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
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# DEFENSE SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT SCHOOL <sup>NU</sup>

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## Program Management Course Student Study Program

APPROACHES FOR COPING  
WITH THE PROBLEM OF STAFFING A  
PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE  
STUDY REPORT  
PMC 73-2

Matthew C. Masem  
GS-13            DAC

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DEFENSE SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT SCHOOL

**STUDY TITLE:** Approaches for Coping with the Problem of Staffing a Project Management Office

**STUDY PROBLEM/QUESTION:**

Is there a PM organizational structure which optimizes the acquisition process?

Do PMs have "competent" people?

What guidance is available to newly-assigned PMs?

**STUDY REPORT ABSTRACT:**

The study is directed toward determining the problems associated with the organization and staffing of a PM office within the Army and some suggested approaches for resolving these problems.

The study questions the PM relative to what he considers "competent people" and raises the possibility that some of his problems result from his failure to provide adequately for administrative time to process requirements.

The study also questions whether or not the PM considers the risk of personnel problems on a par with cost, schedule, and technical uncertainty.

**KEY WORDS:** PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT TRAINING  
PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Student, Rank Service

MATTHEW C. MASEM  
GS-13 DAC

Class

PMC CLASS 73-2

Date

21 NOVEMBER 1973

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6 APPROACHES FOR COPING WITH THE PROBLEM OF STAFFING A PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE.

An Executive Summary  
of a  
9 Study Report,  
by

10 Matthew C. Masem  
GS-13 DAC

12 29 p.

11 21 November 1973

Defense Systems Management School  
Program Management Course  
Class 73-2  
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of the study was to gain an insight into the problems associated with staffing a Project Management Office and to suggest approaches to cope with the problem.

These questions are raised and discussed as follows:

- Is there a PM organizational structure which optimizes the acquisition process?
- Do PMs have competent people?
- What guidance is available to newly-assigned PMs to assist them in their early endeavors?

The optimized organizational structure appears to be an academic decision because of AMC's apparent direction of effort toward standardization of PM offices.

The question of what constitutes competent people, how the civilian work force is categorized so far as competence is concerned and the PM's judgmental factors are discussed and questioned.

Although some guidance is available to prospective PMs, it is minimal--but adequate to provide proper orientation if the PM chooses to utilize it. It appears that he may be so enamored with his unique position and the belief that his system is so different from all others that such guidance is not considered or utilized.

It also appears that problems are compounded by the fact that PMs do not provide adequate consideration of time required for administrative actions.

Project Management is one way of managing a defense system. It is not a panacea for all the ills attributed to the acquisition process. There is no reason that it cannot or should not operate within the regulatory framework.

If the study does nothing more than raise some new questions in the minds of the readers in regard to thinking of problems in a different perspective, then I feel that it has been a worthwhile endeavor.

APPROACHES FOR COPING WITH THE PROBLEM OF  
STAFFING A PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE

STUDY REPORT

Presented to the Faculty  
of the  
Defense Systems Management School  
in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Program Management Course  
Class 73-2

by

Matthew C. Masem  
GS-13            DAC

November 1973

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The writer owes his appreciation to many people, including fellow students who were willing to give freely of their limited time to share their past experiences and opinions.

The writer wishes also to express his sincere appreciation to the staff and faculty of the Defense Systems Management School (DSMS) for their farsighted and realistic attitude toward total integrated education for major system acquisition.

Specifically, the writer extends his gratitude to LTC Charles E. Rose, Chief, Armament Systems Office, Headquarters, US Army Weapons Command, Rock Island, Illinois, for his confidence in nominating me for attendance at DSMS and to Dr. Andrew P. Mosier, of the Resident Faculty, for his assistance and encouragement in this endeavor. The writer also wishes to thank Mrs. Sandy Harris for her conscientious effort in insuring that this study was completed within the time frame allotted her.

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APPROACHES FOR COPING WITH THE PROBLEM OF  
STAFFING A PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE\*

Introduction

The material presented during the conduct of Program Management Course 73-2, Defense Systems Management School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and the discussions among the student body during such presentations, reinforced by additional readings, led the writer to conclude that the problems and the approaches for coping with the problems associated with staffing a Project Management Office was an area which warranted additional consideration.

Consistent with time constraints imposed upon the writer, the study was limited to Army Project Management (PM) organizations. In addition, and based upon the personal interest of the writer, the study was further limited to the civilian personnel employed within a PM Office.

The specific questions considered, within the parameters indicated above, are as follows:

- Is there one organizational structure which optimizes the process for the acquisition of major defense systems under the Project Management concept as envisioned by Department of Defense Directive 5000.1? (Reference 1.) An associated aspect of this question involves the manpower and skills set forth in the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) for the operation of a PM Office.
- Do PMs, in fact, hire and utilize the "competent people" that DODD 5000.1 considers of primary importance to the successful development, production, and deployment of major defense systems?

---

\*ABSTAINER

This study represents the views, conclusions and recommendations of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Defense Systems Management School nor the Department of Defense.

- What data is now available to assist PMs in coping with the problems indicated by the above questions?

Although the writer does not claim to be an expert in the area of Project Management, he has attempted to sort fact from fiction and present the facts as he interpreted them. In this endeavor, the writer does not subscribe to Paul Winterton's rueful dictum: "There are no experts-- only varying degrees of ignorance". (Reference 2.) The writer does not subscribe to such a comment regarding any intellectual endeavor, for it is a form of negativism, and in the writer's opinion, defeats, or at least inhibits, the successful accomplishment of the pursuit of knowledge. Rather, what is needed is a positive approach--for any pursuit of knowledge, regardless of its parameters, reduces the so-called Winterton's "degree of ignorance". The writer sincerely hopes the study reflects this philosophy.

In the conduct of the study, the writer:

1. Researched numerous Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Materiel Command, and Civilian Personnel regulations. Those considered of significant value to the contents of this study are contained in the Bibliography.
2. Reviewed various study reports and research papers pertinent to the subject matter. These articles have been recorded in the Bibliography.
3. Conducted various interviews, via phone and personal contact, with individuals knowledgeable regarding the acquisition process. These individuals are identified throughout the study and are documented within the Bibliography.
4. In addition, conducted informal, unstructured conversations with various fellow students and faculty members who were either familiar with or had prior experience in the acquisition process.

5. During the conduct of an interview with Mrs. Mary M. Marek, from AMC Project Management Office, it was determined that only minimal changes had been made to the Army's PM structure since May of 1973. (Reference 3.) As a direct result, the writer has relied heavily upon the analysis made by LTC MURRY PARKER of the replies he received from a questionnaire, Figure 1, submitted to nine PMs in May of 1973. (Reference 4.) Hereinafter, any reference to this data will be referred to as the "Parker Study". The data included in the "Parker Study" is important and meaningful not only because of the sample size it brings to bear on the problem, but also due to the credibility such documentation lends to the writer's endeavor. The writer's attempts to obtain the original replies to the questionnaire in order to conduct an independent evaluation were unsuccessful.

In the conduct of the study, its organization is as follows:

1. Introduction. A brief explanation of the purpose and scope of the study is presented. The research questions are posed and the parameters of the study definitized. The research conducted is specified to include the primary sources of the data.
2. Background. A resume of Project Management within the Army is presented in order to provide the basis for the discussion that follows.
3. Discussion. A review and analysis of the material researched is made in an attempt to categorize the pertinent data with respect to the research questions in order to arrive at the threshold for the presentation of the conclusions and recommendations.
4. Conclusions and Recommendations. The conclusions drawn from the study are indicated, as are recommendations for coping with the problems identified.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Did you establish the Project Manager Office?  
Yes      No
2. If you did not establish the office, at which point in the acquisition cycle was the office when you were assigned as PM?  
Conceptual      Validation      Full Scale Dev      Production
3. Did you choose a Deputy with a background of technical or administrative experience?
4. Did you have absolute choice in the selection of your Deputy?  
Yes      No  
Comments:
5. Did the Civil Service Regulations hamper you or influence your selection of your "key personnel"?  
Yes      No  
Comments:
6. Did the local Civilian Personnel Office support your choices or did you feel that they were more interested in matching available personnel to your vacancies in spite of your desires?  
Please comment:
7. Were you strongly supported by the command group of the commodity command where you are collocated, or did they let you "fight your own battles" for personnel? (Your answer will be considered classified as to source of information.)  
Please comment:
8. Did you find any civilian personnel reluctant to join the PMO because of the uncertainties involved in PM operations?  
Yes      No  
Comments:
9. Did you attempt to fill vacancies with lower grade personnel than the authorized grade and stimulate personnel with the possibility of promotion?  
Yes      No  
Comments:
10. Have reorganizational turbulencies affected your PMO by civilian personnel with more service seniority than your selected staff exercising their "rollback" or placement rights?  
Yes      No  
Comments:
11. Did you find that Civilian Personnel Regulations have hampered you in performing your chartered responsibilities?  
Yes      No  
Comments:

## Background

An understanding of the environment in which Project Management came into being within the US Army Materiel Command contrasted to that in which it exists today is germane to the study.

For those unfamiliar with or desiring more detailed background data regarding management theory and development and understanding of the reasons the Army adopted Project Management, the writer refers them to the Lukert Study, titled "Army Project Management--Another Look". (Reference 5.)

At the outset of the Army reorganization in 1962, General Frank S. Besson, Jr., then Commanding General of the United States Army Materiel Command (AMC), made the now historic decision to develop and apply Project Management to many major systems on an unprecedented scale. Initiation of Project Management in the Army, as it is known today, coincided with the activation of the US Army Materiel Command. In the environment in which it was created, few if any problems existed in obtaining the civilian personnel with the expertise desired by the PM. Standardization was minimal, for it was new and no baseline existed from which to measure quantity or quality of organization, people or the expertise required of such people. During an interview with Mr. Charles Vaccarro, former Chief, Plans and Programs Office for DAVY CROCKETT (1962-1963), and PMSO for the M60 Tank (1963-1973), he confirmed that during the above periods he knew of no significant problems related to the organization or staffing of a PM Office. (Reference 6.) "The PM got what he wanted." He also was emphatic in his comments that it was a different environment than it is today.

Today's environment poses still another problem. Project Management is not a panacea for all acquisition ills. Every PM cannot have "top priority". To the risks of cost, schedule, and technical performance must be added the risk of personnel. During the interview with Mr. Michellon from AMC Project Management Office, the writer was advised that the number of personnel with any PM Office depends upon "what the traffic will bear". (Reference 7.) Today's environment is dictating what that traffic will be and what can be tolerated and herein may lie the problems and answers to the problems faced by PMs with respect to organization and staffing.

## Discussion

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5000.1 indicates that a major defense system is one "so designated by the Secretary of Defense/ Deputy Secretary of Defense . . . ." The designation is not as arbitrary as it may sound, for it involves national urgency as well as various other considerations, including cost, schedule, complexity, technical difficulty, high visibility, and Congressional interest.

The Project Management concept for the technical and business management of major defense systems is predicated on the use of a designated centralized management authority for the day--to-day management of an approved program.

The question of authority is addressed by DODD 5000.1 as follows:

"The development and production of a major defense system shall be managed by a single individual (Program Manager) who shall have a charter which provides sufficient authority to accomplish recognized program objectives."

However, as a practical matter, the PM provides direction to his team, regardless of its organizational configuration, and as he becomes knowledgeable of all aspects of the program, he develops a natural leadership and authoritative role which enables him to provide the necessary direction and exercise the proper control over his mission items.

DODD 5000.1 further states that "Successful development, production and deployment of major defense systems are primarily dependent upon competent people, national priorities and clearly defined responsibilities".

The national priorities are inherent in the criteria for designation of a major defense system as well as in the various acquisition reviews (DSARC) which must be passed during the various phases of the life cycle. The clearly defined responsibilities are initially provided for by the PM's charter. That portion of the DODD relative to "success depending upon competent people" is rather nebulous, for nowhere has the writer been able to locate a definition of or a measurement for success or what constitutes competent people. Success and/or the degree of competence of people presents evaluation problems which are beyond the scope of this study.

However, what is germane is the fact that people represent a degree of risk commensurate with risks associated with cost, schedule, and technical uncertainty and must therefore be recognized as an integral part of the overall risks associated with Project Management; not as a separate entity.

As previously indicated, DODD 5000.1 considers competent people of primary importance to the success of the acquisition process. Having examined the regulatory data, the most logical question appears to be: "At what point in time does the PM surface?"

The Department of the Army's (DA) Letter of Instruction (LOI) for Implementing the New Materiel Acquisition Guidelines outlined in DODD 5000.1 indicates that the first step in the development of a system must be the establishment of a REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (ROC). (Reference 8.)

A ROC is simply an indication that a materiel requirement may exist. The ROC can, in theory at least, be initiated by anyone and can involve the upgrading of an existing defense system or the introduction of a new concept. Regardless of the origin, it is reviewed to determine its feasibility and utilization within the defense community. Upon approval of the ROC, a Special Task Force is assembled to prepare a Concept Formulation Package. The prospective Project Manager, who is selected after an exhaustive qualification review, is normally a member of this Task Force. It appears logical that during the operational period of the Task Force that the prospective PM should mentally evaluate the relative merits of the requirement. It also seems logical to reason that during this period the prospective PM should begin to mentally formulate his plans for the organizational concept he plans to employ during the acquisition process, including the numbers of personnel desired and the skills required of such personnel. To argue otherwise would, the writer submits, negate the image of a PM portrayed by the rigid selection process.

The results of the "Parker Study," however, appear to indicate otherwise. The Study states: "The PMs interviewed indicated that they were not aware of regulations which assisted them in TDA staffing procedures when they were assigned."

The writer finds this difficult to understand for sundry reasons:

1. Project Management can be traced back to the days of World War II. However, as a high-visibility management concept, it has been, as indicated previously, in practice within the US Army Materiel Command since 1962. Officer

personnel of this calibre eligible for selection as a PM have varied backgrounds. It is therefore difficult for the writer to believe that such officer personnel have not been involved directly or indirectly with civilian personnel during their various career assignments. The writer does not presuppose that officer personnel are fully aware of the Civil Service Regulations. The writer does, however, submit that to deny any knowledge is highly improbable.

2. It is also logical to reason that any senior officer selected as a PM would be aware of the procedures involved in developing a military organization. The writer submits that the procedural differences between developing a Project Management civilian TDA or a military organizational TDA are not that significant.

The "Parker Study" indicated that some PMs stated that establishment of a TDA was a "large and time-consuming task". The writer would not quarrel with such a statement. However, the "Lukert Study" sums it up by saying, "To be objective, this problem is no different from those faced throughout the Army". Manpower is limited and the designation of a major defense system is not tantamount to filling positions. Recruitment is necessary regardless of priority assigned to an effort, and there are many competing efforts throughout the Army.

The writer opines that the present environment of "austere weapon systems," more "bang for the buck" and the design-to-cost efforts will dictate what the traffic will bear to a greater extent than ever before with respect to TDAs for Project Managers' offices.

3. AMC Regulation 11-16 provides sufficient guidelines for a PM relative to basic policies and concepts pertaining to various aspects of the acquisition process, including organization and staffing. (Reference 9.) The writer was advised that it was not considered a mandatory document. However, it appears naive to assume ignorance of the document.

In addition, the writer was also advised by Mr. Michellon that upon notification that a PM has been selected, his (Michellon's) office

arranges for a briefing regarding the various aspects associated with the organization and staffing of a PM Office. Although not specifically mentioned, there is no reason to doubt that the PM, during such a briefing, is not made aware of Civilian Personnel Regulation (CPR) CP-2, Army Civilian Career System for Staffing Project Management Offices (Reference 10.) However, the writer can understand its rejection, for it could lead one to conclude that standardization is being fostered upon the PM. In this connection, it is interesting to note that a revised AMCR 11-16, Volume II, is, according to Mr. Michellon, being staffed and the prognosis for approval, publication and implementation is promising. (Reference 11.) In this regard, Section V of the draft, Project Manager Table of Distribution and Allowances, was approved on October 11, 1973. The outline of several sections of the draft, including Section V, are indicated below because of their impact on and pertinence to this study:

AMCR 11-16 (Draft)

Section IV Project Manager Organization--Mission and Functions

- Model Organization
- Standard Alignment of Functions
- Requests for Deviation
- Organization Chart and Mission and Functional Statements

Section V Project Manager's Table of Distribution and Allowances

- Staffing Patterns
- Distribution of Staff
- Degree Evaluations
- Request for Project Management Approval

Section VI Job Descriptions

- Selection of Personnel
- Standardized Job Descriptions
- Request for Project Management Approval
- Modification in Subsequent Phases

The draft regulation, as the outline infers, is driving toward organizational standardization. Paragraph 3 of Section IV states:

"Experience has proven that almost all Project Management Offices have been and can be organized within broad latitudes of the standard configuration depicted herein, and at the same time give the Project Manager an organization which is responsive to all requirements and objectives . . . . If . . . the Project Manager feels that conditions warrant a non-standard organizational element, complete justification should be prepared . . . ."

The "Parker Study" revealed that some of the eight PMs responding to his questionnaire stated:

"For the first six months, I felt I was doing nothing but attempting to overcome civilian personnel regulations and the inertia/resistance of the local Civilian Personnel Officer. Because of this, I was unable to give adequate attention to my responsibilities and I could not obtain a staff that could carry out the functions of a PMO."

The fact that the Deputy PM is, in essence, the alter-ego of the PM, and is usually a civilian, and further is responsible for the program in the absence of the PM is overlooked. It appears reasonable, feasible and desirable that a Deputy PM should be appointed to the Task Force at the same time as the PM. The Deputy would then be involved in the program and could be delegated the responsibility for the administrative tasks relative to civilian personnel activities. The actual selection could and should be made by the PM.

However, during the conduct of PMC 73-2 and the conduct of this study, the writer was repeatedly reminded that the PM tailors the organizational structure to fit the task requirement of the program, within given constraints, and his (the PM's) style of management, as well as the

urgency associated with the major defense system. In essence, tailoring within the Army PM structure, except for such a program of the magnitude and/or importance of SAFEGUARD, is minimal. This was made evident on two occasions:

First, during the conduct of the interview with Mr. Michellon, it was indicated that the majority of present Army PM organizations are, in fact, standardized. Such standardization is evident in Section V of draft AMCR 11-16, in the following guidelines which are used for the organization of a PM office during various phases of the life cycle:

| ELEMENT                      | PHASES<br>(IN PERCENTS) |             |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|
|                              | VALIDATION/DEVELOPMENT  | PRODUCTION  |
| Office of PM                 | 7                       | 10          |
| Program Management Div       | 22.                     | 20          |
| Technical Management Div     | 36                      | 13          |
| Procurement & Production Div | 10                      | 15          |
| Logistics Management Div     | 12                      | 20          |
| Product Assurance Div        | 9                       | 12          |
| Configuration Management Div | 4                       | 10          |
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Second, during attendance at the Review and Command Assessment of Projects (RECAP) for the Mortar/Artillery Locating Radars (MALOR), the PM indicated that due to software requirements, he had need for specialists not now assigned to be part of the PM Office. Apparently this requirement had not been anticipated earlier. No questions were raised by the RECAP participants regarding this matter and it is reasoned that the PM was given tacit approval and would now take necessary action to recruit for these positions.

The writer does not interpret this type of action as being within the context of tailoring as advocated. Tailoring, so far as the writer is concerned, is a more radical departure from the standardized organizational structure indicated in Section V, AMCR 11-16.

In furtherance of the study objectives, the specific question relative to the type of organizational structure required for the acquisition process becomes, then, in the writer's opinion, an academic one. The Army's PM structure has historically been somewhere in between the Navy's concept of small staffs highly dependent upon functional activities, and the large, so-called "self-contained" Program Office of the Air Force. Inherent in the Army's type of organizational structure is the so-called "friction" existing between project and functional managers. The writer's experience leads him to the conclusion reached in the "Luckert Study": ". . . exercising his de jure authority [PM] can cause resentment. However, proper use of de facto authority and personal persuasion by the Project Manager can overcome much of the problem . . . ." The type of organizational structure utilized is relatively unimportant, providing that the mission objectives can be accomplished.

The number of civilian personnel needed to staff an organization and the expertise required of these personnel are integral parts of the organizational structure, and is the next logical step in the organization of a PM Office. In this regard, a portion of the previous discussion has relevance. The percentage breakout of personnel within each division and by phases of the life cycle will indicate the expertise needed at specific points in time during the acquisition cycle.

An important issue, as indicated previously, is the question of competent people. However, the writer is not aware of any criteria for measurement of competence. Competence, then, resolves itself down to the PM's judgment based upon his personal knowledge of individuals versus a documented record of expertise. The writer agrees that the PM should be afforded an opportunity of choice, whenever feasible. The generalities associated with civilian competence or lack of it are based upon weak foundations and small samples. To infer that civilians are incompetent, functional organizations don't perform, etc., is not acceptable to the writer, for when proof is requested, the reply normally reflects an isolated incident. However, some insight into this situation is reflected in the "Parker Study". Parker states:

"... one PM exhausted those lists of supposedly qualified individuals before final selection."; and "... one PM stated that difficulty was experienced refusing priority referrals while justifying the individuals found to be more acceptable."

It would be interesting to pursue the PM's meaning of "supposedly qualified" and "individuals found to be more acceptable". From the writer's own personal experience, the best qualified people are those the PM knows. This is not to deny the PM's right to accept whomever he chooses; only to indicate that "competent people" are, in fact, an individual judgment.

The interviews with Messrs. Michellon, AMC Project Management Office, and Sarvella (Reference 12), Personnel Specialist, AMC Personnel Office, confirmed that from one to one-and-one-half months are required to obtain a list of qualified personnel. The procedure is as follows:

1. The PM initiates recruitment action to the local Civilian Personnel Officer (CPO).
2. The CPO prepares DA Form 2302-2, Career Referral Record, and forwards to AMC, indicating grade and skills desired.
3. AMC submits AMC Form 1276, Career Program Referral Listings Request, to the AMC Data Center at Tobyhanna Army Depot. (AMC Personnel advised that such requests are submitted on Thursday, only, because of Tobyhanna planned work load. However, telephone inquiries have been made, if urgency warrants.)
4. Tobyhanna, in turn, queries the computer to match grades, skills, and geographical performance with the request and then submits AMC Form 1320, Career Program Referral Listing, to AMC. (There is one form for each individual referred. The form lists pertinent data for each individual considered qualified to fill the position vacancy.) (It must be noted that unless an individual has indicated his preference for PM consideration and in the specific geographical area in which the vacancy exists, he will not be referred, regardless of his qualification.)
5. Upon receipt of the above data, an AMC ad hoc committee is formed whose members evaluate each referral and document their findings on AMC Form 1321, Ad.Hoc Committee Work Sheet. (The Committee is composed of three individuals: one from Personnel, a representative of the AMC Project Management Office who will service the PM, and a representative with the expertise to be evaluated; i.e., Comptroller, Engineer, etc.)
6. The names are selected, and about ten are submitted to the PM for his evaluation and selection.

The writer has been personally exposed to the selection process on various occasions and has never been personally interviewed when the position vacancy involved a transfer. The writer has been, on occasion, queried by phone as to interest in a particular vacancy. The PM has latitude in selection, and there are various methods to speed up the process. It must be recognized that the various Civil Service Regulations may, at times, force PMs, as well as others, to fill vacancies by priority referral, Reduction-in-Force procedures, etc. However, as a general rule,

and whenever feasible, both AMC (Messrs. Michellon and Sarvella) and Mr. Emil Miklas (Reference 13), Civilian Personnel Officer, Rock Island Arsenal, advised that the PM gets what he wants.

It is difficult and wasted effort to debate the time factors involved in obtaining personnel for the PM. Unless a PM has an extended "time horizon," he will be forever reacting, whether the problem be personnel or technical, cost or schedule related. Personnel recruitment actions take time. It is true such actions can be expedited; however, all PM activities cannot have top priority, nor should the PM be given the idea that anything goes. It is not the case, nor should it be. The cry of "wolf" cannot be tolerated indefinitely. LMI Task 69-28 places this time factor in perspective as follows:

"Inadequate consideration of the time it takes to process paper through the administrative mill is another weakness. It is a problem right from the start because it takes longer to build up the program office than was planned." (Reference 14.)

## Conclusions and Recommendations

### A. CONCLUSIONS.

The study conclusions are as follows:

1. The problems associated with organizing and staffing a PM Office are fostered, to some extent, by the attitude of the PMs relative to civilian-oriented organizational structure and to the Civil Service employee associated with these organizations.
2. With minor exceptions, the Army's PM organizations are standardized. Any significant tailoring of a PM Office is the exception, not the rule. In this regard, there is no one organizational structure which optimizes the process of the acquisition of major defense systems under the Project Management concept. However, historically, Army PM Offices are somewhere in between the Navy's small staff organization and the large, self-contained Air Force Program Office. So far as the Army is concerned, the direction of effort appears to be toward standardization of relatively small staffs incrementally filled and released as dictated by the various phases of the life cycle.
3. The Civil Service Regulation and the civil servant with his broad or specialized expertise stand ready to serve the Project Manager. In this connection, PMs fail to appreciate that recruitment of civilian personnel follows a prescribed pattern in order to reduce, if not preclude, grievances and resultant further delays. PMs also fail to recognize that in order to obtain manpower, actions must be initiated sufficiently in advance of requirements. The PM also fails to recognize or perhaps believe that he must compete with other high-priority areas for the manpower and skills available.
4. PMs fail to recognize that in the current environment, the manpower pool is decreasing and that the specific individuals they desire and consider "competent" may not be available for sundry reasons.
5. Documentation, although limited, is available to the PM for his use in organizing and staffing his office. AMC Project Management Office personnel brief prospective PMs and assist them in the routine tasks associated with their endeavor. AMCR 11-16, Volume II, is being staffed and incrementally approved. When published, and even in the interim, it will provide definitive guidance for the PM.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. As soon as possible after approval of the ROC, and in conjunction with the assignment of the prospective PM to the Special Task Force, a Deputy PM should be designated and appointed to the Task Force. As the alter-ego of the PM, the Deputy will not only provide the continuity to the program, but also will provide the requisite knowledge of civilian personnel policy and procedures in order to plan for the organization and staffing of the PM Office.
2. Opt for the standardization proposed in AMCR 11-16 (Vol II, Draft), and as practiced by the US Army Materiel Command. Extensive tailoring should be accomplished only if absolutely necessary for reasons peculiar to a specific program.
3. Afford the civil servant an opportunity to prove himself. Do not prejudge him. Be willing to train civilian personnel to either meet desired skill levels or to reinforce existing skills not only for the short run benefits, but most importantly to strengthen the base for the long run.
4. Broaden the base not only as indicated above, but also by encouraging civilian personnel to indicate their interest in PM activities by so documenting their Career Referral Record.

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This booklet is as the purpose indicates: a source of hints, lessons learned, and pitfalls seen by program managers.