Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence,

Abstract

According to the scenarios imagined by most strategists, nuclear confrontation is a game involving a trade-off between two values. First, there is the value associated with the immediate issue of contention: e.g., in the Cuban missile crisis, maintaining U.S. prestige in the world arena; in the Berlin crisis, maintaining the credibility of U.S. commitments. Second, there is the value of minimizing the possibility that an unwanted general war could result from this superpower confrontation. A trade-off relationship exists between these two values. That is, assuming a strong commitment on the part of both adversaries, any policy which tries to attain the value associated with the immediate point of contention will tend to increase the likelihood of general war. Conversely, any policy which seeks to maximize the avoidance of war will jeopardize the protection of the other value.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Oct 01, 1976
Accession Number
ADA040856

Entities

People

  • Jack L. Snyder

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Case Studies
  • Cognition
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Corporations
  • Crisis Management
  • Deterrence
  • International Relations
  • Maintenance
  • Mental Processes
  • Motivation
  • Perception
  • Psychology
  • Recognition
  • Social Psychology
  • Social Sciences
  • United States

Readers

  • Strategic Security Studies
  • Team-Based Human-Centered Cognitive Task Decision Making and Information Performance.