

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An analysis of the likelihood and resultant effects of force reductions in Europe on the military capabilities and vulnerabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This study traces political, sociological and economic conditions in the United States and Europe which have fostered a climate conducive to consideration of mutual reduction of military forces in Europe. American willingness to participate in the Soviet-sponsored Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is the primary impetus for the Soviet

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and Eastern Bloc's decision to enter into formal negotiations concerning Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). This paper finds that reductions of NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces will likely occur and that such reductions will take place in the context of a Mutual Force Reduction Agreement. The study concludes that these reductions will have considerable impact on Allied Command Europe and that changes in that organization are required to minimize the effects of such reductions and to maintain existing military and political stability in Europe.

Abstract of

CAN NATO COPE WITH FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE?

An analysis of the likelihood and resultant effects of force reductions in Europe on the military capabilities and vulnerabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This study traces political, sociological and economic conditions in the United States and Europe which have fostered a climate conducive to consideration of mutual reduction of military forces in Europe. American willingness to participate in the Soviet-sponsored Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is the primary impetus for the Soviet and Eastern Bloc's decision to enter into formal negotiations concerning Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). As the on-going MBFR discussions offer a great potential for producing an atmosphere of continued stability in Europe, as well as suggested force reductions that will be acceptable to both East and West, the subject of unilateral force reductions by either Soviets or Americans is treated briefly. This paper finds that reductions of NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces will likely occur and that such reductions will take place in the context of a Mutual Force Reduction Agreement. The study concludes that these reductions will have considerable impact on Allied Command Europe and that changes in that organization are required to minimize the effects of such reductions and to maintain

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existing military and political stability in Europe. It is recommended that the principle of mobile defense be reaffirmed as the basis for present conventional defense, and that a study of the "chequerboard" defense concept be initiated as a potential future alternative. It is further recommended that the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe be reorganized to place a General of the Federal Republic of Germany as the Chief of Staff. Other major headquarters of Allied Command Europe should be realigned to include an FRG General as CINCNORTHAG, and appointment of a French Ceneral as CINCAFCENT as an incentive to recruit French forces back into the NATO military infrastructure. Coupled with these organizational changes, several structural realignment of forces are suggested to better balance NATO's defensive posture.

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PREFACE

In selecting the subject for this research paper, we knew that a great deal of information had already been written on NATO, but saw a real need to supplement academic discussion with a military perspective. This integrated perspective becomes increasingly significant in light of force reductions currently being negotiated by NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Believing that we are indeed on the verge of change in the political, economic and military institutions in Europe after a thirty year pause, we have endeavored to recommend some selected changes we feel essential to maintain the viability of Allied Command Europe and that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

We take this opportunity to extend our appreciation to the following persons for their assistance in providing much of the information on which this study is based: Senator Sam Nunn, Jr.; Mr. Jeffrey Record, Military Assistant to Senator Nunn and prominent military author; Dr. James A. Thomson, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA&E) RP, Europe Division; Major James E. Hankins, USA, Intelligence Support Detachment, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; Lieutenant Colonel Lewis L. Bird, Jr., USAF, Department of Defense MBFR Task Force; Commander Gerald D. Anderson, USN, Strategic

Plans and Policy Division, Chief of Naval Operations Staff, and Vice Admiral Julien J. LeBourgeois, USN, President, Naval War College. Our special thanks to the personnel of the Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island--in particular to Commander Jim Conway and Professor James E. King, Jr., who provided a great deal of encouragement during the early stages of our effort.

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CAN NATO COPE WITH FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE?

CHAPTER I

NATO POLITICAL AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Introduction.

Fundamental to understanding the climate which existed during the formative period of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an analysis of Soviet foreign policy, past and present, toward Western Europe. The United States and the Western democracies should accept the Soviet Union as a global power which can only be content with a goal of lessening the United States presence in Europe.

> . . . the Russians have always been drawn to the idea that in any geographic grouping of states, the most powerful nation should naturally assume the leadership of the group. Therefore, in the most general terms, the Russians feel that Europe is part of "their" continent, and that they have the right to be politically pre-dominant in the European area. The presence of any other super-power, under whatever pretext, is regarded, in this broad sense, as an intrusion, to be elimina-ted if possible, without endangering the security of the Soviet Union.[1]

This chapter will discuss this climate, the background against which NATO was created, and the resultant political and military organizations of the Alliance. Knowledge of these organizations is prerequisite to any analysis involving the intricate issues of force reductions, organizational and structural changes, as well as definitional problems of conventional defensive doctrine.

Background.

In undertaking a description of the origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it should be recalled that the establishment of the Alliance was above all based on a series of compromises, and reflected the synthesis of international emotions which existed during and immediately following the close of the Second World War.

> The NATO Treaty was born of collective insecurity, and much of the energies of the member nations have been directed primarily to strengthening their defence against aggression. But to provide an effective defence within the limits of financial possibilities and economic realties demanded collective defence in the true sense of the word--.[2]

Prior to the close of the Second World War, the Americans, British and Soviets met in February 1945 at Yalta, in what was to be the last of such "Big Three" conferences prior to the unconditional surrender of the Germans.[3] The outcome of this conference would later prove to be the basis for further East-West tensions and add to the Soviet paranoia for maintaining a Western "buffer zone" and a subjugated German nation.

> A study of the Yalta Conference will reveal that while the three leaders Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt parted with expressions of eternal friendship, agreement on the more urgent problems of post-war Europe was not reached. Final victory began to come closer soon after the Conference broke up; but as it came closer, arguments over vital issues became more inflamatory. Stalin remained suspicious of American and British attempts

> to maintain spheres of influence in the Balkans, or any other areas near the Russian frontiers. It was clear to all that Stalin was not going to hold to the vows he seemed to have made 'when the going was bad'.[4]

Seven weeks after the capitulation of the Germans on June 26, 1945, fifty nations signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco. Shortly thereafter, the Western Allies, as required by their wartime pledges and popular demand, began to demobilize.[5] With the exception of occupation forces in Germany and troops committed elsewhere in the world, the Allies had completed most of the demobilization of their troops during the following year and the strengths of their forces in Europe was as follows:

FIGURE 1

STRENGTH OF ALLIED FORCES IN POST-WAR EUROPE

	1945	1946
United States	3,100,000	391,000
United Kingdom	1,321,000	488,000
Canada	299,000	-0-

Source: Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, The First Five Years 1949-1954, p. 4.

Meanwhile, during this headlong race of the Allies to disarm, the Soviet Union maintained a large part of their wartime complement of military forces, which in 1945 amounted to more than four million men, and kept its war industries at full capacity to assist in rebuilding their economy and for raison d'etat. It is quite obvious that we should not

fault the Soviets for consistency of purpose; keeping military and civilian goals in sight; and for following previously articulated doctrine. Historically, the Soviets have been extremely sensitive about the vulnerability of their nearly 2000-mile European and 4000-mile Far Eastern frontiers. Although the Eastern frontier of the Soviet Union is approximately twice the length of the European border, the uninhabited distances between major cities and military outposts, as well as mountain ranges and other physical barriers, have caused them less concern (despite confrontations with Chinese military forces) as opposed to the historic sensitivity they feel for the Western border. On the European side, it is only a short distance over easily accessible terrain to their industrial heartland, and to the major political and governmental centers of the Soviet Union. Hence, one of the basic aims that motivated Soviet policy before, during and after the Second World War, was the concern to secure an absolute and decisive area of influence over any potentially destabilizing factors in the contiguous European regions considered vital to the USSR's security.[7]

The attitude of the Western democracies following the close of the war was then much the same as it had been after the close of the First World War, and quite the opposite of the Soviets' conciliation. Soviet paranoia referred to

previously in this chapter was certainly reinforced by the sacrifices of the Red Army and the great suffering and starvation experienced by literally millions of the Soviet population. It was likewise the recent memory of these dramatic events which motivated the Western governments to attempt numerous approaches to reach an accord with the Soviets concerning the future of Europe following the war.

The Potsdam Agreement of 1945 (and other Allied Accords) placed the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, some of which had been German for centuries, under the administration of the Polish government pending a final disposition of these lands by a peace treaty. The Polish Administrators then proceeded to expel 13 million Germans from these still disputed lands and replaced them with Polish settlers who had been previously evicted by the Soviets when they occupied Polish territories near their borders.[8] With these movements of peoples and the resultant shifting of national boundaries, the Soviets began to build their Western buffer zone and continued to add to the series of events that would cause the Western nations to consider the formation of a collective alliance for security.

Although for a short time following the formation of the United Nations it appeared that conciliation with the Soviets was possible, they persisted in the use of the veto in the Security Council and thereby gave further notice of future intentions to the Western world. During the

sessions that led to the signing of the United Nations Charter in 1945, Poland was not represented because the Soviet Union and its wartime Allies were unable to agree on the composition of a government that was acceptable to both sides.[9]

Also during 1945, in September, at the London Conference of wartime Allied Foreign Ministers, Mr. Molotov refused to allow any discussion of the United Kingdom's proposal to study the status of two countries divided by the war: Romania and Bulgaria. It was only after a series of concessions that the Western Powers, in November 1945, were able to obtain Soviet agreement on the procedures for drafting peace treaties with other war torn nations: Finland, Italy and Germany's former satellites in the Balkans. Although the Paris Peace Conference convened on July 29, 1946 to discuss these matters, peace treaties with Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were not formalized until February 10, 1947 because of Russian intransigence.[10]

During 1947, the Foreign Ministers again met first in Moscow during March and then in London in November, to discuss the drafting of peace treaties with Germany and Austria. They were unable to agree upon terms for these treaties because of Soviet demands. The following year, the Soviets ceased to take part in meetings of the Allied Control Council in Berlin and as a result, discussion of these treaties wasn't possible for the foreseeable future.[11]

For the period 1942 to 1947, the Communist Parties of the Western nations had adopted a Soviet inspired policy of relative moderation, and of participation in the governments of Western Europe under the guise of nationalism, patriotism and even disassociation with the USSR.[12] As Stalin reviewed Western political and economic initiatives (Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, et. al.) for the post-war period, he created the Cominform in September 1947. Its predecessor, The Comintern, had been dissolved for reasons of political sensitivity during the war, and the Cominform was to be the new forum for collective Communist Party action in the Western nations. The members of this Soviet appointed organization were the leaders of the Communist Parties in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and later the Netherlands.[13] By the latter part of 1947, the Communist Parties of Western Europe were creating a great deal of labor unrest, with emphasis on direction of the trade unions in France and Italy.[14]

The years of methodical Soviet expansion and annexation of the Eastern European nations that now lay within their strategic buffer, began to show their greatest promise with the formation of a new pro-Soviet government in Hungary by the Communist Party on November 21, 1947. The Nagy government had been forced to resign on May 29th culminating a

Communist campaign of violence endorsed and directed by the Soviet Union.[15]

In Bulgaria, Nicolas Petkov, leader of the Agraian Party and the opposition to the Communist Party, was accused of plotting a military coup d'etat and subsequently hanged on September 23, 1947. His party was dissolved, and on December 11, 1947 a predominantly Communist cabinet assumed control of the government. In Romania, following suspect elections, King Michael abdicated on January 1, 1948. In Poland the opposition in the form of the Peasant Party was dissolved on November 21, 1947, and in Czechoslovakia a Communist government was formed following the resignation of President Benes in February effective in May 1948. In less than one year, the Kremlin had successfully gained control over the governments in Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Sofia and Warsaw.[16]

A summary of Soviet expansion during and following the Second World War indicates the re-establishment of a sphere of influence which included territories previously controlled by Tsarist Russia during the 19th Century.

During the post-war period of Soviet expansion in Europe, the countries of Western Europe looked to the United States, quite naturally, as the only nation with adequate resources to impress the Soviet Union. Following the March 12, 1947 enunciation of the Truman Doctrine to assist

and support free peoples throughout the world who were trying to resist "subjugation by outside pressure," the United States Congress authorized the appropriation of 400 million dollars for aid to mitigate Soviet pressure against Greece and Turkey. The USSR by that time had succeeded in supporting the Civil War in Greece (albeit through 3rd parties) and pressuring the Turkish government to allow the Soviets to annex certain strategic politico-military areas contiguous to their borders.[17] However, this aid in the form of dollars and civilian and military missions was designed specifically to assist those two countries. Meanwhile, the rest of the Western Europe was having a great deal of difficulty dealing with economic recovery while coping with Communist inspired labor unrest, and was, in fact, on the verge of total economic collapse. To provide requisite support in the form of aid, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced the American sponsored European Recovery Program in a June 5, 1947 speech at Harvard University. After some hesitation, Stalin refused Russian participation in the Plan and despite early intentions to do otherwise, Poland and Czechoslovakia likewise did not participate.[18]

FIGURE 2

SOVIET EXPANSION 1940-1948

Year	Area	Population (Millions)	Square Miles
1940	Estonia	1.1	18,300
1940	Latvia	2.0	25,400
1940	Lithuania	3.0	21,500
1945	Part of East Germany (Prussia)	1.2	5,400
1945	Part of Poland	11.8	69,900
1945	Part of Czechoslovakia	.7	4,900
1945	Part of Romania	3.7	19,400
1945	Soviet Zone of Germany	18.8	42,900
1946	Albania	1.2	10,629
1947	Poland	26.5	120,355
1947	Bulgaria	7.2	42,796
1947	Hungary	9.8	35,902
1948	Romania	16.1	91,584
1948	Czechoslovakia	12.3	49,381

Source: NATO Information Service, NATO Facts and Figures, 1969, p. 17 (as amended by the authors).

The central design of the Marshall Plan was its collective approach in dealing with the economic needs of the war-torn European nations. The Marshall Plan required that participating countries agree on their collective requirements and submit a majority approved request for aid to the United States for action.[19] Although the participants had argued in favor of a series of bilateral aid agreements, the United States persisted, and the comprehensive collective approach resulted in the formation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Accordingly, the demanding economic problems of Europe and the uninhibited

thinking of economists participating in the OEEC, opened up many issues for examination, including those which were essentially political.[20] Thus, the United States in creating a collective program for recovery of member European States, was in fact reacting to what was felt to be the basic inequities of the old nation-state system and the cause of the German expansionism of the twentieth century. It is impossible to describe the impact of the Marshall Plan on the future course of history in Europe and the Free World. It is certainly one of the economic success stories of modern history. This doctrine encompassed some of the ideas of Schuman, Monnet, Acheson, and others, and was in the main responsible for the scheme of joint Western European effort that replaced the outmoded system of European nationalism and may yet prove to be the basis for the United States of Europe.

Stalin obviously considered the Marshall Plan a political as well as an economic threat as a result of the unstable post-war environment in Europe.

> . . . The Italian settlement, the protests over Eastern Europe, and the abrupt ending of Lend-Lease might have appeared as hostile acts. Anglo-American bizonal fusion in Germany and the increases in the level of permitted production in the western zones, although legitimate responses to administrative difficulties, could have been viewed by the Soviet Union as indications of increasing Western hostility and as evidence of an intention to use Germany against the East . . . French adherence to the Anglo-American program for Germany, and the veto of

> the Soviet proposal for four power control of the Ruhr must have appeared as sledgehammer blows to the Kremlin. This impression must have been reinforced critically in the summer of 1947 when JCS 1067, providing for the dismantling of German heavy industry, was formally revoked.[21]

Therefore, Russia's opposition to the Marshall Plan, continued expansionism, use of the veto within the United Nations, creation of the Cominform, maintenance of a large standing Armed Force, retention of wartime industry, reorganization and rearming of the satellite Armies of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, and the February 1948 Prague coup, figured prominently in the signing of the Treaty of Brussels on March 17, 1948. This was the first European collective security treaty of its nature following the Second World War and was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The treaty was suggested by the previously negotiated bilateral Dunkirk Treaty between France and Great Britain and the signing of the Rio Treaty between the United States and a majority of the Latin American nations.[22] The Brussels Treaty was a fifty year pact (ostensibly aimed at a future German State) which provided for a political body of the Foreign Ministers of the five member nations and a subordinate military body consisting of the Defense Ministers of those five member states known as the Western Defense Committee.[23]

With firm backing of the United States Congress and President Truman, on April 30, 1948 the Western Defense Committee of the Brussels Treaty Organization met to determine their military needs and how much supplementary aid should be requested from the United States. From July 1948 onward, American and Canadian observers attended meetings of the Committee with a "non-member" status. In September 1948, the Western Union Defense Organization was created to carry out plans for mutual military support among the signatories of the Brussels Treaty. Field Marshal Montgomery (United Kingdom) was appointed permanent Chairman of the Land, Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief Committee with subordinate officers to serve as Commanders-in-Chief for the Army, Air and Navy. This organization was headquartered in Fontainbleau, France.[24]

On June 11, 1948, Resolution 239, the Vandenberg Resolution, was passed by the United States Senate enabling the United States to enter regional and collective security arrangements during peacetime.* Unlike the authority which permitted this country to enter into bilateral security arrangements, this legislative initiative recommended that the United States be a party to preliminary talks with the

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*For the full text of the Vandenberg Resolution see Appendix I, page 210.

Brussels signatories and the Canadians. These talks began in Washington on July 6, 1948 and centered on the creation of a Treaty for the collective defense of Western nations. This single document, more than any other, had the effect of moving the United States out of the normal post-war isolationism which we had experienced before in our history and seemed to be facing again at the close of the Second World War.

Following the termination of these exploratory talks, the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Organization announced their agreement on the need for a defense pact in the North Atlantic area. The negotiators stated their desires that the Irish Republic and Sweden accede to the Brussels Treaty and join the talks for a broader alliance but, of course, they did not. Throughout the North Atlantic Alliance negotiations, the Soviets were very active politically trying to discourage the conclusion of the talks and the promulgation of a North Atlantic Treaty. Particularly singled out for harrassment was Norway. The Norwegians, for years, interested observers to the Western Alliance developments, had insisted throughout the 1940's that any Scandinavian (regional) Pact and subsequent defense association be aligned with appropriate Western Alliances. However, the Swedes would not consider abandoning their "workable" neutrality and hence consideration of such a

regional pact failed. Prior to formally inquiring about the prospects of an Atlantic Treaty, Norway received an offer of a bilateral Soviet non-aggression pact which they subsequently refused in the face of oblique threats from the Soviets and Eastern Bloc nations.[25] Denmark, of course, had experienced the "Bornholm occupation" after the Second World War and likewise faced the difficult choice of post-war alignment.

On January 29, 1949, in an act of frustration with recent events in the West, the Soviets warned all Europeans that a North Atlantic Alliance was only a tool of Anglo-Saxon imperialist aims, and on March 31, 1949, they directly warned the group of twelve nations who were the prospective signatories to such a pact that it would controvert the intentions of the United Nations Charter if they were to formalize such an agreement. Disregarding these empty threats, the North Atlantic Treaty* was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949 by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Greece and Turkey were to accede to the provisions of the Treaty on February 18, 1952[26] and the Federal Republic of Germany became a member on May 5, 1955 following the ratification of the Paris Agreements by the Allies.[27]

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*For the full text of the North Atlantic Treaty see Appendix II, page 212.

The Political Organization-Implementation of the Treaty.

On April 5, 1949, one day following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the five nations who were also signatories to the Brussels Treaty submitted a request for military and financial assistance to the United States. Denmark, Italy and Norway also submitted similar requests for this type of aid to the United States. The United States responded to these requests by proposing a program of military assistance to any nation whose "independence and freedom were threatened." The total value of this collective offer was a "then year" total of $1,450,000,000 for fiscal year 1950, with approximately $1,000,000,000 reserved expressly for European members of NATO.[28]

Addressing the subject of future United States sponsored programs for mutual aid (collective defense alliances/ treaties) in a speech before a Senate Committee on April 27, 1949, Secretary of State Acheson stated:

> . . . the North Atlantic Treaty does not bind the United States to the proposed military assistance program, nor indeed to any program. It does bind the United States to the principle of self-help and mutual aid. Within this principle, each Party to the Pact must exercise its own honest judgment as to what it can and should do to develop and maintain its own capacity to resist and help others. The judgment of the Executive Branch of this Government is that the United States can and should provide military assistance to assist other countries in the Pact to maintain their collective security.[29]

The following is a summary of actions taken by the United States government to implement military aid and assistance programs in the period immediately following the signing of the North Atlantic Pact.

FIGURE 3

SUMMARY OF UNITED STATES ACTIONS FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT

July 25, 1949	The President submits Mutual Defense Assistance Bill to Congress.
August 10, 1949	Visit of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Europe.
October 6, 1949	Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 signed by the President.
October 7, 1949	Director of the Military Assistance Program appointed.
November 1949	Department of Defense creates an Office of Military Assistance.
January 27, 1950	Eight NATO members and the U.S. sign bilateral military aid agreements.
March 8, 1950	French aircraft carrier Dixmude receives first shipment of U.S. military aid and equipment at Norfolk, VA.

Source: Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, The First Five Years 1949-1954, p. 23, 24.

The North Atlantic Treaty was ratified by the governments of the signatories on August 24, 1949.[30] It was at this point that the member nations began the difficult task of creating a structure to manage and implement the actions

and goals required by the Treaty, and to enunciate an agreed upon collective defense policy. The first session of the North Atlantic Council was held in Washington on September 17, 1949 and the following decisions reached: the Council would consist of the Foreign Ministers of the member nations;* they would meet annually (except for emergency situations covered by the Treaty); the Chairmanship would be held by each of the Foreign Ministers in turn; English and French would be the official languages of NATO; a Defense Committee was established to consist of the Defense Ministers of the member nations (they were to meet annually and were to prepare unified defense plans for the North Atlantic); the Defense Committee should include certain subordinate organizations** to include five Regional Planning Groups to be titled the Northern European, Western European, Southern European-Western Mediterranean, Canadian-United States, and the North Atlantic Groups.[31]

At the second session of the Council held on November 18, 1949 in Washington, two new defense-related agencies were created: the Defense Financial and Economic Committee, and a Military Production and Supply Board.[32]

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*For the Original Configuration of the North Atlantic Council see Figure 11, page 44.

**See the Military Organization Section of this chapter, page 27, and Figure 12, page 45.

The Defense Finance Committee was to be based in London and was to consist of member nation Finance Ministers who would report as a body to their Foreign Ministers comprising the Atlantic Council. This organization was created to provide needed expertise concerning economic guidelines for future defense planning, to suggest plans for the mobilization of financial resources during emergencies, and more importantly, it was designed to measure the individual and collective economic impact of prospective NATO defense programs. This group was also given the responsibility of providing guidance, and ultimately procedures, for implementing financial arrangements for the transfer of military materials among member nations and also between member and non-member nations.[33] The Military Production and Supply Board was also to be based in London and would report to the Defense Committee directly. Its primary functions were to recommend methods of increasing critical items when they fell below required stockage levels and to promote more efficient production of military equipment by the member nations.[34]

To digress from the subject of this section at this point, even at this early stage of NATO's existence, it must have been quite obvious to all Parties (as it is painfully so to us now), that standardization of military equipment was essential to provide a viable tactical capability for NATO. At that time there were approximately fourteen

divisions in Western Europe against some 200 Soviet divisions (size and capabilities of division-sized units differing, of course). Despite the recognition of this problem some thirty years ago, and the establishment of an organization to deal with it, NATO has been, in the main, unable to provide the solution. One has only to examine the structure of the Unified Armed Forces, the military arm of the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization, to see the dramatic increase in capability available to that force because of their practice of commonality of arms and munitions. It is argued frequently that this standardization of arms by the Warsaw Pact has been achieved only at tremendous political and social cost to the Bloc countries at the hands of the Kremlin. While this observation is certainly valid, as evidenced in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia during the 1960's, this in no way diminishes the successful application of the methodology of standardization in production and usage by their joint forces. Many authors continue to analyze NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities without considering standardization: a quantum error. Will NATO ever effectively solve the problem of standardization? Yes, they should. They will because the financial solvency and the economic excesses of the 1960's are gone and the economic realities and continuing threat of the 1970's dictate that they must. The remainder of the decade and the potential

economic problems of the 1980's which will face the remaining partners of the Atlantic Alliance (whatever it is to be called), require at the very least, in the face of a strong and continuing Soviet threat, that NATO nations (and other prudent Western nations and emerging third world countries) standardize every possible armament and munitions, decentralize and redistribute production of component as well as major weapons systems, and possibly place the authority to direct NATO procurement in the hands of the Alliance Commander.* It is evident that the Soviets have been, and will continue thinking along similar lines to improve management and military capabilities.

> In increasing the defensive might of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, great importance is attached to the further improvement of its organs of Management. In accordance with the decisions of the Budapest Conference of the Political Advisory Committee in 1969, the Committee of Defense Ministers was established and is now functioning. This committee elaborates coordinated recommendations and proposals on questions pertaining to strengthening the defensive capability of allied countries and to increasing the combat readiness of the Unified Armed Forces. Sittings of the Committee of Defense Ministers, held in December 1969 in Moscow and in May 1970 in Sofia, discussed matters relating to the strengthening of the defensive capability of Warsaw Treaty member nations and examined current problems pertaining to increasing the combat readiness of the troops.[35]

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*For an innovative approach to the solution of international logistics problems see Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, U. S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative, The Brookings Institute (Washington: 1974).

Continuing their efforts to build an administrative structure for NATO, the Council decided during a May 15, 1950 meeting in London, to establish the Council Deputies Organization to supervise administration of the Alliance's civilian and military bodies. This group was to be composed of the deputies to the Foreign Ministers of each member country and was to meet in continuous session in London.[36]

In May 1951 the Defense Committee and the Defense Financial and Economic Board were abolished and a Financial and Economic Board was established in Paris where it would have access to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. The effect of this reorganization was that the Council Deputies, in effect, became the single permanent "working" organization of the North Atlantic Council. To assist this body, an International Staff was created. The North Atlantic Council was not the Alliance's one Ministerial level body.[37] To complete this phase of the restructuring, an "Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International Staff" was signed in September 1951, to formalize the operation of the political-civilian component of NATO.[38]

On September 20, 1951 in Ottawa, Canada, the Council appointed a Temporary Council Committee and a three man Executive Board to reconcile requirements of collective

security with the political and economic capabilities of member countries. This Executive Board, consisting of Mssrs. Harriman (U.S.), Monnet (France), and Plowden (U.K.), had the unenviable task of deciding whether the military authorities were asking too much or whether their governments were offering too little for defense. This small, powerful group was obviously created to overcome some of the bureaucratic "red-tape" that had already surfaced in the NATO organization, and soon became known as the "Three Wise Men" to friends or accusers alike.[39] The procedures established by this Executive Board were the forerunners of those used today in NATO to determine what share of the collective defense burden each member should have to bear.

At the Lisbon, Portugal meeting of February 1952, the Council Deputies, Defense Production Board, and the Financial and Economic Board were dissolved and the Permanent Council created to handle their functions. Its Chairman was to be the Vice Chairman of the Ministerial Council who was also to be appointed to the Office of Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On March 12, 1952, Lord Ismay, Secretary for Commonwealth Relations in the United Kingdom was appointed as the first Secretary General of NATO. The International Staff was established in Paris and during that year the member nation Permanent Representatives and national delegations were also located there.[40]

From this point onward, despite numerous inter-office and minor administrative and functional staff reorganizations, the basic civilian and political structure remained the same. Today, the highest civil authority of the Alliance is the North Atlantic Council which is composed of representatives of the fifteen nations who are currently members. The Council, however, can meet in a variety of roles depending on respective governmental positions of the attending representatives and the subject matter on the agenda. Accordingly, the Council meets at the Ministerial level (Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance or Economic Affairs) at least twice a year, and at the NATO Ambassadorial level is in permanent session at the Brussels Headquarters, meeting at least once a week. The Foreign Ministers, on a rotating basis, are designated as honorary President of the Council, and the Secretary General is Chairman of the Council at whatever level it meets. Besides the Ministerial and Ambassadorial level meetings described above, the Council also meets as the Defense Planning Committee, the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group.* All decisions made in the Council, at whatever level

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*The DPC is composed of all nations in the integrated military structure; the NDAC consists of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and the NPG consists of eight nations selected from the members of the NDAC. Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO, NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1969), p. 159.

it is meeting, are by common consent (often difficult to arrive at, and almost always decided by caucus before the session for the record) and not by a majority vote.[41]

The Council decision process is assisted by a number of Committees which were created over the years to study questions submitted to them and to provide assessments or recommendations. There are currently committees which deal with the following fields of interest to the members of the Council: political affairs, economics, armaments, defense review, nuclear defense, science, ecology, infrastructure, communications, civil emergency planning, information and cultural relations, and civil and military planning. In addition to these general fields of interest, there are committees established as necessary to deal with specialized subjects, e.g., NATO pipelines, European air space, etc.[42]

The NATO civil staff, the International Secretariat, is comprised of a staff of professional employees from all member nations and is presently configured as followed.

FIGURE 4

CONFIGURATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT

Secretary General
Deputy Secretary General
- Private Office
- Legal Adviser
- Office of the Executive Secretary
- Office of Security

Office of Council Operations and Communications
    Council Operations Directorate
    Communications and Electronics Directorate
Office of Administration
    Personnel Services
    Conference and Linguistics Services
    Statistics Services
Financial Controller
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs
    Political Affairs Directorate
    Economic Affairs Directorate
    Information Directorate
    Press Service
Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning & Policy
    Force Planning Directorate
    Nuclear Planning Directorate
    Civil Emergency Planning
Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support
    Resources Directorate
    Infrastructure Directorate
    Defense Review Directorate

Source: NATO Information Service, NATO Handbook, 1975, p. 35, 43-47.

Each of the four Assistant Secretaries General is normally the Chairman of the main committee which deals primarily with the subject area which corresponds to that which his staff is responsible for.

The Military Organization.

As stated previously, during their first meetings in September 1949, the North Atlantic Council created a Defense Committee composed of the Defense Ministers of member nations, with the responsibility for developing coordinated defense plans for the North Atlantic area. In addition to this organization, a number of subordinate, permanent military bodies were created. A Military Committee, consisting

of member nation Chiefs-of-Staff, was then established to advise the Defense Committee and the Atlantic Council concerning military matters. A Standing Group was created as the Military Committee's Executive body, for the stated purpose of providing "strategic guidance" concerning areas in which NATO forces operated. This organization was composed of representatives from France, the United Kingdom and the United States.[43] Five regional groups were also created to develop defense plans for their respective areas.

FIGURE 5

REGIONAL PLANNING GROUPS ESTABLISHED BY NATO

Regional Area of Interest	Group Members
Northern Europe	Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom
Western Europe	Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom
Southern Europe/Western Mediterranean	France, Italy, United Kingdom
Canada/United States	Canada, United States
North Atlantic Ocean	All countries except Italy and Luxembourg

Source: NATO Information Service, NATO Facts and Figures 1969, p. 29.

On November 18, 1949, the Council created two additional organizations to deal with military matters. The Defense Financial and Economic Committee, consisting of

the Finance Ministers of member nations, was to work with the Standing Group and the Military Committee to provide overall financial and economic guidance for defense programs. The Military Production and Supply Board was, as mentioned previously, to promote standardization and technical research of systems for military application, reporting directly to the Defense Committee.[44]

During their meeting in September 1950, which followed the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the Council was particularly concerned with promoting the concept of a "Forward Strategy" for Europe that would deter aggression. The application of such a strategy in Europe would obviously require a large increase in the numbers of Western troops available for this purpose, and the development of coordinated defense plans. The Atlantic Council therefore requested that the Military Committee plan the establishment of a structure to integrate national forces under a centralized command to be directed by a supreme commander appointed by NATO. Realizing that such a strategy necessarily includes planning defense and maneuver against a Bloc threat on Germany territory, on December 18, 1950, the Council requested that the three occupying powers in Western Germany discuss with post-war German authorities future ways to include the Federal Republic's political and military participation in NATO. These difficult and sometimes "stormy" negotiations by

the occupying powers culminated with the signing of the Paris Agreements on October 23, 1954, which regularized relations between the NATO countries and West Germany, invited the FRG to join NATO, and which supplied guarantees concerning future European force and armament levels.[45]

Following a recommendation by the Defense Committee to establish a Supreme Headquarters in Europe, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) on December 19, 1950, culminating many months of behind-the-scenes discussions between President Truman and Western political leaders. General Eisenhower's Command, to be known as Allied Command Europe (ACE),* and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), were established at Marly-le-Roi (Rocquencourt) near Paris, France on April 2, 1951. Arriving in Paris in January 1951, the "U.S. Advance Planning Group, SHAPE" consisted of about sixty American officers and men who were assisted by National Liaison Officers. These liaison officers were to process and channel requests for officers and men from the Planning Group to their respective governments. By the date that SHAPE was activated officially, there were a total of 183 officers from nine nations and 163 enlisted men from six

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*For the Original Configuration of ACE (1954), see Figures 13-17, pages 46-50.

nations serving at the new Headquarters.[46] Lord Ismay, described some of the problems that faced this new international staff.

> . . . How was this staff to be organized? On the American system, which was not unlike the French? Or on the British system, which was different from both? How were the staff appointments to be distributed among the various nationalities so as to ensure that each and all were fairly represented? What was to be the command structure through which the Supreme Commander would exercise control? Where were the Headquarters to be situated?[47]

The majority of key staff appointments proved to be French, British and American, as one might expect. Although there is now a wider representation of nationalities in the NATO command structure, the SHAPE organization (minus Air and Naval Deputies) remains today* basically as it was in 1951.

FIGURE 6

INITIAL SHAPE STAFF

SACEUR (American) General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (British) Field Marshal Montgomery
Air Deputy (British) Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders
Naval Deputy (French) Vice Admiral Andre Georges Lemonnier
Chief of Staff (American)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations (British)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics and Administration (French)
Chiefs of Divisions
Chiefs of Branches

Source: NATO's Fifteen Nations Magazine, SHAPE and Allied Command Europe 1971, p. 30, 31.

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*Current SHAPE Staffs are listed as Figures 18-20, pages 51-53.

Obviously, as the first SACEUR was American, so was his Chief of Staff. The staff system selected for the new Headquarters was based on the American concept of separate bureaus for administration, intelligence, plans and operations, and logistics, with provision for special staffs such as finance, communications and automatic data processing. Likewise, staff terminology and procedures were largely American in origin.[48]

The planning functions for the new NATO military organization during the early 1950's were the responsibilities of the Regional Planning Groups. Long range planning was based on the assumption that war might start by 1954; short range planning was for any contingency to meet "sudden aggression." The Standing Group was expected to estimate what NATO forces were necessary to defend against projected threats. In January 1951, the Standing Group asked Allied Command Europe to assume the operational planning being performed by three of the five* Regional Planning Groups. Planning for the Western Europe area was taken over by the Allied Army

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*The Regional Planning Group for the North Atlantic Ocean was later divided into several naval commands, including Allied Command Atlantic and Allied Command Channel. The RPG for Canada/United States still meets alternately in Ottawa and Washington. NATO's Fifteen Nations Magazine, SHAPE and Allied Command Europe (Brussels: PID-SHAPE, 1971), p. 33.

Forces Central Europe* (AAFCE) and the Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AIRCENT) on April 2, 1951. On June 21, 1951, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) assumed the planning responsibilities for the Southern Europe and Western Mediterranean area. Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) took over the planning functions for the North European area on July 31, 1951.[49]

In 1952, the military structure of NATO was then broadened by the addition of two new commands (co-equal in authority with ACE over their areas of respective responsibilities). The Atlantic Command was established in Norfolk, Virginia in January, and the Channel Command was activated in February at Portsmouth, England. The first Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic was Vice Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, United States Navy, and Admiral Sir Arthur John Power, Royal Navy, was designated the first Commander-in-Chief Channel.[50]

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*These major subordinate commands of NATO were redesignated as follows: Allied Army Forces Central Europe was renamed Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT) on August 2, 1951. Two years later, on August 20, 1953, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) was established as a superior headquarters to both LANDCENT and AIRCENT. At the same time, Flag Officer Central Europe, established on April 2, 1951, was redesignated Commander, Allied Naval Forces Central Europe (COMNAVCENT), also under AFCENT. NAVCENT was deactivated in 1962. Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED) also existed as a Major Subordinate Command in the Southern Region from March 15, 1953 to June 5, 1967. NATO's Fifteen Nations Magazine, SHAPE and Allied Command Europe (Brussels: PID-SHAPE, 1971), p. 33.

Aside from minor organizational and administrative changes, there have been relatively few changes in either the civil bodies which govern the operation of the NATO military structure, or in the military structure itself. It is worthy of note, however, that the extremely influential Standing Group was dissolved in 1966 for numerous political reasons, although for all practical purposes the influence of the United States and the United Kingdom remains reflected in the day-to-day functioning of the Military Committee.[51] The Military Committee remains today the highest military authority in the Alliance, and is responsible for recommendations and supplying guidance on military matters to the Defense Planning Committee and the Atlantic Council. Except for France (which withdrew in 1967) and Iceland (which has no military forces), this committee is composed of the Chiefs-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of each member nation. The Presidency of the Military Committee rotates annually in the alphabetical order of countries, but the Chairman is elected by the Committee for a period of two to three years. There is also a Deputy Chairman elected who is responsible for the coordination of nuclear matters within the International Military Staff and for all questions pertaining to Mutual *and Balanced Force Reductions.* Each Chief-of-Staff then appoints a Permanent Military Representative to conduct the

routine business of the Committee, as the Chiefs-of-Staff are only in attendance at the full Committee sessions twice a year. Liaison between the Military Committee and the French High Command is conducted through the offices of the Chief of the French Military Mission to the Military Committee. The Chairman of the Military Committee is a representative of that body to the North Atlantic Council and speaks for them at meetings of the Council.[52]

Before discussing further aspects of the organization and functioning of NATO military staffs, it should be noted that the Military Committee itself has a number of NATO military agencies under its authority.

FIGURE 7

AGENCIES SUBORDINATE TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

Allied Long Lines Agency (ALLA), Brussels, Belgium
- focal point for plans and policies for NATO long lines communications requirements.

Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD), Neuilly-sur-Seine, France
- assures cooperation in research and development, exchange of technical information and provides scientific and technical advice.

Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), Brussels, Belgium
- aims to foster military standardization, has an international staff and representatives of all member nations.

NATO Defense College (NDC), Rome, Italy
- trains military and civilian officials for key NATO posts.

Source: NATO Information Service, NATO Handbook 1975, Annex 3, p. 51.

The Military Committee is assisted in performing its functions by a group of professional staff officers and assistants in the body of the International Military Staff (IMS). A Director is selected from one of the six nations who staff the organization, and he is assisted by six Assistant Directors of general officer rank, and by the Secretary, who is also selected from among the members of the staff nominated by the member nations. The Assistant Directors head Divisions of the IMS concerned with the following areas (much the same as a military staff organization): Intelligence; Plans and Policy; Operations; Management and Logistics; Communications and Electronics; and Command, Control, and Information Systems. The IMS is generally responsible to the Military Committee for preparing plans, initiating studies, and recommending policy on matters of a military nature.[53]

Turning to the NATO Military Commands, the three major commands established in the early fifties, shortly after the ratification of the Atlantic Treaty, remain unchanged today: the Atlantic Ocean Command, the European Command, and the Channel Command. As previously mentioned in the remarks introducing this paper, discussions of the Atlantic and Channel Commands are necessarily sketchy in order to permit concentration of the structure of Allied Command Europe as the vehicle to discuss the subject of this thesis.

The area of geographic responsibility for the Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) extends from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the North American coastal waters (including islands such as Iceland and the Azores) to those of Europe and Africa. The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) (a U.S. Admiral), headquartered at Norfolk, Virginia receives his orders and direction from the Military Committee and commands several subordinate units.

FIGURE 8

ORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC

The Western Atlantic Command
- Submarine Force Western Atlantic Area
- Ocean Sub-Area
- Canadian Atlantic Sub-Area
- Bermuda Command
- Azores Command
- Greenland Command

The Eastern Atlantic Command
- Maritime Air Eastern Atlantic Area
- Northern Sub-Area
- Maritime Air Northern Sub-Area
- Central Sub-Area
- Maritime Air Central Sub-Area
- Submarine Force Eastern Atlantic Area
- Island Commanders of Iceland and the Faeroes

The Striking Fleet Atlantic Command
- Carrier Striking Force
- Carrier Striking Groups One and Two

The Submarines Allied Command Atlantic

The Iberian Atlantic Command
- Island Command of Madeira

The Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT)--afloat. This Force comprises an international squadron of ships from NATO countries normally operating in the Atlantic.

Source: NATO Information Service, NATO Handbook 1975, Annex 2, p. 39, 49, 50.

SACLANT's responsibilities are almost entirely operational. Peacetime responsibilities include the normal staff planning function, conducting joint exercises for training, and developing strategic requirements for NATO. During war, his primary duties are to insure security in the Atlantic area by guarding the sea lanes and denying their use to the enemy.[54]

The Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN) includes the English Channel and the southern area of the North Sea as its geographical areas of responsibility. The Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN) (a U.K. Admiral), headquarters at Northwood, the United Kingdom, also receives his orders directly from the Military Committee, and commands several subordinate units.

FIGURE 9

ORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIED COMMAND CHANNEL

The Nore Channel Command

The Plymouth Channel Command

The Benelux Channel Command

The Commander Maritime Air Channel Command

The Standing Naval Force Channel (Mine Countermeasure)--afloat
- This is a permanent force comprising mine countermeasures vessels of Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Source: NATO Information Service, NATO Handbook 1975, p. 40, 50.

The mission of CINCHAN is to control and protect merchant shipping in his area of responsibility, cooperating with SACEUR in the air defense of the English Channel. Assigned forces for an emergency are predominantly naval but also include maritime air forces. CINCHAN is advised by a Channel Committee consisting of the Naval Chiefs-of-Staff of Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.[55]

Prior to turning to ACE, the Canada-United States Regional Planning Board is worthy of mention. This body is the only surviving member of the original five Regional Planning Groups. As mentioned previously, this group meets alternately in Ottawa and Washington. Its responsibilities remain to develop plans for the defense of the Canada-United States region for the Military Committee. The planning functions for the other four planning groups have been incorporated into the staff functions and responsibilities of the three main NATO military commands.

The Allied Command Europe is responsible for the geographic area which extends from the North Cape to the Mediterranean and from the Atlantic to the eastern border of

Turkey (excluding the United Kingdom and Portugal--defended by overlapping command responsibilities). SHAPE, located near Mons, Belgium, houses a large, complex bureaucracy which is somewhat understandable when one considers that it originated from the efforts of General Gruenther's U.S. Advance Planning Group. SHAPE principal staff agencies, positions and nationalities are listed in an Appendix,* and ACE subordinate commands which are treated in this paper are identified below:

FIGURE 10

MAJOR HEADQUARTERS SUBORDINATE TO ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

Allied Forces Northern Europe (Kolsaas, Norway)
British General
- Allied Forces North Norway
- Allied Forces South Norway
- Allied Forces Baltic Approaches

Allied Forces Central Europe (Brunssum, Netherlands)
German General
- Northern Army Group - British General
- Central Army Group - American General
- Allied Air Forces Central Europe - American General
  (2nd Allied Tactical Air Force)
  (4th Allied Tactical Air Force)

Allied Forces Southern Europe (Naples, Italy) American Admiral
- Allied Land Forces Southern Europe
- Allied Land Forces South-Eastern Europe
- Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
- Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe
- Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe

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*The principal SHAPE staffs are listed as Figures 18-20, pages 51-53.

The UK Air Defense Region Command (High Wycombe, UK)

The Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Seckenheim, Germany)

Source: NATO Information Service, NATO Handbook 1975, p. 38, 49, and others.

As in the case of the other NATO Commanders, SACEUR reports to the Military Committee and is responsible for making recommendations to improve the organization of his command. During wartime his powers are much expanded, and because of the location of his forces in relation to Bloc and Soviet forces, he plays the key role in the defense of NATO members and Western Europe. He would control all land, sea and air operations within his theater of responsibility, even to the point of carrying out operations involving national internal defense areas and coastal waters, although such are normally the purview of national authorities.[56]

Perspective.

> In order to strengthen West European resilience against Soviet political pressures based on the three of force, the task for the Alliance is essentially threefold: (1) to formulate jointly a politically acceptable strategy; (2) to effect the required force improvements and modifications that will give the Western posture sufficient flexibility to meet the formidable military challenge confronting it; (3) to restore the mutual confidence that is indispensible to Alliance elan and to consensus on strategy.[57]

The danger inherent in a shallow or completely politically motivated analysis of the recent period of detente

with the Soviets are manifest. It should be remembered that although the Soviet threat appears to be latent, their military capabilities have not declined nor has the industrial base which supports it. Perhaps more important, is the danger in postulating Soviet intentions; such predictions cannot be the basis for deciding Western military preparedness.

Some authors indicate that American policy was every bit as hostile as that of the Soviets during the post-war period of the forties. This notion is not consistent with the realities of that period. Although it is recognized that the Soviets and her Allies found political and military activity in Western Europe to be "provocative" so soon after the close of World War II, it is difficult to ascribe to a view which details these actions as being a credible military "threat." Accordingly, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshal Plan, and ultimately the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization cannot be examined in a vacuum and labeled as Western adventurism or the ploys of power politics (balance of power movements). These ideas and organizational responses were least of all political. They were primarily humanitarian, social, and also a military reaction to not merely a perceived but an articulated Soviet threat. The greatest accolade that these Western programs can receive is that they worked, as NATO has, for


some thirty years in deterring the Soviet Union from extending their sphere of influence into Western Europe.

But in this paper we are concerned with the future of the Alliance and its military effectiveness against a background of almost certain force reductions, and the inevitable question: will it remain viable? Our answer is a resounding yes! We have only to look at history to determine that it can. And with an imaginative and innovative approach to the development of new tactics, and American willingness to face the realities of Alliance political, economic and social problems, there is little doubt of future success as we hope to point out with the remainder of this paper, the "how" of our thesis.

> For all these reasons, any American initiatives toward improving the Western posture and strategy must be undertaken with great circumspection. Initiatives must be prudent if only to avoid the past image of heavyhanded and capricious American management of NATO affairs. Even beyond this central consideration, however, the initiatives must be staged gradually and with a keen eye toward the complex and sometimes contradictory thickets of European sensitivities and fears.[58]

FIGURE 11


ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL



Source: Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), p. 26.

FIGURE 12


ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION OF THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE



Source: Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), p. 26.

FIGURE 13


ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION OF ACE (1954)



Source: Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), p. 71.

FIGURE 14


1954 STRUCTURE OF ALLIED FORCES CENTRAL EUROPE



Source: Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), p. 71.

FIGURE 15


1954 STRUCTURE OF ALLIED FORCES NORTHERN EUROPE



Source: Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), p. 71.

FIGURE 16


1954 STRUCTURE OF ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE



Source: Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), p. 71.

FIGURE 17


1954 STRUCTURE OF ALLIED FORCES MEDITERRANEAN



Source: Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), p. 71.

FIGURE 18


CURRENT ORGANIZATION OF SHAPE



Source: NATO, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1975), p. 38, 39; and the SHAPE Staff Directory, 1 Sept 1975.

FIGURE 19


CURRENT ORGANIZATION OF THE DCPO, SHAPE



Source: NATO, NATO Handbook (Brussles: NATO Information Service, 1975), p. 38, 39; and the SHAPE Staff Directory, 1 Sept 1975.

FIGURE 20

CURRENT ORGANIZATION OF THE DCLAA, SHAPE



Source: NATO, NATO Handbook (Brussles: NATO Information Service, 1975), p. 38, 39; and the SHAPE Staff Directory, 1 Sept 1975.

CHAPTER II

THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

It is not unreasonable to expect alliance strategy to dictate force structure. Over the years that NATO forces have guarded Western Europe, however, alliance strategy has changed significantly in its emphasis from deterrence to defense without concomitant changes in force structure. One reason for this may be the deliverate ambiguities that have been injected into strategic policy guidance in order to provide sufficient flexibility so as to allow for competing interpretations. The present strategy, one of flexible response, is the result of lengthy and complicated bargaining. Documentation of this policy is, by necessity, a delicately worded compromise, the political guidelines and operational plans (GDP's) of which all are sufficiently flexible to adapt to minor shifts in national attitudes. Use of nuclear weapons, both as to timing and degree, has long been and continues to be the point of departure with regard to differing national viewpoints.*

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*The strategy of flexible response has been the subject of many analyses with many conclusions as to its feasibility. See for example, Wolfgang Heisenberg, The Alliance and Europe: Part I: Crisis Stability in Europe and Theater Nuclear Weapons, Adelphi Papers Number Ninety-Six (London: IISS, Summer 1973). See also Colin S. Grey, "Mini-nukes and Strategy," International Journal, Spring 1974; Michael J. Brenner, "Tactical Nuclear Strategy and European

(Continued on page 55)

The first decade of Alliance doctrine managed to "spoil" all concerned. Conceptually the European partners were to provide the conventional arm of the NATO punch while the United States would provide massive nuclear protection as a deterrent to Soviet adventurism in Europe. Such a policy appeared eminently practicable in the relative absence of Soviet capability to inflict harm upon the United States. From the American perspective, however, the nuclear response was to be used after it became obvious the initial conventional response to Warsaw Pact aggression was not faring well. The Europeans, on the other hand, were aware that a conventional response that was not faring well would, by definition, be so faring on West European territory. Such a prospect was understandably repugnant to countries that had just recently cleared away the rubble of the last war. From these feelings, coupled with the scarce military resources associated with the war-torn West European economies, emerged an unenthusiastic attitude toward a conventional defensive capability. The corollary to this was

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(*Continued from page 54)
Defence: A Critical Reappraisal," International Affairs, Jan 1975; Marc E. Geneste, "The City Walls: A Credible Defense Doctrine for the West," and Richard Hart Sinnreich, "NATO's Doctrinal Dilemma," both in Orbis, Summer 1975; Colin S. Grey, "Deterrence and Defense in Europe: Revising NATO's Theatre Nuclear Posture," Strategic Review, Spring 1975; Jeffrey Record, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Issues and Alternatives (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974).

an over-reliance upon the United States strategic nuclear arsenal to deter aggression in Europe. In practical terms any Pact aggression could be countered only with token conventional resistance which would thereby serve as the "trip wire" that would initiate a massive nuclear retaliation. The Berlin crisis made clear the desirability of more surgically precise force options than the blunt, brute instrument of massive retaliation afforded. The credibility of such an option as a deterrent to limited provocation was questionable. As the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew in size and as the delivery capability of those weapons improved in the early 1960's, the credibility of the threat to use U.S. strategic nuclear forces to deter any level of conventional aggression became increasingly questionable, since such action would surely invite a similar response from the Soviet Union on American soil. The clarion call of the American nuclear response was indeed the "uncertain trumpet" of General Taylor's prophetic warning.*[1]

The search for more politically pallatable response options to Pact aggression eventually came to focus upon

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*See also Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961). Briefly the Gallois thesis suggests that in an age of superpower parity where either antagonist can inflict unacceptable damage to the other, alliances dependent upon nuclear deterrence are meaningless since no country would ignore its "raison d'etre" by endangering its people to annihilation in support of an ally.

tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons were said to provide an intermediate step up the escalatory ladder before resort to general nuclear war was necessary. There still was no intention on the part of NATO planners to fight a conventional war. Tactical nuclear weapons were to be used at the outset of hostilities and were to compensate for the imbalance of conventional forces facing each other. Such a policy still relied upon the backing of the United States strategic superiority in nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons would be used at the battle front against military targets in a defensive role while the threat of strategic response within the Pact's rear areas would deter escalation in addition to placing the onus of escalation upon the enemy. Implicit in such a strategy is the assumption that only when counter-value use of nuclear weapons (as opposed to the counter-force employment of tactical nuclear weapons) takes place, is escalation determined to be necessary. The threshold exists, so this thinking goes, not between conventional and tactical nuclear force employment, but between tactical and strategic uses of nuclear weapons.

Although more flexible than massive retaliation and thereby offering more credibility as a deterrent posture,

the feasibility of such a force posture was not without debate.*

With the enunciation of Military Committee document MC 14/3, "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area," in March of 1967, a formalized consensus was obtained which officially dictates present day policy. Popularly known as "flexible response," its interpretation was and remains more flexible than its response. The policy provided

(a) the NATO defend against any aggression short of general nuclear attack at the level, either conventional or nuclear, selected by the aggressor.

(b) that deliberate escalation to the use of theatre tactical nuclear weapons will be employed if the aggression cannot be contained by conventional means.

(c) that if a general nuclear attack is encountered, an appropriate general nuclear response will be initiated.

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*(See, for example, Raymond Aron, The Great Debate, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965.
See also Andre Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy, New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966.
Both of these authors contradict the Gallois thesis thus supporting a continued need for NATO. Additionally, however, they contend that a national deterrent capability within Europe (specifically France) was necessary to act as a confusing element and perhaps a catalytic effect within the overall deterrent equation. Such a national deterrent capability within Western Europe enhances the overall deterrence credibility but the question then arises--Would France or Britain risk nuclear war over a conventional thrust limited to Germany? See Michel Debre, "France's Global Strategy," Foreign Affairs, April 1971, p. 395-406.

This "flexible response" satisfied the needs of the allies as well as of the United States. To the European allies such a policy emphasized the deterrent role of the threat of escalation to general nuclear war. Such a deterrent, it was assumed, would lessen the likelihood of actual hostilities which, after all, would take place on the battlefields of Western Europe. To the United States, on the other hand, such a policy emphasized a conventional response to a conventional attack thereby raising the nuclear threshold to some extent. Obviously, the tolerance of such a policy to these widely divergent interpretations poses some very real practical problems. Two such problems, themselves interrelated, concern the definition of forward defense and the undetermined duration of conventional conflict. With regard to the definition of forward defense, the Europeans feel rather strongly that this implies defense at the border, no doubt a function of their geographical proximity to those borders. The German government in particular would have a difficult task justifying any different interpretation of forward defense to its people. Yet, as a conventional defensive capability, such a concept is questionable. It suffers from a high degree of vulnerability to penetration, there being little if any reserve behind the forward line of defense.* Penetration of this conventional "forward

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*Such tactical considerations are to be covered in detail in Chapter V.

defense" would tend to be both quick and obvious thereby signalling a rapid and unambiguous need for escalation to the employment of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, the second problem, that of the duration of conventional conflict, is inexorably intertwined with the definitional problem of forward defense. The American interpretation of forward defense has seemed to emphasize the doctrine of mobile defense. Somewhat analogous to the absorption characteristics of a sponge, the mobile defense entails a controlled retreat whereby front line units maintain contact with but do not attempt to "hold" the aggressor back. Attrition within advancing enemy units and increasing difficulty of the enemy logistical tail to keep up with the advancing aggressors eventually lead to counter attack by reserve elements previously maintained in the rear. This may be coupled with attacks on the flanks of the corridor over which the enemy has penetrated. Implicit in this concept of mobile defense is the trading of space for time.* Such tactics envision the conventional containment of a conventional thrust of even a massive Warsaw Pact attack for a substantial length of time. A rapid escalation to nuclear weapons in the absence of Pact use of nuclear weapons is not anticipated. Only as a "hedge against failure

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*See page 155.

of our conventional forces" would the use of tactical nuclear weapons be entertained.[2] That point at which the mobile defense breaks down is less pronounced than is the case of the more obvious penetration of the forward defense at the border. Indeed, a mobile defense, if it is mobile enough, is relatively immune from penetration. In the mobile defense there exists the additional constraint against the use of tactical nuclear weapons that such use would take place on friendly soil. It is no doubt that our West European allies are less than enthusiastic with such a strategy.

Still, as indefinite as the U.S. nuclear response may be, the flexible response strategy provides our NATO allies an attractive alternative to the unacceptable costs associated with an adequate European conventional force structure to defend against the Pact forces. The strategy of flexible response not only gives the Europeans an excuse for not increasing their conventional forces, but it also emphasizes the conventional capabilities sufficiently to argue convincingly that even if defense against Pact aggression is required, it may not be necessary to resort to nuclear weapons.

One point that is not arguable is that the NATO strategy of flexible response is a reactive strategy. The type response--conventional, tactical nuclear, or general nuclear--

depends on two things: (a) the level of conflict initiated by the aggressor, and (b) the capability of the NATO forces to defend successfully against a Warsaw Pact offensive at that level of conflict, keeping in mind that failure to defend at a given level of conflict necessitates escalation to the next higher level.

It should be obvious that in those border regions guarded by West European forces employing forward defense tactics, if these tactics fail and the forward line of defense is penetrated, some hard choices concerning the employment of tactical nuclear weapons must be made. Where are these border regions, who is guarding them, what Warsaw Pact forces are available for an offensive, and where are the most probable penetration corridors? Only the answers to such questions can shed light on the chances of containing a conventional offensive with the conventional defensive forces available. If vulnerable areas exist efforts should be made to "plug the holes." What is the threat and what are the forces available to deter aggression in Europe or defend against it if deterrence fails? The next chapter will examine these issues.

CHAPTER III

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CHAPTER III

THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE CENTRAL REGION

Any assessment of the military balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces involves not only quantitative, but qualitative inputs as well into the analysis. Not only the numbers of men and weapons systems, but their combat effectiveness, a function of equipment capabilities, personnel training, force deployment, logistic support, and mobilization potential must be considered. Additionally there are obvious geographical asymmetries as well as doctrinal and philosophical imbalances that affect the inter-bloc balance of power in Central Europe.

Although opposing bloc forces stretch from Norway to Turkey, the area of primary concern to this study is the Central Region divided by the German Federal Republic borders with East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Austria. It is the opinion of the authors that these borders are most likely to witness advancing Warsaw Pact forces. Consequently terms such as flexible response strategy, possible force reductions in Europe, maldeployment of NATO forces, and U.S. troops in Europe take on more meaning in this area. While such subjects are to some extent applicable to the northern and southern flanks of NATO, these areas are of only peripheral concern to this study.

Figure 1 summarizes the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance in the Central Region* in Europe with regard to ground manpower, armor, and tactical aircraft. These are the forces currently deployed to the Central Region and do not account for reinforcement or mobilization capabilities. The Soviet Army component is organized around twenty-seven Category 1** divisions deployed to the Central Region. Of these a full twenty are stationed in the German Democratic Republic and are referred to as the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG). The remaining seven divisions are allocated to Poland (two divisions) and Czechoslovakia (5 divisions). It would appear that the GSFG is more than adequate to enforce political celibacy to Moscow. Most Western military analysts look upon the GSFG as a stacking of the deck in


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*Defined as the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

**Soviet divisions have three degrees of combat readiness: Category 1 divisions are 75-100% manned with complete equippage for combat operations. Category 2 divisions are 50-75% manned and still have complete equippage although much of it is in storage. Category 3 divisions are approximately 33% manned and although possibly fully equipped, most equippage is in disrepair or is obsolescent. See The Military Balance: 1975-1976 (London: IISS, 1975), p. 9. See Also Jeffrey Record, U. S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 18-19; and Irving Heymont and Melvin H. Rosen, "Five Foreign Army Reserve Systems," Military Review, March 1973.

Figure 1

THE NATO/WARSAW PACT CENTRAL REGION BALANCE (CONVENTIONAL)



Source: International International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1975-1976 (LONDON: 1975), p. 120.

anticipation of the most probable attack corridors into the FRG should initiation of hostilities occur. Figures 2 and 3 portray those corridors that are geographically inviting and the dispositions of allied forces in the paths.* The remaining portion of the Warsaw Pact forces in Figure 1 are the indigenous forces within the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia.** Hungarian forces as well as Soviet forces stationed in Hungary have not been included in the Central Region balance. It is felt that these forces are more politically and militarily useful to Moscow guarding the Pact's southern flank. Movement of these forces to the Central Region front, moreover, would attract the attention of NATO commanders. One aspect of the Warsaw Pact force capabilities that is impossible to quantify is the

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
*For an in depth unclassified analysis emphasizing the offensive posture of the Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe see Record, U. S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative, p. 6-20. He points to such indicators as massive numbers of offensive weapons such as tanks, high combat to support ratio within Soviet forces, and the emphasis on the offensive in Soviet military literature. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in his annual report to the Congress, points out repeatedly that Soviet/Pact forces are geared for the blitzkrieg offensive. See for example, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1977, p. 116.

**East European Warsaw Pact divisions are categorized by readiness level as were the Soviet. There are, however, only two categories: Category 1 are similar to their Soviet counterparts. Category 2 units are unlikely to be more than 25% manned. The Military Balance: 1975-1976, p. 12.

FIGURE 2

LIKELY WARSAW PACT INVASION ROUTES

INTO NATO'S CENTRAL REGION




Source: Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, U.S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 31.

FIGURE 3

GENERAL DISPOSITIONS OF NATO FORCES

IN THE CENTRAL REGION



Source: Donald F. Bordon, "Inflexibility in NATO's Flexible Response," Military Review, January 1976, p. [illegible] as amended by the authors).

political reliability of the Eastern European members.*

The NATO side of the Central Region balance (Figure 1) consists of forces belonging to the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Of these forces, the 193,000 U.S. forces are organized around four divisions and three brigades all attached to the Central Army Group (CENTAG) and deployed as roughly shown in Figure 3.**

French forces have been listed along with the NATO forces in Figure 1 even though France is officially militarily divorced from the alliance. Although France withdrew

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*One analyst writes off the Eastern European contribution to the Pact's war-fighting potential as "marginal," this being caused by low levels of readiness and obsolescent weapons coupled with his belief that "it is highly doubtful that certain Pact members would participate in any combat operations other than local ones in defense of their respective homelands." Record, U.S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative, p. 23. Most analysts admit that some degradation of Warsaw Pact effectiveness will occur because of this factor, but few go as far as Mr. Record. See, for example, Military Balance: 1975-1976, p. 95-102; The other extreme view from Mr. Record is that the Eastern European Pact members "maintain 39 divisions immediately available for commitment, and 16 in a lesser state of readiness," there being no mention of political reliability, Annual Defense Department Report; FY 1977, p. 124.

**Support to combat conversions authorized by the Nunn Amendment in 1974 called for the deployment of two additional brigades to be deployed to the NATO Central Region by the end of FY 1976. Added to the brigade already forward deployed, these three brigades (each deployed from one of three CONUS-based divisions on rotating schedules) in effect constitute a fifth division always on station.

(Continued on page 71)

in 1966 from the NATO military structure,* it maintained a seat on the ambassadorial level North Atlantic Council. Since the it has never been clear if France (a mere 300 miles from the Central Region front) would commit her military forces in event of a Warsaw Pact offensive. General DeGaulle, in a handwritten note to President Johnson at the time of the French withdrawal suggested that in the event of "unprovoked aggression" against one of her allies, France would be ready to fight.** France has since that

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(Continued from page 70)

An all too common basis of combat comparison between blocs has traditionally been the number of combat divisions. Such comparison is misleading since divisions differ in size as shown below:

Country	Mechanized Div.	Armored Div.	Airborne Div.
U.S.	16,300 men	16,500 men	13,000 men
U.S.S.R.	12,000 men	9,500 men	7,000 men

Figures from Military Balance: 1975-1976, p. vii.

*For an interesting and thorough analysis of those factors prompting the French withdrawal, see Elliot R. Goodman, "DeGaulle's NATO Policy in Perspective," Orbis, Fall 1966.

**"President DeGaulle's letter to President Johnson, March 7, 1966," NATO Letter, May 1966, p. 22. It has been argued that "in event of 'unprovoked aggression'" is a much more vague commitment than "an attack against one is an attack against all (Article 5 of NATO Treaty)" since it is a subjective determination of what constitutes unprovoked (as opposed to provoked) aggression. See, for example, Donald F. Borden, "Inflexibility in NATO's Flexible Response," Military Review, January 1976, p. 28. Conversely, the authors of this study feel the argument can be made that DeGaulle's pseudo commitment can be interpreted as an attempt to avoid an unequivocal denial of French support thus opening the door to future further commitments to NATO should the terms be more favorable to France than were perceived to be the case in 1966.

time negotiated a bilateral agreement with the FRG to allow the deployment of French forces on German soil. The French Forces de Manoeuvre stationed in West Germany consists of 58,000 men organized into two mechanized divisions and one surface-to-surface missile battalion with 12 Pluton missiles.[1] In a recent address by the French Prime Minister, he stated that once these deployed French forces were engaged by an attacking enemy force, France would be determined to fight with "all the means at her disposal" including tactical nuclear weapons.[2] Whether it would be prudent for NATO planners to include French forces in the Central Region balance is debatable, but it would be imprudent for Soviet planners not to do so.

With regard to armor the Warsaw Pact enjoys a substantial quantitative advantage over the NATO tank force. (See Figure 1) Qualitatively speaking the advantage decreases. Many of the armor units of the East European Warsaw Pact countries still utilize the older Soviet T-55 and T-54 tanks although the newer T-62 is gradually replacing these models. Even when the T-62 becomes the mainstay of the indigenous Pact member units (as it now is in the Soviet units stationed in the Central Region), it can be argued that these newer Soviet tanks lack the durability, long-range gun accuracy, and armor protection of their NATO

counterparts.* Additionally, when balancing opposing force capabilities, forces should be examined with respect to their roles. Soviet armor units, if designed for a blitzkrieg offensive, as is generally believed, would require greater strength than the defending NATO units, perhaps as much as a three to one offensive-defensive ratio. In this context, new developments in anti-tank technology have given the individual foot soldier a degree of lethality never before realized with such anti-tank missile systems as DRAGON and TOW.**

Tactical aircraft within the Central Region are also included in Figure 1. These figures are somewhat misleading, however, because numbers of aircraft are much more sensitive to reinforcement capabilities than are men and armor.

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*See, for example, Record, U.S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative, p. 20. He bases his argument in part on a study done at the U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, entitled Comparative Characteristics of Main Battle Tanks. Since Mr. Record's study the newer T-72 is being produced and introduced into Soviet divisions. See Annual Defense Department Report: FY 1977, p. 124.

**The utility of these weapons and recommended tactical employment of them is the subject of a later chapter. Much has been written on the subject of anti-tank technology as a result of the use of such weapons in the October 1973 war. For two differing views on the subject with respect to their use in Europe see John H. Morse, "New Weapons Technologies: Implications for NATO," and Richard Burt, "New Weapons Technologies and European Security," both in Orbis, Summer 1975.

In numbers of aircraft the Warsaw Pact again enjoys a substantial advantage over NATO air forces. Many of the qualitative arguments that lessened the advantage for armor are equally applicable to aircraft. NATO aircraft in general exhibit more multi-purpose capability with better performance over their full mission profiles. Greater range and payload in particular enhance the NATO air forces' relative qualitative advantage. Conversely, although the Warsaw Pact is modernizing its inventory, many of the existing aircraft are obsolescent, with capabilities that limit them to day-time air defense roles.

The Warsaw Pact air forces have a greater capability than do their NATO counterparts for operations from widely dispersed and unsophisticated airfields serviced by mobile support systems. The far greater number of these Eastern European airfields gives the Pact a flexibility unknown to NATO planners, who must contend with the lack of standardization coupled with greater sophistication that inherently leads to fewer airfields capable of servicing the variety of systems within the NATO inventory. This handicap of NATO air forces is partly offset by the superior versatility of multi-mission NATO aircraft and NATO's better trained aircrews.

Thus far, in looking at the Central Region balance, we have focused on indigenous forces of the countries involved

augmented by deployed forces in that region. The addition of reinforcements or mobilization of skeletal units indigenous to the area would substantially alter the figures. Peacetime figures would, in time of crisis or hostilities, be augmented to some extent dependent upon the degree of crisis. In the event of a Warsaw Pact offensive across Western Europe, the entire mobilization potential of each bloc would necessarily be considered. Advance warning time of an impending need to mobilize and reinforce is a key ingredient in the balance. Here the advantage lies with the aggressor if covert mobilization can be fulfilled to some extent prior to the initiation of mobilization of the defender.* It is generally recognized that any major build-up of mobilized forces in Eastern Europe would be detected within a matter of a few days.[3]

Mobilization plans for the two blocs differ in ways other than just the day on which they begin. The three categories of Soviet readiness and the two categories of Eastern European units have been mentioned. Mobilization would entail augmentation of Category 1, 2, and 3 units to 100% manning levels with reserves. Additionally, many

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*One study that has considered various scenarios where both simultaneous mobilization and prior covert Pact mobilization take place is found in Record, U.S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative.

divisions located in Western Russia and Eastern Europe would be moved closer to the front. Category 2 Soviet divisions, the authors estimate, could be combat ready and deployable within thirty days of mobilization. Category 3 Soviet divisions and Category 2 Eastern European divisions could not be deployable in less than ninety days after mobilization. Even when deployed it remains uncertain that such units would be combat ready at that time considering equippage quality and hasty training. Theoretically Soviet reinforcements could come to the Central Region from as far away as the Sino-Soviet border area, although current political tensions between those two countries would discourage such a transfer. The total number and categories of Soviet and East European divisions (which are approximately 40% smaller than NATO divisions) are shown in the following figure:

FIGURE 4

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN DIVISIONS

	Armored Divs. Category			Mechanized Divs. Category			Other Divs. Category		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Czechoslovakia	5	-	-	3	2	-	-	-	-
East Germany	2	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-
Poland	5	-	-	6	2	-	2	-	-

	Armored Divs. Category			Mechanized Divs. Category			Other Divs. Category		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Soviet Divs.									
In above area	14	-	-	13	-	-	-	-	-
Elsewhere (except those in Far East)	8	8	11	12	25	37	0	4	1

Source: International Institute for Strategy Studies, Military Balance: 1975-1976 (London: 1975), p. 98 (as modified by p. 9). (These figures include the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Hungary, but do not include Bulgarian, Hungarian and Rumanian national forces.)

It has been suggested that the 27 Soviet divisions in the Central Region could be increased to between 70 and 80 divisions within a few weeks.[4] This assumes that mobilization is not impeded. If hostilities had commenced, however, mobilization would be slowed somewhat by interdiction of transportation routes, both road and rail. The fact remains that the Soviet Union with its contiguous borders to Eastern Europe, enjoys a major advantage in being able to move units with their heavy equippage faster overland than the United States could do by sea.

A NATO reinforcement would consist initially of reserve mobilization within the Central Region countries. The FRG in particular would immediately mobilize its home defense force of 220,000 men. The feasibility of including French forces has already been discussed. In the author's opinion they should be counted in the NATO strength.

Within the continental United States there are two dual based* divisions earmarked for rapid deployment to Europe. There is one additional division earmarked for (but not dual based in) Central Europe. Although the personnel and light equipment can be airlifted to Europe rapidly, the heavier support equipment and weapons would necessarily be sealifted and would require additional time. Of the remaining nine active U.S. Army divisions, two are deployed in the Pacific and the other seven are CONUS based and are considered a strategic reserve. In event of a war in Europe, however, the latter would obviously be available for service there.

It would appear the single greatest problem in reinforcing Europe with American forces is the inadequate capacity for the rapid transfer of heavy equipment and weapons.** Sealift, while necessary, cannot contribute to the reinforcement effort in less than twenty days after mobilization begins (M+20). Strategic airlift is the only way that early reinforcements requirements can be met and our current capability in this area is "marginal."[5]

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*Dual based refers to the fact that these units have their complete heavy equippage predeployed to the FRG and therefore can be quickly airlifted to Europe in event of a crisis.

**In the words of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, "We do not have sufficient long-range airlift capability to deploy our reinforcements to Europe in a timely fashion." Annual Defense Department Report: FY 1977, p. 7.

Particular attention is being paid to augmenting the C-5A's and C-141's of the Military Strategic Airlift Forces with the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). U.S. commercial airlines have committed to CRAF 243 (91 passenger-only and 152 cargo/passenger) long-range aircraft which would become available in event of mobilization. Proposals currently before the Congress would provide for a CRAF modification program whereby 100 wide-bodied, long-range aircraft would be modified to carry "oversize" cargo. This is but part of an overall Airlift Enhancement Program which would roughly double the United States strategic airlift capability.[6]

Notwithstanding the need for rapid and adequate strategic airlift, sealift is the supplemental, yet dominant means of sustaining overseas forces indefinitely after M+20. The bulk of European resupply plus any POL would necessarily be moved by sealift.

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is not capable of supporting a NATO resupply.[7] Consequently the NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS) has precommitted NATO merchant ships to the task of European resupply upon initiation of any hostilities. Similarly U.S. merchant marine vessels could expect to be "pressed" into service in event of war. For contingencies less than those involving national mobilization, the Sealift Readiness Program has obtained certain commitments to make 117 ships available in 60 days,

with at least half to be available during the first 30 days.

Strategic reinforcement of Europe requires training. Annually since 1967 the exercise called REFORGER has provided this training by airlifting units to their prepositioned equipment (dual based) in Europe. This Fa-l's REFORGER will, for the first time, be modified to airlift personnel of the 101st Airborne Division to Europe while simultaneously sealifting portions of their supporting equipment and weapons. Such an exercise, in addition to improving strategic mobility readiness, strongly demonstrates U.S. resolve to West European allies, thus reinforcing their perceptions of a positive U.S. commitment. It appears that Congressional enthusiasm for continuation of the annual REFORGER may be waning. In September of last year the House Appropriations Committee indicated that FY 76 would probably be the last year the exercise would be funded.*

There are two additional problems that United States reinforcements to NATO must face. First, if the threat

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*Interview with Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) on 3 February 1976. Ironically, many of the Congressional opponents to REFORGER use the Nunn Amendment (which in effect added nearly 20,000 combat troops to Europe) as rationalization for termination of the annual exercise. Such thinking regards the exercise not as a display of resolve or as training for strategic mobility, but merely as a quick injection of 20,000 troops to Europe.

encountered in Europe is Warsaw Pact mobilization without initiation of hostilities, the major hurdle will be that of political resolve. Obvious arguments against mobilization and reinforcement would include claims that such action may exacerbate a potentially explosive situation that might otherwise subside. Second, if hostilities have begun, reinforcement efforts will be vulnerable at sea as well as at West European airfields that might not remain intact. With regard to the vulnerability of our resupply sea lanes to Europe, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recently told the Congress that "while NATO would probably incur major losses in an antishipping campaign, these losses would not be prohibitive as far as we can tell."[8]

In summary, then, it would seem fair to say that the Warsaw Pact is intrinsically capable of more rapid reinforcement in the early days of mobilization. This advantage would obviously be greatly increased if Pact mobilization intentions remained hidden under the guise of massive field exercises. Only if NATO has sufficient warning time and has the political resolve to muster her mobilized armies can a Warsaw Pact build-up be closely matched. Even then the subsequent rate of reinforcement favors the Warsaw Pact, primarily because of the need to sealift United States heavy equipment. Only in the event of a slow and full reinforcement could the NATO countries, which maintain larger numbers

of armed personnel worldwide, be expected to exceed the Warsaw Pact in front line forces. The political and economic hurdles of full mobilization and reinforcement, however, could never be jumped in the NATO countries short of an actual outbreak of hostilities. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact, aware that time is on the side of the NATO bloc, would hardly postpone hostilities (assuming the offensive is premeditated) to accommodate the West.

According to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld "A successful non-nuclear defense of Western Europe should be feasible, given the resources available within NATO."[9] The overall Central Region balance would seem to justify his statement. Warsaw Pact forces do, however, enjoy local superiority in areas such as the North German Plain where the offensive-defensive ratio is dangerously high, thereby inviting conventional defeat. The North German Plain is the most attractive attack route for Warsaw Pact armor, offering relatively flat terrain and ample road coverage. Yet this area is the most marginally defended area. Conversely, the southern areas of Germany, not as well suited for tank offensives but ideal for defensive maneuvers because of geographical conditions, is overly defended. These facts invite recommendations concerning force levels, deployments, structure, and tactics, all the subjects of forthcoming chapters.

The overall military balance in the Central Region area, as delicate and multi-faceted as it has been shown to be, is extremely sensitive to changes in force levels of either bloc. Within the framework of Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), both blocs have, since the negotiations officially began in late 1973, proposed reductions of forces. Mutual force reductions in Europe, as proposed by each bloc, along with the underlying negotiating criteria and their implications for the balance in Europe will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

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CHAPTER IV

PROSPECTS FOR FORCE REDUCTIONS

It has been shown that an approximate balance of military forces in the Central Region exists between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. The Pact has an advantage over NATO in the number of ground forces and the number of tanks while NATO enjoys not only a quantitative advantage in tactical nuclear weaponry but also a qualitative advantage in tactical fighter aircraft. Measures of arms control which undermine the balance of power defeat their own purpose. This is the danger from which the MBFR negotiators must refrain. Although such negotiations afford an opportunity to improve the security of NATO allies in Central Europe by achieving a more stable balance at lower force levels, there are serious potential risks which must be avoided. One such risk may be the adoption of a strategy of means, that is to say, the acceptance of the thinking that the only alternative to MBFR is UFR or unilateral force reductions.*

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*This movement has in the past been spearheaded by Senator Mansfield but includes others such as Senator Percy who has argued the balance of payments deficit problem resulting from the U.S. troop commitment in Europe. For a thorough analysis of the burden sharing problem in NATO and pressures for U.S. withdrawal see John Newhouse, U.S. Troops in Europe (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1971). See also Leslie H. Gelb and Morton H. Halperin, "Why West Europe Needs 300,000 G.I.'s," Military Review, September 1971, p. 13-24; Elliott Richardson and Mike

(Continued on page 86)

Within this context MBFR becomes merely a means to an end--that of force reductions. Only by giving these negotiations the most careful consideration and engaging in thorough consultations among the NATO allies, can security in Central Europe be improved and not diminished.

The current proposals that have been tabled at the Vienna negotiations on the subject reflect the philosophical differences and historical fears of each bloc. The apparent objectives of each side with regard to MBFR have not significantly changed since the subject was first broached in 1968 in Reykjavik. For that reason, a brief historical review of the subject is warranted before attempting an analysis of the various proposals that have been offered.

Although the subject of mutual and balanced force reductions had historical antecedents in the various arms control proposals of the 1950's and 1960's, it seems to have grown in popularity so that by 1970 there were

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(*Continued from page 85)
Mansfield, "American Forces in Europe--The Pros and Cons," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Spring 1970, p. 5-16; and Alan C. Enthoven and Wayne K. Smith, "What Forces for NATO? And From Whom?," reprinted from Foreign Affairs, October 1969 in Atlantic Community Quarterly, Winter 1969-1970, p. 571-586.

Although the issue of unilateral force reductions in Europe is not dead, the Congressional focus on Europe is not as sharp and seems to be shifting toward U.S. troops in Korea. This information obtained from interview with Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) on 3 February 1976. There is, of course, no assurance that, given the rapid changes in economic as well as political conditions, Congressional attention will not again focus on U.S. troops in Europe.

various proposals for detailed implementation.* In the mid 1960's NATO initiated a major study of the subject and made its own proposals, albeit of a less detailed nature. Several of the criteria suggested by the NATO study have been reiterated several times since, beginning with the Declaration of Reykjavik of June 1968. These criteria, proposed by the NATO Ministers, envisaged European force reductions in accordance with several agreed principles:

a. They should be reciprocal and balanced in scope and timing.

b. They should represent a substantial and significant step, which will serve to maintain the present degree of security at reduced cost, but should not be such as to risk destabilizing the situation in Europe.

c. They should be designed to inspire confidence in Europe generally and in each party concerned.


d. They should be consistent with the vital security interests of all parties and capable of being carried out effectively.[1]


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*See, for example, proposals for mutual, phased reductions in Timothy W. Stanley, A Conference on European Security? Problems, Prospects and Pitfalls (Atlantic Council of the United States, 1970), p. 38-43 and Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell Whitt, Detente Diplomacy: United States and European Security in the 1970's (New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., Inc., 1970), p. 63-66. In the latter, the authors propose a 4-phase reduction of forces model based on an "across-the-board" percentage cut. Although such a cut could well be regarded as too symmetrical, it does provide for greater cuts in the Warsaw bloc forces given their larger initial figures to which these percentages would be applied.

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NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

The Soviets, by their actions in Czechoslovakia in the Fall of that same year, answered the NATO proposal, making it all too obvious the degree to which they depended upon an overwhelmingly large Soviet force in Eastern Europe to maintain political fidelity to Moscow. The NATO response was to make only casual mention of the idea of MBFR at Ministerial Session meetings in April and December 1969. It was not long, however, before the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a fading memory. The renewal of Congressional pressures for unilateral U.S. withdrawal had convinced NATO to again focus its attention more sharply on MBFR. In 1970, in the Rome Declaration[2] of May and again in the Ministerial Communique of December,[3] the NATO governments reaffirmed their strong interest in the subject and extended an invitation to interested states to hold exploratory talks on mutual reductions with special reference to Central Europe. It was emphasized that such reductions should not disserve Alliance security interests nor be militarily disadvantageous to either side. Similarly, reductions must be reciprocal, must include both stationed and indigenous forces, and must be subject to adequate verification.*

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*For many years the verification issue has continually proven to be a difficult bargaining point when dealing with the U.S.S.R. in arms control agreements. Consequently verification of MBFR and related arms control agreements has long been a subject of NATO study. In 1968, for example, an Anglo-American arms control inspection test by the name of Exercise "First Look" was undertaken. See David Thomas, "Exercise 'First Look'," NATO Letter, October 1968, p. 17-19.

Soviet responses concerning force reductions prior to summer 1970 had been either non-existent or had demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces alone from Europe. In June 1970, at the Budapest Conference, the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers agreed that "a reduction of foreign armed forces stationed on the territories of the European States" would serve the interest of European security and should be discussed.[4] If one interpreted the term "foreign" to include American and Soviet forces, then this was the closest the Warsaw bloc had come to proposing an MBFR. If, however, one interpreted the term "foreign," because of the context in which it was used, to mean non-European, then this communique contained nothing new since the Soviet Union had long considered itself a European power. In either case it was not fully compatible with NATO proposals for reductions of both stationed and indigenous forces.

The ambiguousness of the Soviet declaration was somewhat clarified in March 1971 when Brezhnev, in the capacity of General Secretary of the CPSU, addressing the 24th Congress of the Party, stated: "We stand for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in areas where military confrontation is especially dangerous, especially in Central Europe . . ." and that "the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate an agreement on the reduction of military expenditures above all by the major states."[5] He left little doubt that the

major states were the United States and the Soviet Union. In his famous "wine-tasting speech" at Tbilisi the next month he further beckoned the NATO countries to start negotiations on this question.[6] In June 1971, Brezhnev again answered NATO queries as to whether Soviet proposals concerned foreign armed forces, indigenous forces, or both: "We would answer this way: we are prepared to discuss both questions."[7] Moscow, it would seem, was making it clear that the extent and nature of an MBFR was dependent upon the intentions of the countries involved which could only be determined by commencement of negotiations.

At a time when prospects for an MBFR agreement seemed better than ever before, there still existed the difference of opinion over which should come first--negotiations or a determination of whether common ground existed on which to base those negotiations.* It would appear that the latter, ascribed to by NATO, would hold the best prospects for a meaningful agreement, while the former, the Soviet position, would be better suited as a means to propagandize. Taking little notice of this difference of opinion NATO chose

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*This latter approach is identical to President Nixon's "building block approach" to MBFR whereby preliminary exploratory probes on major substantive issues precede any concrete proposals or more detailed discussion of the individual issues. See U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace. A Report to the Congress by the President of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 197.

Manlio Brosio, former Secretary General of NATO, to explore the Warsaw Pact views on MBFR, in an effort to "taste the wine" offered by Brezhnev in May.

A year later, during President Nixon's summit visit to Moscow, specific Soviet assurances of a willingness to begin negotiations on the subject of MBFR were received. The membership and format of the forthcoming negotiations were established during multilateral preliminary consultations held the next spring. It was agreed that there were to be 19 participants--12 on the NATO side and 7 Warsaw Pact countries--divided into two categories, so-called direct participants and special participants as listed in Figure 1. The geographic area of concern of MBFR consists of those countries listed in Figure 2 and corresponds to the Central Region analyzed in the preceding chapter on the military balance.* With so many NATO participants involved, it is no wonder that proposals have taken months to achieve an

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*In much of the DOD material written on the subject, the synonomous term NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) is often used. It is the subject of some concern that Hungary is not included within the NGA. Some German observers feel the USSR's reluctance to subject their forces in Hungary to MBFR is indicative of Soviet designs to use the Austrian corridor as a likely invasion route. Others argue that Hungary can be used as a "parking garage" for Soviet tanks pulled back as a result of an MBFR agreement. For an alternative argument see Jeffrey Record, U.S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative, p. 14.

FIGURE 1

PARTICIPATING NATIONS IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

MBFR DIRECT PARTICIPANTS

United States
United Kingdom
Canada
Federal Republic of Germany
Belgium
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Soviet Union
German Democratic Republic
Poland
Czechoslovakia

MBFR SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS

Denmark
Norway
Italy
Greece
Turkey
Hungary

Source: Interview with LTC Lewis L. Bird, Jr., USAF, Department of Defense MBFR Task Force, Washington: 4 February 1976.

FIGURE 2

MBFR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF CONCERN

Federal Republic of Germany

Belgium

Netherlands

Luxembourg

German Democratic Republic

Poland

Czechoslovakia

Source: Interview with LTC Lewis L. Bird, Jr., USAF, Department of Defense MBFR Task Force, Washington: 4 February 1976.

FIGURE 3

AMERICAN AND SOVIET MBFR DELEGATIONS

AMERICAN DELEGATION (Principals)

HON Stanley Resor, Chief

MR. Jonathan Dean, Deputy Chief

MR. Bruce Clarke, Jr., Sec Def Rep

MR. Robert Behr, ACDA Rep

MAJ GEN Lee E. Surut, USA, JCS Rep

SOVIET DELEGATION (Principals)

AMB O. N. Khlestov, Chief

AMB M. N. Smirnovsky, Deputy Chief

MR. V. V. Shustov

COL P. G. Kapitonov

Source: Interview with LTC Lewis L. Bird, Jr., USAF, Department of Defense MBFR Task Force, Washington: 4 February 1976.

alliance consensus before being tabled before the Warsaw Pact negotiators. There exist numerous panels and councils at all levels of the NATO infrastructure performing overlapping functions and serving several political masters. The U.S. organizations alone are overwhelmingly complex, as is shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6.


Participants belonging to both blocs view the subject of force reductions in the Central Region from different perspectives depending upon whether they are located inside or outside the area. For the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Canada, direct participants whose territories lie outside the agreed area, the effect of MBFR is evaluated solely in terms of limits on their forces deployed in Central Europe. Their armed forces as a whole remain unaffected, since their deployed forces need only be recalled home in event of an agreement calling for their reduction.

Those direct participants located within the Central Region covered by MBFR, on the other hand, face the possibility of reductions in and consequent limitations on the totality of their armed forces, thereby infringing upon their national sovereignty.

In a determination of the extent to which a meaningful MBFR is possible in the near future, therefore, it is necessary to examine the political attitudes of the

FIGURE 4


U.S. MBFR ORGANIZATION IN WASHINGTON



Source: Department of Defense, "What's behind the Mutual Balanced Force Talks?" Commander's Digest (Washington: U.S. Print. Off., 14 November 1974), p. 4-5. (As modified by authors)

FIGURE 5


U.S. MBFR ORGANIZATION IN BRUSSELS



Source: Department of Defense, "What's behind the Mutual Balanced Force Talks?" Commander's Digest, (Washington: U.S. Print. Off., 14 November 1974), p. 4-5. (As modified by authors)

FIGURE 6

U.S. MBFR ORGANIZATION IN VIENNA



Source: Department of Defense, "What's behind the Mutual Balanced Force Talks?" Commander's Digest, (Washington: U.S. Print. Off., 14 November 1974), p. 4-5. (As modified by authors)

participants as well as the assets and liability imposed by an MBFR agreement.

The United States has provided the largest impetus toward an MBFR agreement. Well aware of the Congressional pressures for unilateral American troop withdrawals and wary of initiating fears in Europe that U.S. troops withdrawals are indicative of concomitant crumbling of the U.S. nuclear guarantee, the administration primarily desires MBFR as an alternative to UFR or unilateral force reductions. UFR, in addition to eroding the foundations of NATO based on mutual confidence that allies honor their commitments, would also weaken the conventional capabilities of the alliance thereby lowering the nuclear threshold--that point at which resort to nuclear force becomes necessary.*

A comprehensive study of the various European political attitudes toward MBFR is beyond the scope of this work.**

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*Elliott Richardson and Mike Mansfield, "American Forces in Europe--The Pros and Cons," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Spring 1970, p. 7-8. The U.S. attitude is also expressed in L.L. Lemnitzer, "The Nature of a Deadly Lesson," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Summer 1970, p. 194. Administration statements indicative of strong support for MBFR can be found in U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, p. 195-197 and United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970. A report of the Secretary of State. Department of State Publication 8575, March 1971, p. 5.

**There are several excellent articles that extensively study these attitudes. For example, see Zbigniev Brzezinski, "America and Europe," Foreign Affairs, October 1970, p. 11-30; G. B. Howard, "The Role of Belgium in NATO," Military Review,

(Continued on page 100)

It will be our intention, rather, to generalize those attitudes and focus on those countries that have voiced the loudest concern for MBFR. In general, European attitudes toward MBFR are dictated by their attitudes toward maintaining a strong and unified NATO as a basis for their diplomacy. This is true at least in the short term. It may be that Europeans, in their long term diplomacy, are in search of better alternatives to the existing security machinery. If this is so, then recent moves by Europe in general and the FRG in particular to increase the European share of U.S. troop costs may be merely a means of "buying time."*
Any East-West negotiations affecting European security issues (including MBFR) can be entered into with a stronger

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(*Continued from page 99)
July 1971, p. 17-22; Christoph Bertram, "West German Perspectives on European Security: Continuity and Change," The World Today, March 1971, p. 115-123; Guttorm Hansen, "Norway and NATO," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Summer 1969, p. 235-240; Robert W. Russell, "The Atlantic Alliance in Dutch Foreign Policy," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Summer 1970, p. 175-189; Michael Stewart, "Britain, Europe and the Alliance," Foreign Affairs, July 1970, p. 648-659; Charles Micaud, "Gaullism After De Gaulle," Orbis, Fall 1970, p. 657-672.

*The NATO Infrastructure Program provides for joint funding of various facilities commonly used by NATO military forces. The U.S. share of these costs have declined in recent years. See Annual Defense Department Report: FY 1977, p. 249-251. The Jackson-Nunn Amendment passed by Congress 15 October 1973 calls for reductions of U.S. forces in Europe equal in percentage to that which the allies fail to offset their balance of payments deficits with the United States. The New York Times, 6 November 1973.

bargaining position than if U.S. troops cuts occurred prematurely. The FRG freely admitted, for example, that such a policy as Ostpolitik was dependent upon the continued backing of a strong Western Alliance.*

France, likewise, is desirous of U.S. troops remaining in Germany, albeit not for the purpose of maintaining a strong and unified NATO. Rather they are primarily concerned with the U.S. presence in the context of deterrence. A secondary role, as perceived by the French is undoubtedly to act as a counterweight to the Bundeswehr which, if the Americans withdrew, would be the strongest conventional force in Western Europe.

Strictly speaking the European members of NATO are not favorably disposed toward reductions of any sort.** The political realities of the situation, however, force them to accept MBFR as the alternative to reductions of a

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*For a complete discussion of the role of Ostpolitik within the context of an East-West balance, see Bertram, "West German Perspectives . . . ," The World Today, March 1971, p. 115-123. See also "Security and Detente . . . Cornerstones of Bonn Policy," an interview with Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt in German International, June 1971, p. 20-29.

**This attitude was expressed by Pompidou as cited in Francois Duchene, "A New European Defense Community," Foreign Affairs, October 1971, p. 79.

Many Europeans think of the U.S. troops in Europe in a "trip wire" context. In this regard their presence is emphasized in a deterrence role rather than as a capability to conduct conventional warfare in the defense of Europe. For a complete analysis of this thinking, see General Andre Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

more unilateral nature. This attitude was expressed by Foreign Minister Walter Scheel when he said:

> . . . the current balance of power in Europe must not be changed. A lowering of force and armament levels in the West can be accepted only in concert with a simultaneous and balanced reduction of force and armament levels by the Warsaw Pact countries. At this stage of discussion, the following principle is critical: MBFR must remain an initiative of the Alliance . . . . The Federal Government will intensively support all such projects.*

Europeans are not so much worried about U.S. unilateral reductions as such. Rather they are concerned more about the phenomenon of which troop reductions are merely one symptom--that of neo-isolationism. If the U.S. were to withdraw unilaterally even a small percentage of its troops from Europe, it would be indicative of a precedence of similar future actions, especially considering the extensive Asian withdrawals in recent years. Within the more general context of American neo-isolationism, it could well be viewed with alarm as a lessening of the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe. The resulting attitudes would pose a threat to the credibility of NATO as a collective security system. Experience has shown that U.S. reductions in Europe have not proven a stimulus for greater burden sharing, but rather they have served as an example for European allies to reduce

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*Original text of an article by Federal Foreign Minister Walter Scheel entitled "Alliance and Detente," p. 2-3. Also reprinted in Publik, September 8, 1971.

their capabilities as well.[8] The action of U.S. reductions, then, coupled with the effects on European capabilities would most probably cause the reduction of NATO's conventional capability if not the destruction of its underlying principles of mutual commitment.

Deviation from the general West European attitudes toward MBFR is seen in French policy. France, in strict Gaullist fashion, is opposed to bloc-to-bloc negotiations on the subject of MBFR on the grounds that such an important foreign policy subject be negotiated by sovereign nations and not regional organizations. An underlying French fear is that bloc conducted negotiations may allocate reductions amongst the allies in such a manner as to concentrate on U.S. reductions from Germany, thus leaving the Bundeswehr as the strongest conventional force on the continent as discussed previously.

An interesting question arises on what advantages and/or disadvantages for the Soviet Union would accompany an MBFR agreement. One might list these as follows:

a. Advantages: As a safeguard to assuage the historical fear of encirclement, an MBFR agreement could be utilized by the Soviet Union to add to efforts already underway to stabilize the European front at a time when the Eastern front presents more of a threat. Concern over the latter may have been recently rekindled by moves toward U.S.-PRC accommodation. A Soviet accommodation in Europe by means of an MBFR

agreement would permit a reallocation of forces to the Eastern front, thus making more effective use of funds and forces. Indeed, it could even permit a downgrading of the defense budget, thereby allowing reallocation of funds to satisfy consumer demands better. Additional economic and technological benefits would be forthcoming with improved trade relations resulting from such a European accommodation. Such a strengthening of ties between Eastern and Western Europe, however, could conflict with the maintenance of strict Soviet control in Eastern Europe.

In the absence of an MBFR agreement, some degree of unilateral U.S. reductions is most likely to occur in the near future in spite of recent West European efforts to relieve the balance of payments deficit resulting from the U.S. forces in Europe. This unilateral withdrawal of American forces could possibly affect the U.S.S.R. adversely. Although many of the Soviet forces are in Eastern Europe to maintain Soviet political standards of loyalty to Moscow, the ostensible reason for their presence is as a counter to the NATO threat. As that threat perceptually diminishes in the wake of American withdrawal, the justification for Soviet presence diminishes likewise. The U.S.S.R. may benefit from an MBFR agreement which could "codify" a certain Soviet troop strength in Eastern Europe, this "codification" providing an alternative justification for Soviet presence to replace that of a declining NATO threat.

Additionally a unilateral U.S. withdrawal would leave the West German Army as a relatively stronger conventional force, creating a perceptually greater role for the FRG within the NATO framework. The German proponents of Neo-Gaullismus (a short-lived movement manifesting itself in the FRG after the fall of Vietnam) would certainly agree.* Suggestive of revanchism, the result should hardly be pleasing in Moscow.

Whether U.S. unilateral withdrawal would stimulate Western European political-military integration efforts or have the effect of encouraging individual West European countries to seek policies of further accommodation with the East is speculative at best. If Moscow chose to agree on an MBFR of even a token nature (in keeping with the spirit of Moscow's detente oriented peace strategy), pressures for West European integration would be far less than would be the consequence of unilateral U.S. troop reductions.

This promotion of detente by token MBFR would undoubtedly strengthen the arguments of those in the United States who favor substantial U.S. troops cut.

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*Such thinking contends that flexible response and controlled escalation are a step backward from massive retaliation, thus aligning with French Gaullist thinking of the mid 1960's.

b. Disadvantages: If, as suggested earlier, a major goal of the Soviet Union is to decrease American influence and troop strength in Europe while maintaining the status quo in Eastern Europe, it may be to their benefit merely to do nothing. Pressures for unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces, although less than they were a few years back, still exist and may grow stronger. It may be merely a matter of time before this Soviet goal would be realized at no cost.

As was mentioned earlier a dilemma arises for the Soviets when efforts to accommodate certain polycentric tendencies in Eastern Europe with commensurate economic and technological advantages clash with the limited sovereignty concept enunciated in the Brezhnev doctrine. With various moves towards a "Westpolitik"* by the Soviets

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*The term "Westpolitik" is used to describe the Soviet dealings with the West similar in nature to those of FRG Ostpolitik. "Westpolitik" has included such actions as a non-aggression pact with the FRG, the Berlin accords, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the recent MBFR negotiations. SALT is similarly a component within "Westpolitik." It is here that another similarity to Ostpolitik arises. Just as Ostpolitik has divisive pressures in Eastern Europe, so "Westpolitik" as evidenced in SALT has divisive pressures on the U.S.-Europe relationship. What is the effect, for example, on the extended guarantee of the U.S. as viewed by West Europe when a form of parity is accepted at SALT. Europe also feels, in spite of U.S. efforts to keep her allies informed of SALT matters, that the U.S. is not adequately taking European interests into account at the SALT.

it may become increasingly necessary to maintain Soviet forces in Eastern Europe to maintain the political loyalty to and dependence on Moscow.[9] The U.S.S.R. is well aware of the implicit divisiveness in such policies as Ostpolitik. Indeed, Soviet sources accused Chancellor Brandt of using the Moscow Treaty to strengthen Eastern European perceptions of West German economic and ideological importance by means of "a veiled campaign to sow dissention among Moscow's East European Allies."[10] If the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968 convinced the Soviets that the capability of overwhelming military intervention is an asset, the political and ideological ramifications resulting from the Soviet "invasion" were such as to convince Moscow that it is far better to prevent such a need from arising. This can be best served by maintaining adequate Soviet forces inside the territories of its allies.

The Soviet Union is primarily concerned with preserving the status quo in Eastern Europe; that is, in maintaining the present relationship of satellites closely aligned to Moscow in both their external and internal policies. Closely associated with this purpose has been the effort to obtain diplomatic recognition of the status quo through bilateral and multilateral treaty agreements on boundaries.

An extremely important foreign policy objective of the U.S.S.R. is the prevention of a politically or militarily

integrated Western Europe. Such a unified West Europe would have tremendous resources and growth potential, which the Soviets would perceive as a threat to their security. This would undoubtedly stem in part from the possible partial West German control of a European nuclear capability. Added to the military threat would be a formidable political threat. A West Europe that was a potential superpower both militarily and economically could possibly exert an irresistible attraction to Eastern Europe resulting in divisive pressures unacceptable to Moscow.

A corollary to the preceding objective is the goal of maintaining a fragmented West Europe, one that is vulnerable to a process of "Finlandization." In this regard Soviet policy is directed toward a detachment of the FRG from Western Europe perhaps in the form of a more neutral government. By maintaining a facade of detente, thereby lulling the American Congress into recalling U.S. troops, the U.S.S.R. can take advantage of a weaker Europe once U.S. forces have diminished. Although filling the gap left by departing American forces is economically within the capability of West Europe, it is not politically feasible with a growing tendency in those countries to disregard the idea of an Eastern threat.* A weak Western Europe would be

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*Newhouse, U.S. Troops in Europe, p. 156. See also White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of the Armed Forces (Presse und

(Continued on page 109)

forced to accommodate the subtle Soviet political pressures in its internal politics as well as to formulate its foreign policies with special consideration for the interests of the Soviet Union. One European has described the result as follows:

> U.S. isolation from Europe would allow the Soviet Union to expand and rule over our continent and become the undisputed first World Power in economic, military, and political terms. This would mean . . . European dependence on an immediate and overpowering neighbor.[11]

In addition to those problems which arise from intra-alliance organizational complexities and reflect both intra-alliance and inter-alliance political differences, MBFR faces additional difficulties stemming from technical and definitional problems which find their roots in the asymmetries of the European balance of power.* To be sure, this balance of power is a function of not only military capabilities, but also the will of each side to use their capabilities, and the perceptions of each side of the will

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(*Continued from page 108)
Informationsant der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 1970), English translation, p. 20 and David Calleo, The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S., NATO, and Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1970).

*These problems were alluded to in the last chapter within the context of different sized divisions and the reinforcement difficulties that arise from inequitable geographical constraints such as 3000 miles of ocean compared with 300 miles of rail-lines from Western Russia. For a detailed analysis of some of the asymmetrical complexities see, for example, Stanley and Whitt, Detente Diplomacy . . ., p. 54-58. See also Record, U.S. Force Structure in Europe: An Alternative.

and capabilities of the opponent. But even if the unknown factors of will and perceptions are removed from the equation, the definitional problems of a strictly military capability balance are formidable. In determining this military capabilities balance in Europe one must look somewhere between the two extremes of those forces immediately available to the Central European theater and the total of all NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, wherever deployed. There are several points along the continuim between these extremes that are reasonable to consider in this balance determination, given the mobilization and reinforcement capabilities of each bloc. Some authors contend that at certain of these points it can be said that the balance tips in favor of the NATO forces.* But even if the position along the spectrum at which a balance exists is

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*John Newhouse and others, U.S. Troops in Europe (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1971), p. 50-65. Another optimistic viewpoint on NATO capabilities is found in Alain B. Enthoven's article in Foreign Affairs, October 1969. His ideas have remained unchanged for the past six years in this regard. See Enthoven, "U.S. Forces in Europe: How Many? Doing What?," Foreign Affairs, April 1975, p. 515. A 1973 Pentagon Study concluded that NATO forces were capable of successfully and conventionally defending against a Pact conventional offensive for up to 90 days. See Washington Post, 17 June 1973. Those who look pessimistically on NATO capabilities include J. A. Graf Kielmansegg and Denis W. Healey as expressed in their articles in Orbis (Spring 1969).

unknown, there does exist a less stable political-military balance based on deterrence.

The asymmetries within the make-up of the NATO-Warsaw bloc balance can be said to be threefold:

a. Military asymmetries: Although the troop count figures in the Central Region are accurately placed at three quarters of a million for NATO and just under one million for the Warsaw Pact,[12] these numbers of military forces cannot necessarily be considered synonymous with military capabilities. There are additionally such intangibles as morale, leadership, organization, and, indeed, the reliability of East European forces that must be considered. The relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear forces embodied in each bloc's strategy is similarly important. Military capabilities must also be looked at with regard to whether the role envisioned for the forces is to be defensive or offensive. Obviously, a NATO force conceived and structured as a defensive instrument need not be as large as a Warsaw Pact force designed to overrun these defensive positions.

When considering a balanced reduction of the capabilities of each side, these ambiguities lead to difficulties in determining the criteria necessary to maintain a deterrence relationship. The problem is compounded when similar military formations (divisions, battalions, etc.)

have different strengths in the two blocs. For example, as noted earlier, while Warsaw Pact infantry divisions greatly outnumber their NATO counterparts, the troop count of a NATO division is considerably higher. The same is true of military formations of lesser magnitude. The types and nationality of forces must also be considered, and reductions must be distributed among allies so as not to undermine the credibility of the nuclear deterrent on either side. Problems arise as to the "equality" of a British and a GDR supply contingent, for example, or an American and a Czech infantry battalion. Should an American division, itself a foreign force, be deleted from NATO inventory in exchange for one Soviet division or would an indigenous Polish division suffice? With the asymmetrical troop count within these divisions and the distances to be withdrawn, perhaps other figures such as two Soviet divisions or one and one half Polish divisions would be required to insure a balanced reduction. To maintain a mutual trust and confidence there must be mutually acceptable ratios of the superpower forces as well as of indigenous capabilities. But different countries have different criteria by which they must operate--criteria that may be incompatible with each other. The U.S.S.R., for example, must approach MBFR within the framework imposed by the political constraints associated with the uncertainties

of Eastern European loyalty to Moscow. To maintain that loyalty Soviet troop levels may not be as low as Western criteria may demand.

Another objective may be to maintain a flexible response strategy. To what extent can either bloc lessen its conventional capabilities and maintain such a strategy? If the overall commitment remains unchanged (for example, defend West European territory from Warsaw Pact intrusion), then as the conventional capabilities are reduced the nuclear threshold is necessarily lowered somewhat. These criteria, however, are not inconsistent with the concept of MBFR. Coupled with a possible Soviet objective of establishing a non-nuclear zone in Germany, an MBFR agreement could be forthcoming as a "one missile-one man" exchange whereby the Warsaw Pact would pay a conventional price for a NATO tactical nuclear reduction.

Even if Soviet and American troop reductions were forthcoming, military asymmetries again present themselves should the need for reintroduction of those forces arise. The relative ease and rapidity with which Soviet forces can be brought to bear was exemplified by the Czechoslovakian invasion. This is a direct function of the logistic and political asymmetries of the two blocs which are discussed below.

b. Geographic asymmetries: The Western bloc is disadvantaged by the lack of geographical depth, the East-West

confrontation line being a mere few hundred miles from the Atlantic. Furthermore, Western Europe offers little natural defense in the form of either mountain ranges or other natural barriers to advancing armies. The lack of territorial expanse also adds to the vulnerability of Western Europe to limited range weapons systems. Conversely, the vastness of Warsaw bloc territory (which theoretically extends to the Pacific) places many targets beyond the range of similar NATO weapons systems. Finally, the industrial centers of Western Europe are correspondingly more concentrated.

This lack of geographical depth was heightened in 1966 with the withdrawal of French territory from the military alliance. Should West Germany ever become a nuclear-free zone, forcing NATO to rely more heavily on conventional defense, this problem would be made all the more evident.

Another obvious geographic asymmetry is the distance in miles that Soviet and American forces would be withdrawn. If this were the only standard for determining the balance in an MBFR, ten times as many Soviet troops than American troops would need to be withdrawn to achieve equal reductions expressed in "man-miles." Whereas Soviet troops in a reinforcement action (or an enforcement action such as in Czechoslovakia) need only be moved a few hundred miles along land transportation routes, American reinforcements,

and most of their equipment and supplies, must be moved thousands of miles by air or sea. A rapid reinforcement capability would be required, given the lack of "defense in depth" discussed earlier. The attainment of this quick reaction capability is dependent not only upon the types and quantity of aircraft available, but also, in a more distant time frame, the political attitude within the United States.

c. Sociological-political asymmetries: As the United States focuses its attention less on unilateral commitments abroad, the determination of the "American Will" lessens. There is growing feeling that Europe should bear a greater share of the NATO burden. Although this has, in the past, stemmed mostly from the American dissatisfaction over the burden of maintaining troops in Europe (and dissatisfaction with the resulting balance of payments deficit), there is also a growing feeling that the Soviet threat has diminished and that U.S. forces in Europe can fulfill their mission with a lower force level. Consequently as a reaction to anything short of an actual invasion it would be difficult to muster the political support necessary to mobilize a significant reinforcement effort in Europe. The reinforcement will be even more difficult after American forces are reduced because of domestic opposition to changing such a decision once it has been made. Furthermore, if a Warsaw bloc threat

short of invasion of Western Europe should arise, the proposal to reinforce American troops in Europe would promptly run into criticism that such an action would worsen the crisis.

The Warsaw bloc, on the other hand, and the Soviet Union in particular are able to function more as a State than as a Society. Although subject to various domestic and factional pressures, the Soviet Union nevertheless can mobilize her resources with relatively less friction than might be encountered in a democratically organized society.*

All three of the above mentioned asymmetries--military, geographical, and sociological-political--must necessarily be considered in the formulation of a mutual and balanced force reduction designed to reduce the level of military confrontation while maintaining mutual confidence in the resulting balance of forces.

When the nineteen nations joined together for exploratory talks in January 1973, the NATO negotiators rapidly made it clear that their negotiating objectives would include offsetting the numerical and geographical advantages

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*The extent to which domestic pressure as well as factionalism within the governmental power structure is evident in the U.S.S.R. was amply brought out in an unpublished paper entitled Soviet Interests in SALT: Political, Economic, Bureaucratic and Strategic Contributions and Impediments to Arms Control presented by Thomas W. Wolfe at the Fifth International Arms Control Symposium held in Philadelphia, October 15-17, 1971.

enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact by asymmetrical reductions. Although seemingly contradictory to "balanced" force reductions, it was insisted that to offset the Pact's numerical advantage, greater reductions must occur to maintain a relative balance.[13] This concept was rejected by the Soviets who insisted that equal reductions would leave the security of each side unchanged. Resembling, as it did, the argument that two men--one rich and one poor--are being treated equally if each pays a one hundred dollar tax, the Soviet argument was equally unappealing to the West.

The NATO proposal in November 1973,* after MBFR talks opened in Vienna in October, suggested that reductions take place in two phases. In Phase I the United States and the Soviet Union were each to reduce approximately 15% of their forces deployed to the Central Region. While the United States was to withdraw 28,000 men from unspecified units, the Soviets would withdraw 68,000 men from specified tank units. Phase II, to be negotiated after Phase I is complete, would reduce the collective bloc ground forces on both sides to a celing of approximately 700,000 men. In Phase I, it is unclear if the 68,000 Soviet men would, when they withdraw from the area, take their tanks home with them. Such a number of Soviet ground forces conveniently approximates a

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*The figures contained in the following discussion on various bloc proposals can be found in Survival, January/February 1975.

Soviet tank army which contains something in excess of 1,500 tanks. Recent modifications to the original NATO Proposal have added the element of armaments to that of personnel by offering to remove from the NATO area one thousand American nuclear warheads in explicit exchange for the removal of a Soviet tank army with 1,700 Soviet tanks.[14] Such a trade may be more appealing to the Soviets, who would certainly have balked on any one-sided agreement with respect to armaments.

The Warsaw Pact proposal, also tabled in November 1973, called for three phases, to take place in 1975, 1976, and 1977 respectively.[15] Phase I would be an equal manpower reduction of 20,000 to be taken from both indigenous and deployed forces. Phase II would reduce each side by an additional 5 percent and Phase II, an additional 10 percent. In the Pact proposal there were four main items that stood out.

a. Both foreign and indigenous forces of all the direct participants would be involved in all three phases.

b. Reductions taking place would be symmetrically undertaken with Pact reductions matched in like units from NATO forces (i.e., tank unit for tank unit, etc.).

c. Reductions would include, in addition to just the ground forces covered by the NATO proposal, air manpower and nuclear units.

d. Deployed units (U.S., U.K., Canada, and U.S.S.R.) that were part of reductions would take all their equipment with them, while indigenous units would be completely disbanded.

The last of these points clearly emphasizes the Soviet principle that ceilings on national forces (as opposed to the collective bloc ceilings of the NATO proposal) are desirable. Remembering Soviet historical fears and political objectives discussed earlier, it can be assumed that such a principle is aimed primarily at the FRG. Obviously such a constraint would deny NATO the flexibility to replace one member's forces that may for some reason be recalled for duty elsewhere (Northern Ireland, for example), with the forces of another member requiring the reactivation of disbanded units. The Warsaw Pact proposal strongly implies that withdrawn foreign forces are not to be reintroduced and disbanded indigenous forces are not to be reactivated. The FRG, perhaps most capable of fielding the forces needed to replace the temporarily withdrawn forces of another member, as well as, of all the European NATO members, the most exposed to attack, would object strongly to acceptance of such a principle.

Several potential pitfalls exist in the Warsaw Pact proposal in addition to the obvious one of continued imbalance after Phases I, II, and III. First, any agreement

to expand manpower to include air and nuclear as well as ground manpower, should include provision for a detailed exchange of the data to permit analysis of proposed force allocations and resulting structure of forces. Second, the ban on the transfer of defense responsibilities among allies implicit in the concept of national sub-ceilings is not only potentially dangerous in terms of resulting military balance but also could prove politically divisive within the Alliance. Third, in order to even the imbalance of 3,000 reinforcement miles versus 300, Soviet units should be required to withdraw their heavy equippage along with their manpower while some degree of U.S. prepositioning should be maintained. Fourth, some degree of flexibility should be maintained to inject additional U.S. forces into the Central Region from time to time for exercises thereby maintaining proficiency in strategic reinforcement capability--a capability upon which a reduced force posture would be even more dependent than it is today. Fifth, verification measures must be complete and adequate. No reductions should occur until after verification measures supplementary to those of "national means" have been developed. Agreement for agreement sake must be avoided.

Focusing again on the NATO proposal, it can be seen that the recent modification to include the removal of 1,000 nuclear weapons opens up a pandora's bos with a new subject: armament limitations.

on the nuclear weapons provided by any other NATO member, such as the U.K. or France, should the latter formalize military ties to the Alliance. NATO negotiators should insist on similar arrangements concerning Pact armor units. Since Phase I (NATO proposal) deals only with U.S. and Soviet forces, commitments to limits on non-U.S. armaments may serve as additional leverage to urge Warsaw Pact negotiators to commit themselves to the spirit of Phase II, the details of which remain to be negotiated.

One additional recommendation follows: in the NATO proposal 68,000 Soviet men constituting the equivalent of a tank army have been specified while 28,000 U.S. troops from unspecified units have been suggested to be the "price." Since NATO is asking for a piece of the Soviet's front line battle units (a tank army), it would not be unreasonable of them to ask for an American equivalent--a U.S. armored division. Pressured by the Nunn Amendment, the combat-for-support revisions that have been made since 1975 have changed the structure of U.S. ground forces in Central Europe from four and one-third combat divisions to the equivalent of five combat divisions without the addition of more manpower. Although there exists a reasonable, albeit elusive, limit to the exchange of support and staff personnel for combat manpower, this process whereby we "prefabricate" our own bargaining chip out of less attractive material may be the only way to trade away a Soviet tank army.

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The effects of force reductions on the feasibility of NATO's strategic doctrine are elusive. Although deterrence may not be affected (a debatable point itself), NATO's capability for defense would certainly be affected, especially if the symmetrical reductions proposed by the Warsaw Pact were accepted to some degree. If deterrence fails defensive capabilities are all that remain. Deterrence is rational* where actions are based upon logical determination of probable gains and losses. Perhaps, then, deterrence is appropriate only to a deliberate, rationally conceived Warsaw Pact offensive. But war in Europe may become a reality through a spill-over from an East European crisis, for example, or post-Tito Soviet adventurism in Yugoslavia. These two scenarios are particularly subject to miscalculation and/or accident.

If that day comes and deterrence either fails or is irrelevant, it is the size, strength, disposition, and tactics of NATO's war-fighting capability that will be tested. Disposition of NATO's forces and tactics employed by these forces (accompanied by certain recommendations) are the subjects of the following chapter.

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*It has been said that deterrence, to be credible, is enhanced by adding the element of uncertainty to deterrence. See, for example, Aron, The Great Debate, and Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy, footnoted previously. Thomas Schelling has gone so far as to suggest that an irrational factor is helpful. See Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.

CHAPTER V

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CHAPTER V

IMPACT OF FORCE REDUCTIONS ON NATO'S DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE

General.

The question of how many troops are necessary for the conventional defense of Western Europe is at the heart of the MBFR negotiations. In recent years it has also been a key element in the debate in the United States on unilateral withdrawal. The diplomats undoubtedly are well versed in the required force levels below which it would be suicidal for NATO to reduce. Numbers of forces, however, are only one element of the defensive issue. There is also the element of the form of defense which NATO should employ. For years, proponents of differing opinion have expounded the defensive options available to NATO and recommended the adoption of one or the other. To date, no unanimous agreement has been reached on this fundamental issue. What has been even more surprising of late is that advocacy continues unabated, while a balanced review of all that has been said is lacking. In this chapter we will review the applicable defensive options and as objectively as possible assess their effectiveness. Based on these assessments, pertinent recommendations will be made.

The most significant determination to be made by NATO in contemplation of a reduction of forces in Europe is the practical effect of the reduction on NATO's own defensive posture. If the force reduction is a unilateral one by a NATO member, the nature of the Warsaw Pact threat will not change at all, yet NATO's defensive capability will certainly be degraded to some extent. If mutual reductions are made by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the immediate threat to NATO will be lessened, and hence some degradation of defensive capability might appear tolerable. The argument can be made, however, that the relative threat to NATO will not have lessened or even remained constant, but rather could be considered to have increased. This argument is based on the USSR's geographical advantage over the U.S. in terms of being able to reintroduce the withdrawn forces into Central Europe before the U.S. can.[1] U.S. forces enroute to Europe by sea or air face a more difficult movement than do Soviet forces returning by land from the western military districts of the Soviet Union. NATO's dilemma, then, would be to construct a viable defense with fewer forces immediately available.

The potential threat facing these NATO forces should not be considered to have changed appreciably from that which existed during the pre-reduction period. These Warsaw Pact forces have been addressed in the previous chapters and

will be analyzed more deeply in this chapter in the context of their offensive capabilities versus NATO's potential defensive formations. One major point of concern (after a force reduction is achieved) would center on the question of whether the withdrawn Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces would necessarily have to be moved forward again, before the Warsaw Pact could reasonably expect success in initiating an offensive. Such a forward deployment would be a logical expectation, if the Warsaw Pact believed NATO had already obtained strategic warning. On the other hand, the possibility of a campaign employing only in-place Pact forces with no strategic or tactical warning being given cannot be discounted, although its chances of remaining undetected are highly unlikely. Even in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, NATO was able to obtain strategic, although not tactical warning.[2] If the Pact's intent was such a surprise campaign, the withdrawn Soviet forces would probably not be reintroduced prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The detection of the movement of these forces by NATO would surely provide that body with strategic warning and negate the planned element of surprise.[3] The appearance of these forces shortly after the start of the conflict would, however, almost be a certainty.

NATO's formulation of a credible defense under the constraints imposed by force reductions is most difficult.

Many would argue that only increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) can afford NATO's defense any realistic degree of credence.[4] The relationship between the use of TNWs and the steadfastness of a defense has all the philosophical subtleties of the chicken-egg controversy. It is probably most reasonable to state that NATO would use TNWs only as a measure of last resort after a conventional defense had given every indication of imminent collapse or if the Pact used them first.[5] It is well to remember in the discussion which follows that TNWs have their rightful place in every form of defense. The success of TNWs usage in a particular form of defense will not be considered the driving force for the adoption of that defense, since NATO's public position implies that the use of TNWs is contingent upon the failure of a conventional defense. For this reason, each version of the NATO defense must be evaluated first for its merit as a conventional (non-nuclear) defense.

What are the basic defensive options from which NATO can choose? In the not too distant past, basic approaches to defense in Western military circles centered around two concepts, the area defense and the mobile defense. In recent years, however, there is an emerging new concept of conventional defense, the "chequerboard" defense. This new defensive concept recognizes the impact on warfare

made by impressive advances in weapons technology. Like the navies and air forces of the world, armies are being drawn into ever more complex types of warfare. Sensors, stand-off weapons, and precision guidance are rapidly finding multiple uses on the modern battlefield. The history of warfare is replete with examples of weapons development being closely followed by significant changes in tactics which specifically exploit the advantages of weapon improvement. It may well be that the "chequerboard" defense is the latest link in that chain. Before analyzing this new type of defense, it is worthwhile to examine the fundamentals of the area and the mobile defenses. Such an examination is beneficial for two reasons. First, either the area or the mobile defense might prove itself useful to NATO after a reduction of forces; and, secondly, an understanding of the new "chequerboard" defense can only be achieved after a careful study of the two predecessors from which it derived.


Area Defense.

The area defense is the oldest, most familiar form of defense. Every layman can envision its basic elements. One pictures soldiers fighting side-by-side in foxholes; units occupying adjacent positions on a clearly defined line; and the enemy trying his hardest to penetrate that line and capture territory beyond. It is basically linear warfare in its classic form. Why then the name "area" defense? Some analysts argue that the term is just a

euphemism to avoid the frightful connotations of linear warfare.[6] A look at how the U. S. Army doctrine views the area defense will greatly clarify the concept. Figure 1 shows a typical division deployed in the area defense. The solid circles represent battalion positions, while the broken ones shown planned fall-back positions. The left brigade has two battalions on the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) with one battalion (minus) to the rear in reserve. The right brigade has three on the FEBA with one also in a reserve. Two additional battalions are in the division rear, one positioned behind each committed brigade. They would be under the control of the third brigade, the position of the brigade headquarters being indicated by the flag symbol. From this figure, one can see that there is some depth to the defense. The division would try to hold the trace on the ground defined by the FEBA. If the enemy attack is apparently going to penetrate the FEBA despite all friendly countermeasures, the division does have the flexibility to withdraw to a parallel line of positions, defined by the dashed circles. Granted, this second line of positions would be in close proximity to the FEBA, but it does shown that there is no "hold the FEBA at all costs" mentality inherent in the area defense doctrine.

There are certain doctrinal principles instilled into U.S. commanders as to how this defense must be successfully

FIGURE 1



DIVISION IN THE AREA DEFENSE

Source: Department of the Army Field Manual, FM 61-100 The Division (Washington: November 1968), p.

employed. The first is that "the forward defense element contains the bulk of the combat power."[7] In Figure 1, this principle is observed by having seven of the division's nine battalions on, or in close proximity to, the FEBA. The next principle is really a corollary of the first: "the priority for allocation of combat power is to the forward defense."[8] A simple example is that if simultaneous threats arose on the FEBA and in the division rear area (airborne landing, guerrilla activity, etc.), the division commander's primary responsibility in most circumstances would be to maintain the integrity of the FEBA and call for assistance from other units in combating the rear area threat. The third principle is: "the defense plans to accept decisive engagement and accomplish the mission along the forward edge of the battle area."[9] In an actual overhead photo showing the area covered in Figure 1, one would expect to see an extensively fortified (if time has permitted) FEBA, with firing lanes cleared, bunkers constructed, and barriers built. Since the force has decided to fight at this location, it will do everything possible to gain advantage from the terrain. Another tenet of the area defense is that "emphasis is on retention or control of specific terrain."[10] The friendly force has determined that the terrain behind the FEBA is valuable and must be retained. It is the interpretation of this tactical

principle which has caused some confusion as to the relationship between NATO's stated strategy of "flexible response/ forward defense" and the tactics NATO employs to implement that strategy. This is a complex political, as well as military issue, which will therefore be treated elsewhere in this paper.* The final principle of the area defense is that "counterattacks are made to eject or destroy enemy penetrations of the forward edge of the battle area."[11] In Figure 1, a penetration of either brigade's FEBA would be initially counterattacked with that brigade's reserve battalion. Should that counterattack fail, the division counterattack force, consisting of the brigade headquarters and two battalions in the rear area, could then be called on to execute the division counterattack plan.

Earlier, the use of tactical nuclear weapons was said to have its place in each of the defensive concepts analyzed. The doctrine of flexible response implies that TNWs would only be used when it seemed a conventional defense was no longer effective. This seems an appropriate place to postulate how that might happen in the area defense. A division commander, under orders to avoid the use of nuclear weapons to the last possible moment, would probably first be forced to consider using them when his forward

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*See page 166.

brigades had already given up the FEBA, and having fallen back to their supplementary positions, were in turn being penetrated there. Before initiating the division counter-attack plan with the last of his battalions, the commander might realize that all he had left were his organic TNWs. He might then report his situation to the corps commander and request permission to use TNWs. Naturally only the National Command Authorities have such release power over TNWs, but it would be the division commander's duty to signal the imminent collapse of his conventional defense by his initiation of a TNW release request. The corps commander, probably under similar orders regarding the use of nuclear weapons, would choose instead to use his corps reserve to counterattack the penetration in the division area. This would be a likely course of action if that one penetration were the only one in the entire corps area. It must be remembered though, that once the corps commander chooses the area defense, he is equally subject to the principles of the area defense as is his division commander[13] The bulk of the corps is deployed forward at the FEBA and only a relatively small reserve is available. The corps commander would be likely to decide to use TNWs in the event of multiple penetrations of his FEBA. The reason is that he could not stretch his reserve to counter multiple threats. He would also favor that option,

if once he committed his reserve for the counterattack, he learned that the counterattack failed to blunt the enemy penetration. The reaction of commanders up the line would be very similar to those of the corps and division commanders. The moment of truth, calling for a decision by SHAPE to use TNWs, would come at the latest when there were either more enemy penetrations of the area defense than available reserves to counterattack them, or when counter-attacks with all available reserves had failed to halt even a limited number of penetrations. The use of TNWs in the area defense would then appear to be a function of the number and severity of enemy penetrations as well as the probability of the friendly forces successfully countering them. In general, this probability of successful counter-attack would not appear to be high, since by definition the reserves or counterattack forces in an area defense have a low priority in the allocation of combat power.

There are certain conditions which according to U.S. doctrine favor the adoption of the area defense posture by the defending force. These conditions are:

(1) There is a lack of depth in the defensive area.

(2) There is a requirement to retain specific terrain.

(3) Terrain restricts maneuver by the defending force.

(4) The attacker possesses greater mobility than the defender.

(5) The attacker possesses air superiority.

(6) Time is available for the construction of defensive positions including preparation of barriers.


(7) The frontage assigned is relatively narrow.[14]

It can be argued that Conditions 1 and 2 do apply to the NATO environment. Across the North German Plain the distance from Helmstedt on the East/West German border to the Wesel/Arnhem area on the Netherlands/West German border is only some 200 miles.[15] To the citizens of the European NATO countries, especially West Germany, the requirement certainly exists for the retention of the specific terrain in which they live.[16]

Condition 3 does not apply to the NATO environment. On the North German Plain, the defender is just as free to maneuver as is the attacker. In fact a recent study of the North German Plain by NATO revealed some interesting facts concerning this locale which has long had a reputation as excellent tank country. The North German Plain (see Figure 2) may not be such an ideal location for decisive tank battles in these days of increasing stand-off ranges. Most areas on the Plain offer effective target ranges of 1000-3000 meters with only 8% offering ranges of 3000-4000 meters. A mere 5% of the terrain on the Plain offers ranges

FIGURE 2

LIKELY WARSAW PACT INVASION ROUTES
INTO NATO'S CENTRAL REGION




Source: Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, U.S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 31.

up to 5000 meters.[17] In the central part of West Germany, the primary invasion route, the Fulda Gap, probably impedes the attacking force more than the defending force. In contrast, the terrain of the Hof Corridor in southern Germany is not nearly as restrictive as that of the Fulda Gap, and the case can be made that on this invasion route the two sides would have equal maneuverability.[18] Even if that is so, Condition 3 still does not apply.

Condition 4 invariably leads one to a discussion of the quantity of the Warsaw Pact's ground and air combat platforms versus the quality of NATO's smaller ground and air forces. In the geographical area of the MBFR discussions (Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, West Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) the Warsaw Pact has been credited with over 15,000 tanks and 2,800 aircraft, while NATO has over 6,000 tanks and 1,300 aircraft (see Figure 3).[19] Recent indications are that the Warsaw Pact may have as many as 19,000+ tanks in the MBFR area of interest. Two reasons are given for this recent increase: better Western intelligence collection/analysis ("bean counting" in the trade[20]), and the Soviet introduction of the T-62 tank to replace the older T-55, without the withdrawal/junking of the older version.[21] The quality and type of weaponry available to NATO and the relative insufficiency of the Warsaw Pact logistic system, however,

FIGURE 3

The NATO/WARSAW PACT BALANCE IN EUROPE



Source: Department of Defense, Commander's Digest (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 14 November 1974), p.6.

led former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to conclude: "As a consequence, there is an approximate balance between the immediately available forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the Center Region."[22] The former Secretary's annunciation of this balance certainly brought the question of Warsaw Pact ground mobility into sharper focus. In many analyses of the Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, nothing short of awe was displayed at the Pact's impressive seizure of that country within one day.[23] What was often overlooked was the available evidence showing that the Pact's logistical tail was hard pressed to function effectively in support of that operation. Even more notable is the fact that this apparent breakdown in logistics took place in an environment where no resistance was offered by the Czech Army.[24] When mention is made of the weakness of the Warsaw Pact logistic system, some analysts are quick to point out that the Pact soldier is trained to forage and can exist on less than his Western counterpart.[25] While this may be true, tanks still require gasoline and artillery pieces ammunition, so this weakness is one which NATO should attempt to exploit to the fullest. Furthermore, the Czech experience obviously cannot be simply carried forward into the scenario of NATO-Warsaw Pact warfare. There the awesome, mobile Warsaw Pact "teeth" forces will be directly dependent on the lethargic "tail"

force, and it is highly unlikely that little or no resistance will be offered by NATO. One need only remember that the Russian T-62 tank carries only 44 rounds of ammunition (while the U.S. M-60 has a basic load of 63).[26] In the postulated 200+ mile dash to the North Sea from the East German border, it is very likely that ammunition resupply for tanks will be a key concern of the Warsaw Pact. Once the first few tanks require this resupply, the entire logistic chain of events is set in motion. The weak link in the entire operation is then subject to NATO's exploitation. Granted, improvements have undoubtedly been made by the Soviets since 1968,[27] but in relative terms, their logistic system is probably still a comparative weakness. Similarly, numbers of aircraft do not always tell the entire story. The 2,800 Warsaw Pact aircraft have, for the most part, an air defense mission in support of their own forces. It is highly unlikely that they could establish air superiority over a NATO/Warsaw Pact battlefield.* Conditions 4 and 5 then do not appear to apply to the Warsaw Pact forces.

Condition 6 directly concerns the question of warning time. That general topic must be further sub-divided into strategic and tactical warning. Of the two, tactical warning is the more difficult to obtain. As stated earlier, tactical

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*See pages 144-145.

warning was not obtained in the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion, while strategic warning was. Strategic warning, however, is all that is needed to justify commencing the fortification of the FEBA as envisioned in the area defense doctrine. The sophistication of the resulting barriers and defensive positions would, of course, depend on the length of time between the warning and the attack. It is not likely that NATO would ever have the time to construct a really effective fortified defensive line. Obtaining funds from the governments concerned before the receipt of strategic warning does not appear likely. After the warning is obtained, time would then be the primary factor. Effective fortifications require time to construct, and it is unlikely that NATO would have enough time to prepare very elaborate emplacements before the initiation of hostilities.

The final condition favoring the adoption of the area defense also does not apply to NATO. The frontage covered by a force is a function of the mission, enemy threat, nature of terrain occupied, and the size of the friendly force. In the area defense, the mission of the units on the FEBA is to hold that line and either to prevent or to destroy penetrations. On the terrain of the North German Plain the task of stopping all penetrations seems an impossible one; it would be only a little easier in the

areas of the Hof Corridor and the Fulda Gap. The frontages that would have to be assigned to the on-line NATO divisions after even only a token force reduction make any arguments favoring the adoption of an area defense highly suspect. On balance, an assessment of the conditions which favor the adoption of an area defense in accord with U.S. doctrine do not appear to apply to the situation in Central Europe, either now or in the event of force reductions.

As a supplement to the foregoing conceptual assessment, it is worthwhile to examine the offensive capability which the Soviets have incorporated into their combat formations before passing final judgment on the area defense concept. The lessons of World War II play a large role in the formulation of Soviet doctrine.[28] It is well to remember the character of Soviet operations on the Eastern Front after the German advance had been halted and the Soviets had seized the initiative. The Soviet commanders developed offensive tactics which exploited the extremely inflexible German defensive plan. This "plan" seems to have been limited to Hitler's drawing a line on a map and telling his generals to hold it at all costs.[29] Inane as that defense was, representing the most inflexible aspects of linear warfare with complete disregard for concepts of defensive mobility, it is hardly surprising that the Soviets readily devised tactics to defeat it. It is perhaps also not very

surprising then that the organization of today's Pact forces still reflect the lessons learned by the Russians in the victorious land battles of World War II.

What is the basic concept behind Soviet, and hence Warsaw Pact, combat organizations, that so radically differs from Western military doctrine and poses such a threat to an area defense?

> The Soviet doctrinal linchpin is the blitzkrieg, the concept of overwhelming an opponent quickly through that attack. The tactic is to concentrate on narrow sectors of the front in order to break through the defenses and then pour into the rear areas, enveloping the main forces and paralyzing any reaction. If only one or two breakthroughs are required because of the weakness of the defense or lack of depth, the enemy can be defeated in a matter of weeks. Against stronger defenses a series of breakthroughs may be required before the enemy collapses.[30]

In the initial Wehrmacht version of the blitzkrieg, the German generals successfully wedded the tank with the Stuka dive-bomber to yield the mobility and firepower which has since characterized that genre of offensive warfare. In the Soviet variant, it seems that a third component has been added. The Soviet military's long love affair with artillery has survived into the nuclear age. The Warsaw Pact enjoys a 3 to 1 advantage in artillery pieces over NATO,[31] while Soviet tactical aircraft have not been designed for a large carrying (range times payload) capability.[32] The major emphasis for Soviet tactical aviation has been air defense.

Although recent design trends in Soviet aircraft production indicate that tactical air concepts long espoused by Western air forces may now be in their Russian infancy, the firepower aspect of blitzkrieg warfare will likely be provided by both artillery and air power, with the former playing the dominant role. The potency of Soviet artillery bombardments, including the rapid-fire rocket launchers, has been recognized by Western analysts since World War II and must be deemed capable of blasting the gaps in an area defense through which the armor elements can pour.[33]

In structuring their ground forces, the Soviets have provided them with the necessary mobility for the exploitation phase of the blitzkrieg. Some 31 Soviet divisions are deployed in Eastern Europe, 15 motorized rifle and 16 armored divisions.[34] The Soviet divisions are usually subordinate to armies (the Soviets do not use the corps level of command seen in most Western armies). A Soviet Army can control from three to five divisions. The armies are in turn under the control of the group or front. The Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) poses the main threat to NATO. It is located in East Germany and has control of five armies with a total force of 20 divisions. The five armies of GSFG are: 3rd Shock Army in the Magdeburg area, 8th Guards Army in the Weimar area, 20th Guards Army in the vicinity of Eberswalde, 2nd Guards Army southeast of Berlin/Burstenberg,

and the 1st Guards Tank Army near Dresden.[35] The 3rd Shock Army and the 1st Guards Tank Army (each being a tank army) would probably be the vanguard of any Warsaw Pact westward advance.

The remaining eleven Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, while not posing as significant a threat as GSFG, certainly are a force to be reckoned with in their own right. The Northern Group of Forces (NGF) in Poland has two subordinate divisions. The Southern Group of Forces (SGF) in Hungary has four divisions.[36] The Central Group of Forces (CGF) with five divisions came into being shortly after the Czechoslovakian invasion of 1968. CGF has been stationed in that country ever since.[37] The presence of NGF, CGF and SGF in countries where uprisings against the Soviet backed regimes have taken place in the past raises the possibility of an internal security mission for these forces in the event of war with NATO. With no firm evidence of this possibility yet available, a worst case analysis must assume the participation of these forces in a war against NATO. NGF and CGF would probably be part of the threat facing NATO's Central Region, while SGF in Hungary would more likely be employed against NATO's southern flank.


To further complicate the NATO defensive mission, the presence of certain East European armies in a Warsaw Pact attack must also be assumed in a worst case analysis.

Of prime concern are the six East German divisions, ten Czech divisions and thirteen Polish divisions. These units are all motorized or armored. Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria can also field a total of 26 motorized/armored divisions.[38] The forces in these three countries, like the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Hungary, would probably be used against NATO's southern flank.

Having discussed the firepower and mobility components of the Warsaw Pact's blitzkrieg capability, it is time to examine the specific tactic which might be used against a NATO area type defense. It appears that in most area defense situations, the Soviets would employ the direct frontal assault. This tactic should not be viewed as a vehicular wave assault, applying equal pressure along a broad front. Instead it is a selective or surgical application of mass and firepower along a narrow sector in order to create the desired ruptures.[39] The concentration of the armored force to exploit the penetration is a very delicate operation where positive control (or prior rehearsal) can be expected. This is so because the act of concentrating the armored force will present the foe with a very lucrative TNW target. As shown in Figure 4, this armored force will approach the defensive line in a dispersed fashion. At a given signal or time, the dispersed force will concentrate rapidly in order to pass through the penetration made in the area defense. Once thorugh the FEBA, the attacking force

FIGURE 4

SOVIET FRONTAL ATTACK



Source: P. H. Vigor and C. M. Donnelly, "The Soviet Threat to Europe," RUSI, March 1975, p. 70.

fans out while still thrusting deeper into the enemy's rear area.[40] In this fanning maneuver, the attacking force can thus engage the local reserves from unexpected directions and use meeting engagements to thwart higher commands' counterattack forces moving up to seal the penetration. In this age of mobile warfare, the meeting engagement is a type of offensive operation whose importance is recognized by the Soviets and frequently practiced in exercises.[41] When employing the frontal assault against the Germans in World War II, the Soviets claim that they were usually able to breach the defensive line within 24 hours.[42] Such quick breakthroughs were achieved, however, only when the Soviets enjoyed force ratios on the order of 7 to 1 or higher.

Another aspect of Soviet combat organizational theory bears mention at this point. The Pact forces employ "echelon" formations in the attack. This is unlike anything in the West. The first "echelon" units are the attacking formations whose mission is to close with and destroy the enemy. "The second echelon . . . is employed in a follow-up role to maintain a high tempo of advance, to repel enemy counterattacks, and to exploit offensive success of the first echelon. The march formation, direction of advance, and area of commitment are designed to provide direct support to the attack of the first echelon."[43] What is even more interesting, is that usually a reserve is used in addition


to the two echelons.[44] This echelon organization exists from the regimental through the army level, and certainly provides the Pact commander with a high degree of flexibility in conducting his operations.[45] In attacking an area defense, the second echelon might be used to provide that little extra combat power required to penetrate the defensive positions. If not needed in achieving the penetration, the second echelon certainly could be used effectively when the Pact force fans out into the rear area behind the penetration and presses on to exploit the initial success.

There is a variation of the frontal assault which the Soviets utilize when they plan to make the first use of nuclear weapons. In this case, the breach of the defensive line is made with TNWs, and the dispersion of the attacking force becomes paramount (see Figure 5). The basic combat formation of the Pact is considered to be the battalion or an equivalent combined arms formation. Although the battalion's companies maintain their normal combat interval, the spacing between battalions is increased to 2 Kilometers. The Soviets would be expecting NATO's nuclear counterfire and believe that losses could be held to a minimum by means of adequate dispersion.[46]

In summary, several aspects of the analysis of the area defense merit review. The employment of the area defense by

FIGURE 5

SOVIET FRONTAL ATTACK WITH
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS



Source: P. H. Vigor and C. M. Donnelly, "The Soviet Threat to Europe," RUSI, March 1975, p. 73.

NATO in light of its stated nuclear policy would seem paradoxical. NATO's strategy of flexible response holds that nuclear weapons would only be used in the event of the failure of the conventional defense. If NATO forces are reduced by only one division, the frontages of the remaining on-line divisions would be too great to anticipate realistically holding a FEBA against penetration by the Warsaw Pact. Once penetrations of the area defense have been made, the probability of successful counterattack is not high. This is due to the bulk of the combat power being deployed on or near the FEBA, which has already been breached. To stop the Pact's penetrations, TNWs become surrogates for counterattack forces. The ultimate use of TNWs in the area defense hinges, then, on the enemy's probability of successfully penetrating the FEBA. In light of observed Soviet/Warsaw Pact organizational theory, doctrine and equipment development, the ability to achieve a breakthrough of a static line seems a realistic capability with which the Warsaw Pact must be credited. The area defense seems to cause too many uncontrollable factors to enter into the NATO decision of whether to use TNWs or not. It would seem that a better, more controllable defensive alternative should be available.

Mobile Defense.

The next defensive option to be analyzed is the mobile defense. Throughout history the shock-power of cavalry units in attack formation has captured the imagination of man. Equally inspiring have been the accounts where cavalry counterattacks against the flank of an attacking force have saved the day for a harried defensive line. It is both these aspects of the cavalry tradition which flavor the mobile defense, for this type of defense has many offensive characteristics which clearly differentiate it from the area defense. There are non-quantitative troop leadership benefits inherent in that statement. Troops who are being trained for offensive type operations possess a psychological attitude different from those constantly exposed to defensive stimuli. The aggressiveness and esprit evident in such offensive-oriented units certainly give them a greater combat power than a mere tally of the tanks and guns in their TO&E would indicate. This is an experience most soldiers have shared, yet one which few analysts employing quantitative measures can grasp.

> Conventional in contrast to nuclear analysis, on the other hand, is not so easily structured and requires a detailed and historical understanding of military doctrinal and organizational patterns--the very type of institutional analysis unfashionable in academia.[47]

That major observation must be borne in mind throughout the discussion of the mobile defense.

Another significant non-quantitative factor inherent in the mobile defense bears mentioning. As will be evident from the following discussion, the mobile defense concept envisions a highly fluid, everchanging environment on the battlefield, where quick decisions and reactions will be required to insure success. The American military system has traditionally instilled high leadership standards in all ranks down to and including NCO's. When coupled with the initiative and resourcefulness typically displayed by American soldiers, one sees that the U. S. Army is uniquely molded by tradition, doctrine and personality to engage in such a free-wheeling type operation as the mobile defense. The Soviet Army, on the other hand, is accustomed to highly structured control procedures and an obvious lack of initiative and flexibility at the lower unit levels.[48] It is probably least suited to employ such tactics. How an attacking Soviet force would react when confronted by such defensive tactics leads to some interesting speculation. A Soviet author recently commenting on Russian World War II armor penetrations stated:

> Tank formations tried to escape protracted battles with the withdrawing enemy troops and did their best to quickly reach the areas and lines which the offensive aimed to capture.[49]

There is no indication that Soviet tactics have changed in this regard, and it seems reasonable to assume that the armored penetration force could easily be channelized and made to rush headlong into the awaiting trap. An apparent inflexibility in tactical doctrine which can be ideally exploited by the mobile defense! Since the Continental NATO military systems evolved from traditions and social backgrounds different from those of the two superpowers, their place on the command and control spectrum probably lies midway between the extreme poles representing the American and Russian positions. The degree of flexibility in their operations and initiative in their leaders is most certainly greater than that of their Warsaw Pact counterparts.

The basic concept of the mobile defense is to destroy enemy forces.[50] No emphasis is placed on retention of terrain, the major tenet of the area defense. The mobile defense will trade some space in order to lure the enemy force into a location against which a successful counterattack can be made. The main point of contention among NATO members concerning the mobile defense is the concept of not specifically defending terrain. The difficulty seems to be one of a lack of full understanding of the mobile defense doctrine. There is apparently some confusion with the concept of a retrograde movement. The phrase "trading space

for time" is normally used in the context of the delaying action, a form of retrograde operation.[51] On the strategic plane, retrograde operations are undertaken in the face of overwhelming enemy superiority. An example was Rommel's westward withdrawal across North Africa after the battle of El Alamein in World War II. It is the buying of time by the yielding of space. The purpose of the time gained is to organize a defense capable of halting the enemy advance. If a defense is successfully established and the enemy halted, offensive operations can then be launched and the territory lost may ultimately be won back.* In the mobile defense, on the tactical plane, this concept of trading space for time really does not apply. The mobile defense aims at the destruction of enemy forces somewhere within the zone chosen as the defensive area. Once the enemy within the zone has been destroyed, the friendly force can recapture the territory within the zone which it had previously yielded to the foe. Through different means, the

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*President Thieu of Vietnam ordered a retrograde operation from the Central Highlands in the spring of 1975. His withdrawing forces, however, were unable to establish an effective defense in the coastal enclaves as originally planned. The fault apparently lay in the fact that the populace and most military were not told (or convinced) that this was a rational, controlled maneuver designed to retain some degree of initiative for the RVN. The ensuing panic among the populace and military caused the plan to disintegrate.

mobile defense strives for the same goal as the area defense. How then is the mobile defense able to achieve that goal?


There are three underlying principles upon which this defense is based:

> (1) The forward defense echelon is relatively light in strength, and reserves are dispersed in rear assembly areas.
>
> (2) The priority for allocation of combat power is the reserve.
>
> (3) Blocking positions are located to contain or slow enemy penetrations for subsequent attack by the reserve echelon.[52]

The first two principles are diametrically opposed to those of the area defense. In that defense, the bulk of the force is placed at or near the FEBA. If the enemy successfully penetrates the FEBA, he has little to fear from the relatively weak counterattack forces in the rear area. That is not so in the mobile defense. Figure 6 shows a typical division in the mobile defense (solid lines represent manned positions, while dashed ones indicate planned fall-back positions). (The model of a division conducting a mobile defense is used here solely for illustrative purposes and does not suggest that the authors believe one NATO division acting alone could defend against several Warsaw Pact divisions. The basic defensive force in NATO is the corps. A corps, nevertheless, would still employ the mobile defense concepts explained here.) Five battalions are on the FEBA, while six are held in reserve in the divi-

FIGURE 6

DIVISION IN THE MOBILE DEFENSE



Source: Department of the Army Field Manual, FM 61-100 The Division (Washington: November 1968), p.

sion rear area. These six battalions form a significant counterattack force. Just enough force is placed at the FEBA in the forward defense echelon to slow and delay the enemy and make him vulnerable to counterattack.[53] It is expected that a strong, determined enemy will penetrate the FEBA, but he must not be allowed to achieve a breakthrough.[54] In light of the earlier analysis of Warsaw Pact capabilities, a Warsaw Pact penetration seems a logical assumption for NATO to make. In the event of force reductions and NATO's resultant degraded defensive capability, the penetrating power of the Warsaw Pact would be increased.* It must be remembered, though, that in the mobile defense the FEBA which the enemy penetrates is only a line on the ground and not a manned defensive line like that of the area defense. The NATO commander will use fall-back and delaying tactics to prevent his forces themselves from being penetrated.[55] He is thus giving up ground, not for the gaining of time, but rather for the opportunity of luring the enemy into a vulnerable position. By falling back, the friendly force commander maintains unit integrity and close order while simultaneously keeping the enemy continuously engaged in combat.

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*For a deeper analysis of this possibility, see General Andrew Goodpaster's article, "NATO Strategy and Requirements 1975-1985," in Survival, Sept/Oct 1975, p. 210-216.

This aspect of the mobile defense which concerns keeping the enemy continuously engaged deserves further analysis. In view of the recognized Soviet weakness for sustained combat, this continuous engagement is a major advantage of the mobile defense. To illustrate a point, it is again helpful to use the 44 round basic load of the T-62 tank as a logistic indicator. In the area defense, the major combat action is over once the FEBA has been penetrated. The firepower needed to blast the gap in the FEBA would be primarily provided by Warsaw Pact artillery/rocket units. The tanks, as the exploiting force, would rush through the resulting gap in the defenses, and then engage targets of opportunity in the rear areas with their main guns. Such tank operations are not very demanding in the way of expected ammunition usage.[56] Shockpower and mobility override firepower considerations in the exploitation face of a blitzkrieg operation. In the mobile defense, however, the fight has just begun, once the line of the FEBA has been crossed. The delaying NATO forward defense echelon, as well as the entire reserve (counterattack) force still have to be reckoned with; and in that situation, the limited sustained fighting capability of the Warsaw Pact units will hurt them. Artillery will not be as responsive in fighting against the mobile defense as it was against the area defense. Accurate, observed artillery fire will be more difficult to

employ on the fluid, ever-changing field of battle than it was against the more or less static positions of the area defense. To make up for this degraded artillery support, the tank cannons of the Soviet forces will have to assume a larger role in suppressing NATO defensive fires. The limited basic load of ammunition on the Warsaw Pact tanks will not allow this type of firing to be sustained for very long, and logistical considerations should soon slow the tempo of the advance. In addition, the poor quality of fire control equipment in the Pact tanks can only complicate the problem further.[57] More rounds will have to be fired to achieve a hit and more ammunition will consequently be consumed in the process. The average NATO tank, on the contrary, has 50% more ammunition on board and a higher quality fire-control system than its Warsaw Pact counterpart and can engage in such tactics as part of its normal operating procedure.[58] It thus appears that the Soviets have optimized their armored offensive capability for blitzkrieg engagements against an area type defense by trading off logistical considerations not needed in that type operation, but have failed to plan and organize for combat against other defensive formations in which logistical requirements assume greater importance.

In analyzing the third and final principle of the mobile defense ("Blocking positions are located to contain or slow

enemy penetrations for subsequent attack by the reserve echelon"), many analysts concentrate solely on quantitative methods and ignore completely such non-quantitative factors as the use of terrain by the defending force. The best known critique of the mobile defense currently in vogue concludes:

> Because the Soviet Union stacks up large numbers of divisions in the breakthrough area in order to swamp the defence and to exploit the breakthrough, a division's forward forces cannot possibly contain the main breakthrough thrusts, and its reserves can only risk a frontal attack against the penetration.[59]

Current U.S. doctrine holds that a major factor in the choice of location for the defensive area is the terrain.[60] Through judicious use of the terrain, the defending commander can lever-up the effective amount of relative combat power he is able to employ against the attacker. By supplementing the natural terrain with barriers and pre-planned fires, it is not inconceivable that the NATO defender could contain/channelize the attacker as envisioned in the mobile defense doctrine. If NATO were to employ a mobile defense after force reductions, the advantages which terrain affords the defender should be exploited to the fullest in order to offset the lower available manpower resources.

In assessing the probability of successful counter-attack by the division in the mobile defense, analysts often tend to make assumptions which are not properly qualified. The critique of the mobile defense quoted in the last

paragraph further states that a counterattack force can only launch a frontal attack, and not a flanking attack, against an enemy penetration, because:

> If a flanking attack were attempted, the divisional reserve would find itself subjected to a counter counter-attack on its own flank by a much larger enemy reserve waiting for the breakthrough.[61]

The implicit assumption in that statement is that the Warsaw Pact second echelon force has not already been committed. Delivering counterattacks is one mission of second echelon units, but as previously discussed, maintaining the tempo of advance is another. If the Warsaw Pact first echelon units do encounter some logistic difficulties in combating the forward defense echelon of the mobile defense, as postulated in this paper, the second echelon might have to be sent in to render assistance and maintain the momentum of the attack. If the NATO division counterattacks after the second echelon units are committed, the counterattack can hit the flank of the Warsaw Pact force and expect a reasonable probability of success. If the second echelon force has not yet been committed, the NATO counterattack force would indeed have to launch a frontal attack against the penetration, and that fact is stressed in current tactical doctrine.[62] It must also be recognized that proper use of terrain in formulating the counterattack plan might also insure that a flanking attack was achieved without the worry of one's own flank being exposed.

This seems an appropriate spot to postulate when and how tactical nuclear weapons might be considered for employment in the mobile defense. Again the basic assumption according to stated NATO policy is that these weapons will only be used in the event that the conventional defense cannot do the job. The matter of enemy penetrations of the FEBA has to be viewed in a totally different light than was the case in the area defense. In the mobile defense, the commander wants the enemy to enter his lair, so to speak. He places his blocking positions and channelizing forces to allow the enemy to penetrate at the point(s) of his, the defender's, choosing. Soviet doctrine calls for the rapid exploitation of just such weak spots in the defense, so in a sense the enemy is playing the defender's game and can logically be expected to penetrate where the defender wishes.[63] A certain amount of initiative has thus slipped from the enemy commander's grasp right from the outset. By employing a coordinated effort in the placement of blocking positions and channelizing forces across an entire front, the number of weak spots, and hence likely enemy penetration points, can to a certain extent be pre-determined by the defender. A major determinant of TNW usage in the area defense--the number and location of enemy penetrations when he, the enemy, has the initiative--can thereby be rendered more controllable for the NATO commander employing the mobile defense.

The other determinant of TNW usage in the area defense--the severity of the enemy penetration--also becomes less critical in the mobile defense. Unlike the weak counter-attack forces of the area defense, the reserves in the mobile defense are specifically tailored for the counter-attack role, possess greater combat power, and have a higher priority for allocation of supporting fires. The succession of counterattacks by such reserves at the NATO division, corps and army levels should strain the limited sustained combat capability of the Pact assault forces (and their second echelons) to the breaking point. It must be remembered that these NATO reserves will face an enemy force that has been in continuous combat since crossing the FEBA and not merely a high-balling armored force exploiting a FEBA penetration of an area defense. It is then only logical to expect that the mobile defense's counterattack forces will have a higher probability of success than did those of the area defense. NATO commanders employing a mobile defense across the entire Central Region should reasonably be expected to slow and defeat a series of major enemy thrusts into the region. If, however, it appeared that all the available, committed reserves were not able to destroy the penetrating enemy forces, only then would the commanders have to request TNWs as the true weapon of last resort. The likelihood of this happening, though, would be less than in the case of the previously analyzed area defense.

The conditions which favor the adoption of the mobile defense will now be examined to determine their applicability to the NATO environment. These conditions are:

> (1) The mission and area of operation permit the defense to be organized and fought in depth.
>
> (2) The terrain permits the defending force relatively free movement.
>
> (3) The defending force's mobility compares favorably with or is greater than the enemy's.
>
> (4) The enemy has the capability of employing nuclear, biological, or chemical munitions and the defender must employ dispersion and mobility to decrease vulnerability to nuclear, biological, or chemical munitions attack.
>
> (5) The friendly forces have sufficient air capability to permit the defending force relatively free movement.
>
> (6) Minimum time is available for deployment of forces and organizations of the ground and defensive positions.
>
> (7) The mission is to destroy enemy forces.
>
> (8) The frontage assigned exceeds the defender's capability to establish an effective defense along the forward edge of the battle area.[64]

Condition 1 raises the issue of the interpretation of the term "forward defense" in NATO's stated strategy of "flexible response/forward defense." As previously discussed, the mobile defense doctrine can and should be viewed as another means of achieving a forward defense. The connotation of trading space for time rightly belongs to the realm of retrograde operations, which are a separate and distinct military entity in themselves, and should not in any way,

shape or form be erroneously appended to the mobile defense doctrine. The depth of the NATO Central Region is sufficient to allow this defensive option to be employed. The fact that the mobile defense aims at the destruction of enemy forces through a defense in depth concept causes difficulties for NATO officials in reconciling the depth requirement with their mission of preserving/restoring the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Germany. General Sir Harry Tuzo, the Commanding General of the Northern Army Group located astride the North German Plain, recently addressed this point when discussing the Army Group's mission:

> Our job is to fight to force a pause . . .
>
> Forcing a pause postulates immediate conventional resistance to give everyone a chance for second thoughts before it gets rougher . . .
>
> A lot of extremely thoughtful people in this country Britain advance the view that the situation calls for embracing large parts of Western Europe in the defensive plans for our main forces--in other words, for defence in real depth. I think that their proposals . . . simply cannot be reconciled with the 'pause' philosophy I have outlined.[65]

The emphasis on the words "immediate conventional" resistance in the above quote is the author's own. The General appears to imply that defense in depth and immediate conventional resistance at the border are mutually exclusive. It is hoped that the analysis of the mobile defense doctrine contained in this paper has demonstrated that they are not.

The second condition for the adoption of the mobile defense is based on the same analysis of terrain conditions as appeared under the area defense.* The terrain of the North German Plain, Fulda Gap and Hof Corridor allow the defender as much freedom of movement as the attacker. This relative state of equality in the maneuver-room potential of the opposing forces favors NATO's adoption of the mobile defense. With that defense, NATO has the physical space needed to react to the developing situation. Conversely, by restricting itself to the static positions of the area defense, NATO would enhance the Pact's maneuver capability by the de facto reduction of its own maneuver-space to the immediate vicinity of the FEBA. The entire dimension of depth is, in effect, eliminated from the defensive equation in the area defense. It must be kept in mind that it is the depth dimension which contains the vast majority of the defender's potential maneuver-space.

The third condition concerning the defender's mobility presents no stumbling block to the imposition of the mobile defense. Most of NATO's divisions responsible for the defense of the Central Region are either mechanized or armored.[66] Thus the requisite inherent mobility is present in the NATO defensive force.

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*See page 136.

With regards to the nuclear, biological and chemical warfare implications of Condition 4, much has been written concerning the various aspects of tactical nuclear warfare. Dispersion of forces has long been recognized as a sound defensive countermeasure. Most citizens of the NATO countries, however, seem to have been lulled into a false sense of security concerning the chemical threat because of the Soviet and American signing of the Geneva Protocol on chemical munition production. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recently placed that entire issue into its proper perspective:

> In the nuclear and chemical warfare environment, the Soviets are increasing both their capability and their ability to protect men and equipment. Their capabilities for chemical warfare are particularly worrisome since we do not possess a similar capability. Although the Soviet Union is a signatory to the Geneva Protocol, the U.S.S.R. currently has an unsurpassed capability to conduct chemical warfare.[67]

The advocates of the area defense seem to ignore the vulnerability of that defense to this chemical threat, while never really considering the advantages offered by the inherent dispersion of forces in the mobile defense. Since dispersion of forces is such a universally accepted countermeasure against TNWs, it is also a sound countermeasure against the chemical threat. The presence of both a realistic nuclear and a realistic chemical threat in the Warsaw Pact arsenal is even a more compelling reason for

NATO's adoption of a defensive option capable of withstanding their usage.

Condition 5--regarding friendly air capability to permit the defending force relative freedom of movement--concerns itself with the airspace over the NATO defensive area. Since the Soviet air force is primarily tasked with strategic and tactical air defense and has relatively few air assets capable of providing close air support to ground forces,[68] the requirements of this condition are presently fulfilled and would allow NATO to assume a mobile defense posture.

Secretary Rumsfeld recently addressed the warning time aspect of Condition 6 in his Annual Defense Department Report FY 77:

> In principle, the Pact mobilization and deployment could be completed in a very short time, which would force NATO to resist with its immediately available forces and might oblige the allies to consider an early use of nuclear weapons to stem the attacker.[69]

Admittedly this is worst case planning, but still a key factor in the selection of NATO's basic defensive posture. From NATO's point of view, the situation can only worsen after a force reduction (of any size) is agreed to. The flexibility inherent in the mobile defense, given such a mobilization threat, certainly deserves consideration vis-a-vis the political niceties of the area defense illusion, wherein the forward defense forces may not even have

time to reach and man their forward positions. The problem of rapidly manning the forward NATO defensive positions is inextricably bound-up in the elaborate procedure whereby authority over national forces is released by the respective governments to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in the event of a crisis.[70]

The mission of the defending forces is the focal point of Condition 7. NATO's present conventional mission is one of forward defense. That mission statement is simple and clear to understand and conjures up politically acceptable images of NATO forces manning a neat line from the Baltic to the Alps. This neat line can be visualized as following every twist and contour of the Federal Republic of Germany's borders with the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. Except for the light forces screening the border in peacetime (U.S. cavalry regiments, etc.), that image is an illusion. General Sir Harry Tuzo pointed out the practical problems of receiving timely release authority over the national forces in question from their respective governments,* and Secretary Rumsfeld focused upon the issue of adequate warning time in the event of hostilities with the Pact.** By combining these two problems it is easy to envision a scenario

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*See footnote #70.

**See footnote #69.

where very few NATO forces could actually be deployed in time to the border area to stop a Pact westward incursion. If those few forward-moving NATO forces were governed by an area defense mission and attempted to establish a hasty area defense somewhere between the border and their staging area, they would likely be routed by the adversary. A credible area defense cannot be set up in a hasty fashion, and the NATO forces would be likely to find themselves involved in meeting engagements for which they were less well schooled than their enemy.

Some defense researchers encountering such a scenario tend to think only in terms of a possible NATO tactical nuclear response, which is so escalatory in nature, and thus call for the abandonment of a forward defense strategy and the substitution of a more flexible delaying strategy in its place.[71] One wonders then whether the subtle distinctions of the mobile defense are really understood and appreciated. The mobile defense does bridge the gap between the extremes of a forward (area) defense and a delaying strategy. In that fact lies its value.

The U. S. Army in Europe prefers the mobile defense in the execution of its defensive mission.[72] This implies that the U. S. Army has taken the broader view of forward defense as outlined in this paper. This concept of forward defense is not keyed to specific terrain at the border, but envisions

some depth to the defensive zone, the destruction of the enemy therein, and the ultimate restoration of the original FEBA, if possible. One is then forced to wonder whether CENTAG, the southern Army Group in which the U. S. Army is predominant, differs in basic defensive tactics from NORTHAG, where the British prevail. It is difficult to reconcile General Sir Harry Tuzo's earlier comments on his mission and subsequent disdain for defense-in-depth with the fact that the U. S. Army prefers the mobile defense. Is NORTHAG "defending specific terrain" while the U.S. led CENTAG is "destroying the enemy?" What happens then in wartime at the boundary where the two army groups interface? Is this a NATO Achilles' heel or just some semantic problem? From available journals and literature it is hard to tell. Since NATO too has tended to favor the mobile defense in recent times,[73] it may be that the appearance of the phrase "forward defense" in NATO's unchanged strategy statement of "flexible response/forward defense" has blinded some commanders to the subtle distinctions required in the shift of tactics to the mobile defense. Certainly General Tuzo should be thinking in terms of the depth of his defensive area and the destruction of enemy forces rather than just stacking forces at the FEBA to "force a pause." Destruction of the enemy forces will certainly cause the foe to pause, while positioning one's force so as to be easily penetrated by the foe--and there is little doubt that the enemy can

penetrate a static line--will hardly cause him to bat an eye. A more precise definition of NATO's conventional defensive mission seems warranted. The politically nebulous "forward defense" is fine to a point, but when the military implementers can't agree on the basic concepts involved--and in this instance only the English language is involved--there appears to be an immediate need for clarity of expression.

The eighth and final condition favoring the adoption of the mobile defense concerns the frontages manned by the defensive forces. Since U.S. forces are very likely to be involved in any early phase of an MFR agreement, it is worthwhile to concentrate on the CENTAG area where the U.S. forces in Germany are deployed. The CENTAG frontage is some 375 miles in length and manned by four corps, two American and two German.[74] Twelve+ division equivalents (four U.S. divisions and three brigades, seven German divisions, and one Canadian brigade) face the Pact forces across the border. The division frontages in the CENTAG area are considered rather excessive at present, and the situation would only be worsened, if, for example, a reduction of one U.S. division were agreed to. This last condition, then, leads to one of the most compelling arguments for NATO's adoption of a mobile defense. The resulting division frontages after an MBFR agreement (of almost any size) would be too excessive to even think of employing an area defense.

In summary, the conditions which favor the adoption of the mobile defense (according to U.S. doctrine) certainly seem to apply in the case of the NATO defensive environment, both as it now exists and especially as it would exist after even only the most minimal force reductions. Aside from this analysis of the theoretical model, no major Soviet tactics appear to have been developed to combat the mobile defense, whereas the frontal assault was designed to combat linear defensive warfare as mentioned earlier. As a supporting part of any Soviet offensive tactic, NATO should expect desant operations. These airborne/helicopter assault forces, usually a battalion size, would normally appear in friendly rear areas to seize vital road junctions, defiles, etc.[76] While they might seriously disrupt the rear area of a force engaged in an area defense with the bulk of its combat power at the FEBA, that would not be so in the mobile defense. The extensive, armor heavy reserves found in the rear areas of a NATO mobile defense would pose a grave threat to these Warsaw Pact airborne forces and handily limit their effectiveness. Tactically, the soundness of the mobile defense seems unsurpassed in any other present defensive doctrine.

"Chequerboard" Defense.*

The term "chequerboard" defense is a new one, which has only recently appeared as a defensive concept, highly touted in many journals. It is not yet the official defensive doctrine of any NATO country, nor is it known whether any of the Western armies are studying its applicability. Although defense analysts and researchers have treated the new weapons technology and its implications in fragmentary articles in numerous journals over the course of the past few years, it is to Mr. Canby's great credit that he attempted to piece this new knowledge into a defensive tactic that has the potential to revolutionize land warfare. Before taking an in-depth look at this "chequerboard" defense, it would be worthwhile to review quickly some of the new technological developments influencing ground combat.

For the typical Western military professional of the early 1970's, the complexity of the day-to-day routine was sufficiently time-consuming to allow only the most cursory interest in the myriad research and development related articles regularly appearing in the military publications.

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*For a detailed description of this defense, see Adelphi Papers #109 (The Alliance and Europe: Part IV: Military Doctrine and Technology) of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. Mr. Steven L. Canby, who wrote the document and might be considered the innovator of the "chequerboard defense," is a 1956 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. After six years of service as an Infantry Officer, he left the Army and received a PhD from Harvard. He has since written on military subjects for many prestigious defense research institutions.

Gadgetry, as it was often viewed, was here to stay, so why worry about its implications. The great promise which a new item of equipment always displayed in its controlled tests somehow managed to diminish when it was placed in the hands of the troops. At least that was the case for the ground soldiers, who never received quite such exotic systems as were produced for the other services. Then along came the Mideast October War of 1973 and the situation changed. The Arab armies, fielding many of the new weapons, appeared to initiate a new era in land warfare. The interest factor in R&D rose within the Western military world like the Dow-Jones Index during a bull market. What the sinking of the Israeli destroyer, Elath, by an Egyptian missile boat in the 1967 war did for the U. S. Navy's interest in anti-ship capable missiles (ASCM), the October 1973 war did for the Western armies' interest in the new weaponry of land warfare. "Lessons learned" about the proper employment of the new systems poured forth in ever-increasing volume, while many of the old doctrines were left behind, if not outrightly discarded, in the minds of many analysts. Now that some two years have passed since that war, a sense of balance has returned to the weaponry discussion. For example, the large number of Israeli tanks killed, which was initially credited solely to the merits of the Arab-employed, Soviet-built Sagger antitank guided missile (ATGM), it now appears,

should be credited at least equally to the demerits of Israeli tactics--to the incorrect mixture of tanks and infantry in the Israeli formations which assaulted the missile positions.[76] Western doctrine has long held that tanks must be fought in conjunction with infantry and artillery when attacking enemy infantry-heavy positions, which the Arab ATGM positions were in the 1973 war. The reaffirmation of this old, accepted doctrine is mentioned here solely to remind the reader that claims made by the new technology advocates are as yet unproven in the view of many experts.

One of the most controversial ramifications of the new weaponry is the claim that it could cause tactical nuclear weapons to become obsolete. The rationale is that the precise guidance, extreme accuracy, increasing ranges and high kill probabilities of the new weapons more efficiently, and less dramatically destroy those targets which previously were vulnerable only to the less accurate but more potent TNWs.[77] Some analysts believe that if TNWs still have a place in the NATO arsenal, it is not as weapons to be used, but rather because they complicate the Warsaw Pact's planning process.[78]

The European members of NATO do not accept that theory. For them TNWs still serve as they have always served as the ultimate weapon against the invasion threat, which they fear

most, and the vital link to the U.S. strategic retaliatory force, should an escalatory process commence.[79] If the TNWs were to become obsolete, then the possibility of a limited, conventional war would, in the European view, become a reality. With the lessened likelihood of a U.S. strategic nuclear retaliation, the Pact might just be tempted to test NATO's will. The inscrutable logic of the tactical nuclear world is always capable of another twist, however, and the layman is invariably brought back to square one with a statement such as follows:

> A NATO conventional-emphasis strategy, because it appeared to reduce the likelihood of both Warsaw Pact conventional success and Western recourse to tactical nuclear use, would seem to invite the early use of TNW by the Soviet Union.[80]

If that statement is accepted, then TNWs will always be around for use in a tit-for-tat fashion against the Pact, regardless of the impressive progress in conventional weaponry.

The new developments have led some analysts to conclude that the initial advantage in combat now lies with the defender instead of the attacker. The new systems make dispersion on the battlefield mandatory, forcing the offense to abandon mass and concentration of forces as a means of achieving local superiority. The dug-in defensive forces will then be capable of submitting the attacker to defeat in detail.[81] The attacker's best chance of success

under such conditions would be realized by emphasizing one of the already resurging principles of war-surprise. Offensive shock-power could be generated through surprise instead of mass and concentration.[82]

The modern weapons with their greater ranges and accuracy also favor smaller units. Not as much manpower is required to accomplish the task. Concealment, swift movement and rapid communications are also desirable on the modern battlefield.[83] Those attributes are easier to obtain with smaller combat units. It is at this point that a dilemma becomes apparent. The developments in command, control and communications' (C^3) technology have been as impressive, if less publicized, than the progress in modern weaponry. These advances in C^3 have made the possibility of "real time" decisions a reality for high level commanders. The resultant C^3 procedures have led to increasing centralization of the command structure. If the dispersion and small unit formations associated with the new technology do become a recognized tactical principle, then a trade-off may have to be made in the centralization of C^3 versus the decentralization of tactics.[84] This is an area which will be addressed later in the critique of the "chequerboard" defense.

The final characteristic of the new weaponry which has greatly excited its advocates is the resulting relative cheapness of the defense. The average first generation

weapon of this type ranges in cost from $1,000 to $10,000, but has a high probability of destroying a vastly more expensive tank or aircraft.[85] Developing the thought further leads one to the possibility of the Warsaw Pact pricing itself out of the offensive business. That conclusion is inaccurate. The current modern weaponry does have some significant limitations which lessen its effectiveness. These deficiencies are: problems in target detection, inaccuracies in ranging, lack of an all-weather capability, and the inability to function at night. The second generation of the new weapons may overcome some, perhaps most, of these problems but at a cost.[86] For example, the new Condor air-to-surface missile will have a price tag in the neighborhood of $200,000 each.[87] Such systems will be a boon to the defender. They will greatly enhance the possibility of successful accomplishment of the defensive mission, but the cost aspects of maintaining such a defensive posture are not likely to decline from the present levels, as some analyses of the new technology have erroneously implied.

This on-going study of the new weapons has led some experts to the conclusion that the basic problem associated with employing them is commencing the redefinition of both strategy and equipment usage.[88] Others believe that this redefinition has probably already begun, ". . . for acquiring

the advanced weapons will likely necessitate the organizational changes championed by the restructuring advocates."[89] The point made in this paper is that the period of MBFR negotiations is the logical time for NATO to conduct an exhaustive study of the subject of restructuring defensive doctrine. If an MBFR agreement is achieved and some reductions made, NATO would have to realign its defensive thinking and quite possibly its forces. In the past, various national concepts of defensive tactics played an inordinately large role in the formulation of NATO defensive doctrine. In realigning defensively after an MBFR agreement, NATO should lead the way and consider some of the newer concepts of defense. Paramount among these is the concept of the "chequerboard" defense.

The synergistic implications of the new weapons developments form the conceptual basis for the "chequerboard" defense. In overview form, the defense consists of four zones or belts:

(1) early attrition belt.
(2) antitank cavalry and strong point belt.
(3) main defense belt.
(4) tank reserve belt.[90]

It is an attempt to derive a union between the principles of the area defense and the mobile defense. The defense is designed to retain terrain, as in the area defense, while recognizing the significant combat potential of the counterattack forces of the mobile defense.[91] In the "chequerboard"

defense, the mission of the counterattack force would be to destroy enemy penetrations of the main defense belt; hence, the main emphasis, even in the execution of the counter-attack sub-function, is on the retention of specific terrain.

In wedding the concepts of the area and mobile defenses, some of their basic aspects have been retained and varied, while new innovations have been created to synthesize their disparate mission philosophies. The early attrition belt and the antitank cavalry and strong point belt are further evolutions of present cavalry screens and General Outpost (GOP) and Combat Outpost (COP) lines. When armed with the new weaponry and sensors, the forces manning those lines will be more effective in performing the missions for which many observers have long felt they were too lightly armed. The tank reserve belt is a variation of present mobile defense counterattack theory. Three essential variations are acknowledged:


> (1) The counterattack force will have only a "strike" mission. It will therefore not need combined arms teams capable of offensive and defensive action. The main defense belt (which will be treated next) can perform the defensive function. The counterattack force should be very heavy in tanks and light in infantry.
>
> (2) The counterattack force needs little organic artillery or logistic support. This support can be provided by the main defense belt which the counterattack force is going to assist. Since the firepower and logistical support is already concentrated at the main defense belt, it is only necessary to shift priority of support to the counterattack force.

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

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NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

(3) The counterattack force will be of division size. The author feels that current U.S. mobile defense doctrine calling for the division to constitute from its own battalions both the forward defense echelon and the reserve stretches the division too thin.[92]

A brief critique of these organizational differences is offered here. Such a tank heavy counterattack force, denuded of almost all infantry, might find itself in a predicament similar to certain Israeli units in the October 1973 war. Secondly, the lack of artillery and logistic capability in the counterattack forces assumes that priority of support can be shifted to them upon arrival at the main defense belt. In the heat of battle the forces of the main defense might themselves require the highest priority. An organic redundancy of support forces would then be preferable. As far as the final point is concerned, most commanders would willingly accept larger counterattack forces as long as the forward defense forces were not critically weakened in order to create them. Since the "chequerboard" defense does not weaken the forward defenses but rather strengthens them, this final point would probably be militarily acceptable.

The major innovation of the "chequerboard" defense centers around the third of the four belts--the main defense belt. It is envisioned as a series of half-company or company-sized positions separated diagonally by approximately 1.5-2.5 km. Figure 7 is an artist's concept of what a

FIGURE 7



DIVISION IN THE "CHEQUERBOARD" DEFENSE

Source: Original Artist's Conception.

division deployed in the "chequerboard" defense might look like. The commander would be free to tailor the frontage, spacing and number of belts to his specific situation and terrain. A division could cover a 50 km front with a depth of 8 km as guideline figures. In weak threat areas, the frontage might be stretched to 80 km and conversely constricted in high threat regions. A defensive division manning the main defense belt would be able to deploy some 40 company-sized strong points in its "chequerboard."*[93]

Two new concepts are associated with the composition of the main defense belt. The first concept places emphasis on the company as the prime defensive organization instead of the battalion as in existing doctrine, and the second calls for the physical separation of the companies, replacing the contiguous unit theory, which has long been the basis of defensive concepts designed for the retention of terrain. Mr. Canby's analysis indicates that the primary constraints of the past, which forced the battalion to be viewed as the basic defensive unit, were the requirements

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*In order to employ the "chequerboard" defense in NATO, Mr. Canby calls for the complete reorganization of NATO forces into defensive divisions, counterattack divisions, etc. The limited scope of this paper allows only an analysis of the tactical principles underlying the "chequerboard" defense and not a discussion of the feasibility of such a reorganization of forces. If the tactical principles are sound, they may be usable in some form under existing organizational concepts.

to provide the sufficient antitank capability as well as adequate close-in night defensive protection.[94] These requirements were fulfilled by massing the capabilities of the companies together with those organic to the battalion headquarters. He further claims that available technology, if appropriately developed, will alter that situation. His judgment in this regard is not dissimilar to the views others have expressed about smaller units assuming greater importance on the modern battlefield. The new ATGMs, with excellent effectiveness out to 3,000 m, the modern high/low pressure cannons, achieving good first-round hit probabilities out to 1,000 m, the highly accurate terminally guided artillery, and the growing family of sophisticated battlefield early-warning sensors now more than adequately enable a single company to hold its own while on the defensive.[95] The separation between company strong points is justified by two compelling arguments. The first concerns the increased effective range of the new ATGMs and cannons. It would be inefficient to deploy the units possessing them in a contiguous manner along a line as in the days when effective weapon ranges were on the order of a couple of hundred meters. By spacing the companies and insuring good fields of fire, the resulting gaps can be covered with devastating accuracy from both flanks and the rear. Secondly, the forces saved (which under the old doctrine

would have been positioned where the gaps now exist) can be deployed in a second, third or even fourth row of interlocking strong points. The defense thus acquires greater depth by the physical occupation of terrain.[96] There was much less depth in the previously analyzed area defense, while, although the mobile defense also has a depth dimension, it is not keyed to the physical occupation of specific terrain. The Federal Republic of Germany is quite concerned that NATO be committed to the retention of specific terrain near the border.[97] As the most voiciferous NATO member on that particular point, it seems almost certain that the defensive concept contained in the "chequerboard" defense would be more acceptable to the FRG than the more controversial, but in this paper's view, better proven theory of defense-in-depth inherent in the mobile concept.


The abandonment of the contiguous unit theory of defense might seem to indicate that fewer forces were needed to perform a defensive mission. In light of the current force reduction talks, NATO soon could be faced with a situation in which an agreement has been reached and overall force levels reduced. In that context, the "chequerboard" defense might have a certain appeal as an economy of force measure. Such a conclusion would be erroneous, however, because a credible "chequerboard" defense is built by having several lines of positions. It must always be remembered that the

personnel to man these additional ines come from the units which would have been positioned where the gaps now exist. The ultimate adoption of the "chequerboard" defense should not be made, then, on the basis of illusory personnel savings, but rather on the effectiveness of the defense against the existing threat.

How would the companies manning the "chequerboard" strong points fare against the recognized Warsaw Pact threat? Figure 8 envisions what a portion of that scenario might look like from an overhead view. A Warsaw Pact tank battalion is shown in the attack. Prior to deploying in such an assault formation, the battalion would probably have been proceeding toward the FEBA in a column of companies with the tanks leading. The battalion would have recon units deployed forward to locate the enemy. Once the enemy was located, the Pact artillery preparation for the assault would commence and the tank battalion would deploy into the assault formation shown, usually two companies forward in the first echelon and one to the rear in the second echelon. Sandwiched between the two echelons would be the command group, ZSU-23 anti-aircraft system and the antitank reserve. The probability is that motorized rifle company normally attached to the tank battalion would likely be employed piecemeal, with one platoon of three BMP vehicles assigned to each tank company. Each of the two assault

FIGURE 8

Tank Battalion Attacking The "Chequerboard" Defense



Source: Original Artist's Conception

companies of the first echelon would deploy all nine tanks in a linear formation with no tank reserve constituted at company level. The platoon of infantry would be positioned some 300 m to the rear of the tanks in order to be able to move forward and render assistance where needed. Each of the two first echelon companies would have a frontage of about 1.5 km. Although the two companies are shown attacking in a contiguous manner, Soviet doctrine does allow up to a 500 m separation between first echelon units.[98]

The "chequerboard" company located at the focal point of the Pact battalion's attack is really not as isolated as one might initially think. The adjacent strong points on the same line can provide assistance, since the enemy is within the 3,000 m range of their ATGMs. Granted these strong points might also be facing enemy battalions in their sectors and thus only able to provide limited help. On the other hand, if the Soviets believed tactical nuclear warfare was imminent, the basic minimal spacing between battalions would be increased to 2 km as previously discussed.* Thus on the tactical nuclear battlefield, a chequerboard offense of Pact battalions would be attacking a "chequerboard" defense of NATO companied. In addition to the supporting fire delivered from the flanking company positions, the strong

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*See page 150.

points of the second line, some 2.5 km to the rear, could also begin taking the enemy under fire with their 3,000 m ATGMs. The enemy companies are then exposed to accurate fire from a minimum of two, but possibly three, directions. As aimed, direct fire is usually very accurate, the attacker could quickly find himself in a very precarious position. But even if he were to succeed in defeating a strong point or two on the first line and achieve a penetration there, he would still be faced with the prospect of having to breach several more such lines, while knowing that his early success had surely triggered a reaction of the strong counterattack force in the tank reserve belt. The limited sustained combat capability of the Warsaw Pact forces, which was discussed in detail under the mobile defense, should soon begin to take its toll and slow the momentum of the attack. It is likely, then, that the second echelon company would have to be committed to regain the momentum of the attack and thus not be available for any counter-counterattack role.

Since the "chequerboard" theory is in its infancy, very little has been written concerning its incorporation of tactical nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. Realizing that Mr. Canby calls for the extensive reorganization of all NATO forces prior to implementing the "chequerboard" defense, he has on paper the large number of counterattack divisions

needed to repulse enemy penetrations without resort to the use of TNWs. Since it is the view of this paper that such a huge reorganization of NATO forces is unlikely (based on just the problems associated with NATO's attempts at weapons standardization over the years), it is difficult to determine whether sufficiently strong counterattack forces could be created, were the "chequerboard" defense to be tried with existing organizations. If strong reserves were not available, then the probability of TNW usage in the "chequerboard" defense would seemingly range between the high probability in the area defense and the lower estimate for the mobile defense. The reason is that the inherent depth of the "chequerboard's" main defense belt should attrite the attacker to a greater degree than possible in the area defense, and thus allow for some degradation in counterattack potential before the TNW "panic" button would have to be pressed. One basic element of the "chequerboard" defense does receive high marks when TNW usage is taken into consideration. That is the dispersion of the friendly forces manning the positions in the main defense belt. Their dispersion would make them less vulnerable to Pact nuclear fire than were the old battalion formations.[99] For the Warsaw Pact to attempt to blast through the "chequerboard" defense, many nuclear weapons would be required. Even a 100 kiloton warhead causes prompt casualties to

protected personnel only out to a 1.14 km radius.[100] The basic 2.5 km dispersion of the "chequerboard" grid shown in Figure 8 would therefore require an equivalent warhead to be placed on each company position located in the potential attack area. Although the attacker is not supposed to know the location of the defensive units before contact is established during the attack, the effectiveness of Soviet tactical recon units should enable the defensive positions to be identified and subjected to TNW fire before the main attacking force advanced too close to ground zero to prohibit the use of such weapons on each NATO defensive position. When TNW usage reaches that scale, there is little sense in worrying over the survivability of conventional forms of defense. Nuclear escalation will probably have begun.[101]

There is one serious drawback with the theoretical "chequerboard" defense at present. Current technology has not yet developed and operationally deployed good all-weather and night capable weapons and sensor systems. The Soviets' recognized capability for night combat and the generally poor weather conditions in Central Europe would leave the "chequerboard," as it is now envisioned, too vulnerable to defeat in detail. Two other uncertainties in this defense must also be clarified before it can be employed by NATO. The first concerns the C^3 aspect. How will the 40 companies

comprising the defensive division be controlled? Mr. Canby did not address this point at all. Are there still roles for the battalion and brigade levels of command in this type defensive division? If so, how complex would these headquarters have to be, since maneuver would no longer be an option for the units in the main defensive belt? With so many companies in the decentralized "chequerboard" formation, would the division commander be able to make "real time" decisions? How would intervening battalion and brigade command levels affect this "real time" potential? These are questions which of course have as yet no answers, but are ones that must be researched in order to assess the effectiveness of the "chequerboard." The second uncertainty concerns the training of the men who are assigned to the companies in the main defense belt. Mr. Canby does not seem to realize the tremendous psychological strain which these soldiers would be subjected to in their isolated positions. The contiguous unit philosophy of current offensive and defensive doctrine instills a team spirit in contemporary soldiers. They learn to think in terms of their unit's flanks being secured by other friendly forces, their unit being but a small part of a larger whole. All that would of course be drastically altered by the "chequerboard" concept. Companies in this new defense could regularly find themselves surrounded on

three or even four sides by enemy forces attempting to push their way through the defensive grid. Soldiers conditioned by standard training procedures cannot be expected to perform such a defensive mission as envisioned in the "chequerboard" concept, and it is this point that has escaped Mr. Canby's otherwise excellent analysis. In his emphasis on the technological and economic faces of the issue, he has forgotten the human element. Soldiers who will be expected to stand and fight in such a defensive formation will have to receive training as tough, demanding and expensive as that of commandoes and rangers. Even the economic side of this training issue has not been accounted for in the "chequerboard" analysis, nor has this direct training cost been calculated and weighed in the summation of the advantages and disadvantages of the "chequerboard" versus the other more costly (in Mr. Canby's view) forms of defense. The general conclusion of this paper is that the effectiveness of the "chequerboard" defense concept will probably be proven one day.

It is now time to depart the conceptual model of the "chequerboard" defense and return to the real world where some practical developments in NATO armies are occurring as a result of the new technology. As an earlier quote hypothesized, the mere acquisition of the new weapons might require the organizational changes postulated by the tactical revisionists. These are already occurring and may, indeed,

constitute the first step on the path to the "chequerboard" or an analogous defense.

The German Army is the one most burdened by the task of achieving a viable "forward defense." After all every meter of ground lost on the Central Front would come from sovereign German soil. That army, too has more of a repository of combat knowledge concerning the intricacies of the Soviet blitzkrieg than any other Western army. Although its officers with World War II experience are rapidly diminishing in number, their "lessons learned" are undoubtedly institutionalized in tactical doctrine. It is not surprising then that some organizational changes are in the offing in the Bundeswehr. The basic test has been given the name "Brigade 80." Since the spring of 1975 three new brigades have been formed in the German Army, raising the total number of brigades from 33 to 36. The three new brigades will all be armored and will serve as the models for the Armored Brigade 80 test.[102] In addition, two of the original 33 brigades will be reorganized to serve as the models for the Armored Infantry Brigade 80 tests.[103] The basic concept of the experiment is to increase the number of combat companies and battalions in a brigade, while slightly decreasing the brigade's overall authorized wartime personnel strength.[104] It is interesting that for some time the German Army has thought in terms of brigades

in contrast to the U. S. Army's divisions, and is now emphasizing even smaller units. Four reasons were given for the emphasis on smaller companies and battalions:

> (1) . . . an increasing urbanization which makes the central control of all weapons of a company or battalion difficult;
>
> (2) the increasing tempo of battle and growing tactical mobility and firepower which make command and control of large units a task of ever greater complexity . . . ;
>
> (3) the need to have units of manageable size to enable tactical commanders to employ the manpower and equipment assigned to them to best advantage;
>
> (4) . . . smaller units permit more intensive training.[105]

Whereas the old armored brigade had two tank battalions, one armored infantry battalion, and one armored artillery battalion, the Brigade 80 model will have three tank battalions plus the other two.[106] The new armored infantry brigade will have six battalions instead of four: two tank battalions, two armored infantry battalions, one Jager (mechanized infantry) battalion, and one armored artillery battalion.[107] Other significant changes are summarized in Figure 9. The 300% increase in ATGMs of the armored brigade and 1,000% increase of these systems in the armored infantry brigade show the increased importance of antitank weaponry in the post 1973 military world. By combining the number of ATGM systems with the number of tanks--the tank being viewed as the ultimate

FIGURE 9

BRIGADE 80 EXPERIMENT

Unit	Present Structure		Brigade 80 Model
	Peacetime	Wartime	Peacetime & Wartime
Armored Brigade	2939 men*	3552 men*	3026 men, including 546 men not permanently in active units
Main battle tanks	108	108	99
MICVs**	50	50	43
ATGMs	13	13	50
Self-Propelled Howitzers	18	18	18
Armored Infantry Brigade	3246 men*	3872 men*	3730 men, including 964 men not permanently in active units
Main battle tanks	54	54	66
MICVs**	100	100	66
ATGMs	8	8	86
Self-Propelled Howitzers	18	18	18

*Excluding field replacement battalions
**Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicles

Source: Federal Republic of Germany, White Paper 1975/1976: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces, 20 Jan 1976, p. 111.

antitank weapon--an impressive total antitank capability will be organic to these new German brigades. Recent U.S. doctrinal studies have indicated that a defensive company being attacked by an enemy force fielding 60-70 armored vehicles (roughly a Pact battalion sized combined arms force) must be able to concentrate 20-30 antitank systems (squad, platoon and company level weapons as well as attached battalion assets) in order to destroy the enemy force.[108] Using this criterion to calculate the projected antiarmor effectiveness of the Brigade 80 model shows that the new German brigade should pass the test with flying colors.

The U. S. Army is also conducting an experiment of interest in this general area. It is not nearly as drastic as the new German concept, nevertheless it is one which further demonstrates the expanding role of technology on the future battlefield. Secretary Rumsfeld recently reported that:

> . . . the Army will begin by FY 1977 a test to develop doctrine and tactics for antitank battalions designed around infantry antitank guided missiles.[109]

Considering that the U. S. Army has long been the leading proponent of the concept that the tank is the best antitank weapon, this development is a significant, if hesitant, shift from traditional thinking. The test, if successful, will result in the formation of strategic reserve antitank

battalions which would be planned for early deployment to overseas theaters in the event of hostilities.[110] The rationale of the reserve status of these battalions was not disclosed. It would seem that if the experiment were successful, the logical expectation would be that such battalions would be deployed on active duty to a high armor threat environment, such as the NATO Central Region. While the mere test of such an organization's feasibility in no way indicates that the U. S. Army is considering changing its basic antitank doctrine, the results of the test will be worth watching. It may be that the ATGM is about to achieve equal standing with the tank as the best potential anti-armor systems in U. S. Army doctrine. Were that to occur, then economics alone would ultimately force some procurement priority changes and organizational and doctrinal changes could be expected to follow. The beginnings of a new U.S. defensive doctrine may now just be emerging. Time only will tell.

Summary.

This chapter has reviewed the theory underlying the proven concepts of area and mobile defense and the still theoretical model of the "chequerboard" variant. The purpose of that review was to assess the defensive options available to NATO, should a realignment of defensive forces become necessary after the conclusion of an MBFR agreement or the

initiation of Allied unilateral reductions. The capabilities of the Warsaw Pact forces are a major determinant of NATO's selection of a defensive course of action, so they were examined in detail. The main Warsaw Pact offensive capability almost unanimously recognized in the Western world is the blitzkrieg-type armored offensive. This paramount enemy capability was evaluated against the three possible NATO defensive postures. The following conclusions were derived:

(1) The area defense is least suited for use against the blitzkrieg. It allows the friendly commander little flexibility and could be easily penetrated by Warsaw Pact forces. The ultimate use of TNWs by NATO would therefore have a high probability of occurrence. Although terrain near the border would initially be held by NATO, the friendly forces manning this FEBA would be subject to defeat in detail and the terrain they defended seized. With little combat power in the NATO reserves, large expanses of the rear area could also be easily occupied by the enemy.

(2) The mobile defense is much better suited for use against the theoretical blitzkrieg. In the case of the Warsaw Pact forces with their limited sustained combat capability, the chance of success is even enhanced. Detailed prior planning in establishing the mobile defense robs the enemy commander of the initiative to a large extent,

and leads to his penetrating where the NATO force has chosen. With the bulk of their combat power assigned to the counter-attack reserves, these forces have a very good chance of destroying the opposing forces. The probability of TNW usage is thus lower than in the area defense. Although retention of terrain is not a specific requirement of the mobile defense concept, this defense can easily restore lost terrain. This is done by destroying the penetrating enemy force and using the resulting momentum of offensive action to restore the original FEBA.

(3) The "chequerboard" defense is an attractive option which may prove feasible in the future. The technological foundation of this concept is not yet sufficiently firm to support the doctrinal structure. The published concept statement (Adelphi Papers 109) presupposes an entire NATO force reorganization prior to the implementation of the "chequerboard" defense as well as the availability of weapons not yet in production. In that sense the concept is somewhat utopian. Further research should be undertaken by NATO to determine whether a more pragmatic version is attainable with current assets/organizations. The theoretical "chequerboard" defense does present an attractive alternative for constructing a viable conventional "forward defense" with little apparent reliance on TNWs to insure mission accomplishment.

CHAPTER VI

IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Soviet Union has never advocated the idea of a far reaching detente. Even the concept of "peaceful coexistence" as developed by Khrushchev and his successors, means little more than an avoidance of general war while continuing the class and national struggle by other means. A complete reconciliation between differing social systems is not possible within the ideological framework of Marxist-Leninist dogma. Soviet leadership, vulnerable to factional criticism and eager to maintain their legitimacy as "true heirs of Marxism-Leninism" must at least pay lip service to, if not practice, the tenets of dialectical and continuous struggle. Accordingly, complete and universal reconciliation is not the goal of Soviet detente. Rather it is, at the moment, almost exclusively limited geographically to the European area. Detente, thus defined, has parented a period of unprecedented negotiations that have seen progress in such areas as the Berlin Accord, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and MBFR. Detente, thus defined, has been the child of a strong and capable Western alliance, albeit not without serious weaknesses inherent in the organization, force structure, and tactics employed. Depending upon the negotiations

criteria that control any MBFR agreement, force reductions in Europe may serve to heighten these weaknesses. The NATO criterion of asymmetrical reductions resulting in equally balanced force ceilings is, of course, desirable, but would most probably not be accepted by the Soviets without some compromise such as national sub-ceilings (specifically directed at the FRG). Even if the NATO criterion is accepted, there remains the task of repairing the holes in our defensive posture so as to stabilize the balance that has precariously deterred war in Europe. Some recommendations follow.

One leitmotiv repeatedly uncovered in research dealing with the Soviet Union's perceptions of NATO is the Soviet fear of resurgent West German militarism. In the decade immediately following the close of the Second World War, reinforcement of this historical paranoia was certainly understandable; but after the passage of some thirty years, it may be viewed as the result of a deliberate internal propaganda campaign to reinforce the political sensitivity of the Russian population toward a more notional than real German military threat. The post-war decade also witnessed the creation of the West German Army and its integration into NATO. During that period a paranoia towards the new German Army likewise existed on the part of West European nations. A decade was obviously too short a time for the

sufferings and extreme cruelty wrought by the Third Reich's Army to be forgotten. In addition to the political restraints of the Paris Accords, from the very outset the relationship of the West German Army to other NATO national forces has always been different. Among these differences: the German Army could have no General Staff, but would be integrated into the NATO command/planning structure; the largest tactical German formation would be the corps, and this corps would be a part of a larger NATO Army Group commanded by a non-German officers. It is noteworthy, that although the intervening thirty years have proven the allegiance of the West German people and that of their armed forces to the Atlantic community, these initial arrangements defining the German Army's relationship with NATO have never been altered. While the "form" has remained constant, the "substance" has not. This latter statement applies not only to Germany, but to England and France as well.

The German Army of the mid-1970's comprises the largest of the NATO European ground forces. These forces are organized into four corps, one located in AFNORTH and three in AFCENT. The three corps in the AFCENT area of responsibility are of particular importance in addressing the subject of this paper. One corps is in the Northern Army Group which is commanded by a British general, while

two are subordinate to Central Army Group, commanded by an American general. The Northern Army Group is located astride the key terrain of the North German Plain. As stated throughout this paper, that locale provides an avenue of approach that is viewed as the primary Warsaw Pact invasion route into the Central Region. The British commander of the Northern Army Group is likewise the Commander of the British Army of the Rhine, another force subordinate to the Northern Army Group. Notwithstanding the prestigious title of the British "army," in reality it is at best little more in size than a corps. While the past thirty years have been kind to West Germany in the way of economic growth and political evolution, the same cannot be said for the British economy and political system. Most observers of the world scene would likely readily acknowledge these facts; but what is not generally known is that British military forces have dwindled accordingly. The resulting disparity in actual military power of the British and German armies has never been formally recognized by NATO. With the possibility of force reductions of both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces rated as good, it would be wise for NATO to plan for, and execute the post-reduction alignment of forces with such disparities taken into consideration. It is the opinion of the authors that the defense of the North German Plain should be placed in the hands of a German officer as CINC Northern Army Group,

with the current British commander reverting to command of only the British Army of the Rhine. Soviet recriminations should simply be rebuffed with the assertion that, since no shifting of forces was involved, it is merely an internal NATO command realignment.

The vulnerability of NATO following an MBFR agreement would heighten the necessity for continuing NATO efforts to reinstate France as a full military partner in NATO. To facilitate such an occurrence, the French should be offered the position of CINC Allied Forces Central Europe, a position which they have held in the past. The German general currently filling that position should be moved to the position of Chief of Staff, SHAPE. The yielding of that position by the Americans, who have held it because of its staff relationship to the American dominated position of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, would provide German representation in the command element of SHAPE and serve as a further demonstration of the capabilities and contributions of the German armed forces.

One final point concerns the deployment of the French forces currently stationed in Germany, should France re-enter the NATO military structure. These two French divisions should be moved from the east bank of the Rhine to a location nearer the border and assume responsibility for a section of the Central Army Group front. The German III Corps,

U.S. V Corps, U.S. VII Corps, and the Canadian brigade should then readjust to man the remainder of the Central Army Group frontage. The German II Corps, currently the northernmost corps of Central Army Group, would thus not be needed in CENTAG and should be transferred to Northern Army Group. This could be done with either an army group boundary change or an actual redeployment of II corps units. This would result in two German corps, one Belgian corps, one Dutch corps, and the British Army of the Rhine comprising Northern Army Group's forces. Additionally it would be prudent to station a portion of American forces in the relatively under-defended NORTHAG area instead of maintaining them all in the well defended CENTAG region. It would be feasible to so station Brigade '75 and Brigade '76 (the so-called Nunn Amendment brigades). These brigades, forward deployed and therefore inherently mobile, offer themselves as obvious nominees for NORTHAG deployment. All these measures would result in an increase of immediately available combat power in North Germany and would greatly alleviate a long-standing deficiency in that region, thereby adding significantly to the viability of NATO's overall defensive posture.

APPENDIX I

THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION

THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION

Senate Resolution 239, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 11 June 1948

Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations: Therefore be it Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of The Senate that this government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

1. Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.
2. Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.
3. Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.
4. Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self defense under Article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.
5. Maximum efforts to obtain agreement to provide the United Nations as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.
6. If necessary, after adequate effort towards strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under Article 109 or by the General Assembly.

Source: Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), Appendix III, p. 171.

APPENDIX II

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Washington, D.C., April 4, 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for the collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty.

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

ARTICLE 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTCILE 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to the other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of revising the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in effect for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States, which will inform the governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the governments of the other signatories.

Source: Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), Annex A, p. 17.

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