Vietnam, Mao, and Clausewitz.
Abstract
This memorandum discusses the strategies followed by the opposing sides in Vietnam and the influence that the teachings of Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung had on them. The author concludes that the political limitations placed on military strategy and tactics were not the main cause of the loss of the war in Vietnam. The war was lost because the American strategists, both political and military, chose the wrong strategy. Pacification was the key to victory in Vietnam, not the destruction of the North Vietnamese main force units. The author concludes that if the nature of the war had been correctly understood, American strategists would not talk today of a military victory and political defeat in Vietnam. To do so is not only a contradiction in Clausewitzian terms, but it is also to miss the whole point of the painful experience. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 1977
- Accession Number
- ADA041056
Entities
People
- William O. Staudenmaier
Organizations
- United States Army War College