

AD-A039 632

ARMY INST FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUD--ETC
DOSAAF AND PRE-INDUCTION TRAINING: TRENDS AND PROBLEMS.(U)
JAN 76 J F CLARE

F/G 5/9

UNCLASSIFIED


NL

1 of 1
ADA039 632



END

DATE
FILMED
6-77



AD A 039632

AD No. _____
DDC FILE COPY.

US ARMY INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN
AND
EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES



STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT

CPT Joseph F. Clare Jr.
DOSAAF AND PRE-INDUCTION TRAINING
TRENDS AND PROBLEMS

GARMISCH, GERMANY

APO NEW YORK 09053

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited



6

DOSAAF AND PRE-INDUCTION TRAINING:
TRENDS AND PROBLEMS.

7

Student research rept. Jun 74-Dec 75,

10

Captain Joseph F. Clare, Jr.

11

Jan ~~1975~~ 1976

12 41p.

ACCESSION BY

HTIS

White Section



DOC

Buff Section



UNANNOUNCED



JUSTIFICATION.....

BY.....

DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY CODES

DOC

AVAIL. CODE/SPECIAL

A

41

410 192

not

FOREWORD

This research project represents fulfillment of a student requirement for successful completion of the overseas phase of training of the Department of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (Russian).

Only unclassified sources are used in producing the research paper. The opinions, value judgments and conclusions expressed are those of the author and in no way reflect official policy of the United States Government; Department of Defense; Department of the Army; Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence; or the United States Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies.

Interested readers are invited to send their comments to the Commander of the Institute.


RICHARD P. KELLY
LTC, MI
Commander

SUMMARY

In this paper, [↓]the author examines several aspects of the Soviet pre-induction training program and the DOSAAF role in the conduct of that program during the period June 1974-December 1975. The author focuses on trends and problems which have become apparent during the stated time period. The author concludes that the Soviets still have considerable inadequacies in the program and that Soviet officials are attempting to correct these deficiencies in a variety of ways. [↑]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword	ii
Summary	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Introduction	1
Organization and Supervision	3
Military Instructors	7
Program Content	10
Emphasis on Physical Fitness	16
Building the Material-Technical Base	18
Prospects and Problems	21
Conclusion	24
Footnotes	27
Bibliography	32

INTRODUCTION

The primary concern of this paper is the recent (i.e. June 1974 - December 1975) Soviet experience with regard to their pre-induction or "introductory" military training program. Of necessity, this involves as well an appreciation of the role of the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and Navy (DOSAAF by its Russian acronym) in this training program. Specifically, this paper will focus on trends and problems connected with the pre-induction training program during the stated time period. Before beginning this "current" survey, however, some brief background concerning DOSAAF and the pre-induction training program is essential.¹

Having developed out of a series of predecessor organizations with similar aims, DOSAAF attained its current form in 1951. This agency is subordinate to the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, and has the following general areas of interest:

- (1) military-patriotic training
- (2) training of specialists (such as mechanics, drivers and so forth) for the Armed Forces, as well as for employment in the civilian sector of the economy
- (3) the pre-induction training program
- (4) physical fitness (especially with regard to the military-technical types of sports)
- (5) civil defense

It should be noted that, although the "pre-induction training program" is listed as a separate entity, it actually combines elements of all of the above-mentioned "areas of interest"-- a fact which will become clear in the course of the paper.

The size of the organization is impressive: by late 1975, the society numbered 71 million members. At the same time, DOSAAF counted more than 316,000 primary (local) organizations.² One of the results of all this is that currently every third inductee into the Soviet Armed Forces has a DOSAAF-acquired military-technical specialty.³

In contrast to specific training in a military-technical specialty, the 1967 Soviet Law of Universal Military Service established the pre-induction training program (or "introductory military training" to use Soviet terminology) in order to give pre-draft-age youth a general background in military education. The goal of the program is to permit a more rapid utilization of draftees when they are called to active duty--i.e. since they will (presumably) already have a basic level of military knowledge and skills.⁴ The training program, as finally formulated and approved in 1968, consists of 140 hours of instruction, to be given in the ninth and tenth grades of high schools and technical schools (that is 70 hours each year, two class periods per week). Young men not attending school receive basically the same pre-induction training at "training points", which are established at factories, enterprises, sovkhoses, and other institutions.⁵

With this extremely brief introduction, it is now possible to discuss some of the current trends and problems in the following areas:

- (1) organization and supervision
- (2) the military instructor
- (3) program content
- (4) emphasis on physical fitness
- (5) building the material-technical base

ORGANIZATION AND SUPERVISION

In reality, the questions of organization and of military instructors are closely related, because they both involve the problem of supervision. Two governmental agencies are primarily concerned with the pre-induction training program: the Directorate of Military Training for Civilians in the Ministry of Defense, and the Department of Introductory Military Training in the Ministry of Education. Nevertheless, a whole series of additional organizations and various levels of government, including the (local) military commissariats and even tactical military units, are involved with the program.⁶ This "multiple responsibility" was stressed at a June 1975 All-Union Conference in Moscow concerning the problems of military-patriotic and pre-induction training. The conference stressed that effective training demands the centrally directed and united efforts of organs of the national economy, the Communist Party, Komsomol, Trade Unions and DOSAAF.⁷

DOSA AF, in particular, bears a large share of the organizational responsibility for the program conducted at the "training points." Tasks include the selecting and training of instructors, planning the training program, improving the material-technical training base, and assisting personnel involved in the program (particularly as regards instructional methodology).⁸ These tasks are often accomplished through periodic or special seminars or training meetings ("refresher courses") at city, raion and oblast levels (i.e. organized by DOSAAF organizations at these levels). The current emphasis in all of these activities continues to be toward improving the training and methodological preparation of instructors and other cadre associated with the pre-induction training program.⁹ Recently noted was a concentrated effort to have the raion-level (district) DOSAAF committees take more responsibility for qualitative improvement of the military-related aspects of the physical fitness program, the goal of which is to have each pre-inductee pass the norms of the "Ready for Labor and Defense" award.¹⁰

As with all other "centrally directed" activities in the Soviet Union, the organization of the pre-induction training program naturally involves the planning process. The basic document for the program is the yearly "Situation and Program for Pre-Induction Training," which gives the aims, tasks and contents of the program (i.e. training goals for various subjects, themes, number of hours, etc.). On the basis of

this document, each school or "training point" develops:

(1) a yearly "Thematic Plan for the Conduct of Pre-Induction Training", (2) a "Quarterly Training Program", and (3) a plan-conspect for each lesson.¹¹ In addition to all of this, it is important to realize that in the planning and organization of the training, the overall program is more and more coming to be seen not just as the 140 hours of class time for ninth and tenth graders, but as including a whole complex of military-related extra-curricular activities organized by the military instructor and the DOSAAF clubs in each school (and enterprise). In schools, these activities are designed to include children from the sixth to eighth grades, as well as the older students.¹²

There has apparently been a recent tendency in some schools to organize "double-length" military classes--i.e. to schedule these lessons only once per week, but still fulfill the two hour per week training requirement. However, this is being discouraged by central authorities as not being effective from a pedagogical and psychological point of view--i.e. it supposedly leads to overwork and ineffective learning.¹³ Another tendency in the recent past has been to combine the "training points" of several enterprises. This has been possible because of progress toward universal secondary education, which means that most young people receive their basic military training in school. On the one hand, this makes it less important for each enterprise to have its own "training point", while at the same time

permitting more concentrated efforts to improve the program at selected locations.¹⁴

As indicated above, the primary problem in this area (as with the question of military instructors) involves the supervision of the program throughout the many levels of "multiple responsibility". For example, at the lowest level, leaders of schools, factories and other enterprises often forget about their responsibilities in regard to the pre-induction training program, and local DOSAAF committees do not manifest an active role in the training program.¹⁵ Specifically with regard to DOSAAF, experience in 1975 in Uzbekistan indicated that DOSAAF leaders rarely visited schools/"training points", and did little to help improve the quality of instruction. Partly as a result of this, in Samarkand oblast the training program was shortened at a whole series of places; in Bukhara oblast the program was for all practical purposes curtailed.¹⁶

At another level, the military commissariats reportedly fail to insure that required training aids are provided, and fail to effectively monitor the overall quality of the program.¹⁷ Additional supervisory bottlenecks were noted in a lack of control at oblast level, where it was charged that there were not enough assigned specialists to effectively supervise the program. As a result, the program came under the control of people not knowledgeable in military affairs. Also guilty of neglect were State Committees for Professional-Technical Education at Union Republic level, which reportedly

are aware of many of the shortcomings at lower levels, but do not take action to correct these deficiencies.¹⁸

MILITARY INSTRUCTORS

As mentioned previously, closely related to the above organizational questions are the problems of selection, training and supervision of the military instructors. Moreover, the question of instructor qualification (i.e. both technical and methodological competency) is perhaps the most serious current problem of the entire pre-induction training program.

By way of introduction, we can say that the military instructors (including under this term the "military director" of schools, the "military chief" of the "training points", ~~as well as the "military instructor"~~) are the individuals directly responsible for the organization and conduct of the pre-induction training program. As a rule, they are officers or sergeants of the Reserve or in retirement; they are paid for their teaching activity in the program; they have the right to wear the military uniform; and about 90 percent have a secondary or higher-technical education.¹⁹ Although the large majority of military instructors have served in the Armed Forces, and thus possess a degree of technical knowledge, in many cases this is apparently old, out-of-date information.

Perhaps the more serious problem is that most of these people do not have any formal methodological preparation--

i.e. they are not by profession teachers. Because of this, lessons are often poorly organized and conducted and do not give students the required knowledge.²⁰ For example, during a period of instruction explaining the use of the gas mask, the instructor did not issue masks to the students, although masks were available for everyone.²¹ In another case, students received weapons firing instruction before receiving familiarization training with the weapons.²²

Although many, if not the majority of military instructors recognize their own shortcomings and need for self-improvement, some apparently are not particularly conscientious about their responsibilities. Some reportedly forget the necessity to present a good personal example, while others do not make any effort to improve their technical competency and teaching skills--for example, refusing to read military periodicals and newspapers.²³ On the other hand, in order to improve their competency, many instructors go through three to five day training programs each year with military units prior to the start of the academic year.²⁴

This whole question of instructor qualification is receiving the most serious attention at all supervisory levels. And while it is planned that within the next three to four years, all military instructors will attend a formal course of instruction at a pedagogical institute in order to improve their teaching qualifications, the basic method for accomplishing this goal at the present time is "self-help". To

this end, the Ministry of Education has developed a "home study" course, which instructors are encouraged to utilize.²⁵

One of the most difficult tasks of the military instructor, and one which to some degree reflects the lack of pedagogical expertise, concerns the problem of grading. On the one hand, grades are considered an important "teaching vehicle" and a means of increasing the participation of students in military courses; on the other hand, grades apparently reflect to higher authorities the performance of the military instructor himself. Two specific problems are of current concern. First, some instructors overstress the importance of grades, and waste too much time in testing students.²⁶ Second and more serious, grade inflation is apparently a widespread abuse through which instructors attempt to show that requirements have been fulfilled, when in fact they have not.

The instructor finds himself in a difficult situation. For while it is decried that in the Kara-Kalpak A.S.S.R. (Uzbekistan) and the Karelian A.S.S.R. (Russian Republic) 20 to 40 percent of students receive an "unsatisfactory" grade in military subjects, and in a school in the Georgian S.S.R. one-third of the students receive a "2" on drill and weapons firing, nevertheless it is also reported that only one-half of the students who receive "4" and "5" deserve these grades.²⁷ Concern is voiced that too many non-deserving students receive grades of "4" and "5". In one Moscow school, for example, an instructor gave only "4" and "5" grades,

however, a check by higher authorities revealed that in fact 20 percent of the students were "unsatisfactory", and that only 23 percent of the students actually merited the "4" and "5" ratings.²⁸ The military press confirms that, regardless of the grades given in the classrooms, many inductees still do not have the basic knowledge which the pre-induction training program is designed to provide.²⁹ This is, of course, the ultimate indication of the deficiencies of the military instructor.

PROGRAM CONTENT

Turning to the actual content of the current training program, instruction is presented in the following general subject areas: the character and peculiarities of the Soviet Armed Forces; the regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces; tactics; weapons familiarization and firing; drill; and military topography.³⁰ Additionally, according to the 1967 Law, civil defense training is a required part of the pre-induction training program, although at least part of this civil defense education may be conducted outside of the 140 hour program.³¹ Included in the 140 hour program is a 35 hour block of instruction on military-technical specialities, the purpose of which is to acquaint the students with the basics of these various specialties.³² As noted above, physical fitness is also an important component in the training process, although outside of the 140 hour program. Finally, at the end of the ninth grade academic

year, students complete a five-day field exercise, which gives them the opportunity to strengthen their theoretical knowledge with practical experience. During this thirty-hour exercise, emphasis is placed on tactics, weapons firing, familiarization with the technical equipment of military units, orientation in place, camouflage, communication, and defense against weapons of mass destruction.³³ Distinct from the pre-induction training program, but of continuing importance, are a series of military-sports games, the most important of which are "Zarnitsa" ('Summer Lightning') and "Orlenok" ('Eaglet').

Military-patriotic training is an integral element in all phases of the training program. Great emphasis in the 1974-1975 training year was placed on celebrating the 30th Anniversary of the defeat of Germany, while in 1975-1976 emphasis is being placed on the upcoming XXVth Party Congress. The basic content of this training concerns the "leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the life of our state; the glory of the revolutionary, military and economic traditions of the Soviet people, and the heroic feats of the valiant Armed Forces."³⁴ Techniques for accomplishing this part of the training (which again, it should be stressed, is an all-pervasive element in the training program in general) include classroom presentations and speeches, meetings with military veterans, lessons on courage (the so-called "urok muzhestva"), visits to historical places/museums, and so forth.³⁵

Concerning military and civil defense training, a typical training year might be broken down into different "stages", during which various subjects are presented. For example, one military instructor in Tadzhikistan constructed the following schedule: Stage One - weapons familiarization; Stage Two - weapons firing on a 25 meter range; Stage Three - civil defense training; Stage Four - drill, parade and garrison life of the soldier; Stage Five - marksmanship, communications, reconnaissance, field sanitation, and operations of tactical units.³⁶

Specifically with regard to civil defense training (which Soviet authorities consider extremely important), students learn about:

- the tasks and organization of the civil defense system
- characteristics of zones of contamination
- methods of defense against weapons of mass destruction
- instruments of radiological and chemical monitoring
- actions of monitoring teams
- emergency work in areas of contamination

This technical side of civil defense training is closely tied to moral-political and psychological preparation of the students--the emphasis being that, no matter how awesome the weapon, there is always a means of defense.³⁷ Specific current course titles include: "Characteristics of Areas of Nuclear Contamination"; "Instruments of Radiological Reconnaissance"; "Reconnaissance of Areas of Contamination";

and "Decontamination and Urgent Repair Work in Areas of Contamination".³⁸

In the current training cycle (i.e. 1975-1976), the time within the 140-hour program devoted to civil defense training has been condensed, and an increased emphasis has been placed on tactical exercises as opposed to classroom courses. (This, by the way, reflects the current emphasis in civil defense training in the country at large.) This reduction of allocated times does not seem to reflect a de-emphasis on civil defense training, although it makes the problems associated with this training significantly more complicated. The "new" approach to civil defense training involves, among other things, a tailoring of courses to fit the specific specialities of those studying. Examples of such new, highly specialized courses include: "Priority Re-Establishment of Work in Electric Power Stations"; and "Adaptation of Mines for the Defense of the Population".³⁹ This in turn demands updating the knowledge of instructors, as well as providing revised teaching materials. In connection with this, film segments and filmstrips are being produced, and the textbook Civil Defense is in the process of being revised.⁴⁰

The current (1975-1976) program related to general military and tactical subjects is also the result of recent revision, and to some extent is the beneficiary of the reduced time allotted to civil defense topics. As with

civil defense, however, a prime aim in the new program is to devote much greater attention to practical application of military knowledge.

In one area, the block of instruction related to "The Soviet Armed Forces on Guard of the Country" has been both qualitatively improved and significantly increased in allotted time. Some specific courses under this heading include: "Types of Soviet Armed Forces, Branches of Service and Their Missions"; "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Tasks of the Armed Forces in the Period of the Construction of Communism"; and an entirely new course, "Soviet Law Concerning Service in the Armed Forces."⁴¹ What the increased emphasis in this particular area may indicate is a general dissatisfaction with the level of military-patriotic indoctrination which has been achieved to date, and perhaps a corresponding reluctance of young people to willingly enter (or stay in) the military service.

In general military subjects, the amount of time devoted to practical instruction in the responsibilities of guard duty has been significantly increased. A new course, "Internal Order in the Camp" was added to the program of instruction in conjunction with this. Additionally, increased time was allocated for weapons familiarization, to include the AK (assault rifle) and RPK (light machine gun). At least 50 percent of the training time devoted to these subjects is to be spent in familiarization by assembling/disassembling the weapons. Also related to this, the

study of older models of personal weapons was dropped from the schedule.⁴²

Tactical subjects have also undergone significant change in the current program, with new emphasis being placed on the structure and operations of motorized rifle elements. One course ("Two Sided Maneuver in the Locality") was eliminated and replaced by several new courses: "Squad in the Offensive"; "Squad in Defense"; "Reconnaissance"; "March and Movement Security"; and "Activities of Personnel Near Vehicles and On Vehicles" (i.e. dismounted and mounted). Stress was also to be placed on : quick and systematic orientation in place; communication; overcoming radiation hazards; firing the assault rifle and light machine gun; firing the RPG (anti-tank weapon); and the use of hand grenades. Additional changes were to be incorporated into the instruction on military topography and military-technical orientation.⁴³ All of this is, of course, designed to fulfill the primary function of the pre-induction training program, which as noted previously is to give participants the basic military and military-technical knowledge and practical skills which they will need when they enter the service. The extent of the changes in the current year suggest that, up to this point, the program has not successfully accomplished that goal.

EMPHASIS ON PHYSICAL FITNESS

A brief effort should be made to stress the current importance of physical "hardening" ('zakalka') in the Soviet perception of pre-induction training. In numerical terms, the scope of the program is impressive: in 1974 more than 17 million young people regularly participated in military-related sports activities in DOSAAF organizations--up from 11 million in 1966.⁴⁴ Some of these types of sports include flying, parachuting, motorcycling, shooting, radio building/operation, automobile driving, and others. The number of DOSAAF sports-technical clubs is planned to reach 6,000 by the end of 1976.⁴⁵ As noted previously, other important elements for military-sports development are the "zarnitsa" and "orlenok" activities. In 1975 more than 7 million youths participated in "orlenok", while about 16 million youths participated in "zarnitsa".

However, perhaps the greatest emphasis in physical fitness in recent years has been the attempt to have all draft-age youth qualify for the appropriate level of the "Ready for Labor and Defense" (GTO) award. New norms for these awards were approved in April 1972. At that time, five levels of the GTO award, corresponding to various age groups between 10-60 years, were established. Level 3, "Strength and Courage" ("sila i muzhestvo"), was established for the age group 16-18, and, thus, is of direct concern to the pre-induction program. In October 1972, the amount of time under the purview of the pre-induction training program was

increased to 80 hours with the aim of having all youths pass the Level 3 GTO norms.⁴⁷ The GTO "complex" is based on a whole series of events, from running, swimming, chinning, and broad jumping, to shooting and grenade throwing. Of special note, the new 1972 regulations for the first time established "civil defense" norms, which must be passed for the completion of requirements at each level.⁴⁸

As with other aspects of the training program, results of the physical fitness effort appear to be mixed. In some areas, including the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Latvia and Estonia, it is reported that every third draftee is not only qualified for the GTO award, but is also a "rated sportsman" ("razriadnik") in one of the military-technical sports.⁴⁹ (The implication being that the vast majority of youth in these areas has at least fulfilled requirements for the GTO award.) On the other hand, in other areas, including Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia and Moldavia, the situation is not as positive. For example, in Tyumen oblast and Chita oblast (both in the Russian Republic), only 2 of every 5 draftees have qualified for the GTO award. The situation in a whole series of oblasts, including Irkutsk (Russian Republic), Surkhandarya, Khorezm and Tashkent (all in Uzbekistan) is reported to be even worse.⁵⁰

The apparent unsatisfactory level of physical fitness of draftees has raised concern in the Armed Forces, and much of the blame is attributed to indifferent "formal" attention

being given by responsible instructors to the physical training of youth. In a similar manner to the previously mentioned "grade inflation", it is an apparently widespread practice to lessen established standards for receipt of the GTO award, and, thus, produce unqualified ("falsified") medalists. The problem of supervision is evidenced here too as in some instances it was reported that violations of established norms was known by higher authorities (in this case by the military commissariat); however, no action was taken to correct the deficiencies.⁵¹

BUILDING THE MATERIAL-TECHNICAL BASE

Another aspect of the problems of pre-induction training which touches on many of the subjects already discussed, is the question of building the material-technical base for the program. For example, in regard to physical training and evident falsification of GTO qualifiers, it must be appreciated that at present less than half of the 8-year and 10-year high schools in the Soviet Union have sports fields/sports halls. A similar situation exists in the professional-technical schools or technikums.⁵² If there are no facilities for physical training, how can physical training standards be achieved? Or to take an example related to weapons instruction, in one raion because of lack of adequate (secure) arms rooms, only two of five schools had any training weapons; in another case, only six of 14 high schools in the raion had any weapons.⁵³ In

such circumstances, how can effective training be conducted?

The creation of the material-technical base has been a problem for the Soviets ever since the inception of the pre-induction training program. Certainly much has been accomplished, and many schools have developed a material-technical base including a military classroom, firing range, arms room, drill area, obstacle course, air raid shelter and so forth. Additionally, during the course of the 9th Five Year Plan, DOSAAF constructed about 50 buildings for military studies in the oblast centers of the RSFSR alone.⁵⁴ Further, in the course of the 1974-1975 training year, it was planned to bring each school up to its authorized strength in weapons, small caliber rifles, military-technical equipment, civil defense equipment, and to upgrade the military classroom facilities to recommended levels.⁵⁵

Despite all of this, problems remain, even after eight years. Constant mention is made in the newspapers and periodicals concerning the inadequacies of the training base, the shortage of equipment, and the poor/outdated condition of training aids. Specifically, serious deficiencies continue to be noted in Central Asia, Kazakhastan, and some oblasts of the RSFSR. It was revealed as late as September 1975 that most schools in Tadzhikistan, Azerbaydzhan, Uzbekistan and many oblasts of the RSFSR were not yet equipped with rifle ranges.⁵⁶ Encouragement is constantly

given to improve the material-technical base through "creative initiative"--i.e. self-help.

An interesting indication that even the "authorized equipment strength" figures may be impractically low was noted in a letter written by a military instructor from a Moscow high school. His school was authorized only two small-caliber rifles and one to two AK assault rifles, which he felt was an insufficient number of weapons with which to conduct effective weapons training (i.e. specifically marksmanship). Also of interest was the instructor's proposed solution to this problem: a wider employment of air rifles in marksmanship training. This proposal would have the additional advantage of not requiring the construction of a firing range at each school. According to the instructor, it would be more efficient to have one small caliber firing range used by five to six schools, rather than to construct a range at every school.⁵⁷ Such a proposal follows the general line of thinking mentioned earlier in this paper with regard to the consolidation of "training points" and the focusing of available resources into a fewer number of (higher quality) facilities. This may in fact be one of the best ways for the Soviets to improve the future development of the material-technical base.

Again, however, even in the presence of an adequate material base and technical means of instruction, the problem of methodological qualification of instructors remains (i.e. the problem of effective utilization of available

equipment).⁵⁸ Training of instructors has already been mentioned as an absolute requirement to correct this problem. One effort in this regard was the publication in 1975 of a handbook on methodological preparation for military instructors. The volume contains variations of plans-conspects for each subject, supplemental material, practical exercises and training goals for each lesson. The first volume deals with the topics of tactics, preparation for firing, military topography and regulations concerning garrison and guard duty.⁵⁹ A second volume, planned for publication in 1976, will include civil defense, drill and physical conditioning and regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces.⁶⁰

In another effort at improving one aspect of the material base, in 1975 a new series of brochures under the general title "The Pre-Inductee's Library" began to be published in Leningrad. Some of the already-published titles include: "Soviet Tankers"; "Wings of the Fatherland"; "On the Ocean Expanses"; "Submarines"; "Naval Aviation"; "Naval Infantry" and others.⁶¹

PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

In a sense, the prospects for pre-induction training in the Soviet Union are a reflection of the current problems being experienced in the program. Among these problems have been noted:

- (1) Inadequate supervision of the program by the various agencies and levels of government which share in the

"multiple responsibility" for the program. This is apparently a problem both of organizational responsibility and personal responsibility.

(2) Inadequate technical and methodological preparation of military instructors. This problem also has both organizational as well as personal implications.

(3) "Grade inflation" and lowering of established norms in an effort to "fulfill" training goals.

(4) The apparent inability to achieve the desired goals in reference to military-patriotic training. In part, this has probably been complicated because the Soviet population in general has become accustomed to a "peaceful tenor of life", and people find it increasingly more difficult to believe that the situation could be otherwise.⁶²

(5) The apparent inability, at least up to the current training year, to develop a program of military studies which fulfills the goals of the program. This is reflected by the recent extensive changes in the program, as well as by continuing reports of dissatisfaction with the level of military knowledge and skills brought by inductees into the Armed Forces.

(6) Failure to achieve the stated physical fitness goal (i.e. to have each pre-inductee qualify for the Level 3 GTO award).

(7) The many inadequacies of the material-technical training base.

The prospects, then, are for further efforts to be made in correcting these problem areas. As noted, such efforts have already been proceeding, as illustrated by organization of training for instructors, revision of the program of instruction, publication of new training aids, and constant work to improve the material-technical base. Further attention to precisely these problem areas was indicated by the discussions of the Presidium of the Central Committee of DOSAAF (August 1975) concerning preparation of the XXV CPSU Congress and the resolutions from the V Plenum of the Central Committee of DOSAAF (October 1975) concerning measures for the improvement of defense-mass work in the local DOSAAF organizations.⁶³ Items of emphasis included:

(1) The need to stress the personal responsibility of all those involved with the training program, and especially the responsibility of DOSAAF members and local DOSAAF organizations.

(2) The need to improve the quality of training in all areas.

(3) The need to improve the material-technical base by all means possible. To some extent, this may involve consolidation or sharing of facilities.

(4) The need to introduce and master progressive methods of instruction.

(5) The need to insure further growth in military-technical types of sports.

(6) The need to devote more attention to the political and military-technical preparation of students.

(7) The need to further develop activities of DOSAAF clubs within schools, especially along the lines of military-technical education and military-technical types of sports. Also to further develop opportunities for seventh and eighth grade students to participate in these activities.

CONCLUSION

To briefly recapitulate and conclude, it should first of all be said that the pre-induction training program and the DOSAAF role in this program illustrate one clear aspect of what might be termed the "militarization of Soviet society". It might also be said that this "psychological militarization" of Soviet youth through DOSAAF and the pre-induction program may be even more important from the viewpoint of Soviet leaders than any tangible military training benefits of the program. Although the Soviets obviously do desire to create (and are still attempting to create) a pre-induction training program which will give pre-inductees a good basic and practical fund of military knowledge, the military-patriotic aspect of the program is perhaps the "sine qua non". As noted previously, there is some reason to believe that the Soviets are not at all satisfied with this aspect of the program, and are consequently making great efforts to improve their military-patriotic training, both in regard to raising the patriotic devotion of students

as well as in regard to training of instructors in military-patriotic propaganda.

While the Soviets have obviously not achieved all that they desire in the area of basic military training of youth, it should be noted that they have been successful in providing some kind of military training to the vast majority of young Soviet men. Since only about one out of every two Soviet draft-age males is currently being inducted into the Armed Forces, the pre-induction program at the very least provides a basic introduction to military subjects for the 50 percent who would otherwise apparently not receive any such training.

In the attempts to solve the continuing problems of the material-technical base, instructor qualification, program content and the direction and control of the program, the Soviets appear to be placing primary emphasis on increasing the personal responsibility of those personnel connected with the system. This is to say that the military instructor, training point director, program supervisor at higher levels and military commissariat member are constantly being exhorted to improve their personal qualifications and performance of duty as the primary means towards improving the system of pre-induction training. "Organizational" approaches to problem solving, such as the previously-mentioned attempts at consolidation of facilities, have thus far received less emphasis, at least in the open press. Perhaps the most significant improvement in the program is coming

about through a trend which has little to do directly with pre-induction training. This concerns the movement toward universal secondary education. This will mean a reduced need for "training points" at factories and other economic enterprises, which probably (because of other priorities) cannot devote as much time and effort to pre-induction training as can the average secondary school, and which are, thus, less effective elements of the training program.

In short, although still beset with problems, the pre-induction training program will continue to improve both in quality of personnel, quality of the material-technical base and program content. The level of purely military skills of pre-inductees should, consequently, also improve. However, whether this will be matched by a corresponding improvement in the military-patriotic conditioning of Soviet youth is probably the question which most concerns Soviet leaders at this time, and the one to which the answer is far less certain.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a detailed discussion see: Robert M. Frasche, Pre-Mobilization Preparedness in the USSR; The Pre-Induction Training Program. Student Research Report (Garmisch: US Army Russian Institute, June 1974), pp. 35-80.
2. "Kommunizma Pobednyi Shag" ("A Victorious Step of Communism"), Sovetskii Patriot, November 5, 1975, p. 1. Nevertheless, 80% of the primary organizations were considered "small"--i.e. less than 500 members--which apparently poses real problems in creating the material-technical base for an active organization. See: "I Nam Bol'shie Dela Po Plechu" ("And For Us, Great Tasks Upon Our Shoulders"), Sovetskii Patriot, November 23, 1975, p. 2. Additionally, it is admitted even by the DOSAAF leadership that the proportion of actively-working primary organizations is not large, and that a significant number of primary organizations, in fact are not operating at all. See: "Rukovodit' Konkretno so Znaniem Dela" ("To Lead Concretely, with Knowledge of the Matter"), Speech by Chairman of the Central Committee of DOSAAF, Pokryshkin, Sovetskii Patriot, October 5, 1975, p. 1.
3. "Rukovodit' Konkretno so Znaniem Dela", p. 1.
4. This was necessitated by the reduction in the term of active duty service in accordance with the 1967 Law of Universal Military Service.
5. For an evaluation of the pre-induction training program from its inception to March 1974, see: Frasche, pp. 53-80.
6. G. Belyx and M. Kalinin, "Komitet DOSAAF i Uchebnyi Punkt" ("The DOSAAF Committee and the Training Point"). (DOSAAF, Moscow, 1974), p. 30. See also Frasche, pp. 44-52.
7. "Soldatu Nuzhno Mnogo Znat'" ("A Soldier Must Know Many Things"), Sovetskii Patriot, July 2, 1975, p. 3. It should of course be remembered that all of these organizations have their representatives at Republic, Oblast, Raion, City, etc. levels.
8. Belyx and Kalinin, pp. 3-4. See also: "Komitet DOSAAF i Uchebnyi Punkt" ("The DOSAAF Committee and The Training Point"), Sovetskii Patriot, November 26, 1975, p. 1. These basic functions to a greater or lesser

degree also concern DOSAAF organizations in high schools, technical institutes, etc.

9. Belyx and Kalinin, p. 9ff.
10. Op. cit., Note 8 (Sovetskii Patriot, November 26, 1975,) p. 1.
11. "Nado Vse Splanirovat'" ("Everything Must be Planned"), Voennye Znaniia, August 1974, pp. 39-40.
12. "Za Ramkami Programmy" ("Beyond the Limits of the Program"), Sovetskii Patriot, November 26, 1975, p. 3.
13. Op. cit., Note 11, p. 40.
14. "Raionnyi, Ob"edinennyi" ("Regional, Unified"), Voennye Znaniia, July 1975, p. 14.
15. "Sut' - v Kachestve Obucheniia" ("The Essence - in the Quality of Instruction"), Voennye Znaniia, April 1975, pp. 40-41.
16. Op. cit., Note 8 (Sovetskii Patriot, November 26, 1975), p. 1. As a result, in the Uzbek SSR in the spring of 1975, examiners from the Main Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense checked several training points and found that students did not have the required knowledge and skills in weapons firing, drill and tactical subjects.
17. "Voenkomaty i Nachal'naia Voennaia Podgotovka" ("The Military Commissariats and Introductory Military Training"), Krasnaia Zvezda, August 16, 1975, p. 1.
18. "Formalizma Gor'kie Plody" ("The Bitter Fruits of Formalism"), Sovetskii Patriot, December 15, 1974, p. 3. Both of these problems had specific reference to the situation in Uzbekistan, however, publication in an All-Union newspaper probably indicates that these shortcomings are not limited to the Uzbek SSR.
19. D. N. Kuznetsov, "DOSAAF SSSR - Shkola Patriotov" ("DOSAAF USSR - School of Patriots"). (DOSAAF, Moscow, 1975), pp. 21-22. See also: "Tovarishch Voenruk" ("Comrade Military Leader"), Voennye Znaniia, August 1974, pp. 2-3. Also: "Etot Vypusk - Spravochnyi" ("An Informative Issue"), Voennye Znaniia, June 1974, p. 40.
20. "Gotovit' dlia Armii Dostoinoe Popolnenie" ("To Prepare For the Army Suitable Replacements"), Krasnaia Zvezda, June 14, 1975, p. 3. See also: "Vospityvat' Budushchego

- Soldata" ("To Educate the Future Soldier"), Krasnaia Zvezda, December 10, 1974, p. 2.
21. "Luchshe Odin Raz Uvidet'" ("Better to See Once"), Sovetskii Patriot, February 5, 1975, p. 3.
 22. Op. cit., Note 8 (Sovetskii Patriot, November 26, 1975), p. 1.
 23. "Novyi God, Novyi Zadachi" ("A New Year, New Tasks"), Voennye Znaniia, September 1975, p. 34. See also: Op. cit., Note 18, p. 3.
 24. Op. cit., Note 7, p. 3. Periodic training meetings ("refresher courses") and seminars are also held throughout the academic year.
 25. Op. cit., Note 23, p. 35.
 26. "Otsenka i Trebovatel'nost'" ("Evaluation and Exactness"), Voennye Znaniia, June 1975, p. 38.
 27. Op. cit., Note 23, p. 34. The Soviet grading system ranges from "1" (very poor) to "5" (excellent); "3" is average. Both "1" and "2" are failing grades.
 28. Op. cit., Note 26, pp. 38-39.
 29. See for example: Op. cit., Note 20 ("To Prepare for the Army Suitable Replacements"); Also: "Zatianuvsheesia Stanovlenie" ("A Tightened Formation"), Krasnaia Zvezda, September 29, 1974, p. 2.
 30. Uchebnoe Posobie Po Nachal'noi Voennoi Podgotovke (Educational Handbook on Introductory Military Training). (DOSAAF, Moscow, 1971), pp. 324-327.
 31. Article 17 of the 1967 Law on Universal Military Service. See Izvestiia, October 13, 1967, p. 3. It should be noted that civil defense training is first introduced in the second grade in Soviet schools, and receives especially heavy emphasis in Pioneer Summer Camps (for children 10 to 14 years of age).
 32. Op. cit., Note 7, p. 3.
 33. "Gotovnost' #1" ("Preparedness #1"), Sovetskii Patriot, May 28, 1975, p. 3.
 34. "Est' Chto Vspomnit' Panfilovtsu" ("There is Something to Remember About Panfilovets"), Voennye Znaniia, February 1975, p. 39.

35. "Iskusstvo Ubezhdat'" ("The Skill to Convince"), Voennye Znaniia, October 1974, p. 13.
36. "V Piat' Etapov" ("In Five Stages"), Voennye Znaniia, December 1974, p. 38.
37. V. Garanov, "Sodeistvie Komitetov DOSAAF Shtabam Grazhdanskoi Oborony" ("The Cooperation of DOSAAF Committees With the Headquarters of Civil Defense"). (DOSAAF, Moscow, 1975), pp. 26-27.
38. "Razvedchiki Voshli v Ochag" ("The Scouts Go Into the Hotbed"), Voennye Znaniia, March 1975, pp. 32-34. Also: "Tsennyi Opyt--Vsem Shkolam" ("A Valuable Experience--For All Schools"), Voennye Znaniia, May 1975, p. 39.
39. "S Samogo Nachala" ("From the Very Beginning"), Voennye Znaniia, August 1975, p. 22.
40. Ibid.
41. "Vvoditsia Novaia Programma" ("A New Program is Introduced"), Voennye Znaniia, July 1975, p. 34. Also: "Chtoby Znaniia Byli Prochnym" ("In order that Knowledge be Durable"), Voennye Znaniia, March 1975, p. 38.
42. Op. cit., Note 41 ("A New Program is Introduced"), p. 34.
43. Ibid. See also: "Novaia Programma--Novye Trebovaniia" ("A New Program--New Demands"), Sovetskii Patriot, August 10, 1975, p. 3.
44. Kuznetsov, p. 27.
45. "Prizyvnik--Znachkist GTO" ("The Draftee--A GTO Medalist"), Voennye Znaniia, November 1975, p. 20.
46. "U 'Orlenka' Kanikyl Net" ("At 'Eaglet' There Are No Vacations"), Sovetskii Patriot, June 8, 1975, p. 2. Also: "'Zarnitsa' 75" ("Summer Lightning '75"), Voennye Znaniia, October 1975, p. 12.
47. Belyx and Kalinin, p. 41.
48. Garanov, p. 8.
49. Op. cit., Note 45, p. 20.
50. Op. cit., Note 7, p. 3.

51. See for example: "Chtoby Pobedit' v Boiu" ("In Order to Win in Battle"), Krasnaia Zvezda, November 15, 1974, p. 4. Also: Op. cit., Note 17, p. 1.
52. Op. cit., Note 7, p. 3.
53. Ibid.
54. "Stroiki DOSAAF--Pod Kontrol' Komitetov" ("The Construction of DOSAAF--Under the Control of the Committees:), Sovetskii Patriot, August 27, 1975, p. 1.
55. Op. cit., Note 11, p. 40.
56. Op. cit., Note 23, p. 34.
57. "Prostota Dostupnost'" ("The Simplicity of Availability"), Voennye Znaniia, September 1975, p. 37.
58. See for example: "Tekhnikh Na Urokakh" ("Technology in the Classroom"), Sovetskii Patriot, October 26, 1975, p. 3.
59. "Metodicheskie Razrabotki Po Programme Nachal'noi Voennoi Podgotovki Molodezhi Na Uchebnykh Punktakh" ("Methodological Elaboration on the Program of Introductory Military Training of Youth at Training Points"). (DOSAAF Moscow, 1974).
60. "Poleznoe Posobie" ("A Useful Handbook"), Sovetskii Patriot, January 5, 1975, p. 3. Additionally, it should be noted that the journal Voennye Znaniia regularly publishes articles designed to provide methodological preparation for the conduct of specific military courses.
61. "Dlia Vas, Budushchie Voiny" ("For You, Future Soldiers"), Sovetskii Patriot, November 12, 1975, p. 2.
62. Garanov, p. 21. Although this specific reference was made with regard to civil defense training, it is likely to be a factor in regard to military-patriotic training as well.
63. See: "Doevaia Programma Deistvii" ("An Urgent Program of Activities"), Sovetskii Patriot, August 31, 1975, p. 1. And: "O Sostoianii i Merakh Uluchsheniia Oboronno-Massovoi Raboty v Pervichnykh Organizatsiakh DOSAAF: ("Concerning the Condition and Measures of Improvement of Defense-Mass Work in the Local DOSAAF Organizations"), Sovetskii Patriot, October 5, 1975, p. 2.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Belyx, G., and M. Kalinin. "Komitet DOSAAF i Uchebnji Punkt" ("The DOSAAF Committee and the Training Point"). DOSAAF, Moscow, 1974.
2. "Boevaia Programma Deistvii" ("An Urgent Program of Activities"), Sovetskii Patriot, August 31, 1975, p. 1.
3. "Chtoby Pobedit' v Boiu" ("In Order to Win in Battle"), Krasnaia Zvezda, November 15, 1974, p. 4.
4. "Chtoby Znaniia Byli Prochnym" ("In Order That Knowledge Be Durable"), Voennye Znaniia, March 1975, p. 38.
5. "Dlia Vas, Budushchie Voiny" ("For You, Future Soldiers"), Sovetskii Patriot, November 12, 1975, p. 2.
6. "Est' Chto Vspomnit' Panfilovtsu" ("There is Something to Remember About Panfilovets"), Voennye Znaniia, February 1975, pp. 39-40.
7. "Etot Vypusk--Spravochnyi" ("An Informative Issue"), Voennye Znaniia, June 1974, p. 40.
8. "Formalizma Gor'kie Plody" (The Bitter Fruits of Formalism"), Sovetskii Patriot, December 15, 1974, p.3.
9. Frasche, Robert M. Pre-Mobilization Preparedness in the USSR; The Pre-Induction Training Program. Thesis, US Army Russian Institute, Garmisch, June 1974.
10. Garanov, V. "Sodeistvie Komitetov DOSAAF Shtabam Grazhdanskoi Oborony" ("The Cooperation of DOSAAF Committees with the Headquarters of Civil Defense"). DOSAAF, Moscow, 1975.
11. "Gotovit' dlia Armii Dostoinoe Popolnenie" ("To Prepare For the Army Suitable Replacements"), Krasnaia Zvezda, June 14, 1975, p. 3.
12. "Gotovnost' #1" ("Preparedness #1"), Sovetskii Patriot, May 28, 1975, p. 3.
13. "I Nam Bol'shie Dela Po Plechu" ("And for Us, Great Tasks Upon Our Shoulders"), Sovetskii Patriot, November 23, 1975, p. 2.
14. "Iskusstvo Ubezhdai'" ("The Skill to Convince"), Voennye Znaniia, October 1974, p. 13.

15. "Komitet DOSAAF i Uchebnyi Punkt" ("The DOSAAF Committee and the Training Point"), Sovetskii Patriot, November 26, 1975, p. 1.
16. "Kommunisma Pobednyi Shag" ("A Victorious Step of Communism"), Sovetskii Patriot, November 5, 1975, p. 1.
17. Kuznetsov, N. N. "DOSAAF SSSR - Shkola Patriotov" ("DOSAAF USSR - School of Patriots"). DOSAAF, Moscow, 1975.
18. "Luchshe Odin Raz Uvidet'" ("Better to See Once"), Sovetskii Patriot, February 5, 1975, p. 3.
19. "Metodicheskie Razrabotki Po Programme Nachal'noi Voennoi Podgotovki Molodezhi Na Uchebnykh Punktakh" (Methodological Elaboration on the Program of Introductory Military Training of Youth at Training Points"). DOSAAF, Moscow, 1974.
20. "Nado Vse Splanirovat'" ("Everything Must be Planned"), Voennye Znaniia, August 1974, pp. 39-40.
21. "Novaia Programma---Novye Trebovaniia" ("A New Program--New Demands"), Sovetskii Patriot, August 10, 1975, p. 3.
22. "Novyi God, Novyi Zadachi" ("A New Year, New Tasks"), Voennye Znaniia, September 1975, p. 34.
23. "O Sostoinii i Merakh Ulusheniia Oboronno-Massovoi Raboty v Pervichnykh Organizatsiiakh DOSAAF" ("Concerning the Condition and Measures of Improvement of Defense-Mass Work in the Local DOSAAF Organizations"), Sovetskii Patriot, October 5, 1975, p. 2.
24. "Otsenka i Trebovatel'nost'" ("Evaluation and Exactness"), Voennye Znaniia, June 1974, p. 38.
25. "Poleznoe Posobie" (A Useful Handbook"), Sovetskii Patriot, January 5, 1975, p. 3.
26. "Prizyvnik---Znachkist GTO" ("The Draftee--A GTO Medalist"), Voennye Znaniia, November 1975, p. 20.
27. "Prostota Dostupnost'" ("The Simplicity of Availability"), Voennye Znaniia, September 1975, p. 37.
28. "Raionnyi Ob"edinennyi" ("Regional, Unified"), Voennye Znaniia, July 1975, p. 14.
29. "Razvedchiki Voshli v Ochag" ("The Scouts Go Into the Hotbed"), Voennye Znaniia, March 1975, pp. 32-34.

30. "Rukovodit' Konkretno so Znaniem Dela" ("To Lead Concretely, with Knowledge of the Matter"), Sovetskii Patriot, October 5, 1975, p. 1.
31. Sapienza, Guy F. Pre-Induction Military Training in the USSR: The Impact of the 1967 Universal Military Training Law. Thesis, US Army Russian Institute, Garmisch, March 1971.
32. "Soldatu Nuzhno Mnogo Znat'" ("A Soldier Must Know Many Things"), Sovetskii Patriot, July 2, 1975, p. 3.
33. Sovetskii Patriot. June 1974 - December 1975
34. "Sut'--v Kachestve Obuchenie" ("The Essence--in the Quality of Instruction"), Voennye Znaniia, April 1975, pp. 40-41.
35. "Stroiki DOSAAF--Pod Kontrol' Komitetov" ("The Construction of DOSAAF--Under the Control of the Committees"), Sovetskii Patriot, August 27, 1975, p. 1.
36. "Tekhnikakh Na Urokakh" ("Technology in the Classroom"), Sovetskii Patriot, October 26, 1975, p. 3.
37. "Tovarishch Voenruk" ("Comrade Military Leader"), Voennye Znaniia, August 1974, pp. 2-3.
38. Uchebnoe Posobie Po Nachal'noi Voennoi Podgotovke. (Educational Handbook on Introductory Military Training). DOSAAF, Moscow, 1971.
39. "U 'Orlenka' Kanikyl Net" ("At 'Eaglet' There are No Vacations"), Sovetskii Patriot, June 8, 1975, p. 2.
40. "Voenkomaty i Nachal'naia Voennaia Podgotovka" ("The Military Commissariats and Introductory Military Training"), Krasnaia Zvezda, August 16, 1975, p. 1.
41. Voennye Znaniia. May 1974--December 1975.
42. "Vospityvat' Budushchego Soldata" ("To Educate the Future Soldier"), Krasnaia Zvezda, December 10, 1974, p. 2.
43. "V Piat' Etapov" ("In Five Stages"), Voennye Znaniia, December 1974, p. 38.
44. "Vvoditsia Novaia Programma" ("A New Program is Introduced"), Voennye Znaniia, July 1975, p. 34.

45. "Zakon o Vseobshchei Voinskoi Obiazannosti" ("Law on Universal Military Service"), Izvestiia, October 13, 1967, pp. 3-4.
46. "Za Ramkami Programmy" ("Beyond the Limits of the Program"), Sovetskii Patriot, November 26, 1975, p.3.
47. "'Zarnitsa' 75" ("'Summer Lightning' 75"), Voennye Znaniia, October 1975, p. 12.
48. "Zatianuvsheesia Stanovlenie" ("A Tightened Formation"), Krasnaia Zvezda, September 29, 1974, p. 2.