The Perception of Tactical Intelligence Indications: A Replication
Abstract
As part of an effort to provide improved techniques and methods for planning the collection and analysis of intelligence information, an experiment was replicated which showed that tactical intelligence indications, as currently used, are of doubtful effectiveness. In the present experiment, 28 intelligence specialists (primarily from the 163d Military Intelligence Battalion) each assumed the role of an intelligence analyst in a G-2 section of an infantry division conducting a mobile defense in north central West Germany. Each individual estimated the probability that each of the 49 indications of conventional military operations listed in Field Manual 30-5, Combat Intelligence, would occur, given a known aggressor course of action. Each indication was evaluated with four separate enemy courses of action-Attack, Defend, Delay, and Withdraw. Eleven indications were evaluated twice with each course of action to provide an estimate of reliability. The previous experiment had used the same procedure with 44 students in the Intelligence Officers Advanced Course. In both experiments, individual estimates were highly reliable. However, variability in the estimates made by different individuals for the same indication was extremely high (greater than .7 on a 0-1.0 scale in both experiments). Only 12 indications were perceived by this group and 19 by the previous group as effective discriminators of the course of action with which they are doctrinally associated. Estimates made by officers and enlisted men in the present experiment did not differ significantly.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 1977
- Accession Number
- ADA041954
Entities
People
- Edgar M. Johnson
Organizations
- U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences