas and carry out offensive and security missions.

Before the US can reduce its force and expenditure levels in Southeast Asia, the South Vietnamese armed forces will have to assume a larger share of the fighting (and pacification). Since 1965 the RVNAF has increased both the quality and quantity of its troops, but it is still far from being able to stand alone against the VC/NVA. The remainder of this section will analyze the RVNAF's present capabilities and deficiencies and will outline the plans to modernize and re-equip the Vietnamese forces.

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Relative Fighting Efficiency. We have attempted to evaluate the fighting efficiency of RVNAF forces by comparing Vietnamese operational results (in terms of killing enemy troops) to those of US forces. This approach is imperfect because it fails to consider the effect of different types of missions, but data is not available for such a study. In addition, our method does not relate RVNAF performance to a standard we expect them to attain. Rather, it provides a rough approximation of changes in their capability and allows us to estimate future force improvements under the RVNAF modernization program. On the positive side, our analysis shows that:

1. RVNAF combat efficiency has increased significantly since 1967 compared to US forces. During 1967 RVNAF forces killed enemy troops at about 46% of the US rate; RVNAF troops killed 50 VC/NVA per 1000 South Vietnamese troops while US forces killed 108 enemy per 1000 US troops. RVNAF efficiency increased steadily during 1967 and peaked at 75% of the US rate in the first quarter of 1968; the Jan-Sep 1968 average was 58% of the US performance. This fairly steady improvement should continue (and perhaps accelerate) under the proposed RVNAF modernization program.

2. ARVN operational days of contact increased 42% this year. US days of contact increased only 22% during the same period. The increase in days of contact during 1968 indicates that ARVN is (1) more willing and (2) more able to find the enemy than in previous years or, more likely, (3) that the enemy is hitting RVNAF more.

3. ARVN troops captured 121% more enemy weapons this year than in 1968, although US forces captured 187% more.

While these trends are encouraging, a number of serious problems continue to threaten the effectiveness of RVNAF forces.

1. The number of VC/NVA killed by RVNAF in small unit actions dropped from a quarterly average of 2440 in 1967 to 814 in 1968. The reasons for this precipitous decline in small unit performance are unknown.

2. Net desertions among RVNAF units increased 26% during the first eleven months of 1968 (13.2 desertions per month per 1000 men versus 10.5 in 1967). The Jul-Sep 1968 rate of 15 was the highest since the GVN crack-down on desertions in mid-1966. However, the overall RVNAF desertion rates significantly understate the impact of desertions on Vietnamese combat units. Considering only Vietnamese Army and Marine combat units, the net annual desertion rate in 1967 was 227 per 1000 strength, approximately 23% of the total forces. The current rate is 348 per 1000, or 35%. At this rate, the RVNAF regular combat units could lose over a third of their personnel during the next year through desertions.

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3. RVNAF forces are critically short of good leaders. On October 31, 1968, Vietnamese Regular and Regional forces had only 52% of their authorized captains through colonels, despite an increase of 2626 officers in these ranks between March 31 and October 31. Morale and performance cannot be high in a service where, if all authorized jobs are held, 57% of the Lieutenant Colonels are holding Colonel's jobs and 45% of the Majors should be Lieutenant Colonels.

Our analysis indicates that the GVN criteria for battlefield promotion are too stringent; service in battle is clearly not the path to success in RVNAF. For example, during Jan-Oct 1967 "special, other than battlefield promotions" accounted for 26% of the total; during the first six months of 1968 they accounted for 59% of all promotions. Regular promotions account for nearly all the remainder. MACV has convinced JGS to establish goals to fill the authorized leader spaces, but 4274 officers and 12,695 NCOs must be promoted in November and December to meet their goals. Although RVNAF has promoted more officers this year to these than in the past it remains to be seen whether they can meet their own goals. We doubt that they can revise their strict, slow, and class-conscious promotion policies to provide the combat leaders they need.

4. The Vietnamese Popular Forces, whose primary mission is to provide territorial security at the local level, have severe equipment, firepower, leadership, and motivational difficulties. The PF consists of 4679 lightly armed infantry platoons. They generally defend small static outposts located to provide warning of enemy attacks and protect hamlets or GVN facilities. Under sustained attack they must rely on rapid ground reinforcement or fire support for survival. However, our analysis indicates that they generally fight alone (ground reinforcements support about 11% of their contacts) and that their arms and equipment are extremely poor (in September 1968, 43% of the PF platoons had less firepower than nearby enemy units). As a result, the PF seek protection in their static outposts and tend to become preoccupied with defending themselves and their families. This tendency, and their inadequate weapons, make them inviting targets for enemy actions; the PF absorbed about half of all VC actions against RVNAF forces over the past five years. In addition, the PF have the lowest enemy/friendly kill ratio of any military force in Vietnam.

MACV and the GVN recognize the PF shortcomings and have programs to improve their effectiveness. If pacification is ever to work in Vietnam, the PF must be made capable of carrying out the territorial and population security missions assigned to them.

5. The Vietnamese Regional Forces (RF) presently outperform the PF by about 50% in the number of enemy killed per 1000 friendly forces and by 44% in the enemy/friendly kill ratio. But the RF also have serious leadership, firepower, resupply, and friendly support difficulties. Vietnamese Province Chiefs rely heavily on the 1102 RF rifle companies to maintain control over their provinces and guard the provincial capitals. About 75% of the RF companies perform security missions and 15% conducted offensive operations during November 1968. The RF have more firepower than the PF and are generally better equipped.

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Nevertheless, the MACV Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) indicates that only 43% of the RF units have adequate leadership and promotion programs, and only 42% of the officers assigned to RF forces are actually in the field. The RF have only 28% of their authorized captains through colonels. In addition, RF units are scheduled for 3-5 weeks of training each year, but most province chiefs are reluctant to part with their security forces and thus many RF units never get a refresher course. Finally, CIA estimates that over half of the RF units have slow or undependable supply systems.

RVNAF Improvement and Modernization

Programs are currently planned or underway to re-equip and modernize the RVNAF forces. The ultimate objective of these programs is to create an effective and self-sustaining Vietnamese military force that is capable of providing territorial and population security and eliminating the VC/NVA military threat. In the meantime, as RVNAF capability improves, US forces could be gradually withdrawn with no decline in the overall Allied combat capability in Vietnam. If the enemy threat declines, the US phase-down could be accelerated accordingly.

The program to modernize and improve RVNAF is proceeding in two phases. Phase I, which is well underway, is designed to improve RVNAF ground combat capability by adding personnel, re-equipping them with modern weapons (such as M-16 rifles and M-60 machine guns), and increasing the units available for offensive combat missions. However, these forces will remain heavily dependent on US troops for naval, air and some logistic support.

It is impossible to compute precisely the expected RVNAF improvement as a result of Phase I, because it will be a product of many separate programs that are subject to enemy action, and other uncertainties. Nevertheless, we have attempted to make a rough estimate from a study of RVNAF's equipment and organization. Considering regular RVNAF ground forces only, we estimate that their total combat capability will increase by 54% (or 31 additional US battalion equivalents) by June 1970 as a result of the Phase I modernization program. It is more difficult to state RF/PF improvements in regular force equivalents. However, the RF/PF are scheduled to gradually take over the mission of regular battalions now supporting pacification. Through this substitution and the results of expansion and modernization, Vietnamese regular ground forces available for combat operations could increase 128% or the equivalent of an additional 38.5 US battalions by June 1970. (There are 112 US maneuver battalions now in SVN.)

Phase II of the plan is designed to make RVNAF units self-sufficient, to operate without US support. This program was originally designed as a follow-on to Phase I, but General Abrams recently proposed an accelerated plan to implement Phase II along with Phase I. This was approved in December 1968. At the same time, the Vietnamese authorized force level was raised to 867,000.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Under the accelerated Phase II, it will be impossible to provide the necessary helicopters, artillery, logistic support, and other equipment from production. Therefore, some equipment now used by US units in VN will be transferred to the RVNAF as the Vietnamese forces complete their training. MACV is developing a program to withdraw US forces as their equipment is given to the RVNAF. A precise estimate of US troop withdrawals is impossible at this time, but our best guess is that we could draw-down US troop strength by 30,000 to 50,000 men (minus their equipment) by January 1970.

Pacification in South Vietnam

Most South Vietnamese want peace, security, and prosperity above all else, and they tend to support the side they believe will ultimately win, regardless of their economic or political philosophies. They shift sides as the tide of the battle turns, and if nobody is clearly winning, they hedge their bets by passively supporting both sides.

The VC/NVA thoroughly understand this phenomena in Vietnam and have skillfully exploited it for over a decade. Their basic strategy is (1) to promote security and development in areas under VC control by forming local defense/administrative groups and redistributing land, and (2) to destroy security and economic development in government-controlled and contested areas by selective military attacks, assassinations, propaganda, and economic blockades. This strategy has been highly successful.

On the other hand, while the Allied forces have recognized the importance of the "other war" in Vietnam, they have not been effective in fighting this type of warfare, at least until very recently. Allied strategy has focused on destroying the enemy's military forces, not his political base. We have been unwilling to spend the time and the resources required to bring security and development to the rural population in Vietnam. Consequently, our pacification program has made little progress.

The table below shows population control statistics for Vietnam since September 1965. At least on the surface, the GVN pacification effort appears to have been effective; people living in "relatively secure" areas increased from 7.8 million in September 1965 (about 51% of the SVN population) to 13.4 million in December 1968 (76% of the total). The government gains came from both VC-controlled areas (3.5 million in 1965 to 2.1 million in 1968) and contested hamlets (4.0 to 2.0 million).

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PACIFICATION PROGRESS IN SVN (people in millions)

	Sep 1965		Sep 1966		Sep 1967		Sep 1968		1968	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<u>Population</u>										
Relatively Secure (A,B,C)	7.8	51	9.4	58	11.3	66.5	11.7	66.7	15.4	76.3
Contested (D,E, Other)	4.0	26	3.8	24	2.8	16.5	2.9	16.6	2.0	11.4
VC Controlled (VC)	3.5	23	2.9	18	2.9	17.0	2.9	16.5	2.1	12.3
Total	15.3	100	16.1	100	17.0	100.0	17.5	100.0	17.5	100.0

SOURCE: MACV Hamlet Evaluation System for 1967-68; GVN data for 1965-66.

Statistics on pacification progress are often misleading and ambiguous, and the data shown above must be interpreted cautiously for several reasons. First, two different reporting systems were combined to provide these pacification statistics; GVN data was used for 1965-66 because the more sensitive and sophisticated Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) did not become available until 1967. The earlier data has been retrospectively adjusted but the comparability of the two systems is not known.

Second, and most important, HES does not measure "pacification" as it is generally conceived. Rather than evaluating political attitudes and GVN control, HES measures military presence (and to some extent, geographical control) and known enemy activity in the area, conditions that change rapidly and often in rural Vietnam. We have not yet developed a system to measure the impact of these changes on popular allegiance or support commanded by the GVN. HES is based on the weighted average of 18 indicators, 9 that measure

development. It may well be as good a system as we can devise for the purpose, but it often fails to tell the whole story.

Finally, war-induced geographical shifts in the population complicate the meaning of pacification statistics. For example, the fighting has created about 1.2 million temporary refugees, about 7% of the total SVN population. In addition, numerous South Vietnamese have moved to urban GVN-controlled areas to find jobs or to avoid Allied attacks and VC taxation. These large-scale population shifts tend to cloud the meaning of pacification statistics.

In spite of these statistical hazards, three broad conclusions emerge from our pacification efforts in Vietnam. First, pacification progress ground to a virtual halt in about June 1967. Second, the Tet offensive set pacification back at least one year and may have had still more lasting effects on

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GVN support. Finally, pacification is often illusory in Vietnam: a village that is pacified today may well be VC tomorrow; some hamlets that were pacified in 1966 had to be repacified in 1968; about 62-69% of the population is subject to strong VC influence for at least one month out of the year; and 81% of the people in rural areas are exposed to an active VC political infrastructure.

Pacification Slowdown in 1967. The HES data indicates pacification progressed slowly during the first half of 1967, but actually lost ground during the second half prior to the 1968 Tet offensive. Most (60%) of the total 1967 gain in relatively secure population resulted from accounting-type changes to the HES system, not from real pacification progress. Additions and deletions of hamlets and revision of population estimates accounted for half of the Jan-Jun 67 increase and for all of the Jun-Dec 67 increase. In the area that really counts -- VC-D-E hamlets rising to A-B-C ratings -- we may have suffered a slight net loss between June and December 1967. Thus, pacification progress as reported by the HES had actually stalled prior to the Tet offensive.

Tet Offensive Impact. The relatively secure South Vietnamese population declined by about 1.3 million people during the Tet offensive, setting the GVN pacification program back to its late 1966 level. Recovery has been slow however. The HES data indicate that it took until September 1968 to return about 1.4 million South Vietnamese to a relatively secure status. Unfortunately, 35% of this statistical recovery represented "accounting gains" that were achieved by adding and deleting hamlets to the reporting system; only 916,000 South Vietnamese were actually upgraded into the relatively secure status during this period (about 70% of the relatively secure population lost during Tet).

Recent HES data indicate that the pacification program has made significant progress since September 1968; about 1.6 million people moved into the relatively secure category and the total GVN-controlled population reached a new peak of about 13.4 million people (76% of the total) during September-December 1968. We have not yet received sufficient detailed data to determine the reasons for this development but suspect that three principal factors account for it. First, a joint US/GVN Accelerated Pacification program began in early November and was designed to rapidly improve security in over 1000 hamlets. Movement of GVN pacification personnel into those hamlets would automatically help raise HES scores. Second, the recent lull in combat intensity has undoubtedly increased security scores in many villages (these security "improvements" would disappear rapidly if the enemy stages another country-wide offensive). Finally, based on past experience, up to 40% of the increase may come from accounting-type changes not actual pacification improvements.

The Pacification Illusion. Pacification is not what it appears to be in Vietnam. The HES system represents a snapshot of security and development at one point in time. The monthly statistics merely provide a series of these snapshots and creates an impression of steady progress and widespread GVN influence among the people of South Vietnam. But security and development are

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dynamic, not static events; and much of the movement and interaction in pacification is not reflected by the summary HES reports.

For example, a large percentage of the South Vietnamese (perhaps as high as 69%) live in areas that are subject to VC domination or influence for at least one month out of the year. These people simply cannot afford to openly support the GVN knowing that an active VC infrastructure still operates in their village and that enemy troops will return one day soon. The table below shows that only about 38% of the population was rated continuously under GVN control in 1967; during June 1967 - March 1968 only 31% were continuously rated secure, largely because of the country-wide Tet offensive. On the other hand, a relatively constant 14% of the population (about 2.3 million people) remained under VC control throughout this period.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION (millions)

	<u>Jan - Dec 1967</u>		<u>Jun 67 - Mar 68</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>Continuously Secure (A-B)</u>				
Hamlet population	3.52		2.29	
Non-hamlet population	3.06		3.06	
Sub-total	6.58	38%	5.35	31%
<u>Contested or Churned</u>				
Churn between A/B & C	1.72		1.89	
Continuously rated C	1.91		1.72	
Churn between C/D & E	1.19		1.40	
Continuously rated D/E	1.26		1.29	
Churn between D/E and VC	0.52		0.30	
Non-hamlet contested	0.29		0.29	
Other churned population	0.52		1.05	
Sub-total	7.43	43%	7.94	46%
<u>Continuously Under VC Control (VC)</u>				
Hamlet population	2.09		2.32	
Non-hamlet population	0.11		0.11	
Sub-total	2.20	13%	2.42	14%
Not Continuously Rated	1.01	6%	1.44	9%
Total Population	17.20		17.15	

SOURCE: MACV Hamlet Evaluation System

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In addition, much of the GVN pacification activity and movement is focused on "re-pacifying" hamlets that were already pacified (or programmed for pacification) in previous years. About 67% of the 1785 hamlets in the 1968 Revolutionary Development Program were either "new life" or RD hamlets in 1967 or earlier. The GVN apparently feels the pacification task is not complete in these hamlets, and that many of them must be redone or upgraded.

Thus, the bulk of the South Vietnamese people live in a continuously contested hamlet or churn in and out of a contested status at least once during the year. This means that they are subjected to taxation, arrest, and military draft by both sides, or first one side and then the other. This precludes commitment and generates the type of instability and insecurity that the Viet Cong hope to create.

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Overview

The war in South Vietnam has wound down to a point well below the levels of previous years and has entered a period of relative quiescence. Each side still has sufficient forces and resources in place to sustain hostilities, although enemy capabilities have declined considerably in recent years.

Reduction in US Activities

During FY 70, US activities, costs, and casualties in South Vietnam declined significantly:

- About 25% of the US forces redeployed, leaving US strength at its lowest point in 3½ years.
- US attack sortie levels in South Vietnam declined about 40%.
- The cost of the war to the US declined about \$5 billion.
- US combat deaths declined nearly 50%.

This year (FY 71), US activities are winding down further. At least 150,000 US troops will redeploy, US attack sortie levels will decline at least 30-50% more, and costs will drop another \$4 billion. US combat deaths are also expected to decline another 50% (current FY 71 average of about 50 per week is 57% below the comparable period of FY 70).

Impact of US Reductions on SVN Situation

Pacification progress has exceeded expectations, despite reduced US forces and activity. When redeployments began about a year and a half ago, most observers (including us) anticipated a slowing of pacification progress and some regression. Instead, the HES/70 A-B-C score has risen about 14 percentage points (to 95%) and the A-B (secure) score has gained about 23 points (to 84%). Moreover, GVN control of the rural population has increased more than 25 points (to 66%) since US redeployments began.

Despite serious enemy challenges in April and May, the Secure (A-B) population has continued to expand in 1970 at about 1.4% per month. This is about the same rate of progress achieved during the GVN's second Accelerated Pacification Campaign (second half of 1969), when enemy opposition was light.

Finally, experienced observers returning to Vietnam after long periods out of the country unanimously agree that security conditions in the countryside are better than ever before, and that the allied main force military campaign has achieved most of its objectives in MR's III and IV. (On the other hand, enemy activity has picked up in Cambodia and may be on the increase in Southern Laos.)

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The favorable military situation in SVN probably stems from a variety of factors:

- The enemy main force war seems to be blunted (for the moment anyway). For example, battalion sized attacks declined 70% in FY 70 and none have been reported in SVN during FY 71 to date. The general tempo of enemy activity in SVN seems to be winding down--except for harassment and terrorism--and the enemy is targeting RF/PF, paramilitary forces, and civilians more than before, while avoiding the Regular Forces. This pattern has probably resulted from a combination of successful allied pressure and an enemy decision to keep their combat forces intact until all US units are gone.

- The RVNAF has gained in equipment, capability, and strength (up about 20% since US redeployments began, mostly in the Regional and Popular Forces), although extremely serious shortcomings persist. The tempo of RVNAF operations, casualties, and enemy kills (RVNAF now accounts for about 65% of the enemy KIA) has increased accordingly. Finally, ARVN's successes in Cambodia have boosted its confidence and improved the situation in MR's III and IV.

- The ratio of total allied to enemy military personnel has actually increased since US redeployments began. The RVNAF expansion helped to fill gaps left by departing US forces, and further dried up enemy sources of manpower.

Differences Among the Military Regions

Despite the ability of both sides to make relatively uniform strategy changes throughout South Vietnam, the nature of the war in each of the 4 GVN military regions is so different that analysis of countrywide trends alone may be grossly misleading.

Disparate Factors. Our analyses of these individual regions show distinct differences in such factors as:

- The opposing forces and the impact of the Cambodian situation.
- Future options available to the enemy.
- The effects of continued US redeployments.
- RVNAF effectiveness and ability to cope with the VC/NVA threat as US units leave.

Evaluation. The interaction of these factors with differences in terrain and population density has fostered a different rate of Vietnamization progress in each MR.

- MR I, tied with MR III for the lead in GVN control, has the worst friendly to enemy strength ratio in RVN and may not have enough RVNAF to compensate for continued US redeployments. RVNAF leadership is good and the units are excellent.

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- MR II is ranked last in GVN control but second only to MR III in RVNAF strength. The new MR commander faces an awesome challenge; the leadership is poor and RVNAF effectiveness is the worst in the country (particularly the RF/PF).

- MR III leads the country in pacification and is tied with MR I in GVN control. Its friendly to enemy strength ratio is the best in the country and the enemy here seems to be deteriorating. This was the only region in which enemy attacks and terrorism declined during the first half of 1970.

- MR IV has had little main force conflict and relies heavily on RF/PF. The RVNAF have progressed well since US ground combat units left in mid-1969, but enemy attacks, harassment and terrorism are increasing, as are RF/PF, paramilitary, and civilian deaths.

Where the War is Being Fought

An even closer look at the war reveals it is being fought mainly in 10 provinces of South Vietnam (see Map). The intensity of the conflict in the other 34 provinces is very low.

These 10 provinces, Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Tin, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai (MR I), Kontum, Binh Dinh (MR II), Tay Ninh (MR III), Dinh Tuong and Chau Doc (MR IV) comprise 23% of the SVN provinces, but account for:

- 53% of the allied deaths (US and SVN).
- 72% of the US combat deaths.
- 62% of the enemy KIA.
- 56% of the enemy attacks.

These provinces contain 54% of the allied regular combat strength, and about 58% of the enemy's combat strength.

A fairly straightforward main force war is being fought in five of the provinces:

Quang Tri

Thua Thien

Kontum

Tay Ninh

Chau Doc (because of the NVA influx during late 69 and early 70).

In the other five, a complex mixture of main force and guerrilla war is being fought, caused by a strong enemy main force presence closely linked with

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a strong, well entrenched VC infrastructure (VCI);

Quang Nam

Quang Tin

Quang Ngai

Binh Dinh

Dinh Tuong (to a lesser extent)

To illustrate the point, these five provinces contain over 35% of the US/FW combat strength and more than 20% of the ARVN/VNMC combat strength facing about 25% of the enemy's regular combat strength. Additionally, 20% of the country's RF/PF face 28% of the enemy's separate unit (company or platoon) and guerrilla forces there. Nearly 30% of all KIA (both enemy and friendly) occur there, as well as about 20% of all the terrorist incidents. The five provinces also contain over 30% of the nation's VCI.

Five other provinces are of continuing interest because they feature a high level of guerrilla warfare and contain about 25% of the reported VCI:

Phu Yen

Binh Thuan


Kien Hoa

Vinh Binh

Vinh Long

MR Studies: Concise, but detailed, analyses of each GVN Military Region appear in the following four articles.

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WHERE THE WAR IS FOUGHT

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Nov Dec 1970

MILITARY REGION I

Summary. Pacification progress in MR I is attributable to the quality -- not the quantity -- of the friendly units fighting there.

-- MR I has the worst friendly/enemy strength ratio in the country, with 35% of the enemy forces and only 20% of the friendly forces in RVN.

-- Despite its last place standing, MR I is tied for the lead in GVN control with MR III, which has the best strength ratio.

GVN forces in MR I (ARVN, RF/PF and National Police) are consistently rated as the top performers in the country. But only 16% of the total GVN forces are stationed in MR I, and the US forces remain a vital factor.

-- In October 1970, MR I had 42% of the US combat forces in RVN and they accounted for 53% of the MR I combat battalion strength.

-- US KIA in MR I account for 50% of the US combat deaths in RVN and nearly the same share of the regular force fatalities in MR I.

-- Over 40% of the enemy KIA in MR I were contributed by US forces in 1970 (down from 55% in 1969), they still contribute about 70% of the enemy killed in friendly initiated operations. These operations are a key factor in keeping enemy pressure against pacification from mounting.

The intensity of the main force war in MR I has diminished since mid-1969, but is still highest in the country. Enemy attacks against civilians in 1970 exacted higher casualties than reported for any previous period, and the coupling of main forces and a strong VC infrastructure in southern MR I poses a continuing threat to pacification.

Thus, continued redeployment of US combat units from MR I poses some hard choices for the GVN. If the enemy maintains his presence after the US units redeploy, the GVN may have to shift regular ARVN forces into MR I from other MRs, recruit more ARVN in MR I, or expand the RF/PF and use them in a main force role.

Comparative Strength and GVN Control

With 35% of the enemy forces in South Vietnam, MR I has 20% of the friendly forces, and only 16% of total GVN forces.

As of June 1970, the overall friendly/enemy strength ratio in MR I was 4.4-to-1, compared to 7-to-1 in MR II, 818-to-1 in MR III, and 6.6-to-1 in MR IV.

Despite this last-place strength standing, MR I, with 65% of the rural population under GVN control, is second only to MR III, with 70% control. Moreover, the rate of improvement in MR I has exceeded the other MRs, including MR III. MR I rural population control rose from 10% in 1968 to 65% in August of 1970, while MR III went from 25% to 70%.

Table 1 below shows MR I changes in strength ratios and control over the past 30 months.

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As of June 1970, there were 71,000 enemy soldiers (main force, administrative and guerrillas) in MR I. They were opposed by 309,000 allied soldiers (main force, territorials and logistic support).

TABLE 1
CHANGES IN STRENGTH RATIOS AND CONTROL

	1968		1969		1970	% Change 1968-1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	
<u>Friendly/Enemy Ratio a/</u> (Monthly Average)						
Combat Strength (without US)	1.1	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.5 (.7)	+ 36 (- 36)
Total Strength (without US)	3.1	3.1	4.3	4.5	4.4 (2.5)	+ 42 (- 20)
<u>Rural Population Control b/</u> (end of period in %)	10%	26%	40%	53%	65%	+ 55

a/ Combat strength ratio calculated from friendly maneuver battalion strength and enemy maneuver/combat support battalion strength only. Total strength includes all military forces - US, FWF and RVNAF versus total VC/NVA maneuver, combat support, administrative and guerrilla forces.

b/ VSSG control indicator based on Hamlet Evaluation System (HES).

Performance of Friendly Units

The progress of the control war in MR I is attributable to the quality -- not the quantity -- of the friendly units fighting there.

ARVN. There are 40 ARVN battalions in MR I. They represent 29% of all ARVN battalions, whereas the enemy has 39% of his battalions in MR I. Most of the ARVN battalions are attached to either the 1st and 2d Divisions, or the 51st Regiment. The ARVN battalions in MR I have been consistently rated as among the most effective in country. The SEER advisory report shows an average rating of 80% for ARVN units in MR I during 1968 and 1969, while the countrywide average was 75%.

This difference is hardly striking, but the qualitative assessments contained in Senior Officers' End-of-Tour Reports strongly emphasize the capable leadership and technical skills of the ARVN battalions in MR I.

U.S. Battalions. There were, as of October 1970, 31 U.S. battalions in MR I. They represented 42% of all U.S. battalions in SVN and 53% of the total battalion manpower strength in MR I. (A U.S. battalion is considerably larger than an ARVN battalion.)

Critical to Vietnamization is the eventual redeployment of these U.S. forces, and the adequacy of the ARVN to deal with the enemy main forces thereafter. It may be that the U.S. presence provides the GVN in MR I with an element of benevolent redundancy; i.e., that the U.S. forces are helpful but not necessary to improve, or at least hold stable, the current situation.

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Needed or not, they are certainly engaging the enemy. Table 2 indicates the percent of U.S. fatalities which have occurred in MR I.

TABLE 2

U.S. FATALITIES IN MILITARY REGION I

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>Thru September 1970</u>
Number	4642	8090	4475	1805
% of Country-wide Total	51%	56%	48%	55%

A fundamental point emerges from these casualty figures: the U.S. forces account for 70%^{1/} of all MR I enemy killed or captured in friendly-initiated incidents. Offensive pressure accounts for 88%^{2/} of all enemy killed or captured. Thus, when U.S. forces move out of an offensive mode in June of 1971, as promised by the Secretary of Defense, either the ARVN must operate more frequently and more aggressively, or the enemy's total casualty costs (killed and captured from enemy-initiated plus friendly-initiated) for prosecuting the war will decrease by 62%^{3/}.

It is questionable whether there is a necessity to continue to exact a high price against the enemy (lest the enemy initiate more action once he is freed of the current level of offensive pressure). For example, the U.S. 9th Infantry Division in early 1969 was claiming 50% of all enemy killed in IV Corps. Yet IV Corps continued to improve after the 9th left, and many claim more substantial progress was made once there were no American forces in the delta. (RVNAF increased their enemy KIA by about 40% after the US forces left.)

On the other hand, one must be careful about inter-corps comparisons. I Corps has been the scene of the heaviest main force fighting; IV Corps the least. Conservatively speaking, then, the indicator of friendly-initiated activities warns that the enemy will shortly be under less pressure in I Corps. The question is how he will respond to less pressure, if he responds at all.

The absence of Americans in an offensive posture will be a new situation to both the ARVN and the enemy in MR I. As Table 3 shows, however, the ARVN is absorbing a larger percentage share of friendly main force casualty costs in 1970 than in previous years. This, however, is due to U.S. and enemy redeployments as well as ARVN initiative.

- ^{1/} U.S. FI (friendly-initiated) accounted for 13,105 of the 18,562 enemy killed or captured in friendly-initiated actions, or 70%.
- ^{2/} 21,099 enemy were killed or captured, 18,562 of which were due to FI, or 88%.
- ^{3/} U.S. FI 13,105 divided by total enemy killed or captured figure of 21,099 yields 62%.

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Table 3

FRIENDLY DEATHS - MR I

	Monthly Average					Distribution (%)					
	1968		1969		1970	1968		1969		1970	
	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	1H	2H	1H	2H		
<u>Regular Force</u>											
US	923	425	511	235	221	68	63	67	62	46	} % of Regular Force
FW	35	16	19	13	10	3	2	3	3	2	
RVNAF	401	236	238	133	250	29	35	30	35	52	
Subtotal	1359	677	768	381	481	78	64	67	59	52	
<u>Territorial Force</u> (RF/PF)	185	155	166	111	140	11	15	14	17	15	
<u>Paramilitary/Civ</u>											
Killed	107	100	90	80	168						
Assassinated	83	121	127	75	142						
Subtotal	190	221	217	155	310	11	21	19	24	33	
Total	1734	1053	1151	647	931	100	100	100	100	100	

Korean Forces. There are four Korean battalions in MR I. They are not highly regarded. With 17% of the friendly main force strength, they have during 1970 absorbed only 2% of the friendly main force casualties. They are not inclined to conduct offensive operations. They are useful for guarding a small sector of the populated area, although their conduct towards civilians has been a sore point.

RF/PF. By countrywide comparisons, MR I is not much better off in terms of territorial forces than it is in maneuver battalions. With 78,000, or 15%, of the 500,000 RF/PF in RVN, MR I ranks third among the other regions based on either population or area density criteria.

The particular problem is that there exists an inverse correlation between the density of territorial forces and the demand for them. Territorial forces are recruited locally, so if one side has firm control over an area, it can augment its control by organizing territorials (PFs or guerrillas). The problem the GVN faces in hard VC areas like southern I Corps, then, is that the VC has been there first, has soaked up most of the available manpower, and has inculcated the population with a fear or hostility towards the GVN. Yet it is in precisely these hard areas that a thick density of territorials is desirable.

The RF/PF in MR I fight well and are considered the best in the country. Comparative kill ratios in Table 4 clearly show MR I's superiority.

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Table 4

RF/PF KILL RATIO
(Monthly Average)

	1968		1969		1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
MR I	5.4	5.7	5.7	6.9	5.2
MR II	4.2	2.1	1.7	1.6	1.9
MR III	2.0	3.4	3.4	2.9	2.9
MR IV	2.9	3.8	4.3	3.5	2.8

The MR I RF/PF complement, and sometimes substitute for, ARVN units in the main force war. During TET 1968, a 31-company NVA attack against DaNang was discovered and fragmented by the territorials. Twice during the summer of 1970, NVA companies attempting to establish base areas in the populated lowlands of Quang Tri province were attacked and routed by RF/PF units. Over the past few years, only about 10% of the I Corps' territorial missions could be termed "offensive." In October of 1970, however, General Lam began using the territorials on major sweeps in Quang Nam and Quang Tin. These operations were successful and it is reported that the Corps commander plans to use the territorials frequently in the future on offensive operations.

Starting in the last half of 1969, MR IV began to use RF companies in "Lien Doi" battalions on offensive operations. These operations have been successful. Table 5 below shows that MR IV paid a price in RF/PF casualties for this increased activity. In MR I, by contrast, the RF/PF fatalities per 1000 friendly strength have steadily decreased as the tempo of the war has slowed.

This raises the possibility that there may be "slack" in the current missions of the RF/PF units in MR I; that is, it may be possible to employ them on offensive operations and to suffer the concomitant casualties approaching 4 KIA per 1,000 without hurting the morale of the territorials so used. This may not be possible in MR II, where RF/PF fatalities are rising due to enemy pressure. And in MR III, the question is moot, due to decreased enemy pressure.

Table 5

NORMALIZED FATALITIES FOR RF/PF UNITS
(KIA per 1000 Assigned Strength)

	1968		1969		1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
MR I	4.8	3.6	3.7	2.1	2.5
MR II	4.1	1.8	2.0	1.7	2.3
MR III	5.1	1.9	2.2	1.8	1.8
MR IV	5.6	2.7	3.0	3.9	4.0

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Police. In August 1970, MR I had 339 police assigned to the Identification Branch, 2,441 in Special Branch, 2,340 in National Police Field Forces and 3,440 in a category called Other, for a total of 8,560. This total represents 14% of all such branches (62,155) in SVN and together comprises the police attack upon the VC infrastructure. Yet I Corps accounts for 20% of the known infrastructure.

In the first half of 1970 MR I accounted for 25% of the total VCI neutralizations in RVN, second only to MR IV, and the National Police are generally regarded as the best in the country. They need to be, for in MR I the VCI are more dangerous than their proportionate strength would indicate; they have repeatedly demonstrated close linkage, especially in southern I Corps, with the NVA main forces. The intensity of this coupling, and its adverse effect upon GVN population control efforts, is equaled in only one other province in Vietnam: Binh Dinh. Taken together, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai and Binh (see map) deserve a special effort to root out or neutralize the VCI.

Intensity of Combat

During the past 30 months, the intensity of combat in MR I has greatly exceeded that of any other MR. Of 333,000 enemy reported killed during that time period, 128,000 died in MR I, or 38% of the total. Of 137,000 friendly soldiers killed, 44,000 died in MR I, or 32%. Of 12,000 enemy-initiated incidents, 5,000 were in MR I, or 43%.

The war has been most intense in MR I because the enemy had a strong infrastructure, capable local forces, secure jungle redoubts, short supply lines and direct access to North Vietnam. For three years,--mid-1966 through mid-1969,--the NVA chose to fight a conventional war in northern MR I (Quang Tri and Thua Thien), while at the same time reinforcing the VC in their efforts to set back pacification in southern MR I (Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai).

The enemy's total strength peaked during the second half of 1968 at a level of 104,000 troops; by the first half of 1970 he was down to 71,000,--a drop of 32%.

The enemy's main force strength has been cut 57% in I Corps in the past three years.^{4/} He reached his main force peak (maneuver plus combat support) in January 1968, when his forces number 60,000. By 30 June 1970, his main forces were down to 26,000.^{5/}

Basically, by 1970 the enemy had forsaken his main force confrontation and his tenacious population defense in MR I. Total casualties on both sides fell accordingly and US and ARVN units were able to increase the circumference of their shields around GVN controlled areas.


^{4/} On the other hand, allied forces in I Corps have dropped 11% from their peak. And if all US forces are redeployed, I Corps' strength would drop 54% from its peak.

^{5/} Source for both figures: DIA Retroactive Summary of VC/NVA Battalions by MR, (cite S.2387/AP-4A, 16 Sep 1970). There is, of course, some variance between these and other figures used for enemy strengths in other tables. This is due to the different sources used. But in no table have two different sources been used, so each table should be internally consistent.

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MILITARY REGION I



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Recent Enemy Changes and Activity

In 1970, the enemy markedly changed his strategy in MR I. He withdrew two NVA regiments and decentralized two others, encadring VC local units and resorting to small unit evasion tactics.

The pattern of his recent incidents (Table 6) shows:

-- A downward trend in total incidents primarily due to fewer harassments.

-- The highest number of attacks since the Tet 68 period, but at a lower intensity. This intensity, measured by the number of KIA the enemy sustains from his own ground attacks, has nearly always been higher in MR I than in the rest of the country.

-- Friendly deaths from all enemy incidents exceeding the first half 1968 rates primarily due to a sharp rise in paramilitary and civilian fatalities. Enemy deaths from the same incidents have declined.

Table 6

ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY IN MR I (Monthly Average)

	1968		1969		1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
<u>Number of Incidents a/</u>					
Total Attacks	111	42	78	41	37
Harassment	1165	797	1064	545	703
Terror	80	106	91	62	96
Total	1356	945	1233	648	886
<u>KIA Results b/</u>					
Enemy	412	175	387	177	339
Friendly	403	337	425	215	490
<u>Enemy KIA per Ground Attk</u>					
MR I	11	12	11	9	9
RVN (less MR I)	9	13	9	5	4

Source: VC initiated Incidents and Actions (VCIIA) Computer File, prioritized to eliminate double-counting, and Terrorist Incident Reporting System (TIRS), similarly prioritized.

a/ Attacks include ambushes, assaults and attacks by fire with 20 rounds or more. Harassment includes attacks by fire with less than 20 rounds, sabotage, and terror incidents reported through military channels. Terror reflects all civilian oriented incidents with casualties (assassinated, abducted or wounded).

b/ From enemy initiated activity only. Friendly KIA includes military, paramilitary, and civilian deaths.

In 1970, the enemy struck soft civilian targets on an unprecedented scale. To be sure, a high level of volume was normal in MR I. But in the first half of 1970, as Table 3 on page 4 showed, the number of civilians as

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a proportion of total friendlies killed rose to 33%. It had been 21% in 1969 and 16% in 1968. There were too many attacks by NVA units on refugee hamlets and other soft targets for the rise to be accidental.

The enemy's attacks against the people are the most savage in the war. His intention is to prevent cooperation between the people and the government. According to the MR I Commander, General Lam, the enemy ideally seeks to kill more selectively, concentrating upon those civilians who run for, or are elected to, public office. Yet in the June provincial elections, an average of five candidates filed for each seat. MR I recorded a record number of candidates.

The enemy clearly is turning against the people, trying to force them into a posture of neutrality. But the election candidacy is one indicator that he has not been successful yet.

There is no real defense against military attacks upon civilians and hamlets. There are no front lines, no way of stopping an NVA company who skirts the fire bases and falls upon a refugee village.

But the unanswered question about the strategy is: what will it gain the enemy?

PROBLEM AREAS

A. US Redeployments and GVN Superiority in the Main Force War.

There are five optional ways by which the GVN might retain main force superiority and control over the rural population after the withdrawal from combat of US forces.

1. No Contest. The enemy has cut back on his forces in MR I and he has in the past year afforded little resistance to allied outward pacification moves. He has been either unable or unwilling to defend his populated areas. After the US forces redeploy, he will be faced with the requirement of counterattacking, if he wishes to regain population control. If he does not counterattack, the present level of GVN forces may prove sufficient in MR I.

2. ARVN Redeployment. The GVN might begin moving regular forces north on a "shift-and-try" basis. The problem here is a matter of unit morale, unless dependents are included in the move or units are rotated on a regular basis. This would require thinning out ARVN units presently in MRs III and IV.

3. Recruitment of ARVN. Currently, there is no plan for creating additional ARVN battalions in the GVN force structure. If the other options prove unworkable, more ARVN units would be necessary.

4. Improve ARVN Performance in MR I. This is possible but unlikely and perhaps undesirable. As noted, ARVN in MR I leads the country in

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performance. The room for marginal improvement is low compared to other regions. MR II should take precedence over the other regions in terms of performance-boosting inputs. Basically, performance is most sensitive to improved leadership. In this regard, MR I has more to offer than to take from the other regions.

5. Utilize RF/PF in Offensive Roles. This is the most likely short-term option. Following the lead of MR IV, MR I in July began a series of large unit sweeps using territorial forces and the results were good. It is uncertain, however, whether this move alone could compensate for the US redeployments.

B. RF/PF Additions

If pacification continues until the GVN controls all the rural population, there will be a requirement for additional RF/PF to bring under GVN control the 353,000 people in MR I currently outside GVN control. At a ratio of 35 persons in the rural area for each RF or PF deployed, this means another 10,000 RF/PF, under current conditions.

But there are no MACV plans for such additional territorials. For this reason, redeployments of territorials may be as important a necessity as is the redeployment of ARVN units. But territorials removed from their home areas no longer are truly territorials and subsequently they often perform poorly. If population and area control becomes critical, then, (as would be the case in a ceasefire), an alternative would be to decentralize to territorial level ARVN units in their local areas, and to bring other ARVN in to act as shield forces. Thus, the 51st ARVN Regiment in Quang Nam might displace several scores of squads into the outlying villages while a Ranger regiment moved up from MR III to fill in as the shield force.

C. US Casualties

There is a price that the US forces must pay to stay in MR I. Currently that price is about 25 fatalities per week. By withdrawing to rear base areas, and abjuring any patrolling or offensive maneuvers, the US forces can substantially reduce that number. But if patrolling is required, and if the enemy persists in mining and harassment attacks, and if preemptive strikes continue to be a necessary adjunct to a strong defense, then the only way US forces might avoid paying a steady casualty price would be to deploy to a safer MR.

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MILITARY REGION II

Summary. In 1970, several events rekindled friendly interest in MR II:

-- The NVA forces which had gone to MR I in 1968 moved back into the northern coastal area of MR II during late 1969 and early 1970.

-- Terrorism exploded, not only outstripping all previous levels in MR II, but accounting for over 40% of the countrywide incidents.

-- HES security scores fell during the first quarter of 1970, recorded no progress in the second quarter, and continue to lag behind the nation-wide average. GVN control is still the lowest in the country.

-- Continued improvement in MRs III and IV, particularly since the Cambodian operations, highlighted the situation in MR II.

These events do not presage imminent collapse in MR II, but they do suggest that the situation is serious. Senior US and RVNAF officials consistently report that the following factors are impeding GVN progress in MR II:

-- Poor RVNAF leadership at all levels (although the new MR commander, General Dzu, is showing promise).

-- Regular forces are spread over a region which comprises half the area of RVN and ARVN operations are not conducted aggressively.

-- The location and tactics of the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces are no longer appropriate to the situation.

-- The Territorial Forces (RF/PF) are the worst in the country.

-- A strong VC infrastructure is well entrenched in the coastal area.

FORCES

In the first half of 1970 an average of about 49,000 enemy soldiers (combat, administrative, and guerrilla) opposed the 345,000 allied soldiers (regulars and

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territorial forces) in MR II. This represents about 22% of the RVN total for both sides and a friendly/enemy strength ratio of 7:1, the second highest in the country (MR III is first).

MR II now has 52 regular combat battalions (34 ARVN and 18 ROK) to cope with 67 enemy combat battalions as the US presence declines. From a steady 17 battalions throughout 1968 and 1969, US units were cut to 14 by mid-1970 and will drop to 6 by the end of 1970.

Table 1 shows that both the total friendly/enemy force ratio and the combat force ratio have declined 20% to 30% this year, as enemy units returned to MR II and US units departed. The ratios remain constant, however, if we exclude the enemy units diverted to Cambodia from MR II. The diversion has had little effect on enemy strength in the key provinces of Phu Yen and Binh Dinh, where the recent enemy buildup of forces (and terrorism) has taken place.

TABLE 1

FRIENDLY/ENEMY RATIO b/ (Monthly Average)	FORCE RATIOS AND GVN CONTROL					
	1968		1969		1970	
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half ^{a/}
Total Strength	5.9	7.4	9.0	8.9	7.1 (8.9)	7.1 (8.9)
Combat Strength	1.8	2.5	3.7	3.4	2.5 (3.3)	2.4 (3.1)
GVN CONTROL (% of Rural Pop., end of Period)	13	26	42	45	42	60

a/ Projected data - GVN control based on June-Sept 1970 rate of progress while ratio projections reflect US redeployments and a constant enemy threat.

b/ Parenthetical values exclude enemy units outside MR II border in Laos and Cambodia. Combat strength ratios calculated using friendly maneuver battalion strength and enemy maneuver/combat support battalion strength only.

Despite its favorable force ratio, GVN control in MR II is the lowest in the country, more than 14 percentage points behind third-ranked MR IV, and the relationship between GVN control and the force ratio does not appear to be very strong. The control score did mirror the force ratio decline in the first half of 1970, but the control losses have since been reversed while the strength ratio remained constant. More to the point, GVN control almost doubled in the last half

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of 1968 when strength ratios were about the same as they are now.

The most severe losses in GVN control during the first half of 1970 were in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Phu Bon, and Pleiku. These provinces, together with coastal Binh Thuan to the south, received the brunt of the enemy's 1970 terrorism campaign, suggesting that the effectiveness of friendly territorial/paramilitary forces in coping with the VC guerrilla/infrastructure apparatus also exerts a strong influence on GVN control.

Territorial Forces (RF/PF) and enemy guerrilla strengths (87,000 and 10,000 respectively) are included in the total strength ratio. MR II accounts for about 24% of the RVN total for both forces.

The strength of the National Police and the VCI in MR II is about equal at approximately 13,000, representing 15% and 18% of the RVN totals, respectively. The VCI in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Binh Thuan provinces account for about 10% of the RVN total, with more than 5% in Binh Dinh alone.

Significant Force Shifts

There have been three distinct shifts of forces in MR II since 1967:

-- An outward shift to other regions, beginning with the transfer of four US brigades to MR I in late 1967, followed by the departure of five NVA regiments during 1968. Two of the regiments were sent to southern MR I and three to MR III.

-- Internal shifts during much of 1969 as US units gradually turned over defense of the Highlands to ARVN units and moved east toward Binh Dinh. NVA units shifted into and out of the Cambodian sanctuaries from the Highlands area.

-- A combination of inward and outward shifts beginning in late 1969 with the return of the two NVA regiments from MR I to the Binh Dinh-Phu Yen area. This was followed in 1970 by the redeployment of three US brigades (one in April and two in Nov-Dec) and diversion of two NVA regiments from the Highlands to operate in Cambodia.

COMBAT OPERATIONS


A combination of terrain, population distribution, and enemy activity patterns creates three somewhat different types of conflict in MR II:

-- The Highlands area (MAP 1) has almost half the area of MR II but contains very few people, most (70%) of whom are Montagnard. Here the forces are predominantly NVA and the conflict has been primarily a conventional jungle war.

-- The southeastern four provinces (Lam Dong, Tuyen Duc, Ninh Thuan, and Binh Thuan) have three times the population density of the Highlands, concentrated along the coast and in the important city of Dalat. VC main and local forces predominate in this area and the contest has tended to be between

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GVN Military Region II
 Notes:
 — ARVN Div TAOR
 == Eastern boundary of the Highlands

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guerrilla and counter-guerrilla forces.

-- The Northeastern three provinces (Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Khanh Hoa) have the highest population density and the enemy forces are a combination of those found in the other two areas. Together with the population's strong VC ties, this has created the most complex war in MR II.

Enemy Activity

Enemy activity in the Highlands since 1967 has consisted primarily of two yearly campaigns, one in the northern area (Kontum/Pleiku) during spring and summer, followed by a fall and winter offensive in the southern portion (Darlac/Quang Duc). Interspersed with recuperation periods in the Cambodian/Lao-tion sanctuaries, these enemy offensives culminated in multi-battalion ground assaults against isolated GVN Special Forces/CIDG camps.

Enemy attacks in the eastern part of MR II are smaller in scale and generally avoid major confrontation with friendly main forces. Unlike the Cambodian sanctuaries, the base areas supporting the coastal provinces have always been vulnerable to friendly penetration, and this has restricted the enemy ability to mass without detection. In 1970 there were increasing reports of main and local forces fragmenting to support guerrilla units, particularly in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen; a GVN district Chief in Binh Dinh stated in August that he had documented evidence showing NVA soldiers in command of some local hamlet and village guerrilla units. These reports are consistent with COSVN Resolution 9 and later implementing documents which stressed the importance of small unit and guerrilla activity.

By mid-1970 it was evident that the return of NVA units was accompanied by resurgence of enemy activity (Table 2).

-- The mid year levels of enemy initiated incidents and resultant friendly deaths exceeded any previous period; comparable enemy deaths were the highest since the first half of 1968, but were 40% under that period.

-- Ground attacks in the three northern coastal provinces (Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Khanh Hoa) exceeded those in the Highlands for the first time since 1968, and MR II alone accounted for 43% of the RVN total.

-- The sharp upsurge in terrorism was concentrated in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Binh Thuan; these three provinces, with less than 9% of the RVN population, accounted for 50% of the nation's general abductions, 33% of its selected abductions, and 16% of its general assassinations.

-- The enemy in MR II had the initiative to a greater extent than in the rest of the country, with his own actions accounting for a higher proportion of his KIA (23% vs. 9%) and a larger majority of the friendly deaths (80% vs. 67%). The current contrast between MR II and the rest of RVN is consistent with the historical trend.

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TABLE 2

ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY IN MR II (Monthly Average)

	1968		1969		1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
<u>Incidents a/</u>					
Total Attacks	78	31	68	76	106
Harassment	250	143	149	129	294
Terror	98	93	122	89	188
Total	426	267	339	294	588
<u>Resulting KIA b/</u>					
Enemy	504	211	235	139	300
Friendly	424	270	414	316	501
<u>Enemy Initiated Share of Total KIA (%)</u>					
<u>MR II</u>					
Enemy KIA	25	19	13	13	23
Friendly KIA	70	71	73	75	80
<u>RVN (less MR II)</u>					
Enemy KIA	10	7	10	8	9
Friendly KIA	46	51	53	61	67

Source: VC initiated Incidents and Actions (VCIIA) Computer File, prioritized to eliminate double counting, and Terrorist Incident Reporting System (TIRS), similarly prioritized.

- a/ Attacks include ambushes, assaults and attacks by fire with 20 rounds or more. Harassment includes attacks by fire with less than 20 rounds, sabotage, and terror incidents reported through military channels. Terror reflects all civilian oriented incidents with casualties (assassinated, abducted or wounded).
- b/ From enemy initiated activity only. Friendly KIA includes military, paramilitary, and civilian deaths.

Friendly Activity

By the end of 1968, a lull had settled on the MR II battlefield; the VC general offensive had ended and the GVN Accelerated Pacification Campaign was getting underway. Friendly regular forces were generally supporting pacification in their areas of operation.

US Forces. Following a combined ARVN/US operation in northwestern Pleiku during Jan-Feb 1969, US units gradually turned over the highlands to the ARVN. Units released by this process were shifted eastward toward Binh Dinh; some of these units later assumed the mission of selected ARVN units, permitting them to be employed in the two major campaigns of 1969 (Ben Het-Kak To and Bu Prang-Duc Lap).

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In April 1969, the 173d Airborne Brigade was committed to pacification support in the four northern districts of Binh Dinh and is still so engaged. Throughout 1969 and 1970, the US 4th Division shifted from the Highlands to Binh Dinh, western Phu Yen and eastern Pleiku and Task Force South continued to conduct combat operations in the area of the 23rd ARVN Division.

During the Cambodian operations in May-June 1970, eight US battalions from MR II participated initially; half had returned to Binh Dinh by May 10 and the rest by May 20, leaving ARVN units, augmented by US combat support elements, to continue the action.

With 25% of the maneuver battalions and 30% of the regular combat strength in 1969, US units recorded about 38% of the battalion-days of operation in MR II. This contribution remained about the same in 1970 (37%), even though the US share of maneuver battalions and combat strength dropped to 21% and 26% respectively.

ROK Forces. The ROK's are not fully and effectively employed:

-- They tend to conduct small unit operations from relatively dispersed company sized bases, but pacification progress has expanded beyond the bases, and, in some instances, RF/PF units are between the ROK bases and the enemy.

-- Their large operations are meticulously planned and aggressively executed but have yielded declining returns.

-- The ROK troops apparently aren't working very hard. In 1969, with 25% of the maneuver battalions and 30% of the regular combat strength in MR II, the ROK forces logged only about 12% of the total regular force battalion days of operation; their contribution increased slightly in 1970 (to 14%).

ARVN Forces. Supported by US air, artillery, and intelligence resources, ARVN forces successfully countered two multi-regimental enemy threats in the Highlands during 1969. ARVN forces in the Ben Het-Dak To battle were controlled by the commander of the 24th Special Tactical Zone (STZ) (now 22d Division Forward), while the 23rd Division Commander controlled the Bu Prang-Duc Lap engagement. In both cases ARVN fought the ground maneuver battle alone, reinforced by battalions from the coastal area or those released by a US battalion's assumption of the ARVN unit's previous mission.

During the first half of 1970 ARVN operations varied from pacification support to multi-regimental offensives--the latter conducted against enemy forces in the Dak Seang area during April and in the Cambodian operations. Units from both ARVN divisions and the Ranger Group were employed under the control of the 22d Div (Fwd) in the Dak Seang battle, while two regiments from each division, the Ranger Group, and all three cavalry squadrons were employed at one time or another in Cambodia.

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These multi-regimental offensives generated a need for additional maneuver battalions which were obtained by accelerating the replacement of ARVN on pacification support by Territorial Forces in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen. By mid-1970, however, declines in village and hamlet security forced a renewed emphasis on pacification, particularly in these two provinces.

ARVN regular forces accounted for about 50% of the total battalion days in MR II during 1969 and 1970, with 50% of the maneuver battalions and 40% of the combat strength. Table 3, comparing the ARVN effort in MR II to the countrywide average (excluding Cambodian operations) shows fewer, but longer, large unit operations than elsewhere. This contrast was reversed in 1970 as the RVN average increased. Small unit operations appear to be increasing in MR II while the RVN average has been relatively constant.

In monthly contacts per battalion, MR II units achieved parity with the RVN average in 1969 but fell off sharply in 1970; this seems odd in the light of the enemy resurgence and indicates lack of aggressiveness by the MR II battalions.

TABLE 3
COMPARATIVE ARVN ACTIVITY - MR II VS RVN
(Monthly Average per Battalion)

	MR II					RVN				
	1968		1969		1970	1968		1969		1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
<u>Number of Operations</u>										
Large Unit (LUO)	8	5	4	4	5	10	10	9	8	4
Small Unit (SUO)	49	30	34	81	54	43	41	51	45	47
Days per LUO	a/	5	5	5	4	a/	2	2	3	5
<u>Number of Contacts</u>	7	4	7	4	3	9	7	7	4	6

a/ Not reported until July 1968.

Territorial Forces. RF/PF units participate in joint operations with regular forces in addition to operating by themselves. The SEER reporting system shows an average of five ARVN battalions in MR II conducting such operations since December 1968, down from 10-12 battalions during 1968.

Pacification progress in other regions of the country has been most successful when well coordinated, Regular Force/Territorial Force operations were conducted on a sustained basis, particularly when the VC are strongly entrenched among the population. There is some evidence to show that this is a problem in MR II. A recent Senior Officer Debriefing Report stressed that the military operations of ARVN and the RF/PF in MR II must be more closely coordinated and controlled.

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The number of RF/PF units with offensive operations as a primary mission is a useful indicator of the Territorial Force ability to release ARVN units from local security missions. RF companies are more often employed on offensive missions than PF platoons; the countrywide average in 1969-70 shows 20% of the RF units on such operations compared to 2% of the PF units.

MR II units lag substantially on this indicator--with only half the countrywide average for RF and less than a third for PF. Moreover, there is a declining trend evident in the critical 22d TAOR, which includes Binh Dinh and Phu Yen.

Table 4 shows MR II RF/PF units conduct about the same number of operations as the other MRs but get much fewer contacts. Narrative reports support this, calling the MR II Territorial Forces non-aggressive and defense-oriented. After a dismal 1969 (RVN average 2-3 times the MR II average), both RF and PF improved in 1970 while countrywide performance declined.

TABLE 4
COMPARATIVE RF/PF ACTIVITY
(Monthly Average)

	MR II					RVN (less MR II)				
	1968		1969		1970	1968		1969		1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
<u>Operations Per Unit</u>										
RF Rifle Cos.	35	52	61	74	74	40	59	67	72	73
PF Platoons	14	23	30	36	35	14	23	31	32	36
<u>Contacts Per 1000 Operations</u>										
RF Rifle Cos.	22	14	18	12	16	39	39	36	32	23
PF Platoons	15	10	9	6	8	30	27	26	21	15

Friendly Performance

All Forces. The most significant direct result of enemy and friendly activity is the number of deaths occurring on both sides. In MR II the cost of each enemy death is consistently higher than the countrywide average; its friendly/enemy KIA ratio has been about 25% below the rest of the country, when all paramilitary and civilian casualties are included with the military.

The MR II cyclical patterns for total KIA in Table 5 are about the same as in the other military regions. Each year has a high first half followed by a lower second half. However, enemy KIA in MR II are going down while friendly deaths hold steady; both are going down countrywide.

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TABLE 5

ENEMY AND FRIENDLY KIA a/
(Monthly Average)

	MR II					Less MR II				
	1968		1969		1970	1968		1969		1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
<u>Enemy KIA b/</u>	2607	1225	2105	1550	1895	17239	9111	14895	10192	9083
<u>Friendly KIA</u>										
Regular Force c/	431	216	289	208	209	2683	1398	1694	928	1083
RF/PF d/	262	130	157	134	198	961	569	665	701	850
Other e/	198	159	198	165	275	854	598	684	608	874
Total	<u>891</u>	<u>505</u>	<u>644</u>	<u>507</u>	<u>682</u>	<u>4498</u>	<u>2565</u>	<u>3043</u>	<u>2237</u>	<u>2807</u>
KIA Ratio	2.9	2.4	3.3	3.1	2.8	3.8	2.6	4.9	4.6	3.2

Sources: a/ From both friendly and enemy initiated activity but excluding operations in Cambodia. b/ MACV Measurements of Progress. c/ OASD(C) Table 53. d/ MACV-TFES. e/ OPREP-5 (VNDBA) and TIRS. Includes paramilitary and civilian KIA; calculated by summing terrorist assassinations and other military activity.

Regular forces sustain a declining proportion of the KIA in both MR II and the other military regions. RF/PF and "other" KIA absorb the difference about equally in the rest of the country, but in MR II, the RF/PF share has remained fairly constant, while the paramilitary and civilian share has increased to 40%.

US combat deaths in MR II dropped about 45% in the first half of 1970 from the same period in 1969. ARVN deaths dropped 20%, and ROK deaths remained about the same. Thus, US combat deaths accounted for 30% of the Regular Force KIA in 1970 instead of 40% last year, while the ARVN and ROK absorbed the difference.

US units inflicted 40% fewer enemy KIA in MR II in the first half of 1970 than they did a year earlier, and their share of the total dropped from 32% to 22%. GVN forces picked up some of the slack by killing 30% more enemy than in the first half of 1969, and increased their share from 44% to 63% this year. ROK performance deteriorated, with ROK combat deaths remaining about the same but their enemy KIA totals dropping 43%. The ROK share of enemy KIA also declined, from 24% to 15% of the total.

The contribution of the ROK forces to the MR II conflict in 1970 is not commensurate with their share of the resources. They fielded 30% of the regular force strength but only accounted for about 15% of the effort (in battalion days) and results (enemy KIA), while sustaining a regular force KIA cost of 18%.

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RVNAF. As a departure from previous comparisons with countrywide data, Table 6 displays comparative results from the 12th DTA in MR I (Quang Ngai and Quang Tin) which is where the 2nd ARVN Division operates. This area is part of VC MR 5, which also includes the critical provinces of Binh Dinh, Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa in MR II. Using this area for comparison provides a good opportunity to compare RVNAF performance in two similar areas.

Table 6 shows that since mid-1969, the 12th DTA ARVN units (with 65% fewer personnel) have accounted for more enemy than the whole of MR II. The difference in Territorial Force (RF/PF) performance is even more striking. With 70-80% less assigned strength than MR II, the RF/PF units in the 12th DTA since mid-1968 have consistently killed more enemy than the MR II units, while sustaining about half as many friendly KIA.

In terms of enemy KIA per 1000 friendly troop strength, ARVN battalions in the 12th DTA appear to be about twice as effective as those in MR II. RF units are about four times as effective and PF platoons at least six times as effective. Some improvement can be noted in 1970, but Territorial Forces in MR II are still achieving only about half the national average for the two indicators. The low KIA ratios further confirm the RVNAF inadequacies in MR II.

TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE RVNAF RESULTS a/
(Monthly Average)

	MR II					12th DTA ^{b/}				
	1968		1969		1970	1968		1969		1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
<u>Enemy KIA</u>										
ARVN Bns	447	295	541	319	385	144	197	428	326	394
RF/PF	1098	277	260	220	384	351	476	588	477	477
<u>Enemy KIA per 1000 Friendly Str</u>										
ARVN Bns		^{c/}	29	17	21	^{c/}		64	52	58
RF Rifle Co.	33	5	5	4	6	21	24	38	22	21
PF Platoon	5	2	2	1	3	22	23	30	21	20
<u>KIA Ratio</u>										
ARVN Bns	4.2	5.9	5.5	3.7	5.1	5.0	4.1	5.3	7.1	8.1
RF Rifle Co	5.9	2.8	2.0	1.9	2.3	4.4	4.5	6.5	7.9	8.6
PF Platoon	1.8	1.5	1.3	0.6	1.5	6.3	7.0	6.8	8.0	5.0

a/ Not including Cambodian operations.

b/ Quang Ngai and Quang Tin, the operational area of the 2nd ARVN Division in MR I.

c/ ARVN strength data breakout not reported in 1968.

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Security and Pressure on the Enemy. Rural population security in MR II (% ABC) exceeded the RVN average until it declined in 1st quarter 1970; after a zero progress in the 2nd quarter, the security score has recovered to its previous level and is now about par with the countrywide average (Table 7).

Even though security scores have improved, the GVN control indicator (Table 1) has the lowest rating of any MR, and the enemy has greater access to the population in MR II than he does elsewhere. He can still reach almost half the rural population, as shown in Table 7, and the countrywide military Chieu Hoi rate per 1000 enemy strength is about five times that in MR II. Experience seems to show an increasing number of ralliers when the enemy power structure is being seriously eroded, as recently illustrated in MR IV's Kien Hoa provinces.

TABLE 7

SECURITY

	MR II						RVN					
	1968		1969		1970		1968		1969		1970	
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	Oct	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	Oct
<u>Security a/</u> (End of period in %)	61	74	84	88	83	90	47	65	79	82	86	92
<u>Contest/VC Control b/</u> (End of period in %)	87	74	58	55	58	47	86	73	61	52	44	35
<u>Military Chieu Hoi</u> (Mo avg per 100 enemy strength)	2.4	3.2	3.5	4.0	2.6		4.1	9.0	14.0	19.6	13.0	

a/ Security scores are the percent of rural population rated ABC under the Hamlet Evaluation System.

b/ That portion of the rural population not under GVN control as measured by the VSSG indicator.

In neutralization of the VCI, MR II lags all other regions in accounting for 13% of the country total during the first half of 1970 (third ranked MR III accounted for 21%). Elsewhere in the country, RF/PF forces are the most productive, with 37% of the total neutralizations. Once again, the RF/PF in MR II lag: they account for only 25% of the VCI, ranking behind the Chieu Hoi program in neutralizations.

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PROBLEM AREAS

Obstacles to Vietnamization progress in MR II include:

- (1) A continuing need for US combat support.
- (2) Training weaknesses.
- (3) Personnel problems, particularly leadership.

The ARVN logistical system has shown in 1970 that it can support a division during sustained combat (Dak Seang) and react quickly to support hasty operations such as the cross-border operations in Cambodia, but the combat support picture is not quite so bright; senior RVNAF and US officers insist that the requirement for US helicopter, tactical air, and B-52 support will continue for some time. Training runs the scale from poor to excellent and is also tied to the leadership problem in that the "In-Place" training remains the most conspicuous training deficiency. The most glaring overall problems are in leadership and the other personnel areas discussed below.

Leadership. An MR II Senior Officer Debriefing Report submitted in December 1969 stated that "the fundamental, persistent, and most debilitating weakness of ARVN is their lack of strong leadership at all levels" and cited poor, hap-hazard staff work as the second glaring weakness. The most recent such report (July 1970) echoes these remarks and further states that the poor initiative and supervision in ARVN cannot be ascribed to lack of leadership training but to the over-centralization of power and unwillingness to delegate authority.

Other sources, such as the province senior advisor reports and CAS Field interviews with RVNAF leaders, point to the same problem for the Territorial Forces. An intensive study was conducted in MR II to determine why some Territorial Forces did better than others. A prime conclusion was that units training at least six hours a week performed two to four times better than those which did not.^{1/} While obviously pointing to a training problem, data gathered during the course of the study showed that most of the units did not train six hours a week, even if critiques of operations, weapons maintenance, and improvement of positions were considered as training, suggesting that even the rudimentary elements of leadership were lacking.

There have been a number of leadership changes in MR II during 1970, beginning with the MR commander, who was replaced by Major General Dzu in late August; five of the 12 province chiefs and 10 of the 34 battalion commanders are newly assigned since December 1969. These changes, particularly the new MR commander, who is a native of MR II (Binh Dinh), may alleviate the problem. Capability assessments of the two division commanders vary, but they certainly do not appear exceptional. Their competence is a particularly vital element; field reports since the reorganization under the Military Region concept show the Vietnamese province chiefs still look to the division commanders for direction, partially because of the vast areas in MR II.

^{1/} Senior Officer Debriefing Report; CG I Field Force Vietnam, dated 22 Apr 70.

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Other Personnel Problems. Personnel strength reporting is not timely and the replacement system cannot meet demands of heavy combat losses. These problems are further compounded by desertions, which were about three times the KIA loss for the first half of 1970.

Desertions plague combat units throughout the country, but MR II has a unique problem, because the Highlands area of Kontum and Pleiku is generally regarded as a hardship tour. The 42nd Regiment and 2nd Ranger Group in this area have experienced the highest MR II desertion rates in 1970. In a recent field interview the Kontum province chief remarked that seven officers and about 60 soldiers had been sent to Kontum "for punishment" during the week preceding the interview.

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MILITARY REGION III

Summary. MR III leads the country in pacification scores and GVN control, primarily because of its overwhelming friendly strength and the lack of enemy pressure in 1970.

- 93% of the population is rated A or B in security and more than 70% of the rural population is under GVN control.

- With 36% of the friendly forces and only 27% of the enemy in RVN, MR III has the best strength ratios of any military region.

- More than half of the enemy threat to MR III is now in Cambodia, and in the first half of 1970 it was the only region in which enemy attacks, enemy KIA and friendly KIA were below second half 1969 levels.

Plagued by supply shortages, many of the enemy battalions inside MR III have broken down into smaller units which can be handled by RF/PF units or National Police. As a result, ARVN/VNMC battalions are moving outside of MR III in search of the enemy, sending VNMC battalions to MR I and IV and conducting preemptive operations in Cambodia.

Unless the enemy recommit a sizeable number of his battalions diverted to Cambodia, his capabilities in MR III will probably continue to decline, giving the GVN additional flexibility to shift ARVN battalions from MR III to areas with a greater threat. Because of GVN emphasis on the defense of Saigon, however, adjacent Cambodia is a more likely destination for these ARVN battalions than other MRs.

Forces. MR III has 36% of the total friendly forces in South Vietnam, and 27% of the enemy forces. Some intelligence sources estimate that over half of these enemy forces are not in MR III at all, but in Cambodia. Even if they all returned to MR III, it would still have the highest friendly/enemy force ratio in country (over 8 to 1).

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Given this overwhelming strength, it is not surprising that MR III leads the country in pacification scores and GVN control. In October 1970, 93% of the total population was rated A or B in security and more than 70% of the rural population was under GVN control.

Changes in strength ratios and control over the past 30 months (Table 1) show the dramatic effect of the Cambodian situation on the main force war in MR III -- the average friendly/enemy ratios increased more than 30% from the last half of 1969 to the first half of 1970. Against a friendly force of 540,000 men, the enemy now has less than 47,000 men within the boundaries of the region, and only about a third of these are maneuver/combat support soldiers.

TABLE 1

STRENGTH RATIOS AND GVN CONTROL

<u>Friendly/Enemy Ratio b/</u> <u>(monthly average)</u>	1968		1969		1970	
	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>2nd Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>2nd Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>2nd Half</u> a/
Total Strength	7.8	7.4	7.2	7.9	8.8 (10.3)	8.2 (9.7)
Combat Strength	2.3	2.0	1.9	2.2	2.6 (3.0)	2.3 (2.8)
<u>GVN Control (% of</u> <u>Rural pop., end of</u> <u>period)</u>	25	28	38	45	70	72

a/ Projected data--GVN control (VSSG indicator) based on recent rate of progress while strength ratio projections reflect US redeployments and a constant enemy threat.

b/ Parenthetical values exclude enemy units in Cambodia. Combat strength ratios calculated using friendly maneuver battalion strength and enemy maneuver/combat support battalion strength.

In MR III 61 ARVN/VNMC battalions currently face 110 enemy combat battalions. However, the average strength of the VC/NVA units (230) is about 40% of the ARVN/VNMC battalions, and 60 of them are in Cambodia. Moreover, 24 US/ FWF battalions are helping the RVNAF in MR III (down from 48 in January), and these units are considerably larger than the ARVN/VNMC battalions.

The RF/PF strength is equally impressive. MR III leads the country in RF/PF density per rural population and in density per square kilometer of inhabited area. Thus, with 21% of the RF/PF unit assigned strength in RVN,

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MR III is able to deploy a thick patrol belt of RF/PF between the enemy main forces and the city of Saigon and maintain a strong presence of local defenders in the rural hamlets.

Combat Operations. In addition to shielding the RF/PF in the countryside and seeking out the enemy main forces, ARVN/VNMC battalions in MR III perform three unique tasks:

- (1) Protect Saigon.
- (2) Provide the RVN strategic reserve.
- (3) Conduct preemptive operations in Cambodia.

Due to these special missions and the strong enemy threat to Saigon up until this year, regular forces have accounted for about 80% of the friendly military strength in MR III. US units were not only a key factor in the defense of Saigon, but also played the major role in regular force operations, accounting for about 70% of the enemy KIA in MR III until 1970, when their contribution dropped to about 50%.

RVNAF battalions have begun to shift out of MR III in search of the enemy. Eighteen battalions (9 airborne and 9 VNMC) comprise the JGS general reserve, and in 1970 7 of the VNMC battalions have been employed in either MR IV or MR I. This is partly due to the addition of 3 VNMC battalions formed during 1969. Moreover, Cambodian operations adjacent to MR III have been conducted by RVNAF units only except during May and June, when 20-25 US battalions also participated.

Since June, ARVN battalions have been concentrating their efforts in the vicinity of the Cambodian border as US forces redeployed and/or shifted eastward. These ARVN units have rotated into Cambodia on short duration forays less than 12 km deep, thereby maintaining a constant presence of about 8 battalions in Cambodia.

Friendly Performance. Enemy and friendly KIA data for MR III (Table 2) show that friendly forces appear to have successfully countered the enemy challenge; both the main force and control wars are ebbing in this area.

-- Casualties on both sides are declining at about the same rate, with a sharp drop in the first half of 1970 compared to the same periods in 1968 and 1969.

-- Regular forces have contributed about 50% of the friendly deaths since mid 1969, down from 60% previously.

-- Fewer RF/PF, paramilitary, and civilians are killed in MR III than in any other region.

-- The total enemy/friendly KIA ratio (which includes paramilitary and civilian deaths) has been consistently higher in MR III than in the rest of the country as a whole and better than MR I since mid-1969.

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TABLE 2

Total Enemy and Friendly KIA in MR III a/
(Monthly Average)

	1968		1969		1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
<u>Enemy KIA b/</u>	6015	2783	5159	4270	2498
<u>Friendly KIA</u>					
Regular Force c/	810	466	546	307	256
RF/FF d/	249	111	141	131	137
Other e/	413	184	195	181	153
Total	1472	761	882	619	546
<u>KIA Ratio</u>					
MR III	4.1	3.7	5.0	6.9	4.6
RVN (less MR III)	3.5	3.4	4.2	3.5	2.9

Sources: a/ From both friendly and enemy initiated activity within MR III (excludes Cambodia).
 b/ MACV Measurements of Progress, c/ OASD/C, Table 53, d/ MACV-TFES
 e/ OPREP-5 (VNDBA) and TIRS. Includes paramilitary and civilian deaths from terrorist assassinations and other military activity.

Two of the three ARVN divisions in MR III (5th and 18th) are not highly regarded, but a combination of new commanders in mid-1969 and recent opportunities for action in Cambodia appear to have improved their performance.

The 6 Thai battalions in MR III operate in a relatively quiet area and do not contribute much to the regular force effort. MACV rates this force below the 5th and 18th ARVN divisions.

The RF/FF performance indicators rank MR III well behind units in MR I, but they are almost as good as those in MR IV. Their fatality rate (KIA per 1000 assigned strength) is lower than any other region, indicating the high degree of security there.

The strength of the VC infrastructure (VCI) in MR III (8500) is the lowest in the country, and the combined VCI/guerrilla threat elsewhere is three times the threat in MR III. In 1970, MR III recorded 21% of the VCI neutralizations in RVN, the only region in which the percent neutralized exceeded the strength percentage (MR III has about 13% of the VCI).

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Enemy Activity and Options

Enemy Activity. The enemy is not seriously contesting the GVN in MR III (Table 3); he has been unable to keep up the pressure. His attacks there during the first half of 1970 were less than 17% of the countrywide total, and MR III's share has fallen more since then. Moreover, MR III was the only region in the country where enemy attacks, enemy KIA, and friendly KIA were below second half 1969 levels.

The reduced initiative of VC/NVA forces in MR III since mid 1969 is clearly shown by a sharp drop in the enemy initiated share of his own KIA. The transfer of five regiments to the delta in late 1969, and diversion of units to Cambodia have apparently aggravated the situation even more in 1970.

TABLE 3

ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY IN MR III (Monthly Average)

	1968		1969		1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
<u>Incidents a/</u>					
Total Attacks	147	65	136	85	55
Harassment	373	295	430	287	326
Terror	116	30	104	95	88
Total	636	440	670	467	469
<u>Resulting KIA b/</u>					
Enemy	542	387	707	300	194
Friendly	609	335	453	354	273
<u>Enemy Initiated Share of Total KIA (%)</u>					
<u>Enemy KIA</u>					
MR III	13	16	20	8	7
RVN (less MR III)	11	6	7	9	13
<u>Friendly</u>					
MR III	50	54	54	64	59
RVN (Less MR III)	52	54	58	64	73

a/ Attacks include ambushes, assaults and attacks by fire with 20 rounds or more. Harassment includes attacks by fire with less than 20 rounds, sabotage and terror incidents reported through military channels. Terror reflects all civilian oriented incidents with casualties (assassinated, abducted, or wounded).

b/ From enemy initiated activity only. Friendly KIA includes military, paramilitary and civilian deaths.

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At the end of August 1970, over half of the enemy's combat forces operating in and around MR III were located in Cambodia. Of the 110 battalions (81 maneuver and 29 combat support) subordinate to VC/NVA command elements in GVN MR III, 59 battalions were physically located in Cambodian territory. Of these, 34 still might be considered a potential threat to MR III, while the other 25 units are actively involved in Cambodian combat operations.

Many of the 50 enemy battalions still inside MR III have been broken down into company sized units, with the limited objectives of countering GVN pacification efforts and strengthening the Local Force and Guerrilla efforts at the village level. They are chronically plagued with food and supply shortages.

The diversion of enemy units to Cambodia has greatly reduced the enemy's capability to launch a significant military offensive in MR III and has made it difficult for him to maintain even a low profile military posture. Unless he recommitts a sizeable contingent of military units, his capabilities will no doubt continue to diminish. The diversion of any more of his MR III assets to Cambodia would most likely leave the Local Force, Guerrilla, and VCI structure extremely vulnerable to GVN pacification efforts.

Enemy Options. The first task the enemy must undertake is to stop the erosion of his units. Unlike the situation in MR II, the enemy has not succeeded in halting his strength decline--this must be his first task. If he managed to check his decline, then he might choose between two broad options:

- Gather forces in Cambodia and strike hard, perhaps even trying for Saigon, or
- Continue his economy of force tactics and rebuild a credible presence in the countryside.

The main force option does not appear realistic within the next year--the ARVN holds the Parrot's Beak and has demonstrated its capability and willingness to disrupt enemy concentrations. It seems highly improbable that the enemy could build to a main force attack posture without touching off a series of preemptive ARVN strikes.

The countryside small unit option appears more likely, with the ARVN 5th Division commander claiming that is the direction the enemy is moving. As long as main forces are not a threat, the small unit control war requires RF/PF and police, not ARVN.

Friendly Prospects. The situation in MR III, like that in MR IV, affords the GVN flexibility to shift ARVN forces to other more dangerous areas. We estimate that up to 11 battalions could be released from MR III unless the enemy increases his main forces by an order of magnitude.

Indeed, current plans by the MR III commander envision the use of about this many battalions outside MR III--but in Cambodia. As the enemy's dry season activity in Cambodia mounts there will be added temptation to increase the scope of ARVN activity in that area.

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MILITARY REGION IV

Summary. The war in MR IV is basically a low level confrontation between small enemy units and the RF/PF. The introduction of NVA units was effectively countered by RVNAF. Their impact was further diluted by the Cambodian operations.

-- The continued progress in GVN control is closely related to increases in RF/PF, which now account for over 60% of all military forces in MR-IV.

-- RF/PF units have a greater impact in MR IV than the regular (US and ARVN/VNMC) forces, contributing over half the total enemy KIA and more than 60% of the friendly military deaths there.

-- The heaviest cost falls on the more lightly armed elements, RF/PF paramilitary forces, and civilians suffer more than 70% of the total friendly deaths in MR IV. The first half 1970 level is the highest ever.

The RF/PF units are coping with most of the enemy activity in MR IV, despite increasingly heavy losses. They have almost eliminated the need for ARVN battalions to conduct pacification support missions, and nearly 200 of the RF companies are conducting offensive operations instead of static security missions.

Although the enemy has temporarily arrested his strength decline in MR IV, his future options offer him a stalemate at best. A continued enemy decline is highly likely because of:

-- The overwhelming RF/PF presence and an unprecedented ARVN assault on his remaining strongholds.

-- The diversion of combat forces and severe logistic problems resulting from Cambodian operations.

RVNAF has progressed well in MR IV since the departure of US ground combat units and may be able to release one or two ARVN divisions next year. On the other hand, the low level enemy activity will continue to exact a high cost in civilian deaths unless the RF/PF, National Police, and the Phoenix program can improve the protection of the populace.

Force:

In the first half of 1970 an average of about 48,000 enemy soldiers (combat, administrative, and guerrilla) opposed the 313,000 allied soldiers (regulars and territorial forces) in MR IV. This represents about 21% of the RVN total for both sides and yields a friendly/enemy total strength ratio of 2.6 to 1, which is also the average for South Vietnam as a whole.

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Except for the Tet 1968 period, MR IV has not seen much main force confrontation, and this is reflected in the strength distribution for both sides. Although 41% of the enemy guerrillas and 39% of the PF/PF unit assigned strength are located in MR IV, its share of both the friendly and enemy combat battalion strength is only about 14%.

U.S. participation, since the departure of its last ground combat battalion in August 1969, has been limited to advisory functions and to combat support by helicopter and engineer units.

MR IV has 46 ARVN battalions, plus 4 VNMC battalions currently attached, for a total of 50. These 50 battalions, representing 28% of the total ARVN/VNMC combat strength, face a total of up to 62 VC/NVA combat battalions in MR IV and adjacent Cambodia.

Control of this populous region, which produces some 80% of South Vietnam's basic food requirements, has been avidly sought by both sides. Table 1 shows that GVN control passed the 50% mark during the first half of 1970. It is now (Oct 70) nearly 67%, ranking behind MR I and MR III.

TABLE 1

FORCE RATIOS AND GVN CONTROL

	1968		1969		1970	% Change 1H68-1H70
	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	
<u>GVN Control a/</u> (% of Rural Pop, end of period)	20	28	40	48	58	+38
<u>Friendly/Enemy Ratio b/</u> (monthly average)						
Total Strength	5.1	5.2	5.6	6.3	6.6 (6.8)	+29 (+33)
Combat Strength	2.5	2.9	3.1	2.8	2.3 (2.5)	-8 (N/C)

a/ VSSG Indicator.

b/ Total strength ratio includes all friendly and enemy force components, while the combat strength ratio compares only friendly maneuver battalions to enemy maneuver/combat support battalions. Parenthetical values in 1970 reflect the diversion of NVA units to Cambodia.

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There does not appear to be a strong relationship between the combat battalion strength ratio and GVN control. The departure of the 9th U.S. Division during July-August 1969, together with the influx of NVA units and personnel in late 1969-early 1970, caused a 25% drop in the combat strength ratio while control and the overall force ratio continued to improve.

The primary reason for continued improvement in the overall force ratio is the 55% increase in Territorial Forces (RF/PF) since the first half of 1968 (Table 2). The increase of the RF/PF strength in MR IV appears to be a key factor in the expansion of GVN control; from mid-1969 to mid-1970, control advanced 18 percentage points, while RF/PF strength and density (excluding unpopulated areas) increased by 24% and 33% respectively. The increase of 807 new units (750 PF platoons and 57 RF rifle companies) during this same period closely parallels the pacification gain of 801 hamlets in the A and B security ratings.

TABLE 2

TERRITORIAL FORCE (RF/PF) INCREASES

	1968		1969		1970	% Change 1H68-1H70
	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	
<u>Unit Assgd. Str. (000)</u>	125	147	157	176	194	+55
<u>Inhabited Area Density</u> (RF/PF per sq. km)	4.8	5.7	6.1	7.4	8.1	+69

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Friendly Activity

Regular Forces. The heaviest share of combat battalions within MR IV has usually gone to the areas of the 7th and 21st ARVN divisions (see map). The 7th Division, in the key upper delta region south of Saigon, was augmented first by two U.S. brigades until their redeployment and later by a VNMC brigade until the Cambodian operations. A regiment of the 9th ARVN Division has augmented the 7th Division since the end of June 1970.


The 21st ARVN Division generally has Ranger and/or VNMC battalions attached for employment in its large area. This area has the largest VC base area inside South Vietnam (U Minh forest) and contains 52% of MR IV's total area (about equal to the sum of the 1st and 2nd ARVN Division area in MR I).

The 9th ARVN Division was designated as the mobile reaction force for MR IV in October 1969, and has operated all over MR IV and in Cambodia. This division was the principal ARVN element in the Cambodian operations adjacent to

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MILITARY REGION IV



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MR IV, and still has two of its regiments operating either in Cambodia or in the 44th Special Tactical Zone (STZ) next to the Cambodian border.

Operations in Cambodia since June by the 9th Division and other MR IV units have been restricted to forays of short duration close to the border area, except for a VNMC brigade of 3 battalions, which has been stationed at the Neak Luong ferry site (the key Hwy-1-Mekong River junction) on a semi-permanent basis since May.

In addition to conducting preemptive operations in Cambodia, the new MR IV commander (MG Truong, former CG of the 1st ARVN Division) has launched an offensive against the remaining enemy strongholds within MR IV, including the U Minh Forest and the Seven Mountains base areas. He intends to establish friendly fire support bases in these areas to further restrict the enemy's freedom of movement.

Territorial Forces

Experienced officials in MR IV have emphasized that successful pacification progress, particularly near VC base areas or areas of long term VC influence, is dependent upon well-coordinated joint operations of Regular and Territorial Forces. The 9th Division was cited as the best example of such coordinated operations and their progress enabled them to free up their regular units for employment outside of their divisional area. Elsewhere in MR IV, results have not been so dramatic:

-- The 21st Division, faced with extensive real estate and the task of containing enemy units in the U Minh Forest, has had to act as a "fire brigade" for RF/PF units in difficulty.

-- The 7th Division, little more than Territorials during the tenure of the 9th U.S. Division, has only recently begun to fulfill its main force role in MR IV.

The capability of Territorial Forces to free up ARVN units for mobile employment can be measured in terms of the number of ARVN battalions in support of pacification and the number of RF rifle companies on offensive operations. Table 3 shows the substantial progress in MR IV:

-- The number of regular battalions in support of pacification has been reduced by two-thirds from the peak in the last half of 1968, while the number of RF rifle companies on offensive operations has doubled.

-- With 36% of all RF rifle companies in RVN, MR IV has 65% of the country-wide total of RF rifle companies on offensive operations, far exceeding any other region.

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TABLE 3

TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES (Monthly Average)

	1968		1969		1970
	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>2nd Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>2nd Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>
Regular Bns on Pacification	8.	9	6	4	3
RF Rifle Cos on Offensive Opns	47	101	156	176	196

In November 1970, only one ARVN battalion was in support of pacification in MR IV, and the formation of 8 new RF battalions should help to eliminate regular forces from this role. In addition, several border ranger battalions have been formed since mid-1970 from Special Forces/CIDG assets to operate under ARVN control. We cannot as yet assess the effectiveness of these relatively new units, but their presence should ultimately allow greater flexibility in employing the regular force.

RVNAF Performance. Except for the 7th Division, regular forces in MR IV overcame a tendency toward "9 to 5" operations during the course of 1969, doubling the duration of their large unit operations from 2 days to 4 days. This trend continued in 1970 and, with a mid January 70 change in commander, the duration in 7th Division operations has increased from $1\frac{1}{2}$ days in 1969 to 5 days for the first half of 1970.

The RF/PF performance statistics are second only to MR I RF/PF units. Their enemy contacts held constant during 1969, in contrast to a decline for the regular forces in MR IV. In early 1970, the influx of NVA units from MR III, heated up the main force war - enemy contacts by RF/PF declined, while those by the regular forces increased. By mid-year, however, regular force contacts had returned to second half 69 levels within MR IV, and RF/PF contacts were increasing.

Enemy and friendly KIA data (Table 4) also show the dominance of the local force conflict in MR IV, and the high cost it exacts from the territorial force. Until mid-1969, the enemy and friendly KIA in MR IV each accounted for about 25% of the countrywide totals. Since then, the friendly KIA share has increased to over 50%, while the percentage of enemy deaths remained about the same (27%).

-- Regular forces have consistently killed less than half of the total enemy KIA in MR IV; in the last half of 1969 their share was only 30%.

-- The RF/PF have suffered the brunt of the friendly KIA; since mid-1969 they have accounted for over 60% of the military deaths and more than 40% of the total fatalities in MR IV.

-- Paramilitary and civilian deaths in the first half of 1970 were the highest ever recorded and contributed 31% to the total. Since mid-1968 their share has consistently been about 27%.

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-- The KIA ratio has rarely been more than half that for the rest of the country, a further indication that the burden of the war is falling on the more lightly armed friendly military and paramilitary elements as well as defenseless civilians.

TABLE 4

TOTAL ENEMY AND FRIENDLY KIA a/
(Monthly Average)

	1968		1969		1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
<u>Enemy KIA b/</u>	2426	2088	4144	2564	2827
<u>Friendly KIA</u>					
Regular Force c/	514	256	379	240	347
RF/PF d/	527	302	359	455	574
Other e/	252	192	272	273	411
Total	1293	750	1010	968	1332
<u>KIA Ratio</u> (Enemy/Friendly)					
MR IV	1.9	2.8	4.1	2.6	2.0
RVN (less MR IV)	4.3	3.7	4.8	5.2	3.8

a/ From both friendly and enemy initiated activity but excluding operations in Cambodia.

Sources: b/ MACV Measurements of Progress. c/ OASD(C) Table 53. d/ MACV-TFES. e/ OPREP-5 (VNDBA) and TIRS. Includes paramilitary and civilian KIA; calculated by summing terrorist assassinations and other military activity.

The RF/PF units are coping with most of the enemy activity in MR IV, but at a heavy cost to themselves and the population they are protecting. Reduction of this cost entails not only more alert defense tactics but better coordination with Police operations.

The National Police in MR IV, with a strength of almost 20,000 (23% of the RVN total), already have their hands full coping with the estimated 34,000 VC infrastructure (VCI), the highest strength of any region and over 44% of the countrywide total.

MR IV has 5 of the top 9 provinces in VCI strength and the Phoenix (neutralization) program is not going well. MR IV accounted for fewer neutralizations (41%) than its percentage of the countrywide VCI strength in the first half of 1970, and 4 of the 5 top provinces contributed far less than their share of the neutralizations. They had 24% of the VCI strength in RVN, but only 13% of the neutralizations.

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Enemy Activity and Options

Activity. A major development on the enemy side during 1969 was the arrival of NVA forces in MR IV. In addition to NVA filler personnel for depleted VC units, five NVA regiments were transferred from MR III, bringing the total number of VC/NVA regiments in MR IV to 10. Although these reinforcements initially evoked considerable concern, the RVNAF effectively contained 2 NVA regiments which managed to reach the U Minh forest and inflicted severe losses on 2 other regiments, preventing them from reaching their apparent destination. One of the NVA regiments in the U Minh area was later merged with a VC regiment, and two NVA regiments withdrew into Cambodia during May-June 1970, reducing the MR IV total to 7.

Moreover, the two VC regiments in the upper delta appear to have decentralized in consonance with the "protracted struggle" option in COSVN Resolutions 9 and 14, so MR IV now has about the same number (5) of functional regiments it did prior to the shift from MR III. The number of combat battalions still exceeds the 1969 average by about 5, but the total maneuver/combat support strength within MR IV is lower than any previous period.

Recent trends in enemy initiated activity (Table 5) show:

-- An increase in total attacks since the end of 1968, but still well under the Tet 68 level.

-- The cyclical pattern for harassment seems to be leveling off while that for terrorism is increasing.

-- KIA from enemy incidents is increasing for both friendly and enemy forces, but friendly deaths are up more sharply. In the first half of 1970 friendly KIA was 92% of the Tet 68 rate while enemy KIA was only 33%.

TABLE 5

ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY IN MR IV
(Monthly Average)

	1968		1969		1970
	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>2nd Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>2nd Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>
<u>Incidents</u>					
Total Attacks	137	40	69	73	83
Harassment	421	260	220	159	227
Terror	93	96	109	94	117
Total	<u>651</u>	<u>396</u>	<u>398</u>	<u>326</u>	<u>427</u>
<u>Resulting KIA</u>					
Enemy	321	26	60	121	106
Friendly	506	263	403	363	467

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The rise in enemy attacks and associated enemy KIA suggests that his economy of force tactics in MR IV are about as cheap as he can make them. Enemy ground attacks (Table 6) are much less costly to him in MR IV than elsewhere in the country.

TABLE 6

ENEMY GROUND ATTACKS IN MR IV
(Monthly Average)

	1968		1969		1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
<u>Enemy KIA per Attack</u>					
MR IV	5.9	2.8	2.3	3.5	2.9
RVN (less MR IV)	10.4	14.5	11.5	5.9	5.8
<u>KIA Ratio</u> (Enemy/Friendly)					
MR IV	1.5	0.5	0.6	1.1	0.8
RVN (less MR IV)	2.7	2.8	3.1	2.3	2.3

MR IV appears to offer the enemy his best arena for economy of force tactics. The high cost he sustains in MRs I and III can be attributed to the combination of a more intense main force conflict and better GVN control in those regions. MR II results are more akin to those in MR IV, if we omit the highlands area.

Supply problems due to the loss of Sihanoukville (Kompong Som) and disruption of enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia since May also appear to have influenced the intensity of his attacks. The July-Sept average number of enemy large caliber ordnance (tons) expended in MR IV is about 40% less than the April-June average, and October is even lower.

The possibility always exists, of course, that the enemy may be conserving for a high point, but it could also be argued that the supplies stored inside MR IV at the start of the Cambodian operations are being exhausted. Subsequent expenditure levels may be determined by the effectiveness of NVA seaborne supply. There has been sharp upsurge in trawler sightings in 1970 and one reportedly unloaded supplies in An Xuyen during August.

Enemy Manpower Attrition. The enemy has made a concerted effort to halt his strength decline in MR IV. Besides NVA unit transfers from MR III in 1969-70, his infiltration into the COSVN area (GVN MRs III and IV) during the same period accounted for about 50% of the RVN total, much higher than the pre-1968 years.

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These measures have arrested the declining maneuver/combat support strength (although the diversion to Cambodia has reduced this available strength within MR IV), but his personnel system must continually provide replacements for the casualty cost (over 2,500 KIA per month) of maintaining a credible presence (Table 7).

TABLE 7

ENEMY STRENGTH AND KIA (Monthly Average)

	1968		1969		1970
	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>2nd Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>2nd Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>
<u>Enemy KIA</u>	2426	2088	4144	2564	2827
<u>Strength (000)</u>					
Maneuver/combat spt	19.8	19.0	19.2	17.8	20.1
Total	41.8	48.1	48.2	46.1	47.1

Enemy Options. Even if the enemy has successfully halted his strength decline, he has not turned back pacification in the Delta. He must now confront:

-- The realization that his economy of force tactics have reached maximum effectiveness and higher levels of activity will likely cost more per attack.

-- An ARVN challenge in his base areas, possibly requiring greater enemy effort and resources to prevent a more rapid decline.

-- Diversion to Cambodia of two regiments, about 3,000 of his scarce maneuver/combat support troops.

-- Supply shortages which may limit his future options.

The enemy probably has only two options for 1971:

-- Continued decline in VC control if the diverted MR IV units remain in Cambodia and infiltration to MR IV in 1971 continues at the 1970 rates.

-- Stalemate if the enemy increases his infiltration by some 10,000 above the 27,300 infiltrated to COSVN in 1970, and returns his diverted forces to MR IV.

FRIENDLY PROSPECTS

We estimate that up to two ARVN divisions can be released from MR IV for employment elsewhere in the country, depending on which option the enemy chooses.

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<u>Enemy Strategy</u>	<u>Battalions Available for Release</u>		
	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>Total</u>
Continued Decline (most probable)	13	13	26
Stalemate	0	13	13

This assessment is based on the expectation that enemy KIA by RF/PF will continue at or slightly above the 1969-70 level of 1,020 per month (up from 762 per month in 1968). Enemy harassment and terror tactics, the bulk of the enemy's activity in MR IV, are best countered by aggressive police and territorial forces.

In addition, ARVN divisions in MR IV are more active, with enemy KIA per division increasing from a monthly average of about 200 in 1968 to 300 in 1970. Thus two divisions in 1971 should be able to account for the same number of enemy KIA as three divisions did in 1968, and their increased mobility should enable them to cover the same territory.

If the situation in the Delta (and adjacent Cambodia) continues to improve, an even smaller regular force of about 17 battalions may suffice. Such a force might consist of a mobile, division size reaction force and a regimental size armored cavalry/infantry task force for cross border operations.

MR IV now has 50 battalions (including the 3 VNMC battalions in Cambodia). Due to the open terrain, the improved control situation, and the freedom to launch preemptive attacks into Cambodia, it is not unreasonable to expect that MR IV could sustain an ultimate reduction of up to 26 battalions--initially, units could be taken out on a "cut and try" basis.

How effectively the transferred units might operate in a different Military Region is another question--in 1964 the 25th ARVN Division was shifted from MR I, where it was performing well, to MR III, where its performance was horrible for the next four years. In 1970 the 25th is again considered one of the best ARVN divisions, so the extent to which its performance can be attributed to a different environment rather than poor commanders is unknown.

The 2nd quarter 1970 SEER report shows the 7th and 21st Divisions to be average in performance indicators, with the 9th Division rated above average. Desertions are high in all three MR IV divisions (as well as the RF/PF), reflecting the increased activity of the 9th and 7th Divisions and problems of long standing in the 21st Division.

MRs I and II, where more ARVN units may be needed, are generally considered to have a more hostile environment than MRs III and IV. To avoid even more serious desertion problems, if divisions are selected for employment outside MR IV, every effort must be made to either provide suitable family quarters at the new locations or to use them on short duration (3-6 weeks) missions to cope with a dangerous threat.

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THE SITUATION IN MR IV

Summary

In late 1969-early 1970 the situation in MR IV was jeopardized by the poor performance of the ARVN 7th Division and the large influx of NVA units and filler personnel.

Since then the new commander of the 7th Division has turned it into one of the better ARVN divisions and the enemy is under increased pressure from a series of unprecedented RVNAF initiatives:

-- The large scale RVNAF operations conducted against his Cambodian border sanctuaries in May and June of last year have been followed up by periodic pre-emptive operations.

-- ARVN regular forces have been operating in traditional enemy strongholds such as the U Minh and Seven Mountains since late 1970.

-- Since January 1971, coordinated "Dong Khoi" (clean-up) operations have been conducted throughout MR IV by ARVN and Pacification Forces (RF/PF, PSDF, and National Police) to break the link between VC/NVA units and the VCI.

Instead of putting up a strong defense of his sanctuaries the enemy has countered by increasing his activity against the pacification forces in adjacent areas:

-- The monthly incident total during the 1970/71 dry season nearly reached TET 68 levels.

-- The RF/PF share of RVNAF KIA totals increased from 52% in the first half of 1970 to 77% in 1971. Moreover, paramilitary and civilian deaths increased from about 40% of RVNAF to over 50% for the same periods.

-- By June 1971 the number of outposts overrun in MR IV about equalled the 1970 total for the whole year.

But the net impact seems to be less in 1971 than the comparable period in 1970.

-- Very few attacks (2-3 out of 100) are judged significant by the field observers, and the enemy's monthly expenditure of ammunition is less than half his 1970 average.

CONFIDENTIAL

86

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-- His primary emphasis is on harassment, sabotage, and terror. These accumulate high totals from a host of relatively minor incidents and their impact is localized.

So far the impact of outposts overrun appears to be limited to the forces in the outposts. The MR commander recognizes that these incidents are a potential danger to pacification and has taken corrective action.

-- More than 80% of these incidents have occurred near the threatened VC base areas.

-- The total population of hamlets directly affected by overruns of outposts during the November 1970-April 1971 period represented only 1.7% of the region's rural population.

-- Less than half of this group (0.7% of the rural population) suffered a net security decline during the period.

As the main force war recedes to Cambodia and the remote base areas within the region, the enemy has apparently decided to return to the 1960-65 "struggle movement" strategy--re-establishing overt and covert party chapters in the GVN pacified areas.

Performance of the GVN Pacification Forces, who are taking over primary responsibility for the conflict in MR IV is critical to a successful GVN outcome. In the initial stages their performance has been somewhat uneven.

-- More forces are actively engaged in offensive operations and GVN control (measured by the VSSG indicators) continues to progress.

-- But they have been unable to stem the enemy's low level activity which is claiming a high toll among the populace. Moreover, lax security measures have also contributed to the high incidence of overrun outposts and associated loss of equipment to the enemy. (The RF/PF in MR IV lose 4 times as much equipment per unit as the same forces elsewhere in SVN.)

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THE SITUATION IN MR IV - JUNE 1971

Background. In late 1969--early 1970 a substantial threat of main force combat appeared in MR IV for the first time since Tet 1968. In addition to the arrival of NVA filler personnel for depleted VC units, five NVA regiments were sent down from MR III.

Meanwhile, the last US ground combat unit had departed in August 1969, reducing the US participation to advisory functions and combat support by helicopter and engineer units.

Faced with this combination of events, RVNAF improved its regular forces by replacing the 7th Division commander, whose unit had performed poorly after the US departure, and attached a second VNMC brigade to MR IV from the general reserve. These six VNMC battalions together with the nondivisional Ranger and Armored Cavalry units and the 9th ARVN division (designated the MR-wide mobile reserve in October 1969) provided MR IV a reaction force of at least two divisions.

Key Environmental Factors. Combat in MR IV is strongly influenced by the terrain and weather, as well as the density and distribution of the population.

-- Large unit operations are inhibited for both sides during the wet season (May-Sept), when torrential rains flood the rice fields and marshes which cover most of the flat terrain in the Delta.

-- Enemy infiltration of men and supplies, however, increases during this period, since the widespread flooding allows him to avoid outposts along the canals. Conversely, he becomes more vulnerable to detection from the air and patrol boats.

-- Protecting the rural population from enemy access is a difficult task in the region, which ranks first in both total and rural population. The rural population of over 5 million is more than twice that for any other region and accounts for 81% of the total population in MR IV. Moreover, these rural inhabitants are more evenly distributed, living alongside the interlacing network of canals and roadways. The region's inhabited area is twice that of MR II and more than three times that for MRs I and III.

1970/71 Operations. Although the influx of NVA fillers and units into MR IV evoked considerable concern, RVNAF operations in the first quarter of 1970 effectively contained the two NVA regiments which managed to reach the U Minh forest. Moreover, severe losses were inflicted on these units during their infiltration as well as on two other NVA regiments which were only partially successful in moving into the interior.

CONFIDENTIAL

3

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The change in Cambodian governments during March 1970 aided RVNAF in countering the NVA influx. Those units which had not succeeded in infiltrating became increasingly preoccupied with securing their sanctuaries in Cambodia and toward the end of April there were some short forays into these sanctuaries by small ARVN task forces (normally one or two battalions accompanied by local RF units).

In May and June large scale RVNAF operations were launched into Cambodia from MRs III and IV which greatly relieved the pressure on border provinces. The 9th ARVN Division was the principal unit employed by MR IV, augmented by VNMC, Ranger and Armored Cavalry units. Meanwhile, the other two divisions (7th and 21st) continued to operate within their respective areas, except for a 10 day operation in Cambodia conducted by the 21st division during May.

MG Truong, former CG of the 1st ARVN division, was appointed MR IV commander in August 1970. He launched a campaign to reduce long time VC strongholds in Kien Hoa province, the U Minh forest and the Seven Mountains areas, thereby altering the previous strategy of merely containing enemy units inside their base areas. Operations in Cambodia since June 1970 have been restricted to forays of short duration close to the border area conducted primarily by non-divisional units, augmented by the 9th division as required.

In conjunction with the campaign against the enemy base areas, RVNAF conducted province level "Dong Khoi" (clean up) operations in November-December 1970. A similar region-wide campaign has been repeated periodically since January 1971. The Dong Khoi concept resembles the Hiep Dong saturation operations conducted in southern MR I; it involves the coordinated operation of ARVN and Pacification Forces (RF/PF, PSDF and National Police) to destroy enemy safe havens close to population centers and break the link between VC/NVA units and supporting VC infrastructure (VCI) personnel.

The RF/PF, which had already assumed a substantial portion of the conflict during 1969, have had greatly increased responsibilities since the initiation of operations against VC strongholds in the Delta. Concentration of regular ARVN units and their associated combat support element against these remote VC base areas reduced the availability of friendly reaction forces near the populated areas. Moreover, the enemy has been unable or unwilling to conduct a determined defense of his base areas. Instead he has apparently chosen to relieve the ARVN pressure by increasing his attacks against more vulnerable targets such as RF/PF and PSDF outposts near the fringe of the populated areas, thus attempting to divert attention of ARVN regular battalions from the base areas.

Forces. In total military strength, US/RVNAF forces in MR IV outnumbered the enemy by over 8 to 1 during the first quarter of 1971, compared to about 7 to 1 for RVN as a whole.

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Looking only at ground combat elements, nearly 70% of the enemy's 26,500 strength inside the MR consists of small units (separate companies and platoons) and guerrillas. On the friendly side, RF rifle companies and PF platoons comprise about 87% of MR IV's 186,000 ground combat strength.

This strength distribution is indicative of the type of conflict in MR IV, which has 41% of the RF/PF strength and more than a third of the enemy small unit/guerrilla strength in the country. In contrast, its share of both the friendly (regular) and enemy combat battalions is only about 15%.

The enemy infrastructure (VCI) strength in MR IV is approximately 20,000, about a third of the RVN total and commensurate with its share of the country's population (35%). Assisting RVNAF in countering this enemy force element are some 30,000 of the 100,000 man GVN National Police, including 8,000 in the Field Force and Special branches.

The Peoples Self Defense Force (PSDF) are also an important augmentation to RVNAF for the pacification program, particularly the 35 man Key Interteams (KITs) which have replaced PF platoons in some of the more secure hamlets. About 25% of the 6.4 million MR IV population has been organized into the PSDF with nearly 500,000 in the combat PSDF. As of March 31, 1971 nearly 4,800 KITs had been organized and trained, more than double the 2,100 on hand in June 1970.

The friendly/enemy strength ratio for combat battalions and RF/PF to enemy small unit/guerrillas, when compared to GVN control (Table 1) show:

-- The friendly/enemy battalion strength ratio has regained 1969 levels. The departure of the VNMC battalions (completed by January 1971) has been offset by the combined effects of enemy attrition and movement of NVA units out of MR IV into Cambodia.

-- The strength ratio of RF and PF units to enemy small units and guerrillas has more than doubled since 1969. Enemy strength has steadily dwindled while the RF/PF strength increased by over 40% (from 115,000 to 164,000).

-- There was no regression or slowdown in control progress associated with the reduced battalion strength ratio in the first half of 1970. Although progress has now begun to flatten out, control gains through the first 9 months of 1970 equalled or exceeded the 1969 rate (1.7% per month).

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TABLE 1

STRENGTH RATIOS AND GVN CONTROL

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>				<u>1971</u>
			<u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>3rd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u>
<u>Friendly/Enemy</u> <u>Strength Ratios</u> (Monthly Average)							
Combat Bns a/ RF/PF to VC Small units/guerrillas	2.7	2.8	2.3	1.8	2.5	2.8	2.8
	4.0	4.3	5.5	6.3	6.8	7.9	8.8
<u>GVN Control b/</u> (% of rural pop, end of period)	28	48	53	58	65	69	71

- a/ Excludes battalions in Cambodia, both ARVN units conducting cross border operations and enemy units located in Cambodia but which could be rapidly introduced into MR IV.
- b/ VSSG indicator based on HES which generally corresponds closely to the A-B security score.

Enemy Activity. According to recent re-evaluation of the enemy situation in MR IV^{1/}, the enemy has since mid-1970 re-initiated the "Struggle Movement" tactics which typified his political and military activity during 1960-65. Their maximum goal is the re-creation of the NLF political organization to establish the degree of population control which they previously (1965-68) exercised. All activity, military as well as political, supports this effort, and the minimum goal is demoralization of the GVN.

Despite the infusion of NVA units and fillers in late 1969-early 1970, COSVN guidance (Resolutions 9 and 14) stressed that these reinforcements were intended to support the generation of a guerrilla movement, and were not to be used in widespread main force attacks. More recently the concept has been modified (COSVN Resolution 10 and Directive 01/71) to concentrate more on reorganizing and strengthening overt and covert party chapters in the GVN pacified areas.

The new guidance does not, however, call for suspension of all VC/NVA military action in pacified areas; instead, scattered small scale activities

^{1/} Special Annex to the Delta Regional Assistance Command (DRAC) PERINTREP, dated May 23, 1971.

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are to continue against selected targets and in defense of covert networks. Additional tasks include proselytizing RVNAF and PSDF personnel to develop penetration agents in outposts and key GVN pacification units.

The recorded pattern of enemy initiated incidents and resultant KIA (Table 2) shows enemy incidents progressively increasing since the 1968/69 dry season low, when the VC were recuperating from losses suffered in the Tet 68 offensives.

-- 1969 and 1970 yearly levels exceed their preceding dry season period (68/69 and 69/70), while total incidents during the 1970/71 dry season approached Tet 68 levels.

-- The primary enemy emphasis is on those incidents which entail the least cost of his personnel and ammunition (harass by fire and harassment/sabotage/terror) but maintain high friendly KIA levels.

-- Friendly KIA during the 1970/71 dry season exceeded that for the corresponding 1967/68 period, whereas enemy KIA shows a decline of nearly 80%.

TABLE 2

ENEMY ACTIVITY PATTERNS
(Monthly Average)

	Yearly Average			Oct-Apr (Dry Season) Avg			
	1968	1969	1970	67/68	68/69	69/70	70/71
<u>Enemy Initiated Incidents</u>							
Ground Attack	31	29	38	61	15	37	50
Attack by Fire	58	43	50	76	39	39	46
Harass by Fire	370	329	473	518	284	367	497
Har/Sab./Terror a/	141	152	185	150	161	157	195
Total	600	553	746	805	499	600	788
<u>KIA From Enemy Incidents</u>							
Friendly b/	385	383	461	522	322	396	554
Enemy	191	103	92	318	54	156	67

Source: Computer File of Operational Reports (VCIIA/VNDBA, SITRA, and TIRS) prioritized to eliminate double counting.

a/ Includes those incidents reported through military (OPREP-5) and civilian (TIRS) channels.

b/ Includes assassinations from TIRS.

Despite this progressive increase in enemy initiated activity, a consensus of other related factors, as well as observations from the field, indicate that the intensity and impact of these incidents have actually diminished.

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It seems likely that the relatively minor upsurge in late 69/early 70 was associated with the renewed enemy interest in, and reinforcement of, the Delta. The substantial increases since then, however, appear to be more in reaction to RVNAF initiatives such as the cross-border operations and the base area/Dong Khoi campaigns. In general, GVN control continued to progress in 1970 and 1971 (thru April).

-- The enemy has broken up many of his larger units and attacks are smaller in scale; only 2-3 of the 100 attacks conducted monthly during the 1970/71 dry season were significant.^{1/} His monthly expenditure of large caliber (57/60mm up) ammunition has decreased from 15 tons in early 1970 to 6 tons in 1971.

-- More than 70% of all enemy incidents and resulting friendly KIA were recorded in provinces affected by RVNAF campaigns against VC base areas in the U Minh (21st Liv area) and Kien Hoa/Vinh Binh province (Base area 487/490).

-- The high friendly KIA levels are rarely felt in the aggregate since they accumulate from a host of relatively minor incidents. On the average, it takes 3 harassments by fire to cause 1 friendly KIA, while each ground attack will exact 3 KIA. Each of the other two incident types (attack by fire, H/S/T) result in 1 KIA per incident.

Outposts Overrun. A total of 61 outposts have been reported overrun in 1971 (through 6 June) by the Delta Regional Assistance Command (DRAC), about equal to the 1970 total for the year. Most of these outposts have fallen because the RF/PF or PSDF defenders either displayed gross lack of security or were penetrated by enemy agents.

This selective targeting of outposts not only yields the enemy sorely needed supplies but also maintains his credibility among the populace. Since January, the number of weapons and radios captured by the enemy in MR IV would be sufficient to equip 10 PF platoons per month at their current assigned levels. Most of this equipment comes from overrun outposts.

The growing concern at the possible adverse impact of a continuation of these incidents on the Pacification Program is reflected in a recent (April 1, 1971) directive from the MR IV commander. This directive clearly fixes responsibility at appropriate leadership levels and establishes graduated punishment for any recurrence (outposts overrun more than once in the same area).

So far the impact of these overrun outposts appears to be primarily limited to the forces in the outpost and highlights the pervasive problem of leadership

^{1/} The MACV Measurement of Progress (MOP) defines a significant attack as one which meets one or more of the following criteria: (a) total enemy and friendly KIA and MIA of 30 or more, (b) enemy attacks a major friendly installation, (c) substantial amounts of friendly or enemy materiel is lost or captured, (d) destruction or damage to friendly aircraft or weapons systems, and (e) new tactic or technique is introduced by the enemy.

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and personnel security procedures caused by rapid expansion of the pacification forces during the past two years. Although representing a potential danger to the Pacification Program itself, its actual impact to date has been restricted to less than 2% of the rural population.

Data from the HES monthly hamlet level question relating to the overrunning of friendly positions^{1/} shows 62 hamlets with an outpost overrun from November 1970 through April 1971. This correlates closely with the report of 61 outposts overrun from regular sources. Of the 62 hamlets, 5 reported overrun incidents twice during the period and two reported 3 overruns. Detailed analysis of the data shows:

-- More than 80% were recorded in the area of the 21st Division and Kien Hoa/Vinh Binh provinces, where RVNAF pressure on enemy base areas continues.

-- The total population of hamlets affected during the 6 months (Nov 70 - April 71) period is about 89,000 and represents 1.7% of the MR IV rural population.

-- Only 58,000 (1.1%) of the MR IV rural population were in hamlets where the incident was reported to have a significant impact^{2/} and the maximum for a single month during the period was 23,500 (0.5%).

-- In 42 of the 62 hamlets (68%) the security status between November 1970 and April 1971 either had no net change or improved. The population of hamlets which sustained a net security decline of one or more letter grade was 35,000 (0.7% of the MR IV rural population).

RVNAF Performance

In late 1969--early 1970 the situation in MR IV was jeopardized by the poor performance of the 7th ARVN division after redeployment of US combat units from its area and the large influx of NVA units and filler personnel for depleted VC units.

Since then RVNAF has seized and maintained the initiative in MR IV; the new commander of the 7th Division (appointed in mid-January 1970) has turned in into one of the top performers in the country, and the enemy is under increased pressure from the combined effects of Cambodian cross-border operations, the campaign against his long held base areas inside MR IV, and the Dong Khoi (clean-up) operations.

^{1/} Question HMB-3, response number 5, which indicates that the most serious enemy initiated incident was a ground assault with the friendly position overrun.

^{2/} Question HMD-5, response number 5 signifies a significant defeat of friendly forces.

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In the first four months of 1971, RVNAF in MR IV accounted for 41% of all enemy KIA inside RVN, contrasted to 26% for a comparable period in 1970.^{1/} Monthly KIA averages (Table 3) indicate:

-- The overall intensity of combat in 1971 is somewhat lower than a comparable period (1st half) in 1970, and the burden of the war is shifting from regular units to the pacification forces.

-- The RF/PF share of RVNAF KIA increased from 62% in the first half of 1970 to 77% in 1971. Moreover, paramilitary/civilian deaths increased from about 40% of RVNAF to over 50% in the same period.

-- The enemy/friendly KIA ratio dropped during the last half of 1970. This is probably associated with the initial ARVN movement into VC base areas and the previously cited enemy reaction against more vulnerable friendly targets.

TABLE 3

	KIA RESULTS (monthly average)				
	1969		1970		1971
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	Jan-April
Enemy KIA ^{a/}	3807	2134	2697	1569	2352
Friendly KIA ^{a/}					
Regular Force (US/RVNAF)	379	240	346	224	203
RF/PF	359	455	560	593	684
Total	738	695	906	817	887
KIA Ratio (Enemy/Friendly)	5.2	3.1	3.0	1.9	2.7
Paramilitary/Civilian Deaths ^{b/}	233	189	244	211	317

^{a/} From OASD(C) Table 53.

^{b/} Deaths and assassinations from enemy incidents. Unlike the operational reports of military KIA, which is later adjusted and confirmed, no such follow up action is taken for civilian casualty reports. The paramilitary and civilian deaths are therefore probably understated. Applying the OASD(C) adjustment factor to this data shows that paramilitary/civilian deaths were about 40% of the RVNAF KIA except for 1971 and the first half of 1969, when they were about 50% of the RVNAF total.

^{1/} While it should be noted that US helicopter gunships contribute 25-30% of enemy KIA credited to RVNAF in MR IV, the same is true for friendly ground units on operations elsewhere in the country (KBA for Lam Son 719 and the Cambodian Toan Thang operation accounted for about 32% of the enemy KIA).

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Regular Forces. In 1969 and early 1970 many of the regular ARVN battalions were still conducting short duration operations from secure bases in the heavily populated areas. They attacked enemy units attempting to move into or out of base areas such as the U Minh and Seven Mountains and in some cases inflicted heavy casualties, but the basic strategy was to contain rather than reduce these strongholds.

Since then regular battalions have operated for the most part either in Cambodia or from bases in or near the enemy strongholds in MR IV. Unlike previous campaigns against such enemy strongholds, the regular units have stayed in the area, built fire support bases and are beginning to bring in RF units for a more permanent presence -- much like the 1969 performance of the 9th ARVN division in Sa Dec and Vinh Long.

As a result of these extended operations in the U Minh, Seven Mountains, and Kien Hoa/ Vinh Binh base areas, the enemy has:

-- Suffered a further reduction in his recruiting base due to exodus of civilians from these areas. In the first quarter of 1971 these three areas in MR IV accounted for nearly 60% of the countrywide Chieu Hoi totals.

-- Lost the use of his major weapons factories and now must rely on mobile repair teams, captured weapons and supply by sea.

-- Continued a trend of dispersing many of his larger units into platoon and squad size elements, particularly in the northern delta (VCMR 2) where the 88th NVA and DT2 regiments have apparently disbanded.

-- Reduced the size of infiltration groups to 30-50 men, in contrast to the battalion size groups of late 1969-early 1970.

A recent field interview^{1/} indicates that the campaign against the U Minh area will be reinforced by a regiment of the 9th Division. Its operations in the Seven Mountains area is to be turned over to a combined Ranger/RF task force.

The JGS is reportedly considering the designation of the 9th Division as a countrywide mobile reaction force. If so, it will probably need some refitting time. Since the end of the first Cambodian operations last year (July), the 9th has operated with its regiments widely scattered and has slipped from its former position as one of the leading ARVN divisions. Constantly on the move since October 1969, the 9th has the worst desertion problem of any division and some of its battalions reportedly can field only about 250 men (of an authorized 665).^{1/}

^{1/} CAS Field interviews with the G-3, 9th ARVN Division in June 1971 (TDCS DB-315/03436-71).

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Low assigned strength levels pervade all of the regular battalions in MR IV. The April MACV Measurement of Progress shows 29 of the 36 infantry battalions in divisions at less than 70% of authorized strength.

Pacification Forces. With the regular forces operating mostly in remote areas of MR IV and large enemy units dispersing rather than defending their base areas, greater responsibility for the overall conflict falls on the pacification forces (RF/PF, PSDF, National Police, etc.). Their response to this challenge will either "nail down the lid" and eventually reduce conflict to a police action or will allow the enemy to start his 1960-65 cycle all over again. At this point there seems to be some hope for the former although their performance in the initial stages has been somewhat uneven.

On the positive side:

-- GVN control of the rural population has not regressed, and after maintaining a plateau at the 69% level from Dec 70 through Feb 71, control in the next two months increased to a little over 72%.

-- The 15% increase in RF/PF strength over the past year has primarily been used to provide additional offensive capability.

- Comparing March 71 with March 70, there are now about 100 more RF companies and 1,000 more PF platoons, yet the commitment to security duties remained essentially constant.

- The number of RF battalions has doubled since mid 1970 -- from 6 to 12, and each of the nearly 4,800 PSDF KITS has the same strength as one of the 3,400 PF platoons.

-- Despite the increased number of units, operations per unit and contacts per operation have not declined. Contacts per 1,000 RF/PF operations in the rest of RVN are only about 2/3 those recorded in MR IV (15 vs 20).

-- The Dong Khoi (clean up) operations have apparently contributed to substantial improvement in VCI neutralizations (killed or captured) in 1971. MR IV accounted for 47% of the RVN total in the first quarter of 1971, compared to 38% in the first quarter of 1970. The MR IV RF/PF alone account for 20% of the RVN total for both years.

On the debit side of the pacification force ledger however, is their inability to stem the enemy's low level activity (harassment, sabotage, and terrorism) which is claiming a high toll among the populace. Moreover, lax security measures have also contributed to the high incidence of outposts overrun and associated loss of equipment to the enemy.

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-- On a per unit basis, RF/PF in MR IV lost 4 times as many weapons as all other units in the country and their weapons captured/lost ratio is 2.0 compared to 6.3 for the rest of RVN.

-- For each enemy weapon captured, the PSDF in MR IV lose 3, twice as many as PSDF in the rest of the country.

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SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN MR I

Summary. The withdrawal of US units together with continuing enemy pressure and problems with RF/PF have produced a decline in security to mid-1970 levels in the three southern provinces of MR I (Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai). The enemy's activities are actually below last year's levels, but lack of confidence in territorial forces has produced a general climate of pessimism, particularly in Quang Nam where the enemy continues to emphasize terrorism and shelling of population centers.

The situation may be analagous to the former area of US operations in the Delta. Security lost momentum there for about six months while ARVN units adjusted to the absence of the US 9th Division. It would appear that the security arrangements in Quang Nam province should be strengthened in order to compensate for the aggressive leadership and resources formerly provided by US Marine units.

Forces. During the past six months US forces declined in southern MR I while RVNAF and enemy units remained relatively constant. Table 1 shows that US battalions declined from 18 in December 1970 to 11 in May 1971. The last US Marine battalions left Quang Nam province in March-April, and US Army battalions shifted from Quang Tin and Quang Ngai to help fill the gap. The withdrawals are placing an added burden on the ARVN 2nd Division and 51st Regiment, and are forcing the GVN territorial forces to operate on their own (without US MAT and CAP advisors) for the first time.

TABLE 1

ENEMY AND FRIENDLY UNITS

	<u>Quang Nam</u>		<u>Quang Tin</u>		<u>Quang Ngai</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Dec 70</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Dec 70</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Dec 70</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Dec 70</u>	<u>May 71</u>
<u>Enemy</u>								
Combat Bns	15	14	7	5	9	11	31	30
Separate Cos	8	9	8	9	20	20	36	38
Separate Plts	0	0	2	2	1	1	3	3
<u>Friendly</u>								
US Bns	6	5	6	2	6	4	18	11
FW Bns	4	4	0	0	0	0	4	4
ARVN/VNMC Bns	8	8	5	5	8	8	21	21
Total	18	17	11	7	14	12	43	36
RF Cos	62	64	38	40	54	54	154	158
PF Plts	223	223	222	226	285	283	730	732

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The decline in friendly forces was felt in Quang Nam more than the other two provinces. While the number of friendly units in Quang Nam remained constant, there are indications that the changeover from US Marines to US Army/ARVN/RF/PF responsibility may have disrupted force effectiveness there. The table below shows that friendly operations with contact declined from 1970 to 1971 in Quang Nam, but generally increased in the other two provinces.

TABLE 2

US/FW/ARVN ACTIVITY a/
(Monthly Averages)

	<u>Quang Nam</u>		<u>Quang Tin</u>		<u>Quang Ngai</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>1st</u> <u>Half</u> <u>1970</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Half</u> <u>1971</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Half</u> <u>1970</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Half</u> <u>1971</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Half</u> <u>1970</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Half</u> <u>1971</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Half</u> <u>1970</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Half</u> <u>1971</u>
<u>Large Unit Opns</u>								
US/FW	3	2	6	3	10	4	19	9
ARVN	<u>14</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>34</u>
Total	<u>17</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>43</u>
<u>Small Unit Opns with</u>								
<u>Contact</u>								
US/FW	453	17	0	0	1	0	454	17
ARVN	<u>19</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>70</u>
Total	<u>473</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>523</u>	<u>87</u>

a/ 1971 data through May.

Territorial force performance also appears to be suffering, particularly for PF in Quang Nam province. Table 3 shows that RF/PF effectiveness in terms of contacts per 100 operations dropped off sharply in Quang Nam (from 7.3 in first half 1970 to 4.1 in 1971), but remained constant in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai (6.5). Furthermore 100% of PF platoons reporting in June 1971 in Quang Nam were operating primarily in secure areas, rather than in the consolidation zones where the enemy threat is greater and there is opportunity for contact and results. A recent report by a field grade ARVN officer also suggests a general pessimism and defensive attitude on the part of territorial forces, particularly in Quang Nam provinces.

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TABLE 3

RF/PF ACTIVITY
(Monthly Averages)

	<u>Quang Nam</u>		<u>Quang Tin/ Quang Ngai</u>		<u>Total RVN</u>	
	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
<u>Small Unit Opns with Contact</u>						
RF	296	195	223	536	2395	3797
PF	477	265	597	763	2989	3623
Total	773	460	820	1299	5384	7420
<u>Contacts per 100 Operations</u>						
RF	9.1	5.5	10.1	8.5	2.1	2.1
PF	6.4	3.4	5.8	5.6	1.3	1.2
Total	7.3	4.1	6.5	6.5	1.6	1.5
<u>Percent of Units Operating Primarily in Secure Areas a/</u>						
RF		28		42		26
PF		100		71		61

a/ Units reporting "not applicable" or "unknown" are excluded from consideration. Based on June 1971 data of unknown reliability.

Enemy Activity. The enemy's first half activities were generally lower in 1971 than 1970 in southern MR I, but terrorism continued unabated, particularly in Quang Nam. Enemy attacks in the three provinces declined about one-third from 1970 (48 per month) to 1971 (33 per month), and other types of incidents declined 40-60%. Terrorist incidents continued to produce about as many victims (assassinations, abductions, and woundings) in Quang Nam in the first half of 1971 (289) as in 1970 (298).

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TABLE 4
ENEMY INCIDENTS AND CHIEU HOI RESULTS
(Monthly Averages)

	<u>Quang Nam</u>		<u>Quang Tin</u>		<u>Quang Ngai</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>1st</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>1st</u>
	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
<u>Enemy Incidents a/</u>								
Attacks	18	14	18	4	12	15	48	38
Harassment by fire	160	92	72	21	67	41	299	104
Other Har/Ter/Sab	160	103	42	31	115	73	331	207
Total	338	159	132	56	194	129	678	344
Terror Casualties	298	289	74	56	150	127	522	472
<u>Chieu Hoi Ralliers b/</u>	91	38	121	70	160	66	372	174

a/ Prioritized to include data from OPREP and TIRS reporting systems.
b/ 1971 data through May 1971 only.

The patterns of enemy activity indicate a general decline in overall capability, but an increased emphasis on building guerrillas and VCI for protracted warfare. One result of the continued enemy presence in rural areas is a recent decline in the rate of Chieu Hoi ralliers in all three provinces. First half 1971 ralliers totaled 174, compared to 372 in 1970. VCI neutralizations are also lagging in many areas.

Security Results. The overall result of US withdrawals, lagging RF/PF, and continued enemy presence has been to set security back to mid-1970 levels in all three provinces. Data from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/71) below shows that 61.9% of the population was rated A-B in June 1971, compared to 62.6% in June 1970.

TABLE 5
HES POPULATION DATA
(% of Population Rated A-B)

	<u>Jan 70</u>	<u>Jun 70</u>	<u>Dec 70</u>	<u>Mar 71</u>	<u>Jun 71</u>
Quang Nam/Danang	45.6	72.2	76.9	70.7	71.1
Quang Tin	60.3	59.3	75.0	64.9	69.8
Quang Ngai	36.3	51.1	51.3	49.7	44.7
Total Southern MR I	52.0	62.6	68.1	62.5	61.9
VSSG Rural GVN Control	45.8	54.0	66.3	54.6	N/A

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The VSSG rural control indicator shows a similar loss in GVN control. Detailed data shows that the loss of control is due to increased enemy companies and battalions in the populated areas, indicating lagging RF/PF effectiveness in controlling the approaches to hamlets.

Prospects for Recovery. The situation in southern MR I is analogous in many ways to the tough situation the ARVN 7th Division faced in the Delta in mid-1969. Both areas were traditional VC strongholds, and both had been dominated for several years by a vigorous US presence (US 9th Division in the Delta, and US Marines in Southern MR I). When the US units left the Delta, it took a full six months before ARVN was able to achieve full effectiveness, and population security lagged in the interim. It wasn't until a forceful, energetic ARVN division commander took over that security resumed strong upward momentum.

In southern MR I, the burden for population security rests squarely on the RF/PF and PSDF. These forces were largely dormant under the massive US presence, and may take some time to develop their full potential. It also appears that some additional measures may be needed to strengthen security arrangements in Quang Nam to restore confidence and aggressiveness formerly provided by US units and the CAP/MAT teams which worked with the RF/PF.

CONFIDENTIAL

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BATTLE PROSPECTS IN THE MR 2 HIGHLANDS

Summary

Recent assessments indicate the strong possibility of an enemy offensive in MR 2 early in 1972. The enemy has historically mounted offensives in the highlands of MR 2 normally employing a 3 regiment force. The major difference in this year's enemy build-up in the deployment of the 320th Division to the B-3 front. This will substantially increase enemy capability. The critical factor in judging enemy intentions is the employment of the 320th NVA Division; its arrival from North Vietnam is imminent but there are two differing views on its likely employment.

- Strong Offensive. This view, strongly held by COMUSMACV, sees the 320th augmenting organic B-3 Front units in MR 2. This would lead to a $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 force ratio in favor of the enemy, the worst in the history of the Highlands but not as bad as the 2 or 3 to 1 faced by RVNAF during Lam Son 719.

- LOC Protection. Those holding this view believe the 320th will provide a reserve to protect the enemy logistic network in Cambodia and South Laos. This would release all of the organic units of the B-3 Front for action in MR 2 but the force ratio would be about the same as in last year's FSB6 attacks.

Despite the adverse ratio of forces if the 320th is employed, MR 2 units will be on defense in familiar home terrain, in contrast to RVNAF in Lam Son 719. Should it become necessary, the adverse ratios could be improved to about 1 to 1 by using more units from the ARVN 23rd Division or MR 3.

Analysis of support furnished during past enemy offensives reveals that combat support now available to MR 2 should be adequate:

- Of 13 ARVN artillery battalions available, the 5 under MR control would more than double the amount used at Ben Het/Dak To.

- The three VNAF helicopter squadrons now in the Highlands provide about 3 times the support furnished RVNAF during Ben Het/Dak To.

- Major engagements in MR 2 have never received more than 8% of the total US/VNAF tactical air sorties, and support equalling the highest level ever flown in MR 2 would require less than 15% of the current US/VNAF capability.

- In May-June 1969, Ben Het/Dak To received almost 25% of the B-52 sorties being flown in SEA. Support equivalent to that provided at Ben Het/Dak To would require 40% of the current capability.

Since last year's battle in MR 2 a new armored cavalry squadron has been activated and a VNAF gunship squadron transferred from MR 3. More recent RVNAF actions to counter the expected offensives include alerting two brigades of the general reserve for movement to MR 2 and replacement

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of the 23rd Division's commander.

Principal RVNAF shortcomings noted during the intense action at Lam Son were battlefield coordination and casualty replacement. After action reports from MR 2 cite the same deficiencies in addition to poor staff planning.

CONFIDENTIAL

105

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Details

Introduction. Recent assessments indicate the strong possibility of an enemy offensive in western MR 2 around mid-February 1972. Despite general agreement on the enemy capabilities in the area, there are some understandable differences among analysts as to his actual intentions. Moreover, RVNAF preparations and activity will influence not only the outcome but also the intended scope of the enemy's activity. This analysis discusses current enemy capabilities and intentions, the historical data on past enemy offensives in the Highlands, and RVNAF preparations to counter the expected offensives this year. Additional perspective is provided by comparing the scope of past and projected enemy offensives with Lam Son 719.

Current Enemy Capability and Intentions

The OJCS/CIA recently updated last spring's assessment of enemy capabilities in RVN and noted that enemy preparations since then in the B-3 front (increased personnel and unit infiltration) give them an added capability to launch an offensive in the Highlands early in 1972. In addition, Hanoi's search for a dramatic (albeit temporary) tactical success might focus on this region, where RVNAF units are more dispersed and of poorer quality than those in MR 1.

Informal discussions with intelligence analysts from several agencies reveal considerable unanimity not only with regard to the capability assessment but also the enemy's probable scheme of maneuver -- a main thrust in Kontum province with supporting attacks in Pleiku and northern MR 1 to tie down ARVN forces there. To further restrict the RVNAF reinforcing capability, increased activity is also expected in MR 3 and the coastal provinces of northern MR 2 and southern MR 1. According to some analysts, the intelligence signals countrywide are more reminiscent of 1964 (heavy attacks in the Kontum area and northern MR 1, low level activity elsewhere) than 1968.

The principal difference in analysts' views of the current situation revolves around the intended use of the 320th NVA division whose arrival in the B-3 front is imminent and thus the probable intensity of this year's enemy offensive in the Highlands compared to those in the past.

- Strong Offensive. This view, strongly held by COMUSMACV, assumes employment of the 320th NVA division in the battle area and thus the largest enemy effort since TET 1968.

- LOC Protection. Those holding this view believe the 320th is to provide a reserve and protect the South Laos portion of the supply network, while the three regiments normally organic to the B-3 front conduct an offensive similar to the Ben Het/Dak To campaign in 1969.

In addition to the 320th Division, the B-3 front has apparently been augmented by up to a battalion of 122mm field guns (10-12 tubes). The significance of this added combat support to an enemy offensive, however,

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may be more psychological than real; the 122mm guns have a greater range than the ARVN 155mm howitzer (22km vs 15 km) but the 155 is more accurate and its projectile weight is nearly twice as large. Moreover, the 122mm gun is vulnerable to allied air strikes; it is 15% heavier than the 155mm and has only been sighted behind tracked vehicle movers.

Intelligence reports from the field show no distinct pattern and could support either view, depending on the analyst's interpretation. Since there has been no significant change in enemy capabilities over the past weeks, COMUSMACV's recent request for new authorities may simply reflect his growing conviction in the strong offensive interpretation.

The LOC protection view is primarily based on the importance of the expanded Ho Chi Minh Trail to the enemy and declining levels of US support to RVNAF:

- Elements of two B-3 regiments have been helping to expand and protect the routes through South Laos and northern Cambodia since mid-1970. Enemy sensitivity to RVNAF ground interdiction threats may have dictated the dispatch of the 320th to assume this mission. This would release organic B-3 units for action in the Highlands this year, leaving them the option to employ the additional division in 1973.

- Return of all B-3 units for a 1969 style activity upsurge would probably achieve the desired publicity this year, while next year would be more opportune for a major offensive. US combat support to RVNAF, already reduced over previous levels, will be essentially nil by 1973, and the 320th would have gained valuable familiarity with the terrain.

Historical Perspective. The highlands of MR 2 have been the scene of large scale enemy action for the past several years, usually beginning in late March/early April, peaking in May and subsiding in June after which enemy units retire to their sanctuaries across the border.

Enemy attacks in the eastern portion of MR 2 are smaller in scale and generally avoid major confrontation with friendly main force units. Enemy base areas supporting his coastal units are more vulnerable to friendly penetration, which restricts his ability to mass without detection in this area.

Battle Detail. The enemy opens these setpiece battles in the highlands with scattered attacks by fire which build to a crescendo and are followed by multi-battalion ground assaults against isolated GVN outposts. Normally two infantry regiments and the bulk of his artillery regiment attacks in Kontum, with one or two regiments and the rest of the artillery in Pleiku.

Since 1969 this two province area has been on a par with all of MR 3 in number of enemy ground attacks during the April-June period. Moreover, during this same period in 1971 friendly regular KIA there equalled the

CONFIDENTIAL

107

CONFIDENTIAL

total for both MRs 3 and 4. A comparison of these past battles and projected force ratios for this year in the area (Table 1) shows:

- Employment of the 320th NVA Division is the key issue. ^{1/}
- If the 320th is used in the enemy attack, friendly to enemy force ratios approach that for Lam Son 719 (.7 compared to .5).
- If the 320th is not used, force ratios will be about the same as last year (about 1 to 1).

Despite the adverse ratio of forces should the 320th be deployed, in contrast to Lam Son 719, the MR 2 forces will be on defense in their home territory. Moreover, the ratios above assume only the same reinforcement as last year. As discussed later in the RVNAF preparations section, it would be possible to provide enough reinforcement to raise the combat strength ratio to nearly 1 to 1, should that prove necessary.

TABLE 1
BATTLES IN KONTUM/PLEIKU a/

	<u>BATTLES IN KONTUM/PLEIKU a/</u>			<u>1972</u>		<u>LAM SON 719</u>
	<u>1969</u> (Ben Het/Dak To)	<u>1970</u> (Dak Seang)	<u>1971</u> (FSB 6)	<u>In</u> (320th NVA)	<u>Out</u> (320th NVA)	<u>1971</u>
<u>Combat Bns</u>						
Friendly	20 (8 US)	16 (3 US)	25	<u>25^{b/}</u>	<u>25^{b/}</u>	20
Enemy	19	18	26	38	26	40
Fr/En Ratio	1.1	.9	1.0	.7	1.0	.5
<u>Combat Str (000)</u>						
Friendly	15.6	8.6	11.6	11.6	11.6	12.5
Enemy	5.8	5.5	8.7	13.5	8.7	27.1
Fr/En Ratio	2.7	1.5	1.3	.9	1.3	.5
Enemy Attk (per month)	72	72	24	-	-	N/A
<u>Results</u>						
Enemy KIA	3241	1699	4526	-	-	13642
Friendly KIA	330	708	577	-	-	1532
En/Fr Ratio	9.8	2.4	7.8	-	-	
<u>GVN Control (%)</u>						
Before Battle	34	52	50	60(Nov 71)	-	-
After Battle	27	48	50	-	-	-

a/ Data is for the entire two province area during the course of the battle. KIA results are operational (OPREP) figures, not final verified casualties.

b/ Assumes the 2 airborne brigades and a regiment of 23rd Division are moved to the battle area.

1/ Although there are some tentative indications that the 271st Regiment may also be destined for the B-3 Front, it was not included in our assessment, because the sketchy intelligence information available indicates that the 271st currently consists of only one battalion, and this would not materially affect either the calculations or outcome.

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Artillery and Helicopter Support. Since much of the enemy KIA in these battles is credited to artillery and air we examined available data to determine the scope of such support in the past and the impact of US redeployments.

US forces furnished all of the helicopter support and most of the artillery and TAC AIR support for the 1969 Ben Het/Dak To Campaign.

- Two battalions (36 tubes) of light and medium artillery augmented by a composite heavy (175/8") battery (5 tubes). All of the heavy artillery and half of the light/medium tubes were US.

- US Army Aviation units provided 32 helicopters (6 gunships, 20 utility, 6 heavy) per day. In sharp contrast, more than 20 times that number (659) were used on IAM SON 719.

By the time of the FSB6 attack in 1971, US artillery in MR 2 had been reduced about 2/3 (to 5 bns). A medium (155mm) and heavy (175/8") battalion were in Pleiku but were not employed in the actual battle area. According to the commander of the VNAF 2d Air Division,* his division furnished all of the air support in the actual area of operations (2 helicopter squadrons, 2 fighter squadrons, and a liaison squadron).

Based on the above, RVNAF seems to have adequate combat support available in MR 2 for the predicted enemy offensive even though all US artillery has been withdrawn and US helicopters have been reduced:

- Of the 13 ARVN artillery battalions, the 5 under MR control would more than double those employed in the Ben Het/Dak To battle.

- Although ARVN does not have heavy (175mm/8") artillery in MR 2, available US heavy artillery was not actually used in the battle area during the FSB6 battle last year, although it was used during Ben Het/Dak To.

- VNAF in MR 2 has three of its four UH-1 helicopter squadrons (31 helicopters each) stationed in Pleiku, giving them about 3 times the number provided in support of the Ben Het/Dak To battle.

*CIA field report dated 27 May 1971.

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Tactical Air and B-52 Support

Tactical air sorties have not been used extensively in Kontum and Pleiku provinces. Even in the months characterized by major battles, no more than 8% of the total U.S. and VNAF sorties in Southeast Asia (and 17% of all those flown in South Vietnam) were flown in support of operations in the two provinces. This is in contrast to the air effort devoted to LAM SON 719 which, during February and March 1971, received about 30% of all tactical air sorties flown in SEA and over 50% of those flown in South Laos.

The level of B-52 effort supporting the significant engagements in Kontum and Pleiku provinces has never exceeded 25% of the total sorties flown during the period of the battles. However, during the time LAM SON 719 was in progress over 80% of all B-52 sorties flown (and 90% of those flown in Laos) were in support of the operation.

The table below shows the level of tactical air and B-52 effort supporting the major engagements in Kontum and Pleiku during 1969-1971, as well as the levels during LAM SON 719. Sorties flown in conjunction with these operations are compared with the air activity in the remainder of SEA during the times the operations were in progress, and with the capability now available.

CONFIDENTIAL

110

CONFIDENTIAL

US/VNAF AIR OPERATIONS IN KONTUM AND PLEIKU a/

	<u>Ben Het/Dak To</u> <u>May-June 1969</u>	<u>Dak Seang</u> <u>Apr-May 70</u>	<u>FSB6</u> <u>Apr-June 71</u>	<u>LAM SON 719</u> <u>Feb-Mar 71</u>
<u>Tactical Air b/</u>				
Sorties supporting battle (monthly avg.)	2,037 (1,019)	2,577 (2,035)	721 (240)	8,512 (5,674)
Sorties in all SVN	37,154	15,519	12,675	16,063 c/
Total SEA Sorties	60,707	32,343	46,846	29,824
% of SVN total for battle	5	17	6	53 c/
% of SEA total for battle	3	8	2	29
% of current monthly capability	6	13	2	35
<u>B-52</u>				
Sorties supporting operation (monthly avg.)	804 (402)	114 (90)	96 (32)	1,358 (906)
Sorties in all SVN	3,019	1,015	791	1,485 c/
Total SEA sorties	3,544	1,778	3,425	1,664
% of SVN sorties for battle	27	11	12	91 c/
% of SEA sorties for battle	23	6	3	82
% of current monthly capability	40	9	3	91

- a/ Sortie data for Ben Het/Dak To and Dak Seang from USAF reports of air support for the operations. Data for FSB6 include all sorties in Kontum and Pleiku provinces. LAM SON 719 data from USAF report of COMMANDO HUNT V.
- b/ Includes gunship sorties.
- c/ Sorties in South Laos for LAM SON 719.

CURRENT US/VNAF AIR CAPABILITIES

<u>Tactical Air</u>	(sorties/Month)
US	10,000
(Air Force)	(6,700)
(Navy)	(3,300)
VNAF	6,500
<u>Gunship</u>	
US	750
VNAF	800
<u>B-52</u>	1,000

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Through June 1972 Air Force aircraft based in South Vietnam and Thailand will have the capability to fly 6,700 tactical air sorties, 750 gunship sorties and 1,000 B-52 sorties each month. Navy aircraft will add an additional 3,300 sorties monthly to the tactical air total. The VNAF have been programmed to fly 6,500 tactical air and 800 gunship sorties monthly; however, their contribution will probably not be more than 5,000 tactical air sorties and 500 gunship sorties each month. Thus, about 15,000 tactical air 1,250 gunship and 1,000 B-52 sorties should be available each month until June 1972 (this does not include monthly totals of 3,000-3,500 T-28 and 200 gunship sorties flown by the Lao).

As can be seen in the above table, engagements of a magnitude similar to Ben Het, Dak Seang and FSB 6 would not require significant portions of the current US/VNAF tactical air monthly sortie capability. To fly the level of B-52 support flown during Ben Het would require 40% of the current B-52 capability. B-52 support equivalent to that at Dak Seang and FSB 6 would require 9% and 3%, respectively, of the current sortie level.*

As noted previously one squadron of A-1s (24 aircraft) are at Pleiku. A squadron of A-37s (24 aircraft) is at Nha Trang. To fly the level of tactical air support flown during Ben Het would require the sortie capability of one A-37 or two A-1 squadrons. Twice that number of aircraft would have to be used to support an operation of the magnitude of Dak Seang. B-52 support as used at Ben Het would require approximately 18 aircraft; support as used at Dak Seang, 4 B-52s and FSB 6, less than 2 B-52s.

RVNAF Shortcomings. In LAM SON 719, battlefield coordination and casualty replacement were considered the principal RVNAF shortcomings. In addition, a series of MR 2 RVNAF performance assessments during periodically intense combat since 1969 shows a consistent set of deficiencies. The previous MR 2 senior advisor noted in his final report that "shortcomings which existed at Dak Seang (1970) were also present to a lesser extent at FSB 6 (1971)." Among those cited were:

- Command and Control. Failure to quickly establish a forward command post when the operation is large and involves units from several organizations.

- Planning. MR 2 has neither a campaign nor a seasonal plan. Although MG Dzu moves forces quickly to the scene of action, there is no accompanying scheme of maneuver, chain of command, or fire support plan.

- Coordination. Coordination of intelligence, aviation, artillery, and Tac air was poor.

- Personnel and Unit Management. Casualty reports were not timely or accurate and there was little or no attempt to establish a priority system for casualty replacement. Moreover, units were often rotated in and out of the battle area without regard to their performance potential or casualties taken.

*While not germane to the current build-up in MR 2, air support of an operation of the magnitude of LAM SON 719 would require 35% of current US/VNAF tactical air and 91% of the current B-52 capability. Since the period of LAM SON 719 combined US/VNAF tactical air capability has decreased less than 10%; however, since early 1970 the decrease has been over 30%. B-52 capability is down 10% from a year ago and down 30% from early 1970.

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Current RVNAF Preparations

In addition to the two ROK divisions (18 bns) along the central coast of MR 2, there are 35 RVNAF maneuver battalions operating generally as follows:

- The 22d Division (17 bns) has two regiments operating in the threatened northern Highlands (Kontum and Pleiku) and two in the perennially troublesome Binh Dinh area.

- The 23d Division (13 bns) has its three regiments operating over a wide area from Binh Thuan on the southern coast to Darlac in the highlands south of Pleiku.

- MR forces (5 bns) include a 3 battalion ranger group and a 2 squadron armored cavalry brigade now operating around Pleiku.

The OJCS RVN assessment (January update) cited measures taken to strengthen MR 2 since last May--an armored cavalry squadron activated and a VNAF gunship squadron transferred from MR 3. More recent actions include:

- Two airborne brigades (3 bns each) withdrawn from Cambodia and alerted for movement to MR 2, leaving 2 brigades (1 Abn, 1 Marine) as JGS general reserve in MR 3.

- Replacement of the 23rd Division commander by the deputy MR commander and new province chiefs in Binh Dinh, Darlac, and Quang Duc.

While it seems strange that the 22nd Division commander, whom COMUSMACV rates incompetent, was not relieved, it is probable that the MR commander (MG Dzu) will personally direct operations in the northern highlands as he did in last year's FSB 6 attacks. Thus having his former deputy in command of the other division might facilitate rapid movement of reinforcements to the battle area from the 23rd Division.

In past years, MR 2 commanders have reinforced the highlands with regiments from either the 23rd Division or the Binh Dinh area. The present MR 2, senior advisor has stated, however, that the two regiments now in Binh Dinh would remain there to preclude the usual GVN control losses in Binh Dinh which have accompanied this turbulence.

In addition to the 6 airborne battalions then, 6-8 battalions could be provided from the 23rd Division. Depending on the situation in MR 3 and MR 1, one of the two remaining general reserve brigades might also be made available, since the JGS has alerted a reinforced regiment in MR 4 for possible movement to MR 3.

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THE WAR IN VIETNAM -- POST-TET

The intensity of the war in Vietnam since the VC/NVA Tet offensive is much higher than during 1967. The attached tables present key statistics about the war in Vietnam, before, during, and after the 1968 Tet offensive. They show that:

1. US and VC combat deaths continue to run about double the 1967 rates in the post-Tet period, while RVNAF deaths are 65% above 1967 levels. (Table 1.)
2. Post-Tet US fixed-wing and helicopter losses in SVN are about double the 1967 average. Losses in NVN have dropped to less than half the 1967 average. (Table 2.)
3. VC/NVA activity is very high in the post-Tet period. First quarter 1968 infiltration is estimated at over 50,000, more than double the 1967 rate. The Chieu Hoi rate has remained low in March, April and May. Enemy attacks are continuing at twice the last half 1967 rate, including many attacks by mortar fire only. Harassment and sabotage incidents continue at well above the 1967 rates. Finally, VC assassinations and abductions continue at very high levels. (Table 3.)
4. By the end of May there were 535,000 US military personnel and 112 US maneuver battalions in South Vietnam. The enemy had about 123,000 combat personnel and 193 maneuver battalions there. By adding 29 maneuver battalions to his force since June 1967, the enemy has maintained a fairly constant ratio through April 1968, of about 1.8 enemy battalions per US maneuver battalion. (Table 4.)
5. RVNAF personnel strength increased 65,000 in March-April due to a large influx of volunteers and draftees. Desertions in February-April were 62% higher than the 1st half rate of 1967; per 1,000 strength the rate was 46% higher. RVNAF forces bore the brunt of the Tet offensive but have not collapsed. (Table 4.)
6. The Tet offensive reduced the secure population by 1.3 million, cancelling the total gain in 1967. Recovery is slow and far from complete. (Table 5.)
7. The price of the piaster has fallen in the post-Tet period. The AID retail price index for Saigon reached a record high in May despite earlier signs of stability. The piaster supply is increasing rapidly but the supply of goods and foodstuffs is not. The economic situation in South Vietnam is not healthy at present and the prospects for improvement in 1968 are not bright. (Table 5.)

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TABLE 1
CASUALTIES ^{a/}
(Monthly Average)

	1967		1968					5 Months Average
	1st Half	2nd Half	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	
<u>KILLED</u>								
Allied: US	814	746	1202	2124	1543	1410	2169	1690
SVN	1053	1066	1449	2443	1544	1312	1969	1743
FWF	78	106	111	147	88	85	85	103
Total	1945	1918	2762	4714	3175	2807	4223	3536
VC/NVA	7691	6993	15217	39867	17371	12215	22809	21496
<u>KILL RATIO (VC/NVA To Allied)</u>	4.0	3.6	5.5	8.5	5.5	4.4	5.4	6.1

a/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary

TABLE 2

AIRCRAFT LOSSES
(Monthly Average)

	1967		1968				
	1st Half	2nd Half	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
<u>US AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN SEA^{a/}</u>							
<u>SVN</u>							
Fixed Wing	7	5	8	7	9	8	15
Helicopter	20	23	56	66	60	42	50
Total	27	28	64	73	69	50	65
<u>NVN</u>							
Fixed Wing	24	30	23	11	9	12	16
Helicopter	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Total	24	30	24	11	9	12	16
<u>Other ^{b/}</u>							
Fixed Wing	22	33	35	54	47	32	41
Helicopter	29	38	51	64	47	40	41
Total	51	71	86	118	94	72	82
<u>Total</u>							
Fixed Wing	53	68	66	72	65	52	72
Helicopter	49	61	108	130	107	82	91
Total	102	129	174	202	172	134	163

a/ Source: Table 6, OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary, 19 June 68.

b/ Aircraft and helicopters lost to non-hostile action, support aircraft losses, and all other losses in connection with the war.

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TABLE 3

VC/NVA ACTIVITIES^{a/}
(Monthly Average)

	<u>1967</u>		<u>1968</u>				
	1st Half	2nd Half	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
<u>Infiltration</u> ^{b/}							
Reported to Date	8050	5600	20600	6100	10300	4300	
OASD/SA Estimate ^{c/}	8184	7076	23700	11500	22700	16200	
<u>Chieu Hoi</u>	3012	1517	1303	720	518	881	894
<u>VC Incidents</u>							
Attacks: Bn Size	4	5	28	18	18	5	19
Other	163	241	381	552	540	386	569
Total	167	246	409	570	558	391	588
Harassment	1620	1585	1615	1289	2585	1929	2329
Terrorism	155	173	139	68	134	75	113
Sabotage	62	178	195	185	484	212	210
Propaganda	77	57	32	7	29	12	7
AA Fire	1234	981	1241	1633	1394	1031	943
Total Incidents	3315	3220	3631	3752	5184	3650	4190
<u>Assassinations</u>							
GVN Officials	23	25	58	N/A	37	21	
Other Civilians	212	358	560	N/A	506	266	
Total	235	383	618	N/A	543	287	
<u>Abductions</u>							
GVN Officials	15	17	39	N/A	20	22	
Other Civilians	295	568	822	N/A	1113	806	
Total	310	585	861	N/A	1133	828	

a/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

b/ Confirmed, Probable and Possible.

c/ Based on factors developed to compensate for the fact MACV is unable to count many infiltrators until long after they have infiltrated.

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TABLE 4
US AND ALLIED FORCES^{a/}
 (End of Period)

	<u>1967</u>		<u>1968</u>				
	<u>1st</u> <u>Half</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Half</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>
<u>US Military Personnel</u>							
<u>in SEA (000)</u>							
SVN	448.9	486.6	494.3	506.9	516.4	526.2P	534.8P
Thailand	39.0	44.5	44.3	45.1	46.0	46.2	47.1P
<u>VC/NVA OB in SVN^{d/}</u>							
Total Combat Str (000)	120.0	119.5	140.2	124.2	123.3	122.6	
Total Maneuver Bns	164	176	193	193	193	193	
<u>US Maneuver Battalions</u>							
<u>in SVN</u>							
	85	102	102	108	109	112	112
<u>Ratio of VC/NVA to US</u>							
<u>Maneuver Battalions</u>							
	1.9	1.7	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.7	
<u>RVNAF Strength^{c/}</u>							
Strength (000)	609.3	643.1	646.9	647.2	677.6	713.3	
Desertions b/	6911	6722	4867	10021	12715	10950	
Volunteers b/	7833	11462	9057	5939	23538	30853	
Conscripts b/	3771	4320	1833	4997	11004	12325	

a/ Source: OSD SFA Statistical Summary.

b/ Monthly average.

c/ The figures below include only Regular, PF and RF forces. CIDG is not included.

d/ Confirmed, probable, and possible.

"P" Preliminary.

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TABLE 5

PACIFICATION AND SVN ECONOMY
(End of Period)

	<u>1967</u>		<u>1968</u>				
	1st Half	2nd Half	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
<u>Pacification (HES)^{a/}</u>							
Population (000)							
Secure	11256	11515	11581	10258	10472	10629	
Contested	2822	2833	2818	3777	3554	3461	
VC	3087	2862	2835	3118	3136	3066	
Total	17165	17210	17234	17153	17162	17156	
<u>Percentages (%)</u>							
Secure	65.6	66.9	67.2	59.8	61.0	62.0	
Contested	16.4	16.5	16.4	22.0	20.7	20.2	
VC	18.0	16.6	16.4	18.2	18.3	17.8	
<u>SVN Economy^{b/}</u>							
Exchange Rate							
Piaster/US \$1 Green	158	167	165	168	166	170	170
Piaster/\$ Gold	195	218	208	224	236	237	249
AID Retail Price							
Index for Saigon	267	305	326	360	328	351	389
SVN Money Supply							
(Piasters-Billions)	72.8	82.7	90.8	96.5	99.2	101.7	106.7

a/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

b/ Source: USAID, Office of Economic Policy.

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LULLS IN VIETNAM

The recent lull in the Vietnam fighting raises the question of whether it is part of a seasonal pattern of enemy operations or whether it signals a change in the war. A look at KIA and VC/NVA attack statistics for the past three years indicates that some monthly trends exist, particularly in the first half of the year. October appears to have been a month of abnormal lull. If past patterns persist, US KIA will exceed the October 1968 level in each of the next four months.

Countrywide Fluctuations

The KIA data show a more distinct pattern of monthly fluctuations than the VC/NVA attack data and are probably a better measure of combat intensity, since they are reported precisely and since many enemy attacks are only by fire with little loss to either side. US KIA show the clearest patterns (Graph 1). Those for total allied KIA and VC/NVA KIA are roughly similar. In every case the pattern for the first half of the year is much stronger than for the last half.

Each year starts with increased US KIA in January, followed by a peak in February or March, a comparative lull in April, a second peak in May or June, and a decline again in July. August, normally a low month, saw an increase in US KIA this year. October normally declines from September, followed by a rise in November and slight decline in December. All months in 1968, except October, are higher than their 1967 counterparts. If the 1966-67 patterns repeat, US KIA in November and December 1968 will be above the October level and Jan-Feb-Mar 1969 will see US KIA rise well above current levels.


The patterns for VC/NVA attacks are not as clear. However, Graph #2 does show a decline of attacks in October (no battalion or larger attacks at all), in contrast to past years. This, the sharp October decline in US KIA, and the lowest level of total VC/NVA incidents since May 1965, all indicate that October was a month of abnormal lull, possibly keyed to the NVA moves at the Paris talks.

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
GRAPH 1

US KIA



GRAPH 2

VC/NVA TOTAL ATTACKS



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TABLE 1

US KIA

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
1966	282	435	507	316	464	507	435	396	419	340	475	432
1967	520	662	944	710	1233	803	781	535	775	733	881	774
1968	1202	2124	1543	1410	2169	1146	813	1080	1053	600		

TABLE 2

VC/NVA TOTAL ATTACKS

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
1966	70	69	52	77	53	68	91	64	86	121	86	101
1967	142	117	219	162	193	168	197	204	260	264	264	286
1968	409	570	558	391	588	288	137	242	215	145		

Source: OSD Statistical Summary, Table 2.

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TRENDS IN 1968

1968 was a year of contrasts in the Vietnam conflict. During the first half of the year VC/NVA operations and the resulting intensity of combat were much higher than 1967. After June, however, VC activities declined consistently and the 4th quarter statistics reflected a level significantly lower than 1967. The attached tables present key statistics about the war during 1968. They show that:

1. Casualties. US combat deaths increased 56% in 1968 to 14,592, but 4th quarter 1968 was below 4th quarter 1967. RVNAF combat deaths increased 28% and still exceeded US combat deaths. VC/NVA combat deaths rose 105% and exceeded the 1967 quarterly average in every quarter of 1968. The enemy/friendly kill ratio rose from 3.8 to 5.7 and was especially high during the 1st and 4th quarters. The high 4th quarter ratio is unusual since combat intensity was low and high kill ratios have normally been associated with high combat intensity. (Table 1)

2. Air Sorties and Losses. Aircraft attack sorties increased 11% in 1968 with the largest increase in Laos (69%) resulting from diversion of aircraft from North Vietnam after the bombing restrictions and halt. Fighter/attack aircraft losses were down 24% over-all, as losses in North Vietnam were cut by 60%. The all-service, all-aircraft type attack loss rate (losses per 1,000 attack sorties) dropped over NVN (1.11 vs 2.40) and Laos (.60 vs .70) and rose over SVN (.48 vs .39). Total Army and Marine helicopter losses were up 53%, with heavy losses during the intense combat in the first half of the year. (Table 2)

3. VC/NVA Attacks. VC/NVA attacks rose sharply with most of the activity in the first half of the year. Attacks by fire more than doubled. Ground assaults and ambushes actually declined 9%, but the decline must be balanced against the increase of 133% in battalion size or larger attacks. All other incident rates were lower except sabotage. (Table 3)

4. Forces. US troop strength remained fairly constant (around 535,000) after May. Vietnamese military forces added over 175,000 men as they built up towards new force levels; about half of the increase was in the regular forces. The RVNAF net desertions were 51% above 1967. The desertion rate must be reduced by at least 50% if the Vietnamese are to sustain their present force levels past 1969. VC/NVA forces replaced their Tet, May and August losses through increased infiltration, but the quality of their forces declined somewhat. (Table 4)

5. Pacification. Over-all Hamlet Evaluation System ratings reflect significant population and hamlet gains for the GVN in 1968 (preliminary December reports show over 76% of the population as relatively secure). The gains occurred primarily during the 4th quarter and may reflect the low rate of VC/NVA activity and the flurry of allied activity in the Accelerated Pacification Program rather than actual gains. Whether the gains can be maintained during a more intense period of conflict remains to be seen. The Chieu Hoi program had recovered its 1967 pace by 4th quarter 1968, but returnees declined 33% over-all. (Table 5)

6. Economic. Prices increased roughly 30%, which was a smaller increase than in any of the past three years. However, the piaster depreciated against the dollar, gold, and MPC. (Table 5)

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TABLE 1

CASUALTIES

	Total 1967	Total 1968	1968			
			1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
<u>KILLED</u>						
Allied:						
US	9,378	14,592	4,869	4,725	2,946	2,052
SVN	12,716	16,336P	5,436	4,648	3,910	2,342P
FWF	1,105	979	346	262	196	175
Total	23,199	31,907	10,651	9,635	7,052	4,569
VC/NVA	88,104	180,966P	72,455	46,620	34,666	27,217P
<u>KILL RATIO</u> (VC/NVA vs Allied)	3.8	5.7	6.8	4.8	4.9	6.0

Source: OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary.
P indicates preliminary figure.

TABLE 2

AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AND LOSSES

	Total 1967	Total 1968	1968			
			1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
<u>Fighter and Attack Aircraft</u> ^{a/}						
<u>OPERATION</u>						
Attack Sorties						
NVN	105,698	92,231	14,745	27,373	37,872	12,241
Laos	44,443	75,120	21,279	12,831	8,355	32,655
SVN	194,659	222,897	54,191	61,592	57,762	49,352
Total	344,800	390,248	90,215	101,796	103,989	94,248
Non-attack Sorties	51,665	51,002	14,889	12,111	12,209	11,793
Total Combat Sorties	396,465	441,250	105,104	113,907	116,198	106,041
<u>LOSSES</u>						
Attack Sorties						
NVN	254	102	30	29	34	9
Laos	31	45	18	9	4	14
SVN	76	108	25	33	34	16
Total attack	361	255	73	71	72	39
Other Combat Sorties ^{b/}	47	34	10	9	10	5
Operational and D.O.G.	136	124	39	29	35	21
Total Losses	544	413	122	109	117	65
<u>Helicopter</u> ^{c/}						
To hostile causes	273	572	232	149	98	93
To operational causes	374	419	115	125	80	99
Total losses	647	991	347	274	178	192

Source: OSD Comptroller Statistical Summary

a/ Excludes B-52, AC-47, AC-130, AC-119.

b/ Destroyed on ground by hostile attack.

c/ USA and USMC only.

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TABLE 1

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<u>KILL RATIO</u> (VC/NVA vs Allied)	3.8	5.7	6.8	4.8	4.9	6.0

Source: OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary.
P indicates preliminary figure.

TABLE 2

AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AND LOSSES

	Total 1967	Total 1968	1968			
			1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
<u>OPERATIONS</u> ^{a/}						
Inter and Attack Aircraft						
Attack Sorties						
NVN	105,698	92,231	14,745	27,373	37,872	12,241
Laos	44,443	75,120	21,279	12,831	8,355	32,655
SVN	194,659	222,897	54,191	61,592	57,762	49,352
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To hostile causes	273	572	232	149	98	93
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Source: OSD Comptroller Statistical Summary

^{a/} Excludes B-52, AC-47, AC-130, AC-119.

^{b/} Destroyed on ground by hostile attack.

^{c/} USA and USMC only.

CONFIDENTIAL

124

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TABLE 3

VC/NVA ACTIVITIES

	Total 1967	Total 1968	1968			
			1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
<u>Attacks</u> a/						
By Size: Bn. Size	54	126	64	33	27	2
Other	2,422	3,795	1,473	1,234	567	521
Total	2,476	3,921	1,537	1,267	594	523
By type: b/						
Ground Assaults	1,482	1,341	635	346	198	162
Attacks by fire	1,003	2,376	857	786	374	359
Incidents: a/						
Harassment	12,231	18,233	5,489	5,674	3,671	3,399
Terror	1,963	1,047	341	249	218	239
Sabotage	1,443	1,609	864	566	133	46
Propaganda	801	102	68	24	4	6
Anti-aircraft fire	13,290	13,078	4,268	3,534	2,544	2,732
<u>Total Attacks & Incidents</u>	39,204	37,990	12,567	11,314	7,164	6,015

a/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary.
 b/ Source: DIA - figures are approximate only.

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TABLE 4
FRIENDLY AND ENEMY FORCE STRENGTHS AND RVNAF DESERTIONS

	<u>Dec</u> <u>1967</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>1968</u> ^{a/}	<u>1968</u>			
			<u>1Q</u>	<u>2Q</u>	<u>3Q</u>	<u>4Q</u>
<u>FRIENDLY STRENGTH</u>						
US Military in SEA (000)						
SVN	485.6	536.0	515.2	534.7	537.8	536.0
Thailand	44.5	48.6	46.0	47.7	48.1	48.6
Total	530.1	584.6 ^P	561.2	582.4	585.9	584.6
Third Nation Forces (000)	59.4	65.7	61.0	62.4	66.0	65.7
RVNAF (000)	643.1	826.3	677.6	765.3	816.0	826.3
Total Friendly Military Forces (In SVN Only)	1188.1	1428.0	1253.8	1362.4	1419.8	1428.0
<u>RVNAF DESERTIONS AND INPUTS</u>						
Gross Desertions	81797	140922	27603 ^{c/}	33485	39275	40559 ^P
Deserters Returned	4083	23654 ^{b/}	12600	5488	2752	2814 ^{b/}
Net Desertions	77714	117268	15003	27997	36523	37745
Volunteers	115769	214641	38534	89329	64162	22616
Conscripts	48545	99809	28418	17834	26231	27326 ^P
Total Inputs	164314	314450	66952	107163	90393	49942
<u>ENEMY FORCE STRENGTH</u>						
<u>Combat Troops:</u>						
North Vietnamese <u>c/</u>	77.6	125.0	97.1	101.7	99.0	125.0
Viet Cong <u>d/</u>	48.6	37.0	39.1	38.8	38.8	37.0
Total	126.2	162.0	136.2	140.5	137.8	162.0
<u>Support & Administration:</u>						
VC Guerrillas	79.9	65.0	56.1	55.6	82.0	65.0
VC Administration	37.5	39.0	33.5	33.5	33.5	39.0
NVA Administration	.6	f/	.6	.6	1.8	f/
Total	118.0	104.0	90.2	89.7	117.3	104.0
Total Enemy Strength	244.2	266.0	226.4	230.2	255.1	266.0

a/ All December 1968 strength figures are preliminary.

b/ Estimated on basis of Oct-Nov data.

c/ Includes 14,500 NVA personnel that MACV estimates are fillers and replacements in VC units.

d/ Not including 14,500 NVA in VC units (see footnote c/).

e/ MACV/CINCPAC agreed estimates as of 30 November.

f/ About 5% of the total NVA in SVN may be involved in administrative activities.

P - Indicates preliminary figure.

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TABLE 5
PACIFICATION AND SVN ECONOMY

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968 a/</u>	<u>1968</u>			
			<u>1Q</u>	<u>2Q</u>	<u>3Q</u>	<u>4Q a/</u>
<u>PACIFICATION</u>						
Population (000)						
Secure	11515	12813	10472	10969	11671	12813
Contested	2833	2321	3554	3368	2877	2321
VC	2862	2343	3136	3005	2933	2343
Total	17210	17477	17162	17342	17481	17477
Percentage (%)						
Secure	66.9	73.3	61.0	63.3	66.8	73.3
Contested	16.5	13.3	20.7	19.4	16.4	13.3
VC	16.6	13.4	18.3	17.3	16.8	13.4
<u>CHIEU HOI b/</u>						
Military	17672	12548	1978	2145	3062	5363
Political	7877	3797	501	555	951	1790
Other	1629	1826	62	501	743	520
Total	27178	18171	2541	3201	4756	7673
<u>PHOENIX PROGRAM ELIMINATIONS b/</u>		13404	2351	3727	3697	3597
<u>ECONOMY</u>						
Exchange Rate						
Piaster/\$ US Green	167	200	165	174	203	200
Piaster/\$ US Gold	218	284	235	258	280	284
Piaster/\$ US MPC	121	155	122	116	135	155
Aid Retail Price Index (Saigon)	305	408	323	350	409	408
SVN Money Supply (Piasters-Billion)	82.7	122.9 c/	99.2	112.0	126.1	122.9 c/

Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary and Phoenix Program Reports.

a/ HES and Phoenix figures through November only.

b/ Chieu Hoi and Phoenix figures are totals; others are end of period.

c/ As of 16 December 1968.

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TRENDS IN VIETNAM: FIRST QUARTER 1969

First quarter 1969 was highlighted by the VC/NVA post-Tet offensive. The offensive was more limited in scope than the 1968 Tet and May offensives, and the activity indicators generally range between the 1967 and 1968 averages. The most interesting result of the post-Tet offensive is its apparent lack of impact on the SVN economy and on the GVN pacification program. The piaster remained stable, prices declined somewhat, and population security continued to improve. The attached tables present key statistics about the war during the first quarter 1969 with 1967 and 1968 figures for comparison. They show that:

1. Casualties: In first quarter 1969, US combat deaths increased by 55% over the unusually low level of the previous quarter; Vietnamese and Free World Forces (FWF) combat deaths increased 42%-43% in the same period^{1/}. On the other hand, VC/NVA combat deaths increased by 63%. Friendly forces combat deaths were about 45% above the 1967 rate and 15% below the 1968 rate. VC/NVA KIA are running only 1% below the 1968 quarterly average. The enemy/friendly kill ratio rose to 5.3 to 1 in first quarter 1969, well above any quarter in 1968 (Table 1).

2. VC/NVA Activities: VC/NVA total attacks increased sharply in first quarter 1969 and slightly exceeded the quarterly average for 1968. Ground assaults and ambushes increased more than attacks by fire; battalion size or larger assaults were 1% below the 1968 quarterly averages. Incidents of sabotage were 84% below the 1968 quarterly average. Harassment, propaganda, and anti-aircraft fire were near or slightly below 1968. On the other hand, terrorism incidents increased 20% over the 1968 average and exceeded those committed in every quarter in 1968 except the first (Table 2).

3. Air Sorties and Losses: Aircraft attack sorties in Laos increased 20% in first quarter 1969 (over 4th quarter 1968) while attack sorties in SVN declined slightly. Total fighter/attack aircraft losses in first quarter 1969 increased 48% over 4th quarter 1968 with the percentage increase fairly evenly distributed among losses from attack sorties, from other combat sorties, operational problems, and destruction on the ground. Comparing the 1st quarter 1969 all-service, all-aircraft type attack loss rate (losses per 1000 attack sorties) with 4th quarter 1968, we find that losses dropped to zero from .74 over NVN, increased from .46 to .81 over Laos, and increased from .32 to .56 over SVN. The SVN rate is comparable to the 2nd and 3rd quarter rates for 1968. Although 21 more helicopters were lost in 1st quarter 1969 than in 4th quarter 1968, total Army and Marine helicopter losses were 5%

^{1/} RVNAF combat death data is preliminary.

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below the 1968 quarterly average.

4. Forces: End of March 1969 figures show that US troop strength has remained fairly constant while RVNAF increased by over 23,000 men compared to end December 1968 levels. Third Nation forces increased by 6,000 men as the remainder of the Thai troops committed to SVN deployed. RVNAF net desertions dropped 32% compared with 4th quarter 1968 -- an important step toward meeting the 50% desertion reduction goal considered necessary if RVNAF is to maintain programmed force levels. According to the MACV collateral order of battle (OB), enemy troop strength in SVN declined in both combat and guerrilla sectors. However, as the OB is updated with additional information these levels may rise.

5. Pacification: Overall Hamlet Evaluation System ratings reflected significant population gains for the GVN in 1st quarter 1969. March reports show 82% of the population as relatively secure. The pacification progress apparently withstood the pressure of the post-Tet offensive although VC/NVA forces did not seem to target the pacification program in most areas. The Chieu Hoi program continued its steady upward trend with nearly 10,000 ralliers in 1st quarter 1969. Ralliers came in at a high rate even during the post-Tet offensive -- in a complete reversal of last year's situation. The anti-infrastructure program (Phoenix) received continued emphasis but late reporting and a redefinition of categories of eliminations considered to be VC infrastructure makes comparison with previous figures impossible.

6. Economic: Stability was the keynote in first quarter 1969. The piaster appreciated against all indicators: US currency, gold, and MPC. The overall Saigon retail price index moved 7 points lower, holding the level established over the last nine months.

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TABLE 1

CASUALTIES

	Total 1967	Total 1968	1968				1969
			1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr
KILLED							
Allied: US	9,378	14,592	4,869	4,725	2,946	2,052	3,184
SVN	12,716	24,323	9,424	6,241	5,147	3,511	5,000 ^{a/}
FWF	1,105	979	346	262	196	175	251
Total	23,199	39,894	14,639	11,228	8,289	5,738	8,435
VC/NVA	88,104	181,149	72,455	46,620	34,674	27,400	44,797
KILL RATIO (VC/NVA to Allied)	3.8	4.5	4.9	4.2	4.2	4.8	5.3

Source: OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary

a/ Preliminary RVNAF KIA figure of 1263 for March has been increased 50% based on the average increase of final verified RVNAF KIA data over preliminary operational data for 1968.

TABLE 2

VC/NVA ACTIVITIES

	Total 1967	Total 1968	1968				1969	
			1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	
Attacks								
By Size: ^{a/} Bn. Size		54	126	64	33	27	2	15
Other		2,422	3,795	1,473	1,234	567	521	970
Total		2,476	3,921	1,537	1,267	594	523	985
By type: ^{b/} Ground Assaults		1,482	1,341	635	346	198	162	371
Attacks by fire		1,003	2,376	857	786	374	359	640
Incidents:^{a/}								
Harassment		19,231	18,233	5,489	5,674	3,671	3,399	4,627
Terror		1,963	1,047	341	249	218	239	315
Sabotage		1,443	1,609	864	566	133	46	62
Propaganda		801	102	68	24	4	6	19
Anti-aircraft fire		13,290	13,078	4,268	3,534	2,544	2,732	3,407
Total Attacks & Incidents		39,204	37,990	12,567	11,314	7,164	6,945	9,415

a/ Source: OASD SEA Statistical Summary.

b/ Source: DIA - figures are approximate only.

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TABLE 3

AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AND LOSSES

	Total 1967	Total 1968	1968				1969 1Qtr
			1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	
<u>Fighter and Attack Aircraft a/</u>							
<u>OPERATION</u>							
Attack Sorties							
NVN	105,699	92,230	14,745	27,372	37,872	12,241	59
Laos	44,445	75,120	21,279	12,831	8,355	32,655	39,246
SVN	194,658	222,899	54,192	61,593	57,762	49,352	48,613
Total	344,802	390,249	90,216	101,796	103,989	94,248	87,918
Non-Attack Sorties	51,666	51,002	14,889	12,111	12,209	11,793	11,358
Total Combat Sorties	396,468	441,251	105,105	113,907	116,198	106,041	99,276
<u>LOSSES</u>							
On Attack Sorties							
NVN	254	102	30	29	34	9	0
Laos	31	46	18	9	4	15	32
SVN	76	108	25	33	34	16	27
Total attack	361	256	73	71	72	40	59
On Other Combat Sorties	47	34	10	9	10	5	9
Operational and D.O.G. b/	136	123	39	29	35	20	28
Total Losses	544	413	122	109	117	65	96
<u>Helicopter c/</u>							
To hostile causes	273	522	193	135	99	95	121
To operational causes	374	439	107	116	105	111	106
Total losses	647	961	300	251	204	206	227

Source: OSD Comptroller Statistical Summary.

a/ Excludes B-52, AC-47, AC-130, AC-119.

b/ Destroyed on ground by hostile attack.

c/ USA and USMC only.

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TABLE 4

FRIENDLY AND ENEMY FORCE STRENGTHS AND RVNAF DESERTIONS

	Dec	Dec	1968				1969
	1967	1968	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr
FRIENDLY STRENGTH							
US Military in SEA (000)							
SVN	485.6	536.1	515.2	534.7	537.8	536.1	539.6P
Thailand	44.5	47.6	46.0	47.7	48.1	47.6	48.5
Total	530.1	583.7	561.2	582.4	585.9	583.7	588.1
Third Nation Forces (000)	59.4	65.6	61.0	62.4	66.0	65.6	71.5P
RVNAF (000)	643.1	819.2	677.6	765.3	816.0	819.2	842.5
Total Friendly Military Forces (In SVN Only)	1188.1	1468.5	1253.8	1362.4	1419.8	1468.5	1502.1
RVNAF DESERTIONS AND INPUTS							
Gross Desertions	81,797	139,970	27,903	33,485	39,275	39,307	26,795
Deserters Returned	4,083	23,606	12,600	5,488	2,752	2,766	1,788P
Net Desertions	77,714	116,364	15,303	27,997	36,523	36,541	25,007
Volunteers	115,769	214,666	38,534	88,329	64,162	23,641	46,042
Conscripts	48,545	199,145	17,834	28,418	26,231	26,662	19,224
Total Inputs	164,314	313,811	56,368	116,747	90,393	50,303	65,266
ENEMY FORCE STRENGTH							
Combat Troops:							
North Vietnamese a/	76.2	90.0	98.8	95.9	91.5	90.0	84.6
Viet Cong b/	51.5	47.0	41.8	44.0	47.7	47.0	47.8
Total	127.7	137.0	140.6	139.9	139.2	137.0	132.4
Support & Administration:							
VC Guerrillas	80.9	64.7	54.0	67.4	79.6	64.7	54.0
VC Administration	38.2	37.0	33.6	34.3	33.9	37.0	38.1
NVA Administration	.6	4.4	4.6	3.9	5.1	4.4	4.4
Total	119.7	106.1	92.2	105.6	118.6	106.1	96.5
Total Enemy Strength	247.4	243.1	232.8	245.5	257.8	243.1	228.9

a/ Includes NVA troops serving in VC units.

b/ Does not include NVA troops serving in VC units.

Source: OSD Comptroller SEA Statistical Summary.
MACV collateral Order of Battle.

P - Indicates preliminary figure.

Source: OSD Comptroller - SEA Statistical Summary.
MACV Collateral Order of Battle.

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TABLE 5

PACIFICATION AND SVN ECONOMY

	1967	1968	1968				1969
			1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	
<u>PACIFICATION</u>							
Population (000)							
ure	11515	13339	10471	10969	11671	13339	14137
Contested	2833	1983	3554	3368	2878	1983	1345
VC	2861	2155	3136	3005	2933	2155	1741
Total	17209	17477	17161	17342	17482	17477	17223
Percentage (%)							
Secure	66.9	76.3	61.0	63.3	66.8	76.3	82.1
Contested	16.5	11.4	20.7	19.4	16.4	11.4	7.8
VC	16.6	12.3	18.3	17.3	16.8	12.3	10.1
<u>CHIEU HOI a/</u>							
Military	17672	12569	1978	2146	3062	5383	6511
Political	7877	3825	502	609	952	1762	2548
Other	1629	1777	61	448	742	526	804
Total	27178	18171	2541	3203	4756	7671	9863
PHOENIX PROGRAM							
ELIMINATIONS a/		15776	2351	3727	3529	6169	3623c/
<u>ECONOMY b/</u>							
Exchange Rate							
Piaster/\$ US Green	167	200	165	174	203	200	194
Piaster/\$ US Gold	218	284	235	258	280	284	276
Piaster/\$ US MPC	121	155	122	116	135	155	153
Aid Retail Price Index							
(Saigon)	305	408	323	350	409	408	401
SVN Money Supply							
(Piasters-Billion)	82.7	122.9	99.2	112.0	126.1	122.9	N/A

Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

a/ Chieu Hoi and Phoenix figures are totals; others are end of period.

b/ Source: USAID.

c/ Figures for January and February only. Beginning in Feb 1969 new criteria were applied which substantially reduced the type of personnel that could be considered as belonging to the infrastructure.

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TRENDS IN VIETNAM: SECOND QUARTER 1969

Summary

Second quarter 1969, before the lull started in late June, was highlighted by a shift in enemy operations away from sustained offensives to smaller scale actions peaking in a series of highpoints. The enemy raised his activities (except for large attacks) to the level of the May offensive a year ago and suffered similar KIA. RVNAF KIA increased but US KIA remained at first quarter 1969 levels. This could indicate that US forces were better able to cope with the enemy, or that the enemy is in turn targeting GVN forces. Population security continued to improve but the economic stability of the past nine months was upset as prices rose 10%. The attached tables present key statistics about the war during second quarter 1969 with 1967 and 1968 figures for comparison. They show that:

1. Casualties: In second quarter 1969, US combat deaths equalled those in first quarter 1969. Free World Forces combat deaths declined 13% but RVNAF KIA (based on adjusted preliminary figures) increased nearly 20%. Since enemy attacks increased, this may foreshadow a shift in enemy targeting of GVN forces. On the other hand, VC/NVA combat deaths increased by 9% and exceeded those reported in second quarter 1968 and first quarter 1969. Friendly combat deaths were about 62% above the 1967 rate and only 6% below the 1968 rate. The enemy/friendly kill ratio remained at the first quarter 1969 level at 5.2 to 1. (Table 1)

2. VC/NVA Activities: VC/NVA attacks increased by 25% over the first quarter 1969 to a level nearly equal to the second quarter of 1968 (May offensive). However, battalion size attacks remained at less than half the level of a year ago. Although ground assaults and ambushes again increased more than attacks by fire, most were of a fairly low intensity as the enemy moved to a strategy of recurring highpoints rather than sustained, large scale offensive operations. Incidents of harassment and terrorism reached their highest levels of the 1968-69 period in the second quarter 1969, confirming the enemy's shift to smaller scale tactics and return to guerrilla operations. (Table 2)

3. Air Sorties and Losses: Aircraft attack sorties in Laos decreased by 9% in second quarter 1969 compared to 1st quarter 1969 as the rainy season began although almost 3 times as many sorties were flown in 2nd quarter 1969 as 2nd quarter 1968. Attack sorties in South Vietnam increased slightly. Fighter/attack aircraft losses in second quarter 1969 decreased 43% from 1st quarter 1969 to the lowest level for any 1968-69 quarter. The decrease was fairly evenly distributed among losses from attack sorties, other combat sorties, operational problems, and destruction on the ground. Comparing the 2nd quarter all-service, all-aircraft type attack loss rate (losses per 1000 attack sorties) with first quarter 1969, we find that losses remained at zero over NVN, decreased from .81 to .59 over Laos, and decreased sharply from .56 to .28 over SVN. The SVN rate is unusually low. Total Army and Marine helicopter losses increased to the highest level of the 1968-69 period.

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However, helicopter losses to hostile causes were still 9% below the Tet 1968 levels. (Table 3)

4. Forces: End of June 1969 figures show that US and Third Nation troop strength has remained constant while RVNAF increased by over 36,000 men compared to end March 1969 (bringing the RVNAF strength increase for 1969 to over 60,000 men). RVNAF net desertions increased by 10% over 1st quarter 1969 figures, but are running far below last year's level - especially when the increased size of RVNAF is taken into account. However, RVNAF desertions still amount to the equivalent of a division a month. According to the CINCPAC estimate, for the past two quarters, enemy main and local force troop strength has remained at approximately the same levels with minor fluctuations. (Table 4)

5. Pacification: Overall Hamlet Evaluation System ratings reflect continued population gains for the GVN in 2nd quarter 1969. June reports show 85.6% of the population as relatively secure compared with 82% in March and 76% in December. Pacification progress continued, despite the high level of enemy activity although as in first quarter 1969, VC/NVA forces did not seem to target the pacification program in most areas. In the Chieu Hoi program the rallier rate increased 15% over the already high 1st quarter 1969 figures. More ralliers have come in during the first six months of 1969 than in all of 1968, but many of them are porters and other civilians impressed by the enemy, and might equally well be counted as refugees. Field reports indicate that the Phoenix program is lagging behind other pacification efforts although current statistics are not available in Washington to confirm this. (Table 5)

6. Economic: The economic stability of the last 9 months eroded in the second quarter. The Saigon retail price index increased about 10% during the quarter and the piaster depreciated about 4% against the dollar, gold, and MPC. The money supply remained constant. (Table 5)

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TABLE 1

CASUALTIES

	Total 1967	Total 1968	1968				1969	
			1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr
<u>KILLED</u>								
Allied: US	9,378	14,592	4,869	4,725	2,946	2,052	3,184	3,156
SVN	12,716	24,323	9,424	6,241	5,147	3,511	5,043	6,000 ^{a/}
FWF	1,105	979	346	262	196	175	251	219
Total	23,199	39,894	14,639	11,228	8,289	5,738	8,498	9,375
VC/NVA	88,104	181,149	72,455	46,620	34,674	27,400	44,797	48,807
<u>KILL RATIO (VC/NVA to Allied)</u>	3.8	4.5	4.9	4.2	4.2	4.8	5.3	5.2

Source: OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary

a/ Preliminary RVNAF KIA figures for May and June have been increased 50% based on the average increase of final verified RVNAF KIA data over preliminary operational data for 1968.

TABLE 2

VC/NVA ACTIVITIES

	Total 1967	Total 1968	1968				1969	
			1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr
<u>Attacks</u>								
By Size: ^{a/}								
Bn. Size		54	64	33	27	2	15	14
Other	2,422	3,795	1,473	1,234	567	521	970	1,215
Total	2,476	3,921	1,537	1,267	594	523	985	1,229
By type: ^{b/}								
Ground Assaults	1,482	1,341	635	346	198	162	371	489
Attacks by fire	1,003	2,376	857	786	374	359	640	732
<u>Incidents:^{a/}</u>								
Harassment	19,231	18,233	5,489	5,674	3,671	3,399	4,627	5,866
Terror	1,963	1,047	341	249	218	239	315	385
Sabotage	1,443	1,609	864	566	133	46	62	43
Propaganda	801	102	68	24	4	6	19	5
Anti-aircraft fire	13,290	13,078	4,268	3,534	2,544	2,732	3,407	3,491
<u>Total Attacks & Incidents</u>	39,204	37,990	12,567	11,314	7,164	6,945	9,415	11,019

a/ Source: OASD SEA Statistical Summary.

b/ Source: DIA - figures are approximate only.

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TABLE 3

AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AND LOSSES

	Total 1967	Total 1968	1968				1969	
			1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr
<u>Fighter and Attack Aircraft a/</u>								
OPERATION								
Attack Sorties								
NVN	105,699	92,230	14,745	27,372	37,872	12,241	59	177
Laos	44,445	75,120	21,279	12,831	8,355	32,655	39,246	35,741
SVN	194,658	222,899	54,192	61,593	57,762	49,352	48,613	52,891
Total	344,802	390,249	90,216	101,796	103,989	94,248	87,918	88,809
Non-Attack Sorties	51,666	51,002	14,889	12,111	12,209	11,793	11,358	11,887
Total Combat Sorties	396,468	441,251	105,105	113,907	116,198	106,041	99,276	100,696
LOSSES								
On Attack Sorties								
NVN	254	102	30	29	34	9	0	0
Laos	31	46	18	9	4	15	32	21
SVN	76	108	25	33	34	16	27	15
Total attack	361	256	73	71	72	40	59	36
On Other Combat Sorties	47	34	10	9	10	5	9	4
Operational and D.O.G. b/	136	123	39	29	35	20	28	15
Total Losses	544	413	122	109	117	65	96	55
Helicopter c/								
To hostile causes	273	522	193	135	99	95	121	176
To operational causes	374	439	107	116	105	111	106	134
Total losses	647	961	300	251	204	206	227	310

Source: OSD Comptroller Statistical Summary.

a/ Excludes B-52, AC-47, AC-130, AC-119.

b/ Destroyed on ground by hostile attack.

c/ USA and USMC only.

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TABLE 4
FRIENDLY AND ENEMY FORCE STRENGTHS AND RVNAF DESERTIONS

	Dec	Dec	1968				1969	
	1967	1968	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr
FRIENDLY STRENGTH								
US Military in SEA (000)								
SVN	485.6	536.1	515.2	534.7	537.8	536.1	538.2	538.9P
Thailand	44.5	47.6	46.0	47.7	48.1	47.6	49.5	47.8P
Total	530.1	583.7	561.2	582.4	585.9	583.7	587.7	586.7P
Third Nation Forces (000)	59.4	65.6	61.0	62.4	66.0	65.6	72.0	71.6P
RVNAF (000)	643.1	819.2	677.6	765.3	816.0	819.2	844.6	881.1
Total Friendly Military Forces (In SVN Only)	1188.1	1468.5	1253.8	1362.4	1419.8	1420.9	1454.8	1491.6P
RVNAF DESERTIONS AND INPUTS								
Gross Desertions	81,797	139,970	27,903	33,485	39,275	39,307	28,382	31,823P
Deserters Returned	4,083	23,606	12,600	5,488	2,752	2,766	2,748	3,816P
Net Desertions	77,714	116,364	15,303	27,997	36,523	36,541	25,634	28,007P
Volunteers	115,769	214,666	38,534	88,329	64,162	23,641	40,067	48,624P
Conscripts	48,545	199,145	17,834	28,418	26,231	26,662	19,224	20,981P
Total Inputs	164,314	313,811	56,368	116,747	90,393	50,303	59,291	69,605P
ENEMY FORCE STRENGTH (000)								
<u>Combat Troops:</u>								
NVA North of DMZ		28			(130)	28	45	35
Other NVA a/		87				87	76	79
VC b/		37			32	37	41	41
Total		152			162	152	162	155
<u>Support & Administration</u>								
VC Guerrillas		59			71	59	55	50
VC Administration		36			35	36	38	37
NVA Administration		6			-	6	17	20
Total		101			106	101	110	107
Total Enemy Strength c/		253			268	253	272	262

a/ Includes NVA troops serving in VC units.
b/ Does not include NVA troops serving in VC units.
c/ CINCPAC data not available prior to September 1968.
Source: CSD Comptroller SEA Statistical Summary.
CINCPAC Monthly Estimate of Enemy Strength in the RVN area.
P - Indicates preliminary figure.

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TABLE 5

PACIFICATION AND SVN ECONOMY

	1967	1968	1968				1969	2nd
			1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr		
PACIFICATION								
Population (000)								
Secure	11515	13339	10471	10969	11671	13339	14137	14826
Contested	2823	1983	3554	3368	2878	1983	1345	1295
VC	2861	2155	3136	3005	2933	2155	1741	1190
Total	17209	17477	17161	17342	17482	17477	17223	17311
Percentage (%)								
Secure	66.9	76.3	61.0	63.3	66.8	76.3	82.1	85.6
Contested	16.5	11.4	20.7	19.4	16.4	11.4	7.8	7.5
VC	16.6	12.3	18.3	17.3	16.8	12.3	10.1	6.9
CHIEU HOI a/								
Military	17672	12569	1978	2146	3062	5383	6511	7233
Political	7877	3825	502	609	952	1762	2548	2783
Other	1629	1777	61	448	742	526	804	1279
Total	27178	18171	2541	3203	4756	7671	9863	11295
PHOENIX PROGRAM								
ELIMINATIONS a/		15776	2351	3727	3529	6169	4005 c/	1795 d/
ECONOMY b/								
Exchange Rate								
Piaster/\$ US Green	167	200	165	174	203	200	194	202
Piaster/\$ US Gold	218	284	235	258	280	284	276	287
Piaster/\$ US MPC	121	155	122	116	135	155	153	161
Aid Retail Price Index (Saigon)	305	408	323	350	409	408	401	440
SVN Money Supply (Piasters-Billion)	82.6	124.0	100.3	113.3	122.4	124.0	132.0	130.9

Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary .

a/ Chieu Hoi and Phoenix figures are totals; others are end of period.

b/ Source: USAID.

c/ Beginning in February 1968 new criteria were applied which substantially reduced the type of personnel that could be considered as belonging to the infrastructure.

d/ April data only.

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THE CURRENT LULL IN COMBAT

The current lull in combat in South Vietnam may be significant, but it is not unusual. It is right on last year's schedule and comparable in magnitude. Considerably more significant is the data on NVA infiltration and on enemy weapons caches which indicate that the enemy may be planning a major change from past patterns of activity.

Enemy activity rates declined significantly during the last week in June (ending 28 June), and preliminary follow-on reports indicate that enemy activity remains low. Table 1 shows that exactly the same thing happened last year--starting in the same week. The 1968 summer lull lasted until the August offensive, which was, in turn, followed by low activity rates during the 4th quarter of 1968.

The lull in enemy activities is not as low as last year's lull. The weekly average of 38 attacks for the past 4 weeks (ending 19 July) is based on preliminary figures, which are likely to rise somewhat as final verified reports come in. By comparison, attacks for the same period last year dropped to weekly average of 30, based on final, verified statistics. Moreover, no single week in the current lull has approached the low of 17 attacks in the week ending 13 July last year; the current range is 30-48 attacks per week. The current attack rate is comparable to the one in 4th quarter 1968, when attacks averaged 40 per week throughout the quarter, and dropped to as low as 24 per week. Finally, harassment, sabotage and terror incidents are running 43% (469 vs. 328 per week) above the 1968 rate for the same four weeks.

In terms of US combat deaths, this year's lull is identical to the 1968 lull so far. US combat deaths for the past four weeks are almost exactly the same (averaging 181 per week this year compared to 183 per week last year). The announced US combat death figures in Table 2 indicate that the lull started one week later this year (week ending July 5), with the same 37% drop in US combat deaths that started the lull last year. However, the preliminary figures shown in Table 2 indicate that this year's lull in US combat deaths actually started in precisely the same week as last year, with a 40% decline occurring in both years. The preliminary figures are more reliable for following weekly changes, because about 50% of the announced US combat deaths for any given week actually occurred in preceding weeks. ^{1/} Thus, the announced figures in effect are a moving average and are not reliable for tracking from one specific week to the next.

^{1/} The weekly figure represents all US KIA reported that week, not necessarily those actually killed that week. The difference is caused by normal delays in reporting and by deaths which occur several days or weeks after the wound was received. Thus, the weekly combat death report is much like a moving average which tends to smooth or shift short term fluctuations.

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TABLE 1

ENEMY INCIDENTS BY WEEK
(Week Ending)

	<u>5/24</u>	<u>5/31</u>	<u>6/7</u>	<u>6/14</u>	<u>6/21</u>	<u>6/28</u>	<u>7/5</u>	<u>7/12</u>	<u>7/19</u>
<u>1969</u>									
Total Attacks ^{b/}	137	73	132	119	135	48	36	39 ^{a/}	30 ^{a/}
Harassment/Terror/Sabotage	356	546	538	495	501	414	441	501	521
Total	493	619	670	614	636	462	477	540	551
<u>1968</u>									
Total Attacks ^{b/}	114	93	51	56	57	37	39	17	27
Harassment/Terror/Sabotage	512	961	238	354	552	287	362	327	334
Total	626	1054	289	410	609	324	401	344	361

Source: DIA

a/ Preliminary figure which could rise 25% to 100% higher, based on past experience with final data. Total attacks include ground attacks, ambushes, and attacks by fire.

b/ Total attack figures do not agree with those in OSD SEA Statistical Summary, which enters them in the table by date of report; DIA enters them by the date on which the incident occurred.

TABLE 2

US COMBAT DEATHS
(Week Ending)

	<u>5/24</u>	<u>5/31</u>	<u>6/7</u>	<u>6/14</u>	<u>6/21</u>	<u>6/28</u>	<u>7/5</u>	<u>7/12</u>	<u>7/19</u>	<u>7/26</u>
<u>Announced Figures^{a/}</u>										
1968 ^{b/}	426	438	380	324	299	187	198	188	157	193
1969	265	261	252	335	247	241	153	148	182	
<u>Preliminary Figures^{c/}</u>										
1968 ^{b/}	282	334	252	193	172	103	150	101	98	140
1969	202	157	241	232	19C	113	100	95	118	

a/ Source: OASD(C) Southeast Asia Statistical Summary. (See footnote 1 in text for explanation of difference from NMCS figures.)

b/ Comparable 1968 weeks, as shown in Table 1.

c/ Source: NMCS Operational Summaries, which account for about 70% of all US combat deaths eventually reported.

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Infiltration of men and material through Laos is reported lower in recent months. Although the rainy season usually results in a slowdown of enemy supply activity, this year's drop is sharper than in previous years. Sensor detections show June truck traffic was only 10% of the average levels during the first quarter of 1969. Data for sensor detected truck traffic in June 1968 is not available, but June 1969 truck sightings in the Laos panhandle can be compared to previous years' data. Table 3 indicates truck sightings normally decline in June, but the 1969 decline is much greater than last year's and almost as great as the 1967 decline.

TABLE 3

TRUCK SIGHTINGS IN LAOS PANHANDLE
(Monthly Average)

	<u>Jan-Mar</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Decrease %</u>
1967	874	157	-82
1968	5,920	2,434	-59
1969	9,805	1,753	-82

Source: DIA

An even more dramatic drop is noted in infiltration of manpower. Arrivals in the first six months of 1969 totaled approximately 80-88,000 men (compared to 150,000 in the first half of 1968). Although no new infiltration groups have been noted in the pipeline since May, the North Vietnamese have apparently delayed the arrival of some groups already in transit. Even so, the number of men in the pipeline scheduled for arrival in South Vietnam in August and September is very small. In the past the enemy has tried to time infiltration to replace the bulk of his losses during the month in which they occurred, and since infiltration takes 2-3 months to complete, it does not now appear that the enemy plans to replace all his losses (even at lull rates) in July, August, or September.

The number of caches and tons of material uncovered in Vietnam during June was the lowest monthly total this year, according to preliminary reports. Only 24 caches, containing 150 tons of material, were discovered. These figures are much lower than the 1969 averages of 160 caches and 800 tons per month, and show a dramatic contrast to first quarter 1969 figures (Table 4). Only 11 tons of ammunition were uncovered in June against a monthly average of 307 tons in the first quarter of the year. The VC/NVA forces must position supplies in advance to fight sustained large scale actions, so the decline in cache discoveries could mean that the enemy intends to limit his large scale activities.

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TABLE 4

ENEMY CACHES DISCOVERED - 1969
(Monthly Average)

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>June</u>
Number of Caches	282	41	24
<u>Tons</u>			
Food	893	200	106
Ammunition	307	88	11
Weapons & Equipment	48	59	31
Total	<u>1248</u>	<u>347</u>	<u>148</u>

Finally, the formation of the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) by the communists represents a new departure. The enemy actually seems to intend to make use of this as a governing apparatus, as evidenced by the appointment of hardline communists (not fellow travellers or neutralists) to the key positions and the reported dispatch of a 100 man group of civil servants southward from Hanoi. The PRG would fit naturally into any strategy which emphasized political rather than military efforts such as some type of coalition government or a cease fire proposal. Recent enemy moves, such as assigning NVA main force units tasks formerly performed by local force units and issuing directives to low level cadre and supporters to renew the political struggle, may indicate that more intensive political action is underway in coordination with a sustained, but lower, level of conflict for the rest of the year.

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INDICATORS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY LEVEL IN VIETNAM

The following indicators are derived from the major sources of data we have on enemy activity. Infiltration and VC/NVA forces reflect enemy replacements and strength changes; attacks and terror indicate the intensity of his effort; U.S. casualties, attacks on population centers and DZ incidents indicate his targets; and population security shows the result of enemy versus friendly activity in the struggle for control of population.

Infiltration, U.S. casualties, attacks and terror all show seasonal patterns with high points early in the year and falling off in the latter half. Since these indicators have generally risen sharply in the first quarter of each of the past three years (1967-1969), it is very likely we will see this pattern repeated in first quarter 1970.

NVA Infiltration

North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam is tied to the weather cycle in North Vietnam and Laos and to enemy operations in South Vietnam. Since conditions for travel are relatively good from November through April, the enemy normally dispatches the bulk of his infiltrators southward during these months. The enemy usually coordinates infiltration with his operations so that the bulk of his losses are replaced during or shortly after the month in which he suffers them. Hence in 1968, the enemy made a special effort to maintain heavy infiltration through June, July and August, despite the North Vietnamese unfavorable weather, in support of his general offensive in SVN.

Infiltration groups take one to five months to move from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. The period of maximum infiltration into SVN has always occurred in the first or second quarter (Table). About 54% to 75% of total NVA infiltration occurs in the first half of any given year; the period of lowest infiltration has always been the last quarter.

There is an appreciable jump in the number of infiltrators between the fourth quarter on one calendar year and the first or second quarter the next. Collateral data show this jump has ranged from 95% to over 300%. All source data for 1968-69 records a 128% jump between fourth quarter 1968 and second quarter 1969.

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TABLE 1

NVN INFILTRATION ARRIVALS IN SVN
(Monthly Average in Thousands)

	<u>Year</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Half</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Half</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>3rd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>Qtr</u>
<u>MACV Adjusted Collateral^{a/}</u>							
	1966	7.6	10.1	5.2	12.5	7.7	6.1
	1967	8.4	9.0	7.7	8.4	9.6	8.5
	1968	12.3	18.5	6.2	19.9	17.1	9.5
	1969	6.3 ^{b/}	8.0	-	6.1	9.8	3.0
<u>CINCPAC (All Source)</u>							
	1968	20.5 ^{b/}	26.0	15.0	23.6	28.4	22.1
	1969	10.6 ^{b/}	14.3	-	10.6	17.8	3.9

Source: MACV and CINCPAC.

a/ This is MACV data adjusted by Systems Analysis to more accurately reflect expected final levels of infiltration.

b/ Based on nine months data.

It is too early yet to attempt to ascertain what level infiltration will reach in fourth quarter 1969. The all source figures are the most reliable, and CINCPAC reports that only 600 infiltrators entered South Vietnam in October. This would accord with past experience of the fourth quarter being the period of lowest infiltration. However, there is good reason to believe that the 1969 levels of infiltration was unusually low because the enemy was reorganizing its forces; the VC/NVA avoided combat in July, most of September and October.

After the low fourth quarter this year, we expect infiltration to rise in early 1970 because: (1) infiltration is traditionally high in the first and second quarters, (2) conditions for travel are good, and (3) the enemy must replace the losses he has experienced and make up for recruitment problems in South Vietnam. If NVA arrivals in South Vietnam average 2-3,000 men per month over the fourth quarter 1969, past patterns would imply a monthly average of 6-10,000 arrivals in first and second quarters 1970.

US Combat Deaths

The number of US combat deaths are probably the best measure of whether American forces are in a serious jeopardy; it also provides a good measure of enemy activity. Moreover, US combat death rates are probably the American public's best measure of the level of violence in South Vietnam, and thus significantly influence public support for Vietnamization. Finally, US combat deaths are reported more accurately than any other indicator we can use to judge enemy activity.

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Like enemy activity and infiltration, US combat deaths are normally highest during the early part of the year and lowest in the Fall. The table below shows average weekly casualties by quarter for the last three calendar years. The data for the final quarter of 1969 are based on October and the first half of November.

TABLE 2
Allied Combat Deaths in SVN
(Weekly Avg.)

	1966				1967				1968				1969			
	1qtr	2qtr	3qtr	4qtr	1qtr	2qtr	3qtr	4qtr	1qtr	2qtr	3qtr	4qtr	1qtr	2qtr	3qtr	4qtr ^{a/}
US	97	165	213	162	185	377	366	228	159	247	245	148	91			
3rd Nation	14	17	19	27	23	27	20	15	13	20	17	15	19			
RVNAF	212	240	250	220	276	730	484	359	272	391	390	287	227			
Total	323	422	482	409	484	1134	870	642	444	658	652	450	37			

^{a/} 10Oct-Nov 15.

The table indicates that very different judgments would result if we used recent U.S. casualty levels instead of data for the same period a year earlier to determine the significance of increased enemy activity. Many different base periods might be considered, including U.S. combat deaths during the six month period prior to the President's speech (about 175 per week) or a three month period (about 125 per week).

Regardless of the base period used, some variations in casualty levels must be anticipated, and higher casualty rates must be viewed in proper perspective by tying them to the enemy's normal activity cycle. In the past three years, for example, U.S. combat deaths rose sharply in the first quarter of each year (70%, 103%, and 55% over the preceding quarter, respectively). U.S. deaths have been following the 1968 quarterly patterns this year. If past patterns persist into 1970, U.S. KIA might rise at least 50% (to 135-160 per week) during 1st quarter 1970. This would bring them up to the levels encountered during the "lull" last summer. Hopefully, the increase in casualties will be less since about 20% fewer U.S. combat troops will be exposed this year and they will be concentrating on Vietnamization instead of combat sweeps. Any increase in U.S. casualties is a matter of serious concern, but it would be difficult to construe a 50% rise in U.S. KIA as a sign of significant enemy escalation, in view of past patterns. A larger increase, if accompanied by significant increased infiltration, enemy attacks, total allied casualties, and other indicators, might be a sign of significant enemy escalation.

Enemy Attacks

Enemy attacks fall into two major categories: attacks by fire and assaults. Assaults are further broken down into battalion size and small scale attacks. There is a significant difference between attacks by fire and assaults since the former involves few men and small risk. Twenty rounds or more of mortar fire, for example, constitutes an attack by fire. Assaults are more serious, considering the size of the forces involved and the larger number of casualties usually resulting, particularly for the enemy.

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TABLE 3

	ENEMY ATTACKS (Monthly Avg)												
	1966 4Qtr	1967 1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1968 1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1969 1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr ^a
Attacks by fire	6	33	71	101	130	287	268	121	122	211	249	134	136
Assaults Bn Size	1	3	4	4	6	16	10	8	1	3	5	0	0
Small Scale	99	123	173	118	147	211	106	57	53	120	160	108	134
Total	100	126	177	122	153	227	116	65	54	123	165	108	134
Total Attacks	106	159	178	233	283	514	384	186	176	334	414	242	270

a/ 1 October - 8 November.

Source: 1966-67 Statistical Summary and VCIIA; 1968-69 DIA.

Total enemy attacks in both 1968 and 1969 show roughly the same seasonal pattern as casualties. In both years, the 1st and 2nd quarter attack rates are higher than those during the last half of the year. Moreover, attacks increased 80-90% in the first quarters of both years. Attacks by fire follow the pattern more closely than ground assault rates, which have reverted to the 1967 pattern of fairly sustained action throughout each quarter of the year.

The increased number of small ground attacks since June 1969 (twice the 1968 levels) may reflect a shift away from large scale ground attacks; no battalion size attacks were reported between mid-June and early November. This is a departure from the 1968 pattern where 10 such attacks occurred in August and 10 in September. This could be interpreted several ways: (1) enemy response to our withdrawal, (2) a change in tactics to small scale attacks, or (3) a long rest and recuperation period in preparation for a winter offensive. Renewed large scale attacks on a sustained basis could signal a significant change and should be watched carefully.

In summary, in 1st quarter 1970 we can expect an increase of 58% to 90% in total enemy attacks, if past patterns of action repeat themselves; some battalion sized attacks are also likely. If the increase in attacks does not occur, it could be a significant sign that the enemy has changed his strategy.

Terror

Terror is the weapon of the local VC forces and guerrillas rather than main force or NVA units. However, the general pattern of assassinations and abductions follows that of all enemy incidents -- a high number of Vietnamese killed or kidnapped in the first half of the year, particularly in connection with the Tet offensives, followed by lower levels in the second half of the year, as shown by the table.

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TABLE 4

Terror Victims
(Monthly Average)

	<u>1967</u> <u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1968</u> <u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>
Assassinated	538	706	769	519	413	644	562	462
Abducted	1050	1669	955	776	856	1073	440	315
Total	1588	2375	1724	1295	1269	1717	1002	777

If previous patterns persist, we can expect an increase in the level of terrorist incidents in early 1970 after low rates in the fourth quarter 1969. However, rising terrorist incidents could also reflect changing enemy strategy. The enemy signalled the start of a guerrilla war campaign by stepping up terrorist activity in the late 50's and early 60's. When the US entered the war, the enemy shifted to more conventional tactics. There are some indications the enemy is shifting back to a protracted war strategy. Consequently, a significant rising trend in terrorism (above first quarter 1969 levels, for example) over six months to one year, with continuing low levels of conventional activity, may indicate a reversion to guerrilla warfare tactics aimed at controlling the rural population. This type of warfare might be more easily managed by the South Vietnamese than U.S. troops particularly as the RF/PF and the National Police are strengthened.

An increase of 35% in assassinations and abductions during first quarter 1970 would not be surprising, in view of similar increases in the past.

Attacks on Population Centers

Except for a rise in the first quarter of 1969, attacks on population centers have declined steadily since their peak in the first quarter of 1968, when many cities were struck during the Tet offensive. We might expect an increase in the first quarter of 1970, following the pattern of previous years. If this is similar to last year, the increase will be 35-40% for a monthly average of 26-27.

TABLE 5
Attacks on Population Centers
(Monthly Average)

<u>1968</u> <u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u> ^{a/}
98	80	47	42	57	45	31	19

a/ October - 8 November.

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DMZ Incidents

Incidents occurring in the DMZ area do not appear to follow a seasonal pattern. Attacks by fire on allied personnel increased sharply (160%) in the first quarter of 1969, and current rates are so low that some increase would not be surprising. Firing on aircraft has declined steadily since November and December of 1968 and is probably not an important indicator, anyway.

DMZ incident totals also include sightings of enemy personnel and equipment. These data show no clear trends, and are probably not very useful as an indicator of intensified enemy offensive activity.

TABLE 6

DMZ Incidents (Monthly Average)

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>			
	<u>Nov-Dec</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
<u>Attacks by Fire from DMZ:</u>					
On Allied Personnel	8	21	5	5	1
On Allied Aircraft	<u>43</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>
Subtotal	<u>51</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>6</u>
<u>Sightings:</u>					
Personnel	335	385	345	645	291
Other	<u>372</u>	<u>301</u>	<u>360</u>	<u>365</u>	<u>281</u>
Subtotal	<u>707</u>	<u>686</u>	<u>705</u>	<u>1010</u>	<u>572</u>

Source: COMUSMACV Pinnacle Messages, compiled by JCS-J3-CAG.

Despite the erratic pattern of this data, we expect some increase in DMZ activity in early 1970 in conjunction with a general countrywide increase. However, a sharp increase in attacks by fire in the DMZ could be a bad sign.

VC/NVA Order of Battle

There is no particular pattern in the VC/NVA order of battle (Table 7). The low point of enemy strength has repeatedly occurred in the first, third or fourth quarters of previous years. High points of strength have occurred in the first, second, and third quarter. However, enemy strength has surged upwards during times of high activity. Part of the problem is undoubtedly caused by the softness of the data. The current situation is better displayed through all source numbers but there is no time series for these as yet. However, the collateral numbers exhibit a clearly declining trend since second quarter 1968.

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TABLE 7

VC/NVA Order of Battle (000)
(End of Period)

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
1966	259.2	273.8	290.0	227.1
1967	224.5	273.8	238.7	260.9
1968	265.7	269.9	253.4	253.7
1969	252.7	241.1	239.2	--

Source: MACV collateral order of battle computed total.

Population Security

The 1968 Tet offensive seriously affected population security scores of the Hamlet Evaluation System in the first half of 1968. Since then, there has been a steady upward climb in the number and percent of population with relatively secure ratings and a comparable decline in population rated D-E or VC.

TABLE 8
POPULATION SECURITY
(Mo. Avg - %)

	<u>1967</u>				<u>1968</u>				<u>1969</u>				
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>Est.</u>	
A + B	27.3	28.5	29.8	28.9	21.1	19.4	20.9	27.7	34.2	38.6	49.7	57.1	
A + B + C	66.3	67.5	68.2	68.2	62.2	62.2	64.9	73.1	80.5	84.2	89.3	92.5	
D + E + VC	33.7	32.5	31.8	31.8	37.8	37.8	35.1	26.9	19.5	15.8	10.7	7.5	

Since the A-B-C population is approaching 100% we can expect a flattening out of the general upward trend. Any future increases will be marginal as much of the remaining VC population is in remote areas. In addition, as the US withdraws, the role of the South Vietnamese RVNAF will shift to more combat activity and, therefore, less emphasis will be placed on the population security mission. Thus, unless there is a sharp drop in population security we should not interpret a leveling off of the trend as a significant change for the worse.

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INDICATORS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY LEVELS IN VIETNAM

Summary. For the past 4 weeks, (through 24 January) US and RVNAP KIA, enemy terror, attacks on population centers, DMZ attacks by fire, and enemy attacks as a whole have been below the weekly averages for the 1st quarter of last year and for March 1969, which represents the peak of the post-Tet 1969 offensive.

The enemy activity level indicators shown in the accompanying graph and tables are derived from the major sources of data we have on enemy activity. Infiltration and VC/NVA forces reflect enemy replacements and strength changes; attacks and terror indicate the intensity of his effort; US casualties, attacks on population centers and DMZ incidents indicate his targets; and population security shows the result of enemy versus friendly activity in the struggle for control of population.

As we indicated last month, infiltration, US casualties, attacks and terror all show seasonal patterns with high points early in the year falling off in the latter half. Since these indicators have generally risen sharply in the first quarter of each of the past three years (1967-1969), it is very likely we will see this pattern repeated in first quarter 1970.

The graphs on the next page compare this year's US combat deaths, total enemy attacks, and infiltration with last year's levels. US KIA and infiltration through December 1969 were running well below the previous year. Until January of this year enemy attacks were running well above last year's levels. Most have been small ground attacks or attacks by indirect fire.




Table 1 is designed to aid in judging every week how current enemy activity compares with the first quarter of last year and with the peak of the post Tet offensive in March 1969. To avoid misleading conclusions that might result from comparing a single current week with the entire first quarter or March of last year, we have developed a moving average of the past 4 weeks as the standard for comparison. Figures for the most recent week are also shown.

Using the 4 week moving average as a basis for comparison, Table 1 indicates that all of the indicators in the table are currently below last year's levels. The overall enemy attack levels, however, are comparable to the weekly average for 1st quarter 1969.

Table 2 shows the population security figures for the past two years, and indicates steady progress through the end of 1969.

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TABLE 1
INDICATORS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY LEVEL IN SVN
(Weekly Average)

	Last Year		This Year	
	1 Qtr	Mar ^{a/}	Past 4 Weeks (28 Dec--24 Jan)	Past Week (18-24 Jan)
<u>US/RVNAF KIA</u>				
US	245	297	81	75
RVNAF (Paramil not incl)	383	407	286 ^{b/}	237 ^{b/}
Total	633	704	367	312
<u>Attacks</u>				
Bn size	1.2	1.6	1	1
Small scale	75	102	71	76
Total	76	104	72	77
<u>Attacks on Pop. Centers</u>	13	18	5	2
<u>Terrorism</u>				
Assassinations	149	200	60	58
Abductions	248	275	57	88
<u>DMZ--Attacks by Fire</u> (Not including AA Fire)	2	4	.5	2

^{a/} March was the peak month of the 1969 post-Tet offensive for all indicators except RVNAF KIA and abductions which were higher in May and January respectively.

^{b/} Preliminary reports, increased 43% to put them on a par with the verified, 1969 data which was 43% higher than 1969 preliminary data.

TABLE 2
OTHER INDICATORS
(Monthly Average)

	1968				1969			
	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr
<u>Infiltration (000)</u> Monthly Average	24.3	27.9	22.3	7.6	10.1	17.6	5.3	1.7 ^{a/}
<u>Population Security (%)</u> (As of End of Qtr)								
A-B-C	59.8	63.1	65.6	76.4	81.3	85.5	90.8	93.3
A-B	17.9	20.2	21.0	30.8	36.1	40.6	53.6	57.4
VSSG Control Indicator ^{b/}	14.1	16.2	18.3	27.6	33.4	40.1	54.7	NA

^{a/} Arrivals. Data for 1969 are those generally agreed upon by DIA, CINCPAC, and MACV intelligence analysts. The data may change significantly as additional intelligence becomes available.

^{b/} Percent of rural population rated "GVN Controlled" according to criteria devised by the Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) Countryside Panel.

CONFIDENTIAL

153

CONFIDENTIAL

COMPARISON C ENEMY ACTIVITY LEVELS WITH PRIOR YEARS

Summary. For the past few weeks we have been experiencing some of this year's highest enemy activity rates. However, enemy activity so far in 1970 is generally well below that for the comparable periods in 1968 and 1969. This indicates our long term efforts to wind down the war are succeeding. The recent high points (March 31-April 2 and May 2-9) were part of the current enemy spring offensive. These high points were not unusually intense or sustained when compared with earlier peaks of enemy activity. Moreover, activity during the first six weeks of the spring offensive was less intense than during most similar periods in 1968 and 1969. If past patterns hold, we may see a lull in casualties and enemy action in July and early August followed by a high point in mid-August. Enemy terrorism has been increasing in recent weeks, though the number of terrorist victims remains below the same periods in previous years.

Spring Offensive and High Points

With a few exceptions, the intensity of enemy activity during the first six weeks of the Spring 1970 offensive was below previous periods of offensive activity (each considered to have lasted six weeks). Table 1 indicates:

- There were far fewer combat deaths for US and 3rd nation troops than in previous peak periods. US combat deaths were less than half of previous levels.
- There were fewer enemy deaths.
- RVNAF deaths exceeded all but the Tet 1968 offensive, but the higher casualty rate reflects increasing RVNAF participation in combat plus a 12% increase in force strength since last year. VC/NVA incident data do not indicate the enemy is targeting RVNAF forces more frequently than before.
- The enemy continues to suffer 4 to 5 times the level of combat deaths suffered by our side.
- Although the August 1968 and Post-Tet 1969 offensives had fewer total attacks, this year had the fewest large scale attacks and the lowest expenditures of ordnance.

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TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF ENEMY OFFENSIVES
(Weekly Average - each period is 6 weeks)

	1968			1969	1970
	Tet	May	Aug	Post-Tet	Apr-May a/
Combat Deaths					
Allied: US	504	420	273	322	128
RVNAF	973	595	518	441	627
3rd Nation	231	140	98	147	19
Total	1708	1155	889	910	774
Enemy	7616	4830	3766	4634	3563
Enemy/Friendly Kill Ratio	4.5	4.2	4.2	5.1	4.6
Enemy Attacks					
Ground: Battalion	5	3	3	1.5	1
Small	63	28	14	35	67
Attacks by Fire	84	84	35	70	46
Total	152	115	52	107	114
Number Rounds Fired	7427	6265	4200	4417	1914

a/ Through May 9.

High points of enemy activity are active periods of short duration (usually about three days), characterized by intensive activity such as small attacks and attacks by fire on selected targets (population centers, isolated centers, isolated outposts, etc.). They are designed to demonstrate enemy strength, boost VC/NVA morale and perhaps influence US public opinion.

High points have occurred during each of the enemy's seasonal campaigns. He seems to open each campaign with a high point, followed by a second one about four weeks later. In the first two or three weeks after the April high point, intelligence reports indicated we could expect another one in early May. It did in fact occur during the first ten days of May.

A comparison of the April high point with the four previous high points in 1969 (Table 2) indicates that:

- It was slightly more intense than most of them in terms of total attacks.
- It was highest of the four in terms of RVNAF combat deaths but less costly in terms of US deaths. South Vietnamese deaths were higher by 104 than the average of the previous four high points; US/FW deaths were lower by 80.
- More pacification targets were hit than in previous high points. This

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accords well with the efforts of the VC/NVA to counter the pacification program.

Data on enemy target priorities further emphasize his economy of force tactics during the April high point. In the three day period nearly half of enemy attacks were against pacification targets, a significantly higher proportion than in previous high points. In addition, most of the attacks against US military bases and installations were only attacks by fire while most attacks against pacification targets were ground attacks.

Various intelligence information indicates the enemy was satisfied with their "victories" in the April high point. However, the high point appears to have little or no military significance. The volume of incidents was high, but in general the intensity of the individual attacks was low. The impact of the attacks on the RVNAF ability to fight was, with few exceptions, almost negligible. The high point appears primarily to have been a political-psychological warfare action.

TABLE 2

ENEMY HIGH POINTS

	1969				1970
	<u>11-13 May</u>	<u>5-7 June</u>	<u>11-13 Aug</u>	<u>4-6 Sept</u>	<u>31Mar-2 Apr</u>
<u>Attacks</u>					
Battalion	0	1	0	0	1
Small Scale	69	45	60	43	76
By Fire	<u>91</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>64</u>
Total	<u>160</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>141</u>
<u>Targets of Attacks</u>					
Pop. Centers	22	15	13	5	16
ARVN	23	14	10	9	17
Pacification	55	34	43	28	72
US	56	40	33	23	35
Other	4	3	0	2	1
Total	<u>160</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>141</u>
<u>Casualties a/</u>					
US/3rd Nation	316	220	183	121	130
GVN	<u>351</u>	<u>267</u>	<u>284</u>	<u>267</u>	<u>396</u>
Total Friendly	<u>667</u>	<u>487</u>	<u>467</u>	<u>388</u>	<u>526</u>
Enemy	3995	3240	2767	1889	2480
KIA Ratio	6.0	6.7	5.9	4.9	4.7

Source: DIA

a/ Estimates obtained by factoring weekly data into days.

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The May high point differed from earlier high points in one very important respect: it was not well coordinated. It began on May 3 in II and IV Corps, on May 6 in Northern I Corps and on the 8th in Southern I Corps. Apparently no high point activity occurred in III CTZ. Because of its poor coordination, we do not have data which would compare exactly with earlier three day high points. However, Table 3 shows the data by week from March 22 through May 16, 1970. During the week of the May high point (ending May 9):

- Total US and RVNAF KIA exceeded the levels of the April high point. However, 44 US were killed in Cambodia that week. If we subtract them, US combat deaths in Vietnam (124) were about the same as in the April high point week (138).
- A few more small attacks were reported than during the April high point, but only two battalion sized attacks have been reported so far in May, compared to five in the April high point.
- Attacks against population centers were comparable to those in the April high point.
- In both instances, abductions were very high during the week prior to the high point. This is what usually happens, since the enemy needs the extra labor for his preparations.

TABLE 3

INDICATORS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY LEVEL IN SVN

	Weeks Ending:							
	<u>28 Mar</u>	<u>4 Apr^{c/}</u>	<u>11 Apr</u>	<u>18 Apr</u>	<u>25 Apr</u>	<u>2 May</u>	<u>9 May^{c/}</u>	<u>16 May</u>
<u>US/RVNAF KIA</u>								
US	79	138	141	101	94	123	168	217
RVNAF ^{a/}	232	848	586	458	292	553	1027	384
Total	<u>311</u>	<u>986</u>	<u>727</u>	<u>559</u>	<u>386</u>	<u>676</u>	<u>1195</u>	<u>601</u>
<u>Attacks ^{b/}</u>								
Bn Size	0	5	0	0	0	1	1	0
Small Scale	<u>31</u>	<u>116</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>124</u>
Total	<u>31</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>138</u>	<u>124</u>
<u>Attacks on</u>								
Pop. Centers	0	23	10	3	2	4	27	6
<u>Harassment/Terror</u>								
Sabotage	464	567	421	667	686	537	597	579
<u>Terror</u>								
Assassinations	111	66	383	185	165	97	99	456
Abductions	365	119	266	272	187	317	158	320

^{a/} Preliminary reports, increased 58% to put them on a par with the verified, last half 1969 data which was 58% higher than last half 1969 preliminary data.

^{b/} Attacks are by date reported, not by date of actual occurrence.

^{c/} High point weeks.

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Comparison with Prior Years

In assessing the tempo of current enemy actions, it is helpful to view them in the context of enemy activity levels in similar periods of previous years. A comparison of enemy activity in South Vietnam during the first four months of this year with the same periods in 1968 and 1969 shows that enemy activity this year is considerably less intense than in 1969 or 1968. The war appears to be winding down. Table 4 below indicates that:

- The number of large-scale attacks was half that of last year and only 13% of the 1968 total for the four month period.
- Small scale attacks were at about the same level as last year but well below the 1968 level.
- Attacks by fire and attacks against population centers were at the lowest levels in three years.
- The weekly average of US combat deaths was less than half of the 1969 average and 27% of the 1968 levels.
- The average number of enemy killed is about 30% lower than last year.
- The RVNAF weekly combat death rate is 4% higher than last year, but RVNAF strength has increased about 12% and RVNAF is much more active than in prior years. In terms of RVNAF combat deaths per 1000 troop strength, the RVNAF death rate was actually 20% lower than last year and 60% below the 1968 rate.

TABLE 4

	<u>ENEMY ACTIVITY</u> (Weekly Average)		
	January through April		
	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
<u>Incidents</u>			
Attacks:			
Bn Size	4.0	1.1	.5
Small	108	75	72
By Fire	61	47	34
On Pop. Centers	20	11	6
Harassment/Terror/Sabotage	520	417	443
<u>KIA</u>			
Combat Deaths:			
US	365	236	99
RVNAF	652	384	400
Enemy	4965	3465	2413
KIA/1000 Troop Strength:			
US	.7	.4	.2
RVNAF	1.0	.5	.4
Enemy	18.4	13.4	9.7

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While less intense this year, the pattern and timing of enemy activity has been quite similar to those in 1968 and 1969. This raises the question of what we might expect in future weeks.

If the past patterns hold in 1970, we can expect a lull beginning about the last week in June, lasting about 7 or 8 weeks, and ending with a high point in mid-August. An analysis of 1968 and 1969 statistics (Table 5) reveals that all activity and casualty indicators dropped sharply in both years during the lull period (drop of 50-70% for 1968 and 38-55% for 1969) followed by a high point in mid-August. Moreover, a detailed study of the weekly data shows that the timing of the changes was almost precisely the same both years.

TABLE 5

TEMPO OF ENEMY ACTIVITY (Weekly Average)

	<u>Active Period</u> (May-June) a/	<u>Lull</u> (July-Mid Aug.) b/	<u>Active Period</u> (Mid August) c/
<u>Attacks</u>			
<u>Bn Size</u>			
1968	3.4	.6	5.5
1969	1.3	0	0
<u>Small</u>			
1968	105	32	73
1969	104	47	87
<u>Combat Deaths</u>			
<u>US</u>			
1968	420	178	358
1969	272	153	217
<u>RVNAF</u>			
1968	376	188	463
1969	299	184	309
<u>Enemy</u>			
1968	4108	1552	4890
1969	3939	2435	3311

a/ April 28 - June 22, 1968 and April 27 - June 21, 1969.

b/ June 23 - August 17, 1968 and June 22 - August 9, 1969.

c/ August 18 - September 1, 1968 and August 10 - 24, 1969.

However, April has traditionally been a lull month in the past, after very high levels of enemy activity in February and March. The lateness of the April high point this year disrupted this pattern and may indicate a delay or lag in the enemy's activity patterns. Moreover, the May high point was a week late and poorly coordinated, and the allied offensive into Cambodia may cause changes or disruptions of enemy plans. It is too soon to tell. Thus, if the active-lull-active pattern occurs again this summer, it may not be as clear as in earlier years or the timing may be different.

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Increase in Terrorism

Intelligence reports indicate that one possible new direction of enemy activity may be an increase in sabotage, harassment and terrorism in order to disrupt the pacification program. These incidents averaged 600 per week during May, about 25% above the average for last May. Table 6 shows that:

- The 1970 weekly average of casualties from terrorism for the first five months of the year is significantly below that for 1968 and 1969.
- On the other hand, the number of South Vietnamese civilians assassinated or wounded has risen significantly in April and May. Abductions have been constant and fairly high in the past three months.
- The May assassination rate was the highest in two years.

TABLE 6

CASUALTIES FROM ENEMY TERRORISM (Weekly Average)

	<u>(Jan-May)</u> <u>1968</u> ^{a/}	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u> ^{b/}	<u>1970</u> <u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u> ^{b/}
Assassinated	154	144	126	69	71	100	195	255
Abducted	285	191	165	56	76	243	237	249
Wounded	426	361	273	179	110	231	425	543

a/ Excludes February when no terrorist data was reported due to the Tet offensive disruptions.

b/ Through May 16.

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TEMPO OF ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Summary

The attention given to operations in Laos tends to obscure the fact that US involvement in the war is declining rapidly. However, the war has not eased much for the RVNAF forces, because the regular forces are now attacking the toughest enemy targets, while the enemy, in turn, is focusing on the weakest of the RVNAF territorial forces. It is important to keep these factors in mind as the enemy is in the Spring campaign cycle, normally his most active period of the year.

US Involvement Down. After sharp reductions in FY 70, US activities, costs and casualties in Southeast Asia have continued to decline in FY 71 (through April):

- Over 34% of the US forces in Vietnam last June have redeployed. US strength is now 50% below the April 1969 peak.
- US combat deaths are about 55% below the same period of last year.
- US attack sorties are down 65%.
- The cost of the war will decline about \$5 billion in FY 71. (In addition to the FY 70 decline of about \$4 billion.)

Enemy Activity. There have been two large enemy attacks reported in South Vietnam during FY 71 (compared to 14 in the same period of FY 70). Small scale enemy attacks are down 13%.

During the first nine months of FY 1971, the total number of terrorist incidents were up 10% compared to the first nine months in FY 1970 (859 per month vs 778 per month). Total casualties were about the same in both periods (1722 per month vs 1706 per month), but the mix has changed:

- The number of people assassinated rose 5% (219 per month vs 208 per month).
- Abductions rose 18% (108 per month vs 84 per month).
- Woundings declined 13% (139 per month vs 123 per month).

South Vietnamese Activities. South Vietnamese military forces have stabilized at about one million, after an increase of 15% in the past two years. Extensive operations in Cambodia, Laos, and enemy base areas in the Delta of South Vietnam, plus enemy emphasis on attacking territorial and paramilitary forces (instead of the tougher regular forces) have kept South Vietnamese casualties at FY 70 levels.

Pacification. Pacification progressed steadily in the first half of FY 71 but has recently yielded to the increase in enemy activity. Countrywide HES ratings recovered in March to the December 1970 levels (74.8% AP compilation),

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after declines of about 1% per month in January and February (matching last year's HES regression during the April and May activity surge in both duration and magnitude). The regression this year has been most extensive in MR I, northern MR 2 and southern MR 4, where it is estimated that pacification has taken a 4-7 month setback. Three probable causes have been identified:

- A traditional slackening of GVN effort at the end of the lunar year before the Tet holidays.

- A recent increase in small scale enemy attacks associated with the enemy's Spring campaign, especially in MR 1 and parts of MR's 2 and 4.

- Territorial security forces thinly spread to cover populated areas vacated by ARVN forces operating in Laos, Cambodia and the enemy base areas in South Vietnam.

Enemy Strategy. The shift in enemy strategy to protracted war tactics, coupled with political subversion, is taking hold. Recent message traffic contains increased references to enemy plans for moving into areas being vacated by US forces before the GVN can become effective, for positioning cadre in the GVN institutional framework, and for concentrating on political recruiting and organizing.

The strategy is not designed to produce a series of obvious, decisive victories. It is more pervasive - to make (or remake) a large number of small inroads. By placing a man here, organizing a group there, harassing RF or PF outposts, they seem to be bent on maintaining their presence among the people. Their efforts are aimed at eroding GVN control. Where they cannot do so, they will likely settle for a neutral populace.

In MR 4 we have a good example of how the enemy's strategy is being applied. Rather than meet the ARVN threat to his base areas head-on, the VC seem to prefer to counter by pressuring territorial force outposts and by harassing civilians. In this way they can economize their forces while they attempt to draw ARVN back to protect the populace.

The strategy discussed above is dominating the enemy's current spring campaign. He has not mounted a coordinated offensive in any of the military regions, but has succeeded in raising the overall level of activity, especially in MR's I and II. So far, this year's spring rise is, however, well below last year's levels. Comparing the four week period of April 4-May 1 with April of last year:

- US KIA were down 57% (53 per week vs 122 per week); estimated RVNAF KIA were down 13% (472 per week vs 542 per week).

- Small scale enemy attacks were down more than 50% (53 per week vs 109 per week); there were 50% fewer attacks on population centers (5 per week vs 10 per week). Battalion-sized attacks have dropped to zero (compared to 1 per week).

- Incidents of terrorism and casualties among civilians were about 25% below last year's levels, but were above the February-March 1971 rates, reflecting the enemy's continuing reliance on this method of waging war whenever he wishes to increase activity.

CONFIDENTIAL

15

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TEMPO OF THE WAR

As we approach the mid-year point there is tangible evidence of the success of Vietnamization in the tempo of the war. The data show a marked reduction in combat activity within South Vietnam. A large share of the casualties sustained by RVNAF is the result, not of enemy pressure, but of GVN troops carrying the war to the enemy away from the populated areas. As we come to the close of the enemy's Spring campaign cycle (normally a period of high activity) the results are clear. The enemy has been unable to raise activity to a pace anywhere near what he achieved in the three previous years.

Enemy Activity. Comparing January-May 1971 with the same period in the previous three years:

- Attacks were nearly 30% below the 1969 and 1970 Spring rates.
- The peak in attacks was reached in March this year--three months earlier than usual and 30-40% below the levels in the peak months of the past three years.
- Harassments were down 31% compared to last Spring, a possible indication that the enemy is finding it increasingly difficult to get at the population.
- The number of incidents of terrorism against civilians declined 17% (compared to a 5% increase in Spring 1970). Casualties as a result of terrorist attacks also fell (down 15%).

US Involvement. US strength is presently about one-half what it was at its peak (April 1969 - 543,400); it has declined 25% since the first of this year. Other indicators of declining US involvement:

- US combat deaths are down nearly 60% from last year; there has been no sharply defined peak month this year such as we have had in the past four years.
- US attack sorties in SVN are down 78% from last Spring's level, continuing a downtrend which began in 1968.
- US attack sorties SEA-wide are down 32%.

South Vietnamese Activities. Combat deaths sustained by Vietnamese forces this Spring are 17% higher than last year, a direct result of GVN operations in Laos and Cambodia, not of enemy pressure on ARVN in SVN. Within SVN the enemy continues to target territorial and paramilitary forces in preference to the tougher regular forces.

The Vietnamese Air Force has flown about the same number of attack sorties as it did last Spring (3500 per month). About one-third of VNAF's attack sorties this year were flown in Cambodia. VNAF is now flying the majority (53%) of the attack sorties in SVN.

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The GVN forces' initiative against the enemy has inflicted its costs. RVNAF desertions this year are up 18%, reaching an all time high. The problem is centered in the combat forces. Desertions from non-combat and territorial forces are at or below tolerable levels. Hopefully, desertions from combat units will subside as we enter the rainy season.

Pacification. Pacification resumed slow but steady upward progress in April after a decline in the 1st quarter of the year. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/71) scores declined about 2% in January and February and leveled out in March. The A-B rated population increased 0.5% (to 75.3%) in April. A-B-C rated population rose 0.2% (to 94.0%). The brevity of the regression and the ease of the recovery indicate the durability of recent gains. The recovery is especially noteworthy since a large number of regular forces were out of the country during the period.

Coming Months. If past patterns persist, we can expect the tempo of combat to drop further around July 1st and to remain low until a possible minor upsurge in mid-August. We can expect a slightly higher tempo in September, followed by the lowest month of the year, October. If this pattern does not occur, it would signify that the enemy may be changing his cycle of activity and possibly his strategy.

4

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WINDING DOWN THE AIR WAR

Air munitions expended and sorties flown in Southeast Asia since 1965 (table attached) show the following patterns:

-- Intensity levels. Monthly sortie rates for both tactical aircraft and B-52's peaked in 1966 and have steadily declined since then. Monthly munition tonnages show a similar pattern.

- In the three year period 1966 through 1968 tactical air sorties were 50% higher than the monthly rates for the ensuing 3 year period (Jan 1969-Oct 1971).

- Monthly B-52 sorties increased by nearly 300% from 1966 to 1968 and have declined almost 40% since then.

--Monthly munition expenditures tend to follow the B-52 pattern, because of their heavy loads. They increased by 180% from 1966 to 1968 and have declined about 40% since then.

-- Distribution by country. Total B-52 and tactical air sortie levels have been reduced in those areas likely to have high population densities. Munition expenditures again seem to follow the B-52 sortie distribution in each country.

- In 1971 we are flying fewer tactical air sorties in all of SEA than we flew in South Vietnam alone in 1968.

- Although B-52 sorties against the enemy logistic network in lightly populated areas of Laos and Cambodia have doubled since 1968, in South Vietnam they are only one-eighth (1/8) the 1968 levels.

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US TAC AIR SORTIES

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	(thru Oct) <u>1971</u>
South Vietnam	124,686	169,828	205,250	155,091	76,105	15,903
North Vietnam	81,131	105,575	92,231	285	113	284
Laos	48,469	44,450	75,274	144,320	100,576	75,647
Cambodia	--	--	--	20	14,689	14,186
TOTAL	254,286	319,853	372,755	299,719	191,483	106,020
(Monthly Avg)	(21,190)	(26,654)	(31,063)	(24,976)	(15,957)	(10,602)

US B-52 SORTIES

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	(thru Oct) <u>1971</u>
South Vietnam	4,364	6,609	16,505	13,931	5,293	2,136
North Vietnam	223	1,364	686	--	--	--
Laos	647	1,713	3,377	5,567	8,518	7,579
Cambodia	--	--	--	--	1,292	894
TOTAL	5,234	9,686	20,568	19,498	15,103	10,609
(Monthly Avg)	(436)	(807)	(1,714)	(1,625)	(1,259)	(1,061)

US MUNITIONS TONNAGE

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	(thru Sep) <u>1971</u>
South Vietnam	259,891	487,867	830,489	735,147		
North Vietnam	127,659	247,205	227,039	662		
Laos	73,679	128,025	239,617	516,006		
Cambodia	--	--	--	--		
TOTAL	461,229	863,097	1,297,145	1,251,815	976,000	603,000
(Monthly Avg)	(38,436)	(71,925)	(108,095)	(104,318)	(81,333)	(67,000)

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WINDING DOWN THE WAR

Preoccupation with the recent elections in South Vietnam has tended to draw attention away from the overall situation in the country. An analysis of key indicators confirms the greatly reduced level of activity in SVN:

- The intensity of the war has been in a steady downtrend since 1968. Enemy attacks during the first half of this year were 47% below what they were in the first half of 1968 (1494 vs 2804); harassments were off 38% (6901 vs 11163). VC terrorism, perhaps the most pernicious tactic the enemy uses, is also down this year--30% lower than what it was last year (13700 vs 19542).

- Active fighting in populated areas in South Vietnam is now a rare occurrence, in sharp contrast to the situation in 1968. As result, there has been a noticeable trend in people moving back to the countryside. And for good reason. As a result of better security there have been real economic and social gains.

-- Over 500,000 acres of land have been distributed to the people under the land reform program.

-- In the last crop year, the South Vietnamese garnered the largest rice crop in their history (5,715,000 metric tons in 1970; 6,717,000 estimated for 1971).

-- The active refugee case load is now about 40% of what it was at the end of 1968 (569,700 vs 1,328,500).

-- Over 2,000 of Vietnam's 2,300 villages are now operating under elected local governments (2,101 elected village governments reported as of 30 June 1971. 10,391 of a possible 10,655 elected hamlet governments reported as of 30 June 1971).

-- The rate of inflation in South Vietnam has dropped to about 9% this year, down dramatically from the 30% per year that prevailed in the past.

- US war costs have declined over 50% from the peak spending levels of FY 1968 (\$8.1 billion vs \$20.2 billion). We expect a 40% decline during FY 1971 alone (\$8.1 billion vs \$12.6 billion).

- US troop levels have declined 60% since April 1969 when US strength was at its peak (the decline will be at least 65% by December 1). (543,400 vs 212,600 on 30 Sep 71; will be 184,000 by 1 December).

- US casualty rates have declined about 90% in the same period (1393 per month in 1H68; 917 per month in 1H69; 146 per month in 1H71).

- Ammunition expenditures in all of Southeast Asia have declined 47% since CY 1968 (463,000 vs 885,000 short tons during the first seven months of each year).

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- In FY 1971 US tactical air sorties throughout Southeast Asia (not just Vietnam) stood at less than half the peak levels of FY 1969 (12,800 per month vs 29,700 per month), B-52 sorties were about 60% of FY 69 peaks (1100 per month vs 1800 per month). In South Vietnam alone, the US is flying about one-fourth the number of sorties it flew last year (1600 vs 6900 in August of each year).

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Reduced Level of the War in SVN

	<u>1st Half 1968</u>	<u>1st Half 1969</u>	<u>1st Half 1970</u>	<u>1st Half 1971</u>					
<u>Enemy Attacks (U):</u>	2804	2214	2085	1494					
<u>Enemy Harassment (C):</u>	11163	10493	10940	6901					
<u>Terrorist Casualties (U)</u>	<u>January-August 1970</u> 19542		<u>January-August 1971</u> 13700						
<u>Population (Millions) (U)</u>	<u>June 68</u>		<u>June 71</u>						
Rural (MACV criteria)	10.7		11.8						
Total Population	17.3		18.3						
<u>Land-to-the Tiller (U)</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971 (thru Jul)</u>	<u>Tot</u>					
Hectares (000)	5.8	204.3	175.9	386.0					
Acres (000)	14.4	504.8	434.7	953.9					
1970-72 goal:	600,000 hectares (1.48 million acres).								
<u>Rice (U)</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
Total Planted									
Hectares (000)	2537	2562	2429	2295	2296	2394	2430	2510	2520 (fcst)
Planted (high yield)-hectares (000)	--	--	--	--	--	--	202	508	750
Metric tons produced (000)	5327	5185	4822	4336	4688	4366	5115	5715	6717 (fcst)
<u>Refugees (U)</u>									
Case load			<u>End 1968</u> 1,328,500			<u>July 1971</u> 569,700			
<u>Inflation (%) (U)</u>	<u>1968</u> 34		<u>1969</u> 32		<u>1970</u> 29		<u>1971</u> 5.7 thru Aug*		
					*(projects to about 9% for the year)				
	<u>FY 68</u>		<u>FY 69</u>		<u>FY 70</u>		<u>FY 71</u>		
<u>US Involvement (U)</u>									
Incremental Costs (\$Billions)		20.2		17.6		12.6		8.1	
<u>Troop levels (U)</u>		<u>April 1969</u> 543,400		<u>September 1971</u> 212,600		<u>December 1, 1971</u> 184,000 (planned)			

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Hostile Deaths (KIA/Mo) (U)	<u>Jan-Sep 1968</u>	<u>Jan-Sep 1969</u>	<u>Jan-Sep 1970</u>	<u>Jan-Sep 1971</u>
	1393	917	416	146
Ammunition Expend (thousands of short tons) (C)	<u>Jan-Jul 1968</u>	<u>Jan-Jul 1969</u>	<u>Jan-Jul 1970</u>	<u>Jan-Jul 1971</u>
	885	708	701	463
<u>Sortie Rate (Thousands/ Month) All SEA (S)</u>				
US Tac Air		<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>
B-52		29.7	21.2	12.8
		1.8	1.4	1.1
<u>SVN (U)</u>				
US Tac Air	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>		
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
	7.7	1.3	6.9	1.6

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CAMBODIAN ARMED FORCES

Summary. The Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK) have a strength of about 40,000 men and could be expanded to a force of about 70,000. The paramilitary forces number about 60,000 personnel. FANK suffers from lack of combat experience, equipment deficiencies, understrength military units, fragmented dispersal through the country, and lack of mobility, but its greatest shortcoming is the poor quality of its officer corps and soldiers. On the other hand, Cambodian nationalistic feelings, especially when defending the homeland against traditional enemies such as the Vietnamese may result in somewhat greater effectiveness than the foregoing shortcomings would indicate. However, the Army is clearly no match for NVA forces.

Strength. The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK) consist of an Army, Air Force and Navy. The Army has an estimated strength of 37,000 personnel and is organized into 55 infantry and commando battalions, and 9 specialized half brigades of various sizes. The Air Force consists of 1,750 men organized into three wings. The Navy has 1,400 men in Coastal and River Groups. In addition, there are an estimated 55,000-65,000 members of various paramilitary forces.

Effectiveness. The Armed Forces provide the power base for the present government. It consists of politically oriented officers who have entered the Army since Cambodian independence. Most are conscious of their elite social position and sensitive to political movements. Generally, they are loyal nationalists and non-communist. However, the Armed Forces are plagued with a shortage of good combat officers, especially in the field grades. In addition to this shortage, corruption on the part of officers prevails throughout FANK as evidenced by its continuous involvement in smuggling activities (usually through bribes with the NVA/VC). Although French advisors conduct excellent service schools (Major and above), the graduates' influence in their units after graduation is negligible. The French have not been permitted to conduct schools for unit level officers.

The general level of the soldier is poor as Cambodians, culturally, are more attracted by peaceful pursuits and generally do not make good soldiers. Cambodians are not an aggressive or militaristic people and their sociological and religious background is not one to foster the development of an effective modern Army. On the other hand, Cambodians were effective fighters when serving in the French Colonial Army, although they were led by French officers. Also, nationalistic sentiment is strong and could provide an incentive to fight well in defending Cambodia against a traditional enemy.

General training is inadequate, and has only involved small unit operations. Although poor morale is not considered a serious problem, reports indicate it has declined because of the high cost of living and the lack of incentives for advancement. FANK pay is low, but indications are that personnel are paid regularly and shelter is considered adequate. A major determinant of morale will be recent combat with the NVA/VC but

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a variety of ground force weapons, including light tanks, armored cars, field artillery and small arms for the Army, some Naval craft and a limited number of aircraft. France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia also have provided small quantities of military equipment.

The result is that the Army is presently equipped mostly with the Soviet-Chinese Communist family of small arms but also has considerable mix of other weapons. Artillery is limited and consists of US 105 Howitzers, Chicom 80mm mortars and 76mm and 122mm Howitzers and some French 37mm and 75 field guns. The armor units have about 150 vehicles including 12 US light tanks (M-24), armored cars and half tracks.

The Cambodian Air Force has 119 conventional and jet powered aircraft of French, Soviet and US design, including 47 Fighter/Attack, 29 transport, and 10 helicopters. The aircraft are obsolete, and maintenance of both the aircraft and airfields is poor. The incommision rate is very low, POL is short, and Cambodia has few navigation aids. Only one airfield (Phnom Penh) has fuel pumps; refueling at other airfields is primarily done with jerrycans. The current inventory of the Cambodian Air Force is as follows:

TABLE 1

<u>Type of Aircraft</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Total</u>
MIG-17 (Fresco)	Day Fighter/ Ground Attack	13	
Fouga Magister CM-170	Ground Attack	4	
Cessna T-37B	Ground Attack	4	
T-28B (Trojar)	Ground Attack	15	
A-1d (Skyraider)	Ground Attack	<u>11</u>	47
IL-14 (Crage)	VIP Transport	1	
C-47 (Dakota)	Transport	12	
An-2 (Colt)	Transport	6	
Dassault MD-315	Transport	6	
U-6 (Beaver)	Transport	2	
Cessna 170	Transport	1	
Alouette II	Transport (Helicopter)	9	
Alouette III	Transport (Helicopter)	1	
Mi-4 (Hound)	Transport	<u>1</u>	39
(L-19) O-1A (Bird Dog)	AOP	<u>4</u>	4
Gy-80 (Horizon)	Training	12	
Morane Saulnier 733	Training	10	
Yak-18 (Max)	Training	4	
U-MIG-15 (Midget)	Training	<u>3</u>	
	Grand Total		<u>29</u> <u>119</u>

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The Navy's equipment is also obsolete. It has about 80 vessels of which four are patrol boats. Naval craft are mostly of US post war construction and a few of Yugoslavian design. Maintenance has declined since US MAP assistance ended in 1963 and support facilities are inadequate or non-existent.

Cambodian Navy assets are shown below: (US Types)

TABLE 2

US SHIP NUMBERS AND TYPES IN CAMBODIA

2 - PC	Large Submarine Chaser
2 - PT	Motor Torpedo Boat
2 - LSIL	Infantry Landing Ship
20 - LCM	Mechanized Landing Craft
25 - LCVL	Vehicle, Personnel Landing Craft
4 - LCU	Utility Landing Craft
6 - YP	Patrol Craft
2 - YEL	Small Harbor Tug
1 - PBR	Patrol Boat River

Cambodia does not have the capability to manufacture military equipment or ammunition and depends on outside sources for POL. Although the quantities of communist small arms and heavy weapons are adequate for present force levels and to equip an expanded force of about 70,000 men, spare part shortages and poor maintenance practices would attrite these weapons rapidly in a combat environment.

Ammunition available in depots totaled about 30,000 metric tons at the end of 1969. At the 1969 rate of expenditure (about 6000 tons) this quantity would cover several years. Under increased combat conditions ammunition would be used up much faster, and certain types of ammunition (particularly for field artillery and mortars) would be depleted very quickly. DIA believes the stocks of small arms ammunition would be used up in about 100 days of sustained combat.

Expansion Capacity. There is no organized reserve system in the Armed Forces. However, over 4,000 veterans and 400 officers and noncommissioned officers who have served at least one year in the Army are available.

Cambodian's conscription law requires all males 21 to 32 years old to serve in Armed Forces for a period of 18 months. But the draft has been seldom used and only when volunteers are not sufficient to meet quotas. The Air Force and Navy have not used the draft because it is not considered effective in acquiring personnel with specialized skills.

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In the event of emergency mobilization, Cambodia has a population of about 6,700,000 people with about 1,470,000 males in the 15-49 year age group. A maximum of about 800,000 of these are physically fit for military service. The number of males fit for military service by five year age groups are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

<u>Age</u>	<u>Total Number of Males</u>	<u>Maximum Number Fit for Military Service</u>
15-19	349,000	220,500
	279,000	179,500
20-24	226,000	132,000
25-29	189,000	102,000
30-34	164,000	77,000
35-39	141,000	57,000
40-44	<u>122,000</u>	<u>47,000</u>
45-49		
TOTAL	1,470,000	815,000

Without outside assistance, maximum mobilization theoretically could be reached on M+90 with about 70,000 troops comprising about 75 infantry battalions and existing support units, plus security elements. A communist embargo of military supplies would not prevent an expansion of Cambodian ground forces. Weapons and ammunition on hand of US and French origin are probably available to meet expanded force requirements (70,000). For example, more than 15,000 men could be equipped with US rifles currently held in FANK warehouses, if they are in good condition. With sufficient outside assistance in the form of equipment the mobilization capacity is depicted below.

TABLE 4

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Inf Bn</u>	<u>Abn (Bn)</u>	<u>Armed Reat</u>	<u>Arty Half Bde</u>	<u>AAA Half Bde</u>	<u>Prov GI Bde</u>
M Day	46,000	63	2	1	1	1	20
M+15	52,500	63	2	1	1	1	20
M+30	81,500	70	2	1	1	1	20
M+90	86,500	83	2	2	2	2	20
M+180	111,500	119	2	2	2	2	20
M+1 Yr	136,500	580	2	2	2	2	20
M+2 Yrs	727,000	1,109	2	2	2	2	20

The above data are based on manpower considerations only. It is very doubtful that the goals could be achieved, even if outside assistance was obtained, unless the administrative, training and processing apparatus was greatly improved. SVN experience indicates a period of four to five years

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precise data is not available on the results. Nor is data available on the extent to which the common soldier supports the present government.

Army. Army units are manned at one half of their authorized strength. The basic tactical unit is the battalion, of which there are three types (Standard Infantry, Special, and Commando). Some units, particularly the commando battalions, have a reasonable degree of combat effectiveness. Although the Army is capable of small unit tactical operations it seldom has trained in operations utilizing units larger than a battalion. The lack of combat experience and realistic unit training hamper the Army's ability to organize and execute large scale or combined operations.

The Army is not considered capable of organizing an effective defense against external aggression. It has been severely taxed even before the recent situation by engaging in non-military tasks and in maintaining internal security against local dissidents. It is currently fragmented by deployments throughout the country (guarding the border against threats from South Vietnam and Thailand) and limited by a lack of mobility and a "garrison" mentality.

Navy. The Navy consists of about 1400 men, including 200 Naval infantrymen, and is organized into Coastal (800 personnel) and River (600 personnel) Groups. It is organized to protect the coastal and inland waterways and to support ground forces in securing inland waterways. Both the Coastal and River Commands have demonstrated fairly quick reactions to territorial violations by Thai fishing junks, South Vietnamese forces, and insurgents. However, it is only moderately effective as a river patrol and could offer only limited gunfire support to ground troops. It would be ineffective in combating a determined seaborne incursion. The Navy is hampered by lack of good officers and noncommissioned officers, obsolete equipment and limited funds.

Air Force. The Air Force is organized into three wings (tactical, technical and command). It has about 250 officers, of which about 100 are pilots, and about 1500 other ranks. The Air Force would be incapable of defending Cambodia against a determined air attack and has a limited interdiction and close support capability. However, it has not trained for these roles. Lack of training and skilled personnel result in a very low aircraft serviceability rate. The precise number of operationally ready aircraft is unknown.

Paramilitary. Cambodia has a variety of paramilitary forces, which are primarily concerned with internal security. In an emergency they could provide a sizeable input (about 60,000) to the ground forces provided sufficient time, outside logistics aid and, most important, the organizational apparatus was established to effectively utilize them.

Equipment. During the past six years the USSR and Communist China have been the major suppliers of weapons and ammunition to Cambodia, and the PANK is now armed predominantly with communist weapons. Prior to 1963, the US supplied \$100 million in military assistance to Cambodia, which involved

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is required before an organization is capable of accepting large numbers of personnel into its Armed Forces in an effective manner, regardless of raw manpower availability.

Cambodia's capacity for organizing, equipping and training paramilitary forces on a peace time basis has been severely constrained by a lack of trained personnel and organizational infrastructure as well as a lack of governmental financial support. As a result, these forces have functioned with minimal efficiency. These limitations and weaknesses would be greatly exacerbated in an emergency mobilization. So much so, that the success of fielding an effective military force in the short term hinges on administrative and organizational ability rather than available manpower, equipment or outside assistance.

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THE WAR IN CAMBODIA - AN OVERVIEW

Summary

The enemy military response to developments in Cambodia began in late March 1970. By mid-April enemy strategy had three goals for Cambodia:

- The protection of the sanctuaries on the SVN and Laotian borders.
- The isolation of Phnom Penh.
- The organization of a Cambodian Liberation Army.

As a result of the US-RVNAF cross border operations, the enemy stepped up his westward movement in Cambodia. By November he had isolated Phnom Penh, gained control of about 20% of the Cambodian population and seized the territory necessary to extend the Laos logistic system southward.

The Cambodian war is currently being fought on three fronts. The enemy wages a "defensive" war in the northeast to protect his supply lines for South Vietnam. An "offensive" war, designed to isolate Phnom Penh, is pushed in the south and west. Meanwhile, he is trying to start an insurgency by building an indigenous communist military movement.

The intensity of the war in Cambodia is far below that of Vietnam, but has increased compared to the March-July period. Cambodian Army (FANK) combat deaths have not gone up dramatically:

- FANK combat deaths for the first five months of the war averaged about 50 per week; in January 1971 the average increased about 18% to 59 per week.

- FANK wounded in action have doubled. The weekly wounded rate early in the war (March-July 1970) was about 100; in January it was about 210 per week.

- In friendly initiated action FANK reportedly kill about 4 enemy to each friendly lost. When the enemy initiates the action, FANK reportedly loses about 3 KIA for every enemy killed.

The war is currently fought along lines of communication; in January, nearly 85% of all encounters occurred on or within five kilometers of a major LOC.

The intensity of the war varies in terms of military region. In January, MRs I and II accounted for 69% of all reported incidents. The Phnom Penh Special Military District moved from fifth to third most active area as a result of the January 22-23 attacks.

Recent appraisals predict improved FANK combat effectiveness, but continued reluctance to get very far away from the LOCs.

The enemy is expected to stick to the economy of force tactics it has used since the war began; the attacks around Phnom Penh do not presage a shift in enemy strategy.

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Enemy military action against the Lon Nol regime began slowly, a delay probably engendered by the general confusion surrounding the anti-Sihanouk coup and a belief that the Lon Nol government could be toppled without military pressure. Initially, the enemy responded by instigating and supporting pro-Sihanouk demonstrations (the most significant one reportedly involved 20,000 demonstrators at Kampong Cham on March 24th). There were some indications in late March that political cadre had been dispatched from North Vietnam, perhaps to coordinate the return of Sihanouk, who was proclaiming the formation of the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK) and calling for guerrilla warfare in Cambodia.

The Enemy Assessment and the Initiation of the Military Response

By the end of March, the NVA had clearly decided to begin their military activity in Cambodia.

The first significant NVA offensive action - an attack on the Cambodian Army outpost at the border town of Prek Chirv - occurred on March 27. During the first two weeks of April, reports of enemy troop movements westward were received in increasing numbers, and the towns of Krek and Prasaut were overrun. On April 11, DIA reported that the communists had clearly begun offensive action to expand their control of areas north and west of the border base areas. In mid-April there were indications that enemy units near Attopeu were moving southward into Cambodia's northern-most provinces.

The Cambodian General Staff responded to the communist pressure in the east and north by ordering its military region and subdistrict commanders to adopt "mobile defense measures" and to abandon isolated outposts. The contraction which was to characterize FANK activity for the rest of the year had begun.

The Mid-April Assessment of Enemy Intentions

By April 16 the intelligence community had identified three enemy strategic goals in Cambodia. These were:

- The isolation of Cambodia by sealing the border area from South Vietnam.
- The isolation of Phnom Penh from the countryside.
- The organization of a Cambodian Liberation Army.

Cambodian strategy took its direction from the communist's and was responsive in nature. The primary considerations were the protection of Phnom Penh (for which the 2d, 4th and 6th Brigade were withdrawn from the northwest and the 10th Brigade formed at the Capital) and the maintenance of open access to the sea along route 4.

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FANK strategy also sought to deny VC/NVA access to the sea and to Cambodian territory west of the Mekong. Senior Cambodian military officials expressed the belief that if the line along the Mekong could be held for two months, the NVA would run out of food and be forced to withdraw into Laos.

As April passed, it became clear that the communist strategy was more successful than Phnom Penh's. By the end of the month, direct land routes from Phnom Penh to the South Vietnamese border had been severed, and FANK positions east of the Mekong had been isolated. High-level conferences among representatives of North Vietnam, China, the Pathet Lao and Sihanouk were underway in the Lao-China-Vietnamese border area. Although the development of a "Liberation Army" was rudimentary at best, indigenous communist activity was beginning to pose a threat to the lines of communication between Phnom Penh and Battambang in the west.

From the FANK standpoint, NVA units were still held east of the Mekong and the vital link with the sea had been maintained. But confidence in holding the line was falling, and the harassment along Route 4 was increasing as the US-South Vietnamese cross border operations began.

The Cross Border Operations

So far as the war in Cambodia was concerned, the cross border operations lent even greater impetus to the westward movement of NVA units. As the US and South Vietnamese troops pushed into the border base areas, the enemy consolidated control of the Mekong, and by early June had brought the war into Cambodia's western provinces.

Most of the enemy pressure against FANK between May and August was conducted by small units. Regimental sized units hovered in the background around Kampong Cham in the north and Kampong Speu in the south, but the attacks against 16 of Cambodia's 19 provincial capitals by the end of July were conducted by battalions or smaller units.

Communist operations north of Phnom Penh were the work of a single NVA regiment. Elements of this regiment, augmented by some of the troops which and come in from the north and from Cambodian recruiting, were responsible for the initial thrust into Siem Reap. All the attacks south and southwest of Phnom Penh were the work of the equivalent of about two regiments.

The toll of FANK casualties was rising. Between March 18 and July 9 Cambodian military losses were reported to total almost 800 KIA, 1,700 wounded, 1,500 missing, and 1,600 desertions (roughly equivalent to 18 FANK battalions believed overrun or dissolved since March).

The August-November Situation

As the rainy season began to taper off, it appeared that the first phase of communist expansion had been concluded (see Map). The enemy had achieved:

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- The survival of its logistical units in the border area.
- The seizure of the territory needed to extend its Laotian logistic system southward.
- Control of up to 20% of the Cambodian population.
- The isolation of Phnom Penh from the sea and its western provinces.

THE PRESENT

The Three Front War

By the end of 1970, the war had taken on the "three-front" quality it has maintained in 1971. From the enemy point of view the most important front is the "defensive" one north and east of Phnom Penh. Here, the emphasis has been on the reconstruction and expansion of the southern terminous of the logistic supply system from the north.

Between 60 and 70 NVA/VC battalions operate east of the Mekong. Some appear to be charged with the defense of the area from threats within Cambodia, while others use the area as a rear base to prepare for movement into South Vietnam. The three major enemy units in the area - the NVA 7th and the VC 9th and 5th Divisions - are sometimes referred to as "swing" units, a reference to their dual orientation between Cambodia and SVN.

The second "front" in which the enemy invests his resources is the "offensive" war against the Cambodian Government (GKR). Waged primarily in the west and south, enemy activity here centers around isolating Phnom Penh from its own internal sources of sustenance (e.g., the rice production of Battambang in the west and the oil from the refineries of Kampong Som in the south) and the outside world.

Between 20 and 30 NVA/VC battalions operate west of the Mekong. The activity south of the Tonle Sap-Mekong appears to be the responsibility of the NVA 1st Division. The responsibility for the area north of the Tonle Sap and west of the Mekong is unclear, but recent evidence suggests that a new division, made up of NVA/VC cadre and Cambodian recruits, is in charge of the area.

The third, and most obscure, front is the insurgency effort to create a viable alternative to the Lon Nol regime. Formally, the enemy political/military opposition to the Lon Nol regime is embodied in the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK), the organization headed by Sihanouk and charged with reestablishing the monarchy in Cambodia.

The actual control of FUNK is obscure. Power within organizations claiming some connection to FUNK is generally exercised by whoever can mobilize the greatest military power in a given locale. This generally results in Vietnamese domination of a very loosely organized, often internally competi-

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tive movement. Indeed, one element contributing to Lon Nol's success - a pervasive anti-Vietnamese sentiment - is the element which hinders FUNK in its effort to create a viable governmental structure.

But it is clear that some effort is being made to mobilize the countryside in the attempt to bring down the Lon Nol regime. A FANK G-2 assessment in November pointed to enemy organizational activities northeast of Phnom Penh, arguing that what was emerging was:

- A "People's militia" (lightly armed and of minor military importance).
- Regional units of regimental or battalion size (up to 400 per battalion) commanded by Cambodians, but with NVA advisors.
- Cambodian political committees at district, subdistrict and sometimes at province level (in border areas these are under the control of the NLF in neighboring SVN provinces).

DIA believes up to 10,000 Cambodians are now organized into 18 enemy battalions. Some of these units appear to be effective: The US Embassy in Phnom Penh feels the effectiveness of the Khmer Communist units participating in the attacks around Phnom Penh, constitutes a new dimension of the war.

The Intensity of the War

Most observers expected the intensity of the Cambodian conflict to pick up as the rainy season ended in November, and recent field appraisals have pointed to such a development. Our data tend to support these judgments, but indicate that the tempo of the war has not yet changed dramatically.

FANK combat deaths have increased about 18% from the rate estimated for the March-July period. The average rate of FANK KIA early in the war, based on estimated losses between March 18 and July 9, 1970, was about 50 per week. During January 1-25, 1971, FANK suffered about 210 KIA, or about 58.8 per week. Wounded in action have more than doubled, from 100 per week in March-July to about 212 in January.

Accurate casualty data from Cambodia are scarce, but it appears the enemy does well when he starts the fight. Table 1 indicates that about 60% of all FANK combat deaths occur in friendly initiated actions. Most (94%) enemy deaths reportedly occur in the same actions. In friendly initiated actions the kill ratio appears to be about 3.8 enemy killed for each FANK killed. The ratio reverses in enemy initiated actions where the enemy reportedly kills about 3 FANK for every man he loses; if civilian deaths are included, the ratio increases to 4.7 (Table 1).

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TABLE 1

CASUALTIES IN CAMBODIA a/
January 1-25, 1971

	<u>Friendly Initiated b/</u>	<u>Enemy Initiated c/</u>
<u>FANK</u> d/		
KIA	123	87
WIA	420	338
Missing	0	53
Total Casualties	<u>543</u>	<u>478</u>
<u>Enemy</u>		
KIA	467	29
Captured	64	1
Rallied	4	8
Total Casualties	<u>535</u>	<u>38</u>
<u>Civilian</u>		
KIA	4	50
WIA	1	203
Missing	0	2
Total Casualties	<u>5</u>	<u>255</u>

- a/ Source: Khmer Computer File from daily defense attache reports. It should be noted that these are operational and not confirmed data. Any given number is probably not precisely correct, but our experience using similar data from Vietnam indicates that the figures are good enough for sound analysis of trends.
- b/ "Friendly initiated incidents" include attacks on enemy position, contact with enemy forces while on operations or as a result of friendly tactical activity, and friendly ambushes.
- c/ "Enemy initiated incidents" include ground attacks, attacks by fire, ambushes, minings, harassment and terrorism.
- d/ Includes local forces and naval personnel.

Table 2 suggests that:

-- In terms of number of enemy incidents, the current intensity of the war in Cambodia is far below that of Vietnam as a whole, and about 30% below the average of MR's III and IV in the first half of 1970.

-- In terms of the friendly KIA per incident, the Cambodian war exceeds the 1967 figure for SVN and is about 30% below the figures for the following years.

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TABLE 2

ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY IN CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM
(Monthly Average)

	<u>Cambodia</u> ^{a/}	<u>South Vietnam</u> ^{b/}			
	<u>1971</u>	<u>1st Half</u> <u>1970</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1967</u>
<u>Countrywide:</u>					
Enemy Incidents ^{c/}	310	2370	4375	5117	3488
Resulting Friendly KIA ^{d/}	137	1731	2743	3143	951
Friendly KIA per incident	.44	.73	.67	.61	.27
<u>MR III:</u>					
Enemy Incidents		469	1137	1076	
Resulting Friendly KIA		273	807	940	
Friendly KIA per incident		.58	.71	.87	
<u>MR IV:</u>					
Enemy Incidents		427	724	769	
Resulting Friendly KIA		467	766	1047	
Friendly KIA per incident		1.09	1.06	.73	

^{a/} Source: Khmer computer file from daily attack reports.

^{b/} Source: SEA Analysis Report, November-December 1970. Data for 1967 from SEAPRS Computer File.

^{c/} Includes enemy initiated incidents against ARVN forces in Cambodia only as reported through FANK channels.

^{d/} Includes US, FW, RVNAF and civilian figures for South Vietnam; includes FANK, local forces, Cambodian naval personnel, civilian and ARVN as reported through FANK channels for Cambodia.

Where the Action Is

In January nearly 85% of all actions, both friendly and enemy initiated, occurred on or within five kilometers of a major Cambodian LOC. The war clearly revolves around control of LOCs, and the pattern of incidents demonstrates how roadbound FANK is. (See Map Plot 1.)


Until our computer file is complete we cannot provide the statistical background to talk about shifts in the location of activity. Observers on the scene have stated that the current activity differs from earlier patterns in two respects:

-- The enemy is no longer concentrating his attacks on provincial capitals.

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CAMBODIA-LINES OF COMMUNICATION Total Incidents: 1-25 January 1971



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-- The enemy now seeks to interdict the arteries to Phnom Penh further away from the city than in the spring of 1970.

Data for January tends to support both observations. Many provincial capitals were attacked early in the war, but only Kampong Cham experienced a significant share (12%) of enemy initiated incidents in January. Only 11 enemy attacks or attacks by fire occurred within 10 kilometers of Kompong Speu, probably because of the shift of the enemy 101D regiment southward to a blocking position on route 4. Siem Reap, Kampong Thom, and Battambang, all targets of enemy attacks earlier, experienced little activity.


The LOC interdiction nearest to Phnom Penh in January occurred about 25 kilometers away from the city on route 3. Most enemy efforts to interdict lines of communications as opposed to attacks on friendly forces occurred about 25 miles away.

The intensity of the war clearly varies among sections of the country. About 70% of all January action took place south and northeast of Phnom Penh in MRs 2 and 1, a reflection of the Chenla and Pich Nil operations. About 15% of all actions occurred in MR 3, 8% and 7% took place in MR 4 and the Phnom Penh Special Sub-district, respectively. (No reports were received from MR 5, generally considered to be under enemy control.) This rough ranking was maintained through the month until the January 22-23 activity around Phnom Penh moved that area up to the second most active. (Graph 1).

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GRAPH 1
INCIDENT RATES BY REGION ^{a/}

No. of Incidents



^{a/} Includes both friendly and enemy initiated incidents.
Source: Khmer file from daily attache reports.

THE FUTURE

Recent appraisals have made the following points about the short range prospects in Cambodia:

-- The Cambodian Army is reportedly getting better. The increased FANK losses reflect a growing willingness to accept casualties in order to inflict them on the enemy. As training improves, FANK combat effectiveness should also rise.

-- One result of the attacks on Phnom Penh could be a military shakeup. The VC/NVA had virtually free reign at Pochentong airport for over four hours, and the questions and accusations which will come out of this fact will probably result in at least some personnel changes. FANK's morale remained good, however, an initial assessment (January 27) by the US Embassy in Phnom Penh also stressed the view that FANK combat capability will increase.

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-- The VC/NVA are likely to hold the initiative in Cambodia, and FANK will remain reluctant to venture away from LOCs.

-- The enemy probably will stick to his economy of force tactics; there is no immediate threat to the capital which cannot be dealt with by the FANK ground forces now in place and the air power available.

Future analyses will look at trends and changes over time, as soon as our new computer file is loaded with the historical data back to July.

CONFIDENTIAL

188

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THE WAR IN CAMBODIA

Summary

A detailed analysis of the last ten months of the Cambodian war, as reported through Cambodian Army (FANK) and US intelligence channels, indicates:

- The tempo of the war in Cambodia is far below that in South Vietnam.

-- Enemy activity directed against the Cambodians since July 1970 has been about 22% of that directed against South Vietnamese and Free World forces in South Vietnam over the same period.

-- Clashes between FANK and the enemy since July 1970 have killed about 2300 FANK and 5400 enemy. By comparison, ARVN has reportedly killed about 7,000 enemy in Cambodia over the past three months.

- The enemy has shifted toward the standoff attacks; enemy ground attacks are less intense now than six months ago.

-- Enemy attacks by fire have made up about 72% of all enemy activity in 1971; in 1970 the figure was 60%.

-- Both FANK and the enemy lose fewer people per combat action now than last year. FANK KIA in enemy ground attacks has slipped from 1.3 per attack to 0.6; enemy losses per enemy ground attack have fallen from about 3 to 2.

- FANK may be improving.

-- The circumstances of FANK KIA have shifted. In 1970, 64% of all FANK KIA died behind their own wire. Now 64% die when FANK has moved out from its own defenses, suggesting more FANK aggressiveness.

- But FANK has a long way to go.

-- FANK ability to kill the enemy is about as good as the RF/PF of GVN MR II, the worst in South Vietnam.

-- About 80% of all combat actions take place on or within five kilometers of Cambodian LOCs, not in the enemy base areas.

-- FANK has not expanded the Cambodian government's control over the rural population.

Our analysis points up the danger of generalizations regarding the war in Cambodia. Regional variation is probably more pronounced in Cambodia than in South Vietnam, and the character of the war differs, sometimes greatly, among Cambodian military regions:

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- MR 1, north and east of Phnom Penh. Man for man (enemy KIA per 1000 FANK strength), they kill more enemy than any other FANK troops.

- In MR 2, south and west of Phnom Penh, mediocre FANK troops face an enemy whose combat performance has been relatively high.

-- FANK units in MR 2 have been unable to improve their kill ratio for the last nine months.

-- Man for man, FANK units in MR 2 kill only about half as many enemy as the FANK in MR 1, and the trend is downward.

- MR 3, west of Phnom Penh, has been about half as active as MR 1 or MR 2. FANK units there have done comparatively well in clashes with the enemy, but have not improved significantly over the last nine months.

- In MR 4 the pattern of activity suggests a definite attempt by enemy units to disengage from contact.

- Activity in the Phnom Penh Special Military Region (PPSMR) has steadily increased. Enemy units there have the best combat record in Cambodia.

-- Man for man, enemy units in the PPSMR are over twice as active against FANK as enemy units elsewhere.

-- The enemy has maintained a higher level of activity since January 1971, but has reduced the rate of his casualties to about half the level recorded in 1970.

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THE WAR IN CAMBODIA

Background. Enemy military action against the Lon Nol government began in earnest about two weeks after Sihanouk's ouster. On April 11, 1970, DIA reported that the communists had begun offensive action to expand their control north and west of their border base areas. Coincident with the allied cross border operations last Spring, the enemy drove westward, bringing the war to Cambodia's western provinces in early June 1970.

The initial response of the Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK) was to fall back toward Phnom Penh and begin the frantic expansion which tripled their size by July (to about 135,000). By July 31, 1970 the FANK infantry was believed to have grown from 58 battalions, totaling about 20,000 men to 215 battalions in various stages of formation with about 111,000 men. But the rapid expansion of the Army was accomplished mainly by recruiting raw young volunteers, with high morale, but little training and military skill. In some cases, recruits received only a day of military instruction before being sent to face the VC/NVA.

The history of the period between early April and late July reflects these inputs, but is hazy so far as facts are concerned. To most observers, the period seemed a series of communist attacks and FANK collapses. Within four months, the communists had overrun half of Cambodia, taken or threatened 16 of its 19 provincial capitals and interdicted--for varying periods--all road and rail links to the capital. VC/NVA forces in the countryside appeared able to move at will. A series of small unit contacts with FANK had decimated about 18 FANK battalions, killed at least 800 FANK soldiers and resulted in 3,100 FANK desertions and missing in action.


These results were produced by as few as 10,000 enemy troops. In April 1970, between 40,000 and 60,000 VC/NVA troops operated in the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border area. But only about 35% of these are believed to have been in combat units; 65% were in administrative units and charged with rear service missions. As a result of the cross border operations, most of the 40-60,000 enemy strength deployed deeper into Cambodia, but the bulk of these personnel avoided combat.

By the end of July the enemy presence in Cambodia stabilized along the general lines shown in Map 1. The enemy controlled up to 20% of the Cambodian population, was in a position to isolate Phnom Penh from the sea and its western provinces, and now turned to the reconstruction and expansion of the Laos logistics system, a system vital to his activity in Vietnam now that Sihanoukville was closed.

FANK held most of the population centers in Cambodia and had cut communist forces off from the important port of Sihanoukville (now called Kompong Som). But communication and transportation between the provincial capitals and Phnom Penh was tenuous. FANK strength had grown dramatically, but its combat effectiveness lagged. Assessments made in the United States at that time were not optimistic; the chances that the Lon Nol government would survive a year were rated about even--much less than that in the absence of external support.

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The Antagonists

The Enemy. In March 1970 the communists appeared to be preparing for a large scale offensive against major targets in GVN MR 3, preparations which were cancelled by Sihanouk's ouster. At least part of the enemy units which were to participate in the MR 3 offensive--the 5th VC, 7th NVA and 9th VC Divisions--were reoriented toward Cambodia. In April 1970, the communists organized a new entity from enemy units targeted against GVN MR 4 and assigned it missions in Cambodia. But operations by these units were also disrupted, this time by the allied cross border operations beginning in late April.

The enemy command and control structure for Cambodia, now radiating from COSVN, appears to be moving toward four or five major command and control groupings. Up to three of these are emerging east of the Mekong and include at least portions of Cambodian (GKR) MRs 1 and 5. Another major command entity appears to be responsible for an area west of the Mekong and south of the Tonle Sap; another may control the area west of the Mekong and north of the Tonle Sap. The relationship between these nascent command entities is unclear, but those east of the Mekong are probably oriented primarily toward maintaining and protecting the supply system from Laos. Those west of the Mekong could be oriented toward the isolation of Phnom Penh.

Strength. In spite of the difficulties involved in strength estimates, it is generally agreed within the intelligence community that enemy combat strength in Cambodia has remained between 30-40,000 since July 1970, despite losses incurred since the dry season began in October.

Reinforcement Options. In July 1970 it was believed the enemy had three options for reinforcing his Cambodian operations. He could:

- Commit more of the VC/NVA combat forces already astride the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border.
- Shift combat and combat support forces from Laos southward into Cambodia.
- Drawdown forces in North Vietnam.

All three options still exist, but Lam Son 719 and continued ARVN pressure against the enemy supply lines in Cambodia may have made all of them less appealing.

If the communists commit more of their forces in the RVN-Cambodian border areas to action against the Cambodians, the enemy threat to the southern area of South Vietnam would be even further reduced, and the enemy supply lines in Cambodia more exposed to ARVN incursions. The communists might draw on the large number of administrative service personnel along the Cambodian-

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South Vietnam border, but their rear service problems have increased since July, and it is more likely that the enemy would add to his rear service components than reduce them. Thus, reinforcement by drawing on the border units would further reduce the enemy's chances of regaining the ground lost in GVN MRs III and IV.

Lam Son 719 has made it more difficult for the enemy to shift forces from Laos into Cambodia, not only because of damage to the Laotian supply system, but because Laos is no longer a sanctuary. If the enemy wants to guard against ARVN incursions into Laos, he is not likely to reduce his combat strength there by redeployments southward to Cambodia.

Reinforcement from North Vietnam remains possible but, again, Lam Son 719 has made Laos a more important destination for any influx of North Vietnamese combat strength and has implied that the concept of sanctuaries--even in North Vietnam--is a risky assumption on which to plan. With Lam Son 719's implicit argument that even North Vietnam is not secure, the North Vietnamese are now probably even more reluctant to erode their homeland defenses.

These considerations suggest that events since July have increased the enemy desire to build an indigenous Cambodian military force. The communists have probably always seen this as a difficult and time consuming task, but they may now see the creation of Khmer communist battalions as the only feasible means of reinforcing their units in Cambodia.

Unfortunately, while this option may be the most likely one, our ability to determine whether the enemy has adopted it is low. We know organizational efforts are being undertaken, but we do not know very much about them, not only because our own collection sources are limited in this area, but because FANK apparently pays little attention to this aspect of their war with the communists.

Large scale reinforcement may not be necessary if the enemy units in Cambodia can raise their combat output greatly. The statistics indicate wide differences in the combat output of enemy units in various parts of Cambodia. The reasons for the variations are not clear, but one hypothesis is that most enemy units in Cambodia have operated far below the level at which they could operate. If all enemy units in Cambodia raised their combat output to the levels demonstrated by some enemy units there, the whole question of enemy reinforcement options could well become moot.

FANK

On March 18, 1970, the Forces Armee Nationale Khmer (FANK) was a small (about 38,000), untrained, ill equipped, internal security-civic action oriented, quasi-military force. Combat training under Sihanouk had been largely ignored. There were no organized reserves and the field units rarely conducted training exercises. Some individuals in Cambodia's armed forces claimed to have fired weapons in anger--often against US aircraft in the border area--but few officers had commanded troops in combat. Most units were poorly equipped and resupply was complicated by the mixture of Free World and communist arms that had been collected over the years.

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Strength. FANK growth after 18 March was rapid and unmonitored. By July the Cambodian armed forces were believed to have tripled, by the end of 1970 they were thought to have grown to over five times the size they were in March. (Table 1 excludes Naval and Air Forces.)

Essentially a volunteer army, FANK grew from the bottom up. Each battalion did its own recruiting and while the battalions were required to send personnel reports to FANK headquarters in Phnom Penh, this requirement was often ignored in the frenetic drive to expand the force.^{1/}

One result was FANK reliance on the paymaster for strength figures. But the paymaster paid on the basis of the strengths reported by the battalion commanders, who often padded their payrolls. The net result was to overstate FANK strength.^{2/} Recent surveys conducted by FANK headquarters have suggested actual FANK strength may be 10 to 20% less than the strength figures in Table 1 indicate. (Table 1 strength figures reflect the low side of ranged estimates held by DIA.)

TABLE 1

<u>FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES) a/</u>				
(000)				
	<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>Nationwide</u>				
Combat	114.8	137.2	149.3	161.0
Support	20.2	21.4	21.7	33.2
Total	<u>135.0</u>	<u>158.6</u>	<u>171.0</u>	<u>194.2</u>
Training Out of Country	0.7	1.0	6.5	5.8
Combat Strength Ratio <u>b/</u>	4:1	4:1	4:1	5:1
(FANK/Enemy)				

a/ Source: DIA; ground forces figures only, portraying low side of DIA range estimates.

b/ Ratio excludes forces training out of country.

^{1/} The manner in which recruitment was undertaken may have given us an inaccurate picture of FANK desertions during the first four months of the war in Cambodia. (Estimated to be about 1600.) Groups of volunteering students, for example, would apparently "try out" various battalions before deciding upon the one in which they would serve. The initial shifting of personnel from battalion to battalion was often reflected in high desertion rates--not because individuals involved were actually deserting, but because the recruitment system prompted shifting between battalions and FANK records could not keep up with the shifts.

^{2/} The pay procedures in FANK are now under revision.

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Problem Areas

Many of FANK's problems are the obvious ones associated with a crash effort to build an effective combat force from a small, non-combat base. Indeed, there are probably no administrative or functional aspects of FANK which have made the transition easily. But appraisals which have accumulated over the past year stress that FANK's most serious problems are leadership, training, and command and control.

Leadership. FANK's high command (General Officers) had only limited combat experience--none of it above battalion level--prior to the outbreak of the war. Most of the battalion and lower commanders are getting their experience in the war itself. This deficiency has resulted in a series of tactical errors--errors attributable primarily to the inability of commanders to make the right decisions.

FANK leadership has not been without its heroes. Outnumbered troops under Colonel Ly Too Sun held Prey Totung for five days, despite repeated assaults and a series of hand-to-hand fights with VC/NVA main force units in December, and there have been other examples of outstanding leadership on the part of Cambodian officers.

But a recurrent theme in the reports which filter into Washington has been deficiencies in leadership. The recent decimation of the 169th Infantry Battalion near Kompong Cham appears to be one of the latest examples of what leadership deficiencies mean on the Cambodian battlefield, and the difficulties associated with the Chenla and Pich Nil operations were, according to most observers, often a reflection of leadership problems.

It is difficult to gauge whether Cambodian leadership is improving. Many observers believe FANK is doing better--a judgement supported by some of the data later in this paper--and that good leaders are being forged in combat situations. But little information is available about Cambodian leadership. Episodes such as the defense of Prey Totung identify good prospective leaders (e.g. Col Sun), but it is simply too early to generalize about the future of Cambodian military leadership. It is clear that FANK must develop good leaders fast if it is to cope with the NVA forces.

Training. Efforts began almost immediately, but never kept up with the expansion of FANK. By the middle of March 1971, about 18,700 Khmer personnel had completed various training courses in RVN and nearly 1800 had received training in Thailand. But most FANK personnel have had little more than on the job training .

Officer candidate training in Cambodia has been called "totally non-productive" by the US Military Equipment Delivery Team, and while leadership courses in the RVN have now trained about 400 small unit commanders (battalion and below), we have as yet no data indicating this training has paid off in higher combat performance.

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Command and Control. Command and control problems in FANK are generated by communications and transportation systems primitive by South Vietnamese standards, and by a tradition of regional autonomy. In a very real sense, the FANK Headquarters is cut off from direct control of forces outside of Phnom Penh Special Military Region and seldom commands in the full sense of the term. The fact that the regional commands respond to the extent they do attests not only to the network of personal loyalty which extends from Lon Nol downward -- which his subordinates have played upon in the premier's absence -- but to the almost fanatical commitment to the common cause of ridding Cambodia of Vietnamese.

Centralized control is increasing. The creation and activity of FANK's "intervention forces"--those units controlled directly by Headquarters--the revision of administrative procedures (such as the military pay system), the compilation of personnel records and, perhaps most important of all, the monopoly the Headquarters has on the flow of arms, ammunition and supplies and trained personnel coming into the country, are all giving Phnom Penh greater control over the war it must wage. But these are phenomena which erode regional autonomy rather than replace it entirely, and it is likely to be at least a year before the Headquarters in Phnom Penh can exercise the kind of control over FANK that Saigon was able to exercise over ARVN as early as three years ago. In the meantime, command and control between Phnom Penh and the region must rely primarily upon ties of personal loyalty rather than institutionalized procedures.

One of the dangers in this arrangement is the possibility of local accommodation between FANK and the enemy in relatively isolated sections of the country. The data suggest this may already be occurring in GKR military region 4, where the tradition of regional autonomy and difficulty of communication may be combining to promote that development.

The Action

NOTE: The statistics discussed in this section are tenuous and from a reporting system that is still shaking down. We believe that the trends they show are probably about right, but the data and findings must be viewed with some caution for awhile yet.

Most assessments of the Cambodian situation foresaw increased activity as the dry season began in October 1970. There were several reasons for this expectation. Experience with the cyclical pattern of warfare in Vietnam, the increased size of FANK and the growing realization of how much the loss of Sihanoukville and the disruption of the Cambodian sanctuary had hurt the communists all contributed to the assumption that the war would escalate in the dry season.

Table 2 shows that the levels of activity in Cambodia, excluding any ARVN involvement, doubled between the third and fourth quarters of 1970 and have remained at the higher level ever since. The increase stemmed from an upsurge of enemy attacks by fire and contacts between FANK and enemy forces.

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TABLE 2

ACTIONS IN CAMBODIA: FANK VS THE ENEMY a/
(No ARVN Involvement) b/

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
<u>FANK Actions</u>			
Ground Attacks	45	69	65
Ambushes	7	17	18
Other	2	8	10
Subtotal	<u>54</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>93</u>
<u>Enemy Actions</u>			
Ground Attacks	185	323	202
Attacks by fire/harassment	412	843	942
LOC Interdiction	94	141	89
Sabotage/Terror	40	43	57
Other	13	12	15
Subtotal	<u>744</u> (6331)c/	<u>1362</u> (4298)	<u>1305</u> (4889)
<u>Contacts</u>	197	605	862
<u>Total Combat Actions</u>	995	2061	2260

a/ Source: Khmer Computer File from daily attache reports. For definition of each activity, see appendix. Actions reported as a "contact" are often ambiguous regarding the circumstances involved and, in particular, which side initiated the action. "Contacts" are defined by FANK as combat actions which occur outside FANK defensive positions, and, accordingly, many contacts are probably brought about by conscious FANK efforts to find and destroy enemy units. But, because "contacts" can also refer to actions in which FANK either was not seeking nor expecting combat activity, they have been dealt with as a separate category of activity.

b/ Does not include actions in which ARVN was reported as involved.

c/ Figures in parentheses indicate count of similar action in South Vietnam for same period. Source: OASD(C) Southeast Asia Statistical Summary.

While there was an upsurge in activity during the dry season, it is important to keep the figures in perspective; they are far below what has been occurring in South Vietnam for at least the last five years. The figures in parentheses, referring to comparable actions in South Vietnam, show that enemy activity in Cambodia, excluding actions against ARVN, has been about 22% of that recorded in South Vietnam during the same period. Even the highest monthly figure for enemy attacks by fire or harassing actions (about 376 in March 1971) is only about two-fifths of the lowest monthly figure recorded for similar actions in the RVN since 1965 (about 968 in November 1970).^{1/}

^{1/} Sources: Cambodian data: Khmer computer file; South Vietnam: SEA Statistical Summary.

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Enemy Patterns. The enemy appears to have moved toward greater reliance on standoff attacks as opposed to ground assaults. In absolute number, enemy ground attacks nearly doubled last fall, but returned to last summer's level this year. Because of the increase in attacks by fire, however, enemy ground attacks now constitute a smaller portion of total enemy activity than in 1970 (15% this year vs 25% in 1970). Attacks by fire and harassment have risen to about 72% of all enemy combat activity compared to about 60% last year (Table 2).

The shift in enemy activity has probably contributed to lower casualties on both sides during the first three months of 1971. While about 2295 FANK and 5409 enemy have been killed in action since July 1, 1970, exclusive of any ARVN involvement, almost half of this 7704 total occurred during the last three months of 1970. The enemy KIA figures for the first quarter of this year slipped below the level reported for last summer, while FANK deaths returned to the summer level.

In addition, there have been fewer casualties per action in 1971. FANK, for example, lost about 1.3 KIA per enemy ground attack in 1970; this year the loss per attack has been about 0.6. Likewise, the enemy KIA in ground attacks has dropped from about 3.3 to 1.9 KIA per attack. Thus, the drop in casualties in the face of high levels of activity appears due to both a shift in the mix of enemy activity and a reduction in intensity.

TABLE 3

COMBAT DEATHS IN CAMBODIA: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT a/

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
<u>FANK KIA</u>			
In Enemy Actions <u>b/</u>	419	607	243
In FANK Actions <u>c/</u>	111	52	13
In Contacts	123	333	394
Subtotal	653	992	650
<u>Enemy KIA</u>			
In Enemy Actions <u>b/</u>	645	1215	291
In FANK Actions <u>c/</u>	442	258	149
In Contacts	442	1104	863
Subtotal	1529	2577	1303
 Total KIA (FANK plus Enemy)	 2182	 3569	 1953

a/ Source: Khmer computer file from attache reports; data excludes incidents with any ARVN involvement.

b/ Includes enemy ground attacks, ambushes, attacks by fire, harassment, LOC interdiction, sabotage and terror.

c/ Includes FANK ground attacks, ambushes, attacks by fire.

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FANK Patterns and Performance. FANK is clearly on the defensive. At least 64% of all actions reported since July 1970 have been attributed to enemy initiative (Table 2) and the overall pattern of activity clearly shows that the war is being fought along Phnom Penh's lifelines, not in the enemy base areas (see map plots). Nationally, about 80% of all reported actions have occurred on or within 5 kilometers of a major Cambodian LOC.

The percentage of actions which are clearly attributable to enemy initiative has declined over the last nine months, from 75% in the summer to 66% in the fall and 58% this year (Table 2). Likewise the circumstances of FANK deaths have changed. As Table 4 shows, there has been a definite shift in FANK KIA toward actions reported as "contacts."

These trends can be accounted for in two ways. They could be a result of changes in the reporting system; FANK may simply be reporting as contacts what they earlier would have reported as enemy attacks, etc. If this is the case, the data does not say FANK is getting better.

On the other hand, the shift toward "contacts" which appears both in the reports of activity and in the casualty data, may actually portray a greater willingness on the part of FANK to move out of defensive positions. If FANK is reporting honestly, and means what it defines as a "contact" (ie: a combat action that takes place outside FANK defensive positions), then the shift probably reflects greater aggressiveness on FANK's part. The data in this case say that nine months ago 64% of FANK KIA were killed when FANK remained behind its own defenses, now 64% are dying when FANK has at least moved outside its own wire.

TABLE 4

CIRCUMSTANCES OF FANK KIA^{a/}

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
<u>During:</u>			
<u>FANK</u>			
Attacks	107	50	13
Ambushes	1	2	1
Other	3	0	1
Subtotal	<u>111</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>15</u>
<u>Enemy</u>			
Attacks	215	427	104
ABF/Harassment	92	122	68
Other	112	58	71
Subtotal	<u>419</u>	<u>507</u>	<u>243</u>
<u>Contacts</u>	123	333	409
<u>Total FANK KIA</u>	653	992	667

a/ Source: Khmer computer file from attache reports; data excludes incidents with ARVN involvement.


b/ During patrol.

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
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ACTION IN CAMBODIA - 3rd QTR 1970



IN IN CAMBODIA - 3rd QTR 1970




- ▣ - Friendly initiated contact, attack, ambush
- * - Enemy initiated attack, attack by fire, ambush, sabotage or terror


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ACTION IN CAMBODIA - 4th QTR 1970



CAMBODIA - 4th QTR 1970




- - Friendly initiated contact, attack, ambush
- * - Enemy initiated attack, attack by fire, ambush, sabotage or terror

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
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ACTION IN CAMBODIA - 1st QTR 1971 (to 12 February)



205

A - 1st QTR 1971 (to 12 February)



- ▣ - Friendly initiated contact, attack, ambush
- * - Enemy initiated attack, attack by fire, ambush, sabotage or terror

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But the effectiveness of FANK, measured in terms of casualties inflicted on the enemy, is not impressive. In terms of total KIA figures, the enemy/FANK kill ratio has been maintained at about 2 to 1 for the past nine months. Table 5 shows that this is low--below the overall kill ratio achieved by RF/PF units in South Vietnam and only about half the ARVN record.

FANK ability to kill the enemy comes closest to the kill ratio associated with the RF and PF in Military Regions II and III of South Vietnam over the last three years; but these units are considered to be the worst in South Vietnam.^{1/} The ratio has been better when FANK takes the fight to the enemy, (ie: FANK attacks, ambushes, attacks by fire) and when the action takes place outside FANK defensive positions (ie: contacts) but in neither of these cases has FANK come close to the ARVN record in similar categories.

TABLE 5

KILL RATIOS
Enemy/FANK, ARVN, RF/PF

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971¹</u>
Enemy/FANK in Cambodia <u>a/</u>	2.3	2.6	2.0
(FANK Actions)	(3.0)	(4.8)	(4.8)
(Enemy Actions)	(1.5)	(2.0)	(1.2)
(Contacts)	(3.6)	(3.3)	(2.2)
	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Enemy/ARVN in SVN <u>b/</u>	5.4	4.4	5.7
Enemy/RF-PF in SVN <u>b/</u>	3.6	3.8	2.0
(MR II)	(3.5)	(1.7)	(1.3)
(MR III)	(2.5)	(3.2)	(2.3)

a/ Source: Khmer Computer File.

b/ Source: SEER Computer File for ARVN; TFES for RF/PF.

Kill ratios are only one measure of combat effectiveness. But FANK is not very effective by other measures either. It has not, for example, expanded the territory it controls nor has it been able to expand the Cambodian government's (GKR) control over the population. There are probably more people in government controlled areas now than there were six months ago, but the increase has been due to an influx of refugees, not to an expansion of GKR controlled territory. (Thus, increases in the number of people in government controlled areas are a measure of enemy ineffectiveness rather than FANK combat ability.) And field assessments generally agree that while FANK is now performing better than it was six months ago, its combat proficiency remains low.

1/ SEA Analysis Report, November/December 1970.

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The War by Military Regions

The war differs in each of Cambodia's military regions, making generalizations difficult. Indeed, regional variation is probably more pronounced in Cambodia than in South Vietnam for a number of reasons.

-- Enemy strategy in Cambodia differs greatly depending upon locale, if only because a large part of Cambodia east of the Mekong is more intimately involved with the war in South Vietnam. It is possible that the enemy sees two major arenas in Cambodia. The first, and probably most important, is the general border area--a defensive arena so far as the enemy is concerned in which his primary antagonist is ARVN and the primary purpose is the maintenance of the southern terminous of the Laotian supply system. The second arena lies generally west of the Mekong. Here enemy activity is primarily devoted to the isolation of Phnom Penh from its internal sources of sustenance.

-- The participants vary from region to region. Both FANK and the enemy have operated in all of Cambodia's military regions, but ARVN, the war's third major participant, has not often operated west of the Mekong and never in GKR MRs 3 and 4.

-- In contrast to the situation in South Vietnam, Cambodian military regions are not held together by a centralized, institutionalized military establishment. Although efforts are underway to centralize, difficulties in communication combine with tradition to give regional commanders great autonomy. The character of the war in each region therefore necessarily reflects the personalities, aggressiveness and orientation of the men on the ground, resulting in the kind of regional variation South Vietnam knew perhaps 20 years ago.

Each of Cambodia's military regions is discussed below in the same general terms: (1) the intensity and character of the war, (2) the patterns and effectiveness of enemy units there, and (3) the effectiveness of FANK.

Military Region 1.

- Actions and Casualties in MR 1. In absolute numbers, MR 1--north and east of Phnom Penh--most active of all MRs for four of the ten months surveyed, both in terms of combat actions and the production of casualties. More combat actions, exclusive of any ARVN involvement, have occurred here than in any other MR (1597 compared to 1560 in MR 2, the nearest rival), and about 34% of all FANK casualties since July have been reported from MR 1 (Table 6).

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TABLE 6

ACTIONS IN MR 1: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Contacts	51	175	241
Enemy Actions a/	219	509	331
FANK Actions b/	21	31	20
Total	291	715	592
Enemy Actions as % of Total	75	71	56

a/ Includes attacks, ABF, LOC interdiction, sabotage, terror.

b/ Includes attacks, ambushes.

Source: Khmer computer file from attache cable.

The enemy has initiated most of the combat activity each month for the past nine months but as Table 7 indicates, the activity has gradually moved away from situations in which FANK was clearly in a tactical defensive posture.

Casualties on both sides paralleled the pattern of activity until this year, when they fell closer to the lower levels of the rainy season. This decrease, portrayed in Table 9, reflects the enemy shift toward a greater reliance on standoff attacks.

TABLE 7

CASUALTIES IN MR 1: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1970</u>
FANK KIA			124
In Contacts	12	118	76
In Enemy Actions	141	351	4
In FANK Actions	19	22	204
Subtotal	172	491	
Enemy KIA			260
In Contacts	55	349	189
In Enemy Actions	145	799	16
In FANK Actions	18	71	465
Subtotal	218	1219	
Total KIA	390	1710	669
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	1.3	2.5	2.3

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Enemy Activity in MR 1. Enemy activity in MR 1 surged last fall but returned this year to a level much closer to the rainy season level last summer. The mix of enemy activity in MR 1 indicates a greater reliance on attacks by fire than anywhere else in Cambodia. As Table 8 indicates, the enemy launched about six attacks by fire for every ground assault in the 3rd quarter 1970. This ratio dropped to about 4 to 1 in the upsurge of enemy activity during the last three months in 1970, but has increased to about nine attacks by fire for each ground attack this year.

TABLE 8

MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 1

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Attacks	28	92	30
ABF/Harassment	159	384	267
LOC Interdiction	21	24	5
Sabotage/Terror	5	7	14
Other	6	2	8
Total	<u>219</u>	<u>509</u>	<u>339</u>
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks	5.6	4.2	8.7

FANK Patterns and Performance. Table 9 shows FANK strength in MR 1 for four of the last nine months. The FANK-Enemy strength ratio in MR 1 is the worst in the country, but the presence of ARVN compensates for the relatively poor ratio.

TABLE 9

FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES) (000)

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>MR 1</u>				
Combat	27.0	34.6	33.2	38.0
Support	2.3	2.3	2.6	4.2
Total	<u>29.3</u>	<u>36.9</u>	<u>35.8</u>	<u>42.2</u>

MR 1 was the site of the first FANK effort to launch a large scale clearing operation against enemy forces, at that time threatening Kampong Thom. Chen La, as the three month operation was termed, involved 23,000 FANK troops, but bogged down shortly after being launched on 7 September. Troops associated with the operation ultimately required ARVN assistance to break out of holding positions along route 7.

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By most accounts, Chen La showed that FANK had to improve considerably before it could seriously challenge enemy units in MR 1. Most assessments of the operation identified inexperience and leadership deficiencies as the primary problems.

But the attention given FANK difficulties in Chen La may have obscured other facts. FANK units in MR 1 have, for example, a comparatively good enemy/FANK kill ratio. (Return to Table 7.) It remains low compared to the ARVN record in Vietnam (about 2 to 1 compared with the ARVN record of about 6 to 1 over the last three years), but was one of the best in Cambodia this year. (The kill ratio was slightly higher in MR 3, but at a lower absolute level.)

The number of enemy killed per 1000 FANK combat strength has also been impressive compared to other areas of Cambodia. As Table 10 indicates, FANK was killing only about 3 enemy a month for each 1000 FANK combat troops stationed in MR 1 last summer. In the fourth quarter of the year this ratio jumped to 8.8 per month, still only about a third of the ARVN level in South Vietnam (second half 1970) and about half that achieved by ARVN units in GVN MR II (considered poor), but the best ever achieved by the Cambodian Army. The 4.6 level attained in 1971 was, again, the highest in Cambodia. ^{1/}

TABLE 10

ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FRIENDLY COMBAT STRENGTH IN MR 1
(Monthly Average)

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1970</u>
FANK vs Enemy in MR 1 a/			
Enemy KIA	73	306	155
FANK Strength (000)	27.0	34.6	33.2
KIA per 1000 Strength	2.7	8.8	4.6
	<u>2nd Half 69</u>	<u>1st Half 70</u>	<u>2nd Half 70</u>
ARVN vs Enemy in RVN b/			
(KIA/1000/Strength)	19	41	25
(in MR II)	(17)	(23)	(17)
(in MR III)	(14)	(34)	(17)

a/ Source: Khmer Computer File (excluding all actions with ARVN involvement).

b/ Source: SEEK Computer File; record of ARVN units in RVN MR II and III, considered to be worst in ARVN (See SEA Analysis Report, Nov-Dec 1970), included for comparative purposes.

^{1/} But was far below what has been reported for the ARVN units operating in GKR MR 1. During February 1971, about 18,000 ARVN, involved in operation Toan Thang killed nearly 2200 enemy, for a kill ratio of about 125 per 1000 combat strength. In March, the ARVN kill ratio for Toan Thang rose to about 135 per 1000 combat strength. (Based on NMCC reports of 1 March and 2 April 1971.)

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The improved FANK performance implied by the 8.8:ratio during the last three months of 1970 reflects the output of the Chen La operation. It suggests that FANK can perform more effectively when it tries--although it is still unimpressive when compared to the ARVN.

The high kill ratio also suggests that FANK may fight better when near ARVN. ARVN has, after all, operated extensively in GKR MR 1 since the cross border operations last year, and on two occasions--the relief of FANK forces on Route 7 and Operation Toan Thang--has engaged the enemy in the vicinity of the major concentration of FANK forces in MR 1 (the general Kampong Cham area)

To test this hypothesis, we isolated two periods of ARVN involvement in Cambodia and looked closely at the effect ARVN had on the FANK-enemy relationship in the general area of ARVN operations (see map 2: The ARVN relief operation on Route 7 and Operation Toan Thang). We found ARVN operations had significant impact on the enemy tactics adopted vis-a-vis FANK, and that recent ARVN operations have been paralleled by higher combat performance on the part of FANK units in the same general area.


Table 11 shows combat activity involving the enemy and FANK peaked shortly before the ARVN relief force arrived in Kampong Cham on December 15. It also demonstrates how the enemy disengaged from contact with FANK as the ARVN clearing operation pushed along Route 7 toward Prey Totung. No ground attacks were launched against FANK positions and standoff attacks dropped to about half the level recorded during the two weeks just before the ARVN intervention. As the enemy disengaged, however, FANK remained inside their defensive positions.^{1/} The result was a drop in both enemy and FANK casualties. There is nothing in the data which suggests the ARVN intervention in December was paralleled by greater aggressiveness or higher combat performance on the part of FANK.

^{1/} Perhaps because of the heavy losses taken just before ARVN entered the picture.

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MAP 2

THE ARVN-ENEMY-FANK RELATIONSHIP: AREA INVESTIGATED



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TABLE 11

FANK-ENEMY INTERACTION NEAR ARVN*
(Weekly Average)

	ARVN Present				1971 Jan	ARVN Present	
	1970 Oct	Nov	1-15 Dec	15-31 Dec ^{a/}		Feb ^{b/}	Mar ^{b/}
Enemy Activity							
Ground Attacks	2	11	5	0	0.3	1	1
ABF/Harassment	6	8	12	5	3	5	7
FANK Attacks	1	2	1	1	0	1	6
Other Contacts	3	7	10	7	6	6	6
Enemy killed by FANK	22	54	186	30	10	39	57
FANK killed by Enemy	9	39	87	13	5	6	17
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	(2.4)	(1.4)	(2.1)	(2.3)	(2.0)	(6.5)	(3.4)

* Data includes incidents involving only FANK and Enemy Forces.

a/ Period of ARVN relief operation on Route 7.

b/ Period of ARVN Toan Thang 1/71 NB operation.

But data from the second period of ARVN operations in the same general area paint a different picture. The ARVN operation Toan Thang in February and March was paralleled by higher Enemy/FANK kill ratios, (between 3.4 and 6.5 compared to a high of 2.4 for the previous four months), greater FANK willingness to seek and engage the enemy^{1/}, and as Table 12 indicates, slightly better performance than three or four months earlier.

^{1/} FANK launched 25 ground attacks against enemy positions in March compared with a total of 16 for the previous five months; in addition, the conditions of FANK casualties shifted: between October and January 31 only about 30% of all FANK KIA were incurred outside FANK defensive positions; in February and March about 50% of all FANK KIA died outside their own wire.

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TABLE 12

ENEMY/FANK KILL RATIOS a/

	Oct	Nov	ARVN Present	
			Feb	Mar
<u>Enemy Attacks</u>	(8)b/	(22)	(3)	(5)
Enemy KIA	36	154	61	71
FANK KIA	8	90	2	30
Ratio	4.5	1.7	30.5	2.4
<u>FANK Attacks</u>	(4)	(7)	(2)	(25)
Enemy KIA	0	26	3	70
FANK KIA	2	6	1	16
Ratio	---	4.3	3.0	4.4
<u>Other Contacts</u>	(12)	(27)	(25)	(25)
Enemy KIA	28	28	76	65
FANK KIA	13	45	37	10
Ratio	2.2	0.6	4.5	6.6

a/ Data includes incidents involving only FANK and enemy forces

b/ Figures in parentheses refer to number of actions.

These statistics by no means prove that FANK fights better simply because ARVN is present. (A counter example is provided by data from MR 2; see below p. 27). The most important effect ARVN has on FANK combat proficiency is probably indirect; ARVN makes the enemy change his activity vis-a-vis FANK which, in turn, affects what FANK does. But the data from February and March strongly imply that when ARVN's presence is accompanied by other factors, such as good communication between FANK and ARVN leaders, ARVN's presence tends to have a direct and beneficial effect on FANK performance.

Military Region 2

- Action and Casualties. MR 2, south and west of Phnom Penh, has vied with MR 1 as the most active military region. Although 83 more combat actions have been reported in MR 1 for the period beginning last July, MR 2 led the nation in total combat actions for five of the last nine months. Casualties have also been high; MR 2 has contributed about 24% of total FANK KIA.

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The enemy has dominated the war in MR 2 despite about an 8:1 combat strength ratio in favor of FANK over the last nine months. Table 13 indicates FANK has gradually moved outside their defensive positions (i.e.: FANK actions plus contacts) but even if all reported contacts are considered as FANK initiated, the data indicate the gap between enemy and FANK activity has not narrowed significantly. Although the ratio has improved slightly, the enemy continues to start at least two fights for every one started by FANK, even if we assume all "contacts" are FANK initiated.

TABLE 13

ACTIONS IN MR 2: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1970</u>
Contacts	67	200	229
Enemy Actions a/	26	28	22
FANK Actions b/	<u>210</u>	<u>332</u>	<u>449</u>
Total	<u>303</u>	<u>560</u>	<u>700</u>
Enemy as % of Total Actions	69	59	64

a/ Includes ground attacks, ABF, IOC interdiction, sabotage and terror.

b/ Includes ground attacks and ambushes.

Casualties in MR 2 have declined in 1971 despite high activity levels on both sides (Table 14). It is difficult to account for the decline; there has been no shift in activity similar to the enemy concentration on standoff attacks which occurred in MR 1. The ability of the enemy to limit his KIA total this year to a level below that sustained last summer--despite the upsurge in activity brought about by the Pich Nil operation in January--suggests either that the enemy units in MR 2 are very good or FANK forces there are very poor.

TABLE 14

CASUALTIES IN MR 2: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK KIA			
In Contacts	38	80	122
In Enemy Actions	148	110	63
In FANK Actions	<u>2</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>11</u>
Subtotal	<u>188</u>	<u>208</u>	<u>196</u>
Enemy KIA			
In Contacts	213	327	176
In Enemy Actions	56	185	59
In FANK Actions	<u>75</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>48</u>
Subtotal	<u>344</u>	<u>542</u>	<u>283</u>
Total KIA	532	750	479
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	1.8	2.6	1.4

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217

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- Enemy Activity in MR 2. Man for man, the enemy units in MR 2 are more active against FANK than enemy units in MRs 1, 3 and 4. The mix of enemy activity in MR 2 (Table 15) has been different from that reported for MR 1, and shows a greater reliance on ground attacks. The enemy launched only about 1.5 attacks by fire for each ground assault in the last half of 1970. This ratio increased to 4:1 in 1971, but was lower than the 9 to 1 ratio in MR 1. One of the factors which must have contributed to low enemy casualties is better performance during attacks. The highest enemy casualty rate during attacks was one KIA per attack (3rd Qtr 1970) and it has been as low as .3 (1st Qtr 1971); in MR 1 the enemy usually loses 2 to 3 KIA per attack.

TABLE 15

MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 2: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Attacks	60	107	87
ABF/HAR	82	160	319
LOC Interdiction	42	51	28
Sabotage/Terror	22	9	15
Other	4	5	2
	<u>210</u>	<u>332</u>	<u>451</u>
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks	1.4	1.5	3.7

- FANK patterns and Performance. Table 16 shows FANK strength in MR 2. FANK combat troops have outnumbered the enemy there by as high as about 9:1.

TABLE 16

FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES)
(000)

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Sep</u>		<u>Nov</u>	
<u>MR 2</u>				
Combat	31.4	35.9	33.0	37.1
Support	3.1	3.6	3.6	8.3
Total	<u>34.5</u>	<u>40.5</u>	<u>36.6</u>	<u>45.4</u>

The second effort by FANK to launch and carry through a major clearing operation--Operation Pich Nil--was made in January and involved 5,000 FANK combat troops. Although ultimately successful in opening Route 4, this operation required ARVN assistance and US air support. Most observers have commented or implied that the operation demonstrated FANK problems rather than proficiency. Again, the problems identified most often in field assessments were poor leadership and lack of combat experience.

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FANK units in MR 2 have performed at levels lower than those attained by units in MR 1 since the dry season began in October 1970. Despite a friendly enemy combat strength ratio which has been as high as 9 to 1 (September 1970), FANK units in MR 2 have not been able to improve their enemy kill ratio (Table 14); this year the kill ratio in MR 2 has fallen to about the level attained in MR 4 (1.4 for MR 2, 1.7 for MR 4), which is slightly worse than the poorest record achieved by RF/PF units in South Vietnam in the last three years (1.6 in the 2nd half of 1969 in GVN MR II).

The enemy KIA per 1000 FANK combat strength has not improved noticeably either. As Table 17 indicates, it declined after reaching a high of about 5 last fall to a point below that attained last summer. For the last six months it has been only about half as good as that achieved by FANK units in MR 1.

TABLE 17

ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FRIENDLY COMBAT STRENGTH
(Monthly Average)

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK vs Enemy in MR 2			
Enemy KIA	115	181	94
FANK Strength (000)	31.4	36.9	33.0
KIA per 1000 Strength	3.7	4.9	2.8
FANK vs Enemy in MR 1			
KIA per 1000 Strength	2.7	8.8	4.6

MR 2 has also been the site of joint ARVN-FANK operations comparable to those discussed in MR 1. We investigated closely the ARVN assistance in opening Pich Nil Pass on Route 4 (14-31 Jan 1971), to judge whether the patterns we saw in MR 1 were also reflected here. They were not.

Table 18 shows how the introduction of ARVN to the Pich Nil operation during the last two weeks of January reduced enemy pressure against FANK. As ARVN entered the picture, the enemy standoff attacks dropped to about a third the level attained the two weeks prior to ARVN intervention. Ground attacks had actually slackened earlier, and the lower rate of about one per week was maintained as ARVN pushed along Route 4.

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TABLE 18

FANK - ENEMY INTERACTION NEAR ARVN IN MR 2
(Weekly Average)

	1970			1-15	ARVN Present	Feb	Mar
	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	15-31 Jan		
Enemy Activity							
Ground Attacks	1	3	4	1	1	1	1
ABF/HAR	1	1	2	6	2	3	3
FANK Attacks	0	0	0.3	1	2	0	0
Other Contacts	2	1	5	3	5	1	3
Enemy Killed by FANK	4	3	37	15	2	1	3
FANK Killed by Enemy	1	8	10	4	7	3	3
Kill Ratio	4.0	0.4	3.7	3.8	.3	.3	1.0

In contrast to the December road clearing operation in MR 1, the ARVN intervention was paralled in MR 2 by a greater FANK willingness to move out of defensive positions. (The average rate of FANK attacks and contacts increased.) But FANK combat proficiency, as measured by its ability to kill the enemy, actually declined. As Table 19 indicates, the number of enemy killed per FANK attack or contact was lower while ARVN was present than when ARVN was absent.

TABLE 19

ENEMY/FANK KILL RATIO a/

	Dec	1-15 Jan	ARVN Present 15-31 Jan	Feb
<u>Enemy Attacks/Amb</u>	(14)b/	(1)	(1)	(3)
Enemy KIA	130	0	0	0
FANK KIA	16	0	0	0
Ratio	8.1	-	-	-
<u>FANK Attacks/Amb</u>	(1)	(1)	(3)	(0)
Enemy KIA	2	30	0	0
FANK KIA	2	0	10	0
Ratio	1	-	-	-
<u>Other Contacts</u>	(20)	(7)	(10)	(5)
Enemy KIA	14	0	3	4
FANK KIA	19	4	2	9
Ratio	.7	-	1.5	.4

a/ Data includes incidents involving only FANK and enemy forces.

b/ Figures in parentheses refer to number of actions.

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Military Region 3

- Action and Casualties. MR 3, west of Phnom Penh, has less than half as much activity as either MR 1 or MR 2. Higher levels of FANK activity in the last three months raised MR 3 from the least active MR (excluding MR 5) to slightly ahead of MR 4, but only in December 1970 did the number of reported actions exceed 100 per month. Casualties have also been low; MR 3 has contributed about 9% of total FANK KIA.

The locale of combat activity has steadily moved away from FANK defenses. This year more than half of all reported actions have taken place outside FANK wire (i.e. FANK attacks, ambushes and contacts), a situation that occurred elsewhere only in MR 4.

TABLE 20

ACTIONS IN MR 3: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Contacts	75	152	127
Enemy Actions a/	20	74	142
FANK Actions b/	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>9</u>
Total	108	238	278
Enemy Actions as % of Total	69	64	46

a/ Includes ground attacks, attacks by fire, LOC interdictions, sabotage and terror.

b/ Includes ground attacks, ambushes, and contacts.

Both friendly and enemy KIA peaked at the end of 1970. The enemy-FANK kill ratio has been low, but shows signs of improving. This year it was the best in Cambodia, but at a much lower absolute level than MR 1 (Table 21).

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TABLE 21

CASUALTIES IN MR 3: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK KIA			
In Contacts	6	49	39
In Enemy Actions	49	44	25
In FANK Actions	11	0	0
Subtotal	<u>66</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>64</u>
Enemy KIA			
In Contacts	31	139	133
In Enemy Actions	40	29	4
In FANK Actions	74	8	17
Subtotal	<u>145</u>	<u>176</u>	<u>154</u>
Total KIA	211	269	218
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	2.2	1.9	2.4

- Enemy Activity in MR 3. As in MR 1, enemy activity peaked during the last quarter of 1970, but at a much lower level (509 enemy actions in MR 1 compared with only 152 in MR 3). The gain was due both to an increase in enemy forces and to greater aggressiveness. The level of enemy actions per 1000 combat strength increased nearly 20% from the summer to the fall.

Enemy activity in MR 3 has demonstrated a high reliance on ground attacks. Last summer the enemy initiated twice as many ground attacks as attacks by fire. He has since relied more heavily on attacks by fire, but the ratio of attacks by fire to ground assaults is only 3.5 to 1 this year (compared with 9 to 1 in MR 1 and 3.7 to 1 in MR 2).

LOC interdictions in MR 3 rose sharply in the last quarter of 1970; but have returned to rainy season levels this year. Terrorism became evident in MR 3 beginning about six months ago and has constituted about 10% of all enemy initiated action during the last six months. (Table 22)

TABLE 22

MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 3

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Attacks	36	50	22
ABF/Harassment	19	54	78
LOC Interdiction	13	32	12
Sabotage/Terror	6	14	13
Other	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	<u>75</u>	<u>152</u>	<u>127</u>
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks	.5	1.1	3.5

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FANK Patterns and Performance in MR 3. Table 23 shows FANK strength in MR 3. FANK combat personnel have outnumbered their enemy counterparts by as high as 14:1, but MR 3 is considered a general training area by FANK and the best troops there are often sent elsewhere. (Table 23)

TABLE 23

<u>MR 3</u>	<u>FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES)</u>			
	<u>(000)</u>			
	<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Mar</u>
Combat	17.1	19.7	18.2	21.0
Support	2.0	3.0	2.5	3.3
Total	19.1	22.7	21.2	24.3

FANK has conducted few large operations in MR 3 although they have outnumbered the enemy by as high as 14 to 1. The reluctance to begin larger scale operations may be partly a result of difficult terrain (enemy base areas have been established in relatively inaccessible areas of the Cardemom Mountains) and the difficulty of launching and supplying large operations from Phnom Penh.

FANK troops in MR 3 have generally killed fewer enemy per 1000 FANK combat strength than FANK in MRs 1 and 2. During the last three months of 1970, when enemy activity levels reached their highest level, kills per 1000 strength have improved slightly, but Table 24 indicates that enemy KIA per 1000 FANK combat strength currently remain low and at about the same level as in MR 2 (Table 24).

TABLE 24

<u>ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FANK COMBAT STRENGTH</u>	<u>(Monthly Average)</u>		
	<u>3Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1Qtr 1971</u>
FANK vs Enemy in MR 3	39	58	51
Enemy KIA	39	58	51
FANK Strength (000)	17.1	19.7	18.2
KIA per 1000 Strength	2.3	2.9	2.8
FANK vs Enemy in MR 1 (KIA per 1000 strength)	2.7	8.8	4.6
FANK vs Enemy in MR 2 (KIA per 1000 strength)	3.7	4.9	2.8

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Military Region 4

Action and Casualties. This year, MR 4, northwest of Pnom Penh, has been the least active region in Cambodia for FANK because enemy activity dropped off. A total of 565 actions have been reported in MR 4 since last July, the lowest for any region. The region has contributed about 13% of all FANK KIA since July, although both FANK and enemy KIA are declining. As in the case of MR 3, most combat activity appears to now be occurring outside of FANK defensive positions. (Table 25).

TABLE 25

ACTIONS IN MR 4: NO ARVN OR THAI INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Contacts	29	65	92
Enemy Actions	124	158	71
FANK Actions	10	15	1
Total	<u>163</u>	<u>238</u>	<u>164</u>
Enemy Actions as % of Total	76%	66%	43%

Both FANK and enemy casualties have dropped steadily; the monthly KIA rate for FANK has fallen from about 57 last summer to about 19 this year, and the enemy KIA rate has slipped from 97 to 28. The enemy-FANK kill ratio dropped slightly last fall and has remained constant at about 1.3-1.7 enemy KIA for each FANK KIA, the lowest level of any MR. (Table 26)

TABLE 26

CASUALTIES IN MR 4: NO ARVN OR THAI INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK KIA			
In Contacts	58	48	41
In Enemy Actions	44	32	18
In FANK Actions	68	19	0
Subtotal	<u>170</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>59</u>
Enemy KIA			
In Contacts	114	110	101
In Enemy Actions	32	4	0
In FANK Actions	144	17	1
Subtotal	<u>290</u>	<u>131</u>	<u>102</u>
Total KIA	460	230	161
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	1.7	1.3	1.7

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- Enemy Activity in MR 4. The data suggest an enemy effort to disengage in MR 4. Enemy activity surged in August, October and November (64, 55 and 54 actions respectively), but has declined in 1971 to about half the level of last fall. Enemy combat strength in MR 4 has also declined, but the activity drop seems to be more a result of conscious choice by the enemy than of strength reductions. The enemy activity per 1000 strength has, for example, declined from about 79 in the last three months of 1970 to 27 for the first quarter 1971. The argument that the enemy is trying to disengage is further supported by the few enemy KIA in enemy initiated actions this year. (See Table 26).

The mix of enemy activity has also changed markedly; since the beginning of the year only one enemy ground attack had been reported from MR 4 by April 23. (Table 27)

TABLE 27

MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 4

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Attacks	27	19	1
ABF/Harassment	91	120	55
IOC Interdiction	3	16	14
Sabotage/Terror	1	2	6
Other	2	1	1
	<u>124</u>	<u>158</u>	<u>77</u>
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks	3.4	6.3	55.0

- FANK Patterns and Performance in MR 4. Table 28 portrays FANK strengths in MR 4. MR 4 has the second worst FANK/Enemy strength ratio in the country (exceeded only by MR 1). (Table 28).

TABLE 28

FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES)
(000)

<u>MR 4</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Sep</u>		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Mar</u>
Combat	13.4	12.1	15.0	17.8
Support	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5
Total	<u>15.9</u>	<u>14.5</u>	<u>17.5</u>	<u>20.3</u>

The enemy effort to disengage does not appear to have been prompted by greater aggressiveness on FANK's part. The number of enemy killed per 1000

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FANK combat strength has declined. Table 29 shows the steady decline from the highest level of any MR last summer to what has been the second lowest level (exceeded only by the PPSMR) this year.

TABLE 29

<u>ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FRIENDLY COMBAT STRENGTH</u> (Monthly Average)			
	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK vs Enemy in MR 4			
Enemy KIA	97	44	34
FANK Strength (000)	13.4	12.1	15.0
KIA per 1000 strength	7.2	3.6	2.3
Ratios:			
In MR 1	2.7	8.8	4.6
In MR 2	3.7	4.9	2.8
In MR 3	2.3	2.9	2.8

It is difficult to account for the pattern of activity in MR 4, but one of the hypotheses generated by the data is that FANK and enemy units in MR 4 are moving toward or have reached an accommodation with each other. Several bits of evidence support the argument.

- First, MR 4 has a comparatively balanced strength ratio--in Cambodian terms, anyway. Although the worst force ratio exists in MR 1 (about two FANK to one enemy) the enemy units there must contend with ARVN. The strength ratio in MR 4 is better (about 7 to 1), but below the ratio of MR 2. FANK has shown its reluctance to raise its combat output even in MR 3 where it has a very favorable force ratio; it might be even more willing to avoid combat when the ratio is much less favorable.

- Second, command and control between Phnom Penh and MR 4 is probably the weakest link in the entire FANK structure. FANK units in MR 4 would be the most difficult to support from Phnom Penh, and even now probably get last choice so far as the flow of money, material and weapons is concerned. MR 4 commanders realize this fact of military life, a realization which could increase the desire for some sort of accommodation with enemy units in the region.

- Third, the composition of enemy units in the region could contribute to arrangements. Although our understanding of enemy structure and activities is by no means complete; there is some evidence indicating enemy units in MR 4 have a higher percentage of Cambodian personnel than enemy units stationed elsewhere in Cambodia. This may serve to dampen the conflict somewhat.

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- Fourth, there are compelling strategic reasons on both sides for some sort of accommodation. The NVA/VC elements in MR 4 may hope to avoid Thai involvement, something they face if they raise the level of conflict too high; and the Cambodians may be quite reluctant to take the war to the enemy when, as is often the case, enemy positions are in or adjacent to national or traditional shrines (eg: Angkor Wat).

Accommodation is only one explanation generated by the data. The will to fight may exist on the part of FANK units in MR 4; they may simply lack the resources. Efforts to improve the combat potential of FANK in MR 4 are underway and we hope to soon have data which indicate whether the resources obtained are having a beneficial effect. 1/

Phnom Penh Special Military Region (PPSMR)

Action and Casualties. Activity in the Phnom Penh Special Military Region has risen steadily; in March this area had become the second most active region in the country. It has contributed about 21% of the FANK KIA since July. An upsurge in FANK activity in the fourth quarter of 1970 moved the focus of most action outside FANK defenses, but the continued increase in enemy activity this year has prevented FANK from reducing the ratio much more, despite the best strength ratio in the country. (Table 30).

TABLE 30

ACTIONS IN THE PHNOM PENH SPECIAL MR (No ARVN Involvement)

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Contacts	30	87	139
Enemy Actions	116	210	282
FANK Actions	8	21	38
Total	<u>154</u>	<u>318</u>	<u>459</u>
Enemy Actions as % of Total	75%	66%	61%

FANK casualties have remained steady and enemy KIA have declined despite the increase in activity. The monthly enemy KIA rate dropped from about 160 per month last fall to about 75 this year. As Table 31 shows, these changes have been reflected in a noticeable decline in the Enemy/FANK kill ratio.

1/ The MR 4 commander has continued to build his combat base despite difficulties in resupply. Beginning in April 1970, he has recruited and either trained or sent to training in RVN about 21 battalions.

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TABLE 3E

CASUALTIES IN THE PPSMR: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK KIA			
Contacts			
In Enemy Actions	9	34	74
In FANK Actions	37	70	59
Subtotal	<u>13</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>14</u>
Subtotal	59	135	147
Enemy KIA			
Contacts			
In Enemy Actions	27	169	125
In FANK Actions	372	198	39
Subtotal	<u>22</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>62</u>
Subtotal	421	490	226
Total KIA	480	625	373
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	7.1	3.6	1.5

Enemy Activity. The increase in enemy activity suggests the Phnom Penh Special Military Region assumed more strategic importance to the enemy around the turn of the year. While the January attack on Pochentong Airfield captured the attention of FANK and led to extensive troop reshuffling, enemy actions in the PPSMR have been maintained at high levels since then; 104 actions in January, 91 in February and 122 for March, compared to a monthly average of about 70 last fall and 40 last summer (Table 32).

The increase of enemy activity has been a function of greater aggressiveness. Enemy combat strength in the PPSMR has remained fairly stable, but the units have more than doubled their activity level.

Man for man, their level of combat output was over twice that of enemy units elsewhere in Cambodia, took place in the military region where the enemy has the worst strength ratio, and in the faces of FANK's best troops. These factors, combined with the data which indicate the enemy in the PPSMR has cut his casualties drastically, suggest either that the enemy in the PPSMR is the best in Cambodia or that enemy units elsewhere are operating far below their capacity.

Most (88%) enemy activity in the PPSMR has been devoted to ground attacks and attacks by fire. The ratio of attacks by fire to ground attacks has increased gradually to the level attained in MR 2 this year.

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TABLE 32

MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE PPSMR

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Attacks	34	55	62
ABF/Harassment	61	125	228
LOC Interdiction	15	17	10
Sabotage/Terror	6	11	15
Other	0	2	2
	116	210	317
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks	1.8	2.3	3.7

FANK Patterns and Performance

The PPSMR has always been the core of the defense of Cambodia so far as FANK headquarters is concerned. FANK units there are the best equipped, and as the January attack on Pochentong Airfield demonstrated, the FANK command is willing to quickly erode the defenses of other military regions when it senses the capital is threatened. As Table 33 indicates, the importance placed on the PPSMR has been reflected in FANK strength there. FANK combat strength has outnumbered the enemy by as high as 43 to 1 (Table 33).

TABLE 33

FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES)
(000)

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>PPSMR</u>				
Combat	25.1	32.7	43.4	42.0
Support	10.4	10.2	10.2	15.0
Total	35.5	42.9	53.6	56.0

But the performance of FANK units in the PPSMR has not been up to the strategic importance of the region to FANK leaders. As Table 31 indicated, the FANK kill record has not been particularly good since last summer. Despite the increase of FANK combat strength in the region since January and the favorable force ratio, enemy KIA per 1000 FANK strength has declined sharply. As Table 34 shows, it has been the worst in the country in 1971.^{1/}

^{1/} Perhaps because many of the FANK units in the PPSMR are held as reserve and not committed to combat.

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TABLE 34

ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FANK COMBAT STRENGTH
(Monthly Average)

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK vs Enemy in PPSMR			
Enemy KIA	140	163	75
FANK Strength	25.1	32.7	43.4
KIA per. 1000 Strength	5.6	5.0	1.7
FANK vs Enemy in MR 1 (KIA/Strength)	2.7	8.8	4.6
FANK vs Enemy in MR 2 (KIA/Strength)	3.7	4.9	2.8
FANK vs Enemy in MR 3 (KIA/Strength)	2.3	2.9	2.8
FANK vs Enemy in MR 4 (KIA/Strength)	7.2	3.6	2.3

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APPENDIX

NOTE ON THE DATA AND DEFINITIONS

The Data

Many of the statistics used in this paper are from the Khmer Computer File, originated and maintained by OASD/SA. The file, now containing about 15,000 separate records, is based exclusively on data provided by the daily defense attache cable from Phnom Penh (DAMSREP). The DAMSREP, in turn, includes all situation reports which FANK units in the field have sent to FANK headquarters in Phnom Penh. The reports are passed to the Attache, translated, and forwarded to Washington within 24 hours of their arrival in FANK headquarters.

The statistics are therefore based on operational and not confirmed data, and should be used on the assumption that any given number may not be precisely correct. However, close analysis of the reports, direct observation of the collection and translation process in Cambodia, comparison with other reporting systems, and experience with similar data from Vietnam indicate that data derived from the DAMSREP provide the most comprehensive and complete portrait of actions in Cambodia currently available.

Definitions

The following definitions have been applied to the terms used:

Contact - A combat action which takes place outside of FANK or friendly front lines.

Attack - A ground assault, usually accompanied by fire, in which one antagonist attempts to occupy physically the position of another. The size of the forces involved is not specified.

Attack by Fire/Harassment - The firing of weapons of any caliber or type by one antagonist at another which is not accompanied by an "attack." The number of rounds involved is not specified.

LOC Interdiction - Efforts of one antagonist to halt or impede the movement of an opponent. This category includes reports of ambushes, minings, or physical destruction of bridges, etc.

Sabotage/Terror - Efforts of the enemy directed primarily against the rural population or military materiel as opposed to military personnel.

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THE WAR IN CAMBODIA

Summary

Data from Cambodia indicate that the pattern of the war during the April-June period did not change much from that in the January-March period, except for a rise in casualties on both sides.

- The enemy continued to rely on standoff attacks (about 75% of all enemy actions).

- But both FANK and enemy casualties rose (FANK up 37%, enemy up 38%), primarily as a result of actions near Route 4 and in the Tonle Toch area northeast of Phnom Penh.

Comparing July 1971 with July 1970 indicates the level of activity has increased (152 combat actions in July 1970; 702 in July this year), but that KIA totals are similar (455 KIA in 1970; 462 this year). This is due in part to a percentage shift in enemy activity toward standoff attacks and better avoidance of casualties in individual actions by both sides.

The Cambodian Army (FANK) remained on the defensive in the 2nd quarter of 1971.

- 60% of all actions are clearly attributable to enemy initiative.

- Activity remained centered on Cambodian roads.

The war continued to vary by Military Region during the 2nd quarter 1971.

- In MR 1 the enemy/FANK kill ratio slipped to the rainy season level (about 1.3 to 1).

- In MR 2 the enemy/FANK kill ratio improved as enemy KIA reached their highest quarterly level in a year.

- In MR 3 there was no noticeable difference from the previous three month period.

- In MR 4 the enemy has continued to disengage; FANK's ability to kill the enemy continues to decline.

- In the Phnom Penh Special Military Region, the ratio of enemy KIA per 1000 FANK combat strength recovered to (about 4.4) but the pattern of activity crept closer to the capital.

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THE WAR IN CAMBODIA

Details

Background: The April - June 1971 Period.

In late March, the Communist units in Cambodia increased the tempo of their dry season campaign. The step up in activity began with a prolonged attack on two FANK battalions holding the Pich Nil pass and several heavy mortar attacks against South Vietnamese operating near and in the Chup Plantation, northeast of Phnom Penh. By April 2, the Communists had successfully interdicted Route 4 near the Pich Nil pass, and although the Cambodians launched a road clearing operation in late March, the enemy maintained their hold on Highway 4 for over five weeks.

In mid-May, FANK began a highly publicized drive to clear Route 3. The operation was initially conducted by eight FANK battalions under the personal direction of Lt. Colonel Lon Non, the Prime Minister's brother. By late May the force had moved ten miles south of its base at Tram Khnar against light opposition, conducted for the most part by Khmer Communist troops, and had directed its attention to "pacification" rather than continuing a military sweep.

Meanwhile, the Communists moved against government positions in Oddar Meanchey Province, gaining control of most of Route 68 between the province capital and the Thai border. They met little opposition. In early June, the enemy carried out a series of mortar and ground attacks on a number of Cambodian positions northeast of Phnom Penh.

During the first two weeks in June, Communist forces continued to offer strong opposition to government efforts to dislodge them from an area 15 miles northeast of Phnom Penh. The FANK task force sent to clear the enemy from the Tonle Toch area was hit on June 8, but managed to recover from its temporary disarray and fight its way through the encircling enemy troops. By June 18 the Cambodians had committed 28 battalions (about 13,000 troops) to the Tonle Toch area and, as the rainy season began in July, the North Vietnamese troops withdrew.

The activity


Our earlier analysis^{1/} pointed out that the level of activity in Cambodia roughly doubled between the third and fourth quarters of 1970 and was maintained at the higher level through the first three months of 1971. The increase stemmed from an upsurge of enemy standoff attacks (attacks by fire and harassment) and from actions reported as "contacts" (ie: combat actions which occur outside of FANK defensive wire).

Data for the April-June period indicate the general pattern of the war for the country as a whole changed little from the first quarter. As Table 1 shows, the enemy continued to rely on standoff attacks as opposed to ground assaults.

1/ SEA Analysis Report, March/April 1971.

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There were some differences between the first and second quarters of this year. During the April-June period, enemy ground attacks fell to their lowest level. Sabotage/Terrorist incidents were also at their lowest point.

But the mix of enemy activity was about the same as in the previous three months (first quarter standoff attacks constituted about 72% of all enemy actions; they were at 75% in the second quarter.) Percentagewise, the level of "contacts" were also quite similar (38% and 37%, respectively, of all reported actions). The level of enemy activities in the 2nd quarter continued to remain low compared to what the Communists were doing in South Vietnam during the same period.

TABLE 1

ACTIONS IN CAMBODIA: FANK VS THE ENEMY a/
(No ARVN Involvement) b/

	<u>3rd Qtr 70</u>	<u>4th Qtr 70</u>	<u>1st Qtr 71^{d/}</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 71</u>
<u>FANK Actions</u>				
Ground Attacks	45	69	68	15
Ambushes	7	17	20	24
Other	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>16</u>
Subtotal	<u>54</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>55</u>
<u>Enemy Actions</u>				
Ground Attacks	185	323	204	145
Attacks by fire/harassment	412	843	951	829
LOC Interdiction	94	141	90	98
Sabotage/Terror	40	43	57	28
Other	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>6</u>
Subtotal	<u>744(6331)^{c/}</u>	<u>1362(4298)</u>	<u>1317 (4889)</u>	<u>1106(4963)</u>
<u>Contacts</u>	195	605	879	675
<u>Total Combat Actions</u>	995	2061	2299	1836

a/ Source: Khmer Computer File from daily attache reports. Actions reported as a "contact" are often ambiguous regarding the circumstances involved and, in particular, which side initiated the action. "Contacts" are defined by FANK as combat actions which occur outside FANK defensive positions, and, accordingly, many contacts are probably brought about by conscious FANK efforts to find and destroy enemy units. But, because "contacts" can also refer to actions in which FANK either was not seeking nor expecting combat activity, they have been dealt with as a separate category of activity.

b/ Does not include actions in which ARVN was reported as involved.

c/ Figures in parentheses indicate count of similar action in South Vietnam for some period. Source: OASD(C) Southeast Asia Statistical Summary.

d/ Corrected data.

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Enemy KIA increased slightly during 2nd Qtr 1971, due primarily to enemy losses in June in the Phnom Penh Special Military Region (PPSMR) and in Military Region 2. FANK KIA increased to the second highest quarterly total for the last year. (Table 2)

TABLE 2

COMBAT DEATHS IN CAMBODIA: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT a/

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr d/</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>
<u>FANK KIA</u>				
In Enemy Actions <u>b/</u>	419	607	239	480
In FANK Actions <u>c/</u>	111	52	33	19
In Contacts	<u>123</u>	<u>333</u>	<u>396</u>	<u>414</u>
Subtotal	<u>653</u>	<u>992</u>	<u>668</u>	<u>913</u>
<u>Enemy KIA</u>				
In Enemy Actions <u>b/</u>	645	1215	282	615
In FANK Actions <u>c/</u>	442	258	154	123
In Contacts	<u>442</u>	<u>1104</u>	<u>964</u>	<u>1225</u>
Subtotal	<u>1529</u>	<u>2577</u>	<u>1410</u>	<u>1963</u>
Total KIA (FANK plus Enemy)	2182	3569	2078	2876

a/ Source: Khmer computer file from attache reports, data excludes incidents with any ARVN involvement.

b/ Includes enemy ground attacks, ambushes, attacks by fire, harassment, LOC interdiction, sabotage and terror.

c/ Includes FANK ground attacks, ambushes, attacks by fire.

d/ Corrected data.

As Table 2 indicates, July 1971 was much more active than July a year ago, particularly in terms of enemy actions (primarily standoff attacks) and the number of reported contacts. But the number of KIA was about the same.

TABLE 3

ACTIONS AND CASUALTIES IN CAMBODIA: FANK VS. THE ENEMY a/ (No ARVN Involvement)

	<u>July 1970</u>	<u>July 1971</u>
FANK Actions <u>b/</u>	17	45
Enemy Actions <u>c/</u>	116	422
Contacts <u>d/</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>235</u>
Total Combat Actions	<u>152</u>	<u>702</u>
FANK KIA	159	210
Enemy KIA	<u>296</u>	<u>252</u>
Total KIA	<u>455</u>	<u>462</u>

a/ Source. Khmer Computer File from daily attache reports.

b/ Includes attacks and ambushes.

c/ Includes attacks, ambushes, attacks by fire, harassment, sabotage and terror.

d/ Refers to combat actions occurring outside FANK defensive positions; initiator is unclear.

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Three factors probably account for what looks like a much higher level of activity with about the same number of casualties. First, the reporting system itself may be shaking down and reporting more actions which do not result in casualties than it was a year ago.

Second, the pattern of action, particularly enemy actions, has changed. In absolute numbers, enemy ground attacks slipped from 43 in July 1970 to 32 in July of this year. But in percentage of total enemy activity the drop was even more impressive. In July 1970 ground attacks constituted about 37% of all reported enemy activity, a year later ground attacks had slipped to 7% of enemy activity. The enemy's shift toward a less intense mode of tactical activity probably contributes to keeping casualties in line with those of last year despite the increased number of clashes.

Third, both sides may be getting better in avoiding casualties. Both the enemy and FANK apparently lost more men per action in July a year ago than was the case this July. In July 1970, the enemy lost 2.4 men KIA per "contact;" this July the enemy loss per contact was about 1. Likewise, FANK losses were .5 KIA per contact this July as compared with about 1.5 per contact last year.

FANK Patterns and Performance

FANK remained on the defensive through June. At least 60% of all actions reported in the 2nd quarter can be attributed to enemy initiative (Table 2 in previous section) and the overall patterns of activity remained centered around Phnom Penh's lifelines, not in the enemy base areas (See Map plot).

There is some evidence of FANK improvement. The percentage of actions which are clearly attributable to enemy initiative has declined compared to the last six months of 1970. Between July and December 1970, about 70% of all reported actions were attributed to enemy initiative; this percentage fell to about 60% for the first half of 1971 (return to Table 1).


The circumstances of FANK deaths reportedly are changing. During the last half of 1970 about 62% of all FANK KIA died in situations where the enemy was clearly taking the fight to them. This year only 45% of the FANK KIA died inside their own defensive wire. This may indicate greater FANK aggressiveness. However, the 1st quarter record (35%) is much better than that of the second quarter (53%), so any interpretation of improvement must be viewed with caution (return to Table 2).

The effectiveness of FANK, measured in terms of casualties inflicted on the enemy, remains low compared to what ARVN does in either South Vietnam or Cambodia. In terms of total KIA figures, the enemy/FANK kill ratio has been maintained at about 2 to 1 for the last 12 months. By comparison, the enemy/RVN regular forces kill ratio in South Vietnam was five times as good (11 to 1) for the same period.^{1/}


^{1/} OSD/C figures.

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ENEMY INCIDENTS-X / FRIENDLY INCIDENTS-O
2ND QUARTER 1971



ENEMY INCIDENTS-X / FRIENDLY INCIDENTS-O
2ND QUARTER 1971



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The Action by Military Region

Table 4 compares the activity and casualties for 2nd quarter 1971 in each of Cambodia's military regions. A distinction can be made between the level and intensity of the war as fought in eastern Cambodia (MRs 1, 2 and the Phnom Penh Special Military Region) and that fought in the west. The eastern regions clearly experienced more activity and recorded more KIA than those in the west and, as the table suggests, the enemy may have been more willing to engage FANK in MRs 1, 2 and the PPSMR than in MRs 3 and 4. In the three eastern military regions most activity was attributed to enemy initiative.

TABLE 4

ACTIONS AND CASUALTIES BY MILITARY REGION (2nd Qtr 1971 - No ARVN Involvement)

	Military Region				
	1	2	PPSMR	3	4
Enemy Actions	323	324	268	112	78
FANK Actions	10	12	2	0	1
Contacts	<u>178</u>	<u>174</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>120</u>	<u>100</u>
Total Combat Actions	511	510	373	232	179
Enemy % of Total	63	64	72	48	44
FANK KIA	243	190	327	75	78
Enemy KIA	316	898	547	149	89

The division of the war between the three eastern MRs and the two in the west, suggested by Table 4, has been constant for over 9 months as far as the level of activity is concerned. In terms of the percentage of total actions clearly attributable to the enemy, however, the distinction between the two sections of the country appears to have occurred about six months ago (Table 5).

TABLE 5


ENEMY ACTIONS AS % OF TOTAL ACTIONS a/ (No ARVN Involvement)

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 1971</u>
MR 1	75	71	56	63
MR 2	69	59	64	64
PPSMR	75	66	61	72
MR 3	60	64	46	48
MR 4	70	66	43	41

a/ Shaded areas indicate less than 50% of all reported actions can be attributed to enemy actions.

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243

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The shift in the pattern for the western military regions (MRs 3 and 4) can be explained in two ways: either the FANK units there have become more aggressive, or the enemy in these two military regions has sought to disengage.

There are some statistical indications of an enemy withdrawal and/or increasing FANK aggressiveness which can be used. Assuming that the enemy attempts to withdraw from contact we would expect to see: (1) a reduction of his combat activity, (2) a shift in the pattern of his activity toward standoff attacks as opposed to ground assaults, and (3) modification in the pattern of enemy KIA away from enemy initiated activity.

Increasing FANK aggressiveness is indicated by (1) a rise in the number of FANK actions (attacks and ambushes) and contacts (actions which occur outside FANK defensive positions), (2) a shift in the pattern of FANK KIA toward the situation in which most KIA occur outside FANK defensive positions and (3) increasing numbers of enemy KIA per 1000 FANK combat strength.

In Military Region 3 the evidence points to enemy effort to maintain the degree of contact he maintained over the previous nine months. The total number of enemy actions in the 2nd quarter 1971 dropped slightly from the previous quarter's level (112 compared to 127), but the mix of enemy activity, as portrayed by the enemy attack by fire/ground attack ratios, actually indicated a greater willingness to engage FANK. (The ratio shifted downward from about 3.5 attacks by fire for each ground assault to 2.8). Enemy deaths also occurred more often in situations where the enemy was taking the fight to FANK than had been the case in previous three month period. (In the 2nd quarter 1971, about 46% of all enemy KIA occurred during enemy attacks, attacks by fire, or ambushes; this was the highest percentage recorded for a quarter in over a year.)

In contrast, the data from MR 4 support the argument that the enemy has continued to disengage. Although there were several enemy ground attacks reported during the 2nd quarter in MR 4, the enemy continued to rely on a high proportion of standoff attacks rather than ground assaults. (The ABF/ground assault ratio was 6.1 to 1). Only a small percentage of enemy KIA (3%) occurred during enemy actions (Table 6).

Data regarding FANK activity in the two military regions are not conclusive, but some of the trends they portray are interesting. In both military regions, the number of actions which occurred outside FANK defenses were about the same in the second quarter of 1971 as in the first (those in MR 3 decreased slightly while those in MR 4 increased). The circumstances of FANK KIA were different in the two MRs, however. In MR 4 about 70% of FANK KIA have occurred outside FANK defenses in each of the last four quarters. FANK KIA recorded outside FANK defenses in MR 3, however, have shown greater volatility, moving from 18% nine months ago to 61% in the first quarter of this year and then slipping downward to about 53% for the period April-June.

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TABLE 6

ENEMY ACTIVITY/KIA IN MR 3 and MR 4
(No ARVN Involvement)

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 1971</u>
<u>Enemy Actions</u>				
MR 3	75	152	127	112
MR 4	124	158	77	78
<u>ABF/Ground Attack Ratio</u>				
MR 3	.5	1.1	3.5	2.8
MR 4	3.4	6.3	55.0	6.1
<u>Enemy KIA</u>				
MR 3	145	176	154	149
MR 4	290	131	102	89
<u>% Enemy KIA in Enemy Actions</u>				
MR 3	28	16	3	46
MR 4	11	3	0	3

The ability of FANK to kill the enemy (measured in terms of enemy KIA per 1000 FANK combat strength) has remained fairly stable between 2.3 and 2.9 in MR 3, but has continued to slip downward (from 7.2 to 1.6) in MR 4. (Table 7)

TABLE 7

FANK ACTIVITY AND ENEMY KIA IN MR 3 AND MR 4

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 1971</u>
<u>FANK Actions & Contacts</u>				
MR 3	86	119	154	126
MR 4	80	120	94	104
<u>FANK KIA (% occurring outside FANK positions)</u>				
MR 3	18	31	61	53
MR 4	74	71	68	71
<u>Enemy KIA per 1000 FANK combat strength (monthly average)</u>				
MR 3	2.3	2.9	2.8	2.5
MR 4	7.2	3.6	2.3	1.6

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Taken together, these data suggest that in MR 4 the enemy is continuing to disengage, but is not being pursued by FANK units there. In MR 3 the enemy is not disengaging; and continues to meet about the same aggressiveness on the part of FANK as he has encountered for the last 12 months.

In the eastern part of Cambodia (MR 1, 2 and the PPSMR) activities and casualties remained higher.

MR 1

In MR 1 the enemy continued to move toward greater reliance on stand-off attacks during the 2nd quarter 1970. The ABF/ground assault ratio increased from the 1st quarter figure of 8.7 to 10.0. Enemy KIA decreased while FANK KIA increased slightly, resulting in an overall enemy/FANK kill ratio which was similar to the rainy season low a year ago. (Table 8)

TABLE 8

ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 1

	<u>3rd Qtr 70</u>	<u>4th Qtr 70</u>	<u>1st Qtr 71</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 71</u>
Enemy Actions	214	509	339	323
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks	5.6	4.2	8.7	10.0

CASUALTIES IN MR 1

	<u>3rd Qtr 70</u>	<u>4th Qtr 70</u>	<u>1st Qtr 71</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 71</u>
Enemy KIA	218	1219	465	316
FANK KIA	172	491	204	243
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	1.3	2.5	2.3	1.3

FANK combat strength increased in MR 1, but the enemy KIA per 1000 FANK combat strength declined, probably as a result of the greater enemy reliance on standoff attacks. (Table 9)

TABLE 9

FANK COMBAT STRENGTH AND PERFORMANCE IN MR 1 (Monthly Average)

	<u>3rd Qtr 70</u>	<u>4th Qtr 70</u>	<u>1st Qtr 71</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 71</u>
FANK Strength (000)	27.0	34.6	33.2	42.4
Enemy KIA	73	306	155	105
Enemy KIA per 1000 strength	2.7	8.8	4.6	2.5

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MR 2

In MR 2 the enemy continued to shift toward standoff attacks, but suffered severe losses, particularly in the latter part of the FANK effort to re-open Highway 4 in early May. Enemy casualties reportedly reached their highest quarterly level in a year, a factor which led to a marked improvement in the enemy/FANK kill ratio for the region. (Table 10)

TABLE 10

ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 2

	<u>3rd Qtr 70</u>	<u>4th Qtr 70</u>	<u>1st Qtr 71</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 71</u>
Enemy Actions	210	332	449	324
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks	1.4	1.5	3.7	5.9

CASUALTIES IN MR 2

	<u>3rd Qtr 70</u>	<u>4th Qtr 70</u>	<u>1st Qtr 71</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 71</u>
Enemy KIA	344	542	283	889
FANK KIA	188	208	196	190
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	1.8	2.6	1.4	4.7

FANK strength climbed to a monthly average of over 39,000 combat troops in 2nd quarter 1971. This growth was accompanied by an improved kill record, again, due primarily to a series of sharp actions during the Highway 4 road clearing operation in early May. (Table 11)

TABLE 11

FANK COMBAT STRENGTH AND PERFORMANCE IN MR 2
(Monthly Average)

	<u>3rd Qtr 70</u>	<u>4th Qtr 70</u>	<u>1st Qtr 71</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 71</u>
FANK Strength (000)	31.4	36.9	33.0	39.8
Enemy KIA	115	181	94	299
Enemy KIA per 1000 strength	3.7	4.9	2.8	7.5

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The Phnom Penh Special Military Region

Enemy activity in the PPSMR reflected the general trend toward stand-off attacks, but the sharp actions northeast of Phnom Penh during the end of the 2nd quarter 1971 maintained a low ABF/ground assault ratio. Enemy and FANK casualties were high, reflecting the activity in the Tonle Toch area. The enemy/FANK kill ratio has reached low levels this year: (Table 12)

TABLE 12

ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE PPSMR

	<u>3rd Qtr 70</u>	<u>4th Qtr 70</u>	<u>1st Qtr 71</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 71</u>
Enemy Actions	116	210	317	268
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks	1.8	2.3	3.7	4.6

CASUALTIES IN THE PPSMR

	<u>3rd Qtr 70</u>	<u>4th Qtr 70</u>	<u>1st Qtr 71</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 71</u>
Enemy KIA	421	490	226	547
FANK KIA	59	135	147	327
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	7.1	3.6	1.5	1.7

The ratio of enemy KIA per 1000 FANK strength has recovered to its former high levels. (Table 13)

TABLE 13

FANK COMBAT IN THE PPSMR

	<u>3rd Qtr 70</u>	<u>4th Qtr 70</u>	<u>1st Qtr 71</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 71</u>
FANK Strength (000)	25.1	32.7	43.4	41.3
Enemy KIA	140	163	75	182
Enemy KIA per 1000 Strength	5.6	5.0	1.7	4.4


Interest in the PPSMR has been centered in the area northeast of Phnom Penh, the area in which the activity has been intense and the casualties on both sides have been high. Of equal interest is the area west of Phnom Penh where the location of activity, rather than its intensity, is disturbing. The following plots compare the pattern of activity west of Phnom Penh for two periods: during the rainy season last year (July-September) and during the April-June period this year. As the plots show, combat actions have edged closer to the capital from the west.

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
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COMBAT ACTIONS WEST OF PHNOM PENH

3rd Qtr 1970



2nd Qtr 1970



Distance from Phnom Penh
22 km

Distance from Phnom Penh
14 km

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Nov-Jan 72

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THE WAR IN CAMBODIA

Summary

Data accumulated for the past 18 months indicate the pattern of activity in Cambodia is cyclical and tied closely to the monsoons:

- There are about 88-96 ground combat actions per week in the dry season (October-April) versus 75-80 in the wet season (May-September).

Accordingly, the overall level of combat during the last three months of 1971 was similar to the level for the same period a year ago. The differences between the end of 1970 and the final months of 1971 were:

- A greater reliance by the enemy on standoff attacks in 1971.

-- In the 4th Qtr 1970 the enemy launched about 27 ground assaults per week. Ground assaults accounted for about 25% of his total combat effort against the Khmer forces.

-- At the end of 1971, enemy ground assaults had dropped to about 15 per week, about 13% of his total combat effort.

- More friendly KIA than enemy KIA at the end of 1971.

-- Enemy KIA by FANK dropped to their lowest quarterly level in over a year at the end of 1971 (about 76 KIA per week).

-- FANK KIA rose to the same level as the previous year (about 85 KIA per week).

-- For the first time, the enemy/FANK kill ratio favored the enemy (.9).

- The war was closer to Phnom Penh in 1971.

-- Activity within 10 kms of the capital in 1971 was about twice the level of a year earlier.

-- More FANK KIA occurred closer to Phnom Penh in the 4th Qtr 1971 (23% of all FANK KIA died within 20 kms vs 14% for the same period in 1970).

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THE WAR IN CAMBODIA

Details

The level of combat actions between FANK and enemy forces ebbs and flows in relation to the monsoon season. Against this cyclical pattern, however, there has been a pronounced shift in the mix of enemy activity. Beginning about a year ago, standoff attacks began to constitute an increasing percentage of his total combat output. As the data in Table 1 indicate: ^{1/}

- After summer 1970, the war established a rate of about 2100-2300 combat actions per quarter in the dry season and 1800-1900 in the wet season. Aside from the seasonal change, there are no strong trends up or down during the past year.

- The rise in actions after summer 1970 was due to sharp increases in enemy standoff attacks and in action reported as "contacts." Both types of action have remained at fairly constant levels ever since the beginning of 1971. (FANK attacks rose in the last two quarters because of the Tonle Tsch and Chen Ia operations).

-- In absolute numbers, enemy ground assaults reached a peak during late 1970 (about 100 per month) but thereafter slipped to between 40 and 60 per month.

-- Because of the increased number of standoff attacks, ground assaults now constitute a smaller portion of total enemy activity. In percentage terms, standoff attacks have moved from about 55% of all enemy actions in the 3rd quarter 1970 to 72%, 75%, 81% and 75% in 1971.

^{1/} The data portrayed in this analysis is based on daily operational reports from the field. As such, it is subject to the inaccuracies associated with reports emanating from or shortly after actual combat situations. We believe the trends portrayed by the data are accurate; specific numbers may not be precisely accurate.

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TABLE 1

ACTIONS IN CAMBODIA: FANK VS. THE ENEMY a/

	<u>3Qtr 70</u>	<u>4Qtr 70</u>	<u>1Qtr 71</u>	<u>2Qtr 71</u>	<u>3Qtr 71</u>	<u>4 Qtr 71^{e/}</u>
<u>Enemy Actions</u>						
Ground Attacks	185	323	204	145	124	131
Attacks by Fire/Har	412	843	951	829	928	1013
LOC Interdiction	94	141	90	98	67	112
Sabotage/Terror	40	43	57	28	27	72
Other	13	12	15	6	2	11
Subtotal	<u>744</u>	<u>1362</u>	<u>1317</u>	<u>1106</u>	<u>1148</u>	<u>1359</u>
<u>Contacts^{b/}</u>	197	605	879	675	605	648
<u>FANK Actions</u>						
Ground Attacks	45	69	63	14	82	114
Ambushes	7	17	20	21	8	9
Other	<u>37^{c/}</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>66^{d/}</u>	<u>27^{f/}</u>
Subtotal	<u>89</u>	<u>107</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>156</u>	<u>150</u>
<u>Total Combat Actions</u>	1030	2074	2299	1836	1909	2157
	Wet	Dry	Dry	Wet	Wet	Dry

a/ Data do not include incidents involving ARVN.

b/ "Contacts" refer to combat actions occurring outside FANK defensive positions, the initiator of which cannot be easily identified.

c/ Includes 20 "attacks by fire."

d/ Includes 46 "patrol contacts."

e/ Through 28 December DAMSREP

f/ Includes 20 "patrol contacts."

As Table 2 shows, casualties have not followed the same cyclical pattern because of high casualty totals during the 2nd quarter 1971 (the wet season period when total combat actions declined). This increase was brought about by high totals in "contacts" (62% of all enemy KIA and 45% of all FANK KIA in the three months) during the effort to reopen Highway 4 in April and the Tonle Toch operations in June.

Casualties also reflected the enemy shift toward standoff attacks, a less intense combat mode in the sense that an attack by fire usually results in fewer casualties than a ground assault. Over the year there was a steady decline in enemy KIA per action. A more erratic decline in KIA/per action took place in FANK casualties also, until the last three months of the year.

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During the last three months of 1971, however, several changes occurred. Enemy KIA continued to drop, reaching their lowest quarterly level in over a year. But FANK KIA rose to about the same level as a year ago. As a result, the enemy/FANK kill ratio was reversed and for the first time favored the enemy.

As Table 2 shows:

- Enemy losses per combat action have more than halved (1.5 to .4).
- FANK deaths per combat action reached a low point (.3) in the 3rd quarter 1971, but during the last three months of the year returned to the level of late 1970.

TABLE 2 a/

CASUALTIES IN CAMBODIA: FANK VS. THE ENEMY

	<u>1970</u> <u>3rd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>3rd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>Qtr</u> ^{c/}
<u>Killed in Action</u>						
Unidentified Enemy ^{b/}	1333	2331	1293	1904	1149	883
Khmer Communist	24	122	19	15	44	14
NVA/VC	172	116	98	44	18	9
Subtotal	<u>1529</u>	<u>2569</u>	<u>1410</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1211</u>	<u>906</u>
FANK	656	1029	678	913	656	1021
Local Defense Force	5	5	2	0	0	1
Civilian	47	105	153	30	68	143
Subtotal	<u>708</u>	<u>1139</u>	<u>833</u>	<u>943</u>	<u>724</u>	<u>1165</u>
Total KIA	2237	3708	2243	2906	1935	2071
<u>FANK WIA</u>	1930	4150	2742	4222	2620	3692
		<u>RATIOS</u>				
Enemy/FANK kill ratio	2.3	<u>2.5</u>	1.7	2.2	1.8	.9
Enemy KIA/combat action	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.1	.6	.4
FANK KIA/combat action	.6	.5	.4	.5	.3	.5

^{a/} Data exclude incidents involving ARVN.

^{b/} "Unidentified Enemy" refers to casualties reported simply as "enemy."

^{c/} Statistics through December 28 DAMSREP.

Recent field assessments suggest that the low enemy casualties and the reversal of the kill ratio late in 1971 may have been due to the NVA 9th Division operations against Chen La II. This enemy unit is considered to be one of the best in Cambodia and its more effective use of indirect fire in November and December probably accounts in large part for the change in the kill ratio.

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1971 Compared to 1970

The data in the two preceding tables show that in several ways the last three months of 1971 were similar to the same period a year ago. The total number of combat actions were about the same (2,074 in 1970 compared to 2,157 in 1971) as were FANK casualties. The differences are found in the mix of enemy activity (more standoff attacks, only about half as many ground assaults in 1971), and in enemy casualties (over twice as many in 1970).

Another important difference is the fact that the war was much closer to Phnom Penh in the closing months of 1971 than it was in 1970. The number of combat actions occurring within 20 kilometers of the capital moved from about 16% for all of Cambodia to about 22%. More FANK KIA occurred closer to the capital, also (239 or 23% of the national total died within 20 kms in 4th qtr 1971 vs 147 or 14% of the national total in 4th qtr 1970). The greatest increase took place within 10 kms of the capital. Combat actions and FANK KIA within 10 kms of the center of Phnom Penh were roughly double the level recorded in 1970 (see Annex for details).

It is difficult to pinpoint the enemy as the only instigator of the change in the location of action. The increase in activity close to Phnom Penh began at about the same time that the Tonle Toch operation was launched east of the capital (June). Actions associated with that operation are generally considered as "friendly initiated" in that FANK sought to disrupt enemy supply lines running through the area. There is evidence of growing enemy interest and activity west of the capital at about the same time, however, and the continued enemy pressure there in November and December appear to be a result of conscious enemy choice. (See Annex.)

Why the Changes?

Part of the explanation for the enemy shift toward standoff attacks may be that ground assaults were costing him too much.

Table 3 compares FANK and enemy in-country strength over the last 18 months with combat losses. The comparison suggests several things:


- The enemy was paying a relatively high cost (in terms of the percent of his in-country combat strength) for the more intense combat mode he had adopted in late 1970. If these casualty figures are fairly accurate, and we believe them to be a rough approximation of what has actually happened, the enemy was expending about 7% of his in-country combat strength on the Cambodians in late 1970, a level which must have created some concern as to what could be done in South Vietnam and in terms of what it meant for infiltration requirements.

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TOTAL COMBAT ACTIONS

10-20 km Radius of Phnom Penh



Combat Actions

	<u>4Qtr 70</u>	<u>4Qtr 71</u>
<u>Within 10 kms</u>	62	127
<u>10-20 kms</u>	278	358

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TABLE 3

A MEASURE OF SACRIFICE: KIA AS A PERCENT OF COMBAT STRENGTH
(000)

	<u>3Q70</u>	<u>4Q70</u>	<u>1Q71</u>	<u>2Q71</u>	<u>3Q71</u>	<u>4Q71</u>
FANK Combat Strength <u>a/</u>	80.0	140.0	148.0	162.0	180.0	190.0
Reported KIA	0.7	1.0	.7	.9	.7	1.0
KIA as % of Combat Strength	1	1	.5	1	.4	1
Enemy Combat Strength <u>a/</u>	32.4	33.5	33.2	40.0	40.0	40.0
Reported KIA	1.4	2.6	1.4	2.0	1.2	1.0
KIA as % of Combat Strength	4	7	4	5	3	3

a/ Three month average. Both enemy and FANK combat strength figures are estimates. As of October 1, 1971, FANK headquarters operated on an estimate of total strength of 230,000. Analyses by CIA suggested a total strength of about 220,000; DIA held actual FANK strength at between 204,000 and 215,000. Other assessments conclude that actual FANK strength is lower; a DOD assessment team gathered a sample in May 1971 which suggested an actual FANK strength of about 105,000, well below official holdings at that time, and a recent head count indicated a current strength of about 190,000.

Another factor which may have contributed to the shifts was increasing FANK effectiveness.

FANK Effectiveness: Improved, but still a long way to go.

Statistical evidence supports the argument that FANK was improving in combat effectiveness at least until the final three months of 1971. The improvement was not proceeding at a rate which promised to change the strategic balance in the country soon, but it may have been enough to bring about a shift in enemy activity.

In terms of the circumstances of FANK deaths, the data suggest that FANK was increasingly moving out of defensive positions. The data do not allow the conclusion that FANK was becoming significantly more aggressive, but it does seem clear that compared to 1970, FANK personnel were somewhat more willing to move out toward the enemy rather than waiting to die behind their own defensive wire. Table 4 demonstrates this trend; the percentage of FANK KIA occurring outside defensive wire (excluding enemy ambushes and minings) moved gradually upward through 1971. It slipped downward during the second and fourth quarters, but ended the year over 10 percentage points above the level recorded in 1970.

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TABLE 4

CIRCUMSTANCES OF FANK KIA a/
(Shaded areas designate KIA occurring outside FANK defensive positions)

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>			
	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
<u>During:</u>						
<u>FANK</u>						
Attack/Ambush	108	52	34	17	78	116
Patrol	3	0	1	1	10	6
<u>Contacts</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>333</u>	<u>396</u>	<u>414</u>	<u>289</u>	<u>397</u>
Subtotal	234	385	431	432	377	519
<u>Enemy</u>						
Attacks	218	427	129	246	129	243
ABF/Har	89	112	63	157	115	178
Subtotal	307	539	192	403	244	421
Ambushes/mines	107	54	45	67	27	69
<u>Other</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>12</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	656	1029	678	913	656	1021

PERCENTAGE RECAPITULATION

<u>Outside Wire</u>	26	37	64	47	37	51
<u>Outside Wire (but in enemy ambush)</u>	16	5	7	7	4	7
<u>Inside Wire</u>	47	52	29	44	37	42
<u>Unclear</u>	1	5	0	1	1	--

a/ Does not include Navy personnel.

Likewise, other data indicate FANK units have gradually pushed out from their static defenses close to population centers. Based on the number of battalion days per month spent more than 20 kilometers from Phnom Penh or more than 15 kilometers from other population centers, the data suggest a slight movement away from previously established defensive positions close to population centers.

In August over half of FANK's battalion days were spent beyond the 20 or 15 kilometer line, the first time this has occurred since at least December 1970. The trend which suggests some movement into the countryside continued into November.

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257

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TABLE 5

	<u>BATTALION DAYS OF OPERATION: PERCENT OF TOTAL</u>											
	<u>1970</u>					<u>1971</u>						
	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>
Beyond 20 km from Phnom Penh/15 km from other pop centers	44	44	44	47	44	44	47	48	51	56	56	58

The movement away from major cities does not appear to have been entirely tied to major roads. This is inferred from a parallel trend indicating combat actions have gradually moved away from major lines of communication. Table 6 shows that while well over a third of all combat actions continued to occur on or within a single kilometer of Phnom Penh's life lines, the percentage of total actions close to those lines decreased.

TABLE 6

COMBAT ACTIONS AND MAJOR CAMBODIAN LINES OF COMMUNICATION a/
(Percentages)

	<u>3Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1Qtr 1971</u>	<u>2Qtr 1971</u>	<u>3Qtr 1971</u>
Within 1 km	52	48	43	40	38
Within 5 km	70	74	74	64	66

a/ Refers only to Routes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, the Mekong River and the Tonle Sap.

But FANK still has a long way to go.

While many of the trends associated with the combat activity in Cambodia were in FANK's favor through 1971, the data also suggest the distance left to travel before the strategic initiative is taken from the enemy is great. Despite the indications that combat has moved away from major lines of communication, the fact remains that between 65% and 75% of all ground combat occurs on or within 5 kilometers of these lines and, overall, the war is closer to Phnom Penh now than it was last year at the same time.

As long as the bulk of the action occurs near Phnom Penh's life line, the initiative remains in enemy hands, and as the defeat of Chen La II in December demonstrated, as long as FANK continues to stretch its forces out on these roads, the enemy can inflict heavy casualties.

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Nor has the ability of FANK to kill the enemy improved noticeably. In terms of total KIA figures the enemy/FANK kill ratio was maintained at about 2 to 1 until the end of 1971. This is about the level obtained by RF/PF units in South Vietnam's MR II, roughly half the RVNAF record in Vietnam for the same period, and only about a quarter of the level attained by ARVN in operations in Cambodia (7.2 in 1970; 8.6 in 1971). Data from the last three months of 1971 indicate the enemy can reverse this ratio and actually reduce his own casualties in the process.

The exact manner in which the enemy reversed the kill ratio at the end of the year is not clear, but two factors may have been involved:

- First, it is clear that the enemy did not modify the mode of combat adopted early in 1971. He did not return to the more intense tactical reliance on ground assaults. His standoff attacks became more effective, perhaps because he used higher caliber weapons (as suggested by some assessments).

- Second, the enemy may simply have raised the combat output of the units in contact. He can do this in two ways: (1) sending better units against FANK (such as the NVA 9th Division, see above page 8), or (2) increasing the effectiveness of the units "normally" committed against FANK. To the extent that new NVA main force units are diverted toward FANK, the threat to RVN is, in the short run at least, reduced.

But there may be a great deal of "slack" between what the enemy units "normally" committed against the Khmer have done and what they can do against FANK. To the extent that such slack exists, the enemy can continue to compensate for the gradual improvement in FANK without diverting more of his forces in Cambodia away from Vietnam.

We have begun to test this last hypothesis.

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ANNEX 1: LOCUS OF ACTION

Plots 1 and 2 show the difference in combat density between 4th quarter 1970 and 4th quarter 1971. One of the most noticeable changes was the increased activity near Phnom Penh.

The following table compares the area around Phnom Penh for three months of 1971 with the same period a year earlier. With the exception of one category of activity--enemy ground attacks within 20 kms of the capital--activity totals were higher in 1971 in all categories. The greatest gain occurred in the area within 10 kms of the capital, where nearly all categories of actions (and FANK KIA) doubled.

The increase in activity around the capital was driven primarily by increases in enemy attacks by fire and FANK ground attacks/ambushes.

LOCATION OF COMBAT ACTIVITY: THE SHIFT TOWARD PHNOM PENH

	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1971</u>
<u>Within 20 kms of Capital</u>		
Enemy ground attacks	61	39
Proportion of Nationwide total	19%	22%
Enemy ABF/Har	120	257
Proportion of Nationwide Total	14%	25%
Contacts	106	117
Proportion of Nationwide Total	18%	18%
FANK Attacks/Ambushes	18	45
Proportion of Nationwide Total	21%	37%
FANK KIA	147	239
Proportion of Nationwide Total	14%	23%
<u>Within 10 kms of Capital</u>		
Enemy ground attacks	5	11
Proportion of Nationwide Total	2%	6%
Enemy ABF/Har	34	71
Proportion of Nationwide Total	4%	7%
Contacts	12	19
Proportion of Nationwide Total	2%	3%
FANK Attacks/Ambushes	2	21
Proportion of Nationwide Total	2%	3%
FANK KIA	44	82
Proportion of Nationwide Total	4%	8%


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
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
COMBAT INCIDENTS
4 KILOMETER GRID


01-03	04-07	08-12	13-25	26-51
				

PERIOD 70Q4

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CAMBODIA

LAMBERT CONFORMAL CONIC PROJECTION
SERIES 1301 SCALE 1:1,000,000

COMBAT INCIDENTS
4 KILOMETER GRID

01-03	04-07	08-12	13-25	26-51
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263

264

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COMBAT PATTERNS: THE SHIFT TOWARD PHNOM PENH

The following plots portray the pattern of action within 30 kilometers of Phnom Penh (located at the road and river junction in the center of each plot). The timeframe in each case covers three months; the first plot covers the third quarter of 1970; the last plot covers the third quarter of 1971. Squares portray "contacts," FANK attacks and FANK ambushes; Xs portray enemy attacks, ambushes, attacks by fire and minings.

Plot 1 - 3rd Qtr 1970.

The pattern around Phnom Penh is diffuse. Enemy actions tend to cluster along major lines of communication into the capital, but other than the concentrations of activity south of the city on Route 3 and between Routes 1 and 2, the patterns are not particularly meaningful.

Plot 2 - 4th Qtr 1970

Activity has increased around the capital (it is the dry season and increased activity is not restricted to the Phnom Penh area). Again there appears to be enemy interest along major lines of communication.

West of the city at a distance of about 20 kilometers a linear pattern of action develops where, in the previous three months, the pattern was diffuse.

Plot 3 - 1st Qtr 1971

Activity remains high around Phnom Penh, particularly along the Mekong. A new concentration of activity appears in the Tonle Toch area east of the city.

West of the city, activity remains high, but the linear pattern seen in the previous three months is no longer obvious.

Plot 4 - 2nd Qtr 1971

Activity remains high in the Tonle Toch area, but subsides along the Mekong. The enemy appears to have lost interest in or the ability to interdict the road juncture on Route 3.

West of the city, the linear pattern returns. But now there are two lines. One, the western-most, falls along the axis of the line which appeared six months earlier. The second is to the east, about 7 kilometers closer to the city.

Plot 5 - 3rd Qtr 1971

The center of attention remains the Tonle Toch area east of the capital.


But west of the city, the double linear pattern seen three months earlier solidifies. Action now appears concentrated on the inner line.

The inner line became the operating area for the 52nd NVA regiment which moved up from the south during the final three months of the year.

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
PLOT 1: 3Q1970



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
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PLOT 2: 4Q1970



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
PLOT 3: 1Q1971



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
PLOT 4: 2Q1971



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PLOT 5: 3Q1971

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Feb 167

U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS IN THAILAND

Issues of paramount concern to both the U.S. and Thailand can be reduced to two: Thai support of U.S. operations in Vietnam and U.S. programs which support Thai security and development efforts.

The Royal Thai Government (RTG) supports our efforts in Vietnam politically; it has deployed two aircraft crews (70 men) and 180 naval personnel to Vietnam; a 1000-man battalion will arrive there within a few months. Of greater military importance, the RTG has been responsive to our requests to deploy U.S. troops, construct U.S. facilities and originate U.S. offensive actions against North Vietnam and Laos from Thailand.

At the close of January 1967, about 36,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed in Thailand. The Program #4 strength authorized for March is 36,800; the December 1967 level is 38,400. About three-fourths (27,500 in January) are USAF personnel.

About 80 percent of U.S. airstrikes against North Vietnam are launched from five bases in central and northeast Thailand: Korat, Nakhom Phanom, Udorn, Ubon, and Takhli. A sixth airfield in southern Thailand, U-Tapao, may support 15 B-52 bombers by the end of CY 1967, but the final decision has yet to be made.

Construction

The Military Construction Program (MCP) has financed most of the Vietnam-related facilities in Thailand. The MCP in Fiscal Years 1965 and 1966 programmed \$211.7 million for Thailand. The FY 1967 MCP proposed budget is \$108.0 million; \$9.8 million is proposed for 1968. USAF construction funds account for about 63 percent of the program. The major cost items are air bases which total \$147.7 million through FY 1967. Other principal projects are the port at Sattahip (\$58 million), the Army logistics depot at Korat (\$20.5 million) and three radar sites (\$2.7 million). Of the \$39.1 million for road construction, \$2.8 million is being spent on two roads in northeast Thailand, the rest on roads linking Sattahip and Bangkok with U.S. facilities in central Thailand.

Military Assistance

In terms of RTG priorities and in terms of US-Thai relations, U.S. Military aid to Thailand is crucial. Other U.S. assistance is recognized and appreciated, particularly economic aid which reached \$40 million during Thai FY 1967 (50 percent higher than last year's figure). But the RTG tends to measure U.S. support according to the size, content and performance of the Military Assistance Program (MAP).

271

CONFIDENTIAL

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MAP for Thailand rose from \$44.3 million in FY 1966 to \$60 million in FY 1967, the budget also provides for \$60 million to be funded by the Military Services. MACHTAI and Embassy officials hope that the \$60 million level can be maintained through FY 1972 with grants offset by a \$10 million sales program to begin in FY 1970. Aircraft (F-5 fighters, trainers and helicopters) account for 18 percent of FY 1968 MAP. Construction and ammunition make up 10 to 15 percent of MAP for both years. Other major items include ships (patrol gunboats and landing craft), tactical and support vehicles, weapons and communications equipment. About \$4.7 million is allocated to training in FY 1967; \$5.3 million in FY 1968.

Both MAP performance and Thai military performance under MAP can stand improvement. COMUSMACTHAI and Ambassador Martin have criticized MAP as unresponsive to customers' demands and poorly coordinated; they call for tighter programming and faster delivery of essential items. Although MAP since 1965 has helped to direct Thai military attention toward counterinsurgency - the mission deemed essential for Thai security - the manning levels and capability of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) do not yet satisfy U.S. requirements.


Nonetheless, the RTARF is improving in its ability to cope with the small but growing insurgency in northeast Thailand. Expanded and improved counterinsurgency training is centered at a new Royal Thai Army (RTA) special warfare center and is assisted by a U.S. Special Forces team. Small unit suppression operations are becoming the norm. Closer cooperation is evident between military, police and civilian groups engaged in counterinsurgency missions. The RTA has deployed about 2000 men in northeast Thailand to step up civic action and population control as well as strike missions. More deployments are scheduled. Four Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) composite squadrons based in central and northeast Thailand provide air support for some RTA suppression operations. The USAF 606th Special Air Warfare Squadron at Nakhon Phanom, assists RTAF squadrons in civic action missions; some 20 mobile training teams of the 606th provide counterinsurgency training. Thai helicopter utilization, now below desired rates, should improve with the addition of 132 Thai helicopter pilots by August 1967 (83 in February) and 258 maintenance personnel. This is particularly important because 25 U.S.-manned helicopters in Thailand during part of 1966 were redeployed January 31, 1967. The U.S. helicopters had a catalytic effect on Thai operations, greatly improving mobility and coordination of counterinsurgency, civic action, and other missions, and in getting senior Thai officials out to visit troubled areas.

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
INCIDENTS IN THAILAND

Graph A and Table 1 depict the dramatic increase in the incident rate in Thailand between 4th quarter 1964 and 1st quarter 1967. Incidents of all types increased 13 times in 1966 over 1965 (45 in 1965 to 582 in 1966). In 1st quarter 1967 the number of incidents (296) exceeded half the 1966 total. Total friendly and enemy casualties resulting from the Thailand insurgency also rose sharply. Graph B and Table 1 show the increase from 43 in 1965 to 400 in 1966 (9.3 times). 1st quarter 1967 casualties totalled 142.

GRAPH A
INCIDENTS IN THAILAND



GRAPH B
CASUALTIES IN THAILAND



Area Distribution

Most of the action is occurring in Northeast Thailand. However, since reports from other areas began in January 1966, 12% of all reported incidents have occurred outside of the Northeast. Although there is no clear trend in increased incidents outside the Northeast, the US Embassy in Bangkok believes that the increased pressure of RTG security operations in the Northeast (starting in January 1967) is dispersing some insurgent activity to other areas. This is borne out by the jump to 60 incidents outside the Northeast in 1st quarter 1967 (but not by the April total of 4). Also, the first reported insurgent activity in north Thailand occurred in February this year.

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TABLE 1

INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES - THAILAND

	1964				1965				1966				1967		
	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	Apr
<u>Incidents</u>															
Northeast	4	4	3	10	28	77	105	167	181	236	64				
Other	0	0	0	0	0	20	9	21	2	60	4				
Total	4	4	3	10	28	97	114	188	183	296	68				
% NE of total	100	100	100	100	100	79	92	89	99	80	94				
<u>Casualties</u>															
Northeast	3	3	3	13	24	81	104	69	75	115	20				
Other	0	0	0	0	0	13	11	38	9	27	9				
Total	3	3	3	13	24	94	115	107	84	142	29				
% NE of total	100	100	100	100	100	86	90	64	89	81	69				

Initiative

The balance between Royal Thai Government (RTG) and insurgent initiated incidents (expressed as a percentage of total incidents) has remained steady over the last three quarters (38% RTG initiated vs 62% insurgent initiated), though Graph C and Table 2 indicate absolute increases in both. Graph D and Table 3 show that terrorism (except assassinations) and armed propaganda jumped to new high levels in 3rd quarter 1966. This was in reaction to the formation of the CSOC (Counter-Subversion Operations Command), JSC (Joint Security Centers) and CIM (Civilian-Police-Military Headquarters) structure by the RTG. The armed propaganda increase in particular was a response to the RTG security sweep challenge. Total terror incidents jumped from 53 to 103 in 1st quarter 1967, an increase of 50%. This is due to the rising insurgency in areas other than the Northeast and the challenge of the RTG 09/10 security operation (which began on 15 January 1967 in the Northeast), because harassment of RTG security forces accounts for almost half of the terror incidents. Total armed encounters held steady for the last three quarters of 1966 and then almost doubled in 1st quarter 1967 (69 in 4th quarter 1966 to 123 in 1st quarter 1967). This increase also reflects RTG operations.

TABLE 2

FRIENDLY VS ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS

	1966				1967	
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	Apr
Communist Initiated Incidents	52	50	117	114	183	50
RTG Initiated incidents	45	64	71	69	113	18
Total	97	114	188	183	296	68
% Communist Initiated of Total	54	44	62	62	62	74
% RTG Initiated of Total	46	56	38	38	38	26

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

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TABLE 3

INCIDENTS BY TYPE

Terrorism	4	3	3	10	25	45	35	53	53	103 ^{a/}	29
Armed Propaganda						6	10	63	61	60	21
Armed Encounters	0	1	0	0	3	46	69	72	69	133	18
Total Incidents	4	4	3	10	28	97	114	188	183	296 ^{a/}	68

a/ The reporting system was revised in January 1967 to break out sabotage and harassment of security forces by separate categories. Both were previously included under terrorism. For the sake of statistical continuity we have reincluded them in terrorism.



CONFIDENTIAL

275

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Who Gets Killed

Although total casualties increased 9.3 times in 1966 over 1965 and continue to rise in 1967, civilian casualties have declined (Graph E and Table 4). This reflects in part the decline in assassinations. Since armed encounters are up and communist and security force casualties are also up, this indicates an insurgent shift away from terrorizing civilians to meeting the RTG threat.

Communist casualties as shown in Table 4 are too low. Only wounded who are captured are counted as WIA. Also RTG reports put communist KIA at much higher numbers. The truth probably falls in between, and would show communist total casualties to be generally higher than security force casualties.

A comparison of the average number of communist and security force casualties per armed encounter show that both declined through 1966. Then Communist casualties per armed encounter rose in 1st quarter 1967 (and again in April) while the security force average remained stable.

TABLE 4


CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM INSURGENCY IN THAILAND
(Quarterly Totals)

Communist											
Killed	0	0	0	1	4	18	24	24	13	44	11
Wounded						10	5	0	3	15	0
Subtotal	0	0	0	1	4	28	29	24	16	59	11
Avg. Casualties per Armed Encounter	-	-	-	-	1.3	.6	.4	.3	.2	.4	.6
Security Forces											
Killed	0	1	0	1	3	15	25	13	7	18	2
Wounded	0	0	0	5	3	13	17	25	23	32	6
Subtotal	0	1	0	6	6	28	42	38	30	50	8
Avg. Casualties per Armed Encounter	-	1	-	-	2	.6	.6	.5	.4	.4	.4
Civilians											
Killed	3	2	3	6	14	32	39	36	31	31	10
Wounded						6	5	9	7	2	0
Subtotal	3	2	3	6	14	38	44	45	38	33	10
Total Casualties	3	3	3	13	24	94	115	107	84	142	29

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GRAPH E
THAILAND CASUALTIES BY TYPE



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THAI MILITARY GET LARGER ROLE IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY

A recent decision by the Royal Thai government may significantly affect Thailand's counter-insurgency effort.

The Thai counter-insurgency program has been based on civilian-police-military coordination in a single overall agency, the Counter Subversion Operations Command (CSOC), located in Bangkok and operating through its own forward headquarters -- CPM-1 (Civilian-Police-Military Unit, Number One). CPM-1 is located in Sakhon Nakon Province in the northeast region, the area which has the most serious insurgency problem. The CSOC organizational structure coordinates all of the efforts made by the various agencies of the Thai government having operations in the northeast. The emphasis is on using police and civilians as the primary instruments and the military as a supplementary force to be used as necessary. US programs and operations are planned to fit into this structure. CPM's have also been established in the other provinces in the Northeast with serious insurgency problems. CPM's are under the direction of the province governor.

Recently, Thai officials disclosed the decision to enforce martial law in the northeast (it has been in effect on paper for years) and to place CPM-1 under the command of the Second Army. According to General Praphat who is at the same time Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Commander of CSOC, enforcement of martial law in the 15 northeast provinces will strengthen the hand of the forces engaged in counter-insurgency operations. He believes the criminal code and civil law enforcement agencies are inadequate to the task. The shift in the CPM command stems from a need to facilitate rapid reaction to calls for troop deployment without the delay of seeking approval in Bangkok. Additional reasons given for the move are (1) increased outside intervention from China, Laos and Burma in recent years, (2) inability of CPM-1 to direct all the agencies involved, (3) improved command structure resulting from Second Army control of all operations in the Northeast, (4) greater resources available to the Second Army than CPM-1, and (5) power of martial law available to the Second Army.

General Praphat stated in response to queries that the province governors will retain full authority over developmental programs and village security operations and report to Praphat in his position of Minister Interior. However, the Second Army commander (and CPM-1 commander) will have complete responsibility for security, including all forces providing security.

At best this arrangement could fulfill its stated purpose of strengthening the CI program without disrupting current economic and social programs. However, in practice, it will depend on the individuals involved. Praphat will be in a position to subordinate the village security, development,

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civilian and police programs to the general directive authority of the army if he chooses.

Among the possible dangers involved in an army takeover of the counter-insurgency operation are:

1. It may damage the morale of civil officials who heretofore have been carrying out an effective and imaginative program.

2. The police work in an area for several years and feel the need to maintain reasonably good relations with the local populace. This is not the case with the army which enters an area for short periods of time and has frequent changes of personnel.

3. The assumption of partial power by the military could cause a police slow down which in turn would necessitate the assumption of greater power by the military.

4. The army control could complicate the role of US aid and information programs. Presently, AID cooperates with the Ministry of Interior, the CPM's and the province governors.

5. The communists may take advantage of the change in command situation through its propaganda by pointing to the fact that the strength of the Communists has forced the government to resort to the army and therefore the Communists are winning.

6. Most importantly, suppression may become the goal of the counter-insurgency program rather than social and economic development to benefit the people.

The problems above are recognized by some key officials in Thailand who fear that the counter-insurgency concept may lead to the people being the target for military operations. They believe the solution to the insurgency problem is to maintain a basically political/social/economic program to persuade the people to opt for the Thai government as the best means to obtain a better future.

CONFIDENTIAL

THAI MILITARY ROLE IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY: A REBUTTAL

The October SEA Analysis Report contained an article (Pg. 19-20) summarizing recent action by the Thai government to give the military a greater role in the counter-insurgency effort. A number of potential dangers and problems were cited. The Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations submitted the following comments on the October article:

"In a series of recent messages, the American Ambassador in Thailand has quoted assurances made to him by the highest Thai officials that present concept of operations would be maintained. The Counter Subversion Operations Command (CSOC) will continue to coordinate and plan operations. The province and village governmental structure will not change. The changes will occur between these two echelons where there is a need for stronger control and action. The purpose of the changes is to strengthen the organization by providing means for better army support.

The real case in point is in Sakhon Nakon Province, where civilian-police-military unit number one (CPM-1) will be placed under the Commander of the Second Army. Under the present conditions, there is a definite lack of security in the Province. Positive security is provided to some 13 villages which is minute in comparison to those being contacted regularly by the subversives. The present organization appears reasonably effective on paper; however, in practice, the subversives have been able to outstrip the Thai government efforts continually.

On 11 October, Deputy Prime Minister Praphat stated at a press conference, "Our decision to send troops to sensitive areas where communist terrorists are active is not with the objective for them to concentrate only and directly on suppression work, because it is already being carried out by officials under law -- the police -- and troops have been sent only to support the police and to provide them with increased security, as well as to provide greater protection to the people. At the same time, development plans are being carried out and aid is being given to the people in many different ways . . . These are part of normal civic action carried out by military units in any area they are sent to. But should terrorist activities get out of hand and the police not be able to control the situation, then the military have to give support and assistance at once."

The Thai Army must prepare itself for the contingency of a conflict such as exists in RVN today. It must take dramatic steps to prevent such a situation from evolving. To do this the Army must get out of the garrison and into the field. It must support the people and gain their confidence. Any reorganization of activities which will assist these objectives should be fully supported by the US Government."