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A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR 1965-1972

Editor: Thomas C. Thayer

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Volume 3 VIET CONG— NORTH VIETNAMESE OPERATIONS

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This twelve volume set includes every article printed in the fifty issue series of the <u>Southeast Asia Analysis Report</u> . The SEA Analysis Report represented a month-by-month analysis of Vietnam War activity including forces and manpower, VC/NV operations, Allied ground, naval and air operations, RVNAF, casualties and losses, population security, war costs and inflation and construction and port operations in South Vietnam.		

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
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A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR: 1965-1972

VIET CONG--NORTH VIETNAMESE OPERATIONS

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- Volume 4 - Allied Ground and Naval Operations
- Volume 5 - The Air War
- Volume 6 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)
- Volume 7 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)
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VIET CONG -- NORTH VIETNAMESE OPERATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

This volume, plus the other eleven volumes in the series, contains every article ever printed in the Southeast Asia Analysis Report (a few additional papers not printed in the report are occasionally included, too.).

Fifty issues of the Southeast Asia Analysis Report were published from January 1967 through January 1972 by the Southeast Asia office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). The Report had two purposes. First, it served as a vehicle to distribute the analyses produced by Systems Analysis on Southeast Asia. It thus provided other agencies an opportunity to tell us if we were wrong and to help prevent research duplications. We solicited and received frequent rebuttals or comments on our analyses which sharpened our studies and stimulated better analysis by other agencies. Second, it was a useful management tool for getting more good work from our staff -- they knew they must regularly produce studies which would be read critically throughout the Executive Branch.

The first page of the Report stated that it "is not an official publication of the Department of Defense, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), or comparable officials." The intent was solely to improve the quality of analysis on Southeast Asia problems -- and to stimulate further thought and discussion. The report was successful in doing precisely this.

We distributed about 350 copies of the Report each month to OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), the Military Departments, CINCPAC, and Saigon, and to other interested agencies such as the Paris Delegation, AID, State Department, CIA and the White House Staff. Most copies circulated outside OSD were in response to specific requests from the individual person or agency. Our readership included many of the key commanders, staff officers, and analysts in Washington and in the field. Their comments were almost always generous and complimentary, even when they disagreed with our conclusions. Some excerpts appear below:

"I believe the 'SEA Analysis Report' serves a useful purpose, and I would like to see its present distribution continued." (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 31 May 1968)

"We used a highly interesting item in your May Analysis Report as the basis for a note to the Secretary, which I've attached." (State Department, 28 June 1967)

"We were all most impressed with your first monthly Southeast Asia Analysis Report. Not only do we wish to continue to receive it, but we would appreciate it if we could receive 4 (four) copies from now on." (White House, 9 February 1967)

"Ambassador _____ has asked me to tell you that he has much appreciated and benefited from the studies and analyses of this publication." (State Department/White House, 24 January 1969)

"Congratulations on your January issue. The 'Situation in South Vietnam' article was especially interesting and provoking." (State Department, 24 January 1969)

"I let Ambassador _____ take a swing at the paper. He made several comments which may be of interest to you. Many thanks for putting us back on distribution for your report. Also, despite the return volley, I hope you will continue sending your products." (MACV-CORDS, 17 June 1968)

"As an avid reader (and user) of the SEA Analysis Report, I see a need for more rounded analyses in the pacification field and fewer simplistic constructs." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 17 April 1968)

"The SEA Programs Division is to be commended for its perceptive analysis of topics that hold the continuing concern of this headquarters... The approach was thoughtfully objective throughout and it was particularly pleasing to note a more incisive recognition of factors that defy quantified expression." (Commander, US Army Vietnam-USARV, 29 November 1967)

"In general, I think it is becoming the best analytical periodical I've seen yet on Vietnam (though there's not much competition)." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 21 April 1967)

"Statistical extrapolations of this type serve an extremely useful purpose in many facets of our daily work." (CIA, 6 February 1967)

"One of the most useful Systems Analysis products we have seen is the monthly Southeast Asia Progress Report.... Indeed it strikes many of us as perhaps the most searching and stimulating periodic analysis put out on Vietnam." (President of The Rand Corporation, 22 October 1969)

In November 1968, 55 addressees answered a questionnaire about the Report: 52 said the report was useful, 2 said it was not, and .. said, "The report does not meet an essential need of this headquarters;" nonetheless, it desired "to remain on distribution" for 7 copies. From 48 questionnaires with complete responses, we found that an average 4.8 people read each copy -- a projected readership of 500-950, depending on whether we assumed 1 or 2.4 readers of copies for which no questionnaire was returned.

Readers responding to the questionnaire reported using the Report for the following purposes:

Information	42%
Analysis	31%
Policy Making	11%
Briefings	7%
Other	9%
	100%

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In addition, readers reported about equal interest in each of the seven subject areas normally covered in the Report.

VC/NVA	16%
Air Operations	20%
RVN/AF	17%
Pacification	13%
Friendly Forces	12%
Deployments	12%
Logistics/Construction	8%
	<u>100%</u>

There was some negative reaction to the Report. Concern was expressed about "the distorted impressions" the Report left with the reader and its wide dissemination which "implies its acceptance by the Secretary of Defense, giving the document increased credibility."

Given the way in which the Southeast Asia Analysis Report was used, the important responsibilities of many of its readers, and the controversial aspects of the report, I decided to include in these twelve volumes every article ever published in a Southeast Asia Analysis Report. This will allow the users of these volumes to arrive at their own conclusions.

Thomas C. Thayer
February 18, 1975

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May 1967
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GO CONG PROVINCE - PACIFICATION AND VC ACTIVITY

A number of logical theses on changes in patterns of VC incidents in an area undergoing pacification could be developed. One might be a sharp increase in actions as the VC reacted to GVN efforts to increase their control. An alternative hypothesis would be that pacification progress leads to an over-all drop in incident rates. Data on Go Cong Province in IV Corps, a province making rapid progress, supports this latter thesis. a/

When an area is pacified by the GVN significant changes in incident patterns should occur. The nature of the change probably differs depending on the strength of the VC, the approach taken by the GVN, etc. As a preliminary study of how activity patterns change, Go Cong, a province in northeastern IV Corps, was examined. Go Cong Province was created in January 1964 when it was separated from Dinh Tuong Province. GVN efforts have increased its control in Go Cong from essentially 0% to about 50% and progress is continuing. Therefore, Go Cong appears to be a good test of the changes in VC activity as an area is successfully pacified.

Objects of VC Incidents - Table 1 examines the objective of VC incidents since Go Cong was created in 1964. Total numbers of actions have dropped sharply since Jan 1966, averaging 46 per quarter compared to 170 per quarter in 1964 and 132 in 1965. Incidents against military objects decreased until the final quarter of 1966 when a sharp jump occurred; the 1st quarter 1967 level was even higher. The primary cause of this rise was an increase in incidents against aircraft. This may merely reflect a large increase in aircraft sorties in the area or it may be indicative of changes in VC tactics and equipment. In any event aircraft incidents would appear to have little if any impact on the study. If these are excluded, the military incident level would be stable from early 1966 to the present.

Incidents against civilian targets and transportation/communications targets tended to increase in 1964 and early 1965 and declined steadily since. One target that has been struck more frequently is waterborne craft. This may reflect the greater use of waterways since the province began to be secured or it may reflect greater activity by GVN/US forces (such as GAME WARDEN) which draw VC fire. The data are not adequate to provide any insight as to the reasons for this increase.

a/ A data file recently automated by the JCS National Military Command Center (NMCC) may provide a new tool to evaluate pacification progress. This file, based on a study of VC incidents by WSEC (Staff Study 122, May 1966), permits detailed examination of VC incident patterns by province using two type of measures: 1) 36 categories of actions (e.g., attack, harassing fire, sabotage) and 2) 83 categories of the objective of the action (e.g., military unit, outpost, road). The data are very detailed and can be sorted and viewed in innumerable ways. (NMCC file VCJSA)

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VIET CONG INCIDENTS - GO CONG PROVINCE

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	1964				1965				1966				1967	
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
<u>Military</u>														
Watch Tower, Outposts	76	54	106	41	43	30	9	46	13	15	4	5	6	
Aircraft	1	5	13	6	3	5	1	8	3	4	8	20	16	
Police, Military Personnel & Units	11	12	16	11	26	21	8	11	9	11	1	10	18	
Other	-	-	1	0	4	3	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	
Sub-total	88	71	136	58	76	59	19	67	25	30	13	35	40	
<u>Civil</u>														
Hamlets & Villages	5	2	3	1	23	9	2	6	-	-	-	1	2	
Civil Facilities	-	2	4	2	4		4	-	1	-	-	-	-	
Civil Officials	-	3	5	5	4	5	1	3	2	2	2	1	-	
Other	1	4	5	2	-	-	3	2	1	5	-	2	3	
Sub-total	6	11	17	10	31	14	10	11	4	7	2	4	5	
<u>Transportation/Communications</u>														
Roads & Bridges	32	33	155	33	71	72	42	42	14	9	-	14	4	
Land Vehicles	1	4	10	5	7	3	0	1	-	-	-	2	-	
Water Vehicles	2	6	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	5	-	4	12	
Communications	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Other	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Sub-total	35	43	166	39	79	77	42	43	14	14	-	20	16	
Total	129	125	319	107	186	150	71	121	43	51	15	59	61	

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Sept 47

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VC EFFORTS TO DISRUPT PACIFICATION

VC actions against Revolutionary Development workers are up sharply in 1967, and have caused a sharp rise in the desertion rate. However, the number of RD workers killed is running below the 1966 rate.

Prior to 1966 the enemy reaction to US-GVN pacification programs was mild; he apparently did not believe those programs threatened him. In 1966, however, his interest began to grow and a systematic pattern of activities including attacks, assassinations and kidnapping began to emerge.

Table 1 shows VC incidents against Revolutionary Development (RD) workers and RD worker attrition. It shows that:

1. Incidents against RD teams tripled abruptly in March 1967 and have remained at a rate 2.5 times higher than the January-February 1967 level.
2. The number of RD workers killed reached its highest level in March and April 1967, but the first half 1967 rate was slightly below the 1966 rate.
3. RD worker desertions rose sharply in March 1967 and the subsequent rate is about double the January-February level. Moreover, RD desertions per 1000 personnel have risen to 1.6 times the 1966 rate. About 16% of the RD cadre will desert this year, and average total losses will be about 34% of strength.
4. RD worker strength in the field declined from February to April and rose thereafter. The net gain between January and July was 1447 workers (6% over January).

Table 2 shows that RD workers comprise a growing proportion of the total GVN officials and employees who are assassinated, with the sharp rise in assassinations beginning in March 1967. Throughout the past year, RD workers have been abducted at a steady rate of about 5 per month.

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TABLE 1

RD CADRE: INCIDENTS AND LOSSES

		1967			
		Total 1966	Jan	Feb	Mar
VC Incidents Against RD Teams	a/		44	48	126
RD Worker Attrition					
KIA		593	37	20	62
MIA b/		N/A	9	3	19
Captured b/		N/A	18	44	6
Discharged		N/A	127	108	174
Resigned		N/A	51	94	151
Deserted		N/A d/	144	227	361
Retired		N/A	0	0	0
Total Losses			386	496	773
RD Worker Field Strength	17998 e/		23374	22992	22200 2
Monthly Desertion Rate per 1000	8.4 d/		6.2	9.9	16.3

Source: CIA for 1967; USMACV/CORDS for 1966.

- a/ Not reported. 25 "major attacks" were recorded.
- b/ May include some overlap of MIA/Captured.
- c/ Average strength during period.
- d/ Reports available for Sept-Dec only show 603 desertions. On basis of average 1967 this gives average monthly desertions of 8.4 per thousand.
- e/ Computed as average monthly desertions per average worker field strength in thous

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1967					First Half 1967	1967
Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun		July
48	126	110	83	109	520	126
20	62	60	36	45	260	35
3	19	20	18	0	69	0
44	6	22	11	25	126	40
108	174	165	252	209	1035	106
94	151	68	95	88	547	104
227	361	10	435	388	1865	311
0	0	0	2	0	2	8
496	773	45	849	755	3904	604
2992	22200	2440	22295	23824	22688 3/	24821
9.9	16.3	4.5	19.5	16.3	13.7 9/	12.5

sis of average 1967 strength of 17998,
strength in thousands.

12

5

13

6

TABLE 2

ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS OF RD WORKERS
(Monthly)

	<u>3Q 1966 ^{a/}</u>		<u>4Q 1966</u>		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>
	<u>No.</u>	<u>(%)</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>(%)</u>		
<u>Assassinations</u>						
RD Workers	7	(16)	10	(20)	5	
Other GVN Officials/Employees	36	(84)	39	(80)	33	3
Total	42	(100)	49	(100)	38	4
<u>Abductions</u>						
RD Workers	8	(31)	2	(5)	6	
Other GVN Officials/Employees	18	(69)	35	(95)	27	1
Total	26	(100)	37	(100)	33	1
<u>Total Assassinations and Abductions</u>						
RD Workers	15	(22)	12	(14)	11	1
Other GVN Officials/Employees	54	(78)	74	(85)	60	4
Total	69	(100)	86	(100)	71	5

Source: COMUS Public Safety Division Monthly Airgram, "VC Assassination and Abduction of GVN Personnel and ^{a/} July 1966 data not available. Aug-Sept data was divided by 2.

4Q 1966

<u>No.</u>	<u>(%)</u>
10	(20)
39	(80)
<u>49</u>	<u>(100)</u>

2	(5)
35	(95)
<u>37</u>	<u>(100)</u>

12	(14)
74	(86)
<u>86</u>	<u>(100)</u>

1Q 1967

<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>
5	4	24
33	36	33
<u>38</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>57</u>

<u>No.</u>	<u>(%)</u>
11	(24)
34	(76)
<u>45</u>	<u>(100)</u>

<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>
24	56	41
53	5	48
<u>77</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>89</u>

2Q 1967

<u>No.</u>	<u>(%)</u>
27	(33)
44	(62)
<u>71</u>	<u>(100)</u>

6	7	3
27	9	24
<u>33</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>17</u>

5	(23)
17	(77)
<u>22</u>	<u>(100)</u>

12	0	2
30	6	15
<u>42</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>17</u>

5	(17)
24	(83)
<u>29</u>	<u>(100)</u>

11	11	27
60	45	47
<u>71</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>74</u>

16	(24)
51	(76)
<u>67</u>	<u>(100)</u>

36	16	43
83	56	63
<u>119</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>106</u>

32	(32)
68	(68)
<u>100</u>	<u>(100)</u>

Loss and Abduction of GVN Personnel and Civilians."

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June 68

ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY AGAINST RF/PF

PF are more vulnerable and more often attacked by VC/NVA forces than are RF. In 1967 the enemy initiated 69% more incidents, inflicting 48% more casualties (72% more KIA), on Popular Forces than Regional Forces. The PF were hit nearly one and a half times as often as the RF per 1000 troop strength. The reasons for this include (1) the greater vulnerability of the PF due to their static defensive mission and their distribution in small, scattered and isolated units, and (2) PF firepower inferiority to both the enemy and the RF. The enemy hits RF and PF units most frequently in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces in I CTZ, along LOC's (particularly Highways 1, 22 and 4), the III CTZ area north of Saigon, and the eastern Delta.

Enemy Incidents Involving RF/PF

The incident statistics shown in the following tables include all enemy initiated incidents involving RF or PF whether they (1) were the sole target of the enemy action, or (2) were in the company of other allied forces when hit. (For example, many I CTZ incidents involving PF in CAP teams also had US Marines present.) These data do not include encounters with the enemy during friendly operations.

Table 1 shows the incidents since 1965. Harassments compose about 75% of the reported type of incident against RF and PF. The sharp rise in attacks in 1967 is partly due to an increase in mortar attacks reported as attacks (rather than as harassing fire), and partly due to an absolute increase in all types of attacks. Total incidents against RF rose 34% between 1965 and 1967, but total incidents against PF, although up about 10% in 1967 over 1966, did not exceed the 1965 total.

The PF are hit more often than the RF, by 69% in 1967, 89% in 1966 and 232% in 1965. Obviously the gap is falling, reflecting the buildup in RF strength (from 86,760 in mid-1965 to 117,348 at the end of the third quarter 1967) while PF strength dropped during the same period (148,401 in mid-1965 to 139,047 in 1967). It may also reflect increasing enemy emphasis on the RF, and use of the RF in more exposed areas and missions, particularly in conjunction with US and ARVN forces.

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TABLE 1

ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING RF/PF^{a/}

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
<u>RF</u>			
Attacks	159	213	384
Harassment	1076	1237	1266
Other	209	118	285
Total	<u>1444</u>	<u>1568</u>	<u>1935</u>
<u>PF</u>			
Attacks	362	355	608
Harassment	3984	2362	2258
Other	444	249	409
Total	<u>4790</u>	<u>2966</u>	<u>3275</u>

a/ Source for tables 1, 3, and 4: VC Initiated Incidents Computer File, derived from NMCSSC VNDBA File.

If we believe the incident reports, in 1967 enemy activity accounted for 47% of total PF KIA and 36% of RF KIA. There percentages are probably low because of incomplete reporting. In any case the 1967 percentages were lower for both forces than those for 1966 (57% for PF and 56% for RF), possibly indicating more initiative in 1967 by both forces in seeking out the enemy. (Absolute KIA totals for both forces were up in 1967.)

TABLE 2

TOTAL RF/PF KIA FROM ALL ACTIVITY

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
<u>RF</u>		
KIA From Enemy Initiated Incidents ^{a/}	1275	1022
KIA From Other RF Activity	1008	1810
Total ^{b/}	<u>2283</u>	<u>2832</u>
<u>PF</u>		
KIA From Enemy Initiated Incidents ^{a/}	1919	1757
KIA From Other PF Activity	1442	2017
Total ^{b/}	<u>3361</u>	<u>3774</u>

a/ Source: VC Initiated Incidents File.

b/ OSD(SA) Statistical Tables, 4B.

Focusing on only those casualties reported as resulting from enemy activity (Table 3), both RF and PF casualties (KIA, WIA, and MIA) declined slightly between 1966 and 1967. The high 1965 PF total was due mainly to a large number of MIA during that year. MIA has declined every year for both groups. WIA increased in 1967 over 1966, possibly due to increased enemy mortar fire.

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TABLE 3

RF/PF CASUALTIES FROM ENEMY INCIDENTS

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
<u>RF</u>			
KIA	1107	1275	1022
WIA	1697	2481	2673
MIA	713	439	224
Total	3517	4195	3919
<u>PF</u>			
KIA	2264	1919	1757
WIA	3308	3138	3483
MIA	2557	808	562
Total	8129	5865	5802

Table 4 shows a significant decrease in the number of KIA per incident for RF in 1967, but a fairly steady rate for PF for all three years.

TABLE 4

RF/PF KIA FROM ENEMY INCIDENTS

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
<u>INCIDENTS</u>			
RF	1444	1568	1935
PF	4790	2966	3275
Total	6234	4534	5210
<u>KIA FROM ENEMY INCIDENTS</u>			
RF	1107	1275	1022
PF	2264	1919	1757
Total	3371	3194	2779
<u>KIA/INCIDENT</u>			
RF	.8	.8	.5
PF	.5	.6	.5
Total	.5	.7	.5

Enemy Incidents Compared With RF/PF Troop Strength

RF/PF combined strength ^{a/} has risen over the last three years about 9%, while total enemy incidents involving RF and PF declined 16%.

^{a/} Based on data obtained from the monthly RVN strength report. The strength numbers in Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 do not agree with OSD SEA Statistical Summary numbers because the latter include administrative personnel (particularly RF), and the RVN numbers primarily reflect combat strengths.

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However, RF strength has increased each year and so have incidents against RF; PF strength was lower in 1967 than 1965 although showing some increase over 1966, and the incident pattern for PF shows the same trend. A comparison of incidents per 1000 RF and per 1000 PF (Table 5) indicates that the VC attack, harass and terrorize the PF nearly one and a half times as often as they do the RF.

TABLE 5

RF/PF STRENGTH VS ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING RF/PF

	<u>1965^{c/}</u>	<u>1966^{c/}</u>	<u>1967^{d/}</u>
<u>Strength (000)^{a/}</u>			
RF	86.8	109.9	117.3
PF	148.4	138.2	139.0
Total	235.2	248.1	256.3
<u>Incidents^{b/}</u>			
RF	1444	1568	1935
PF	4790	2966	3275
Total	6234	4534	5210
<u>Incidents/1000 RF/PF</u>			
RF	16.6	14.3	16.5
PF	32.3	21.5	23.6
Total	26.5	18.3	20.3

a/ Source: RVN monthly strength report.

b/ Source: VC Initiated Incidents File, derived from NMCS SC VNDBA File.

c/ End of 2 Qtr.

d/ End of 3 Qtr. Complete RF/PF strength data by province not available for 2 Qtr.

Total RF and PF killed as a result of enemy activity has declined each year. PF KIA per 1000 PF is 20-45% higher than RF KIA per 1000 RF. (See Table 6)

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TABLE 6

RF/PF STRENGTH VS RF/PF KIA RESULTING FROM ENEMY INCIDENTS

	<u>1965^{c/}</u>	<u>1966^{c/}</u>	<u>1967^{c/}</u>
<u>Strength (000)^{a/}</u>			
RF	86.8	109.9	117.3
PF	148.4	138.2	139.0
Total	235.2	248.1	256.3
<u>KIA From Enemy Incidents^{b/}</u>			
RF	1107	1275	1022
PF	2264	1919	1757
Total	3371	3194	2779
<u>KIA/1000 RF/PF</u>			
RF	12.8	11.6	8.7
PF	15.3	13.9	12.6
Total	14.3	12.9	10.8

a/ Source: RVN monthly strength report.

b/ Source: VC Initiated Incidents File derived from NMCSSC VNDBA File.

c/ See footnotes "c/" and "d/" in Table 4.

The reasons why PF are more frequently the targets of enemy activity and take more casualties from enemy initiated incidents than do the Regional Forces include the following:

1. The Popular Forces primarily defend their own hamlets and villages. Regional Forces mostly are district forces used to react to attacks on critical areas and district and province capitals. (Territorial Forces Evaluation System data in February 1968 showed 64% of PF units assigned to security of hamlets and villages while only 29% of RF units had this mission.) Being more isolated, the PF offer more vulnerable targets for the VC than the RF.

2. The usual unit size of a PF unit is a platoon (actually about 20-30 men) led by a sergeant, while the RF normally operate with a company size unit and sometimes a battalion.

3. The RF are better equipped. While the PF have only small arms and an occasional grenade launcher, the RF are equipped with mortars and machine guns. (February 1968 TFES data also indicate that 51% of PF are rated inferior or greatly inferior in firepower to VC/NVA units versus 33% of the RF.)

Where Incidents Against RF/PF Occur

As the accompanying plot shows, the hardest hit areas for both RF and PF forces are the following:

1. Coastal I CTZ - 29% of the enemy incidents against RF and PF and 28% of RF/PF casualties occurred in I CTZ in 1967.

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a. Quang Nam Province - In terms of total incidents and casualties for both RF and PF this is the worst province in SVN for these local forces. Quang Nam had 588 (11%) incidents (253 against PF and 335 against RF) in 1967. Casualties totaled 889 (397 PF and 492 RF), 9% of the country total. The incident activity was concentrated most heavily near Hoi An and southward along Highway 1 across the border into Quang Tin as far as Tam Ky.

b. Quang Ngai Province - This was the second hardest hit of the SVN provinces (414 incidents and 687 casualties). While in Quang Nam the RF suffered more incidents and casualties than the PF, in Quang Ngai the PF took the brunt of the activity. The 1967 incident pattern formed a rough square in the mid-coastal area of the province with Quang Ngai city at the top, and a tail of incidents follows Highway 1 southward from the lower right corner of the square.

2. The tri-border area of northern Gia Dinh, southern Binh Doung and northwestern Bien Hoa.

3. Highway 1 from Saigon through Hau Nghia to the Tay Ninh border (where it becomes Highway 22) to Tay Ninh city.

4. Highway 4 particularly in Long An and Dinh Tuong provinces.

5. The three neighboring delta provinces of Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh and Vinh Long. Nearly half of IV CTZ RF/PF incidents and casualties (and about 16% of all SVN incidents and casualties) occurred in this area in 1967.

A review of PF strength, enemy incidents involving PF and PF KIA resulting from enemy incidents by province (Table 7) shows that:

1. In IV CTZ incidents and losses matched PF strength (42% PF strength, 43% incidents and 41% KIA of the SVN totals respectively).

2. In I CTZ, 16% of SVN's PF had 27% of the incidents and 27% of the KIA.

Table 8 shows data on RF strength, enemy incidents and RF KIA from enemy incidents and indicates the following:

1. Although I CTZ had only 14% of total RF strength in 1967, 34% of the incidents involving RF in the country occurred there and 40% of the resulting KIA. Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces had 24% of all RF incidents. One-third of all RF KIA resulting from enemy incidents occurred in three I CTZ provinces -- Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai.


2. In terms of the number of incidents per RF Quang Nam was hardest hit with 9 incidents/per 100 RF strength, followed by Hau Nghia (5), Binh Duong (4), Thua Thien, Quang Ngai, Bien Hoa, and Long An (3 each).

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■ ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING REGIONAL FORCES
■ ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING POPULAR FORCES

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TABLE -

COMPARISON OF PF STRENGTH, ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING PF AND PF KIA RESULTING FROM INCIDENTS IN 1967

	<u>PF^a</u>	<u>Inci-</u> <u>dents^b</u>	<u>KIA^b</u>	<u>Inc/per 100</u> <u>PF</u>		<u>PF^a</u>	<u>Inci-</u> <u>dents^b</u>	<u>KIA^b</u>	<u>Inc/per 100</u> <u>PF</u>
<u>I CTZ</u>					<u>II CTZ</u>				
Quang Tri	3483	80	56	2	Kontum	3191	17	16	1
Thua Thien	4217	165	68	4	Binh Dinh	<u>8305</u>	75	69	1
Quang Nam	4662	<u>253</u>	<u>132</u>	5	Pleiku	<u>1516</u>	13	4	1
Quang Tin	4126	89	82	2	Fau Bon	866	6	9	1
Quang Ngai	<u>612</u>	<u>294</u>	<u>128</u>	5	Fau Yen	3561	54	40	2
Total	22609	681	466	4	Khaoh Hoa	3221	23	31	1
					Ninh Thuan	2883	23	17	1
					Darlac	<u>3497</u>	28	27	1
					Quang Duc	926	8	2	1
					Tuyen Duc	2113	19	20	1
					Lam Dong	<u>936</u>	13	8	1
					Binh Thuan	<u>3538</u>	36	20	1
					Total	34553	315	263	1
<u>III CTZ</u>					<u>IV CTZ</u>				
Binh Tuy	1217	19	7	2	Sa Dec	2923	107	58	4
Phuoc Long	1830	32	25	2	Kien Tuong	937	16	15	2
Binh Long	472	16	13	3	Dinh Tuong	<u>5483</u>	138	59	3
Long Khanh	1744	23	18	1	Go Cong	2507	15	6	1
Phuoc Tuy	1762	15	7	1	Kien Hoa	<u>5692</u>	<u>293</u>	<u>98</u>	5
Bien Hoa	2826	82	53	3	Kien Phong	3572	39	15	1
Tay Ninh	3343	60	31	2	Chau Doc	3955	28	8	1
Binh Duong	2031	101	29	3	An Giang	4369	7	13	0
Ban Nghia	1505	123	33	3	Kien Giang	2472	60	32	2
Long An	2366	108	70	3	Vinh Long	<u>2640</u>	<u>220</u>	<u>158</u>	4
Gia Dinh	<u>4853</u>	80	21	2	Vinh Binh	<u>6213</u>	<u>178</u>	<u>149</u>	3
Total	23949	659	307	3	Phong Dinh	3415	125	29	4
					Chuong Thien	2761	61	29	2
					Ba Xuyen	2248	47	19	1
					Bac Lieu	1377	70	13	1
					An Xuyen	<u>1363</u>	28	20	2
					Total	57936	1420	721	2
<u>ALL SVN</u>									
	139047	3275	1757	2					

^a End of 3Q 1967. Source: RVN monthly strength report.

^b Source: VCIIA Computer File.

NOTE: Underlined numbers indicate the 5 provinces with the largest numbers of PF incidents, KIA, and incidents/PF.

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TABLE 3

COMPARISON OF RF STRENGTH, ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING
RF AND RF KIA RESULTING FROM INCIDENTS IN 1967

	RF ^{a/}	Incidents ^{b/}	KIA ^{b/}	Inc/per 100 PF		RF ^{a/}	Incidents ^{b/}	KIA ^{b/}	Inc/per 100 PF
<u>I CTZ</u>					<u>II CTZ</u>				
Quang Tri	2315	47	40	2	Kontum	2138	18	11	1
Thua Thien	3105	82	38	3	Binh Dinh	5752	60	26	1
Quang Nam	3746	335	134	2	Pleiku	2294	10	4	0
Quang Tin	3010	71	107	2	Phu Bon	1526	11	9	1
Quang Ngai	4416	120	94	3	Phu Yen	3443	37	26	1
Total	16592	655	413	4	Khanh Hoa	2053	6	4	0
					Tinh Thuan	1758	12	4	1
					Darlac	2437	12	4	0
					Tuyen Duc	2311	12	6	1
					Quang Duc	1412	7	2	0
					Lam Dong	1938	20	3	1
					Binh Thuan	366	39	33	1
					Total	30722	244	132	1
<u>III CTZ</u>					<u>IV CTZ</u>				
Binh Tuy	1253	13	3	1	Sa Dec	1305	13	2	1
Phuoc Long	1332	21	5	2	Kien Tuong	1687	11	2	1
Binh Long	1359	23	9	2	Dinh Tuong	3240	37	10	1
Long Khanh	2018	35	17	2	Go Cong	2071	15	5	1
Phuoc Tuy	2789	31	14	1	Kien Hoa	4006	50	26	1
Bien Hoa	3115	93	29	3	Tien Phong	3235	17	4	1
Tay Ninh	3712	58	46	2	Chau Doc	3359	22	23	1
Binh Duong	1857	70	19	4	An Giang	2862	8	1	0
Hau Nghia	1613	83	38	3	Kien Giang	3868	26	5	1
Long An	3014	87	51	3	Vinh Long	2751	50	14	2
Gia Dinh	3518	55	21	2	Vinh Long	3431	77	43	2
Total	25580	569	252	2	Phong Dinh	3456	29	15	1
					Chuong Thien	2137	38	8	2
					Es Xuyen	2543	14	29	1
					Bac Lieu	1967	31	9	2
					An Xuyen	2536	29	29	1
					Total	44454	467	225	1

All SVN 117348 1935 1022 2

^{a/} End of 3Q 1967. Source: RVN monthly strength report.

^{b/} Source: VCIA Computer File.

NOTE: Underlined numbers indicate the 5 provinces with the largest numbers of RF incidents, KIA and incidents/RF.

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To Grosbach
July 67

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ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY AGAINST VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES

Summary. VC/NVA forces target GVN Popular Forces more than any other Vietnamese force, but the Regular Forces are gaining fast (particularly in III CTZ). Regular Forces have more KIA per enemy initiated incident and, in 1967 for the first time, they suffered the most combat deaths and even the most combat deaths per 1000 combat troops. Until Tet the enemy killed more friendly troops than he lost in the incidents he initiated, but U. S. and Vietnamese forces more than held their own when working together. Finally, when the enemy can initiate the action at a time and place of his choosing, he loses only 3-5% of his total combat deaths while inflicting 21-28% of total friendly KIA.

Our June report* noted that in 1967 the VC/NVA initiated 69% more incidents and killed 72% more GVN Popular Forces (PF) than Regular Forces (RF), probably because of the inferior fire power and vulnerability of the scattered PF. Enemy incidents against the Vietnamese army and other Regular Forces were not considered. This month's analysis examines enemy incidents involving the Regular Forces and compares the findings with last month's RF/PF findings.

Enemy Incidents Against RVNAF Forces

The statistics shown in the following tables include all enemy initiated incidents involving RF, PF or Regular Forces whether they (1) were the sole target of the enemy action, or (2) were in the company of other allied forces when hit. (For example, many I CTZ PF incidents involved CAP teams which also include US Marines) These data do not include encounters with the enemy during friendly initiated operations.

Table 1 shows that PF forces consistently suffer the most enemy incidents, but their proportion of the total actions is decreasing as incidents against the RF and Regular Forces increase. The PF were the target of 60% of the enemy incidents against RVNAF forces in 1965, 46% in 1966 and 43% in 1967. In 1967 they were subjected to 69% more enemy actions than the RF and 40% more than the Regular Forces.

The table shows that the most incidents against Vietnamese forces occurred in 1965, followed by a significant decline in 1966, followed by a 1967 rise. This pattern may reflect the intensive enemy campaign in 1965 to destroy the RVNAF forces, which was disrupted in 1966 by the large US forces which had entered combat by that time. The increased campaign against RVNAF in 1967, with more emphasis on Regular and RF forces may indicate (1) a VC/NVA strategy once more directed heavily at RVNAF forces, (2) an increased VC/NVA capability

* SEA Analysis Report, June 1968, p. 1.

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to attack or harass the better equipped RF and Regular Forces successfully, (3) increasing unwillingness to attack US/FW forces, (4) a mix of these factors. The answer will not be clear until we have analyzed the VC/NVA patterns of action against US/FW forces and reviewed in detail the appropriate intelligence regarding the enemy's 1967 strategy.

TABLE 1
ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING RVNAF FORCES a/

	1965	1966	1967	Total
<u>Regular Forces</u>				
Attacks b/	124	158	330	612
Harassment	1044	1225	1332	3601
Other	561	523	674	1758
Total	1729	1906	2336	5971
<u>RF</u>				
Attacks b/	159	213	384	756
Harassment	1079	1237	1266	3582
Other	209	118	285	612
Total	1447	1568	1935	4950
<u>PF</u>				
Attacks b/	362	355	608	1325
Harassment	3984	2352	2258	8604
Other	444	249	409	1102
Total	4790	2956	3275	11031
<u>TOTAL INCIDENTS</u>	7966	6430	7546	21952

a/ Source: VC Initiated Incidents Computer File derived from CIRCPCAC VNDBA File.

b/ The sharp rise in 1967 attacks is partly due to an increase in mortar attacks reported as attacks (rather than as harassing fire) and partly due to an absolute increase in all types of attacks.

Table 2 indicates that Regular Forces bore an increasing brunt of the VC/NVA offensive actions in 1967 in terms of combat deaths. In 1966, the Regular Forces accounted for 34% of the RVNAF combat deaths from enemy offensive actions; in 1967 they lost 42% of the total, while similar RF and PF

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combat deaths actually declined absolutely and in proportion to the total. Moreover, Regular Force combat deaths from all causes increased 38% in 1967 over 1966 compared to a 14% decrease for the RF and 11% for the PF.

TABLE 2

RVNAF COMBAT DEATHS

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Regular Forces Combat Deaths</u>			
From Enemy Incidents <u>a/</u>	1681	1974	3655
From Other Regular Forces Activity <u>b/</u>	2737	4136	6873
Total <u>c/</u>	4418	6110	10528
<u>RF Combat Deaths</u>			
From Enemy Incidents <u>a/</u>	1275	1022	2297
From Other RF Activity <u>b/</u>	2037	1810	3847
Total <u>c/</u>	3312	2832	6144
<u>PF Combat Deaths</u>			
From Enemy Incidents <u>a/</u>	1919	1757	3676
From Other PF Activity <u>b/</u>	2304	2017	4321
Total <u>c/</u>	4223	3774	7997
<u>Total Combat Deaths</u>			
From Enemy Incidents	4875	4753	9628
From Other Activity	7078	7963	15041
Total	11953	12716	24669

a/ Source: VC Initiated Incidents Computer File derived from CINCPAC VMOBA file.

b/ Residual from subtracting combat deaths in VC incident file (footnote a/) from deaths reported in OPRFP 5 (footnote c/).

c/ OASD(SA) Statistical Table, 4B, and OSD(C) Statistical Summary, Table 50.

Table 3 indicates that enemy actions against Regular Forces are more intense (in terms of KIA per incident) than those against the RF or PF. It also shows that the rates of intensity against the Regular and Popular Forces have been fairly constant since 1965. Conversely, the intensity of incidents against the RF declined sharply in 1967, perhaps to allow for the increased actions against the Regular Forces in 1967.

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TABLE 3

RVNAF KIA PER ENEMY INCIDENT a/

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
<u>INCIDENTS</u>			
Regular	1729	1906	2336
RF	1447	1568	1935
PF	4790	2966	3275
	<u>7966</u>	<u>6440</u>	<u>7546</u>
<u>KIA FROM ENEMY INCIDENTS</u>			
Regular	1564	1681	1974
RF	1107	1275	1022
PF	2264	1919	1757
	<u>4935</u>	<u>4875</u>	<u>4753</u>
<u>KIA/INCIDENT</u>			
Regular	.9	.9	.8
RF	.8	.8	.5
PF	.5	.6	.5

a/ Source: VCIIA file.

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Enemy Incidents Compared With RVNAF Troop Strength *

A comparison of incidents per 1000 combat strength (Table 4) indicates that the VC attack, harass and terrorize the PF nearly 1.5 times as often as they do either the RF or Regular Forces. The number of incidents per 1000 troops rose in 1967 for all forces with incidents per 1000 ARVN showing the greatest increase.

* The incident file records all incidents against all Regular Forces as a group (ARVN, VNN, VNAF, VMFC) while strength numbers by province are available only for ARVN. However, since very few incidents occur or are reported against the RVN Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, we believe comparison of the two sets of numbers is valid for analysis purposes.

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TABLE 4

ENEMY INCIDENTS PER RVNAF STRENGTH

	1965	1966	1967
<u>Combat Strength (000)</u>			
ARVN a/	121.1	149.1	141.2
RF b/	86.8	109.9	117.3
PF b/	148.4	138.2	139.0
Total	356.3	397.2	397.5
<u>Incidents c/</u>			
ARVN	1729	1906	2336
RF	1447	1568	1935
PF	4790	2966	3275
Total	7966	6440	7546
<u>Incidents/1000 RVNAF</u>			
ARVN	14.3	12.8	16.5
RF	16.7	14.3	16.5
PF	32.3	21.5	23.6
Total	22.4	16.2	19.0

a/ Source: DIA Fact Book; combat strength as of July for each year.

b/ Source: RVN monthly strength report. These strength numbers do not agree with OSD SEA Statistical Summary numbers because the latter include administrative personnel (particularly RF), and the RVN numbers primarily reflect combat strengths. 1965 and 1966 strength numbers are end of 2nd quarter; 1967 numbers are end of 3rd quarter.

c/ Source: WCIIA file.

The total RVNAF combat deaths per 1000 forces from enemy incidents have remained about the same since 1964, declining slightly. However, the rate for regular forces has increased to 14 per 1000, while the RF and PF rates per 1000 declined significantly and steadily. Prior to 1967, the PF suffered the highest rate.

TABLE 5

RVNAF COMBAT DEATHS FROM VC INCIDENTS PER 1000 STRENGTH a/

	1965	1966	1967
<u>KIA/1000 RF/PF/ARVN</u>			
Regular	12.9	11.3	14.0
RF	12.8	11.6	8.7
PF	15.3	13.9	12.6
Total	13.9	12.3	12.0

a/ Derived from Tables 2 and 4.

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Where Incidents Occur Against Regular Forces

The map plot and Table 6 show that 1967 VC/NVA incidents against the Regular Forces were heavily concentrated around Saigon; 35% of such incidents in 1967 occurred in the five provinces surrounding Saigon. On the other hand, IV CTZ had the most incidents against the PF and I CTZ the most against RF during 1967. [The reasons for the different patterns are not clear, but probably can be explained by further analysis of VC/NVA strategy and capabilities in each CTZ and the numbers and effectiveness of RVNAF forces present in each. For example, IV CTZ has the most PF of any CTZ, and the relatively weak VC forces there probably prefer to fight the PF rather than the tougher RF and Regular Forces. In III CTZ the enemy objective is Saigon which is defended by the Regular Forces, making them the most popular enemy target among RVNAF forces there. *The high concentration of US forces in I CTZ, plus the presence of 10,000 NVA units, probably and the USMC C*


Enemy/Friendly Kill Ratios Resulting From Enemy Initiated Incidents

Up to this point we have compared types of South Vietnamese forces with each other. Table 7 compares kill ratios obtained in enemy incidents against (1) one or more Vietnamese forces, (2) Vietnamese plus US forces, and (3) US forces alone. Until the Tet offensive in first quarter 1968, the best kill ratio for friendly forces was obtained when Vietnamese and US forces were combined. The enemy suffered most when he initiated activity in III CTZ against combined US and Vietnamese forces (about five enemy KIA to one friendly). In addition, until the Tet offensive US forces alone did not fare much better than Vietnamese forces alone. The data also indicate how much advantage the enemy gains when he can initiate actions at a time and place of his choosing; only 3-5% of his total KIA resulted from such activity in 1967-68 versus 21-28% of total friendly KIA.

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■ **ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING REGULAR FORCES**
1967



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TABLE 6

COMPARISON OF ARVN STRENGTH, ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING
REGULAR FORCES & REGULAR KIA RESULTING FROM INCIDENTS IN 1967

	ARVN ^{a/}	Inci- dents ^{b/}	KIA ^{b/}	Inc/Per 100 ARVN		ARVN ^{a/}	Inci- dents ^{b/}	KIA ^{b/}	Inc/Per 100 ARVN
I CTZ					II CTZ				
Quang Tri	5216	114	101	2	Kontum	1600	29	28	2
Thua Thien	6892	95	141	1	Binh Dinh	<u>9416</u>	<u>211</u>	<u>130</u>	3
Quang Nam	5671	<u>136</u>	99	2	Pleiku	<u>2152</u>	<u>24</u>	10	1
Quang Tin	4719	93	83	2	Phu Bon	500	5	2	1
Quang Ngai	<u>7534</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>114</u>	2	Phu Yen	1451	54	20	4
Total	30032	562	538	2	Khanh Hoa		5	5	-
					Ninh Thuan	770	12	3	2
					Darlac	5128	15	35	0
					Quang Duc	575	13	0	2
					Tuyen Duc		2	6	-
					Lam Dong	1630	24	35	1
					Binh Thuan	<u>1200</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>30</u>	3
					Total	23422	431	304	2
III CTZ					IV CTZ				
Binh Tuy	1300	19	26	1	Sa Duc	850	12	0	1
Phuoc Long	1064	54	82	5	Kien Tuong	550	9	3	2
Binh Long	1693	28	53	2	Dinh Tuong	<u>8746</u>	82	56	1
Long Khanh	<u>8744</u>	50	57	1	Go Cong	550	1	14	0
Phuoc Tuy	675	35	33	5	Kien Hoa	2866	57	79	2
Bien Hoa	3680	89	61	2	Kien Phong		7	40	-
Tay Ninh		13	13	-	Chau Doc	1350	7	17	1
Binh Duong	<u>10323</u>	<u>179</u>	77	2	An Giang	1152	0	0	0
Hau Nghia	7306	<u>248</u>	<u>131</u>	3	Kien Giang		11	35	-
Dong An	5033	<u>191</u>	<u>209</u>	4	Vinh Binh	1815	42	58	2
Gia Dinh	<u>10303</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>23</u>	1	Vinh Long	<u>5644</u>	26	6	0
Total	50121	1006	765	2	Phong Dinh	1901	14	27	1
					Chuong Thien	2436	15	9	1
					Ba Xuyen	1362	17	5	1
					B c Lieu	4855	29	12	1
					An Xuyen	<u>2526</u>	8	6	0
					Total	36603	337	367	1

All SVN 140178 2336 1974 2

^{a/} As of July 1967, source: DIA Fact Book.
^{b/} Source: VCIIA Computer File.

NOTE: Underlined provinces indicate those with highest number in each category.

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TABLE 7

RATIOS RESULTING FROM ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS a/

	1966 (YR)			1967 (YR)			1968 (1Q)		
	En	Fr	Ratio En/Fr	En	Fr	Ratio En/Fr	En	Fr	Ratio En/Fr
<u>I CTZ</u>									
VN	1029	1267	.8	945	1304	.7	184	216	.9
US & VN	45	89	.5	322	263	1.2	22	45	.5
US	89	75	1.2	138	283	.5	533	178	3.0
Total	1163	1431	.8	1405	1850	.8	739	439	1.7
<u>II CTZ</u>									
VN	491	734	.7	371	794	.5	625	338	1.8
US & VN	0	7	0	0	17	0	52	26	2.0
US	41	61	.7	13	55	.2	133	37	3.6
Total	532	802	.7	384	866	.4	810	401	2.0
<u>III CTZ</u>									
VN	456	1494	.3	948	1387	.7	132	449	.3
US & VN	250	51	4.9	467	94	5.0	50	10	5.0
US	322	373	.9	506	544	.9	107	144	.7
Total	1028	1918	.5	1921	2025	.9	289	603	.5
<u>IV CTZ</u>									
VN	385	1763	.2	615	1375	.4	436	607	.7
US & VN	23	27	.9	19	28	.7	197	81	2.4
US	1	40	.0	18	61	.3	40	37	1.1
Total	409	1830	.2	652	1464	.4	673	725	.9
<u>TOTAL</u>									
VN	2361	5258	.4	2879	4860	.6	1377	1610	.9
US & VN	318	174	1.8	808	402	2.0	321	162	2.0
US	453	549	.8	675	943	.7	813	396	2.1
Total	3132	5981	.5	4362	6205	.7	2511	2168	1.2

a/ Source: VCIIA File.

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ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST ALLIED FORCES

For a 31% increase in his monthly rate of incidents against allied forces, the enemy was able to kill 67% more friendly troops per month in the first half of 1968 than in 1967, but it cost him 180% more LIA. The incident data also show that the enemy has hit the toughest allied forces more frequently in 1968; incidents against US, Free World, and Regular Forces increased more in 1968 (up 36%) than incidents against the Regional Forces and Popular Forces (up 21%). The total pattern confirms other evidence that the VC/NVA fought harder than ever before during the first half of 1968, at a much higher cost.

Although enemy losses from his offensive actions almost tripled in 1968, the kill ratio and combat death data still indicate that the enemy fares much better in actions he starts than in ones we start; only 8-9% of his total KIA resulted from such activity in 1967-68 versus 27-29% of total allied KIA.

In previous reports we have analyzed enemy actions against Vietnamese Regular, Regional and Popular Forces. We now complete the study by looking at enemy activity involving US and Free World Forces and comparing the findings with the previous analyses.

Trends

Table 1 shows that since 1965 US forces have consistently been subjected to more enemy offensive actions than all RVNAF forces put together.

Of the Vietnamese forces, the FF consistently suffer the most enemy incidents, but their proportion of the total actions is decreasing as incidents against the RF and Regular Forces increase. The FF were the target of 60% of the enemy incidents against RVNAF forces in 1965, 46% in 1966,

1/ SEA Analysis Report, June 1968, p. 1 and July 1968, p. 3.

2/ The statistics shown in the following tables include all enemy initiated incidents involving allied forces whether they were (1) the sole target of the enemy action, or (2) in the company of other allied forces when hit. (For example, many I CTZ FF incidents involved CAP teams which also include US Marines.) These data do not include encounters with the enemy during friendly initiated operations.

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TABLE 1
ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING FRIENDLY FORCES a/

	1965	1966	1967	First Half 1968	Total
<u>US Forces</u>					
Attacks b/	46	73	426	830	1375
Harassment	1828	8251	5482	2745	18306
Other	300	1961	2343	1705	6309
Total	2174	10285	8251	5280	25990
<u>FW Forces</u>					
Attacks b/	2	6	15	44	67
Harassment	59	203	276	343	881
Other	10	41	81	97	229
Total	71	250	372	484	1177
<u>RVN Forces</u>					
Regular:					
Attacks b/	124	158	330	444	1056
Harassment	1044	1225	1332	925	4526
Other	561	523	674	298	2056
Total	1729	1906	2336	1667	7638
RF:					
Attacks b/	159	213	384	321	1077
Harassment	1079	1237	1266	839	4421
Other	209	118	285	115	727
Total	1447	1568	1935	1275	6225
FF:					
Attacks b/	362	355	608	417	1742
Harassment	3984	2362	2258	1338	9942
Other	444	249	409	114	1216
Total	4790	2966	3275	1869	12900
<u>Total RVNAF c/</u>					
Attacks b/	645	726	1322	1182	3875
Harassment	6107	4824	4856	3102	18889
Other	1214	890	1368	527	3999
Total	7966	6440	7546	4811	26763

a/ Source: VCIIA File.

b/ The sharp rise in 1967 attacks is partly due to an increase in mortar attacks reported as attacks (rather than as harassing fire) and partly due to an absolute increase in all types of attacks.

c/ Totals reflect double counting because more than one force frequently is involved in a single incident.

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43% in 1967 and 39% during the first half 1968. In the first half of 1968 they were subjected to 47% more enemy actions than the RF (as compared to 69% in 1967) and 12% (40% in 1967) more than the Regular Forces.

Table 1 also shows that the rate of enemy incidents against Vietnamese forces in the first half of 1968 was the highest ever. The previous high was in 1965 followed by a 1966 decline and then a 1967 rise. This pattern may reflect the intensive enemy campaign in 1965 to destroy the RVNAF forces, which was disrupted in 1966 by the large US forces which had entered combat by that time. Actions against US forces in 1966 were the highest of the 1965-1967 period, but actions against RVNAF were lowest that year. Thereafter, the number of actions against US and RVNAF forces are much closer together, indicating the enemy may have adjusted his activity to fit the new situation by 1967.

A good indicator of VC/NVA ability to undertake offensive actions against allied forces is the attack rate.* Table 1 indicates an increasing enemy willingness to attack tougher targets (although often by indirect rocket or mortar fire): 1968 attacks against US forces are about 4 times the 1967 rate. Attacks against 3rd nation forces have increased six fold and attacks against RVNAF regular forces are up significantly.

Allied Combat Deaths From Enemy Actions

Tables 2 and 3 indicate that: (1) US forces have suffered only 11-26% of the total allied combat deaths from enemy offensive activity, despite being the targets of 50-61% of the incidents, but that (2) each year US combat deaths per VC actions have increased. The data indicate that when US forces are attacked, harassed, etc., they do not suffer as many combat deaths as Vietnamese forces. Table 3 bears this out by showing a range of .1 to .3 KIA per incident for US forces versus a range of .6-.9 KIA per incident for Vietnamese forces over the 1965-68 period.

Table 2 shows that enemy offensive actions have accounted for 14% of all US combat deaths since 1965; the figure for RVNAF is 44%. Moreover, the weaker the RVNAF force, the higher the proportion of combat deaths from enemy offensive actions: PF-59%, RF-47%, Regular Forces-35%. The explanation for the differences probably lies in the firepower, training, location and missions performed by each force. The PF are poorly armed and trained, rarely reinforced, and scattered about the country in static defense positions, all of which makes them easy prey for the enemy. The Regional and Regular forces are correspondingly better off, spend more time on mobile offensive operations and fare better, but not nearly as well as the US forces

* For full description and pitfalls of attack data see, "VC Attack Patterns 1965-1967," SEA Analysis Report, May 1968, p. 10. For data on attacks as an indicator of initiative see, "Military Initiative In South Vietnam" on page 6 of the September 1968 issue.

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TABLE 2
FRIENDLY FORCES COMBAT DEATHS

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1H 1968</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>US Forces Combat Deaths</u>				
From Enemy Incidents <u>a/</u>	678	1230	1529	3437
From Other Activity <u>b/</u>	4311	8128	8042	20481
Total <u>c/</u>	4989	9358	9571	23918
<u>FW Forces Combat Deaths</u>				
From Enemy Incidents <u>a/</u>	42	67	88	197
From Other Activity <u>b/</u>	524	1038	520	2082
Total <u>c/</u>	566	1105	608	2279
<u>RVN Forces Combat Deaths</u>				
<u>Regular Forces:</u>				
From Enemy Incidents <u>a/</u>	1946	2240	1931	6117
From Other Reg Force Activity <u>b/</u>	2472	3870	5117	11459
Total <u>c/</u>	4418	6110	7048	17576
<u>RF:</u>				
From Enemy Incidents <u>a/</u>	1383	1226	968	3577
From Other RF Activity <u>b/</u>	1929	1606	551	4086
Total <u>c/</u>	3312	2832	1519	7663
<u>PF:</u>				
From Enemy Incidents <u>a/</u>	2141	2200	1287	5628
From Other PF Activity <u>b/</u>	2082	1574	230	3886
Total <u>c/</u>	4223	3774	1517	9514
<u>Total RVNAP:</u>				
From Enemy Incidents <u>a/</u>	5470	5666	4186	15322
From Other RVN Forces Activity <u>b/</u>	6493	7050	5898	19431
Total <u>c/</u>	11953	12716	10084	34753

a/ Source: VCIIA File.

b/ Residual from subtracting combat deaths in VC incident file (footnote a/) from deaths in OPREP 5 (footnote c/).

c/ OASD(SA) Statistical Table 4B and OSD(C) Statistical Summary, Table 50.

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who are the strongest of all. On the other hand, the US combat deaths may be understated because any enemy initiated activities occurring in an area where a large US operation is underway are considered a reaction to the operation and are not reported as enemy initiated actions.

Table 3, in addition to showing an increasing US KIA per enemy incident, indicates that enemy actions against Regular Vietnamese Forces have a higher friendly KIA per incident than those against the RF or PF. Finally, the KIA per incident is higher in 1968 than 1967 for all but PF and is at a new high for US and Regular forces.

TABLE 3

FRIENDLY KIA PER ENEMY INCIDENT^{a/}

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>First Half 1968</u>
<u>KIA/Incident</u>				
US	.1	.1	.2	.3
FW	.1	.2	.2	.2
RVN:				
Regular	.9	1.0	1.0	1.2
RF	.8	.9	.6	.8
PF	.5	.7	.7	.7
Total	.6	.8	.8	.9
Total	.5	.4	.4	.5

a/ Derived from Tables 1 and 2.

Enemy Incidents Per Allied Troop Strength

Table 4 shows the monthly average number of enemy offensive actions per 1000 allied troop strength. The main point to emerge is the steady rate of about 1 incident per 1000 RVNAF forces per month throughout the period.

Table 5 shows that the allied KIA per 1000 allied strength from enemy actions increased 11% for US forces but only 22% for RVNAF forces in 1968. It also indicates that, per man, enemy incidents hit the PF harder than any other allied force, and that Vietnamese forces are hit about twice as hard as US forces.

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TABLE 4

ENEMY INCIDENTS VERSUS ALLIED TROOP STRENGTH (Monthly Average)

	2nd Half 1965	1966	1967	1st Half 1968
<u>Strength (000) a/</u>				
US	136.9	281.2	448.1	517.4
FW	12.6	35.2	55.8	61.2
RVN:				
ARVN	257.9	278.9	289.0	374.5
RF	104.9	141.7	144.1	168.6
PF	138.5	140.2	143.6	155.9
Total	501.3	560.8	576.7	699.0
Total.	650.8	877.2	1080.6	1277.6
<u>Incidents/1000 Allied Strength b/</u>				
US	2.5	3.0	1.5	1.7
FW	.9	.6	.6	1.3
RVN:				
Regular	.4	.6	.7	.7
RF	1.1	.9	1.1	1.3
PF	2.3	1.8	1.9	2.0
Total RVN	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1
Total	1.4	1.6	1.2	1.4

a/ Source: OSD(C) Statistical Summary, Table 2 and SEA Statistical Tables, 4A.

b/ Monthly average.

TABLE 5

ALLIED COMBAT DEATHS FROM VC/NVA INCIDENTS Per 1000 Strength a/

<u>Allied KIA/1000 Allied Strength</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968^{b/}</u>
US	2.4	2.7	5.9
FW	1.2	1.2	2.9
RVN:			
Regular	7.0	7.8	10.3
RF	9.8	8.5	11.5
PF	15.3	15.3	16.5
Total	9.8	9.8	12.0
Total	7.1	6.4	9.1

a/ Derived from Tables 2 and 4.

b/ Estimate derived by doubling Jan-June 68 data.

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Where Incidents Occur Against Allied Forces

The map plot and Table 6 show that 1967 VC/NVA incidents involving US forces were heavily concentrated in coastal I CTZ and in the Saigon area. I CTZ had 61% of the incidents and the five provinces surrounding Saigon had 22%. Thus, ten provinces accounted for 83% of all enemy incidents involving US forces in 1967. Quang Nam alone accounted for 40% of the total. Incidents involving Vietnamese Regular Forces occurred in the same area but with a higher proportion of the action (35%) in the areas around Saigon. The PF suffered most in IV CTZ and the RF in I CTZ.

The reasons for the different patterns are not clear, but probably can be explained by further analysis of VC/NVA strategy and capabilities in each CTZ and the numbers and effectiveness of the allied forces present in each. For example, IV CTZ has the most PF of any CTZ, and the relatively weak VC forces there probably prefer to fight the PF rather than the tougher RF and Regular Forces. In III CTZ the enemy objective is Saigon which is defended by a heavy concentration of Vietnamese Regular Forces, making them a popular target there. The high concentration of US and NVA regular forces in I CTZ, plus the US Marines' emphasis on small unit actions may help account for the high concentration of incidents against US forces in I CTZ.

Kill Ratios

Because of a computer error, our Table 7 in the July SEA Analysis Report article, "Enemy Initiated Incidents Against Vietnamese Armed Forces," is wrong. We have reprinted the table this month and changed our conclusions accordingly. The table compares kill ratios obtained in enemy incidents against (1) one or more Vietnamese forces, (2) Vietnamese plus US forces, (3) US forces alone, and (4) FW forces alone. It shows:

1. Before 1968 the best kill ratio was not achieved when Vietnamese and US forces were combined, but by US forces when alone. In 1968, however, the kill ratio for combined US-VN forces was highest.


2. Kill ratios on enemy initiated incidents for all allied forces except FW have improved consistently since 1965.

The corrected data still indicate how much advantage the enemy gains when he can initiate actions at a time and place of his choosing; only 8.9% of his total KIA resulted from such activity in 1967-68 versus 27-29% of total friendly KIA.

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ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING U.S. FORCES
1967



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TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF US STRENGTH, ENEMY INCIDENTS, LIVING
OF FORCES & US KIA RESULTING FROM VIETNAM

US Strength	Incl- dents 1967b/	KIA 1967b/	KIA/ Incl- dent
140	32	7	.2
48,354	114	27	.2
27,013	80	11	.1
42	2	0	0
7,235	19	4	.2
47,134	18	2	.1
6,412	8	1	.1
64	7	0	0
45	1	0	0
38	4	0	0
90	7	9	1.3
138,338	300	64	.2

II CTR
Binh Dinh
Phu Yen
Phu Dong
Phu Yen
Khanh Hoa
Mien Thuan
Darlao Duc
Tuyen Duc
Quang Duc
Lam Dong
Binh Thuan
Total

US Strength	Incl- dents 1967b/	KIA 1967b/	KIA/ Incl- dent
19,640	200	133	.7
16,466	418	31	.1
58,852	3305	137	0
6,287	389	37	.1
12,922	740	48	.1
130,237	5072	388	.1

I CTR
Quang Tri
Thua Thien
Quang Nam
Quang Tin
Quang Ngai
Total

US Strength	Incl- dents 1967b/	KIA 1967b/	KIA/ Incl- dent
247	3	0	0
15	13	1	.1
2,245	164	41	.3
224	53	16	.3
135	13	1	.1
25	6	3	.3
72	5	2	.4
540	27	3	.2
844	13	3	.2
5487	9	0	0
62	3	0	0
767	19	3	.2
210	3	1	.2
121	10	0	0
11,149	346	76	.3

IV CTR
Sa Dec
Kien Tuong
Dinh Tuong
Go Cong
Kien Hoa
Kien Phong
Chau Doc
An Giang
Kien Giang
Vinh Binh
Vinh Long
Phong Dinh
Chong Thien
Sa Xuyen
Mac Xuyen
An Xuyen
Total

US Strength	Incl- dents 1967b/	KIA 1967b/	KIA/ Incl- dent
65	9	3	.3
24	44	6	.1
152	141	36	.3
5175	43	48	.8
10,184	58	8	.1
85,912	333	56	.2
5,853	429	71	.2
4,853	622	189	.2
17,146	354	96	.3
129	290	99	.3
41,181	198	48	.3
176,672	3333	388	.3

III CTR
Phuoc Long
Binh Long
Long Khanh
Phuoc Tuy
Binh Hoa
Tay Ninh
Binh Quang
Binh Dinh
Long An
Gia Dinh
Total

ALL CTR 440,590 3351 1106 .1

12 JUL 1967, Source: GSD(C) Statistical Summary, Table 1.
Source: VCHA Computer File.

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TABLE 7

RATIOS RESULTING FROM ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS a/

	1966 (YR)			1967 (YR)			1968 (1H)		
	En	Fr	Ratio En/Fr	En	Fr	Ratio En/Fr	En	Fr	Ratio En/Fr
<u>I CTZ</u>									
VN	1279	1158	1.1	1321	1308	1.0	1013	510	2.0
FW	15	3	5.0	312	24	13.0	69	31	2.2
US	692	74	9.4	1100	277	4.0	1290	440	2.9
US & VN	51	128	.4	172	188	.9	267	163	1.6
Total	2037	1363	1.5	2905	1797	1.6	2639	1144	2.3
<u>II CTZ</u>									
VN	608	645	.9	475	824	.6	1487	757	2.0
FW	344	21	16.4	3	9	.3	3	16	.2
US	78	61	1.3	88	73	1.2	447	224	2.0
US & VN	74	66	1.1	75	60	1.3	1026	237	4.3
Total	1104	793	1.4	641	966	.7	2963	1234	2.4
<u>III CTZ</u>									
VN	623	1516	.4	803	1323	.6	740	1089	.7
FW	5	7	.7	7	22	.3	118	33	3.6
US	511	395	1.3	1346	592	2.3	1844	477	3.9
US & VN	279	77	3.6	786	264	3.0	467	119	3.9
Total	1418	1995	.7	2942	2201	1.3	3169	1718	1.8
<u>IV CTZ</u>									
VN	603	1805	.3	909	1573	.6	1020	1178	.9
FW	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
US	9	38	.2	66	62	1.1	222	111	2.0
US & VN	1	31	0	24	37	.6	467	166	2.8
Total	613	1874	.3	999	1672	.6	1709	1455	1.2
<u>TOTAL</u>									
VN	3113	5124	.6	3508	5028	.7	4260	3534	1.2
FW	364	31	11.7	322	55	5.9	190	80	2.4
US	1290	568	2.3	2600	1004	2.6	3803	1252	3.0
US & VN	405	302	1.3	1057	549	1.9	2227	685	3.3
Total	5172	6025	.9	7487	6636	1.1	10480	5551	1.9

a/ Source: VCHIA File.

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GVN POPULATION CONTROL AND ENEMY ACTIVITY

Summary

SVN population regressions, as reported by HES, strongly correlate with various measures of VC/NVA military activity. Population gains do not correlate with measures of either VC/NVA or friendly military activity.

Population Regressions

The regressed population is the population of hamlets whose HES ratings have declined from the previous month. It is logical to expect a connection between VC/NVA activities and population regression, and we constructed several hypotheses for this relationship and applied statistical methods to test them.

TABLE 1

REGRESSED POPULATION AGAINST VC/NVA OPERATIONS
February 1967 through September 1968 by Month

<u>Regressed Population Versus</u> ^{a/}	<u>R</u>	<u>R²</u>
	<u>Correlation Coefficient</u>	
Model 1. VC/NVA Attacks and Other Incidents ^{b/}	.86	.74
Model 2. Kill ratio ^{c/}	.82	.67
Model 3. PF/RF Casualties	.88	.77

^{a/} An independent variable for time is included in all three cases.

^{b/} Other incidents include terror, sabotage, and harassment. Attacks include large and small attacks.

^{c/} Kill ratio is Enemy to Friendly KIA.

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Our first model relates regressed population to total enemy attacks, other incidents, and time.^{1/} This model explains 74% of the variation in population regression. The most significant variable is attacks -- the greater the number of VC attacks, the more population is likely to regress.

The effect of other incidents is moderately strong and the correlation is negative; the more terror, sabotage and harassment incidents, the less population regression. This result appears contradictory at first glance, but it is reasonable when the long term trend of attacks and incidents is considered. Since 1967, non-attack incidents have been generally declining in number while attacks have been increasing. Attacks have paralleled population regressions closely (see Graph 1) and incidents, moving in the opposite direction, must show a negative correlation.

Another question arises over the large weight given to attacks. Obviously each enemy attack does not cause 4,670 people to regress in HES scores. VC/NVA attacks seem to have a strong effect because they^{2/} are a good over-all measure of enemy initiative and offensive activity. They seem to tell us when the VC is really on the move in all areas of endeavor that might cause HES scores to regress.

Although time is the weakest of the variables, it is not insignificant. Over time there is a negative trend which indicates that in later time periods more VC attacks or a higher level of VC activity are required to account for the same population regression. Again, this may be reasonable, assuming that allied security forces have become better able to cope with VC/NVA activities.

The second model relates population regressions to the kill ratio.^{3/} Again, a high positive correlation results. The time variable is statistically insignificant in this equation. High kill ratios are associated with periods of high VC/NVA activity, so this model is consistent with the first model discussed above.

The third model accounts for 77% of the variation in HES population regressions using the two variables of RF/PF casualties and time.^{4/} Although both variables are significant, RF/PF casualties have a far more important effect. Once again, the result accords with expectations and with the

1/ Population regressions (100's) = $15,446 + 46.7 (\text{VC attacks}) - 10.6 (\text{other incidents}) - 432 (\text{time})$.

2/ See "Military Initiative in South Vietnam," SEA Analysis Report, September 1968, p.6.

3/ Regressed population (100's) = $-11,055 + 3,600 (\text{kill ratio}) - 150 (\text{time})$.


4/ Regressed population (100's) = $-5,016 + 5.8 (\text{RF/PF casualties}) - 359 (\text{time})$.

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GRAPH 1

POPULATION REGRESSION AND VC/NVA TOTAL ATTACKS



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This situation leads us to suspect that population improvements and regressions are not associated with the same factors. This is supported by the lack of correlation between improvements and regressions within the HES. Regressions account for less than 4% of the variation in population improvements; they do not move together.

Since population regressions are linked to VC/NVA activity, we tried to link population improvement to measures of friendly activity. However, measures of small unit actions, small unit contacts, and battalion days of operation did not correlate significantly with population gains.

TABLE 3

POPULATION IMPROVEMENTS AGAINST FRIENDLY ACTIVITY

<u>Population Improvements Versus</u>	<u>R</u> <u>Correlation Coefficient</u>	<u>R²</u>
1. ARVN small unit contacts	.41	.17
2. Allied small unit operations	.16	.027
3. Friendly Bn. Days of Operation	.54	.29
4. Friendly Bn. Days of Operation (lagged)	.54	.29

Although VC/NVA activity is clearly related to population regressions, other factors govern population improvements, and we must dig further to see if we can determine what they are.

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TABLE 4
REGRESSION ANALYSIS DATA

	1967						Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov
	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul				
Population Regressions(100's) <u>a/</u>	4742	2513	1275	1179	3758	1176	1934	1080	1385	21
Population Improvements(100's) <u>a/</u>	3246	3778	2684	3983	8915	3859	1771	2182	868	21
Total VC Attacks <u>b/</u>	117	219	162	193	168	197	204	260	264	2
VC Other Incidents <u>b/</u>	1538	1894	2059	2059	1629	1880	1798	2354	1833	15
Kill Ratio <u>b/</u>	4.47	4.08	3.42	3.88	3.90	5.08	3.43	3.16	3.31	3.
RF/PF Casualties <u>c/</u>	1504	2223	1293	1573	1783	1121	1545	1733	1653	15
Total Friendly KIA <u>b/</u>	1642	2295	1823	2529	1885	1559	1693	2014	1895	22
Friendly Bn Days of Operations <u>c/</u>	4593	5387	5296	5537	5214	5547	5587	5358	5696	51
Friendly Small Unit Operations (100's) <u>c/</u>	1281	1465	1456	1648	1587	1786	1808	1747	1830	15
RVN Small Unit Contacts <u>c/</u>	334	477	568	420	505	514	455	526	501	5
Time	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

Source: a/ HAMLA
b/ OSD Statistical Summary
c/ OASD(SA) Statistical Tables
d/ Adjusted TFES Figure

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1967						1968								
<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>
1176	1934	1080	1385	2971	2182	2558	25842	3861	2993	4587	1754	2718	3508	2956
3959	1771	2182	868	2721	2239	2807	1553	3861	6129	3589	5723	7669	5227	6703
197	204	260	264	254	286	409	570	558	391	588	288	137	242	215
1880	1798	2354	1833	1700	2051	1949	1542	3203	2216	2652	1621	1492	1334	1196
5.08	3.43	3.16	3.31	3.36	3.83	5.51	8.46	5.47	4.35	5.70	3.96	3.90	5.74	4.73
1121	1545	1733	1653	1978	2616	1964	3400d/	2807	1889	2642	2473	1803	3314	3090
1359	1693	2014	1895	2278	2075	2762	4714	3175	2807	4223	2605	1706	2697	2649
5547	5587	5358	5696	5467	5447	5623	5474	7501	7809	7374	7378	7986	8530	8275
1706	1808	1747	1830	1923	1995	1875	325	756	1567	2059	1840	1804	1926	1799
514	455	526	501	501	572	461	N/A	77	158	111	111	158	171	164
6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

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ENEMY EMPHASIS ON CAUSING US CASUALTIES

Summary

Enemy attack and incident data confirm recent intelligence reports that VC/NVA forces are concentrating their efforts on increasing US casualties. The US portion of allied KIA from actions clearly initiated by the enemy increased from 13% in 1967 to 44% during January and February 1969.

TABLE 1

TOTAL FRIENDLY COMBAT DEATHS - SVN

	1966	1967	1968	1968 1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1969 1Qtr
<u>Combat Deaths</u>								
US	4989	9358	14561	4847	4724	2945	2045	3171
% of Total	28	40	37	33	42	36	36	38
RVNAF	11953	12715	24323	9424	6241	5147	3511	5000 ^{a/}
% of Total	68	55	61	64	56	62	61	59
3rd Nation	566	1105	979	346	262	196	175	251
% of Total	3	5	2	2	2	2	3	3
Total	17508	23179	39863	14617	11227	8288	5731	8422 ^{a/}

^{a/} Preliminary RVNAF KIA figure of 1263 for March has been increased 50% based on the average increase of final verified RVNAF KIA data over operational data for 1968.

Table 1 indicates that US forces consistently suffered about 37-40% of all friendly combat deaths during 1967, 1968 and first quarter 1969; the RVNAF share generally ranged from 55 to 61% of the total. Thus, the total combat death figures do not show a shift of enemy emphasis toward inflicting a higher proportion of US casualties.

However, Table 2 shows a clear and increasing enemy emphasis on inflicting a higher proportion of US casualties. The US proportion of allied combat deaths from actions clearly initiated by VC/NVA forces increased steadily from 11% in 1965 to 44% during January-February 1969. On the other hand, the proportion of RVNAF deaths decreased from 80% to 54%.

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TABLE 2

FRIENDLY COMBAT DEATHS FROM VC/NVA INITIATED ACTIONS ^{a/}
(Monthly Average)

Combat Deaths	1966	1967	1968	1967				1968				1969 Jan-Feb	b/
				1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q		
US	57	102	215	81	103	116	102	266	236	211	148	281	
% of Total	11	18	30	16	19	22	15	24	30	40	37	44	
RVNAF	443	463	483	416	451	398	589	843	527	317	243	343	
% of Total	88	81	68	82	81	77	85	75	68	59	61	54	
3rd Nation	4	6	11	11	1	5	5	14	15	5	9	10	
% of Total	1	1	2	2	0	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	
TOTAL	504	571	709	508	560	519	696	1123	778	533	400	634	

^{a/} Source: VC Incident Reports (VCIIA Computer File).

^{b/} Preliminary data.

We might expect the increases in US forces during the period to explain the increasing enemy tendency to hit US troops, because the number of US targets increased as the forces grew. However, the explanation does not work, because RVNAF strength grew much more than the US strength during the period. The US share of allied forces dropped from 41% at the end of 1967 to 37% by February of 1969. (Table 3) Thus, the increasing proportion of US combat deaths from enemy actions is most likely the result of a clear enemy intention to shift from RVNAF to US targets in order to keep US casualty rates as high as possible.

TABLE 3
FRIENDLY TROOP STRENGTHS IN SVN ^{a/}
(Thousands)

Force	1966	1967	1968	Feb 1969
US	385	487	537	542
% of Total	36	41	38	37
RVNAF ^{b/}	623	643	819	834
% of Total	59	54	57	58
3rd Nation	53	59	66	72
% of Total	5	5	5	5
TOTAL	1061	1189	1422	1448

^{a/} Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2.

^{b/} Regular, RF and PF forces only.

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"What we should do: For each additional day's stay the US must sustain more casualties. For each additional day's stay they must spend more money and lose more equipment. Each additional day's stay the American people will adopt a stronger antiwar attitude while there is no hope to consolidate the puppet administration and Army."

"Missions for summer. --Must be higher, stronger and more painful than the spring. --It must succeed in destroying, wearing down, and disintegrating more US potential, more main force puppet personnel, and, especially, more administrative personnel at the village and hamlet levels."

Table 1 reflects the increasing enemy emphasis on inflicting US casualties indicated by the document. It shows that the US proportion of allied combat deaths from actions clearly initiated by the enemy increased steadily from 11% in 1966 to 49% during first quarter 1969. On the other hand, the proportion of RVNAF deaths decreased from 88% to 50%.

TABLE 1

FRIENDLY COMBAT DEATHS FROM VC/NVA INITIATED ACTIONS a/ (Monthly Average)

Combat Deaths	1966	1967	1968	1967				1968				1969
				1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q
US	57	102	215	81	108	116	102	266	236	211	148	315
% of Total	11	18	30	16	19	22	15	24	30	40	37	49
RVNAF	443	463	483	416	451	398	589	843	527	317	243	324
% of Total	88	81	68	82	81	77	85	75	68	59	61	50
3rd Nation	4	6	11	11	1	5	5	14	15	5	9	8
% of Total	1	1	2	2	0	1	1	1	2	1	2	1
TOTAL	504	571	709	508	560	519	696	1123	778	533	400	647

a/ Source: VC Incident Reports (VCIL: Computer File).

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Table 2 once again shows that the increasing enemy tendency to hit US troops cannot be explained by increases in the number of US troops (and therefore targets), because RVNAF strength grew faster than US strength during the period. The US share of allied forces dropped from 41% at the end of 1967 to 37% in March 1969.

TABLE 2

FRIENDLY TROOP STRENGTHS IN SVN a/ (Thousands)

<u>Force</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>Mar 1969</u>
US	385	487	537	540
% of Total	36	41	38	37
RVNAF b/	623	643	819	845
% of Total	59	54	57	58
3rd Nation	53	59	66	72
% of Total	5	5	5	5
TOTAL	1061	1189	1422	1457

a/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2

b/ Regular, RF and PF forces only.

Table 3 shows the breakout of US combat deaths by type of enemy action. It indicates that:

1. The US share of US/RVNAF deaths from ground assaults and ambushes has steadily increased, from 10% in 1967 to 43% in first quarter 1969.

2. The US share of combat deaths from indirect attacks and harassment by fire only increased from 29% in 1967 to 32% in 1968, but jumped to 55% in first quarter 1969. Indirect attacks also accounted for the most US deaths, in contrast to 1968 when assaults consistently accounted for the most US deaths.

3. The US share of combat deaths from enemy mining, booby traps, and other explosives increased sharply after the 1968 Tet offensive and has remained fairly constant ever since.

Thus, the most pronounced change during the first quarter 1969 is the heavy enemy emphasis on inflicting US combat deaths through indirect attacks by fire -- at minimum cost to himself.

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TABLE 3

US KIA BY TYPE OF ENEMY ACTION a/

	(Qtr Avg)		1968				1969
	1967	1968	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr
<u>US Deaths From:</u>							
Assaults	95	294	447	313	268	147	394
Indirect Fire	143	227	339	249	197	123	412
Mining/Explos.	55	125	29	147	153	166	133
Other	8	1	1	0	1	2	7
Total	301	647	816	709	624	438	946
<u>Total US/RVNAF Deaths</u>							
<u>From:</u>							
Assaults	979	1112	2136	1126	745	440	911
Indirect Fire	489	707	1020	878	524	405	742
Mining/Explos.	206	270	213	268	294	305	251
Other	39	19	40	61	9	17	15
Total	1713	2108	3409	2333	1572	1167	1919
<u>US as % of Total US/RVNAF</u>							
Assaults	10	26	21	28	36	33	43
Indirect Fire	29	32	33	28	38	30	55
Mining/Explos.	26	46	14	55	54	42	53
Other	19	5	2	0	11	12	47
Total	18	31	24	30	40	38	49

a/ Source: VCIIA Computer File.

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Aug. 68

ENEMY EMPHASIS ON INFLICTING US CASUALTIES

Summary. US combat deaths reported from enemy initiated actions have tripled since 1966 and now account for 29% of all US KIA (42% in III CTZ). In contrast, RVNAF deaths reported from such actions have remained relatively unchanged. Indirect enemy fire is the leading cause of US deaths from enemy initiated actions this year. This is a reversion to the 1967 enemy pattern and contrasts with 1968, when enemy ground attacks were the leading cause of US deaths. The enemy loses only about 10% of his total KIA in incidents he initiates, compared to 25% of total RVNAF KIA and 29% of total US deaths in the same actions.

This study is based on casualty reports from VC/NVA-initiated incidents reported in the OPREP system and processed into the VCIIA computer file. The data only cover those attacks, harassment, sabotage, terror, and other actions clearly initiated by the enemy where no US operation is underway. Thus they represent a conservative view of enemy initiated actions; enemy initiated attacks (including attacks by fire and ambushes) against US forces in the field on operations are not counted. Other studies based on more meaningful data indicate that about 80% of US KIA are attributed to enemy initiative. Nevertheless, the trends shown by the OPREP data may be valid.

Table 1 shows that actions clearly initiated by the enemy have inflicted more US deaths each year since 1966. In 1967 such actions killed an average of 101 US troops per month; in 1969 the monthly average has risen to 303. Increases occurred in each Corps area (CTZ) during 1968, indicating a country-wide buildup of enemy effort to kill Americans that year. In 1969, further increases occurred in I and III CTZ as the enemy focused on killing US troops in these two areas.

A higher proportion of all US combat deaths also came from enemy initiated incidents each year. In 1967 only 13% of all US KIA resulted from enemy incidents. This rose to 18% in 1968 and to 29% so far in 1969, indicating that the enemy has been trying particularly hard to kill US forces this year. Again, I CTZ and III CTZ account for the increased emphasis. In III CTZ, 42% of all US KIA this year have come from enemy incidents, up from about 25% during the past two years. Similarly, in I CTZ the percentage doubled to 21% in 1969. Thus, the enemy appears to be devoting considerable effort to raising US KIA rates in these two areas. II and IV CTZ remain essentially unchanged in 1969, although US deaths in IV CTZ dropped during the 2nd quarter as US forces prepared to withdraw.

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TABLE 1

PROPORTION OF TOTAL US KIA
CAUSED BY ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS a/
(Monthly Average)

	1967	1968	(Thru June) 1969	1969 1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
<u>US KIA</u>					
<u>I CTZ</u>					
From Enemy Actions	34	72	107	107	107
From All Causes	389	674	512	488	536
% From Enemy Action	9	11	21	22	20
<u>II CTZ</u>					
From Enemy Actions	8	40	38	36	40
From All Causes	149	119	114	119	108
% From Enemy Action	5	34	33	30	37
<u>III CTZ</u>					
From Enemy Actions	53	84	138	146	130
From All Causes	206	339	332	338	326
% From Enemy Action	26	25	42	43	40
<u>IV CTZ</u>					
From Enemy Actions	6	20	20	30	10
From All Causes	23	73	83	97	69
% From Enemy Action	26	27	24	31	14
Other US KIA from all Causes b/	15	11	16	19	13
<u>Total</u>					
From Enemy Actions	101	216	303	319	287
From All Causes	782	1216	1057	1061	1052
% From Enemy Action	13	18	29	30	27

a/ Source: VCLIA Computer File. Includes KIA from all types of enemy incidents. US deaths from all causes are from OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

b/ US KIA not reported by CTZ in SVN.

In contrast to the trend in US combat deaths, RVNAF KIA from enemy initiated incidents have remained at about the same levels (417 to 487 per month) in 1967-69, and have accounted for about 25% of the total RVNAF KIA in 1968-69; in 1967, before the enemy began concentrating on US forces, they accounted for 44 % (Table 2).

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TABLE 2

PROPORTION OF RVNAF KIA
CAUSED BY ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS a/
(Monthly Average)

<u>RVNAF KIA</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	(Thru June) <u>1969</u>	<u>1969</u>	
				<u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Qtr</u>
From Enemy Actions	470	487	417	340	494
From All Causes	1060	2027	1678	1681	1674
% From Enemy Action	44	24	25	20	30

a/ Source: VCIIA Computer File, and OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

Another way to examine enemy emphasis on causing US casualties is to look at US deaths as a proportion of the total US-RVNAF deaths that reportedly result from enemy incidents. Table 3 shows that the US portion grew from 18% of total US-RVNAF deaths in 1967, to 31% in 1968, and to 42% in 1969. In the 1st quarter 1969 US deaths rose to 46% of the US-RVNAF total from enemy incidents. This was an all-time high, and shows the heavy enemy emphasis on killing US forces during the post Tet offensive.

In the 2nd quarter, the US proportion of US-RVNAF deaths dropped to 37%, reflecting a 10% drop in US KIA and a 45% increase in RVNAF KIA from enemy initiated actions. The RVNAF increase is probably not significant because (1) it simply reverted towards average 1967-68 levels, and (2) there was no significant change in the mix of Regular, Regional and Popular Forces killed by enemy initiated actions between the 1st and 2nd quarters.

Table 3 also shows that PF deaths from enemy action are down sharply since 1967. This could mean any of the following: (1) the enemy's guerrilla structure has been weakened, (2) the enemy does not consider the PF a threat worth attacking, (3) security conditions are better in the populated areas protected by the PF, or (4) the enemy is focusing on US and regular RVNAF units to gain maximum propaganda advantages.

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TABLE 3

US VS. RVNAF SHARE OF KIA FROM ENEMY ACTIONS ^{a/} (Monthly Average)

	1967	1968	(Thru June) 1969	1969 1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
US KIA From Enemy Actions	101	216	303	319	287
RVNAF KIA From Enemy Action:					
Regular	185	220	210	167	253
RF	102	127	112	94	130
PF	183	146	95	79	111
Subtotal	470	493	417	340	494
Total	571	703	720	659	781
US %	18	31	42	48	37

^{a/} Source: VCIIA Computer File. Includes KIA from all types of enemy incidents.

Table 4 shows US combat deaths by type of enemy action. It indicates that:

1. US deaths from enemy ground attacks have steadily increased (from 32 per month in 1967 to 123 in 1969), and the US share of US-RVNAF deaths from ground attacks has increased from a 1967 average of 10% to 35% in 1969.

2. Indirect fire has also caused more US combat deaths each year, and is the leading cause of US deaths caused by enemy incidents in 1969. This is a reversion to the 1967 pattern and contrasts with 1968, when ground attacks were the leading cause of death. The US share of US/RVNAF combat deaths from indirect fire increased from 29% in 1967 to 52% in 1969.

3. The US combat-death pattern has changed, but the RVNAF pattern has remained fairly constant throughout the 2 1/2 year period, with assaults accounting for about 60% of the RVNAF deaths, and indirect fire accounting for 30%.

4. US combat deaths from enemy mining, booby traps, and other explosives increased sharply after the 1968 Tet offensive and have remained fairly constant ever since.

Thus, the most pronounced change during 1969 is a reversion to the 1967 pattern of inflicting US casualties through indirect attacks by fire, but at a much higher rate.

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TABLE 4

US & RVNAF KIA BY TYPE OF ENEMY INITIATED ACTION ^{a/} (Monthly Average)

	1967	1968	(Thru June) 1969	1969 1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
US Deaths From					
Assaults	32	98	123	132	114
Indirect Fire	48	76	137	139	134
Mines/Explosives	18	42	41	46	37
Other	3	0	2	2	2
Total	101	216	303	319	287
RVNAF Deaths From					
Assaults	295	273	230	182	277
Indirect Fire	115	160	127	114	140
Mines/Explosives	50	48	54	41	67
Other	10	6	6	3	10
Total	470	487	417	340	494

^{a/} Source: VCIMA Computer File.

Table 5 provides additional evidence that the enemy has reverted to his 1967 pattern of action, but with considerably greater emphasis on killing US troops. It shows that the average enemy/US kill ratio rose to 3 to 1 in 1968 and dropped back to 1967 levels in 1969. The ratio in second quarter 1969 rose again to 3.1 to 1. Kill ratios seem to vary somewhat with the enemy's emphasis on ground attacks or attacks by fire. As would be expected, our kill ratios are less favorable when the enemy emphasizes attacks by fire.

TABLE 5

ENEMY/US KILL RATIO IN VC/NVA INITIATED ACTIONS (Monthly Average)

	1967	1968	(Thru June) 1969	1969 1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
Enemy KIA in Incidents Initiated Against US Forces	220	648	736	585	887
US KIA in Same Incidents	101	216	303	319	287
Enemy/US KIA Ratio	2.2	3	2.4	1.8	3.1

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Table 6 indicates that the proportion of enemy KIA lost at enemy initiative has been nearly constant during the 1967-1969 period, ranging from 9.4% of total enemy KIA to 9.9%. This compares to the 25% of total RVNAF KIA and 29% of total US deaths lost in the same incidents.

TABLE 6

ENEMY KIA FROM ENEMY INITIATED ACTIONS (Monthly Average)

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	(Thru June) <u>1969</u>	1969 <u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u>	2nd <u>Qtr</u>
In All Enemy Initiated Incidents <u>a/</u>	727	1423	1496	1151	1841
Total Enemy KIA From All Causes <u>b/</u>	7342	15094	15609	14949	16269
% KIA in Enemy Initiated Incidents	9.9	9.4	9.6	7.7	11.3

a/ Source: VCIIA Computer file.

b/ OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

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Nov/Dec 69

ENEMY TARGETING OF US AND RVNAF FORCES

In November, 52% of U.S. KIA came from enemy initiated actions, a sharp rise from past patterns and an indication that U.S. offensive combat activity may be tapering off.

Based on very preliminary data Table 1 indicates that over half (52%) of the US combat deaths in November came from actions clearly initiated by the enemy; this represents a sharp rise from past patterns. The change could have resulted from heavier enemy targeting of US units, or a decrease in US initiated combat operations.

Tables 2, 3, and 4 suggest that a reduction in US operations is most likely the explanation. They also suggest that the enemy is concentrating his attention on RVNAF forces.

Tables 2 and 3 indicate that RVNAF was targeted much more than US forces in November; 43% of all RVNAF deaths (in preliminary report) came from enemy initiated action and RVNAF absorbed 72% of all the total allied (US-RVNAF) deaths from enemy actions.

Finally, Table 4 indicates that U.S. deaths from mines and booby traps, a mark of offensive activity in VC or contested areas, seem to be dropping since redeployments began in the third quarter of this year. It also indicates heavy enemy emphasis on ground attacks against RVNAF.

TABLE 1

PROPORTION OF TOTAL US KIA
CAUSED BY ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS
(Monthly Avg)

	1966	1967	1968	1969 (Thru Nov)	1969 1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	Oct	Nov ^{a/}
From Enemy Actions		101	215	250	319	294	196	93	230
From All Causes		782	1216	825	1061	1052	637	377	446
% from Enemy Action	12.6	13	18	30	30	28	31	25	52

^{a/} Preliminary data.

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TABLE 2

PROPORTION OF RVNAF KIA CAUSED BY ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS (Monthly Avg)

	1967	1968	(Thru Nov) 1969	1969 1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	Oct	Nov ^{a/}
<u>RVNAF KIA</u>								
From Enemy Actions	470	487	419	340	529	361	342	582
From All Causes	1060	2027	1523	1681	1678	1348	1274	1356
% From Enemy Actions	44	24	28	20	32	27	27	43

a/ Preliminary data.

TABLE 3

US VS. RVNAF SHARE OF KIA FROM ENEMY ACTIONS (Monthly Avg)

	1967	1968	(Thru Nov) 1969	1969 1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	Oct	Nov ^{a/}
US KIA From En Actions	101	215	250	319	294	196	93	230
RVNAF KIA From Ene Action	470	487	419	340	529	361	342	582
Total	571	702	669	659	823	557	435	812
US %	18	31	37	48	36	35	21	28

a/ Preliminary data.

TABLE 4

US & RVNAF KIA BY TYPE OF ENEMY INITIATED ACTION^{a/} (Monthly Average) (thru Nov) 1969

	1967	1968	1969	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	Oct.	Nov. ^{a/}
<u>US Deaths From</u>								
Assaults	32	98	99	132	118	76	25	85
Indirect Fire	48	76	116	139	137	98	35	115
Mines/Explosives	18	41	34	46	37	22	33	30
Other	3	0	1	2	2	0	0	0
Total	101	215	250	319	294	196	93	230
<u>RVNAF Deaths From</u>								
Assaults	295	273	220	182	301	169	178	300
Indirect Fire	115	160	132	114	147	127	106	179
Mines/Explosives	50	48	59	41	70	59	44	91
Other	10	6	8	3	11	6	14	12
Total	470	487	419	340	529	361	342	582

a/ Preliminary data.

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ENEMY TARGETING OF US AND RVNAF FORCES

Summary. RVNAF is taking an increasing percentage of friendly KIA from enemy activity, as US deaths decline, reaching 85% according to preliminary January data. RVNAF deaths from indirect fire attacks in January were up sharply--3.5 times the 1969 monthly average.

Table 1 indicates that total US KIA and US KIA from enemy activity steadily declined during 1969. Preliminary 1970 data indicates this declining trend is continuing. However, the proportion of US combat deaths from enemy incidents remained about the same through January of this year.

The proportion of RVNAF KIA from enemy initiated activity in January increased over the 4th quarter level (Table 2). This resulted from an increase in RVNAF deaths from enemy actions. Table 4 shows that most of the RVNAF KIA from enemy actions resulted from indirect fire--3½ times the 4th quarter rate.

Table 3 indicates RVNAF suffered about 85% of all US-RVNAF combat deaths from enemy activity during January. The US share of deaths from such activities has declined from a peak of 48% during 1st quarter 1969 to 15% in January of this year. The shift stems primarily from a steady reduction in the absolute number of US deaths, while RVNAF deaths remained relatively constant. The sharpest reductions in US deaths occurred in the last half of the year as US redeployments began.

Table 4 indicates that deaths from mining and booby traps dropped for both US and RVNAF in January. Indirect fire deaths increased for both, and assault deaths were down significantly.

TABLE 1

PROPORTION OF TOTAL US KIA CAUSED BY ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS (monthly average)

	1967	1968	1969	1969 1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1970 Jan ^{a/}
From Enemy Actions	101	215	231	319	294	196	129	101
From All Causes	782	1216	785	1061	1052	637	388	343
% from Enemy Actions	13	18	29	30	28	31	33	29

^{a/} Preliminary data.

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TABLE 2

PROPORTION OF RVNAF KIA CAUSED BY ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS (monthly average)

	1967	1968	1969	1969 1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1970 Jan ^{a/}
From Enemy Actions	470	487	400	340	529	361	422	572
From All Causes	1060	2027	1572	1681	1678	1348	1581	1548 ^{b/}
% from Enemy Actions	44	24	25	20	32	27	27	37

a/ Preliminary data.

b/ Preliminary reports increased 58% to put them on a par with the verified last half 1969 data which was 58% higher than last half 1969 preliminary data.

TABLE 3

US VS. RVNAF SHARE OF KIA FROM ENEMY ACTIONS (monthly average)

	1967	1968	1969	1969 1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1970 Jan ^{a/}
US KIA from Enemy Actions	101	215	231	319	294	196	129	101
RVNAF KIA from Enemy Actions	470	487	400	340	529	361	422	572
Total	571	702	631	659	823	557	551	673
US %	// 18	31	37	48	36	35	23	15

a/ Preliminary data.

TABLE 4

US AND RVNAF KIA BY TYPE OF ENEMY INITIATED ACTION (monthly average)

	1967	1968	1969	1969 1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1970 Jan ^{a/}
US Deaths from								
Assaults	32	98	91	132	118	76	44	12
Indirect Fire	48	76	105	139	137	98	51	70
Mines/Explosives	18	41	34	45	37	22	34	19
Other	3	0	1	2	2	0	0	0
Total	101	215	231	319	294	196	129	101
RVNAF Deaths from								
Assault	295	273	207	182	301	169	213	84
Indirect Fire	115	160	125	114	147	127	122	430
Mines/Explosives	50	48	60	41	70	59	74	48
Other	10	6	8	3	11	6	13	10
Total	470	487	400	340	529	361	422	572

a/ Preliminary data.

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VC/NVA OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY





TABLE 1

VC/NVA ATTACKS ^{a/}
(Monthly Average)

	CY 1965				1966				Total 1966
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	
BN & Larger	2.3	7.0	5.3	9.7	6.3	5.0	1.7	0.7	3.4
Small Scale	74.7	45.6	38.3	41.3	57.3	61.0	80.3	102.0	75.2
Total	77.0	56.6	43.6	51.0	63.6	66.0	82.0	102.7	78.6

^{a/} Source: Table 8 & 8A OSD SEA Statistical Summary

Chart 1 and Table 1 indicate that the VC/NVA have shifted their emphasis from large scale attacks to small scale attacks. In CY 1966 VC/NVA battalion sized and larger attacks decreased from a monthly average of 6.3 in the 1st quarter to .7 per month in the 4th quarter. Conversely, VC/NVA small scale attacks increased from 57 to 102 per month in the same period.

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TABLE 2

CONTACTS WITH VC/NVA BATTALIONS
IN WHICH VC/NVA UNIT IS IDENTIFIED
(Jan-Nov 1966)

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Total</u>
Nr. Battalions	118	133	149	153	162	177	178	181	186	185	185	-
Contacts	9	15	15	13	24	33	22	42	4	14	17	208
Bns Contacted	9	15	15	13	24	33	22	41	4	14	17	207
Bns Contacted First Time in 1966	9	15	15	13	22	13	14	17	0	4	3	126

MACV data available for the period February through August 1966, indicates that friendly forces contacted VC/NVA battalions 239 times, or an average of 34 times per month. If each contact represented a different battalion, the contact rate would equal about 20% of the average reported total VC/NVA battalions; at best we would contact each battalion on an average of once every five months.

Table 2, which is based on analysis of CY 1966 monthly MACV Order of Battle (OB) reports through November (except for September and October reports, which are unavailable), indicates that only 126 of the 185 battalions carried in the November OB have been positively identified as contacted during the 11-month period; the 59 other battalions show no record of contact. Table 2 also indicates that the rate of positively identified contacts is about 19 per month, or 15 less than the total battalion contacts per month for the Feb-Aug period. Of the 59 battalions not contacted, 38 are combat battalions, 11 are combat support battalions, and 10 are service support battalions. Further information on battalion contacts is shown below. It indicates that 71 battalions were positively identified as contacted once, and 55 were contacted more than once during the period. Table 2 indicates that only one battalion was identified in two contacts during a single month (Aug).

CONTACTS IN WHICH VC/NVA BATTALION WAS IDENTIFIED (CY 1966 Thru Nov)

	<u>Number of Times Contacted</u>						<u>Total Bns</u>
	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	
Combat Bns	38	67	36	12	6	1	160
Other Bns	21	4	0	0	0	0	25
	59	71	36	12	6	1	185

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

Other battalions in addition to the 126 positively identified were undoubtedly active during the period. Nevertheless, it appears that the actual existence, or ability to operate, of some of the 59 units (particularly the 38 combat battalions) with no records of contact with friendly forces is open to question. Moreover, enemy activity rates reflected in the Feb-Aug average of 34 contacts per month and in Table 1 do not show the increases we might expect as the result of the 67 battalion increase reflected in the VC/NVA OB.

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VC/NVA ATTACKS



VC/NVA ATTACKS^{a/}
(Monthly Average)

	1965					1966					196
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Total 1965	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Total 1966	1st Qtr
Bn & Larger	2.3	7.0	5.3	9.7	6.1	7.0	4.7	1.7	1.3	3.7	3.
Small Scale	74.7	49.7	38.3	41.3	51.0	56.7	61.3	78.7	102.0	74.7	156.
Total	77.0	56.7	43.6	51.0	57.1	63.7	66.0	80.3	103.3	78.3	159.

^{a/} Source: Table 2 OSD SEA Statistical Summary

Large scale attacks have significantly increased over the third and fourth quarters of 1966 but have not yet reached the CY 1966 average (Table 1 and Graph 1). The emphasis on small scale attacks has continued and is nearly three times the monthly average in the first quarter 1966.

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ENEMY INCIDENTS IN I CORPS

Coincident with the buildup of allied forces in I Corps, and particularly the introduction of the III MAF in March 1965, there has been a shift from incidents against civilians to incidents against military targets. For example, the table shows in second quarter 1965, only 25% of the total incidents in I Corps were actions against military units, personnel and aircraft. By second quarter 1966, it was at a peak of 87% (3430 incidents out of a total of 3956). Incidents involving the military have risen faster than friendly force strength. There were only 1.5 times as many maneuver battalions (weighted) at the end of 1966 as at the end of 1965 while total incidents in 1966 were 2.3 times what they were in 1965.

Incidents involving fixed and rotary wing aircraft were fairly stable through the first half of 1965 at about 4% of I Corps incidents. They jumped to 40% in first quarter 1966 and have remained in the 40-50% range since then. Incidents involving helicopters alone (excluding fixed wing) went from virtually none in third quarter 1965 to 12% in fourth quarter to 27% in first quarter 1966 and have remained roughly at that proportion since then.

Even more striking changes in the pattern occurred with incidents against other military targets. Incidents against all military units and personnel rose from 325 (24%) in first quarter 1965 to 1108 (34%) in first quarter 1966 and reached a peak in third quarter 1966 at 2139 (52%). Incidents involving company size or larger units only increased more than five times between first quarter 1966 and second quarter (308 or 9%) to 1694 or 43%).

The number of important non-military incidents such as terror and harassment of hamlets reached a peak in 1964, declined in 1965 by more than 50% with the exception of fourth quarter and by the end of 1966 had returned to near 1963 levels. Sabotage incidents show a more direct (and inverse) relationship to the increase in military and aircraft incidents as a result of the troop buildup. The peak level of 195 (15%) incidents occurred in second quarter 1965 at the beginning of the buildup. Subsequently, sabotage incidents dropped off rapidly to less than 2% in first quarter 1967 (77 incidents).

Although incidents involving hamlets, sabotage and civilians are down to near 1963 levels, it cannot be assumed that this is a permanent situation. It is highly likely that military activity is diverting the Viet Cong from terrorism and the withdrawal of friendly forces would probably lead to a reemphasis on terrorist activity.

1/ Douglas Pike in his recent book on the Viet Cong likens this phenomenon to Gresham's Law, violent military acts tend to drive violent political acts out of circulation.

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INCIDENTS IN I C-2 (Quarterly Totals)

	1963 1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1964 1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
INCIDENTS INVOLVING:								
Military								
Aircraft ^{a/}	36	16	4	20	27	92	78	69
Other ^{b/}	106	91	94	184	317	139	229	251
Subtotal	142	107	98	204	344	231	307	320
Non-Military								
Hamlets ^{c/}	21	36	69	302	224	318	481	360
Sabotage ^{d/}	9	17	8	16	16	15	99	175
Subtotal	30	53	77	318	240	333	580	535
TOTAL ^{e/}	213	191	210	592	650	1010	1462	1404
% Military of Total	67	56	47	34	53	23	21	23

Source: NMCC VCJSA File

a/ Includes helicopters.

b/ Includes personnel and units.

c/ Includes hamlets, NRL hamlets, security fences.

d/ Includes roads, bridges, railroad bridges, railroad tracks.

e/ All incidents are not included in the preceding four categories; therefore totals do not

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
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2Q	3Q	4Q	<u>1955</u> 1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	<u>1966</u> 1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	<u>1967</u> 1Q
92	78	69	53	58	117	489	1293	1342	1202	1106	2242
139	229	251	325	265	386	597	1108	2088	2139	1346	1384
231	307	320	373	323	503	1036	2401	3430	3341	2452	3626
318	481	360	244	130	64	190	34	39	69	43	51
15	99	175	163	195	118	158	134	100	100	117	77
333	450	535	407	325	182	348	168	139	169	160	128
1010	1462	1404	1343	1308	1247	2408	3245	3956	4134	3176	4356
23	21	23	28	25	40	45	74	97	81	77	83

; therefore totals do not add.

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VC/NVA INCIDENTS IN II CORPS

Despite a greater increase in friendly maneuver battalions in II Corps, the VC/NVA incident rate there has not reacted with the strong upward trend found in I Corps, nor has the II Corps' shift of incidents from civilian to military targets been as strong. However, the pattern of II Corps and I Corps incidents against hamlets and lines of communications are very similar.

In I CTZ Table 1 and graph A show that incidents have steadily increased since the entry of U.S. troops to five times their previous rate (from 436/mo to 2180/mo). II CTZ incident rates, however, doubled after the entry of U.S. troops, dropped back to previous rates and then doubled again in January-February of this year (graph B).

Graph C shows military incidents compared with growth in friendly battalion strength in II Corps. When U.S. forces entered II Corps, 23% of all II Corps incidents were directed at military targets; this rose to 47% by January-February 1967. In I Corps, military incidents rose from 25% to 83% of the total. In II Corps, the shift to military incidents has been slower than the friendly force buildup. II Corps maneuver battalion strength increased 2.2 times between the entry of U.S. forces and first quarter 1967; the proportion of military incidents increased only 1.7 times. In I Corps, maneuver battalions increased 1.8 times; the proportion of military incidents increased 3.3 times.

TABLE 1
(Monthly Average by Quarter)

	1965				1966				1967
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Jan Feb
<u>I CORPS</u>									
Military Incidents	126	108	168	52	800	1143	1114	817	1813
Other Incidents	321	328	247	441	282	175	264	243	366
Total	447	436 ^a	415	803	1082	1318	1378	1060	2179
Mil as % of Total	28	25	40	45	74	87	81	77	83
Maneuver Bns ^{b/}		29.8	35.3	35.3	41.0	45.1	52.8	52.8	54.0
<u>II CORPS</u>									
Military Incidents	79	84	121	152	324	168	154	141	368
Other Incidents	295	342	308	360	510	333	258	215	419
Total	374	426	429 ^c	512	834	501	412	356	787
Mil as % of Total	21	20	28	30	39	34	37	40	47
Maneuver Bns ^{b/}			25.8	36.8	41.0	44.0	49.3	57.7	57.7

Source: NMCC VCJSA File

a/ Introduction of III MAP 8 March.

b/ Weighted: U.S. Army = 1, USMC = 1.5, ARVN = 0.59, ROK = 1, ROK MC = 1.5.


c/ Introduction of U.S. Army in July.

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
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VC/NVA INCIDENTS
(Monthly Average)

GRAPH A
I CORPS



GRAPH B
II CORPS





Incidents involving fixed and rotary wing aircraft in II Corps (Table 2) have fluctuated with the peaks and declines of the overall incident rate, with a sharp increase in January-February 1967. In contrast, I Corps incidents increased and remained at high levels throughout 1966, reaching an extremely high rate (2240 per month) in January-February 1967. Reported incidents involving helicopters alone (excluding fixed wing) also fluctuated at low levels in II Corps instead of growing to the sustained high rates in I Corps. Helicopter incidents in II Corps peaked at 11% (173) of the total in January-February 1967 in contrast to the I Corps rate of about 27% throughout 1966.

Incidents against military units and personnel peaked in 1st quarter 1966 at 165 per month or 21% of the total. Before 4th quarter 1965 virtually no incidents against company size or larger military units were reported. In 4th quarter 1965, 23 such incidents occurred per month and in 1st quarter 1966

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they peaked at 88 per month and then declined to 36 per month in January-February 1967. In I Corps incidents against company sized and larger units started at a rate of 27 per month, rose to 575 per month (3rd quarter 1966) and declined to 480 per month in January-February 1967.



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TABLE 2

II CORPS INCIDENTS (Monthly Average by Quarter)

	<u>1963</u>				<u>1964</u>				<u>1965</u>
	<u>1Q</u>	<u>2Q</u>	<u>3Q</u>	<u>4Q</u>	<u>1Q</u>	<u>2Q</u>	<u>3Q</u>	<u>4Q</u>	<u>1Q</u>
INCIDENTS INVOLVING:									
Military									
Aircraft ^{a/}	15	16	2	11	14	25	14	12	19
Other ^{b/}	50	45	60	174	179	109	115	66	60
Subtotal	65	61	62	185	193	134	129	78	79
Non-Military									
Hamlets ^{c/}	22	24	43	222	168	166	224	132	137
LOCs ^{d/}	4	5	6	20	35	17	57	68	48
Other	37	37	36	50	63	179	213	144	111
Subtotal	63	66	85	292	266	362	494	344	296
TOTAL	128	127	147	477	459	496	623	422	315
% Military of Total	51	48	42	39	42	27	21	18	21

Source: NMCC VCJSA File

^{a/} Includes helicopters.

^{b/} Includes outposts, facilities, camps, bivouac, units, personnel, company or larger and less than company.

^{c/} Includes NRL Hamlet, security fences, hamlets.

^{d/} Includes roads, all bridges, RR tracks and facilities, communication lines.

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2Q	3Q	4Q	1965 1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1966 1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1967 Jan Feb
25	14	12	19	27	35	68	159	57	87	91	278
109	115	66	60	57	86	84	165	111	67	50	50
134	129	78	79	84	121	152	324	168	154	141	368
166	224	132	137	110	46	47	46	36	25	35	38
17	57	68	48	75	87	50	49	45	27	14	7
179	213	144	111	157	174	264	415	252	206	167	374
362	494	344	296	342	307	361	510	333	258	216	419
496	623	422	375	426	428	513	834	501	412	357	787
27	21	18	21	20	28	30	39	34	37	40	47

s, personnel,

es, communication lines.

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ENEMY INCIDENTS IN IV CORPS

The introduction of U.S. combat forces into IV Corps early this year may have sparked a sharp reaction by the Viet Cong. January and February 1967 incident rates in IV CTZ were up nearly 30% over the levels of a year earlier and the last quarter of CY 1966. Total military and civilian incidents per month almost matched the peak level of the final quarter of 1965 (866 vs 886). The high rate in early 1967 is due to a new peak in military incidents (740 vs 651); non-military incidents were below the levels of the past two years. Aircraft incidents account for most of the increase; the 272 incidents were 101 over the Oct-Dec 1966 level and 193 over the level of a year ago.

This increase in aircraft incidents continues the generally upward pattern of the past 4 years. The pattern has been one of sharp increases to new levels: a jump from 17 to 50 (194% increase) in the 2nd quarter of 1964; an increase from 52 to 103 (98% increase) in the 4th quarter of 1965; and a jump from 103 to 171 (66% increase) in the 4th quarter of 1966. A further increase of 59% took place during the first two months of this year. These increases reflect the increases in tactical air and helicopter sorties that have occurred during this period. For example, helicopter flying hours in IV CTZ increased from 11,800 in the 4th quarter of 1965 to 16,700 during the 2nd quarter of 1966 and about 21,000 per quarter during the last half of 1966. Other factors may be changes in VC tactics and availability of new weapons and ammunition.

Among non-military targets in IV corps the overall trend is downward: 126 per month in the 1st two months of this year compared to 200 per month during CY 1965. Hamlets and villages were primary objects from April 1963 through June 1964. Beginning in July 1964, the emphasis shifted to sabotage (against roads, bridges, and railroad facilities), which suddenly and sharply increased (a 261% increase over the previous quarter's sabotage level) as incidents against hamlets and villages took a downward turn (from 52% to 32% of non-military incidents).

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INCIDENTS IN IV CTZ

(Monthly Average by Quarter)

	<u>1963</u>				<u>1964</u>		
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q
<u>Incidents Involving:</u>							
<u>Military</u>							
Aircraft ^{a/}	11	6	12	10	17	50	74
Outposts ^{b/}	37	72	136	230	116	170	361
Personnel & Units	46	13	73	94	61	51	55
Subtotal	94	151	221	334	194	271	490
<u>Non-Military</u>							
Hamlet & Villages ^{c/}	13	81	95	77	49	65	69
Roads, Bridges & RR ^{d/}	2	4	16	23	21	32	118
Civilians ^{e/}	6	15	12	2	3	27	28
Subtotal	21	100	123	102	73	124	215
<u>TOTAL</u>	115	251	344	436	267	395	705
<u>% Military of Total</u>	82	60	64	77	73	69	70

Source: NMCC VCJSA File

^{a/} Includes helicopters

^{b/} Includes watchtowers

^{c/} Includes hamlets, NRL Hamlets and facilities, security fences.

^{d/} Includes vehicular and railroad bridges, railroad tracks and facilities

^{e/} Includes officials and inhabitants.

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

<u>1964</u>				<u>1965</u>				<u>1966</u>				<u>1967</u>
1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Jan-Feb
17	50	74	35	37	38	52	103	79	85	103	171	272
116	170	361	385	397	447	328	479	385	430	260	275	330
61	51	55	94	93	77	60	69	76	118	72	93	138
194	271	490	515	527	562	440	651	540	633	435	539	740
49	65	69	32	55	43	28	41	24	29	17	21	29
21	32	118	97	91	115	104	141	63	140	76	87	62
3	27	28	25	28	53	37	53	60	50	27	27	35
73	124	215	194	174	211	169	235	147	219	120	135	126
267	395	705	669	701	773	609	886	687	852	555	674	866
73	69	70	77	75	73	72	73	79	74	78	80	85

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VC/NVA ATTACKS



VC/NVA ATTACKS ^{a/}
(Monthly Average)

	1965			1966				Total 1966	1967	
	1st Half	2nd Half	Total 1965	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr		1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
Bn & Larger	4.7	7.5	6.1	7.0	4.7	1.7	1.3	3.7	3.3	4.0
Small Scale	62.1	39.8	51.0	55.7	61.3	78.6	101.4	74.5	156.0	169.0
Total	66.8	47.3	57.1	63.7	66.0	80.3	102.7	78.2	159.3	173.0

^{a/} Source: Table 2 OSD SEA Statistical Summary

Large scale attacks continued increasing in the second quarter of 1967 and surpassed the CY 1966 average (Table and Graph 1). The emphasis on small scale attacks is continuing and is nearly three times the monthly average in the first half of 1966 (Graph 2).

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August 1967

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VC/NVA Incidents 1963-1967

Areas of high enemy incident activity in Vietnam have remained virtually the same since 1963, but some shifts in intensity between the areas are evident. The number of incidents has increased greatly over time, and are becoming concentrated in smaller areas. The greatest proportion of incidents now occurs in I Corps; in 1963 and 1964 IV Corps had the largest proportion.

The tables and accompanying computer plots indicate the increasing concentration of incident activity since 1963, particularly in I CTZ in the southeastern part of Quang Nam and eastern Quang Ngai, and other centers of activity in the Northern Delta and northwest of Saigon.

The computer plots depict total incidents minus anti-aircraft fire, ambushes, anti-aircraft fire alone, attacks, and incidents against lines of communication (roads, railroads, etc.) by year from 1963 through April 1967. Anti-aircraft fire is considered separately from all other incidents against targets on the ground since the rapid growth of such incidents distorts the overall incident picture, and because AA fire is a direct reaction to friendly initiated air activity. The totals in the tables do not necessarily correspond to those found in the Southeast Asia Statistical Summary since Statistical Summary numbers are refined to eliminate double counting while the VCJSA computer file numbers are not (for example an incident where the VC enter a hamlet, propagandize, and kidnap might be counted 3 times, or once for each action).

Total Incidents (Minus Anti-aircraft Fire)

	<u>Table 1.</u>				
	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u> <u>Jan-April</u>
<u>Total (minus AA fire)</u>					
I Corps	878	3461	5539	10658	3995
II Corps	1001	4368	4607	5493	1665
III Corps	1530	3930	4890	7498	2684
IV Corps	2572	5626	9597	8662	2331
Total	5981	17385	24633	32311	10675


As Table 1 and the computer plots show, total incidents * increased each year, the largest increase occurring in 1964 with almost three times the 1963 total (17385 vs. 5981). The major centers of VC incident activity have remained approximately the same over the years. These centers are

* Anti-aircraft incidents are not included in any of the statistics discussed in this section.

SOUTH VIETNAM

JAN - APR 1967

ALL INCIDENTS EXCEPT AA FIRE




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SOUTH VIETNAM


INCIDENTS FOR 1963
ALL INCIDENTS EXCEPT AA FIRE



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INCIDENTS FOR 1964
ALL INCIDENTS EXCEPT AA FIRE



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Incidents for 1965
All incidents except AA Fire

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INCIDENTS FOR 1966
ALL INCIDENTS EXCEPT AA 1966

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generally found in the most populous areas of the country -- the I Corps coastal area **, Gia Dinh and surrounding area and the Delta. It is interesting to note the activity in the War Zone C area of Tay Ninh province in 1967, an area where incidents did not occur before. This indicates that War Zone C has changed from an absolutely VC controlled area to a contested area.

The most notable change in the pattern over the years is the rapid buildup of incident activity in I Corps both in total numbers of incidents, and in the proportion of all incidents which occurred. In 1963 IV CTZ accounted for 43% (2572 out of 5981) of all incidents and I Corps accounted for 15% (878). In 1967 IV CTZ is down to 22% (2331 out of 10675 for Jan-Apr) and I CTZ now accounts for 35% or 3995.

Within I Corps the Marine Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) comprise only 16% of the area of I Corps and contain 45% of the population. Yet, as Table 2 shows, in 1966 79% of all I Corps incidents occurred in these TAOR's and the Danang TAOR accounted for half of these. Countrywide, the Danang TAOR accounted for more than 16% (1702 out of 8372) of incidents during 1966.

TABLE 2

INCIDENTS IN USMC TAORS IN I CORPS

(Quarterly Totals)

	1965					1966					1967	
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Total	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Total	1Q	1Q
<u>All Incidents Except AA Fire</u>												
Danang TAOR	208	214	380	584	1386	1093	1338	1702	1169	5302	1223	
Chu Lai TAOR	94	145	124	291	654	518	638	564	352	2072	555	
Phu Bai TAOR	124	123	63	183	493	123	139	165	114	541	114	
Total TAORS	426	482	567	1058	2533	1734	2115	2431	1635	7915	1892	
Total I Corps	1291	1250	1132	2004	5677	2338	2793	3165	2277	10573	2923	
% Total TAORS of I Corps	33.0	38.6	50.1	52.8	44.6	74.2	75.7	76.8	71.8	74.9	64.7	

SOURCE: JCS - VCJEA Computer File.

** Difficulties of registration between the plots and basic maps make the I Corps incidents in some cases appear to be slightly further from the coast than they actually are.

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Anti-aircraft Fire

TABLE 3

<u>AA Fire</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u> <u>Jan-Apr</u>
I Corps	150	78	337	4288	2683
II Corps	49	155	90	1031	575
III Corps	62	205	109	1397	835
IV Corps	89	362	131	997	636
Total	350	800	667	7713	4729

Table 3 shows that reported anti-aircraft fire in 1963 was very low - 350 incidents for the year. There was a scattering of such incidents north of Gia Dinh and some concentration along the Quang Ngai - Binh Dinh border. 1964 showed a rapid increase in the Delta and Gia Dinh area but still very little in I Corps. 1965 showed a rapid increase in I Corps (78 in 1964 to 337 in 1965) while the IV Corps total dropped from 362 to 131. The computer plots show that the I Corps increase was concentrated on the Quang Nam - Quang Tin border. Countrywide, 1966 AA fire incidents were more than 11 times the 1965 total (7713 over 667 in 1965), reflecting the arrival of US forces with fixed wing and helicopter support. Again, the heaviest concentration was in I Corps, notably the area south of Danang. An interesting line of incidents also appeared for the first time along the Laos - Thua Thien province border. Thus far in 1967, 56.7% (2683 of 4729) AA fire incidents occurred in I Corps.

Attacks

TABLE 4

<u>Attacks</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u> <u>(Jan-Apr)</u>
I Corps	278	112	149	195	223
II Corps	197	191	162	103	60
III Corps	489	372	91	152	118
IV Corps	1426	390	159	278	141
Total	2388	1065	561	733	542

As Table 4 shows, reported attacks were at their lowest point in 1965 (561 down from 1065 in 1964) but were back up in 1966 to 733 and are continuing up in 1967. However, 4th quarter 1966 and all 1967 numbers contain incidents of mortar fire without intent to assault, a type of incident defined as harassing fire in 1964-65. About 28% of attacks in this period are mortar fire only. In 1963 many incidents of harassing fire were listed as attacks, a factor which probably accounts for the large number of attacks reported in that year.

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
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
ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE



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
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
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INCIDENTS FOR 1964
ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE



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
INCIDENTS FOR 1965
ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE



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INCIDENTS FOR 1966
ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE




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SOUTH VIETNAM

JAN - APR 1967
ATTACKS



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
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INCIDENTS FOR 1963
ATTACKS




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
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INCIDENTS FOR 1964
ATTACKS



SOUTH VIET NAM

**INCIDENTS FOR 1965
ATTACKS**




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INCIDENTS FOR 1966
ATTACKS



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The computer plots for reported attacks show the Delta, the area north of Saigon, Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, and Quang Nam in I Corps, and Binh Dinh in II Corps reporting high attack rates over the years. The concentrations in I Corps noted in 1963 and 1964 became more scattered in 1965 and 1966. Thus far in 1967, however, 41% (223 of 542) of reported attacks occurred in I Corps with the province closest to the DMZ, Quang Tin, leading with 68 attacks. This is partially due to the number of mortar and rocket attacks occurring in this province. While attacks in I Corps in 1967 have almost reached the 1963 level (223 vs 278), IV Corps, which had 1426 (59.7%) attacks reported in 1963, reported only 141 in the first four months of 1967. In 1963, 5 IV Corps provinces accounted for 974 or 41% of all reported attacks. By 1967 the five I Corps provinces accounted for 41% or 223 of 542 attacks.

Lines of Communication

TABLE 5

<u>Lines of Communication</u>	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967 (Jan-Apr)
I Corps	102	489	1005	986	444
II Corps	216	839	1162	851	230
III Corps	125	1032	1406	1301	448
IV Corps	243	1146	1780	1615	470
Total	686	3506	5353	4753	1592

Incidents against LOC's peaked in 1965 with 5353 that year and declined since (Table 5). The 1965 plot shows distinct patterns of incidents along railroads and roads; by 1966 and 1967 these lines have become somewhat diffused, reflecting the decreasing frequency of such incidents. This indicates real progress in opening LOC's to friendly traffic. II Corps incidents against LOC's have dropped over time as a percentage of the total -- 32% in 1963 to 14% in 1967. Conversely, I Corps has increased its percentage of the total -- 14.9% in 1963 to 27.9% in 1967. IV Corps, however, has consistently led in LOC incidents varying between 29.5% (1967) and 35.4% (1963) of the total.

In the first four months of 1967 Quang Nam accounted for 11.4% or 182 of 1592 such incidents. Altogether Quang Nam and Thua Thien in I Corps, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong and Bien Hoa in III Corps and Vinh Binh in IV Corps made up 44% or 697 of the 1592 incidents in Jan-Apr 1967.

Ambushes

TABLE 6


<u>Ambushes</u>	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967 (Jan-Apr)
I Corps	75	77	30	56	9
II Corps	133	124	78	32	11
III Corps	156	182	55	72	24
IV Corps	291	163	51	44	2
Total	655	546	214	204	46

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SOUTH VIET NAM

INCIDENTS FOR 1967

Lines of Communication




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SOUTH VIETNAM

INCIDENTS FOR 1964

Lines of Communication



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
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
INCIDENTS FOR 1963

Lines of Communication



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INCIDENTS FOR 1965
Lines of Communication



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
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SOUTH VIETNAM

INCIDENTS FOR 1968
LINES OF COMMUNICATION




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Table 6 shows that reported ambushes have declined over the years. Given the high rates of general incident activity in 1966 and 1967, some incidents formerly reported as ambushes may now be reported under other categories. It does not seem likely, for example, that only the ambushes occurred in IV Corps during the first four months of 1967.

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
JAN - APR 1967
AMBUSHES

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
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
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AMBUSHES



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




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**INCIDENTS FOR 1966
AMBUSHES**



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VC/NVA Patterns of Activity

Systematic analysis of VC incident reports will yield patterns which may indicate the enemy's intent and capabilities in South Vietnam. These patterns also may help in assessing the progress of the war. Countrywide summary statistics are not sufficient since they mask regional patterns. A recent IDA/WSEGC study bears this out.

Incident Concentrations

The IDA study analyzed three lunar years - LY 1964-1966.^{2/} Throughout this period the VC/NVA initiated a consistently high level of activity averaging 1900 incidents per month, excluding anti-aircraft incidents. (Only the AA fire section below discusses these incidents.) The incidents clustered in the same general areas over time, with the patterns becoming more concentrated since LY 1965; 90% of all incidents in any given lunar quarter normally took place in 10% of the country; 25% regularly took place in only 1% of the country. (Map 3 shows the pattern for LY 1966.) In other words, incidents tend to occur where they have occurred before and areas afflicted with many incidents of one type tend to have many incidents of all other types as well. No patterns were found of one type of incident being unique to a particular area.

Incident density (incidents per square kilometer) indicates a great deal about the nature of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam (SVN). In the most active SVN incident areas, one incident every other month (0.5 incidents per month) per square kilometer is a high rate of activity, representing a mature guerrilla war. The worst road segments averaged only one incident per kilometer per month. This helps to explain why it is so difficult to find guerrillas in action at any given place and time.

Thus, VC/NVA initiated incidents viewed over a short period seem to indicate no orderly pursuit of enemy objectives. But when they are examined over three to twelve months, patterns become strikingly evident. This implies that the enemy anticipates that the cumulative effect over long periods will be sufficient to achieve his goals.


Targets of Enemy Incidents

The study divides incidents into "assaults" and "harassments," and the targets or "objectives" into (1) "military facilities and personnel," (2) "civil facilities and personnel" and (3) "transportation and communication." The purpose of these divisions was to determine the changes in the patterns of the enemy's actions -- harassments being supposedly less intense than "assaults" -- and shifts among targets of enemy actions.

1/ A. I. Schwartz, Selected Characteristics of VC Incidents, WSEG Staff Study No. 137, September 1967.

2/ All calculations in the IDA study are based on the Vietnamese lunar calendar. The study covers Gregorian calendar period 13 February 1964 - 8 February 1967.

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MAP 3 (C). High Intensity Incident Areas, L1966 (U)

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



FIGURE 6 (C). Harassment Against Objectives (All SVN, L1964-L1966) (U)

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FIGURE 7



*1966 INCLUDES 13 MONTHS RESULTING IN AN EXTRA MONTH IN THE SECOND QUARTER. DATA FOR THE SECOND QUARTER WERE NORMALIZED TO BE EQUIVALENT TO A THREE MONTH PERIOD.

FIGURE 7 (C). Actions Employing Weapons or Explosives Against Military Facilities and Personnel (F and P) (All SVN, L1964-L1966 by Lunar Quarter)(U)

TABLE 1

Actions Involving Weapons or Explosives (Assault)
Against Military Facilities and Personnel
 (By Lunar Qtr in Thousands)

LY 1964					LY 1965					LY 1966				
1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Total	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Total	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Total
1.7	2.2	2.2	2.3	8.4	1.9	2.5	2.2	3.5	10.1	4.0	5.3	4.4	3.7	17.4

a/ Estimated

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Time of Day

Two-thirds of the VC/NVA incidents occurred at night, with a peak right after dark. Another peak of activity occurred at mid-morning. Individual types of actions had distinctive patterns: attacks occurred most frequently between 2-00 and 0400 hours, ambushes from 0700 through 0900 hours. Night incidents did not vary with the amount of moonlight. Nor was there any other obvious cycle: on most days (two-thirds) the number of incidents in all South Vietnam varied from 45 to 80 per day, with low incident activity during Tet and the 1966 truce periods.

Anti-Aircraft Fire

From about August 1965 through February 1967 the 9500 anti-aircraft fire incidents represented 17 to 35 percent of the total incidents^{3/} reported every quarter. A comparison of the geographic distribution of anti-aircraft incidents and all others shows that, although occasional AA fire incidents are widely distributed, clusters of such incidents tend to be peripheral to concentration of other actions (donut shape). The Danang area in LY 1966 is a notable exception. There, AA fire incidents clustered throughout the area where all other incidents are concentrated.

SEAPRO Comment

Enemy activity must decrease, and GVN security must improve if US/GVN objectives are to be achieved in SVN. A decline in VC incidents in an area over a reasonable period is a significant indicator of a change in the situation -- one side or the other has gained control. The IDA study shows that such changes can be readily identified, using computerized data, and brought to the attention of the operator, planner and policy maker. Analyzed in conjunction with other information (status of hamlets, friendly operations, captured documents, etc.), incident data should give us important clues about who controls which areas of South Vietnam, which areas are most highly contested (high incident rates signify contested areas), and where progress is being made.

The substantive findings of the IDA study are distressing, because they show that the enemy can still maintain a high rate of incidents in the same areas year after year. The 1967 incident rate is comparable to that of 1965 and 1966; no dramatic decline is evident. (Investigation is underway to see if the geographical patterns remain the same.) Obviously, the guerrillas are as active as they ever were, although they have shifted their activity increasingly from civilian to military targets.

The IDA study also hints at substantial inadequacies in incident reporting. Incomplete reporting, changes in reporting criteria and definition, and changes in computer coding procedures have all occurred. These make comparison of incident data over time difficult. We have encountered similar problems with the data ^{3/} Fired-on aircraft plus all other incidents.

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(although we find it very useful as is) and some indications that its quality has declined during 1967. In view of the importance of detailed incident data, we are working with DIA to develop a series of simple changes in coding and other procedures which might bring about substantial improvement in the data without further reporting burdens on field reporters. We hope to discuss these changes with MACV and CINCPAC in January 1968.

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Pict Thayer
Feb 68

VC/NVA ATTACKS IN III CTZ

VC/NVA attacks in III CTZ have increased steadily since 1965. They sharply increased in 1967, primarily due to increased small unit attacks employing mortar fire. In the four III CTZ provinces bordering Cambodia the 1967 attack rate increased seven times the 1966 rate; elsewhere in III CTZ attacks doubled. In 1967 the border provinces accounted for half of the III CTZ attacks, compared to 24% in 1966 and 1965. The attacks in the last quarter of 1967 hit a three-year peak. The pattern suggests that VC/NVA forces may have greatly increased their attacks in the border areas in order to disperse allied forces away from the heavily populated areas around Saigon.

A Word About the Attack Data

Two sets of somewhat inconsistent VC/NVA incident data are used in this article. Tables 1 and 5 are based on summary data from the daily MACV OPREP report. The summary data represents the "official" incident count, but limits analysis of attacks to large-scale versus small-scale attacks by corps area. In order to analyze attacks by province, by target, by type (mortar fire versus assault), etc., we must turn to a computer file which reports each incident separately on the basis of a detailed annex to the daily OPREP. Invariably, the totals from this data do not agree with the summary data. The computer data used in this article shows lower attack figures, because ambushes have not been counted as attacks, and we suspect the enemy attacks in reaction to allied operations have not been included in the file. Future articles will attempt to narrow the discrepancies and to address the ambush reports. In the meantime, we note that both sets of data show the same basic trends. Therefore, they are useful for trend analysis even though specific figures disagree.

Rise in Attacks

VC/NVA attacks in III CTZ have increased consistently each quarter since mid-1965. The 1967 attack rate was 2.4 times the 1966 rate and 4.2 times the 1965 rate. The fourth quarter 1967 rate rose so sharply that it almost equalled the 1966 total. Small unit attacks account for the increases. Battalion-sized and larger attacks hit a three-year peak in fourth quarter 1965 but do not show a significant upward trend during the three-year period.

TABLE 1

TOTAL VC/NVA ATTACKS IN III CTZ
(Summary Data)

	1965	1966	1967	1965				1966				1967			
				1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
Battalion & Larger	25	15	23	2	8	6	9	8	4	2	1	3	4	6	10
Small	136	269	655	34	39	31	32	42	58	78	91	123	118	154	260
Total	161	284	678	36	47	37	41	50	62	80	92	126	122	160	270

Source: (USDA) SEA Statistical Table 3A and DIA Weekly Worksheets.

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(In comparison with the other corps areas, the III CTZ suffered about the same number of attacks as I and IV CTZ during the 1965-67 period, with II CTZ well below all other CTZ. However, III CTZ reported more battalion and larger attacks than any other corps area during 1965, 1966 and 1967, and accounted for 37% of all large attacks during that period. Moreover, its share increased from 3% in 1965-66 to 43% in 1967.)

Table 2, based on our computer file of VC/NVA incidents, also shows the strong upward trend in attacks. Assaults increased abruptly each year, with the 1967 rate about double the 1966 rate, and three times the 1965 rate. Most of the sharp 1967 rise in total attacks is caused by the increasing mortar attacks. Finally, attacks of both types reached a three-year peak during fourth quarter 1967.

TABLE 2

ATTACKS IN III CTZ a/ b/ (Computer Data)

	1965	1966	1967	1965				1966				1967			
				1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
Mortar Attacks c/	13	259								8	5	24	50	76	109
Assaults b/	86	145	265	25	27	21	15	36	33	31	45	66	54	59	86
Total	88	158	524	25	27	21	15	36	33	39	50	90	104	135	195

a/ Source: NMCSSC-VCJSA Computer File, derived from VNDBA file.

b/ Does not include ambushes or, we suspect, attacks occurring in presence of friendly operations.

c/ Mortar attacks of 20 or more rounds began to be counted as attacks during third quarter 1966. Before, they were counted as harassing fire; less than 20 rounds still counts as harassing fire.

Targets of VC/NVA Attacks

During 1967, VC/NVA attacks against both population centers and military targets increased sharply due largely to increased mortar incidents. Attacks against district towns, military personnel, military headquarters, camps (primarily CIDG and US base camps), and outposts accounted for most of the increase (Table 3).

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TABLE 3

TARGETS OF ENEMY ATTACKS IN III CTZ (Computer Data)

				<u>1965</u>				<u>1966</u>			
				1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
<u>Population Centers</u>											
Hamlets	16	6	17	6	4	3	3	2	1	1	2
Villages	1	0	7	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
District Towns	3	2	22	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	1
Other a/	8	5	8	3	3	0	2	0	4	1	0
Total	28	13	54	9	9	5	5	2	5	3	3
<u>Military Facilities</u>											
Headquarters b/	0	1	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Training Center	1	4	12	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	2
Base	0	2	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Airfield	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Military Post	35	35	49	10	10	7	8	7	8	11	9
Outpost	7	29	75	0	3	3	1	5	6	3	15
Camp c/	1	3	71	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0
Other	4	1	10	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	0
Total	48	76	258	10	17	12	9	15	14	19	26
<u>Military Personnel</u>											
	8	43	183	3	1	3	1	10	9	12	12
Total Military	56	119	441	13	18	15	10	25	23	31	40
<u>Other d/</u>											
	4	26	55	1	2	1	0	6	5	6	9
Total e/	88	158	550	23	29	21	15	33	33	40	52

Source: NMCSMC-VCJSA file, derived from VIDBA file.

a/ Schools, markets, village and district offices.

b/ Includes command posts.

c/ Primarily Special Forces and CIDG camps.

d/ Civilians, police, vehicles, area.

e/ Totals do not agree with Tables 2 and 4 due to multiple targets for some attacks

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<u>1966</u>					<u>1967</u>			
4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
3	2	1	1	2	2	0	7	8
0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	2
0	0	0	1	1	1	4	6	11
2	0	4	1	0	0	1	5	2
5	2	5	3	3	3	8	20	23
0	0	0	1	0	4	4	9	12
0	1	0	1	2	2	1	4	5
0	0	0	1	1	3	1	2	2
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	1
8	7	8	11	9	10	9	10	20
1	5	6	3	15	10	12	25	28
0	1	0	2	0	7	15	19	30
0	1	0	0	0	1	4	5	0
9	15	14	19	28	38	46	76	98
1	10	9	12	12	41	40	36	65
10	23	23	31	40	79	86	112	164
0	6	5	6	9	14	11	12	18
15	33	33	40	52	96	105	144	205

for some attacks.

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In 1967, military targets accounted for 441 (80%) of the 550 total targets attacked and for 82% of the 1967 increase in targets. Military personnel accounted for a third of all 1967 targets and showed the greatest increase (+140) over 1966, followed by camps (+68), outposts (+46) and military headquarters (+28). Altogether, the foregoing military targets accounted for about 90% of the increased attacks against military targets in 1967, and for 72% of the military-civilian target increase. The sharp increase in attacks against military headquarters and military camps is a departure from 1965-1966 attack patterns, and is probably due to the increase in mortar incidents, which in 1967 were counted as attacks.

The increase in attacks against district towns also represents a distinct departure from past attack patterns. District towns were targets for 22 attacks (mortar fire only) in 1967; only five attacks of any kind against district towns were reported during all of 1965-1966. The increase in 1967 may have signified the increasing enemy willingness to attack populated areas which culminated in the Tet offensive. (During the last half of 1967 there were 17 attacks against district towns and 15 against hamlets in III CTZ.) In the 22 attacks, five district towns were hit twice (each in a different province). The attacks were spread fairly evenly throughout III CTZ.

Where Attacks Occur

Attacks in the four provinces of III CTZ which border Cambodia increased significantly during 1967, compared to 1966 levels and to the rest of III CTZ. In terms of total attacks, Table 4 shows that the border provinces in 1967 suffered seven times the 1966 attack rate. The rate doubled in the rest of III CTZ. As a result, the border provinces accounted for over half (52%) of the 1967 attacks in III CTZ, compared to one-fourth (24%) in both 1965 and 1966.

If we exclude mortar fire incidents and run the comparisons using assaults only, the pattern is the same. The border provinces had three times as many assaults in 1967; the other provinces only had 1.4 times as many. As a result, the border provinces accounted for 43% of the 1967 assaults, compared to 23-25% in 1965 and 1966. The four border provinces also accounted for 61% of the 1967 attacks by mortar fire only. (160 versus 99 elsewhere in III CTZ.)

a/ Some assaults occurred against other types of targets which were near district towns but are not classified as an assault against a district town in the reporting system - the Loc Ninh attack, for example.

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TABLE 4


ATTACKS BY PROVINCE IN III CTZ (Computer Data)

	1965	1966	1967	1965				1966				1967			
	YR	YR	YR	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr
Border Provinces															
Phuoc Long	9	1	32	2	3	3	1	0	0	1	0	4	3	9	16
Binh Long	0	8	57	0	0	0	0	5	1	1	1	4	6	20	27
Tay Ninh	4	11	97	1	2	1	0	0	0	6	5	20	25	17	35
Hau Nghia	8	18	87	1	6	1	0	4	3	6	5	15	18	24	30
Subtotal	21	38	273	4	11	5	1	9	4	14	11	43	52	70	108
Other Provinces															
Long An	18	26	71	5	5	4	4	7	6	6	7	16	14	15	26
Bien Hoa	9	12	46	2	4	0	3	2	4	4	2	10	9	10	17
Gia Dinh	12	35	25	0	2	7	3	4	11	11	9	4	4	7	10
Binh Duong	11	26	67	5	2	3	1	8	3	2	13	12	12	16	27
Phuoc Tuy	1	10	22	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	6	2	6	10	4
Binh Tuy	5	5	4	4	1	0	0	3	1	0	1	0	2	2	0
Long Khanh	11	6	16	4	2	2	3	3	2	0	1	3	4	5	4
Subtotal	67	120	251	21	16	16	14	27	29	25	39	47	51	65	88
Total^{a/}	88	158	524	25	27	21	15	36	33	39	50	90	103	135	196

^{a/} Includes mortar attacks
Source: VCJSA file.

As Table 1 showed, large-scale attacks in 1967 were 1.5 times the 1966 rate, but were still slightly lower than the 1965 level. Ten of the 23 large attacks in 1967 occurred in the fourth quarter; at least five occurred in the four border provinces. Table 5 displays the available data on large-scale attacks by province in III CTZ; it shows that large-scale attacks in 1967 increased in the border provinces but declined elsewhere in III CTZ.

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III CORPS ENEMY ATTACKS 1965

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TABLE 5

VC/NVA BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER ATTACKS IN III CTZ a/
(Summary Data)

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
<u>Border Provinces</u>			
Hau Nghia	6	2	2
Tay Ninh	0	1	3
Binh Long	1	2	3
Phuoc Long	2	0	2
Subtotal	<u>9</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>10</u>
<u>Other Provinces</u>			
Gia Dinh	1	1	0
Long An	1	1	0
Bien Hoa	2	0	1
Binh Duong	6	3	3
Long Khanh	1	2	0
Phuoc Tuy	0	1	1
Binh Tuy	1	2	1
Subtotal	<u>12</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>6</u>
Total ^{b/}	21 ^{b/}	15	16 ^{b/}

a/ Source: Summary data from DIA weekly worksheets.

b/ Includes only 21 of 25 attacks in 1965 and 16 of 23 large attacks in 1967.


The military targets data also reflects the 1967 increase in border province attacks. During the year, the four border provinces accounted for: (1) more than half of the military targets attacked in III CTZ, (2) half of the attacks against military personnel, (3) 80% of the attacks against CIDG and other camps (Tay Ninh alone accounted for 43% of the III CTZ camps attacked), (4) 38% of the attacks against military posts and outposts, and (5) 59% of the attacks against military headquarters.

Thus, all of the data show a dramatic increase in enemy attacks in the four border provinces of III CTZ during 1967, and particularly during the fourth quarter. Attacks elsewhere in III CTZ increased but at a much slower rate, continuing at the rate of growth between 1965 and 1966. The map plots show the change in graphic fashion.

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TABLE 6

III CTZ Allied Casualties Per Attack
(Computer Data)

	1965 YR	1966 YR	1967 YR	1965 1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1966 1Qtr	2Qtr
Attacks									
Mortar	0	13	259	0	0	0	0	0	0
Assaults	88	145	255	25	27	21	15	36	33
Total	88	158	524	25	27	21	15	36	33
Casualties									
Mortar:									
KIA	0	26	278	0	0	0	0	0	0
WIA	0	106	1572	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIA	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	0	132	1666	0	0	0	0	0	0
Assaults:									
KIA	868	776	757	147	422	217	82	267	240
WIA	795	1185	1909	192	313	204	86	565	182
MIA	891	386	239	312	378	155	46	163	51
Total	2554	2347	2915	651	1113	576	214	995	473
All Attacks:									
KIA	868	802	1045	147	422	217	82	267	240
WIA	795	1291	3131	192	313	204	86	565	182
MIA	891	386	255	312	378	155	46	163	51
Total	2554	2479	4731	651	1113	576	214	995	473
Casualties per Attack									
Mortar:									
KIA	0	2.0	1.1	0	0	0	0	0	0
All Casualties	0	17.2	7.2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Assaults:									
KIA	9.9	5.4	2.9	5.9	15.9	10.3	5.5	7.4	7.3
All Casualties	29.0	16.2	11.0	26.0	41.2	27.4	14.3	27.6	14.3
All Attacks:									
KIA	9.9	5.1	2.0	5.9	15.6	10.3	5.5	7.4	7.3
All Casualties	29.0	15.7	9.1	26.0	41.2	27.4	14.3	27.6	14.3

Source: RMCSSC VCJSA computer file, based on VMDA file.

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alties Per Attack
(ata)

tr	1966				tr	1967			
	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr		1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr
0	0	0	8	5	24	50	76	109	
15	36	33	31	45	66	54	59	86	
15	36	33	39	50	90	104	135	195	
0	0	0	24	2	50	45	94	89	
0	0	0	72	34	159	267	518	628	
0	0	0	0	0	15	1	0	0	
0	0	0	96	36	224	313	612	717	
82	267	240	98	171	169	184	142	272	
86	565	182	174	264	326	354	441	788	
46	163	51	11	161	77	57	41	64	
214	995	473	283	596	572	595	624	1124	
82	267	240	122	173	219	229	236	361	
86	565	182	246	298	485	621	959	1416	
46	163	51	11	161	92	58	41	64	
214	995	473	379	72	796	908	1236	1841	
0	0	0	3.0	0.4	2.1	.9	1.2	.8	
0	0	0	12.0	7.2	9.3	6.3	8.1	6.6	
5.5	7.4	7.3	3.2	3.8	2.6	3.4	2.4	3.2	
14.3	27.6	14.3	9.1	13.2	8.7	11.1	10.6	13.1	
5.5	7.4	7.3	3.1	3.5	2.4	2.2	1.7	1.9	
14.3	27.6	14.3	9.7	12.6	8.8	8.7	9.2	9.4	

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Allied Casualties From VC/NVA Attacks

Table 6 divides the attacks for the 1965-1967 period into mortar fire and assaults, gives total allied losses for each type of attack and the average losses per attack. It shows that:

1. Total attacks increased sharply in 1966 and 1967, but did not inflict additional allied casualties until 1967; mortar attacks accounted for 75% of the additional allied casualties in 1967.
2. Allied personnel killed in all attacks dropped slightly in 1966 and rose only 30% in 1967, despite a threefold increase in 1967 attacks. Allied KIA from enemy assaults actually decreased slightly in 1967.
3. Average casualties per mortar attack in 1967 were 7.2 (1.1 KIA) versus average casualties of 11 (2.9 KIA) per assault in 1967. Thus, assaults are only 1.5 times as effective as mortar attacks in inflicting total allied losses, and only 2.6 times as effective in killing allied personnel. This makes VC/NVA mortar attacks much more profitable to the VC/NVA than assaults, because they can reduce their casualties to practically nothing and still inflict worthwhile losses on allied forces.

TABLE 7

Total Allied Casualties From VC/NVA Attacks - III CTZ^{a/} (Computer Data)

	1965	1966	1967
Border Provinces			
Phuoc Long	844 ^{b/}	3	257
Binh Long	0	155	556
Tay Ninh	74	134	717
Hau Nghia	180	197	915
Subtotal	1098	489	2445
Other Provinces			
Gia Dinh	180	321	162
Binh Duong	250	443	673
Long An	277	353	899
Bien Hoa	154	159	338
Phuoc Tuy	29	272	106
Long Khanh	385	264	115
Binh Tuy	181	178	43
	1456	1990	2336
Total	2554	2479	4781

- ^{a/} Source: NMACSSC-VCJSA computer file. Includes killed, wounded and missing.
^{b/} Phuoc Long suffered at least two attacks in 1965 which involved mass kidnappings and therefore a large number of MIA. Other attacks in Phuoc Long the same year caused large numbers of KIA and WIA. The result was that only nine attacks caused 844 casualties that year.

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VC/NVA ATTACK PATTERNS 1965-1967

The February SEA Analysis report noted a steady increase in enemy attacks in the III CTZ area since 1965, primarily due to increased small unit attacks employing mortar fire. The rapidly increasing number of attacks in the sparsely populated border areas indicated to us a possible VC strategy move to draw U.S. forces away from the urban populated areas centered around Saigon.

Since February we have completed a preliminary analysis of attack patterns throughout Vietnam. Much of what we discovered about attacks in III CTZ holds true for the country as a whole. For example: (1) VC attacks have increased steadily since 1965; (2) the 1967 total was 2.6 times 1966, primarily due to a doubling of assaults and the inclusion of large mortar barrages in the attack data for the first time, (3) attacks against population centers quadrupled throughout the country during 1967, (4) allied casualties from enemy attacks increased in 1967, but casualties per attack continued to decline.

We also find a high concentration of attacks in certain areas of SVN; eight (18%) provinces accounted for 44% of all enemy attacks in 1967. Finally, a comparison of attacks with enemy battalion and combat personnel strength indicates that the enemy attack effort (attacks per enemy unit/strength) increased 60-70% in 1967. The data also indicate that the enemy was too pre-occupied with building up his combat forces to generate a high attack effort between July 1965 (when US forces entered combat) and September 1966. By fourth quarter 1966 he had most of his forces in place and they began to generate higher attack rates.

What is clear from our study so far is the continued ability of the enemy to launch attacks in 1967 and even markedly step up his efforts. His choice of targets reflects his initiative and possibly his strategy. The increasing use of mortar fire reflects his ability to obtain and employ this weapon and thereby gain the advantage of inflicting maximum destruction and casualties at minimum cost to himself. At the same time, he is able to terrorize the population and dramatize the basic insecurity of the towns.

On the other hand, the attack data reflect the success of allied forces in preventing the increasing number of VC/NVA battalions in South Vietnam from launching a higher rate of large attacks; the number of battalions doubled between 1966-67, but the 1967 battalion sized attack rate remained below the 1965 rate. The sharp rise in small attacks and employment of mortar fire, accompanied by less friendly casualties per attack, further indicate that the enemy was forced to operate in smaller units with less effectiveness.

A Word About the Attack Data ✓

The February 1968 SEA Analysis Report article on attacks in III CTZ noted major differences between the VC/NVA attack data reported in the VNDBA computer file and in the OSD Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, the official OSD source of attack data. At that time, we speculated that adding ambushes to the computer's attack figures would bring them

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closer to the statistical summary figures. It brought them within 6% for this article.* This indicates that the attack data in the computer file is quite good for trend analysis in conjunction with the Statistical Summary data and can be used to break out the summary data by province, type of attack, type of target, resulting casualties, etc., in order to obtain a comprehensive picture of VC/NVA attack patterns. It is likely, however, that both sets of data understate actual enemy attacks, because attacks against military personnel and facilities engaged in allied offensive operations are usually reported as part of the operation rather than as an enemy initiated action.

Large Versus Small Attacks

Table 1 shows the consistent increase in attacks since mid-1965. The 1967 attack rate was 2.6 times the 1966 rate, with all 4 CTZ showing increases.

TABLE 1

VC/NVA Attacks 1965-67^{a/} (Summary Data)

	1965	1966	1967	1965				1966				1967			
				1qtr	2qtr	3qtr	4qtr	1qtr	2qtr	3qtr	4qtr	1qtr	2qtr	3qtr	4qtr
Bn Size	73	44	54	7	21	16	29	21	14	5	4	10	13	13	18
Small Scale	612	834	2422	224	149	115	124	170	184	236	304	468	510	548	726
Total	685	938	2476	231	170	131	153	191	198	241	308	478	523	661	814

a/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

Assaults, Ambushes and Mortar Attacks

Table 2 shows that mortar attacks and assaults account for the large increase in attacks during 1967; ambushes declined. Assaults increased each year, with the 1967 rate about double the 1966 rate. Mortar attacks accounted for more than half the 1967 attack gain. Moreover, they rose to 45% of the total attacks in the final quarter of 1967.

* Except for fourth quarter 1967 for which computer data is 20% lower than the statistical summary, because of still preliminary reports. We expect the final data for the record to be close to the statistical summary data.

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TABLE 2

Assaults, Ambushes and Mortar Attacks in SVR^a
(Computer Data)

	1965	1965	1967	1965				1966				1967			
	1965	1965	1967	1qtr	2qtr	3qtr	4qtr	1qtr	2qtr	3qtr	4qtr	1qtr	2qtr	3qtr	4qtr ^{a/}
<u>Countrywide</u>															
<u>Mortar Attrs^{b/}</u>		32	822							8	24	101	181	246	294
Assaults	488	681	1315	160	106	94	128	141	150	153	237	334	318	374	289
Ambushes	182	218	188	60	55	36	31	40	54	65	59	42	30	51	65
Total	670	931	2325	220	161	130	159	181	204	226	320	477	529	671	648c/

a/ Source: NY/CSSC-VCLIA File, derived from VNDMA file.

b/ The reporting of twenty or more mortar rounds as attacks (instead of harassing fire) began during the third quarter 1966. Less than 20 rounds still counts as harassing fire.

c/ Fourth quarter 1967 data incomplete by about 166 incidents or 20% of summary data in Table 1.

VC/NVA Attack Effort per Battalion and Strength

Table 3 shows that VC/NVA forces worked 60%-70% harder (in terms of attacks per 1000 VC/NVA combat personnel or per battalion) at generating ground attacks during 1967 than they did in 1966. The quarterly figures show that the VC/NVA ground attack effort dropped significantly during the summer of 1965, when US forces first entered combat. The enemy effort remained at a low level until fourth quarter 1966 when an upward trend began, lasting through 1967. The table further indicates that the enemy was probably too pre-occupied with building up his combat forces to generate a high attack effort during the 15 month period from July 1965 (when US forces entered combat) through September 1966; he added 86 battalions and 56,000 personnel to his combat force during the period. By fourth quarter 1966 most of his forces were in place and he began working harder; he added only 12 battalions (and lost about 11,000 combat personnel) thereafter.

Targets of VC Attacks

Table 4 shows that attacks against population centers increased faster in 1967 than attacks against military targets. In every CTZ in SVN, population centers sustained nearly four times as many attacks in 1967 as in 1966. District towns were attacked 7.7 times as often in 1967, mostly by mortar fire; they accounted for half of all attacks against population centers in 1967. Attacks against military facilities tripled and attacks against military units/personnel doubled.

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TABLE 3

VC/NVA GROUND ATTACK EFFORT

	<u>Totals</u>			<u>1965</u>			
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1Q</u>	2Q	3Q	4Q
Ground Attacks							
Battalion & Larger	73	44	54	7	21	16	9
Small Scale ^{a/}	612	862	1525	224	149	115	144
Total	685	906	1579	231	170	131	153
VC/NVA Combat Bns ^{b/}	104	188	205	106	117	134	151
Ground Attacks Per Bn	6.6	4.8	7.7	2.2	1.5	1.0	1.0
Confirmed VC/NVA Combat Strength (000) ^{b/}	70	111	114	59.9	68.8	76.7	90.4
Ground Attacks Per 1000 Combat Strength	9.8	8.2	13.9	3.9	2.5	1.7	1.7

^{a/} Calculated by subtracting Table 2 mortar attacks from Table 1 total attacks. Fourth quarter mortar incidents were increased by 25% before being included in Table 1 total attacks because Table 1 total attacks are 25% higher than the Table 2 attacks. This correction causes Table 1 total attacks to be 25% higher than the Table 2 attacks. This correction causes Table 1 total attacks to be 25% higher than the Table 2 attacks. This correction causes Table 1 total attacks to be 25% higher than the Table 2 attacks.

^{b/} Source: Table 105, OSD SEA Statistical Summary. Yearly figures are end of year. Quarterly figures are end of quarter.

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2Q	3Q	4Q	1966				1967			
			1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
21	16	29	21	14	5	4	10	13	13	18
149	115	194	170	184	228	280	367	329	402	427 $\frac{2}{3}$
170	131	153	191	198	233	284	377	342	415	445
117	134	151	182	202	203	193	199	206	210	215
1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.5	1.9	1.7	2.0	2.1
8.8	76.7	90.4	104.8	119.1	124.8	113.9	112.5	114.6	115.6	114.1
2.5	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.9	2.5	3.4	3.0	3.6	3.9

from Table 1 small scale actions.
by 25% before being subtracted, be-
the Table 2 attacks, which are from

. Yearly figures are averages.

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TABLE 4
TARGETS OF VC ATTACKS IN SVN
(Computer Data)

	1965	1966	1967	1965				1966				1967			
				1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr ^b
<u>Pop Centers</u>	102	75	287	41	29	15	16	15	19	14	26	44	65	85	93
<u>Mil Facilities</u>	222	328	1032	64	47	49	62	69	46	76	137	172	262	303	295
<u>Mil Personnel</u>	244	401	758	80	59	58	47	59	90	127	125	198	148	219	193
<u>Other</u>	77	146	320	34	26	8	9	28	41	32	45	77	56	93	94
<u>TOTAL^a</u>	645	950	2397	219	161	131	134	172	196	249	333	491	531	700	675 ^b

a/ Totals do not agree with Table 1 because of multiple targets for some attacks and missing data for 1965.

b/ Fourth quarter 1967 data is preliminary and is incomplete by about 20%.

Friendly Casualties from Enemy Attacks

Enemy attacks caused about 45,000 allied casualties (14,500 KIA) during the 1965-67 period (Table 5). Total casualties from enemy attacks increased about 40% in 1967 over the 1965-66 rate, because the friendly personnel wounded in action (WIA) doubled in 1967; the mortar attacks probably account for most of the WIA increase. The average casualties per attack has declined each year indicating that attacks are more frequent but less serious.

Friendly KIA from enemy attacks remained quite constant (within a 10% range) during 1965-67; only in I CTZ did the KIA from enemy attacks increase significantly (27%) during 1967. Missing in action figures declined throughout the period.

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TABLE 5

FRIENDLY CASUALTIES FROM ENEMY ATTACKS
(Computer Data)

	1965	1966	1967	<u>1965</u> 1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
<u>Attacks</u>	670	931	2325	220	161	130	159
<u>Casualties</u>							
KIA	4839	4577	5100	969	1517	961	1392
WIA	4663	5822	12246	1303	998	922	1440
MIA	4296	2266	1312	1249	858	1322	867
Total	13798	12665	18658	3521	3373	3205	3699
<u>Casualties Per Attack</u>							
KIA Per Attack	7.2	4.9	2.2	4.4	9.4	7.4	8.8
WIA Per Attack	7.0	6.3	5.3	5.9	6.2	7.1	9.1
MIA Per Attack	6.4	2.4	.6	5.7	5.3	10.2	5.5
Total Per Attack	20.6	13.6	8.0	16.0	21.0	24.7	23.3

a/ Fourth quarter data is preliminary and is incomplete by about 20%.

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ATTACKS

1965				1966				1967			
1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q a/
220	161	130	159	181	204	226	320	477	529	671	648
969	1517	961	1392	1466	1218	796	1097	1295	1332	1365	1108
1303	998	922	1440	1765	1350	1323	1384	2317	2918	3914	3067
1249	858	1322	867	1810	489	359	608	300	355	214	442
3521	3373	3205	3699	1041	3057	2478	3089	3912	4636	5493	4617
4.4	9.4	7.4	8.8	8.1	6.0	3.5	3.4	2.7	2.5	2.0	1.7
5.9	6.2	7.1	9.1	9.8	6.6	5.9	4.3	4.9	5.6	5.8	4.7
5.7	5.3	10.2	5.5	4.5	2.4	1.6	1.9	.6	.7	.3	.7
16.0	21.0	24.7	23.3	2.3	15.0	11.0	9.7	8.2	8.8	8.2	7.1

complete by about 20%.

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
TABLE 6

1967 VC/NVA ATTACKS BY PROVINCE


Attacks				Attacks			
	Mortar	Ground	Total		Mortar	Ground	Total
<u>I CTZ</u>				<u>II CTZ</u>			
Quang Tri	139	147	286	Binh Dinh	4	59	63
Thua Thien	50	51	101	Kontum	22	23	45
Quang Nam	32	100	132	Pleiku	13	19	32
Quang Tin	25	59	84	Phu Bon	2	5	7
Quang Ngai	25	104	129	Phu Yen	4	52	56
Total	271	461	732	Khanh Hoa	1	17	18
				Ninh Thuan	0	7	17
				Darlac	6	23	29
				Quang Duc	3	6	9
				Tuyen Duc	1	11	12
				Lam Dong	3	12	15
				Binh Thuan	0	31	31
				Total	59	275	334
<u>III CTZ</u>				<u>IV CTZ</u>			
Binh Tuy	1	7	8	Sa Dec	1	16	17
Phuoc Long	16	21	37	Dinh Tuong	41	42	83
Binh Long	35	27	62	Go Cong	0	3	3
Long Khanh	9	19	28	Kien Hoa	35	51	86
Phuoc Tuy	8	17	25	Kien Phong	19	16	35
Bien Hoa	19	44	63	Chau Doc	13	10	23
Tay Ninh	62	51	113	An Giang	0	10	10
Binh Duong	34	45	79	Vinh Bing	11	59	70
Hau Nghia	41	55	96	Vinh Long	12	43	55
Long An	15	72	87	Phong Dinh	15	24	39
Gia Dinh	7	30	37	Chuong Thien	20	22	42
Total	247	388	635	Ba Xuyen	11	19	30
				Bac Lieu	12	17	29
				An Kuyen	34	15	49
				Kien Tuong	6	8	14
				Kien Giang	15	24	39
				Total	245	379	624
All SVN	822	1503	2325				

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
**ENEMY ATTACKS
1965**



**ENEMY ATTACKS
1966**



**ENEMY ATTACKS
1967**



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Where Attacks Occur

During 1967, five (4 in I CTZ) SVN provinces received more than 100 attacks each and together accounted for a third of all attacks in South Vietnam. Quang Tri, adjacent to the DMZ, led with 28% attacks, more than double the rate in second place Quang Nam. Quang Ngai, Tay Ninh, and Thua Thien trailed the leaders in that order. Mortar attacks were also highest in Quang Tri, followed by Tay Ninh, Thua Thien, Hau Nghia and Dinh Tuong. Ground attacks (assaults and ambushes) were highest in Quang Tri, Quang Ngai, Quang Nam, and Long An. The eight provinces (18% of SVN) listed above accounted for 44% of the 1967 attacks in SVN, including 49% of the mortar attacks and 41% of the ground attacks. (Table 6 shows 1967 attacks for each province in SVN. The map plots show the distribution of total VC/NVA attacks by year for 1965-1967.)

A very preliminary correlation analysis of province attack data with a few other factors indicates that:

1. High rates of mortar attacks tend to occur in provinces with large numbers of: enemy, VC population, and ARVN forces.
2. High rates of ground attacks tend to occur in provinces with large number of: enemy, contested and VC population, and RVNAF forces (particularly PF).

The correlation findings are tenuous at best. A time series analysis was not performed and many possibly relevant factors have not been examined yet (US-FW force strength by province, for example, was not readily available). A more complete analysis will be performed in the future.

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REDUCED ENEMY ACTIVITY RATE

The July 1968 enemy incident total (2338) was the lowest since May 1965. The decline started in June, is noticeable in all four CTZs, and has continued into September.

In Table 1 we have eliminated anti-aircraft fire incidents from the basic incident data, because it has different characteristics from other incidents. Attacks, terror, sabotage, etc., are planned activities, but AA fire seems to be a reaction to allied air sorties.

TABLE 1

TOTAL ENEMY INCIDENTS MINUS AA FIRE

	1967						1968							
	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
I CTZ	777	784	1027	750	617	603	767	751	856	867	1086	614	569	690
II CTZ	344	338	362	283	290	318	416	335	485	273	435	235	243	190
III CTZ	501	506	561	618	491	432	525	598	773	548	965	539	394	375
IV CTZ	516	470	729	487	602	955	671	435	1676	931	761	526	425	323
Total	2138	2098	2679	2138	2000	2378	2390	2119	3790	2619	3247	1914	1631	1578
Total With AA Fire	3078	3271	3757	3130	2759	3320	3631	3752	5184	3650	4190	3474	2330	2403

Source: OSD(C) Statistical Summary, Table 2 and OSD(SA) Statistical Tables, 2D.

Table 1 shows the steady decline of VC/NVA incidents since May. The totals for the first two week of September indicate the decline is continuing (about 1300 incidents estimated for September, not counting AA fire). The rate is down in all four CTZs; the July total for I CTZ was a 33 month low and the August totals for II, III, and IV CTZ were 23, 39 and 43 month lows, respectively.

Table 2 shows that every type of incident has declined, with sabotage and attacks returning to early 1967 levels, and the number of terror incidents sinking even lower.

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TABLE 2

ENEMY ACTIVITY ^{a/} (Monthly Avg. By Quarter)

	<u>1967</u>				<u>1968</u>		
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd^{b/}</u>
	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>
Attacks	159	174	220	271	512	422	189
Terror	123	187	203	142	114	83	60
Sabotage	53	71	164	193	288	189	51
Propaganda	83	71	74	39	23	8	2
AA Fire	1310	1159	1064	898	1423	1178	765
Harassment	<u>1582</u>	<u>1658</u>	<u>1644</u>	<u>1526</u>	<u>1830</u>	<u>1891</u>	<u>1303</u>
Total	3310	3320	3369	3069	4190	3771	2370

^{a/} Source: OSD/SA Statistical Tables.

^{b/} July and August.

The low June to September incident rates are unusual. There are three obvious possible explanations for the summer slowdown:

1. Rest and recuperation after the exertions of Tet and May.
2. The calm before the storm, i.e., another offensive is in the making.
3. Response to our bombing restrictions.

Reasons 1 and 2 are not mutually exclusive. We have seen reports stating the enemy needs about 90 days to recover after suffering severe losses. More than 90 days have passed since May. Reports have also indicated that some large VC/NVA units have withdrawn to sanctuary in Laos and Cambodia. Recent intelligence reports point toward a new offensive which has yet to materialize.

On the other hand, the low incident rate during the summer could reflect enemy decisions to respond to our bombing restrictions or could otherwise be tied to Paris. The fact that the numbers are record lows, and have remained low for over three months throughout the whole country, lends some credence to this hypothesis. But the statements from Paris and our intelligence reports do not confirm this.

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COMPARISON OF ENEMY ACTIVITY LEVELS WITH PRIOR YEARS

Summary. For the past few weeks we have been experiencing some of this year's highest enemy activity rates. However, enemy activity so far in 1970 is generally well below that for the comparable periods in 1968 and 1969. This indicates our long term efforts to wind down the war are succeeding. Two recent high points (March 31-April 2 and May 2-9) were part of the current enemy spring offensive. These high points were not unusually intense or sustained when compared with earlier peaks of enemy activity. Moreover, activity during the first six weeks of the spring offensive was less intense than during most similar periods in 1968 and 1969. If past patterns hold, we may see a lull in casualties and enemy action in July and early August followed by a high point in mid-August. Enemy terrorism has been increasing in recent weeks, though the number of terrorist victims remains below the same periods in previous years.

Spring Offensive and High Points

With a few exceptions, the intensity of enemy activity during the first six weeks of the Spring 1970 offensive was below previous periods of offensive activity (each considered to have lasted six weeks). Table 1 indicates:

- There were far fewer combat deaths for US and 3rd nation troops than in previous peak periods. US combat deaths were less than half of previous levels.
- There were fewer enemy deaths.
- RVNAF deaths exceeded all but the Tet 1968 offensive, but the higher casualty rate reflects increasing RVNAF participation in combat plus a 12% increase in force strength since last year. VC/NVA incident data do not indicate the enemy is targeting RVNAF forces more frequently than before.
- The enemy continues to suffer 4 to 5 times the level of combat deaths suffered by our side.
- Although the August 1968 and Post-Tet 1969 offensives had fewer total attacks, this year had the fewest large scale attacks and the lowest expenditures of ordnance.

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accords well with the efforts of the VC/NVA to counter the pacification program.

Data on enemy target priorities further emphasize his economy of force tactics during the April high point. In the three day period nearly half of enemy attacks were against pacification targets, a significantly higher proportion than in previous high points. In addition, most of the attacks against US military bases and installations were only attacks by fire while most attacks against pacification targets were ground attacks.

Various intelligence information indicates the enemy was satisfied with their "victories" in the April high point. However, the high point appears to have little or no military significance. The volume of incidents was high, but in general the intensity of the individual attacks was low. The impact of the attacks on the RVNAF ability to fight was, with few exceptions, almost negligible. The high point appears primarily to have been a political-psychological warfare action.

TABLE 2

ENEMY HIGH POINTS

	1969				1970
	11-13 May	5-7 June	11-13 Aug	4-6 Sept	31Mar-2 Apr
<u>Attacks</u>					
Battalion	0	1	0	0	1
Small Scale	69	45	60	43	76
By Fire	91	60	39	24	64
Total	160	106	99	67	141
<u>Targets of Attacks</u>					
Pop. Center	22	15	13	5	16
ARVN	23	14	10	9	17
Pacification	55	34	43	28	72
US	96	40	33	23	35
Other	4	3	0	2	1
Total	160	106	99	67	141
<u>Casualties a/</u>					
US/3rd Nations	316	220	183	121	130
GVN	351	267	284	267	306
Total Friendly	667	487	467	388	436
Enemy	3993	3240	2767	1889	2480
KIA Ratio	6.0	6.7	5.9	4.9	4.7

Sources: DIA

a/ Estimates obtained by factoring weekly data into days.

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TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF ENEMY OFFENSIVES
(Weekly Average - each period is 6 weeks)

	1968			1969	1970
	Tet	May	Aug	Post-Tet	Apr-May a/
<u>Combat Deaths</u>					
Allied: US	504	420	273	322	128
RVNAF	973	595	518	441	627
3rd Nation	231	140	98	147	19
Total	1708	1155	889	910	774
Enemy	7616	4830	3766	4634	3563
Enemy/Friendly Kill Ratio	4.5	4.2	4.2	5.1	4.6
<u>Enemy Attacks</u>					
Ground: Battalion	5	3	3	1.5	1
Small	63	28	14	35	67
Attacks by Fire	84	84	35	70	46
Total	152	115	52	107	114
Number Rounds Fired	7427	6265	4200	4417	1914

a/ Through May 9.

High points of enemy activity are active periods of short duration (usually about three days), characterized by intensive activity such as small attacks and attacks by fire on selected targets (population centers, isolated centers, isolated outposts, etc.). They are designed to demonstrate enemy strength, boost VC/NVA morale and perhaps influence US public opinion.

High points have occurred during each of the enemy's seasonal campaigns. He seems to open each campaign with a high point, followed by a second one about four weeks later. In the first two or three weeks after the April high point, intelligence reports indicated we could expect another one in early May. It did in fact occur during the first ten days of May.

A comparison of the April high point with the four previous high points in 1969 (Table 2) indicates that:

- It was slightly more intense than most of them in terms of total attacks.
- It was highest of the four in terms of RVNAF combat deaths but less costly in terms of US deaths. South Vietnamese deaths were higher by 10% than the average of the previous four high points; US/FW deaths were lower by 80.
- More pacification targets were hit than in previous high points. This

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The May high point differed from earlier high points in one very important respect: it was not well coordinated. It began on May 3 in II and IV Corps, on May 6 in Northern I Corps and on the 8th in Southern I Corps. Apparently no high point activity occurred in III CTZ. Because of its poor coordination, we do not have data which would compare exactly with earlier three day high points. However, Table 3 shows the data by week from March 22 through May 16, 1970. During the week of the May high point (ending May 9):

- Total US and RVNAF KIA exceeded the levels of the April high point. However, 44 US were killed in Cambodia that week. If we subtract them, US combat deaths in Vietnam (124) were about the same as in the April high point week (138).
- A few more small attacks were reported than during the April high point, but only two battalion sized attacks have been reported so far in May, compared to five in the April high point.
- Attacks against population centers were comparable to those in the April high point.
- In both instances, abductions were very high during the week prior to the high point. This is what usually happens, since the enemy needs the extra labor for his preparations.

TABLE 3

INDICATORS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY LEVEL IN SVN

	Weeks Ending:							
	28 Mar	4 Apr ^{c/}	11 Apr	18 Apr	25 Apr	2 May	9 May ^{c/}	16 May
<u>US/RVNAF KIA</u>								
US	79	138	141	101	94	123	168	217
RVNAF a/	232	848	586	458	292	553	1027	384
Total	311	986	727	559	386	676	1195	601
<u>Attacks b/</u>								
Bn Size	0	5	0	0	0	1	1	0
Small Scale	31	116	137	124	84	80	137	124
Total	31	121	137	124	84	81	138	124
<u>Attacks on</u>								
Pop. Centers	0	23	10	3	2	4	27	6
<u>Harassment/Terror</u>								
Sabotage	464	567	421	667	686	537	597	579
<u>Terror</u>								
Assassinations	111	66	383	185	165	97	99	456
Abductions	365	119	265	272	187	317	158	320

- a/ Preliminary reports, increased 50% to put them on a par with the verified, last half 1969 data which was 50% higher than last half 1969 preliminary data.
- b/ Attacks are by date reported, not by date of actual occurrence.
- c/ High point weeks.

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Comparison with Prior Years

In assessing the tempo of current enemy actions, it is helpful to view them in the context of enemy activity levels in similar periods of previous years. A comparison of enemy activity in South Vietnam during the first four months of this year with the same periods in 1968 and 1969 shows that enemy activity this year is considerably less intense than in 1969 or 1968. The war appears to be winding down. Table 4 below indicates that:

- The number of large-scale attacks was half that of last year and only 13% of the 1968 total for the four month period.
- Small scale attacks were at about the same level as last year but well below the 1968 level.
- Attacks by fire and attacks against population centers were at the lowest levels in three years.
- The weekly average of US combat deaths was less than half of the 1969 average and 27% of the 1968 levels.
- The average number of enemy killed is about 30% lower than last year,
- The RVNAP weekly combat death rate is 4% higher than last year, but RVNAP strength has increased about 12% and RVNAP is much more active than in prior years. In terms of RVNAP combat deaths per 1000 troop strength, the RVNAP death rate was actually 20% lower than last year and 60% below the 1968 rate.

TABLE 4

ENEMY ACTIVITY (Weekly Average)

	January through April		
	1968	1969	1970
Incidents			
Attacks:			
By Size	4.0	1.1	.5
Small	108	75	72
By Fire	61	47	34
On Pop. Centers	20	11	6
Harassment/Terror/Sabotage	320	417	443
KIA			
Combat Deaths:			
US	365	236	99
RVNAP	692	384	400
Enemy	4965	3465	2413
KIA/1000 Troop Strength:			
US	.7	.4	.2
RVNAP	2.0	.5	.4
Enemy	18.4	13.4	9.7

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While less intense this year, the pattern and timing of enemy activity has been quite similar to those in 1968 and 1969. This raises the question of what we might expect in future weeks.

If the past patterns hold in 1970, we can expect a lull beginning about the last week in June, lasting about 7 or 8 weeks, and ending with a high point in mid-August. An analysis of 1968 and 1969 statistics (Table 5) reveals that all activity and casualty indicators dropped sharply in both years during the lull period (drop of 50-70% for 1968 and 38-55% for 1969) followed by a high point in mid-August. Moreover, a detailed study of the weekly data shows that the timing of the changes was almost precisely the same both years.

TABLE 5

TEMPO OF ENEMY ACTIVITY (Weekly Average)

	<u>Active Period</u> (May-June) <u>a/</u>	<u>Lull</u> (July-Mid Aug.) <u>b/</u>	<u>Active Period</u> (Mid August) <u>c/</u>
<u>Attacks</u>			
<u>Bn Size</u>			
1968	3.4	.6	5.5
1969	1.3	0	0
<u>Small</u>			
1968	105	32	73
1969	104	47	87
<u>Combat Deaths</u>			
<u>US</u>			
1968	420	178	358
1969	272	153	217
<u>RVNAP</u>			
1968	376	188	463
1969	299	184	309
<u>Enemy</u>			
1968	4108	1553	4890
1969	3939	2435	3311

a/ April 28 - June 22, 1968 and April 27 - June 21, 1969.

b/ June 23 - August 17, 1968 and June 22 - August 9, 1969.

c/ August 18 - September 1, 1968 and August 10 - 24, 1969.

However, April has traditionally been a lull month in the past, after very high levels of enemy activity in February and March. The lateness of the April high point this year disrupted this pattern and may indicate a delay or lag in the enemy's activity patterns. Moreover, the May high point was a week late and poorly coordinated, and the allied offensive into Cambodia may cause changes or disruptions of enemy plans. It is too soon to tell. Thus, if the active-lull-active pattern occurs again this summer, it may not be as clear as in earlier years or the timing may be different.

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Increase in Terrorism

Intelligence reports indicate that one possible new direction of enemy activity may be an increase in sabotage, harassment and terrorism in order to disrupt the pacification program. These incidents averaged 600 per week during May, about 25% above the average for last May. Table 6 shows that:

- The 1970 weekly average of casualties from terrorism for the first five months of the year is significantly below that for 1968 and 1969.
- On the other hand, the number of South Vietnamese civilians assassinated or wounded has risen significantly in April and May. Abductions have been constant and fairly high in the past three months.
- The May assassination rate was the highest in two years.

TABLE 6

CASUALTIES FROM ENEMY TERRORISM (Weekly Average)

	<u>(Jan-May)</u> <u>1968 a/</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970^{b/}</u>	<u>1970</u> <u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May^{b/}</u>
Assassinated	154	144	126	69	71	100	195	255
Abducted	285	191	165	56	76	243	237	249
Wounded	426	361	273	179	110	231	425	543

a/ Excludes February when no terrorist data was reported due to the Tet offensive disruptions.

b/ Through May 16.

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STANDOFF ATTACKS: A MAJOR ELEMENT OF VC/NVA STRATEGY IN RVN

Summary. Much has been said about the enemy's reversion to a low level, protracted war strategy. An important element in this strategy is pressure on the GVN by standoff attacks by fire. The enemy is continuing to inflict significant friendly casualties with these tactics.

The major findings emerging from this analysis are:

- COSVN Resolution #9 (which laid out the enemy strategy) has reduced the number of attacks by fire. ✓
- The level of harassment by indirect fire has not changed in three years and has shown the same pattern each year. *
- Incidents of standoff fire have declined substantially in MR 3, but have increased in MR 4. Casualties and ammunition expended in the incidents show the same pattern.
- RF/PP forces are more frequent targets of indirect fire attacks than ever before. ✓
- The protracted warfare style of fighting is a more efficient mode for the enemy. He uses fewer rounds to obtain each KIA, probably the result of his concentrating on more vulnerable targets--civilians and RF/PP.
- In ground attacks he initiates, the enemy has reduced his own losses. The enemy-to-friendly kill ratio dropped out of the 0.5-0.9 to 1 range (which held for nearly three years) to 0.3 to 1 in second half 1970.

Historical Patterns

Typically an attack by fire consists of about thirty rounds. Although military in style--requiring advanced planning, logistic support, etc.--there is no attempt to assault the target. This type of attack is generally a means of exerting military pressure on a target which the enemy cannot hope (or does not desire) to defeat. The enemy inflicts a friendly combat death for every 50-60 rounds he fires. He, in turn, often accepts casualties as a result of allied counter-battery fire.

Harassments, by indirect fire, are usually isolated incidents, not coordinated with other types of military action. Essentially they are an extension of terrorist activity. Using a small (81/82mm mortar), the enemy fires about six or seven rounds. For every twenty-five rounds fired, he kills a friendly soldier or civilian, usually at no cost to himself, except for ammunition.

✓ An attack by fire is arbitrarily defined as one in which 20 or more rounds are fired. A harassment consists of indirect fire of fewer than 20 rounds. The distinction is purely arbitrary, but it does provide a convenient frame of reference and permits us to gain a bit more insight into how the enemy is fighting.

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Table 1 indicates that:

- There has been a year to year decline in total indirect fire incidents in the first half of each year, in keeping with seasonal patterns and long term down trend of most enemy activity.

- COSVN Resolution #9, calling for low level protracted warfare, apparently led to a reduction in the number of attacks by fire, while harassments by fire continued unabated. Prior to COSVN 9, there were 5.6 harassments for each attack, compared to 7.6 afterwards.

- Both attacks and harassments by fire dropped sharply in MR 3 starting in 1969.

- Both attacks and harassments leveled out in MR 4 in 1969 and have increased during 1970. MR 4 accounted for 53% of such incidents in the 2nd half of 1970 and is the only area where they increased.

TABLE 1

ENEMY ATTACKS AND HARASSMENT BY FIRE (Monthly Average)

	1968		1969		1970	
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half a/
<u>Attacks by fire</u>						
MR 1	75	28	45	23	49	31
MR 2	32	13	39	25	34	13
MR 3	92	47	101	54	31	14
MR 4	85	30	46	39	48	54
RVN	284	118	231	141	162	112
<u>Harassment by fire</u>						
MR 1	474	218	433	249	424	222
MR 2	170	115	159	133	212	113
MR 3	341	179	379	293	149	102
MR 4	547	195	335	322	448	502
RVN	1532	707	1306	997	1233	939
<u>Total</u>						
MR 1	549	246	478	272	473	253
MR 2	202	128	198	158	246	126
MR 3	433	226	480	347	180	116
MR 4	632	225	381	361	495	556
RVN	1816	825	1537	1138	1395	1051

Source: SEAPKS Computer File.

a/ Thru November.

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Friendly deaths as a result of enemy standoff fire follow nearly the same patterns observed in the incident data. Deaths from standoff attacks show a modest year-to-year decline in the first half of each year; the number of deaths in the second halves of the past three years has been virtually constant at about 320 per month. Table 2 also shows that 60-70% of the KIA from standoff fire are the result of harassing fire. Again, the contrasting trends in MR's 3 and 4 are most dramatic, with KIA in MR 3 going down and KIA in MR 4 going up to the highest point since the 1st half of 1968.

TABLE 2

FRIENDLY KIA FROM ENEMY ATTACKS AND HARASSMENTS BY FIRE (Monthly Average)

	1968		1969		1970		
	<u>1st</u> <u>Half</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Half</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Half</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Half</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Half</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Half</u>	a/
<u>Attacks by fire</u>							
MR 1	49	22	26	19	57	21	
MR 2	22	12	23	26	62	26	
MR 3	54	31	34	32	19	14	
MR 4	53	29	32	25	37	54	
RVN	<u>178</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>165</u>	<u>115</u>	
<u>Harassment by fire</u>							
MR 1	70	58	73	30	68	30	
MR 2	59	48	62	31	63	48	
MR 3	133	61	132	89	49	31	
MR 4	126	51	99	76	112	100	
RVN	<u>388</u>	<u>218</u>	<u>366</u>	<u>226</u>	<u>292</u>	<u>209</u>	
<u>Total</u>							
MR 1	119	80	99	49	125	51	
MR 2	81	60	85	57	115	74	
MR 3	187	92	166	121	68	45	
MR 4	179	80	131	101	149	154	
RVN	<u>566</u>	<u>312</u>	<u>481</u>	<u>328</u>	<u>457</u>	<u>324</u>	

Source: SEAPRS Computer File.

a/ Thru November.

Civilians and the RF/FF who defend them bear the brunt of the enemy's indirect fire actions. Together, they accounted for 66% of the casualties from January 1968 through November 1970.

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TABLE 3

FRIENDLY DEATHS FROM STANDOFF FIRE ACTIONS (Total KIA)

	US/FW	ARVN	RF/PF	OTHER b/	Total
<u>Attack by fire</u>					
1968	390	220	204	808	1622
1969	290	238	192	572	1292
1970 a/	209	269	408	677	1563
Total	889	727	804	2057	4477
<u>Harassed by fire</u>					
1968	541	516	991	1586	3634
1969	1016	403	638	1508	3565
1970 a/	487	327	886	1101	2801
Total	2044	1246	2515	4195	10000
<u>Total KIA</u>					
1968	931	736	1195	2394	5256
1969	1306	641	830	2080	4857
1970 a/	696	596	1294	1778	4364
GRAND TOTAL	2933	1973	3319	6252	14477

a/ Thru November.

b/ Civilians comprise the bulk of this category.

The RF/PF increasingly became a target in 1970, accounting for 30% of all the combat deaths (compared to 23% and 17% in 1968 and 1969) and suffering their highest totals in the past three years. The increase stems from a doubling of their deaths from attacks by fire and a 40% increase over 1969 in their casualties from harassments.

The remainder of this analysis shows the impact of the enemy's change in strategy on his costs. First, a word about the data is in order. While the KIA and incident counts presented above are fairly complete, the estimate of ammunition expended by the enemy is reported in only 40% of the incidents. Furthermore, it must be recognized that a precise count of incoming rounds is not likely when a position is receiving fire. However, we believe that:

- a 40% sample is large enough to support the analysis that follows,
- it is reasonable to assume that there is no systematic statistical bias in the data.

Enemy Ammunition Expenditures. Over 95% of enemy attacks by fire in 1969 and 1970 were conducted with 81/82 mm mortars. Harassments involved the use of these same small caliber, man-portable weapons in about 90% of the cases; rockets are the main weapon in the remaining incidents. Small

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arms fire and grenades are seldom employed in standoff attacks. The enemy's reliance on small mortars is significant--these weapons are light, easy to use and fairly easy to resupply--they are particularly well suited to use by a small, mobile force.

The enemy's rate of ammunition expenditure in standoff fire actions is shown in Table 4. On a countrywide basis, the enemy has used less and less ammunition in attacks by fire, both on a year to year comparison and in comparing similar periods. The seasonal pattern is evident. The reduction in this type of attack is most obvious in the first half trends--1st half 1969 down 31%, 1st half 1970 down 41%.

On the other hand, his use of ammunition for harassment was nearly constant during 1968 and 1969, and the first half of 1970 was only 6% below 1st half 1969 usage. Second half 1970 was 21% lower than 2nd half 1969.

Table 4 also shows that MR III has had a decline in ammunition expenditures in both types of action that is so sharp that the seasonal pattern has broken:

- Rounds fired in attacks by fire in 2nd half 1970 were 76% below 2nd half 1969 and 84% lower than 2nd half 1968.

- Rounds fired in harassment during 2nd half 1970 were 69% lower than the second half of either 1968 or 1969.

In contrast, 2nd half 1970 in MR IV saw more rounds fired in attacks by fire than in any period since TET 68. And rounds fired in harassing fire reached a three year high during 1970. (A DMAC Periodic Intelligence report dated 7 Feb 71 shows that VC forces expended nearly 116 tons of ordnance (excluding small arms) in MR IV from March-Dec 1970. Twenty-five tons were used in April, the peak month of the year.)

Based on these data, it appears that friendly operations in Cambodia may have reduced the flow of ammunition into that region, and that most of the available ammunitions has been redirected into the higher rate of activity in MR 4.

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TABLE 4

ENEMY AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES IN STANDOFF ACTIONS a/
(Monthly Average)

	1968		1969		1970		
	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	
	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	b/
<u>Rounds fired in:</u>							
<u>Attacks by fire</u>							
MR 1	2097	686	1123	517	1229	971	
MR 2	822	326	815	361	388	294	
MR 3	2475	1482	2366	1012	623	244	
MR 4	2231	762	937	750	878	1040	
RVN	7625	3256	5241	2640	3118	2549	
<u>Harassments by fire</u>							
MR 1	1238	892	1249	498	1033	495	
MR 2	388	357	560	424	833	290	
MR 3	958	732	1139	733	462	230	
MR 4	1188	534	755	918	1156	1027	
RVN	3772	2515	3703	2573	3484	2042	
<u>Total Standoff Actions</u>							
MR 1	3335	1578	2372	1015	2262	1466	
MR 2	1210	683	1375	785	1221	584	
MR 3	3433	2214	3505	1745	1085	474	
MR 4	3419	1296	1632	1668	2034	2067	
RVN	11397	5771	8944	5213	6602	4591	

Source: VCIIA, prioritized to eliminate double counting.

a/ Estimated to represent about 40% of the ammunition fired in standoff attacks, based on the number of incidents reporting a round count.

b/ Thru November.

Intensity of Enemy Attacks

One measure of the intensity of enemy standoff attacks is the number of rounds fired per attack. Table 5 shows that the patterns for both attacks by fire and harassments are quite regular:

- From 30 to 35 rounds per attack by fire.

- From 7 to 8 rounds per harassment.

Intensity of attacks by fire has been steadily increasing in MR 1 and has been declining in MRs 2, 3, and 4 (although first half increases occurred during 1970 in MRs 3 and 4).

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The constant number (7-8) of rounds per harassment in all regions in all years suggests that the enemy may have a standard operating procedure for this type of action.

TABLE 5

INTENSITY OF ENEMY STANDOFF ATTACKS (Rounds fired per attack)

	1968		1969		1970	
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half a/
<u>Attack by fire</u> (20 rounds or more)						
MR 1	37	33	34	35	39	42
MR 2	33	31	33	29	28	27
MR 3	38	38	33	30	33	27
MR 4	32	32	31	28	29	27
RVN	35	34	33	30	32	31
<u>Harassment</u> (less than 20 rounds)						
MR 1	7.1	7.0	6.9	6.4	6.9	6.4
MR 2	7.4	7.0	8.2	6.9	7.3	6.3
MR 3	7.8	8.5	8.1	7.9	7.7	7.2
MR 4	7.3	7.9	7.4	6.9	6.7	6.5
RVN	7.5	7.6	7.5	7.1	7.0	6.5

a/ Thru November.

Efficiency^{2/} of Enemy Attacks

Enemy efficiency in his attacks by fire seems to have improved markedly. The improvement is coincident with his return to the protracted war strategy set forth by COSVN #9 in July 1969. It is probably the direct result of his targeting of civilians and territorial forces noted earlier.

Prior to July 1969, the enemy fired an average of 110 rounds to inflict a single casualty in an attack by fire. After July, the number dropped to about 60. Harassments are even more efficient; the enemy consistently gets a KIA for every 25-30 rounds fired. It seems reasonable that his efficiency in harassment should not have been affected by the strategy change--they

2/ Efficiency is used here in a very narrow sense--it is defined as the number of rounds required to achieve a KIA. Since KIA were reported for all incidents and ammunition expended in only 40%, the following adjustment was used:

$$\text{rounds per KIA} = \frac{2.5 \times \text{number of rounds fired}}{\text{Total KIA}}$$

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are essentially a guerrilla-type activity that has persisted beneath the ebb and flow of more conventional military activity.

TABLE 6

EFFICIENCY OF ENEMY STANDOFF ATTACKS a/ (Rounds fired per KIA)

	1968		1969		1970	
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half
<u>Attacks by fire</u>						
MR 1	107	79	110	69	54	114
MR 2	93	69	89	35	19	28
MR 3	115	120	176	79	67	44
MR 4	106	66	73	75	60	48
RVN	111	88	142	65	51	66
<u>Harassment</u>						
MR 1	44	38	42	42	38	41
MR 2	17	19	23	31	33	15
MR 3	18	30	22	20	24	18
MR 4	24	26	19	30	26	26
RVN	25	29	26	28	30	26

Source: VCIIA prioritized to eliminate double counting.

a/ Data are scaled to permit comparability. KIA are from all incidents, ammunition expenditures are available for 40% of the incidents. The ratio was computed as follows $\frac{2.5 \times \text{rounds fired}}{\text{Total KIA reported}} = \# \text{ Rounds/KIA}$

The enemy has achieved lower costs by his change in strategy in one other way:

- Enemy KIA during ground attacks fell from 700-1700 per month in 1968 thru mid 1970, to only 300 per month in the second half of 1970, even though the number of ground attacks remained within the historical range of 130-190 per month.

- The enemy-to-friendly kill ratio in those attacks, ranging from 0.5-0.9 to 1 during 1968 thru mid 1970, dropped to 0.3 to 1 in the 2nd half of 1970.

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ENEMY ATTACK PATTERNS IN SOUTH VIETNAM 1967 - 1970

In 1970, enemy attacks^{1/} were only 7% lower than the average of the previous two years, and remained 40% higher than in 1967. They were more efficient in inflicting friendly casualties, partly because they were concentrated on softer targets.

The slight decrease in 1970 stemmed from a 24% drop in attacks by fire, partially offset by a 19% increase in small ground attacks. (Harassments by fire--less than 20 rounds--were down a little bit, but not much.) Thus, the enemy apparently shifted to a greater emphasis on small ground attacks in 1970--or was unable to keep up a high rate of attacks by fire. Enemy ground attacks reached a four year peak in 1970, and the ratio of ground attacks to attacks by fire was the highest since 1967.

The enemy's reduced reliance on attacks by fire could be an indication of possible enemy ammunition problems--at least in the calibers he needs for stand off attacks.

Geographical Distribution of Enemy Attacks

Table 1 shows that the attack patterns vary among the military regions. Comparing 1970 to 1969:

- In MR's I and IV enemy ground attacks and attacks by fire rose in 1970. MR IV led the MR's in attacks by fire.

- In MR II enemy ground attacks rose sharply for the fourth year in a row, but attacks by fire dropped, breaking a three year trend. MR II had the most ground attacks.

- In MR III both kinds of enemy attacks were down sharply (attacks by fire declined by 68%).

^{1/} Defined as ground assaults and ambushes, plus attacks by fire of 20 rounds or more.

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TABLE 1

ENEMY ATTACKS BY MILITARY REGION 1967 - 1970

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970^{b/}</u>
<u>Ground Attacks^{a/}</u>				
MR I	408	305	305	367
MR II	288	391	572	732
MR III	426	438	393	245
MR IV	416	366	342	447
Unk/Out-country	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>85</u>
Total RVN	1538	1500	1614	1846
<u>Attacks by Fire</u>				
MR I	367	616	409	456
MR II	74	270	387	299
MR III	267	831	929	267
MR IV	284	692	513	604
Unk/Out-country	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>134</u>
Total RVN	992	2410	2238	1760
<u>Total Attacks</u>				
MR I	775	921	714	823
MR II	362	661	959	1001
MR III	693	1269	1322	512
MR IV	700	1058	855	1051
Unk/Out-country	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>219</u>
Total RVN	2530	3910	3852	3606
<u>Ratio of Ground Attacks to Attacks by Fire</u>	1.6	0.6	0.7	1.0

Source: VCIIA File

^{a/} Enemy assaults plus ambushes.

^{b/} 1970 figures include attacks reported against RVNAF forces operating in Cambodia and Laos.

Table 2 shows the steady buildup of attacks in 1967 which culminated in the 1968 Tet Offensive. It also indicates the relative stability of the total attack rate in the April-June period of the last three years.

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TABLE 2

ENEMY ATTACKS BY QUARTER, 1967 - 1970^{a/}

	<u>Ground Attacks</u>	<u>Attacks by Fire</u>	<u>Total Attacks</u>
<u>1967</u>			
1st Qtr	380	98	478
2nd Qtr	322	212	534
3rd Qtr	368	302	670
4th Qtr	<u>468</u>	<u>380</u>	<u>848</u>
Total	1538	992	2530
<u>1968</u>			
1st Qtr	743	894	1637
2nd Qtr	393	811	1204
3rd Qtr	203	375	578
4th Qtr	<u>161</u>	<u>330</u>	<u>491</u>
Total	1500	2410	3910
<u>1969</u>			
1st Qtr	322	622	944
2nd Qtr	490	768	1258
3rd Qtr	317	441	758
4th Qtr	<u>485</u>	<u>407</u>	<u>892</u>
Total	1614	2238	3852
<u>1970</u>			
1st Qtr	391	297	688
2nd Qtr	659	721	1380
3rd Qtr	488	502	990
4th Qtr	<u>308</u>	<u>240</u>	<u>548</u>
Total	1846	1760	3606

^{a/} Source: VCIIA File

Efficiency of Enemy Attacks

The enemy has increased his efficiency in producing friendly combat deaths. The overall enemy-to-friendly kill ratio in enemy attacks for 1970 was 1.14 to 1, the best achieved by the enemy since 1967 (0.98:1) and much better than the 1.9 to 1 ratios of 1969 and 1970.^{1/} The sharp drop in 4th Quarter of 1970 (to 0.51 to 1) reflects the combined impact of reduced activity (typical of that time of the year) and the enemy's economy of force tactics.

^{1/} When this statistic is low, the enemy is doing well.

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TABLE 3

KILL RATIOS IN ENEMY ATTACKS^{a/}
(Ratio of Enemy KIA to Friendly KIA)

Activity	1967	1968	1969	1970
Ground Attacks	1.11	2.37	2.34	1.53
Attacks by Fire	.26	.21	.31	.08
Total Attacks	.98	1.93	1.94	1.14

a/ Source: SEAPRS File.

The enemy seems to have increased his efficiency by a more effective use of attacks by fire (targeting the more vulnerable RF/PF and civilian populace) rather than by a more efficient overall effort in ground attacks. In 1970, the enemy achieved an average of 2.5 friendly KIA for each of his ground attacks, a four year low. But the enemy's record in attacks by fire improved noticeably during 1970, regaining its 1967 level of 1 friendly KIA in each attack by fire. This gain offset the loss of efficiency in ground attacks and enabled the enemy to stabilize at a constant 1.7 friendly KIA per attack for his overall attack effort in 1969 and in 1970.

TABLE 4

FRIENDLY KIA PER ENEMY ATTACK^{a/}

	1967	1968	1969	1970
Friendly KIA Per				
Ground Attack	3.7	4.2	3.3	2.5
Attack by Fire	1.0	.7	.6	1.0
Total	2.7	2.0	1.7	1.7

a/ Source: SEAPRS File.

Enemy Targeting

Table 5 shows that US-FW and RF/PF deaths from enemy incidents reverted to the 1967 pattern last year. The Vietnamese regular force losses declined for the third consecutive year. The figures suggest that the enemy is systematically targeting the RF/PF forces. Recent reports, particularly from MR IV, support this interpretation.

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TABLE 5

FRIENDLY DEATHS FROM ENEMY ATTACKS^{a/}

<u>Force</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
US/FWMAF	635	1645	1406	642
VN Regulars	1511	1739	1315	1080
RF/PF	2334	1961	1598	2441
Civilian/Paramil.	1423	1577	1395	1634
Unknown	<u>849</u>	<u>1059</u>	<u>836</u>	<u>510</u>
Total	6752	7961	6550	6307

a/ Source: SEAPRS File.


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
April 1967

VC ASSASSINATION AND ABDUCTION OF GVN PERSONNEL

GRAPH 1



GRAPH 2



A review of the Assassination and Abduction statistics suggests that there has been no change in the VC strategy toward SVN civilians but possibly an increase in incidents against GVN officials and employees, there were different terror patterns in each of the VC Military Regions, and about 17% of the incidents against GVN personnel are directed against RD Cadre.

Assassinations (not death due to accident or military action) are deaths presumed or known to be VC caused. Both Table 1 and Graphs 1 and 2 summarize the assassination and abduction of GVN government officials, employees and the general populace since July 1965. The total assassination data is not suggestive of a trend.

Assassinations and abductions of government officials and employees seem, however, to have increased since March 1966. A portion of this increase may be due to a change in the reporting system. The USAID Office of Public Safety, the source since August 1966, has backdated the statistics to July 1965 from MACV data, but it is possible that slightly different reporting definitions were in use before August 1966.

Table 2 shows assassinations and abductions since August 1966 by VC Military Region. It appears that MR's 5 and 6 (from the DMZ to northern III CTZ) account for approximately half of the assassinations and two-thirds of the abductions, (while encompassing only about 30% of the population of SVN). In MR 6 assassinations are 14 times abductions, 4 times in MR 3,

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2.5 times in VR 5, about equal in VR's 1 and 2, and in VR 4, which is approximately the same area as the GVN province of Gia Dinh surrounding Saigon, assassinations run 5 times abductions.

TABLE 1

ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS IN SVN

	1965		1966		1967		1966
	Jul-Sep	Oct-Dec	Jan-Mar	Apr-Jun	Jul-Sep ^{c/}	Oct-Dec	Average Quarter
<u>Assassinations</u>							
Govt Officials ^{a/}	30	36	31	38	41	58	42
Employees ^{b/}	32	30	17	40	57	88	51
Sub-total	62	66	48	78	98	146	93
Gen Populace ^{c/}	308	375	366	447	239	310	340
Total	370	441	414	525	337	456	433
<u>Abductions</u>							
Govt Officials ^{a/}	19	24	37	39	30	70	44
Employees ^{b/}	22	20	22	8	23	41	24
Sub-total	41	44	59	47	53	111	68
Gen Populace	1919	1615	1131	655	511	1244	885
Total	1960	1659	1190	702	564	1355	953
<u>Total Assassinations and Abductions</u>	2330	2100	1604	1227	901	1811	1386

- a/ The Government official category consists of titled officials at the National, Corps, Region, Province, District, Village and Hamlet levels.
- b/ Government employees include National, Corps, Regional, etc employees civil servants (school teachers, health workers, etc.) national police (when not on military operations) and PD Cadre.
- c/ Reporting system changed in August 1966.
- d/ January and February X 150%.

Source: USAID Office of Public Safety-US Reporting of VC Assassinations and Abductions of GVN Personnel.

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TABLE 2

ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS

BY VC MILITARY REGION

	Aug	Sep	1966 Oct	Nov	Dec	1967 Jan	Feb	Total Aug-Feb
<u>Military Region 1a/</u>								
Assassinations	5	28	8	12	7	22	15	97
Abductions	1	12	26	12	25	3	21	100
								197
<u>Military Region 2b/</u>								
Assassinations	17	16	74	41	38	38	31	255
Abductions	70	14	40	52	15	36	28	255
								510
<u>Military Region 3c/</u>								
Assassinations	17	27	20	12	27	5	14	122
Abductions	21	34	40	211	137	20	44	507
								629
<u>Military Region 4d/</u>								
Assassinations	7	10	21	10	6	5	14	73
Abductions	4	3	0	5	1	0	1	14
								87
<u>Military Region 5e/</u>								
Assassinations	75	46	55	37	62	53	97	426
Abductions	84	130	210	174	115	227	152	1092
								1518
<u>Military Region 6f/</u>								
Assassinations	0	8	11	11	4	5	2	41
Abductions	123	26	173	49	70	40	88	569
								610
<u>TOTAL</u>								
Assassinations	122	135	189	123	144	128	173	1014
Abductions	303	219	489	503	363	326	334	2537
	425	354	678	626	507	454	507	3551

Source: USAID Office of Public Safety

a/ Center section III Corps, but not Gia Dinh Province surrounding Saigon.

b/ Southern III Corps and Northern IV Corps.

c/ Southern IV Corps.

d/ GVN Gia Dinh Province, which surrounds Saigon.

e/ All I Corps and northern half of II Corps.

f/ Northern section of III Corps and southern II Corps.

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TABLE 3

ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS OF RD CADRE

	<u>Jul- Sep ^{a/}</u>	<u>Oct- Dec</u>	<u>Jan- Mar ^{b/}</u>	<u>Total Aug - Feb</u>
<u>RD Cadre</u>				
Assassinations	22	29	14	53
Abductions	24	5	19	44
Total	46	34	33	97
<u>RD Cadre as a % of Government Officials and Employees</u>				
Assassinations	17	20	12	17
Abductions	31	4	25	16
Total	22	13	17	17
<u>a/</u> (August & September) x 150%.				
<u>b/</u> (January & February) x 150%.				

Table 3 summarizes assassinations and abductions of RD Cadre. There is a suggestion of a decreasing assassination rate of RD Cadre but with the short period covered it is difficult to be sure. A comparison of RD Cadre with all government officials and employees indicates that RD Cadre account for 53 of the 311 assassinations, or 17%. There are approximately 20,000 RD Cadre in SVN. Of these in 1966 there were 593 killed compared to the 44 assassinated in the period from August to December. Clearly the death rate from military actions is far greater than that due to assassinations.

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VC/NVA ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS IN SVN ^{a/} (Monthly Average)

	1965		1966					1967	
	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Avg 1966	1st Qtr	Apr- May
<u>Assassinations of:</u>									
Govt Officials ^{b/}	10	12	10	13	14	19	14	20	25
Employees ^{c/}	11	10	6	13	19	30	17	25	37
Gen Populace	103	125	122	149	79	103	113	116	183
Total	124	147	138	175	112	152	144	161	245
<u>Abductions</u>									
Govt Officials ^{b/}	6	8	13	13	10	23	15	15	17
Employees ^{c/}	8	7	7	3	8	14	8	8	17
Gen Populace	639	538	377	218	170	415	295	267	247
Total	653	553	397	234	188	452	318	290	281
<u>Total Assassinations and Abductions</u>	777	700	535	409	300	604	462	451	526

^{a/} Reporting system changed in August 1966.

^{b/} The Government official category consists of titled officials at the National, Corps, Region, Province, District, Village and Hamlet levels.

^{c/} Government employees include National, Corps, Regional, etc. employees, civil servants (schools teachers, health workers, etc.) national police (when not on military operations) and ED Cadre.

Source: USAID Office of Public Safety-US Reporting of VC Assassinations and Abductions of GVN Personnel.

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VC/NVA ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS

In the first 8 months of 1967 the VC/NVA assassinated 20% more people in SVN than they assassinated in all of 1966. The sharpest increase was in the rate of assassination (deaths not due to accident or military action and presumed or known to be VC caused) of government officials and employees which was double the 1966 rate (61 per month to 31 per month). Total abductions have maintained their 1966 rate, although the rate in July and August 1967 for abductions of government officials and employees was 32% below the 2nd quarter 1967 rate and 17% below the 1966 rate.

Table 1

VC/NVA ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS IN SVN^{a/}
(Monthly Average)

	1965		1966				1967				
	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Avg 1966	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	Jul-Aug	Jan-Aug Avg
<u>Assassination of:</u>											
Govt Officials ^{b/}	10	12	10	13	14	19	14	20	25	19	21
Govt Employees ^{c/}	11	10	6	13	19	30	17	25	46	53	40
Gen Populace	103	125	122	149	79	103	113	116	239	263	199
Total	124	147	138	175	112	152	144	161	310	335	260
<u>Abductions of:</u>											
Govt Officials ^{b/}	6	8	13	13	10	23	15	15	14	9	13
Govt Employees ^{c/}	8	7	7	3	8	14	8	8	14	10	11
Gen Populace	639	538	377	218	170	215	295	267	302	329	296
Total	653	553	397	234	188	452	318	290	330	348	320
<u>Total Assassinations and Abductions</u>	777	700	535	409	300	604	462	451	640	683	580

^{a/} Source: USAID Office of Public Safety - US Reporting of VC Assassinations and Abductions.

^{b/} The Government official category consists of titled officials at the National, Corps, Region, Province, District, Village, and Hamlet levels.

^{c/} Government employees include National, Corps, Regional, etc., employees, civil servants (school teachers, health workers, etc.), national police (when not on military operations), and RD Cadre.

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In August 40 RD Cadre were assassinated, 41% of all GVN officials and employees assassinated. Table 2 shows the sharply rising trend of RD Cadre assassinations over the past 13 months.

Table 2

VC/NVA ASSASSINATIONS OF RD CADRE (August 1966 to August 1967)

	<u>1966</u>					<u>1967</u>							
	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
Assassinations of RD Cadre	12	3	18	8	3	5	4	24	24	16	41	17	40
As a % of Govt Officials + Employees Assassinated	23	9	23	20	11	13	10	42	31	35	46	36	41

Source: USAID Office of Public Safety -- US Reporting of VC Assassinations and Abductions.

Table 3 shows assassination and abduction data over the period 1958 to 1967. Although the data prior to 1964 is sketchy, and the data since 1964 is from different sources and may thus suffer from inconsistencies, assassinations were quite level in 1962-66, jumping sharply this year; abductions were substantially level in 1962-65, and then were halved in the last two years. A major reason for the upsurge in assassinations during 1967 is the VC/NVA terrorist campaign against the South Vietnamese elections, both during the 2nd quarter and also in August and September. June and August 1967 were the peak months for assassinations in the past 26 months.

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Table 3

**CIVILIAN VIETNAMESE VICTIMS OF VIET CONG
TERROR, 1958-1965^{a/}**

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967 ^{b/}
<u>Assassinated</u>										
Officials	na	na	na	na	na	na	436	209	168	258
Other										
Civilians	na	na	na	na	na	na	1359	1691	1564	-2864
Total	193	239	1400	1000	1719	2073	1795	1900	1732	3122
<u>Abducted</u>										
Officials	na	na	na	na	na	na	1131	323	167	159
Other										
Civilians	na	na	na	na	na	na	8423	7992	3558	3675
Total	236	344	700	2000	5688	7262	9554	8315	3725	2834
<u>Combined</u>										
Total	429	583	2100	3000	11407	9335	11349	10215	5457	6956

a/ Source: Department of State Airgram "Viet Cong Terrorist Casualties," 12 April 1967, for data through 1965. 1966-67 data from USAID Office of Public Safety - US Reporting of VC assassinations and Abductions.

b/ Based on Jan - Aug rate.

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VC ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS

Victory in Vietnam means, more than anything else, protecting government officials and other civilians from the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong killed or kidnapped 9091 South Vietnamese in 1967, 54 percent more than in 1966. The loss rate rose in every quarter in 1967. Assassinations more than doubled in 1967; the rate in October-December 1967 was the highest in two and one half years. Abductions were 41 percent higher in 1967, due primarily to the large number of kidnappings of non-government civilians.

TABLE 1^{a/}

VC/NVA ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS IN SVN

	1966	1967	1965		1966		1967					
			3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr
Assassinations	1732	3702	370	441	414	525	337	456	482	928	1115	1183
Abductions	3810	5383 ^{b/}	1960	1659	1190	701	564	1355	870	1005 ^{b/}	1666	1842
Total	5542	9091 ^{b/}	2330	2100	1604	1226	901	1811	1352	1933 ^{b/}	2781	3025

a/ Source for all tables: USAID, Office of Public Safety - US Reporting of VC Assassinations and Abductions.

b/ A discrepancy in the source document accounts for the difference of 14 between these numbers shown and those in the OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

Government Officials

Table 2 shows the 70 percent rise between 1966 and 1967 of assassinations of government officials (168 to 285) and the 17 percent increase in abductions (176 to 206). This category includes officials of all levels of GVN government.

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TABLE 2

ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS^{a/}

	1966	1967	1965 3Qtr	1966 4Qtr	1966 1Qtr	1966 2Qtr	1966 3Qtr	1966 4Qtr	1967 1Qtr	1967 2Qtr	1967 3Qtr	1967 4Qtr
Assassinations	168	285	30	36	31	38	41	58	61	74	61	89
Abductions	176	b/206	19	24	37	39	30	70	45	57 ^{b/}	63	40
Total	344	b/491	49	60	68	77	71	128	107	b/131	124	129

a/ Includes titled officials at national, corps, region, province, district, village and hamlet levels.

b/ A discrepancy in the source document accounts for the difference of 14 between these numbers shown and those in the OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

Village and hamlet officials have been the key target among government officials, since this aids the VC to intimidate and control the rural population. They represented 92 percent of all officials killed and kidnapped in 1967. Table 3 shows that assassinations and abductions against all village and hamlet officials have been remarkably steady, centering around 120 such incidents each quarter. However, during the year there was a shift in the proportion of these incidents which were directed toward hamlet and village chiefs: 13 percent in the first half of the year and 42 percent in the second half.

TABLE 3

VILLAGE AND HAMLET CHIEFS AND OFFICIALS KILLED/KIDNAPPED BY VC

	1966 4Qtr	1967 1Qtr	1967 2Qtr	1967 3Qtr	1967 4Qtr	YR
Village and Hamlet Chiefs	50	13	15	53	49	130
Other Village & Hamlet Officials	70	79	105	69	70	323
Total	120	92	120	122	119	453

Assassinations of hamlet and village officials in 1967 outnumbered abductions by 254 to 199. Table 4 indicates the VC sharply increased the proportion of assassinations to abductions in the last three months of 1967, perhaps as part of the sharply stepped up attack on GVN population control that we have noted in other statistics. Abductions hit a five quarter low in fourth quarter 1967.

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TABLE 4

ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS OF HAMLET AND VILLAGE OFFICIALS

	1966	1967				YR
	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	
Assassinations	53	48	64	60	82	254
Abductions	67	44	56	62	37	199
Total	120	92	120	122	119	453

Government Employees

Assassinations of government employees (excluding "officials") tripled in 1967 over 1966 and abductions were up almost one and a half times (Table 5). This category includes civil servants (teachers, health workers, etc.), national police (when not on military operations) and RD workers.

TABLE 5

ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES^{a/}

	YEARS		1965		1966		1967		1967		1967	
	1966	1967	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr
Assassinations	202	603	32	30	17	40	57	88	74	138	187	204
Abductions	93	136	22	20	22	7	23	41	23	42	30	41
Total	295	739	54	50	39	47	80	129	97	180	217	245

^{a/} Includes national, corps, regional, etc., employees, civil servants (school teachers, health workers, etc.), national police (when not on military operations), and RD cadre.

Within these totals, Table 6 focuses on national police and RD cadre, two groups which are increasingly targets of VC activity and together accounted for 52% of government employees killed or kidnapped in 1967. Assassinations of national police nearly doubled in the second half of 1967 and abductions almost quadrupled. Assassinations of RD workers doubled but abductions showed an erratic pattern.

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TABLE 6

NATIONAL POLICE AND PD CADRE KILLED/KIDNAPPED BY VC

	1966	1967				YR
	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	
<u>National Police</u>						
Killed	42	21	31	36	65	153
Kidnapped	8	1	9	20	18	48
Subtotal	50	22	40	56	83	201
<u>PD Cadre</u>						
Killed	29	36	81	119	122	358
Kidnapped	6	14	14	4	18	50
Subtotal	35	50	95	123	140	408
Total	85	72	135	179	223	609

Clearly, the VC are increasing their pressure on the GVN pacification program. This program threatens the VC infrastructure and thus the VC control over the people in the rural areas. By showing that the National Police and PD cadre are vulnerable to VC terrorism, the VC increase insecurity in the countryside.

General Populace

Assassinations of Vietnamese non-government civilians rose sharply in the second quarter of 1967 and continued upward to the end of the year. Abductions hit their highest level since mid-1965 in the fourth quarter with 1761 civilians kidnapped. (See Table 7)

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TABLE 7

ASSASSINATION AND ABDUCTIONS OF THE GENERAL POPULACE

	YEAR		1965		1966		1967		1967		1967	
	1966	1967	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr
Assassinations	1362	2820	308	375	366	447	239	310	347	716	867	890
Abductions	3541	5041	1919	1615	1131	655	511	1244	801	906	1573	1761
Total	4903	7861	2227	1990	1497	1102	750	1554	1148	1622	2440	2651

Three incidents in December 1967 accounted for 614 civilians killed or kidnapped, 23 percent of the non-government assassinations and abductions in the fourth quarter. These incidents were the Dak Son massacre of 114 killed, the 200 Montagnards in Kontum province forced into Viet Cong military service, and the 300 refugees kidnapped in Binh Dinh province. Such incidents of mass kidnappings are reminiscent of 1965 when the VC attacked and kidnapped 1269 persons in five provinces in only six separate incidents.

The above statistics show that the VC improved their ability to terrorize the population in 1967. They increased the absolute number of assassinations and abductions and the proportion of assassinations.

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VC ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS

In the March JEA Analysis Report we noted that assassinations and abductions in SVN rose every quarter in 1967, up 64% over 1966. The Viet Cong struck hardest at PD cadre, national police and hamlet and village chiefs. Further review shows that strength increases of these groups account for only a small part of the 1967 rise. Assassinations and abductions rose 3 to 4 fold while strengths increased 13% to 20%. The combination of a stepped-up enemy effort and GVN assignment of officials to more insecure areas probably account for the rest of the increase.

Assassination and abductions of Revolutionary Development (RD) cadre tripled between first and fourth quarter 1967 while total RD cadre strength rose 20% (Table 1); assassinations and abductions per 1000 RD cadre rose from 1.5 to 3.6.

TABLE 1

RD CADRE

	<u>1967</u>			
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>
	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>
Assassination & Abductions a/	50	95	123	140
RD Personnel				
Strength (000) b/ c/	33.9	34.3	36.7	38.9
Casualties/1000 RD	1.5	2.8	3.4	3.6

a/ Source: USAID, Office of Public Safety - US Reporting of VC Assassinations and Abductions.

b/ Quarterly average.

c/ Source: CIA.

National police strength increased 13%, but assassination and abductions almost quadrupled. The police casualties per 1000 strength tripled.

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TABLE 2

NATIONAL POLICE

	1967			
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr
Assassinations & Abductions a/ NP Strength (000) b/ c/ Casualties/1000 NP	22 50.8 .4	40 63.9 .6	56 65.6 .9	83 69.0 1.2

a/ Source: USAID, Office of Public Safety - US Reporting of VC Assassinations & Abductions.

b/ Quarterly average.

c/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2.

Quarterly data on the number of GVN hamlet and village chiefs and officials are not available in Washington. However, by using the Hamlet Evaluation System we were able to compare the assassinations and abductions of hamlet chiefs with the number of hamlets which had elected hamlet chiefs.* The basic weakness of this method is that it relates total terrorism to only a segment of the exposed population -- assassinations and abductions are also committed against appointed hamlet chiefs and elected and appointed village officials, of which there are a considerable number. However, we doubt that the additional data would change the basic trends shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

HAMLET CHIEFS

	1967			
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr
Assassinations & Abductions a/ Hamlets with Elected Chiefs (000) b/ c/ Casualties/1000 Hamlets with Elected Chiefs	13 2.6 5.0	9 2.9 3.1	48 3.3 14.5	35 3.3 10.6

a/ Source: USAID, Office of Public Safety - US Reporting of VC Assassinations & Abductions.

b/ Quarterly average.

c/ Source: Hamlet Evaluation System, Indicator 4A - Governmental Management - all hamlets rated A or B for this indicator.

* Hamlets with A or B rating for indicator 4A (governmental management). The hamlet must have an elected hamlet chief to obtain an A or B rating for this indicator.

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ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS IN SVN

Summary

Prior to July 1968, less than 60% of the assassinations and abductions of GVN officials, employees and members of the South Vietnamese population were reported in the official figures. Moreover, even MACV's new Terrorism Incident Reporting System (TIRS) understates the attrition of GVN officials and civil servants because about two thirds of them are killed by enemy attacks and other actions which are not considered assassinations.

Details

As now reported by TIRS, there were 3711 assassinations and 6764 abductions of SVN civilians in the March - July 1968 period, compared to the 2240 assassinations and 3949 abductions previously reported. This level of terrorism is about 70% higher than the earlier estimates, but the increase represents reporting omissions, not a real increase in terrorism.^{1/}

The greatest part of the increase in reported terrorism came against the general population and GVN employees (RD cadre, National Police, Civil Servants). The increase in reported assassinations of GVN officials is small.

Assassinations and abductions in August and September resumed high levels after a significant decline in July, as shown in Tables 1 and 3. (No TIRS data for October is yet available.)

The new TIRS data will enable us to improve our analysis of VC terrorism. However, the reported levels of terrorism still significantly understate the numbers of GVN officials and civil servants who are being killed. Many are not assassinated in the strictest sense but are killed by VC military and paramilitary activities. Table 4 indicates that only a third of the National Police and Revolutionary Development Cadre killed by the VC were reported as assassinations. Calculation of attrition and its impact is further complicated by the lack of any reliable accounting system for the strengths of GVN officials and civil servants.

^{1/} The figures in the tables that follow do not agree entirely with the figures reported in the monthly Assassinations and Abductions Airgram, which is the source of the OSD Southeast Asia Statistical Summary figures. The airgrams report from the 26th of one month through the 25th of the following month, but the TIRS figures are from the first day of the month to the last day of the month. This presumably accounts for the differences, which are significant.

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TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND TIRS ^{a/} ^{b/}
ASSASSINATION ESTIMATES - BY CORPS

	1968							Cumulative Total (Mar-Jul)
	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	
I Corps								
State	92	41	121	112	172			538
TIRS	140	86	318	221	117	266	219	882
II Corps								
State	153	83	66	66	58			426
TIRS	263	96	152	120	75	111	140	706
III Corps								
State	170	94	189	296	64			813
TIRS	192	137	545	216	73	94	205	1,163
IV Corps								
State	128	69	103	94	69			463
TIRS	166	75	206	435	77	179	148	960
SVN								
State	543	287	479	568	363			2,240
TIRS	761	394	1,221	533	342	650	712	3,711
State as % of TIRS	71	73	39	57	106	-	-	60

^{a/} Both State and TIRS estimates include GVN officials, employees, and members of the general population killed by the VC.

^{b/} No State Department data available for August or September.

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TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND TIRS
ASSASSINATION ESTIMATES - BY TYPE

	1968						Cumulative	
	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u> ^{a/}	<u>Sep</u> ^{a/}	Total (<u>Mar-Jul</u>)
<u>SVN</u>								
Gov't Officials								
State	39	21	28	39	32			158
TIRS	35	32	38	29	33	36	30	167
Gov't Employees								
State	50	28	62	38	21			199
TIRS	79	67	144	70	18	42	65	378
Gen'l Population								
State	454	238	389	491	276			1,848
TIRS	647	295	1,039	894	291	562	617	3,166

^{a/} No State data available for August or September.

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TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND TIRS ^{a/}
ABDUCTION ESTIMATES

	1968							Cumulative Total (Mar-Jul)
	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	
I Corps								
State	130	158	321	113	102			824
TIRS	245	331	393	82	98	419	383	1,149
II Corps								
State	785	376	242	267	310			1,980
TIRS	2,548	367	277	420	201	319	436	3,813
III Corps								
State	86	83	215	104	94			582
TIRS	70	106	811	71	129	123	147	1,187
IV Corps								
State	132	211	93	104	23			563
TIRS	283	105	130	75	22	92	92	615
SVN								
State	1,133	828	871	588	529			3,949
TIRS	3,146	909	1,611	648	450	953	1,058	6,764
State as % of TIRS	36	91	54	91	118			58

^{a/} Both State and TIRS estimates include GVN officials, employees, and members of the general population abducted by the VC.

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TABLE 4

OWN EMPLOYEES ASSASSINATED VERSUS TOTAL KILLED ^{a/}

	1968							Total
	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	(Mar-Sep)
<u>National Police</u>								
Assassinated (TIRS)								
General	11	2	4	13	5	8	17	60
Selective	22	11	68	22	7	6	4	140
Total	33	13	72	35	12	14	21	200
Killed ^{a/}								
By VC	126	126	99	52	32	15	27	477
Not VC	11	30	12	11	14	39	19	136
Total	137	156	111	63	46	54	46	613
<u>RD Cadre</u>								
Assassinated (TIRS)								
General	22	25	20	4	2	4	31	108
Selective	24	27	13	17	3	10	8	102
Total	46	52	33	21	5	14	39	210
Killed ^{a/}								
	149	67	134	75	80	69	98	672

^{a/} Total killed includes assassinations.

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TABLE 5

ASSASSINATIONS IN SVN - 1968
(TIRS)

	1968						
	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
I Corps							
Gov't Officials	4	5	16	8	10	10	7
Gov't Employees	12	9	21	4	5	8	14
General Populace	<u>126</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>281</u>	<u>209</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>248</u>	<u>198</u>
Total	140	86	318	221	117	266	219
II Corps							
Gov't Officials	31	12	14	12	10	16	15
Gov't Employees	39	29	6	12	1	8	14
General Populace	<u>217</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>111</u>
Total	263	96	152	120	75	111	140
III Corps							
Gov't Officials	8	12	4	3	6	5	6
Gov't Employees	24	24	81	20	6	4	11
General Populace	<u>160</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>460</u>	<u>193</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>188</u>
Total	192	137	545	216	73	94	205
IV Corps							
Gov't Officials	6	3	4	6	7	5	2
Gov't Employees	16	5	36	34	6	12	26
General Populace	<u>144</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>166</u>	<u>396</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>162</u>	<u>120</u>
Total	166	75	206	436	77	179	148
SVN							
Gov't Officials	35	32	38	29	33	36	30
Gov't Employees	79	67	144	70	18	42	65
General Populace	<u>647</u>	<u>295</u>	<u>1,039</u>	<u>894</u>	<u>291</u>	<u>582</u>	<u>617</u>
Total	761	394	1,221	993	342	650	712

Source: TIRS file, MACV (CORDS).

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TABLE 3

ABDUCTIONS IN SVN - 1968
(TIRS)

	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>
I Corps							
Gov't Officials	3	2	12	10	1	3	3
Gov't Employees	4	2	3	0	8	2	1
General Populace	<u>238</u>	<u>327</u>	<u>378</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>414</u>	<u>379</u>
Total	245	331	393	82	98	419	383
II Corps							
Gov't Officials	7	3	13	3	0	6	8
Gov't Employees	3	4	4	0	1	2	2
General Populace	<u>2,538</u>	<u>360</u>	<u>260</u>	<u>417</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>311</u>	<u>426</u>
Total	2,548	367	277	420	201	319	436
III Corps							
Gov't Officials	4	3	0	1	2	2	0
Gov't Employees	0	1	13	0	2	1	8
General Populace	<u>66</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>798</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>125</u>	<u>120</u>	<u>139</u>
Total	70	106	811	71	129	123	147
IV Corps							
Gov't Officials	7	8	0	3	2	7	0
Gov't Employees	0	0	6	3	1	4	2
General Populace	<u>276</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>90</u>
Total	283	105	130	75	22	92	92
SVN							
Gov't Officials	21	16	25	17	5	18	11
Gov't Employees	7	7	26	3	12	9	13
General Populace	<u>3,118</u>	<u>896</u>	<u>1,560</u>	<u>628</u>	<u>433</u>	<u>926</u>	<u>1,034</u>
Total	3,146	909	1,611	648	450	953	1,058

Source: TIRS file, MACV (CORDS).

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TERRORISM IN SVN

Summary. More than 36,000 Vietnamese were assassinated, abducted, or wounded by VC terror actions in 1968. About 7-10% of the victims were GVN officials or employees, mostly hamlet and village officials, police, and Revolutionary Development cadre. About 2-3% of the South Vietnamese village and hamlet chiefs were terror victims in 1968.

Functions of Terror

Terror is a traditional weapon of the insurgent. In South Vietnam the communists began using terror again in 1957 as part of their renewed campaign to unite Vietnam under a communist government. General Giap recognized the value of terror as a guerrilla war tactic when he said, "... the most correct path to be followed by the peoples to liberate themselves is revolutionary violence (terror) and revolutionary war."

The use of terror in South Vietnam aims at several important goals:

1. Intimidation of the people. The VC assassinate, abduct, threaten and harass the people in order to force their cooperation, to obtain laborers and porters when needed, to collect taxes, food and other supplies, and to prevent the local inhabitants from giving intelligence to allied forces.
2. Elimination of enemies. Certain individuals, particularly GVN officials (hamlet and village chiefs, for example), national police, RD cadre, school teachers, and individual citizens who defy VC threats are specifically marked for elimination. If the individual is unpopular, so much the better, since the VC can claim credit for removing an "enemy" of the people.
3. Propaganda. Within Vietnam, the VC point to their terror tactics as signs of their strength and presence throughout the country, even in the cities which are traditional government strongholds. The VC also try to influence external factors such as the Paris Peace Talks and world public opinion, by terror attacks on well-known US and Vietnamese personalities (such as those on the Commander of US Naval Forces in Vietnam and on several high GVN officials). Such actions give the VC publicity and help boost their morale.

According to Bernard Fall and Jay Mallin,^{1/} terror is used in Vietnam as a tactic to isolate the rural areas from the cities. The rural areas are easier for the VC to control since the people have lacked security from the GVN in the past. The elimination of a few key GVN people (the hamlet chief, police chief, local schoolteacher, etc.) is usually all that is necessary to intimidate the people. Once rural bases are set up, so the theory goes, the

^{1/} Bernard Fall, The Two Vietnams (New York: Praeger, 1967). Jay Mallin, Terror in Vietnam (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1966).

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cities are isolated and will eventually fall to VC control by economic pressure, terror tactics and lack of popular support for the government. The rural terror campaign is complimented by terror tactics in the cities which serve a different purpose from terror in the countryside. In the cities, the Communists seek to discredit the Government and to undermine the economy by discouraging business activity, causing investment capital to flee and disrupting transportation and communication.

Terrorism Reports

Incidents of terror have been individually reported from South Vietnam for several years. Before mid-1968, two sets of terrorist incident data were reported and used separately. One set consisted of Vietnamese national police data which was reported to Washington in the USAID monthly report of assassinations and abductions. The other set was reported through US and Vietnamese military channels and came to Washington in the OPREP-5 reports. Consolidation of these two sets of information resulted in the Terrorist Incident Reporting System (TIRS) which covers the period from 4th quarter 1967 to the present. This study examines the statistical patterns of terrorism in South Vietnam, based on data from the TIRS.

Trends

Terror incidents declined throughout 1968 (Table 1) after a peak of 1500 per month during the Tet offensive in the 1st quarter; by the 4th quarter, they were down to 800 per month. They rose 25% in 1st quarter 1969, in conjunction with the 1969 post-Tet offensive. (The incidents in Table 1 include some harassment incidents as well as assassinations and abductions.)

About half of the incidents resulted in friendly casualties (KIA, WIA or MIA) and more than 35,000 Vietnamese were assassinated (7000), abducted (12,000) or wounded (17,500) in 1968. The indirect effects from these incidents, particularly on the families of the victims, were undoubtedly much larger.

TABLE 1

TERROR INCIDENTS AND FRIENDLY CASUALTIES (Monthly Avg.)

	<u>1967</u> <u>4qtr</u>	<u>1968</u> <u>1qtr^a</u>	<u>2qtr</u>	<u>3qtr</u>	<u>4qtr</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>1qtr</u>
<u>INCIDENTS</u>	1199	1506	1390	914	805	1005
<u>CASUALTIES</u>						
Assassinated	537	706	754	515	413	652
Abducted	1050	1669	952	766	699	1066
Wounded	1329	1659	2071	1268	922	1590
Sub-Total	2916	4034	3777	2549	2034	3308

a/ February 1968 data was incomplete due to the Tet offensive, so 1st quarter is an average of January and March only. This probably understates the terror incidents and casualties during the 1st quarter.

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Targets of Terror Incidents

Table 2 indicates that about 7-10% of all terror casualties are GVN official or employees. It also shows that their proportion of the total has declined steadily, from 12% in 4th quarter 1967 to 6.6% in the first quarter of 1969.

TABLE 2

TERROR CASUALTIES BY TYPE (Monthly Avg.)

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>				<u>1969</u>
	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr^{a/}</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>
Government Officials	72	101	63	54	49	51
Government Employees	281	306	325	169	97	167
Civilians	<u>2563</u>	<u>3627</u>	<u>3389</u>	<u>2326</u>	<u>1888</u>	<u>3090</u>
TOTAL	2916	4034	3777	2549	2734	3308

a/ Jan. and Mar.

The government officials category in Table 2 includes appointed or elected officials at all levels of government, but most of the casualties (86-96%) are hamlet and village chiefs (Table 3). If we compare the 1968 total casualties of village and hamlet officials with the estimated number elected or appointed by the GVN, we find that between 2-3% of the chiefs became casualties in 1968 and a little more than 1% of the other officials were terrorist victims.

TABLE 3

TERROR CASUALTIES: VILLAGE AND HAMLET OFFICIALS

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>				<u>1969</u>
	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>
Chiefs	122	91	71	60	48	74
Other Officials	<u>85</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>58</u>
TOTAL	207	184	172	147	138	132

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The government employees category includes civil servants through province level, school teachers, national police and RD cadre. RD cadre and police represent the GVN presence in rural areas and they are easily identifiable as prime targets by their uniform and their duties. Thus, RD cadre and national police account for 90-98% of the terrorist casualties who are government employees. Both suffer about the same number of total casualties, but the casualty rate for RD cadre is much higher. They suffer about 80% more casualties per 1000 strength than do the police. Terrorism against both declined in the second half of 1968 and rose slightly in first quarter 1969, but did not approach early 1968 levels (Table 4).

TABLE 4

TERROR CASUALTIES: RD CADRE AND NATIONAL POLICE

	1967	1968				1969
	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr
<u>RD Cadre</u>						
RD Terror Casualties	543	271	480	241	119	225
RD Personnel Strength (000) ^{a/}	27.4	30.3	37.7	46.5	46.5	47.3
Casualties/1000 RD	20	9	13	5	3	5
<u>National Police</u>						
NP Terror Casualties	272	325	483	245	144	269
NP Strength (000) ^{a/}	69.0	72.9	78.1	80.6	79.2	77.5
Casualties/1000 NP	4	4	6	3	2	3

^{a/} Quarterly average.

The civilians category in Table 2 includes news executives, prominent citizens, election candidates, Hoi Chanh, combat youth, refugees, People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF) and civilians in general. About 90% of all terror casualties fall in this category. Table 5 indicates that refugee and PSDF casualties from terrorism increased markedly during first quarter 1969.

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TABLE 5

TERROR CASUALTIES: CIVILIANS

	<u>1967</u> <u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1968</u> <u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2QTR</u>	<u>3QTR</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>1Qtr</u>
Civilians	3348	2652	5375	3370	2473	3784
Refugees	86	199	114	39	55	368
PSDF	0	0	0	0	11	268
Total	<u>3434</u>	<u>2851</u>	<u>5489</u>	<u>3409</u>	<u>2539</u>	<u>4420</u>

Where Terror Incidents Occur

The plot shows the distribution of terror incidents which caused casualties during 1968. These appear to occur most frequently in areas of dense population such as coastal I and II CTZ, around Saigon and in the Delta. Terror incidents also occur frequently along lines of communication (note Route 4 in the Delta and Route 19 in II CTZ).

In 1968 each CTZ had about an equal proportion of terror casualties (Table 6). In the first quarter 1969, however, I CTZ had 31% of the terror casualties and III CTZ dropped to 17%. The increase in I CTZ was due to an increase in abductions to a record high monthly average of 428. Previously, II CTZ accounted for more than half of all abductions.

TABLE 6


TERROR CASUALTIES BY CTZ (Monthly Average)

	<u>1967</u> <u>4Q</u>	<u>1968</u> <u>1Q^{a/}</u>	<u>2Q</u>	<u>3Q</u>	<u>4Q</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>1Q</u>
I CTZ	569	595	854	836	531	1039
II CTZ	867	1677	664	559	630	844
III CTZ	533	678	1469	552	423	567
IV CTZ	947	1084	790	602	450	858
TOTAL	<u>2916</u>	<u>4034</u>	<u>3777</u>	<u>2549</u>	<u>2034</u>	<u>3308</u>

^{a/} Jan. and Mar. only.

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**TERRORIST INCIDENTS
INVOLVING CASUALTIES
1968**



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TERRORISM IN SVN

VC/NVA abductions have decreased 33% in 1969, but the number of people assassinated or wounded has remained close to 1968 rates. The IV Corps share of terror victims is increasing relative to the other Corps areas in 1969.

Table 1 shows that abductions by the VC/NVA have decreased 33% in 1969, but the number of people assassinated or wounded has remained close to 1968 rates. Detailed quarterly data for 1968 and 1969 indicates that the general pattern is about the same for both years; a sharp rise in terror casualties in the first quarter is followed by a continuous decline in the following quarters. So far, however, casualties for each 1969 quarter are below the same periods last year.

TABLE 1

FRIENDLY CASUALTIES FROM TERRORISM (Monthly Average)

	<u>1968</u>	<u>(Thru July)</u> <u>1969</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>July</u>
<u>Casualties</u>					
Assassinated	602	578	652	562	407
Wounded	1498	1457	1590	1442	1100
Abducted	1025	685	1068	440	273
Total	3125	2720	3310	2444	1780

Source: TIRS Computer File.

The distribution of terror casualties for each Corps area as a percentage of the country as a whole is shown in Table 2. The IV share has increased consistently in 1969. In July, IV CTZ accounted for 41% of all terror victims in the country, because the wounded increased, and assassinations continued at a high rate while declining in the other three Corps.

TABLE 2

% TERROR CASUALTIES BY CTZ

	<u>1967</u> <u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1968</u> <u>1Qtr</u> ^{a/}	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>July</u>
I CTZ	19	15	22	32	26	31	23	14
II CTZ	30	42	17	22	31	25	21	22
III CTZ	18	17	40	22	21	17	26	23
IV CTZ	32	27	21	23	22	26	30	41

a/ January and March only.

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There are two categories of assassination and abductions: selective and general, as shown in Table 3. Selective means that the person(s) was specifically targeted. Selective assassinations and abductions have both declined in 1969 (24% and 9% respectively), and so have general abductions (37%). However, general assassinations have increased slightly. The much lower rate of general abductions in the April-July 1969 period may reflect the enemy's reduced need for porters as he switched from large ground attacks to a "high point" strategy featuring indirect attacks by fire.

TABLE 3

SELECTIVE VERSUS GENERAL TERROR (Monthly Average)

	<u>1968</u>		<u>1969</u>		<u>1969</u>		
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(Thru Jul)</u>		<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>July</u>
<u>Assassinations</u>							
Selective	165	27	125	22	166	102	69
General	437	73	453	78	486	460	338
Total	602		578		652	562	407
<u>Abductions</u>							
Selective	153	15	139	20	210	108	18
General	872	85	546	80	858	332	255
Total	1025		685		1068	440	273

Source: TIRS Computer File

Plain civilians account for over 90% of the VC terror victims, as shown in Table 4. An average of 50 government officials have been terror victims each month for the past 13 months, indicating a steady level of enemy effort against them.

TABLE 4

TERROR CASUALTIES BY TYPE (Monthly Average)

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>				<u>1969</u>		
	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr^{a/}</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>July</u>
Govt Officials	72	100	63	55	49	50	52	40
Govt Employees	281	307	330	169	97	168	123	96
Civilians	2565	3632	3455	2351	1891	3092	2269	1644
Total	2918	4039	3848	2575	2037	3310	2444	1780

^{a/} January and March only.

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More than 95% of government officials targeted in 1968-69 were hamlet and village chiefs or officials. Table 5 shows that the chiefs are being hit about as hard in 1969 as they were during most of 1968. Casualties among other officials are lower this year.

TABLE 5

TERROR CASUALTIES: VILLAGE AND HAMLET OFFICIALS (Monthly Average)

	<u>1967</u> <u>4qtr</u>	<u>1968</u> <u>1qtr^{a/}</u>	<u>2qtr</u>	<u>3qtr</u>	<u>4qtr</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>1qtr</u>	<u>2qtr</u>	<u>July</u>
Chiefs	41	46	24	21	16	25	23	18
Other Officials	28	47	34	30	30	23	28	21
Total	69	93	58	51	46	48	51	39

a/ January and March only.

Revolutionary Development Cadre and National Police are the main victims in the government employees' target group. Both suffer about the same number of casualties, but the casualty rate for RD cadre is much higher. In 1969 so far, they have suffered about 70% more casualties per 1000 strength than have the police, as indicated in Table 6.

TABLE 6

TERROR CASUALTIES: RD CADRE AND NATIONAL POLICE

	<u>1967</u> <u>4qtr</u>	<u>1968</u> <u>1qtr^{a/}</u>	<u>2qtr</u>	<u>3qtr</u>	<u>4qtr</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>1qtr</u>	<u>2qtr</u>	<u>July</u>
<u>RD Cadre</u>								
RD Terror Casualties ^{b/}	177	134	160	80	38	75	59	70
RD Personnel Strength (000) ^{c/}	27.4	30.3	37.7	46.5	46.5	47.3	45.7	44.0
Casualties/1000 RD	6.5	4.4	4.2	1.7	.8	1.6	1.3	1.6
<u>National Police</u>								
NP Terror Casualties ^{b/}	91	163	165	82	48	89	60	26
NP Personnel Strength (000) ^{c/}	69.0	72.9	78.1	80.6	79.2	77.5	76.6	77.5
Casualties/1000 NP	1.3	2.2	2.1	1.0	.6	1.1	.8	.3

a/ January and March only.

b/ Monthly average.

c/ Average for the quarter.

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Refugees and Peoples' Self-Defense Group personnel appear to be particular targets of VC terror against civilians, especially in 1969 (Table 7). The monthly average of civilian casualties as a whole has declined about 8% in 1969.

TABLE 7

TERROR CASUALTIES: CIVILIANS (Monthly Average)

	<u>1967</u> <u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1968</u> <u>1Qtr</u> ^{a/}	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>July</u>
Civilians	2450	3422	3334	2265	1778	2570	1895	1381
Refugees	76	140	62	46	76	225	109	5
PSDF	10	28	21	5	28	290	228	232
Other	29	42	38	35	9	7	37	26
Total	2565	3632	3455	2351	1891	3092	2269	1644

^{a/} January and March only.

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TERRORISM IN SVN

Summary. Terrorism increased during April and May with the greatest increases in II CTZ. If past patterns hold, however, terrorism should decline in the second half of 1970. More than three-fourths of terrorist victims are ordinary civilians. Of the remainder, primary targets are PSDF, RD cadre, National Police and hamlet and village officials.

Casualty Rates. A little more than one-half of VC terrorist activities reported in the Terrorist Incident Reporting System (TIRS) are casualty-producing incidents--assassinations, abductions and woundings. In both 1968 and 1969 terrorist activity peaked in the first quarter and declined during the rest of the year. This pattern may not hold in 1970 (or be delayed) since April and May have been the peak months so far. (Table 1)

TABLE 1

	<u>TERROR INCIDENTS a/</u> (Monthly Avg)											
	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>2nd</u>	
	<u>4th</u>	<u>1st</u>				<u>1st</u>				<u>1st</u>		
	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>a/Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>b/</u>
Incidents w/ Casualties	526	548	672	514	414	547	523	435	381	432	822	
Other Incidents	674	862	729	415	332	461	432	383	342	368	623	
Total	1200	1510	1401	929	746	1008	955	818	723	800	1445	

Source: TIRS

a/ Excludes February when no terror incidents were reported because of the Tet offensive disruptions.

b/ April-May.

In 1968 more than 33,000 Vietnamese civilians were killed, wounded or kidnapped by VC terrorists, and in 1969 the casualty total was 27,000. If the rate of terrorist casualties for the first five months of this year continues through June, then drops off in the second half of the year as it has in past years, we can expect about 25-30,000 terrorism casualties in 1970.

Terrorism Targets. Table 2 divides assassinations and abductions into selected and general categories. Those victims who were apparently specifically targeted by the VC for elimination are reported as "selected." A higher proportion of assassinations were selected in 1970 (29%) than in 1969 (21%) or 1968 (27%); but the proportion of selected abductions (18%) was about the same as 1968-69 (16-20%).

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TABLE 2

TERROISM CASUALTIES (Monthly Avg)

	1968 a/	1969	1970 b/	1969 1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1970 1st Qtr	2nd Qtr b/
<u>Assassinations</u>									
Selected	162	106	163	165	101	65	93	116	234
General	430	401	407	488	460	387	267	284	591
Total	592	507	570	653	561	452	360	400	825
<u>Woundings</u>	1480	1254	1227	1593	1437	1154	832	847	1796
<u>Abductions</u>									
Selected	130	101	140	210	108	23	63	132	153
General	837	406	662	858	332	302	136	470	950
Total	967	507	802	1068	440	325	199	602	1103

a/ Excludes February when no terror incidents were reported because of the Tet offensive disruptions.

b/ Through May.

More than three-fourths of terrorist victims are ordinary civilians (76-80% of the total victims). Many of these civilians are only abducted for a few weeks or months of service with the enemy and return home afterward; others are killed or wounded, possibly for their (or their relatives') "collaboration" with the GVN, or simply as a show of force by the VC reentering areas pacified by the GVN.

Paramilitary and government officials reached their highest levels in two years as victims in April and May 1970, primarily reflecting the rapid buildup of People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF) in 1969-1970, both in strength and importance. Other primary targets are RD cadre, National Police (NP), and hamlet and village officials, all of whom (except NP) were more favored as targets in 1970 than 1969. The June 28 provincial elections may have triggered the increase in terror against government officials as the enemy may be trying to intimidate candidates for such jobs. The number of refugee and Hoi Chanh targets has been gradually falling off as refugees are being resettled and returned to villages, and as the Chieu Hoi program is achieving lower results than during the 1968-1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaigns. (Table 3)

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TABLE 3

TERROR CASUALTIES BY TYPE a/									
(Monthly Avg)									
	1968 ^{b/}	1969	1970 ^{c/}	1969 1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1970 1st Qtr	2nd Qtr ^{c/}
<u>Paramilitary</u>									
PSDF	19	229	266	289	227	227	171	178	399
RD/TS	101	63	74	74	59	74	46	43	121
NP/NPTF	110	53	53	89	60	38	23	19	103
Total	230	345	393	452	346	339	240	240	623
<u>Officials</u>									
Hamlet Chiefs	19	18	27	22	22	13	13	25	30
Hamlet Officials	20	20	34	19	19	9	31	32	36
Village Chief's	6	3	4	3	2	4	4	3	6
Village Officials	15	10	19	4	9	13	13	13	28
Other	4	1	1	4	0	2	0	1	0
Total	64	52	85	52	52	41	61	74	100
<u>Selected Civilians</u>									
Refugees	189	95	18	226	108	37	7	28	3
Hoi Chanh	17	20	12	5	36	16	21	10	15
Teachers	2	1	2	2	0	0	1	2	3
Other	13	2	6	3	5	1	0	1	13
Total	221	118	38	236	149	54	29	41	34
<u>Other Civilians</u>	2524	1753	2083	2574	1891	1497	1061	1494	2967
<u>Total</u>	3039	2268	2599	3314	2438	1931	1391	1849	3724

a/ Assassinations, abductions, woundings.

b/ Excludes February when no terror incidents were reported because of the Tet offensive disruptions.

c/ Through May.

Current Trends. Available weekly data for 1970 (Table 4) shows a sharp increase in assassinations, woundings, and abductions since about March, but the 1970 January-May weekly average for such casualties is still comfortably below 1968 and 1969 levels. However, if the high April-May level of terrorism continues through June, the first half 1970 weekly average for assassinations and abductions will equal the first half 1969 average.

TABLE 4

CASUALTIES FROM ENEMY TERRORISM (Weekly Avg)

	(Jan-May)			1970					
	1968 ^{a/}	1969	1970	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun ^{b/}
Assassinated	154	144	126	69	71	100	195	211	226
Abducted	28	191	165	56	76	243	237	247	336
Wounded	42	361	273	179	110	231	425	469	455

a/ Excludes February when no terrorist data was reported because of the Tet offensive disruptions.

b/ Thru June 13.

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All CTZ's had significant increases in terrorist casualties in 1970, but the increases began in I and II CTZ in the first quarter while the increases in III and IV CTZ were delayed until second quarter. The greatest gains were in II CTZ. The 1970 monthly average for II CTZ was 94% higher than in 1969. As a result II CTZ terrorism casualties made up 41% of total SVN terrorism casualties in 1970, up from 24% in 1969 and 27% in 1968. III CTZ showed the greatest decline from 27% in 1968 to 22% in 1969 to 14% in 1970. (Table 5)

While both 1970 assassination and wounding rates were the highest in three years in II CTZ, the greatest increase was in abductions, going from 163 a month last year to 570 a month this year, about 3½ times the 1969 level.

TABLE 5
TERRORISM CASUALTIES BY CTZ
(Monthly Avg)

	1968 ^{a/}	1969	1970 ^{b/}	1969 1qtr	2qtr	3qtr	4qtr	1970 1qtr	2qtr ^{b/}
I CTZ									
Assassinations	162	120	160	180	125	124	52	107	239
Abductions	195	159	77	427	119	71	18	40	132
Woundings	358	287	363	430	314	294	110	292	469
Total	715	566	600	1037	558	489	180	439	840
II CTZ									
Assassinations	117	131	184	193	124	108	97	115	288
Abductions	507	163	570	322	153	90	88	434	775
Woundings	189	255	313	333	236	246	205	177	519
Total	813	549	1067	848	513	444	390	726	1582
III CTZ									
Assassinations	174	106	81	98	136	87	104	72	94
Abductions	162	104	58	169	91	110	44	48	71
Woundings	473	292	214	302	408	212	245	174	274
Total	809	502	353	569	635	409	393	294	439
IV CTZ									
Assassinations	139	150	145	182	176	133	107	106	204
Abductions	103	81	98	150	77	54	49	80	125
Woundings	460	420	336	528	479	402	272	204	534
Total	702	651	579	860	732	589	428	390	863
SVN									
Assassinations	592	507	570	653	561	452	360	400	825
Abductions	967	507	803	1068	440	325	199	602	1103
Woundings	1480	1254	1226	1593	1437	1154	832	847	1796
Total	3039	2268	2599	3314	2438	1931	1391	1849	3724

a/ Excludes February when no terrorist data was reported because of the Tet offensive disruptions.

b/ Through May.

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Table 6 shows that four provinces have consistently ranked among the top ten in level of terrorism casualties in the last 2 1/2 years: Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh and Gia Dinh, making up 27-30% of the total. Five of the top ten provinces were in II CTZ during the first five months of 1970. In II CTZ 63% of 1970 terrorism casualties occurred in three provinces: Binh Dinh, Pleiku and Phu Yen. Phu Yen in particular has experienced intense terrorist activity. In addition to abductions to obtain laborers, reports have been received that the enemy for the first time in II CTZ is kidnapping individuals for ransom. Instances of kidnapping children for training in Laos and North Vietnam and women for training in military proselyting and psychological warfare activities have been reported.

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TABLE 6
CASUALTIES FROM TERRORISM BY PROVINCE
(Monthly Avg.)

	1966 ^{a/}	1967	1970 ^{b/}
Quang Tri	90	8	48
Thua Thien/Hue	85	36	31
Quang Nam/Da Nang	294*	285*	305*
Quang Tin	57	68*	73*
Quang Ngai	189*	165*	143*
I CTZ	715	562	600
Kontum	116*	93*	58
Binh Dinh	159*	148*	136*
Fleiku	50	32	158*
Phu Bon	7	6	58
Phu Yen	176*	47	292*
Darlac	155*	28	24
Khanh Hoa	32	18	12
Ninh Thuan	14	5	10
Tuyen Duc/Dalat	28	47	81*
Quang Duc	37	24	14
Lam Dong	10	7	32
Binh Thuan	51	94*	142*
II CTZ	815	549	1067
Binh Tuy	13	20	30
Long Khanh	55	35	10
Phuoc Long	85	19	5
Binh Long	49	37	18
Binh Duong	54	42	39
Tay Ninh	21	50	38
Hau Nghia	95*	80*	38
Bien Hoa	73	47	28
Phuoc Tuy	58	60	18
Long An	65	32	57
Gia Dinh/Saigon	242*	84*	72*
III CTZ	810	506	553
Go Cong	25	23	23
Kien Tuong	19	13	2
Kien Phong	47	34	29
Dinh Tuong	125*	110*	47
Kien Hoa	42	53	81*
Vinh Binh	40	38	47
Vinh Long	44	37	90
An Giang	6	7	1
Kien Giang	99	40	30
Chuong Thien	42	34	28
Phong Dich	97*	67*	34
Ba Xuyen	48	44	32
An Xuyen	16	28	40
Bac Lieu	38	27	22
Chau Doc	49	51	69
Sa Dec	23	18	24
IV CTZ	702	690	579
Total	3042	2287	2999

* Top ten provinces.

a/ Excludes February when no terror incidents were reported because of the Tet offensive disruptions.

b/ Thru May.

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TERRORISM IN SVN

Summary. Terrorism is the means by which the Viet Cong enter (or reenter) populated areas in SVN. Provinces which experience high levels of terrorist activity have fairly large populations and have historically been the sites of enemy base areas. It is in these areas that the VC feel they can rekindle the fires of latent sympathy for their cause, negate the effect of GVN presence and make inroads into GVN control. In contrast, terrorism applied to areas traditionally opposed to the VC (e.g. Catholic, Hoa Hao) is generally counterproductive, stiffening the resistance of the people.

The frequency of terrorist incidents has remained high in 1970, but its intensity has declined--incidents are up, but casualties are down. More GVN officials are being attacked (mostly in Binh Dinh province in MR II) but little other change from the pattern of 1968 and 1969 is evident. Terrorism remains about level in MR's I and IV, but is down in III MR and up sharply in II MR this year. A factor which undoubtedly contributes to the VC perception that terrorism is a strategy of choice in MR II has been the weakness of GVN leadership and anti-VCI efforts in that area.

Strategy. Barring any change in the last part of 1970, there will be about 25,000 Vietnamese civilian victims of VC terrorism by the end of the year. (There were 33,000 and 27,000 victims in 1968 and 1969, respectively.) These levels indicate the extent of the role terrorism plays in the VC "game plan" for the war in SVN.

The communists have formulated a three pronged strategy--military, diplomatic and political -- enumerated in their Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Resolution #9 (July 1969). Military force is directed to exert pressure, to cause the US to speed its withdrawal (and concurrently to shorten the time available for strengthening the GVN), and to keep the GVN on a wartime footing. Diplomacy is to be used concurrently to marshal world opinion in their favor.

The "Political struggle" will be accelerated to lay the groundwork within SVN. Integral to the political struggle is the liberal use of terrorism to weaken and destroy local government, strengthen the party apparatus, proselyte among the populace, erode the control and influence of the GVN and weaken RVNAP. If positive benefits (to the VC) cannot be gained, COSVN #9 indicates that they will settle for creating "fiercely contested areas." They intend to "motivate" the peasants in all rural areas -- whether contested or controlled by either side. (One observer notes that they sometimes settle for simply teaching the peasants how to remain neutral.)

A Word About the Terrorism Data. There is no single, complete source of data on terrorism. Acts of terror are perpetrated against both military and civilian elements in Vietnam. Consequently, incidents are reported through MACV J-3 or MACCORDS (sometimes both). The MACV J-3 reports yield the "harassment, terror and sabotage" figures in common use. The MACCORDS terrorist incident reporting system (TIRS) is oriented primarily on terrorism directed against

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civilians. The two systems are not completely compatible in their current forms and analysis is underway to correct this. In the meantime, the TIRS data seems to be the most complete set available and has been used for this analysis.

It is estimated that 90-95% of the terrorist incidents and casualties are reported by TIRS. It classifies the terror incidents by their type of casualties, in terms of assassinations (any killing), abductions, woundings. Assassinations and abductions are further classified as selected or general, depending on whether the victim was known, or judged to be, a specific VC target (such as a village chief), or simply an innocent bystander caught in a raid. These classifications are far from perfect, especially when killings, woundings and abductions of various types of people occur in the same incident. But they do give us a fairly good idea of the make up and targeting of enemy terrorism.

National Overview. Enemy military activity has been winding down over the past year and a half, but terrorism has remained high. The 1970 rate of incidents (through August) is 13% higher than a comparable period of 1969, and only 6% below the first three quarters of 1968. However, casualties are 6% lower than in 1969 and 20% below 1968, a rather clear indication that the enemy may be having more difficulty getting at the population in spite of his strategy (Table 1).

TABLE 1

TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES IN RVN (Monthly Average)

	<u>First 3 Quarters</u>		<u>Thru August</u>
	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Number of Incidents	1112	927	1047
Number of Casualties	3036	2561	2418

Source: TIRS

The decline in intensity of terrorism is more clearly illustrated in Table 2. The 1970 ratio of casualties per incident is about 15% lower than 1969. Moreover, the decline is exhibited by all three categories of terrorism: assassinations are down 8%, abductions down 24%, woundings down 19% from 1969 rates.

TABLE 2

INTENSITY OF VC TERRORISM (Casualties/Incident)

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Assassinations	2.35	2.18	2.00
Woundings	8.84	9.11	7.38
Abductions	7.90	6.50	4.94
All incidents	2.73	2.76	2.31

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The relative mix of casualties has not shifted greatly in the past 3 years. This year's pattern most closely resembles that of 1968. This year (through August):

- Selected assassinations were 27% of total assassinations compared to 27% in 1968, 21% in 1969.

- Selected abductions were 17% of total abductions compared to 15% in 1968, 20% in 1969.

- Woundings account for 48% of 1970's casualties compared to 49% in 1968 and 55% in 1969.

COSVN Resolution #9 clearly directed terrorist activity against specific targets. "Tyrants - (GVN administrators) - "spies" and "ringleaders in oppressed organizations or in the reactionary political organizations are to be killed." There has been a 70% increase in casualties among government officials - principally hamlet and village chiefs. (One province, Binh Dinh in MR II, accounts for about 25% of the entire national total.) However, there has been no evidence of increased targeting of other groups - paramilitary forces, government employees or prominent citizens - either on a nationwide basis or in specific provinces.

Regional Results. Military Regions I and IV each account for roughly 20% of the nation's terrorist incidents and the levels have been very stable for the last 2½ years. In MR's II and III, however, the patterns have shifted.

Military Region III has experienced significant declines in six of its ten provinces in both incidents and casualties this year. Only two provinces, Long An and Binh Tuy, have shown increases. Overall, MR III has had:

- a 3% decline in incidents (242/month vs 249/month)
- a 36% decline in casualties (344/month vs 538/month) comparing the first three quarters of 1969 with 1970 (through August).

Military Region II, always high in terrorist activity, has had a general upsurge in 1970. Incidents have risen 17% (362 vs 309 per month) and casualties are up 53% (922 vs 601 per month). Although all categories of incidents are above 1968 and 1969 levels, the primary cause of the MR II gain is the increase in abductions. They went up 122% and the associated casualties rose 48%. Incidents of assassinations are 36% higher than in 1969, and these casualties are up 18%.

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Terrorism in three MR II provinces -- Binh Dinh, Phu Yen and Binh Thuan -- is driving the MR II totals and significantly influencing the national totals. In the first half of 1970 these three provinces (with 8.5% of the SV. population) have accounted for:

- 50% of the nation's general abductions.
- 33% of its selected abductions.
- 16% of its general assassinations.

It has already been pointed out that selected assassinations are at very high levels in Binh Dinh (25% of the national total). Terrorism of all types in this populous province (920,000) has been consistently high for 2½ years.

Phu Yen has experienced the most significant increases in terrorism of any province in the country in 1970. The incident rate has risen 240% (68 vs 20 per month). Casualties are up 362% (240 vs 52 per month in 1969). In terms of both incidents and casualties, the greatest increases have been in selected assassinations and general abductions.

It appears that the VC strategy to "motivate the people to assist in building the armed forces" and "to struggle for their own pressing interest," and the goal of "liberating large blocs of villages or hamlets or to change them into fiercely contested areas" is being pursued with vigor in Northeastern MR II.

Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces fit the mold for lucrative targets for terrorism noted earlier. They are populous and have a history of sympathy for the VC cause. Despite large GVN presence, the government has not been an unqualified success in gaining the support of the people. Moreover, these two provinces are contiguous to the highlands -- an area of strategic importance to the VC as stated expressly in COSVN Resolution #9.

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TERRORISM IN SVN

This update of a previous survey of terrorism in SVN is based upon the most recent data available (through September) from MACV's Terrorist Incident Reporting System. This system is the only source of detailed, final data. The original paper (OASD/SA, 14 October 1970) examined the patterns of terrorist activity in the four military regions. It pointed out that MR II (particularly Phu Yen and Binh Dinh provinces) was responsible for the surge in terrorism this year.

Terrorism continues to be a severe problem in SVN, but the 3rd quarter of 1970 showed a decline from the very high levels of Jan-June, following the pattern established in past years. Comparing 3rd quarter rates with those of the first half:

- Incidents were down 13% (521 per month vs 596 per month).
- Casualties declined 29% (1854 per month vs 2602 per month).

However, comparing incident and casualty rates for 3rd quarter 1970 to 3rd quarter 1969:

- Incidents were up 19% (521 per month vs 436 per month).
- Casualties were down 4% (1854 per month vs 1934 per month), due to a 15% decline in woundings.

TABLE 1

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN RVN (Monthly Average)

	<u>3rd Qtr. 69</u>	<u>1st Half 70</u>	<u>3rd Qtr 70</u>
Incidents with Casualties	436	596	521
Casualties			
Assassinated	453	595	447
Abducted	324	776	422
Wounded	<u>1157</u>	<u>1231</u>	<u>985</u>
Total Casualties	<u>1934</u>	<u>2602</u>	<u>1854</u>

Using preliminary data thru 28 November, casualties during the second half of this year are running 35% below the first half, and are about even with the second half of 1969.^{1/}

The primary reason for the decline in terrorism from 1st half 1970 is an apparent let-up in large scale abductions in MR II. Incidents of abduction

^{1/} Preliminary data, which deals only with casualties and only on a country-wide basis is derived from the Saigon Embassy Mission Weekly Message.

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in this region are down 31% from the average rate of the first half (60 per month vs 87 per month). However, 3rd quarter rates are still well above the rates in MR II during the 3rd quarter a year ago:

- Incidents are up 114% (60 per month vs 28 per month).
- Casualties are up 137% (213 per month vs 90 per month).

As expected, the MR II provinces responsible for the previous upsurge account for the decline. Binh Dinh had 7 abductions involving 35 ordinary civilians in the third quarter, compared to 25 involving 183 people during the peak activity period of April-June. Selective abductions in Binh Dinh (involving officials and other key figures in the local society) have not shown a similar decline.

Phu Yen province had a decline in all types of terrorist incidents, except assassinations of ordinary civilians (which held at about 9 incidents per month). Casualties of terrorism (except woundings) dropped in the third quarter, especially the number of people abducted, which was about 57% lower than in the first half of this year.

Recent message traffic indicates that the GVN has initiated specific actions to combat terrorist activity in MR II. These actions, however, have probably been too recent to have caused the reductions noted above. It is more likely that the declines are due to decreased enemy initiative, a pattern which has been evident in the last two years.

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TERRORISM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

This update of a previous survey of terrorism in South Vietnam is based upon the most recent data available (thru March) from MACV's Terrorist Incident Reporting System (TIRS). TIRS is the only source of detailed, final data about terrorism. The original paper^{1/} examined the patterns of terrorist activity in the four military regions. It pointed out that MR II (particularly Phu Yen and Binh Dinh provinces) was responsible for the 1970 surge in terrorism.

Terrorism continues to be a problem in SVN, especially since it has become one of the enemy's prime means of prosecuting the war. Comparing the first quarters of 1970 and 1971:

- Casualties^{2/} caused by terrorists are 7% higher this year (1905 per month vs 1787 per month last year). There has been a substantial reduction in selective assassinations (down 12%) and selective abductions (down 57%), but this has been negated by a rise in casualties among ordinary civilians:

-- General assassinations are up 37% (376 per month this year vs 274 per month last year).

-- General abductions are up 12% (510 per month this year vs 455 per month last year).

- Terrorist incidents are up 5% for 1st quarter 1971 (827 per month this year vs 791 per month a year ago).

Last year's peak period of terrorist activity came during the 2nd quarter.

- Total incidents jumped 70% above 1st quarter levels.

- The number of people assassinated doubled (802 per month vs 387 per month in the 1st quarter).

- The number of people abducted increased 65% (656 per month vs 586 per month in the 1st quarter).

Five factors lead us to believe that terrorism will again surge in the 2nd quarter of this year and may match last year's levels:

- The strategy pronouncements of the enemy.

- The operations of RVNAF regular forces away from populated areas (out-of-country and in the delta's base areas).

- The inability of the enemy to mount or sustain offensive military operations near the populated areas of South Vietnam.

^{1/} September/October 1970 SEA Analysis Report.

^{2/} Includes all military, paramilitary and civilian casualties from terrorism.

- The enemy's continuing need to recruit among the populace to replace his losses.

- His current tactic of responding to military pressure by attacking civilians, hoping to draw ARVN forces back to protect the populace.

Table 1 shows the terrorism figures for SVN for the last 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ years.

TABLE 1					
TERRORISM IN SVN					
(Monthly Averages)					
	1968	1969	1970	1Qtr 1970	1Qtr 1971
<u>Incidents</u>					
With Casualties	507	472	532	428	463
Other	527	405	440	363	364
Total	1034	877	972	791	827
<u>Casualties</u>					
Assassination	542	507	495	387	475
Abduction	833	508	573	586	567
Woundings	1358	1254	1048	814	863
Total	2783	2270	2116	1787	1905

Source: MACV TIRS.

The most notable change in terrorism this year, compared to last, is the increase in the level of terrorism in MR 1, together with a decline in MR 2.

Terrorist incidents in MR 1 during 1st quarter 1971 averaged 231 per month--about 3% higher than the MR 2 level in the same period and about equal to the highest quarterly rate for MR 1 last year (229 incidents per month during the 2nd quarter).

Incidents in MR 2 during 1st quarter 1971 were lower (224 per month) than at any time in all of 1970.

Last year we noted that Binh Dinh and Phu Yen were the two hotbeds for terrorist activity. First quarter results show that:

- Binh Dinh is still experiencing problems. There were 245 incidents in the province during the 1st quarter, compared to 136 in the 1st quarter a year ago, and 276 during 2nd quarter 1970 when terrorists activity peaked in the province.

- Phu Yen has been replaced as a problem area by Quang Nam (MR 1). The 126 incidents in Phu Yen during 1st quarter 1971 was a lower total than in any quarter during 1970.

- Quang Nam has had 238 incidents in 1st quarter 1971, an increase of 84% over the 129 incidents it experienced during 1st quarter 1970, and 17% above the highest level reached last year (204 in the 2nd quarter).

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Aug-Oct '71

TERRORISM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The level of communist terrorism in SVN has dropped during 1971. Compared to January-August 1970,

- casualties fell 23%
- incidents declined 30%

On the basis of current data and past patterns of activity, we expect:

- about 9,500 incidents in 1971 (compared to over 11,500 in 1970)
- about 20,000 casualties (compared to over 25,000 in 1970)

This means that roughly one in a thousand (0.1%) of SVN's 18,000,000 people will be victims of terrorists in 1971.

In an attempt to place the data in perspective, we compared them to Bureau of the Census statistics on US crime rates. We found:

- The VC are assassinating people in Vietnam at a rate which is about 50% higher than the murder rates of the three worst US cities (28 per 100,000, compared to rates of 18.6 in Charlotte, N.C., and 18.1 for Columbia, S.C., and Shreveport, La.).

- Woundings occur at a rate of 50 per 100,000, about $\frac{1}{3}$ the aggravated assault rate in the US (152 per 100,000).

- Terrorist incidents not involving casualties (extortion, taxation, etc.) occur at a rate of 24 per 100,000, about 84% below the robbery rate in the US (147 per 100,000).

In an attempt to see if terrorism was being pushed out of the populated areas of Vietnam, we measured the proportion of the population living within one kilometer of a terrorist incident during the last three years. Comparing the 2nd quarters of 1969, 1970, and 1971 (the annual peak) we found:

- Fewer people were affected this year (28.5%) than in 1969 (32.6%), or 1970 (36.1%).

- This was true in all regions except MR I.

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Aug-Oct 71

The Military Regions

MR 1. Terrorism is intensifying, particularly in Quang Nam, Quang Ngai and Thua Thien, and terrorism in populated areas remains high. During the 2nd quarter of this year about 45% of the population lived within one kilometer of a terrorist incident, compared to 42% in the 2nd quarters of 1969 and 1970.

MR 2. Terrorism declined this year. Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces, the cauldron last year, have seen a substantial easing, as has Binh Thuan. VC terrorists are still affecting a significant part of the population - about 45% in the 2nd quarter - in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen (but not nearly as much as 2nd quarter of last year, when 60% of the people in Binh Dinh and 75% of the populace in Phu Yen lived near terrorism).

MR 3 continues to have the lowest terrorism rates in the country, probably reflecting the large GVN presence in and around the capital. In Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia, the proportion of people living near a terrorist incident increased.

MR 4 has the most dramatic decline in terrorism this year. It is probably a direct benefit of GVN pressure on the enemy.

-- Incidents and casualties are down sharply, and

-- The fraction of the population living close to terrorist incidents is the lowest in the country (17% compared to the countrywide average of 28% during 2nd quarter 1971).

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May 1967

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ROLE OF THE SOUTHERN VIETMINH CADRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

RAMD recently published* a study of the Vietminh cadres who remained in the South after the ceasefire of 1954. Based on interviews with 17 prisoners and 6 defectors, the study describes the treatment of these "stay-behinds" by the Diem government, their relationship to the "second resistance", and the implications for our ability to negotiate a peace settlement with Hanoi.

Some of the Vietminh cadres who remained in the South after 1954 actively responded to the discipline and control of the Vietminh leaders in Hanoi. These "actives" organized and propagandized but did not terrorize. However, many other former Vietminh broke their connections with the Vietminh organization. Their sentiments ranged from loyalty to the Vietminh to hostility.

To check the potential threat from former Vietminh, Diem began to identify and control Communist elements in 1955. The former Vietminh saw this program as a campaign of terror, particularly as enforced in the rural areas. Many former Vietminh and their families, whether active or inactive, were harassed and persecuted by local enforcement agents. While the campaign damaged the Communist apparatus and its excesses may not have been intended by the central authorities (they were not evident in Saigon), the Diem regime lost the trust of many potential supporters among the former Vietminh. The surviving active cadres among the "stay-behinds", later reinforced by Vietminh returning from North Vietnam, were able to recruit those previously inactive in a new revolutionary and intelligence network. Their experience in the war against the French enabled them to make, to maintain and expand base areas for training, later serving as military jumping off points.

The experience of the "stay-behinds" from 1954-60 will probably affect both VC and NVN views on a settlement of the war. They are likely to be cynical about future promises of amnesty. Hanoi also may fear that the VC might disobey Hanoi's instructions because of the Diem experience. Thus, Hanoi may see a peace treaty as a threat to its control over the Viet Cong movement in the South.

* RM-5163-ISA/ARPA, March 1967: "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1960: The role of the South Vietminh Cadres."

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VC CADRES IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE, SVN

A Rand study* indicates that threatened or disgruntled VC cadre frequently reassess their personal position. At such times they are particularly vulnerable to the argument that the VC is losing popular support, and to the enticement of Chieu Hoi program.

Interviews were held in late 1965-early 1966 with 131 former VC and persons living in VC areas of Dinh Tuong Province in IV CTZ. The study explores the institutional framework within which the VC operate, and the developments in cadre recruitment, organization, and attitudes, with special attention to friction and vulnerabilities.

Despite difficulties, hardships, defections and desertions, the VC cadres were largely blind to evidence of declining strength and prospects. They were isolated from their previous environment outside the National Liberation Front, and they believed that the VC will win because "the people" are supporting them. The interviews suggest, however, that disgruntled or threatened cadres often reassess their personal positions and can be shaken in their beliefs of popular support. The loss of support is a particularly lucrative argument to use against VC cadre because their intensive indoctrination has dwelt so strongly on its importance as the key to ultimate victory.

Another vulnerability is the awareness of the Chieu Hoi program, whose credibility is enhanced for all VC cadres by the strenuous VC efforts to counter it. Additional areas appear to include relations between military and civilian cadres; tensions among cadres of different origin, status, and function; and problems created by harsh or incompetent leadership, corruption and favoritism, and cliques.

* RM- 5114-ISA/ARPA, March 1967. "A Look at the VC Cadres: Dinh Tuong Province, 1965 -1966 (U)."

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Sep 67

VIET CONG OPERATIONS IN THE VILLAGES

A recent RAND study* concludes that Viet Cong power derives from its superb organization in the countryside. Ideological and material appeals are important but secondary. To counteract the VC we must disrupt this organization, develop counterpart organizations, and use family ties to develop support for the GVN.

The study was based on about 200 interviews with VC personnel who defected or were captured during 1964-1966. Their statements were checked against captured documents. The study states that: "popular support for the Viet Cong has decreased substantially during the past two to three years. This change in sympathies seems to be based in part on acquaintance with what life is really like under Viet Cong rule and in part on the fact that fewer rural people now expect the insurgents to win the war." However, the VC organization is not disintegrating.

The VC begin forming their organization in the village by collecting intelligence, applying selective terrorism toward GVN officials and GVN sympathizers, and recruiting supporters. They appeal to: (1) fear of the ARVN draft, (2) nationalism and patriotism, (3) desire for honor and position, (4) desire for land, education and a better life, (5) desire for adventure, (6) hatred for the Saigon government and the Americans, (7) attraction of socialism and equality, (8) escape from personal problems, and (9) desire to be on the winning side. Force is used when persuasion fails.

Once in control (gained with or without the aid of organized military forces) the VC consolidate their position by further use of selective terrorism, removal of the remaining members of the former elite and intensive indoctrination. Even villages sympathetic to the GVN can be overrun in this manner.

Assumption of control is all the easier because most country districts of South Vietnam have few strong community organizations. By itself the family is no match for the insurgent organization. Where community organizations do exist, as among the Catholics and the Hoa Hao, the Viet Cong have more difficulty.

The VC administer the villages by means of a network of committees and associations with the cell as the smallest organization unit. Villagers are incorporated into groups according to activity: farmers, women, youth groups, etc. Party members occupy key positions and are formed into the village party committee and the smaller, more elite party chapter committee. The National Liberation Front, though present, is vague and ill-defined.

Everyone in a VC village is used to support the VC -- the young men join the guerrillas or the army. Older people move supplies, build fortifications and sabotage roads. Women's groups write letters to soldiers. And everyone manufactures crude weapons or booby traps. Heavy taxes are levied, hitting the poor hardest. Land reform brings some benefits but has had its difficulties.

* W.P. Davison, Some Observations on Viet Cong Operations in the Villages
RM 5267-ISA/ARPA, July 1967.

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The VC try to prevent communication from the GVN areas and wide knowledge of what is happening in VC areas. Travel is limited, security agents planted, and propaganda maintained. "One reason that villagers have often been poor sources of intelligence is that the efficient Viet Cong security controls have kept them from knowing very much." But some GVN information does reach VC villages via Radio Saigon, leaflets, loudspeakers from airplanes, rumor, occasional newspapers smuggled in, etc. To enforce control measures the VC use admonition, public humiliation, terror and death, and re-education. Peasant reactions include passivity (hear no evil, speak no evil, see no evil and grow only enough rice for one's family), mass non-compliance (a rare reaction since the VC remove leadership and reduce intravillage communication to a minimum), and, most often, flight to GVN controlled territory.

Recommendations From The Study

Since the strength of the VC lies in its organization, pacification activities should concentrate on disrupting organizations and substituting village administrations which are loyal to the GVN. The GVN should promote communication among villagers in VC areas and tell them as much about the local apparatus as possible.

GVN security and harsh treatment plays into the hands of the VC. Fear of harsh treatment has forced many villagers to join the VC and kept others from rejoining the government side. Viet Cong agents have enlisted villagers simply by tearing up their identity cards, thus making them illegal persons in the eyes of the GVN. Moreover, GVN reprisals against villagers who aid the VC do not seem to lessen support for the VC. Instead, reprisals often force a villager to stay with the VC. To reverse this, the GVN might take the position that all who aid the VC do so unwillingly and thus benefit by fear of VC reprisals.

Villagers understand the need for military operations but they can readily distinguish between justified and unjustified use of force.

Since the VC have been quite successful in enlisting the cooperation of rural women, GVN should give more attention to their aspirations.

If one family member becomes a VC or supports the VC it is likely that the whole family will follow suit. By incorporating large numbers of children into a quality, government-sponsored education system, Saigon might turn this same family to its own advantage.

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THE WAR IN THE DELTA: VIEWS FROM THREE VIET CONG BATTALIONS*

A recent RAND study reports the views of 39 former members (including 35 defectors) of three VC regular force battalions (261st, 263rd and 514th) on recruitment, training, morale, VC control and surveillance measures, and desertion during 1965 and 1966.

VC units operating in the upper Delta began to have recruiting problems in 1964. Until then, the interviewees agreed, the VC could readily get volunteers. After that, more conscription on the spot was required to overcome knowledge of potential prolonged hardship and death. Since 1965, the VC have drafted youths into the guerrillas for later transfer into provincial or regional battalions recognizing that young men preferred to serve in guerrilla units near home.

The use of conscription and shortened training courses allowed the three VC battalions to keep their strength at peak levels during 1965-66 and to maintain their combat effectiveness. To maintain their trained strength, the units reduced their activity. At the same time their missions were changed. Delta units were told that the prolonged struggle required them to: (1) neutralize rather than annihilate the enemy; and (2) meet the increased manpower and supply demands of regional force battalions operating in II and III Corps.

The pervasive and highly effective control system in the three VC battalions seems to explain their durability in face of mounting problems during 1966. The VC control system is designed to break the ties of the individual with his old friends and relations, and to substitute loyalties to the VC. The control system starts with initial training at sites far from home. Friends and fellow villagers are separated; each person is surrounded by strangers and cadre.

The procedures continue in each battalion. The battalion operates as a coordinated unit only during battle (Battalion 514 consisted of 126 cells). Squads are almost autonomous units, sometimes marching and camping alone, and burying their dead in secrecy away from other squads. Visits between squads are sharply restricted, as are visits to villages; in practice, no soldier got home more than once a year. Moreover, outward expression of dissatisfaction is repressed by surrounding the individual with superiors (Battalion 514 had 1 cadre per 2.6 soldiers).

The purpose of the control and surveillance system is not limited simply to shifting loyalties and maintaining secrecy. The system also reinforces the themes that escape is unwise and dangerous, and that final victory belongs to

* Melvin Gurtov, The War in the Delta: Views from Three Viet Cong Battalions, RAND, RM-5353-ISA/ARPA, September 1967

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the Front. It instills fear of punishment for attempted desertion, and degrades GVN promises of fair treatment in the Chieu Hoi program.

Cadres and soldiers in the sample used different standards in assessing the morale of their units. Cadres judged morale in terms of whether political education was effective in making the troops ready to risk death. The soldiers assessed morale in terms of daily hardships and endurance. Low morale in the three battalions seemed to arise from feelings of discouragement and weariness rather than from any important failings of the control system. On the contrary, the control system and the lack of clear and safe alternatives to continued service seem to have prevented demoralization and to have maintained the cohesion and efficiency of the battalions.

U.S. - GVN psywar efforts, the PAED study suggests, should aim primarily at breaking down the uncertainty of the VC troops about the GVN treatment of prisoners. The families of VC personnel can be most useful in this regard, for they are in the best position to convince soldiers of the falsity of the VC warnings. (About half of the 35 defectors went home before deciding to turn themselves into the GVN Chieu Hoi program; only three included GVN propaganda among the reasons they gave for having rallied.) Psywar efforts should also exploit anxiety over the prospect of a long war, villagers' grievances, and the VC policy of transferring troops out of the relative safety of the delta.

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VC/NVA MEDICAL MATERIEL AND SUPPLIES

Data on 72 enemy caches shows that the majority of the VC/NVA's medical materiel and supplies are produced in the Republic of Vietnam and western Europe (primarily France and England). United States production is indicated on fewer than 10% of the items captured, but account for about 50% of the dosage of the drugs. Most of these caches were found in the III CTZ area. The captured material probably did not affect significantly his medical needs.

We have reviewed the detailed reports of medical materiel and supply caches captured between September 1967 and February 1968. These reports are summarized by item in Table 1 and by dosage or item of issue in Tables 2 and 3. An item of materiel is a packaged unit; i.e., 200 aspirin tablets, 14 ampules of quinine, or 1 bottle of alcohol. A unit of dosage or item of issue is a single aspirin tablet, a quinine ampule or a bottle of alcohol. Items give a more meaningful estimate of the national origin of the materiel.

A wide variety of drugs have been found: Analgesics (pain killers) such as aspirin and morphine, Anesthetics like novocaine, Antibiotics and Sulfonamides such as penicillin and streptomycin, Antimalarials like quinine, Stimulants like caffeine, Vaccines - primarily serum antitetanic (tetanus vaccine), Vitamins and other miscellaneous drugs (Table 4). In addition to drugs, 18% of the items captured are medical equipment -- hypodermic syringes, forceps, suture needles, thermometers, etc.

Caches are discovered throughout SVN but 58 or 81% of those studied were located in III Corps. The attached map shows the locations of the caches. These caches consisted of 110,668 doses or items of issue or about one dose per main force soldier (Table 2). It is unlikely that the loss of these caches is the cause of reported enemy shortages of medical supplies.

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TABLE 1

ORIGIN OF ENEMY MEDICAL MATERIEL BY ITEM (Percentage)

	<u>Sept 1967</u>	<u>Oct 1967</u>	<u>Nov 1967</u>	<u>Dec 1967</u>	<u>Jan 1968</u>	<u>Feb 1968</u>	<u>Total</u>
RVN	46.0	30.3	32.5	45.3	27.6	17.0	32.6
NVN	6.9	11.5	9.0	3.6	7.9	3.8	8.0
VC	1.7	1.0	2.6	2.9	1.0	0	1.6
US	9.0	9.1	8.5	10.5	14.5	6.1	9.6
Red China	1.4	2.8	3.0	1.1	2.4	1.9	2.3
West Europe	23.9	21.0	15.4	18.9	16.6	18.9	18.8
Communist Europe	2.8	4.8	6.1	1.4	6.6	6.1	4.9
Other	1.0	1.7	1.7	1.8	2.4	.7	1.7
Unknown	<u>7.3</u>	<u>17.8</u>	<u>21.2</u>	<u>14.5</u>	<u>21.0</u>	<u>45.5</u>	<u>20.5</u>
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 2

ORIGIN OF ENEMY MEDICAL MATERIEL BY DOSAGE OR ITEM OF ISSUE


	<u>Nov 1967</u>	<u>Dec 1967</u>	<u>Jan 1968</u>	<u>Feb 1968</u>	<u>Total</u>
RVN	1258	3179	4989	1303	10729
NVN	3545	981	5755	1497	11778
VC	1689	7	82	0	1778
US	1960	2779	32134	19067	55940
Red China	393	11	35	16	455
West Europe	455	1830	9693	4866	16844
Communist Europe	431	55	167	222	875
Other	5	10	15	1	31
Unknown	<u>275</u>	<u>1193</u>	<u>9432</u>	<u>1338</u>	<u>12238</u>
	10011	10045	62302	28310	110668

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LOCATIONS OF VC/NVA
MEDICAL SUPPLY CACHES



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JOINT STAFF COMMENTS ON JUNE ARTICLES

"1. The June 1968 SEA Analysis Report has been reviewed by the Joint Staff. In accordance with the request for suggestions to improve future reports, page i, the following comments are provided.

"2. The articles in the report appear to represent three general types: those presenting data and information; those reporting on analysis with findings, conclusions, and sometimes recommendations; and those which commingle presentation of data and conclusions without the associated analyses. Examples from the June 1968 report are:

"a. Present data and information - 'The War in Vietnam - Post TET,' page 21; 'Aircraft Sorties and Losses,' page 58; and 'Wage and Real Income Changes in SVN,' page 65.

"b. Report on analysis - 'Enemy Initiated Activity Against RF/PF,' page 1; 'A Comparison of Allied and VC/NVA Offensive Manpower in SVN,' page 26; and 'GVN and VC Manpower Pools,' page 33.

"c. Commingle data and conclusions without analyses - 'VC/NVA Medical Material and Supplies,' page 10; 'Interdiction of Enemy Truck Traffic,' page 63.

"3. Articles presenting data and information can be very useful as a source of data for analyses by agencies which do not ordinarily have access to or the personnel to accumulate such data. This type of article should be continued as appropriate.

"4. Articles reporting the results of analyses can provide useful exchange of information, ideas, and methodology related to analysis of the war in Southeast Asia provided the following are included:

"a. Statement of the purpose, hypothesis, or proposition being addressed.

"b. Statement of the assumptions made or required.

"c. Definition of terms and measures.

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"d. Data, rationale, and methodology used.

"e. Identified findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

'These are required in order to establish a basis for any substantive exchange of ideas or comment on a specific article. The article, 'GVN and VC Manpower Pools,' page 33, is an outstanding example with an additional feature in the sensitivity analysis to show the effects of changes in 'estimated' values. Specific comments on another article, 'A Comparison of Allied and VC/NVA Offensive Manpower in SVN,' are set forth below. 'This type of article, if technically accurate and ably written, is the most valuable to decision-makers and analysts and should constitute the majority of the monthly report, however this particular article does not attain this standard.

"5. Articles which commingle data and conclusions without the associated analyses have no place in a report which has the purpose as that stated for the 'Southeast Asia Analysis Report.' Such articles assess the war by innuendo. They also disguise opinion as fact. Specific comment on two such articles are set forth below. These are: 'VC/NVA Medical Material and Supplies,' and 'Interdiction of Enemy Truck Traffic.'

Specific Joint Staff Comments on June Articles

"1. Article - 'A Comparison of Allied and VC/NVA Offensive Manpower in SVN,' page 26.'

Comments

'The purpose of the article is stated, 'This paper questions these assumptions,' i.e. '(a) that US/Free World Forces ground forces are clearly superior to VC/NVA forces, and (b) that the margin of superiority is great enough so that we can win a war of attrition and shift some of the military burden now borne by the U. S. to the RVNAF.'

"a. There is, by inference, a conclusion regarding the first assumption. That is, the assumption is false. This inference is based on the statements: 'Despite a 5.6 to 1 advantage in total military manpower in December 1967, the friendly forces were roughly at parity with enemy forces in rifle-carrying infantrymen on offensive operations.', page 26, and 'This analysis points up clearly that we do not now have a simple manpower advantage which would enable us to achieve a decisive military advantage, page 31.

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"b. The measure used to determine superiority of force appears to be 'rifle carrying infantrymen on offensive operations.' The number of infantrymen, per se, does not indicate the offensive power of ARVN, U.S., and Free World forces. It totally neglects firepower, combat support, and mobility (all of which are acknowledged in passing as US/FWF advantages). Furthermore, the technique used to quantify 'infantrymen on offensive operations' pits only the ARVN, U.S., and FW forces in designated offensive functions against all VC/NVA main force maneuver units.' This results in an inflated strength ratio in favor of the VC/NVA. The implicit assumption required to support this reasoning is that VC/NVA forces are engaged against only those ARVN, U. S., and FW forces on specifically designated offensive operations. This ignores the reality of combat in South Vietnam. In fact, the article, 'Enemy Initiated Activity Against RF/PF,' page 1, indicates that there were 5,210 enemy initiated incidents against RF/PF forces during 1967.

"c. If 'analysis of force dispositions by function' were applied to VC/NVA units, the 'availability' of VC/NVA manpower for offensive operations would be decreased by approximately 93 percent. Empirical evidence indicates that VC/NVA battalions engage in offensive operations about one day in 15. Thus, using the data for platoon strengths on page 28, the VC/NVA available manpower is $(1/15)(63.0) = 4.2$. The FWF strength would similarly be reduced because they were achieving a utilization rate of 7.5 battalion days of operation per battalion during December 1967. The FWF availability would be $(7.5/31)(9.9) = 2.4$. There would be no reduction in U. S. availability because they were employed at a rate of 31 battalion days of operation per battalion in December 1967. The resulting comparison is:

December 1967

	<u>Men in Platoon.</u>		<u>Men in Platoons</u>
US	34.3	NVA	1.8
FWF	2.4	VC	2.4
Total	36.7		4.2

'The ratio of US/FWF to VC/NVA is 8.7 to 1. Applying the same method to both friendly and enemy forces to determine the number of forces 'available to engage in offensive operations' would give face validity to such comparisons. However, these comparisons would still be virtually pointless because they fail to

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consider many other factors of offensive power.

"d. The exclusion of the ARVN to provide comparisons between the VC/NVA and US/FWF presents an interesting comparison even though such comparison is meaningless in terms of analysis of the countrywide war. In essence, this eliminates the IV Corps Tactical Zone from consideration during the period covered in the analysis because US forces were there in limited numbers (18,232). Neither does it account for the fact that order of battle statistics indicate that 35,900 or 17.9 percent of the VC/NVA force was in the IV CTZ opposing, almost exclusively, ARVN forces.

"e. Based on the force ratios:

Total Military Manpower (pg 26)	5.6 to 1
Main Force Maneuver Units (pg 27)	
Battalions	1.7 to 1
Men in Battalions	2.0 to 1
Men in Platoons "available to engage in offensive operations" (recomputed above)	8.7 to 1

It is asserted that US/Free World Forces ground forces are clearly superior to VC/NVA forces. "Superior" meaning greater in quantity or number since quality has in no way been addressed. Manpower committed to offensive operations has not been considered for two reasons. First, the number of VC/NVA "committed" cannot be determined with accuracy and gross estimates would render the resulting force ratio nearly meaningless (despite the fact that estimates as high as 90 percent of the total VC/NVA force would give a ratio favorable to allied forces rather than the narrow superiority for the VC/NVA indicated in the article.) Second, the number of forces committed to offensive operations can be varied for both sides merely by accounting procedures. As noted on page 29, offensive forces are stationed in defensive positions around South Vietnam's cities and, similarly, defensive units participate in or support offensive actions.

"f. The second assumption - relating to war of attrition and shift of some of the military burden to the RVNAP - is not addressed in the article. An oblique conclusion about shifting

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some of the burden to the RVNAF may have been intended by statements in the main conclusions on page 26. These are: 'Because the U. S. contributed most of the friendly offensive battalion and platoon manpower, a decrease in its forces would enable the enemy to gain an advantage in offensive manpower. Without any U. S. forces, the GVN/FWF combat forces on offensive operations might have been outnumbered by 2 to 1 by VC/NVA forces in battalion manpower.' and 'Since the Tet offensive, additional troop deployments and the reallocation of deployed forces have probably increased the Allies' relative offensive strength. However, projected increases in ARVN combat strength will not significantly add to this advantage.' There is no basis in fact for these statements, without extensive qualification, irrespective of the purpose for which they were made. Conjecture about offensive manpower ratios resulting from a change in one of five related variables without regard to the remaining four has no place in questioning assumptions. A forthright way to address a question is: state the hypothesis related to the question, select an appropriate statistical test, select a confidence level, calculate the critical value of the test statistic and the value of the selected statistic from empirical data, and then accept or reject the hypothesis. The report of the analysis and resulting conclusions need not be written in so simple a manner, but the report should at least reflect that a technically adequate analysis has been completed.

"g. Irrespective of the stated purpose of the article, one apparent purpose is to refute any future requirement for additional U. S. troops. This point is made on page 31 based on the fact that '...the ratio of friendly to enemy maneuver battalions had remained relatively constant since mid-1965.' Using this relatively constant ratio as basis for a conclusion that adding more U. S. troops is not the answer to achieving a 'decisive military advantage' (this term is not defined) is not logically consistent with the earlier developed premise that the key factors are men in maneuver battalions, and, more important, offensive rifle platoon manpower. Neither is it consistent with the change in platoon manpower before and after Tet as noted on page 29. 'Following the Tet offensive, the U. S. was able to both add 12 battalions to its force levels, reallocate 4 battalions to offensive activities from its reserves and pacification programs ... and increase the combat strength through the addition of a 4th rifle company to its standard battalion (ARCOV Program). Likewise, ARVN, without increasing its force size, has been able to shift 21 battalions to offensive operations.' This was accompanied by a total military force increase of 43,200 U. S., 96,500 RVNAF, and 600 3rd Nation which resulted in the following changes:

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	<u>Before Tet</u>	<u>After Tet</u>	<u>Percent Change</u>
Allied Battalion Manpower Advantage <u>1/</u>	1.3 to 1	1.6 to 1	+23
Allied Platoon Man- power Advantage <u>1/2/</u>	.7 to 1	1.3 to 1	+86
US Maneuver Battalions Combat Operations <u>1/</u>	81	97	+20
GVN/FWP Maneuver Battalions (Combat Operations) <u>1/</u>	75	96	+28
Military Forces (Thousands) <u>3/</u>	494.3	537.5	+ 9
US	494.3	537.5	+ 9
RVNAF	636.9	743.4	+15
3rd Nation	60.6	61.2	+ 1
Total	1201.8	1342.1	+12

1/ Source: Southeast Asia Analysis Report, June 1968, pg 29.

2/ Enemy advantage of 1.4 to 1 converted to allied advantage of .7 to 1.

3/ Source: Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, OASD(C), Table 2, 1 August 1968. Before Tet - January 1968, After Tet - May 1968.

From these figures it is noted that a 7 percent increase in allied military personnel, achieved by increasing only U. S. personnel and other forces held constant, would result in a twofold increase in the percent change in allied advantage in both battalion and platoon manpower. Assuming that the U. S. increase would be met by a VC/NVA increase to maintain the 1.7 ratio of allied to VC/NVA battalions, there would be approximately a 5 percent increase in the ratio of both battalion and platoon manpower. Neither these force ratio changes nor any facts presented in the article are sufficient basis for decisions regarding increase or decrease of U. S. forces.

"2. Article - 'VC/NVA Medical Materiel and Supplies,' page 10.

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Comments

"a. There is no data or analysis in the article to support the statements 'The captured materiel probably did not affect significantly his medical needs.' and 'It is unlikely that the loss of these caches is the cause of reported enemy shortages of medical supplies.'

"b. Inclusion of such unfounded statements, apparently the opinion of the author, detracts from the overall value of the article and the 'Analysis Report' by raising the question, 'What is the purpose of the article - and the Report?'

"3. Article - 'Interdiction of Enemy Truck Traffic,' page 63.

Comments

"a. The major conclusion of the article is that 'US airstrikes destroy less than 3% of the total truck traffic in North Vietnam and Laos ... Thus, only about 3% of the total truck movement is destroyed by the US interdiction campaign. Apparently 'destruction of truck movement' is the measure used to evaluate the US interdiction campaign. This does not address the military objective of the air campaign which is to make it as difficult and costly as possible for North Vietnam to continue effective support of the Viet Cong and to cause North Vietnam to cease direction of the Viet Cong insurgency. Interdiction of enemy truck traffic is just one part of the air campaign.

"b. There is inconsistency in the logic used to arrive at the percent of truck movements destroyed. The analysis is based on a CIA estimate that we sight only 25 percent of the actual truck traffic while noting that an increase in truck sightings probably results from seeing a higher percentage of the traffic due to more sorties, more overt enemy movement, and use of night observation devices. This leads to the obvious questions as to when the CIA estimate was made, what is the current estimate of percent traffic sighted, and whether the change in observation rate was taken into account to arrive at the conclusion stated.

"c. The impact of truck attrition on the North Vietnamese truck inventory is discounted by stating that the Communist Bloc truck production is so large that it is unlikely the North Vietnamese logistic effort will be constrained by a shortage of trucks and while the number of trucks may have decreased, the decline has been offset by the importation of bigger and better vehicles. If such statements are intended to support a contention that the interdiction of truck traffic has no effect on the North Vietnamese logistic effort, they show a blatant

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disregard of factors essential to the analysis of a logistic system. Essential factors include: quantity of goods delivered, transportation time, resources required to maintain equipment and roads, transshipment and other support required, utilization of vehicles, etc.

"d. The data presented in the report indicates that 10,466 trucks have been destroyed from January 1967 through May 1968. This represents about a 100 percent turnover during that period and a substantial reduction in truck inventory. Despite the fact that some modernization has occurred, there is no data presented to indicate the capacity of the logistic system and whether the capacity has remained constant, decreased, or increased."

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VC/NVA BASE AREAS

Synopsis. Allied forces have made limited gains in inactivating VC/NVA base areas but evidence shows that, once "neutralized," base areas are generally rated active again the next month. Base areas form a supply network of interdependent bases, with staging areas in SVN or on the Cambodian border, logistical resupply areas both in SVN and across the border, and areas for transshipment of personnel and supplies generally out-of-country. Enemy activity is lowest in II Corps and I Corps base areas and is highest in IV Corps and on the Cambodian border. Enemy activity in the Cambodian border base areas reached its highest level in fourth quarter of 1969 (data for the first quarter of 1970 is not yet available).

The CICV Base Area Study shows that since the second quarter of 1968, only 11 out of a total of 58 (19%) base areas have been deleted as inactive. Most (7) of these eleven inactivations came in the IV Corps. Over the same period four new base areas have been established which makes a net gain of seven base area deletions (12% of the original 58).

Analysis of the BASFA file shows that on the average a base area will be reactivated the month following its neutralization. Out of 95 neutralizations, 80 lasted for only one month. Eleven lasted for 12 months or longer, indicating permanent abandonment/neutralization of the base area.

Analysis of the CICV Base Area Study shows that the base areas form a supply network of interdependent bases, rather than independent, fortress-like areas. There are three major functions that can be performed by a base area: (1) transshipment and infiltration, (2) logistical resupply, and (3) staging for political and military operations. While all bases perform each of these functions to a limited extent, areas with the major function of staging tend to be inside SVN (with the exception of some Cambodian base areas), logistical resupply functions (which include training, command and control, storage, and sanctuary) are found both within and outside SVN, and the movement of men and supplies tends to be performed out-of-country. An exception to this pattern occurs in II Corps where there is a band of transshipment base areas running through the center of the CTZ; these areas may serve as transshipment points for the movement of men and supplies toward the coastal staging areas. Figure 1 gives a detailed presentation of the 4th quarter 1969 base areas and the functions performed by them.

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


Figure 1

FUNCTIONS OF VC/NVA BASE AREAS

Source: CICY VC/NVA Base Area Study, 4th Qtr 1969.

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Enemy activity in base areas is measured in several ways - intelligence reports, anti-aircraft fire incidents, unit sightings, number of installations. Of these, intelligence reports are probably the best indicator of enemy activity.^{1/} Table 1 presents the levels of enemy activity (as measured by confirmed intelligence reports) in VC/NVA base areas during the 4th quarter of 1969.

It shows that bases in II Corps were the least active and that all bases in I Corps except BA 112 were nearly as inactive. Bases in III Corps and in Laos exhibited moderate activity. But, activity was by and large centered in IV Corps and Cambodia (including base areas on the Cambodian border in III Corps, i.e. 350, 351, 353, 354). Together these two areas accounted for 77% of the 4584 confirmed intelligence reports. BA 353, which is home of the in-country portion of COSVN, and BA 708 (these together with BA 352 are known as the Fishhook) accounted for one third, (34%) of the confirmed intelligence reports in the 4th quarter of 1969.

^{1/} Intelligence reports include prisoner interrogations, captured documents, aerial reconnaissance photos, ground observations, etc. Intelligence reports can be either "confirmed" or "unconfirmed," a confirmed report consists of two or more mutually reinforcing intelligence reports, i.e. two or more reports indicating activity at the same place and time. Whenever possible data on confirmed intelligence reports only is given in this paper; however because of the system of reporting, data in Table 2 are the total of both confirmed and unconfirmed reports.

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TABLE 1

ENEMY ACTIVITY IN VC/NVA BASE AREAS ^{a/}
(Confirmed Intelligence Reports, 4th Qtr 1969)

		<u>Base Area</u>	<u>No. of Reports</u>		<u>Base Area</u>	<u>No. of Reports</u>
<u>Low Activity</u>	<u>I CTZ</u>	112	133	<u>II CTZ</u>	226	41
		128	60		236	27
		126	30		202	15
		127	23		229	2
		124	21		238	2
		117	15		203	0
		121	0		228	0
					237	0
					251	0
<u>Moderate Activity</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	353	547	<u>Laos</u>	611	456
		302	68		612	28
		303	33		609	25
		354	29		607	17
		359	22		604	16
		372	12		614	13
		351	11		613	20
		350	9			
		356	9			
		355	1			
<u>High Activity</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	470	365	<u>Cambodia</u>	708	1027
		483	320		704	265
		400	289		709	169
		490	152		706	149
		487	3		740	108
		482	0		702	50
					701	24

^{a/} Source: CIGV Base Area Study, 4th Qtr 1969.

Table 2 gives a time series of enemy activity in the Cambodian border base areas. It shows that enemy activity (as measured by confirmed and unconfirmed intelligence reports) was higher in the 4th quarter of 1969 (data for 1st quarter 1970 are not yet available) than in any previous quarter for which data are available. Activity was more than double that for the third quarter and was 26% higher than the 4th quarter of 1968. Most of this increase was due to base areas 352 and 708^{b/} which were nearly three times as active as they had ever been (they accounted for over 36%

^{b/} During 4th quarter 1969 the area normally covered by BA 352 was included in BA 708-- the term "Fishhook" includes BA 352, 353 and 708.

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of the Cambodian-border area intelligence reports). BA 740 and BA's 704/709 also showed marked increases. The base areas comprising the Parrot's Beak (BA's 354/706/367) hit their lowest point in activity since the 4th quarter of 1968.

TABLE 2
ENEMY ACTIVITY IN CAMBODIAN BORDER BASE AREAS
(Confirmed and Unconfirmed Intelligence Reports) a/

	1968		1969			
	2nd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr
702/701	30	458	365	18	23	178
740	348	197	88	98	99	282
351/350	82	168	61	12	44	55
352/708	160	429	544	351	422	1580
353	292	1252	1040	455	652	850
354/706/367	235 b/	627	1259	997	652	641
709/704	49	276	623	625	302	717
Total	1196	3407	3980	2556	2194	4303

a/ CICV VC/NVA Base Area Study; 2nd Qtr 1968, 4th Qtr 1968; 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Qtrs 1969.

b/ Figure is low due to lack of reporting on BA 354.

However, the reliability of intelligence reports as indicators of enemy activity is not high; while BA's 351/350 had the lowest activity of the Cambodian border areas in 4th quarter, BA 351 yielded some of the largest ammunition caches found in the Cambodian operations. A future article will deal in greater detail with the results of the Cambodian operations.

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