


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


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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Providing Defense Information to Congress: Potential Improvements To A Growing Problem.		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Advanced Research Paper.
7. AUTHOR(s) Cabe, Lewis R. /Cabe/		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Center for Advanced Research Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 02840		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 02840		12. REPORT DATE May 1977
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) 12-104p		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 103
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) A - Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Information Retrieval; Data Banks; Information; Feedback; Information Processing; Requirements; Data Storage Systems; Department of Defense; Legislation; Management Information Systems		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This study is directed towards the current problem of how the DoD is to manage its response to growing congressional information requirements generated by recent reform legislation. More specifically, it focuses on the impact that the growing demand for information on the part of Congress and particularly its staff has had on Defense management. The capabilities of the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries to respond adequately are analyzed and past information trends, potential future impacts and possible improvements in the process are addressed. (OVER)		

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0.45 → This study consists of six chapters. Chapter I is an introduction. Chapter II places the recent surge of congressional reform into historical perspective. Chapter III is an analysis of the impact that congressional reform has had on the DOD. Chapter IV is a brief look at the institutionalized Defense process of responding to Congress. Chapter V addresses future congressional requirements for information. The final chapter is devoted to an investigation of areas of improvement with emphasis on the people involved, management technology, and organizational structures. Although potential improvements related to Congress and the Services are addressed, the perspective of this chapter is primarily related to that of the Secretary of Defense. ↗

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PROVIDING DEFENSE INFORMATION TO CONGRESS:
POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS TO A GROWING PROBLEM

by

Lewis R. Cabe
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



INTRODUCTION (pp. 1-4)

This study is directed towards the current problem of how the Department of Defense is to manage its response to growing congressional information requirements generated by recent reform legislation. More specifically, it focuses on the impact that the growing demand for information on the part of Congress and particularly its staff has had on Defense management. The capabilities of the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries to respond adequately are also analyzed. The study addresses past information trends, potential future impacts and possible improvements to the process.

CONGRESSIONAL REFORM AND DECISION INFORMATION (pp. 5-15)

Congressional reform and the congressional penchant for "microscopic" management are by no means new innovations. Congress dominated the federal resource allocation process until the early 1940's, when the executive process became effectively established. After abortive attempts to regain some measure of control in the 1940's and 50's, Congress succeeded with the passing and implementation of the Legislative Reform Act of 1970 and the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. As a result of these acts, the six committees most affecting DOD have increased their staff over 200%. The GAO staff has

increased 10%, the Congressional Research Service staff has increased over 150% and the Congressional Budget Office was established with a staff of over 200. These actions were in part stimulated by the Defense PPBS which helped make Congress aware of the power of information and analysis.

THE IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL REFORM ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT (pp.15-29)

Congress now has over 1500 staff-years concentrating on Defense issues. In return, DOD devotes a brigade-sized effort (over 2300 staff-years) to legislative affairs activities. This effort represents 14% of the DOD headquarters staff, costs over \$50 million, and is rapidly growing.

The growth in congressional staff and its tendency to be a consumer of enormous amounts of Defense information appears to have created four interrelated problems within DOD: (1) An increased amount of top management time is devoted to congressional affairs, (2) OSD and Service staff workload has increased significantly, (3) a tremendous potential for inconsistency and redundancy in reporting exists due to the increase in congressional sources requiring information, the variety of DOD activities furnishing information and the congressional prohibition of a central liaison activity, and (4) current information concerning congressional actions and intentions is difficult (often impossible) to maintain.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZED DEFENSE PROCESS OF RESPONDING (pp. 30-38)

Defense related information requirements vary with the role of the Member of Congress. Members require one kind of

support in a variety of formats for their roles as members of committees, a different kind of support in other formats for dealing with legislative proposals before committees of which they are not members, a third kind of informational support with respect to other measures and proposals upon which they must vote on the floor of their legislative body and still a fourth kind to carry out their information responsibilities to their constituents. The fractionalized DOD liaison activities located in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries and OSD and Service comptroller organizations must provide all of these type of information in a timely fashion.

FUTURE CONGRESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION (pp. 39-48)

Decreases in the amount of information that Congress will require from DOD should not be expected. Contrarily, based on past trends, proposed legislation and future actions required by law, an increase in staff workload of 5 to 25 percent does not appear to be an unreasonable expectation for the next two to three years. Most traditional information will continue to be required. However, there will no doubt be substantial increases in the quantity and quality of program-related questions from the Appropriations Committees, Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget Office. Implementation of congressionally imposed zero-based budgeting and passing of the currently proposed "sunset" legislation could also require additional DOD

staff resources. Congress will continue to use its traditional methods of acquiring DOD information but will be supported by a powerful computer-based capability to store and retrieve information.

IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES (pp. 49-79)

The problems created by the recent growth in congressional information demands must eventually be addressed by DOD officials involved in managing legislative affairs activities. Failure to do so invites a continuation of "microscopic" management by Congress and its growing bureaucracy. Potential solutions to these problems appear to lie in the set of relationships between the participants in the process, the organizational structures and the use of management technology. The following "menu" of proposed actions is presented in hopes of stimulating innovations in the management of legislative affairs activities:

1. The Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense should disseminate a clear definition of the current role of the SecDef vis-à-vis the roles of the Services and Agencies in the performance of legislative affairs activities.
2. OSD and the Services. An improved and continuing legislative affairs education program should be considered by DOD.
3. OSD and the Services. Congress should be continually informed of the cost of information. As a minimum, routine cost

estimates should be provided when individual Members of Congress request information that will generate an OSD/Service staff effort above some predetermined cost threshold.

4. The Secretary of Defense and Service Secretaries. The Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries should actively use moral suasion to convince Congress that it would be beneficial to both sides to reduce excessive structural interdictions by the growing congressional staff.

5. The Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense should recommend to Congress that a congressional clearing house for DOD information be established. This activity should serve as the focal point for all requests for DOD information coming from individual Members of Congress.

6. OSD and the Services. OSD and the Services should strongly consider the application of improved management technology to legislative affairs activities. This application should include an improved DOD capability to store, retrieve, index, aggregate and manipulate information relating to the needs of Congress.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to many people who made time in their busy schedules to provide advice and data. The study could not have been completed without the invaluable assistance provided by the following people: RADM G.E.R. Kinnear, II, Chief of Legislative Affairs, SecNav; Mr. Graydon Lose, Special Assistant for Legislative Affairs, OASD (Comptroller); MG James M. Lee, Chief of Legislative Liaison, OSA; Mr. Clifford Falkenau, Assistant to DASD (Audit); MG Richard L. West, Director of the Army Budget; BG Robert Tanguy, Deputy Director, Office of Legislative Liaison, OSAF; BG Edgar A. Chavarrie, USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Programs), OASD (Legislative Affairs); COL William Maurer, Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, OSA; LTC (P) Bruce Harris, Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, OSA; CDR John Blasko, Navy Appropriations Committee Liaison Office; Mr. L. Baldinger, Air Force Office of Budget Enactment; Mr. Frank Wall, Correspondence Control Branch, DASD (Admin); Mr. Al Peak, Office of the Administrative Assistant, OSA; LT J.M. Oyler, Correspondence Control Branch, SecNav; LTC James Broadus, Army Budget Liaison Office; LTC Bert Spivey, MIS Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army; Mr. Tidall McCoy, Office of the Administrative Assistant to the SecDef; Dr. John Dawson,

Defense Resources Management Education Center; COL John Shannon, USA, OASD (Legislative Affairs), CAPT Robert Sewell, USN, OASD (Legislative Affairs), COL Stephen Harrick, USA, OASD (Legislative Affairs); CAPT R.B. McDaniel, USN, OPNAV; Mr. Jack Hobbs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM); Mr. Clifford Miller, Deputy Comptroller, OASD (Comptroller); Mr. Charles Hinkle, Director, Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review, OASD (Public Affairs); Mr. Ed Deagle, Congressional Budget Office, Mr. William Cleary, Staff Assistant, House Budget Committee; Mr. Russell Hale, Staff Assistant, House Budget Committee; Mr. John Cove, Senior Staff Assistant, House Budget Committee; Mr. Guy McConnell, Senior Staff Assistant, Senate Appropriations Committee; Mr. Ralph Preston, Senior Staff Assistant, House Appropriations Committee; and Mr. Bob Sneed, Staff Assistant, Senate Budget Committee.

I would like to express special appreciation to Professor Hugh Nott, Director; and Professor F.J. West, Deputy Director, Center for Advanced Research, U.S. Naval War College, for their advice and assistance.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem. During the past six years, top officials within the Department of Defense (DOD) have found themselves spending an increasing amount of their time and the time of their staffs reponding to a variety of congressional demands for information. The resources (time, people, facilities) consumed by this effort have been considerable. A recent report to the General Accounting Office (GAO) states that the staff man-years within the Department of Defense devoted to legislative affairs is equivalent to fourteen percent of DOD headquarters personnel.¹ How was this trend established and what is its current and potential future impact? This study addresses these particular questions.

With the passing of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, an era of apparent congressional re-assertion emerged. Congress has become increasingly concerned with its status in the process of deciding how national resources are to be allocated. This assertiveness has brought with it a new focusing on the congressional decision process and its relation to the overall federal "system" for allocating resources. This new congressional awareness has been greeted with mixed views. The value of the resulting congressional

actions depends upon the perspective of the observer: legislative, executive or departmental. Most observers seem to agree that some (perhaps many) needed changes have been made in the process.

Since the early part of the last decade, Members of Congress have actively promoted the re-establishment of their perceived constitutional role in the national decision process, vis-à-vis the Executive. Many of these changes have surfaced through the oversight functions of the congressional committees as well as the traditional method of control through particularistic legislation. However, significant steps towards legislative reform have provided the primary forum for the debate and actions taken by Congress to improve their decision making capability. Congressional reform is not a new topic. Its roots are traceable to the Jeffersonians of the late eighteenth century. Subsequent interest has vacillated from intense to almost non-existent. This has been particularly true for the last thirty years. The significance of the movements since 1970 is the apparent willingness on the part of Congress to implement, at least initially, the legislated reforms. In previous years there was a tendency to ignore this type of legislation, particularly if it was viewed as threatening to the existing internal congressional power structure.

As one might suspect, the means of implementing the reforms designed to improve congressional decision making centers

on the ability of the Legislative Branch to obtain better and more timely information, a significant amount coming from the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. Consequently, the congressional solution becomes the executive and departmental problem. Necessarily, from the congressional perspective, the assertiveness displayed by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and subsequent legislation and congressional actions has fostered a growing, powerful congressional bureaucracy, charged with making the desired changes viable. More succinctly put, the issue being addressed by Congress (with the assistance of its associated bureaucracy) is power: the commodity of trade is information. This study is directed towards this commodity. It addresses the current problem of how the Department of Defense is to manage its response to growing congressional information requirements. More specifically, it focuses on the impact that the growing demand for information on the part of Congress and particularly its committee staff has had on defense management and the capabilities of the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to respond adequately.

Scope. This study consists of six chapters. Chapter II places the recent surge of congressional reform into historical perspective. The rationale and political climate associated with the increased demand for congressional decision information is investigated, as well as possible links to the establishment

of the Defense Planning, Programming and Budgeting System in the early 1960's.

Chapter III is an analysis of the impact that congressional reform has had on the Department of Defense. This is accomplished through the use of objective and subjective data. The growth of the congressional bureaucracy is documented, as is the concomitant DOD legislative workload trends. A synthesis of the observations of numerous senior Defense officials is also incorporated into this section. These observations vary, but principally relate to the workload trends, timely response and the competition for management time.

Chapter IV is a brief look at the institutionalized Defense process of responding to Congress. Sources of congressional information requests are investigated, as is the organization and process created to manage the response.

Chapter V addresses future congressional requirements for information. The types of information needed by Congress, congressional methods of acquiring information and the potential impact of current information trends are addressed.

The final chapter is devoted to an investigation of areas of potential improvement. Although potential improvements related to Congress and the Services are addressed, the perspective of this section is primarily related to that of the Secretary of Defense.

CHAPTER II
CONGRESSIONAL REFORM AND DECISION
INFORMATION

Background of Reform. Congressional reform, a prominent topic for the past decade, is by no means an innovation. Its roots can be traced to the struggle for power between the Federalists and Jeffersonians of the late eighteenth century. Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, was an advocate of a strong central government. He believed that the Executive Branch should have wide discretionary decision authority, particularly with respect to federal spending. He accomplished this by establishing a process whereby the entire federal government was funded through four broad appropriations. His system gave the Executive Branch considerable latitude in allocating resources among competing national needs. Hamilton's system is the dream of modern-day government executives.

The Hamiltonian system of finance was a short-lived arrangement. By 1796 the House of Representatives had a functioning Committee on Ways and Means. This committee was made permanent in 1802, documenting one of the first major congressional reforms. This action marked the end of the initial period of strong executive financial direction and signalled the beginning of more than a century of congressional

dominance of the national resource allocation process.

During the period of congressional dominance (1800-1921), the President and his cabinet merely served as a conduit for departmental expenditure proposals. They did not alter, criticize or coordinate the requests, nor did they serve in the capacity of financial planner.¹ Financial planning, to the extent that it was done at all, was mainly accomplished by the House Ways and Means Committee.

Congress also displayed a penchant for control through particularistic legislation throughout this period. Its view was considerably more microscopic than that of recent Congresses. For example, the appropriation for the U.S. Military Academy in 1876 contained about 40 lines for a total appropriation of about \$200,000.² Further subdivisions were common. In 1878, the language of the Appropriation Act was quite specific:

For department of artillery, cavalry and infantry tactics, namely: For tan-bark for riding-hall and gymnasium, three hundred dollars; repairing camp stools, tents, and camp-furniture, fifty dollars; furniture for office of commandant of cadets and reception-room for visitors, one hundred and fifty dollars; stationery for use of instructors and assistants, one hundred dollars; text-books, twenty dollars.³

In contrast, the 1976 budget for the Department of Defense had about 50 appropriation accounts for a new budget authority of approximately 100 billion dollars.⁴

The latter part of the nineteenth century was characterized by congressional decentralization and negligence. At one point there were eighteen committees (10 in the House and 8 in the Senate) with authority to recommend appropriations. No one looked at the allocation process as a whole. However, events were soon to transpire that would force major reforms. The relative success of the decentralized congressional system of national resource allocation was predicated upon the absence of resource scarcity. The real decision faced by Congress during the latter part of the 19th century and to some extent the early part of the 20th century was how to dispose of surplus revenues that had been generated primarily by the tariff. The congressional system solved this problem handily, albeit inefficiently. The surplus revenues quickly began to disappear after the turn of the century, creating a real allocation problem. This was caused largely by the Spanish-American War, the maturing of United States industry (causing tariffs to disappear) and an expanding federal government.

The first major change in this congressionally dominated system came with the passing of the Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921. The act established the right of the President to present an executive budget to Congress. This created the first executive budget since Hamilton and was an implicit admission on the part of Congress that it had lost control of its system. The act also established the Bureau of the

Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget) for executive control and the General Accounting Office for assisting in congressional control. This was the first major congressional reform in over a century and represented the beginning of a significant shift in power.

The provisions of the Act of 1921 were not immediately felt. The executive budget concept was not fully effective until the early 1940's. This was made possible in the late 1930's by an infusion of approximately 450 additional staff members within the Bureau of the Budget and the establishment of the Executive Office of the President. Successful implementation brought with it a renewed interest by Congress in regaining control through its traditional "power of the purse."

Abortive attempts were made via the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and the Omnibus Appropriation Act of 1951. For the most part, the acts were not effective in regaining congressional control of the national resource allocation process. They did, however, set the stage for future reforms.

During the late 1960's, perhaps as a reaction to executive actions taken relative to the Vietnam War, Congress renewed its interest in becoming "more equal." It focused on improving its decision-making capability, with a major emphasis on the availability of information. The debate concerning this topic led to the passing of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. In addition to streamlining internal operations, the

act provided for a modern data processing system for federal fiscal and budgetary information, closer scrutiny by Congress of the current projected costs of all federal programs and increased staff assistance for congressional committees. Discussions concerning congressional decision making did not abate with the passing of the Act of 1970. They in fact increased, with attention being directed towards a congressional budgeting system, with functions similar to the executive system.

Hastened by the issues surrounding the Watergate investigations and executive impoundment of funds, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (PL 93-344) was passed. This act was a major congressional innovation. It was revolutionary; creating new budget committees in the House and Senate charged with implementing a coordinated congressional resource allocation system. The act placed considerable emphasis on improving information available to Congress. In this respect, it provided for a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) with broad authority for securing information from the federal departments and agencies.

These acts, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, are significant for they, unlike their predecessors, are being implemented. This has added relevance, since the Act of 1974 appears to be a conscious shift of internal power in an attempt to make major gains externally. In Congress this is no mean task! The

initial results are indicative of the current mood of Congress. Perhaps of most significance is the fact that the resulting implementation is beginning to have impact on the way decisions are made within departments and agencies. This has been particularly true within the Department of Defense. The most tangible result of these two acts has been the increased congressional capability to digest information through a dramatically increased staff. The six committees affecting the Department of Defense (House and Senate Armed Forces, Budget and Appropriations Committees) have increased their staff over 200 percent since 1970, centered mostly in the Budget Committees (Table 1).

TABLE 1
SELECTED COMMITTEE STAFF, U.S. CONGRESS
1970-76

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>N</u>	Change <u>70-76%</u>
HASC	33	33	32	29	28	32	29	+ 6	18
SASC	18	24	25	26	25	26	25	+ 7	39
HAC	13	25	28	32	37	33	46	+33	254
SAC	38	38	26	41	54	58	70	+32	84
HBC						62	66	+66	
SBC						44	74	+74	
Totals	102	120	121	128	144	255	320	+218	213

Source: Congressional Staff Directory, 1970-76.

The staff of the General Accounting Office has increased 10 percent during the same period, apparently in response to additional information gathering responsibilities directed by the two (Table 2).


TABLE 2
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE STAFF
1970-76

<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976¹</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Change 70-76²</u>
4632	4751	4768	4962	5073	5397	5100	+468	10

Source: Appendix, Budget of the U.S. Government, 1971-77

The greatest numerical growth has occurred within the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress.⁵ The CRS is an information gathering activity of Congress charged with providing members and committees with research and reference assistance on the complete range of public policy issues. It has added over 300 staff members since 1970 (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
STAFF ALLOCATION BY PROGRAM ACTIVITY



Source: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Library

The intent of the congressionally directed expansion within the CRS has been to promote analytical and original research, grant the Service greater autonomy from the Library of Congress and render it more responsive to the Congress.⁶ Perhaps the most significant addition to Congress' information gathering capability has been the staff of the new Congressional Budget Office, now numbering almost 200.⁷

Several relevant observations can be extracted from the history of congressional reform: (1) for most of our 200 year history, Congress has dominated the national resource allocation process, (2) Congress has exhibited a tendency towards control through particularistic legislation from its inception, (3) Congress is now attempting to regain control of the national decision process, centering its efforts on obtaining better decision information.

The Congressional Rationale. Congress' reasons for demanding better information stem from Article I, Section 9 of the Consitution, which states "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury except in consequence of appropriation by law." These words have remained unchanged for two centuries. There is an apparent consensus within Congress that the words have lost much of their force through an incremental abrogation of legislative responsibility. The lack of information, staff and time has been one of the most frequently and conveniently quoted explanations for congressional decline.⁸ Congress,

therefore, seems to view its recent reforms and actions as improvements necessary to carry out its constitutional duty. There also appears to be a feeling that it has shirked its national responsibility by allowing excessive power to gravitate to the Executive Branch.⁹

During the late 1960's and early 1970's, Congress found numerous indicators of its eroding capability to control federal expenditures. The appropriations categories had become (and remain) very large, relative to the 1880's; making control more difficult. For example, there were only about 50 appropriations accounts in the 1976 DOD budget for approximately 100 billion dollars in new budget authority compared to the 40 lines in the Military Academy appropriation for 1876 which totaled about 200,000 dollars.¹⁰ There had also been an incremental move towards "back door" spending. This procedure grants authority to obligate funds without passing through the appropriations process. "Back door" spending authority generally falls into one of four categories: (1) borrowing authority, (2) contract authority, (3) permanent appropriations or (4) mandatory entitlements. In 1974, Congress estimated that only 44 percent of the budget was subject to appropriations, and control of this 44 percent was incomplete due to separate consideration of each appropriation bill.¹¹ The Defense appropriation was a major part of this controllable percentage-- obviously other federal agencies had (and continue to have)

more "imaginative" means of financing major parts of their programs.¹² Congress also became aware of what it considered to be a widening gap between the information gathering and processing capabilities of the Executive and Legislative Branches. This awareness was in part enhanced by a proliferation of information relative to the Vietnam War effort, a rising concern with reordering national priorities and the extensive debates concerning the anti-ballistic missile (ABM).¹³ Concern was also expressed about the inadequacy of information about the intentions of the Executive Branch. However, the issue which stirred Congress to action was the President's decision to impound appropriated funds--an act which further degraded Congress' ability to control through the "powers of the purse." Collectively, these actions drove Congress towards reform.

PPBS and Congressional Information Requirements. Ironically, the Department of Defense probably made significant contributions to Congress' awareness of an "information gap." This was accomplished through the establishment, in the early 1960's, of the DOD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). This system, along with a strong Secretary, Mr. Robert S. McNamara, initially served to centralize power at the secretarial level and shift the argument in the resource allocation process from objects to missions and programs. In addition to the normal requests for appropriations, DOD presented Congress with information on programs, replete with analysis

justifying their costs. Initially, the validity of DOD's program oriented presentations was difficult to refute at either the service or congressional level, primarily due to a lack of analytical capability.

The power vested in the Secretary of Defense through his control of program information did not go unnoticed. Congress held numerous hearings and published hundreds of pages of testimony in its early efforts to educate itself. By the late 1960's, after an unsuccessful attempt by President Johnson to implement a planning, programming and budgeting system in all federal agencies, Congress recognized its need to improve its analytic capability. This was addressed explicitly in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. Congress also became aware of the power inherent in multi-year planning accompanied by budget projections, an integral part of the PPBS. By 1972, it recorded this interest by proposing a bill (S 3650) requiring the President to submit to Congress the Defense Department's Five Year Defense Program (FYDP), an internal planning document. This was an open expression of congressional concern for information relative to executive intentions. The congressional interest in better program information and internal Defense documents supporting the PPBS has not declined. Current congressional demands and their impact will be addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III
THE IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

Trends in Congressional Information Requirements. One of the major "growth industries" within the United States during the past six years has been government. Total employment of civilians in governmental activities (state, local, federal) increased from about 12.5 to nearly 15 million during the period 1969-1975.¹ This represents a gain of 20 percent. During this same period, total civilian employment within Congress rose from 10,198 to 15,937, a growth of 56 percent (Table 3).

TABLE 3
FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT IN CONGRESS
1969-1975

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Change 69-75%</u>
Senate	3847	4140	4624	4626	5078	5284	5958	2111	55
House	<u>6351</u>	<u>6888</u>	<u>7483</u>	<u>7517</u>	<u>7783</u>	<u>8912</u>	<u>9979</u>	<u>3628</u>	<u>57</u>
Totals	10198	11028	12107	12143	12861	14196	15937	5739	56

Source: House of Representatives, Report No. 94-1225

Clearly, on a percentage basis, Congress with its emerging bureaucracy, ranks as an "industry" leader. While Congress displayed dramatic growth, the reverse was experienced in DOD. During the period 1969-1975, the Department of Defense could be

appropriately characterized as a "declining firm" in a "growth industry." Defense manpower levels steadily declined during this period, as did the purchasing power of the DOD budget.² One notable area of growth did emerge, however.

As Congress has steadily increased its staff resources since 1970, DOD has found a concomitant increase in congressional demands for information of all types. Workload indicators related to DOD legislative activities reflect a significant shift of resources to this effort. During the period 1972-1975, the number of Defense witnesses called to testify increased 35 percent, man-hours before Congress increased 62 percent and the number of hours of actual testimony increased 49 percent (Table 4).

TABLE 4

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY, SELECTED YEARS

Number of Witnesses			
<u>1972</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Change %</u>
860	1165	305	35

Total Man-Hours Before Congress			
<u>1972</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Change %</u>
5522	8946	3424	62

Hours of Actual Testimony			
<u>1972</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Change %</u>
2376	3538	1162	49

Source: Staff Papers, OASD(C), OASD(LA), Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

The number of printed pages of testimony before the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees increased 90 percent and 17 percent, respectively, during the period 1970-1975 (Tables 5 and 6).

TABLE 5
PRINTED PAGES OF TESTIMONY
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES

	1970-75							Change
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>70-75%</u>
SASC	4500	7100	8700	8100	8900	8000	+3500	78
HASC	<u>6900</u>	<u>9400</u>	<u>9800</u>	<u>8800</u>	<u>8500</u>	<u>13700</u>	<u>+6800</u>	<u>99</u>
Total	11400	16500	18500	16900	17400	21700	+10300	90

Source: Recorded as of year available in print as reported by the Congressional Information Service, rounded to the nearest hundred.

TABLE 6
PRINTED PAGES OF DOD TESTIMONY
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES¹

	FY71-77							Change
	<u>FY71</u>	<u>FY72</u>	<u>FY73</u>	<u>FY74</u>	<u>FY75</u>	<u>FY76</u>	<u>FY77</u>	<u>N</u> <u>71-77%</u>
SAC	5100	6100	5900	5500	4800	5300	5400	+300 6
HAC	<u>7000</u>	<u>10600</u>	<u>11200</u>	<u>13400</u>	<u>12800</u>	<u>9500</u>	<u>8700</u>	<u>+1700</u> <u>24</u>
Total	12100	16700	17100	18900	17600	14800	14100	+2000 17

1. Excludes Joint Hearings on Military Construction.

Source: Congressional Information Service, rounded to nearest hundred.

These percentages serve as crude indicators of increases in the amount of management time being allocated by senior DOD officials to the problem of legislative affairs. The problem faced by senior DOD officials has been further complicated by the number of committees hearing Defense testimony. These have increased 150 percent since 1964 (Table 7), representing the multiplicity of sources of congressional interest and a tremendous potential for redundancy. This also has implicitly created an internal DOD management problem--how to insure consistency of response between committees seeking information for differing purposes.

Other indicators display a creeping pressure on the DOD staff. Although written inquiries have apparently remained at a fairly constant (although high) level, telephone inquiries have increased considerably (Table 7). More significant, however, has been the rise in supplemental questions submitted by committees (or more appropriately, by committee staffs). These must be answered in a timely fashion by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Service staffs. Last year the number of supplemental questions on budget submitted to just one office, the Secretary of Defense, increased 154 percent (Table 7). The Services and other Defense activities have received similar questions, not always related directly to the budget. Pages of congressional justification books have also increased significantly (Table 7). The increase in pages in the committee reports of the Armed Services and Appropriations

Committees (Tables 8 and 9) are further indications of increased DOD staff workload.

TABLE 7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY, SELECTED YEARS

Written Inquiries (Estimates)			
<u>1969</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Change</u> <u>%</u>
178,000	175,000	-3000	2

Number of Committees Hearing DOD Testimony			
<u>1964</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
24	60	36	150

Supplemental Questions on Budget Submitted to Secretary of Defense			
<u>FY 1975</u>	<u>FY 1976</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Change</u> <u>%</u>
293	745	452	154

Pages in Congressional Justification Books			
<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
7189	12527	5338	74

Telephone Inquiries (Estimates)			
<u>1969</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Change</u> <u>%</u>
759,000	900,000	141,000	19

Source: Staff Papers, OASD(C), OASD(LA), Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

TABLE 8

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORTS, 1970-75

(PAGES)

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>N</u>	Change <u>70-75%</u>
SASC	490	440	507	637	524	649	+159	32
HASC	<u>562</u>	<u>742</u>	<u>575</u>	<u>588</u>	<u>787</u>	<u>656</u>	+ <u>94</u>	17
Totals	1052	1182	1082	1225	1311	1305	+253	24

Source: Recorded as of year available in print as reported by the Congressional Information Service.

TABLE 9

 APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE REPORTS,
 DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILLS FY71-76

(PAGES)

	<u>FY71</u>	<u>FY72</u>	<u>FY73</u>	<u>FY74</u>	<u>FY75</u>	<u>FY76</u>	<u>N</u>	Change <u>71-77%</u>
SAC	221	210	204	173	207	302	+ 81	37
HAC	<u>119</u>	<u>139</u>	<u>256</u>	<u>239</u>	<u>171</u>	<u>358</u>	+ <u>239</u>	201
Totals	340	349	460	412	378	660	+320	94

Source: Congressional Information Service

A partial analysis of staff-years spent on DOD legislative activities for fiscal year 1975 reveals that almost 2300 staff-years are being devoted to this effort (Table 10). This estimate is very conservative. Much data are omitted (non-budget testimony, workload outside the Washington area, etc.) and all are incomplete. The significance, however, is that this

estimate of workload represents, at a minimum, 14 percent of the total DOD headquarters staff, costing a conservatively estimated 54.9 million dollars.³

TABLE 10
STAFF-YEARS SPENT ON DOD
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES¹
FY 1975

Witness testimony (budget)	377
Congressional (telephone)	303
Congressional (written)	913
Briefings for Members and Staffs	164
Travel	82
Congressional Notification	21
Congressional Directives Studies	259
Legislative Processing	<u>135</u>
Total	2254

1. Figures are incomplete and only roughly depict trends.

Source: Constructed from General Accounting Office data

In addition to the somewhat "pure" requests for information, Congress has had a similar effect on workload through its direct effort to regain some measure of control of the appropriations process. The principal methods used to make this change have been line item control, designated special interest items, designated action items and the general provisions; all parts of the Defense budget reports presented by the Appropriations Committees. These techniques generally restrict specified action(s) without prior approval by Congress or

require actions to be accomplished. The number of these items have increased by almost 300 percent since 1968 (Table 11).

TABLE 11
ITEMS IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET REPORTS
FOR SELECTED FISCAL YEARS¹

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Change %</u>
Line Items	177	385	720	543	306
Special Interest ²	95 ³	200	436	436	NA
Action Items and General Provisions	<u>105</u>	<u>130</u>	<u>341</u>	<u>236</u>	<u>225</u>
Total	377	715	1497	1120	297

1. Totals are obtained by counting items in appropriate reports.

2. Requires congressional approval for reprogramming.

3. Reprogramming restrictions did not exist officially until FY 1972. Figures for FY 1968 are line item reductions.

Source: Staff Paper, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

This effort has increased DOD staff workload and reduced the flexibility of the Secretary of Defense--marking a real shift in power. From the DOD perspective, this process is neither characterized by rationality nor consistency; further hampering management capabilities. A classic example occurred in this year's Defense Appropriations Act (PL-94-419). Section 728 of the general provisions reads:

Funds provided in this Act for legislative liaison activities of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense shall not exceed \$5,000,000 for fiscal year 1977: Provided, that this amount shall be available for apportionment to the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense as determined by the Secretary of Defense.

This provision is quite inconsistent with the HAC and SAC recognition in the previous year's reports (FY 1976) of the dramatic increase in DOD workload associated with legislative affairs activities.⁴ The language of the FY 1976 SAC and HAC Reports clearly establishes the fact that the committees view the level of work as necessary and expect nothing less in the way of services provided. Responding to these FY 1976 Reports and in particular to the SAC requirement to present a new accounting for personnel and costs associated with legislative activities, DOD submitted a justification for a level of activities costing 7.9 million dollars--essentially a "no change" presentation. The 5 million dollar ceiling in effect dictates a staff reduction in light of rising congressionally imposed requirements. It also requires a communication to the committees detailing how the staff reductions are to be made. The rationality of this action depends upon the perspective of the observer. From the DOD point of view, this represents an additional staff workload--perhaps even a review of all DOD liaison activities. The committees, however, may

simply view the restriction as an effective way of expressing concern over intense lobbying.

The above example and the previously displayed data are not presented as an indictment of the way Congress conducts its business, but only to document the effects congressional reform is having upon the capability of the Secretary of Defense to manage adequately the Defense response to congressional requirements. In this sense, it is clear that the additional staff provided Congress by recent reform legislation is having considerable effect upon DOD. Although the data presented are incomplete and to some extent inconsistent, the trends are unmistakable. If the trends continue and the Appropriations Committees continue to show an interest in the management of DOD legislative activities, more consistent and definitive workload information will be needed. The research conducted to secure the data included in this report suggests that there is an immediate need to improve accessibility to the current institutional memory relating to Defense legislative affairs activities. Currently it is extremely difficult (often impossible) and very time consuming to extract consistent and comparable data. Part of the problem relates to the fragmentation of the storage locations, limited knowledge of the locations (often in the memories of people) or in some instances, no storage at all. The quality of accessibility ranges from excellent to non-existent. This problem is particularly

pronounced at the OSD level. A separate but not unrelated justification for better congressionally related decision information is the imputed cost of the level of effort--over 50 million dollars!

The Defense Management Perspective. An important part of the research conducted for this report involved interviewing over 40 senior Defense and Service officials and their staffs concerning the impact that legislative reform has had upon DOD management. This effort concentrated on the Chiefs of Legislative Liaison within the Services, the Service budget liaison offices, the Special Assistant for Legislative Affairs within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Comptroller (OASD-Comptroller), the Deputy for Plans and Systems (OASD-Comptroller), the Director, Directorate for Freedom of Information (OASD-Public Affairs), the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. The Service and OSD assessments of the management problems resulting from legislative reform were consistent. Likewise, there was little difference between the Service views. There is little doubt as to the major concern of DOD collectively. Almost all officials interviewed expressed concern about the extent to which Congress, through its enlarged staff, is becoming involved in "microscopic" management of Defense affairs.

This verbalized concern is linked both to the workload increases placed on the respective DOD staffs by particularistic committee questions and to the basic philosophy of executive versus legislative responsibilities. As stated by one senior official, "the question to be answered is 'Where do the Executive and Legislative Branches settle on what their proprietary areas of interest are?'" This concern implies that Congress is in fact successfully implementing, at least with DOD, the intent of the recent reform legislation.

Most individuals interviewed were very conscious of the increased attention that top decision makers are devoting to legislative affairs. Most of this workload has apparently been absorbed within the Offices of the Service Secretaries and OSD. One Assistant Secretary of Defense has estimated that he devoted 25 percent of his total working time in 1975 to legislative affairs.⁵ Although legislative activities strongly compete for top management time, those interviewed tended to characterize this as an unavoidable cost of conducting current Defense business, with little or no foreseeable downward trend.

Another question that surfaced during the interviews was how to manage the Service and Defense response to the expanded number of committees and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). There has been some commonality among committee and CBO requirements but also some significant differences. Managing

the response to the requirements becomes quite complicated because of other congressional restrictions. The Appropriations Committees refuse to deal with DOD except through the comptroller organizations. Historically this has not been a significant management problem but under the pressures of the new congressional budget time tables, the Appropriations Committees are asking more program related questions and the Armed Services Committees cannot be unmindful of appropriations when given target budget ceilings by the new Budget Committees. This obviously requires much more coordination by DOD.

The Services and OSD have traditionally prided themselves in their capability to respond quickly to congressional information demands. Maintaining this capability is becoming increasingly difficult, requiring additional resources as the number of sources of requests increase. One senior official indicated that he is occasionally being forced to sacrifice timeliness for accuracy, and he anticipates more tardiness if the proliferation of congressional staff requests continues to grow at the present rate.

From the OSD perspective, the above problems present a unique question--How do you manage the DOD system so that the Secretary of Defense is adequately informed about (1) congressional information needs, (2) the location of the requisite

information and (3) the content of information submitted to Congress from the various Service and Defense activities? These questions become critical if a consistent DOD response is expected. The undisciplined "shotgun" effect of congressional requests makes this an extremely difficult task. To address potential solutions to these and other questions created by congressional reform, a general understanding of the sources of congressional information requests and the DOD organization for response is required.

CHAPTER IV
THE INSTITUTIONALIZED DEFENSE PROCESS
OF RESPONDING

Sources of Congressional Information Requests. Congressional information requests submitted to the Department of Defense originate from many sources. Broadly classified, these requests represent the information requirements of individual Members of Congress, personal staff of Members, committees, professional committee staff, the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget Office. Numerous additional sources exist within each class.

There are 50 states and 435 congressional districts having representation in the House and Senate as well as Congressional Delegates from Guam, the Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia. A Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico is also present. Consequently there are 535 Members of Congress, three Delegates and one Commissioner who serve as potential sources of individual requests for defense information. The Department of Defense has contact with these Members on an individual basis as well as through written communications. For example, in 1976 the Army contacted over 390 of the 535 Members, mostly through group and desk-side briefings by the Secretary, Under Secretary, or one of the Assistant Secretaries.¹ Numerous individual written inquiries are processed each year (see Table 7, Chapter III).

The personal staffs of the Members of Congress also place demands for information upon DOD. Although these demands are primarily constituent related inquiries, they can also relate to legislative activities, particularly if the "staffer" is being used to support the Member in his committee role or is providing information concerning an impending floor vote. Usually this type of request is in the form of a telephone call (Table 7) or a written communication prepared by a "staffer" and signed by the Member of Congress.

Committees, their members and professional staffs constitute the most significant sources of information requests placed on DOD. The increasing amount of top management time devoted to this activity supports this observation as do most of the previously indicated DOD staff workload indicators. This statement should not be construed to mean that other congressionally related information requests are unimportant. All requests from Congress are treated with concern and answered fully and expeditiously. However, top DOD decision makers cannot neglect the important fact that major defense-related federal resource allocation decisions take place within the committee structure of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the House and Senate Budget Committees and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.

The collective work of these committees determines how much of our national resources are to be allocated to defense. They define the parameters within which DOD must carry out its mission. To be sure, other committees and their staffs secure information from DOD, however these six committees generate the majority of the requirements to furnish information. Another significant aspect of the process of responding to committee needs is the increasing influence and power of the "staffer." As committee members are pressed more and more to consider a broader range of information on an increasing number of topics, more actions must necessarily be delegated to the staff. One senior Defense official candidly observed that the committee staff has become more important than the committee members, with perhaps the exception of the Chairman. Much, if not most, of the information communicated to the committees is, therefore, the result of a staff request or a staff-initiated request. For a more detailed breakdown of committees and subcommittees that frequently request information from DOD, see the Appendix.

The General Accounting Office also acts as a source of multifarious information requests. It currently devotes roughly 1400 staff-years to DOD audits, reports and evaluations.² A large part of the GAO requirements are for unique, non-standard data/information.

Defense information requirements within the newly established Congressional Budget Office also tend to be unique when compared to the routine requests of the committees. Like the GAO, many of its requirements cannot be currently anticipated. CBO requirements for information generally come from the Office of the Assistant Director for National Security and International Affairs and the Office of the Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. The character of CBO information requests will continue to evolve as its role in the congressional decision process becomes more clearly identified.

Types of Information Required by Congress. Congress, being a complex, pluralistic entity, has a variety of information requirements, all relating to the differing needs of the individual Members, the committees and the institution as a whole. Defense related information requirements vary with the role of the Member. Members require one kind of support in a variety of formats for their roles as members of committees, a different kind of support in other formats for dealing with legislative proposals before committees of which they are not members, a third kind of informational support with respect to other measures and proposals upon which they must vote on the floor of their legislative body and still a fourth kind to carry out their information responsibilities to their constituents.³

Within DOD, the response to these congressional needs can generally be categorized as being program, budget or

constituent related.* Although these broad categories are not mutually exclusive, they do tend to reflect the basic requirements of the six committees (Appropriations, Budget and Armed Services) most affecting DOD as well as the requirements of individual Members. Within these categories, congressional information requests to DOD reflect interest in facts on an encyclopedic and ever-growing range of subject matter. Moreover, as characterized by Mr. Lester Jayson, former director of the Congressional Research Service:

Congress wants those facts arranged in dozens of different ways and embodied in a wide variety of formats--in summaries, in exhaustively detailed reports and analyses, in speeches, in publications, and, most recently, displayed on office television screens. It wants them tailored for dozens of different purposes and uses, written in technical or layman's language as necessary. Sometimes it wants cursory treatments; sometimes it wants penetrating analysis. And it wants all this, and more, on time: this month, this week, this day, within the hour, at this minute over the telephone.⁴

Obviously, further categorization and subdivision of the types of information requested by Congress is possible and perhaps even necessary from time-to-time. For the purposes of the study, however, these three broad categories will suffice, since they, in part, reflect the way DOD is organized to respond.

*These categories of information should not be confused with the methods of transmission mentioned in Chapter III--inquiries, testimony, justification books, etc.

The Defense Organization for Response. The Department of Defense manages its response to congressional requests for information through a variety of OSD and Service staff offices designated as legislative affairs activities. These activities are further identified as "legislative liaison" and "other legislative activities." Liaison personnel are those assigned permanently or temporarily to any legislative office or are assigned to other DOD activities whose mission is to promote liaison for their particular activity or agency with Congress. Personnel involved in "other legislative activities" generally spend at least 30 staff-days per year in direct personal contact with Congress or its staff. This category also includes personnel who support the legislative program but are not in direct contact with Congress.

Organizationally, DOD manages its response through the designated legislative liaison offices. At the OSD level, this responsibility is vested in the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (ATSD-LA). The Assistant to the Secretary advises and assists the Secretary of Defense and other OSD officials on congressional aspects of DOD policies, plans and programs. He also has the overall responsibility for coordinating OSD actions relating to congressional consideration of the legislative programs of the Department of Defense. In this respect, this office is responsible for maintaining active liaison with Congress, the Services and

other Defense agencies. The Assistant to the Secretary is delegated authority to issue DOD instructions and directive-type memoranda appropriate to carrying out policies approved by the Secretary of Defense. He is also delegated the authority to obtain reports, information and assistance from the military departments and other Defense agencies as may be necessary to keep the Secretary of Defense fully aware of DOD-related congressional intentions and actions. The OSD legislative liaison effort is accomplished through a small, functionally oriented staff. Although the overall Defense liaison responsibility rests within ATSD(IA), most budget related liaison is conducted within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense--Comptroller (OASD-Comptroller), through the Office of the Special Assistant for Legislative Affairs. As indicated in Chapter III, this arrangement has been necessary due to the reluctance of the Appropriations Committees to conduct business except through budget offices and comptroller organizations.

Each military department has established a formal organization for managing its response to Congress. The Army uses the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, the Air Force uses the Office of Legislative Liaison and the Navy uses the Office of the Chief of Legislative Affairs; all located within their respective Service Secretariats. All of the Services also maintain a budget liaison office within their comptroller organizations. The responsibilities of these various activities

are fragmented. Liaison with the Appropriations Committees is in all cases the responsibility of the respective budget liaison office.* This does not mean that the comptroller organizations conduct all budget liaison. In the Army and Navy, liaison with the Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget Office is the responsibility of the Chief of Legislative Liaison (OSA) and the Chief of Legislative Affairs (SecNav). Within the Air Force, however, all budget liaison is conducted by the Office of Budget Enactment; including the Appropriations Committees, Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget Office.

Except as previously noted, the responsibilities of the Service Chiefs and Directors of Legislative Liaison are generally comparable. They provide internal advice on the status of congressional developments affecting their service and on legislative aspects of service policies, plans and programs. They also keep individual Members of Congress and committees advised of service activities within their areas of interest. The major capabilities of these liaison offices include an activity to handle congressional inquiries, a plans/special projects activity, a House and Senate Liaison Office, an activity for coordinating Service-proposed and other legislation, an activity for monitoring congressional investigations

*Army: Budget Liaison Office, Director of the Army Budget; Navy: Appropriations Committee Liaison Officer, Office of Budget and Reports; Air Force: Office of Budget Enactment, Directorate of Budget.

and an activity for coordinating Defense-related congressional travel.

The principal task of all of the liaison activities is to locate and transmit promptly needed information to Congress or its staff. The Service liaison activities usually obtain the required information through tasking other staff activities having an in-depth knowledge of the subject of congressional concern. Tasking authority is generally diffuse, with the Air Force as a partial exception. The Air Force Director of Budget is specifically responsible for all tasking required to respond to action items in the annual Authorization and Appropriations Bills.⁵

Other operational details concerning these staff activities, except those concerning information storage and retrieval, are not material to this study. Information storage and retrieval capabilities and implications will be addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V
FUTURE CONGRESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR INFORMATION

Future Requirements. An essential step in evaluating potential methods of improving DOD's management of legislative activities is an assessment of future congressional information requirements. Projections concerning the intentions of a plural organization such as Congress are necessarily incomplete and difficult. The mood of the body changes frequently, as do the issues and to some extent the members, particularly in the House of Representatives. However, observations of past actions of Members, projections by committee staff, judgments of Defense officials who have in-depth experience in congressional affairs and documented trends in congressional information requirements can serve collectively to present a partial picture of future requirements and their impact.

The trends in congressional information requirements were documented in Chapters II and III. As mentioned previously, over 40 senior Defense officials and their staffs were interviewed in the Fall of 1976. Congressional committee and Congressional Budget Office staff with defense related analytic duties also were interviewed during this period. Their judgments concerning future congressional requirements were recorded. These interviews combined with other research

pertaining to future congressional information requirements serve as the basis for the following projection of congressional information needs.

Without exception, those interviewed projected no short-term decreases in the amount of information that Congress will require from the Department of Defense. Contrarily, most of those interviewed envisioned near-term increases. These opinions are supported by numerous congressional hearings, reports, documents and prints concerning the adequacy of information available for the congressional decision process. In the Senate, for example, the Committee on Government Operations has taken the lead in the effort to improve internal availability of information. In the House of Representatives, the Committee on House Administration has served this function. Other committees contributing significantly include the Joint Committee on the Library and the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations. The House Commission on Information and Facilities also has been active in this effort.

Given the current state of information management technology in use, during the next two to three years the Department of Defense can expect to experience some increase in the number of staff years spent responding to Congress. Based on the past trends in legislative activity documented in Chapter III, Tables 4 through 11, future actions required by law and proposed

legislation, an increase of 5 - 25 percent is not unreasonable. The increase in workload will not necessarily be the result of an increase in the number of requests for information. A substantive increase in the quality of the questions being asked can be expected. This observation is supported by most DOD officials and senior congressional staff members interviewed. The workload associated with some categories of information may decrease. For example, the number of hours spent testifying probably will decrease slightly or at least remain relatively constant due to the constrained time table outlined in the Congressional Budget Act. Most traditional information will continue to be required. However, there no doubt will be substantial increases in the number and quality of program related questions from the House and Senate Appropriations Committees (HAC, SAC), the House and Senate Budget Committees (HBC, SBC), and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The questions asked and information required by the HAC and SAC will be generated from requirements imposed by the Congressional Budget Act--specifically the requirement to submit to the Budget Committees by 15 March their estimates of new budget authority and budget outlays. This submission requires some knowledge of program actions in the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Questions asked by the CBO and the SBC probably will constitute most of the increase in program related questions. Not only will the CBO be interested in a variety of program issues, it probably will show a marked

increase in its use of DOD cost data.

The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires that all Federal agencies submit a budget to Congress for fiscal year 1979 which, in addition to the traditional information, contains a presentation of budget authority, proposed budget authority, proposed outlays and descriptive information in terms of: (1) national needs referenced to all agency programs and missions, (2) agency missions and, (3) agency programs.¹ If this relatively undefined requirement is interpreted by Congress and the CBO to mean that other than currently existing DOD program displays are required, then a marked increase in staff work could be required, at least in the short run. The primary users of this information most likely will be the SBC and the CBO. However satisfied, this requirement undoubtedly will require additional staff work and coordination.

Other possible actions that would require additional DOD staff resources include the implementation of congressionally imposed zero-based budgeting and passing of the currently proposed "sunset" legislation. The SAC is currently using the Navy to test the feasibility of a zero-based approach to the operations and maintenance accounts. If the test is considered successful and this requirement is placed on all Services on a continuing basis, staff workload necessarily will increase. Proposed "sunset" legislation also will have a significant impact on staff workload if passed. This legislation, which was introduced last year by Senator Muskie (S. 2925), would

require a zero-based review and evaluation of all federal programs and activities every four years and, among other things, also would require authorizations for new budget authority for federal programs and activities every four years. This proposal is essentially a zero-based authorization process. The discussion and interest last year was considerable. This bill most likely will be vigorously reconsidered by the current Congress. The proposed bill specifically directs the CBO and the GAO to provide analytical assistance in the required reviews. For DOD this bill no doubt will translate into additional information requirements and staff work.

Related to the proposed "sunset" legislation is Congress' continuing concern with improving its oversight procedures. A part of the discussion of this topic has centered on ways to improve program evaluation. The GAO has been directed to provide continuing assistance in identifying information needs of the Committees and Members of Congress. Particular emphasis has been placed on the collection of data for program evaluation.² This effort is directed by law and will continue unless new legislation is passed.

Other congressional demands such as the HAC request for information on DOD budget alternatives considered but rejected will, if honored, add to the growing list of future congressional information requirements.

Methods of Acquiring Information. Congress will continue to use its traditional methods of acquiring DOD information--written inquiries, personal briefings, testimony, budget justification books, personal and committee staff questions, GAO reports, CBO reports and working papers, etc.. These traditional methods will be augmented by a significant increase in information processing capability. The Information Systems Group of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) is slowly and methodically building a powerful information storage and retrieval capability. This capability is embodied in the CRS Legislative Information Display System (LIDS) and consists of three data files--the Bill Digest File, the Bibliographic Citation File and the Major Issues File. These files, along with two science and technology data bases of the Library of Congress' Reference Department, are available to terminal equipped offices in Congress using the capability of the SCORPIO retrieval system. SCORPIO (Subject-Content Oriented Retriever for Processing Information On-Line) is a computer software system providing on-line access to Library of Congress automated files by remote computer terminal. For example, a congressional "staffer" can sit at a cathode ray tube (CRT) terminal, key in a question and receive the answer flashed on the screen in a matter of seconds. If a printer is available, the displayed results can be printed. This network of terminals is located

throughout the CRS and is being expanded into Senate and House offices by installation of a variety of dial-up terminals--CRT, typewriter and teletype.³

The LIDS system presents a wide ranging information storage and retrieval capability to Congress and its staff. The Bill Digest provides the committees and Members of Congress with information on proposed legislation. It contains a short description of the content of proposed legislation, its status, sponsor, committees assigned for action and the action taken to date. This file is updated daily and is usually current within 48 hours of floor or committee action. The Major Issues File consists of briefing papers prepared by the CRS staff on 200 frequently changing major issues of congressional concern. Sample issue briefs include "General Revenue Sharing," "Defense Manpower Costs" and "National Health Insurance." Of more significance to DOD is the Bibliographic Citation File. This computerized data base includes CRS staff reports; and all of the major publications of Congress, the Executive Branch, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States. It also contains major articles from 150 law journals and 6000 magazines and periodicals. The file is updated weekly. All of the material in the file may be retrieved by subject, author, type of document and/or time frame. The CRS can (and does) provide weekly bibliographic profiles from this file to Members of Congress or staff who are tracking specified subjects such as national crime or the DOD budget.

The potential power of this emerging congressional information storage and retrieval system is enormous, particularly in an environment where information is the commodity of trade. The GAO is now starting to place its program evaluations and other program related information in the CRS system. From the DOD perspective these capabilities are significant. The system will allow Congress to retrieve and review quickly any DOD related documents or information included in the system. Congressional capabilities to track defense issues and to notice inconsistencies will be enhanced as more defense related information is incorporated into the system and the system becomes more widely used. The staff of the Senate Budget Committee already uses this system to obtain selected information related to defense issues. As the system becomes more accessible, the use no doubt will increase.

The Department of Defense has no analog to the growing congressional information storage and retrieval system. No existing DOD system has the capability to quickly inform the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries or staff of information that DOD has provided Congress or the status and categories of information requested by committees, Members and staff. There is no DOD data bank of information relating to legislative affairs.

The Trends and their Potential Impact. The previously documented trends and personal interviews with DOD officials

and congressional staff all indicate that congressional information demands will continue to increase for the foreseeable future. This increase assuredly will mean additional staff workload. One of the questions that eventually must be addressed by the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries is "how much will the increase be and at what cost?" Using as a base the conservatively constructed GAO estimate for the staff years and costs associated with DOD legislative activities in FY 1975, rough projections can be made (Table 12).

If a linear relationship is assumed, a five percent increase from the FY 1975 base would result in an increase of 118 staff-years costing nearly three million dollars. An increase of 25 percent would require almost 600 additional staff-years at a cost exceeding 14 million dollars (Table 12).

TABLE 12
COSTS OF INCREASING THE
INFORMATION PROVIDED CONGRESS BY DOD¹

<u>Potential Increase In Staff-Years Devoted To Legislative Activities</u>	<u>Incremental Staff-Years</u>	<u>Incremental² Costs</u>
5%	118	\$2,832,000
10%	236	5,664,000
15%	353	8,472,000
20%	471	11,304,000
25%	589	14,136,000

1. Increases estimated using GAO estimated base of 4.9 million congressionally related staff hours for FY 1975.

2. Cost estimates are made using average cost/staff year of \$24,000; constructed from GAO estimate of \$54.9 million associated with the 4.9 million staff hours used in FY 1975.

This, of course, assumes no opportunity costs. If opportunity costs are considered, the costs easily will double. Given current congressionally imposed manpower ceilings, any increase in legislative affairs workload will mean a reduction in DOD's capability to perform other military functions, regardless of the availability of appropriated funds. In this instance, the constraints on the real resources (people) will dominate constraints on resource proxies (money). This is not to say that dollars are unimportant. However, given inflexible manpower ceilings, the range of possible increases (five to 25 percent) is roughly equivalent to giving up a ship's company or a battalion of infantry, regardless of the availability of funds appropriated for weapons and equipment. The opportunity costs, therefore, become extremely important.

CHAPTER VI

IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

One of the most challenging tasks facing managers of DOD's legislative affairs activities is that of arresting the growth in staff workload and concomitantly satisfying Congress' growing requirements for information. Consequently, near-term management concerns probably will center on ways of improving internal efficiency. In this respect, the analysis of the "sunk costs" of past congressional actions presented in previous chapters serves as a precursor to future managerial improvements within DOD. The following sections address actions which have potential for improving the process of responding to Congress. These actions represent potential improvements at the margin rather than a comprehensive evaluation of the entire process.

The Internal Management Challenge. The recent (1970-1976) growth in congressional information demands has created a series of internal problems that eventually must be addressed by DOD officials involved in managing legislative affairs activities. The severity of these problems will depend upon the extent that current trends continue into the future. If the growth continues, these problems could reach enormous proportions in a few years. For example, a 15 percent growth

rate in congressional information demands could increase DOD staff-years supporting legislative affairs activities by over 50 percent in less than four years. The choice of growth rate is left to the reader, however, as mentioned in the previous chapter, a 5 to 25 percent range does not appear to be an unreasonable expectation for the next 2 to 3 years. The problems created by past growth will remain, regardless of growth in the future.

At the OSD level, the growth in congressional information requirements appears to have created at least four interrelated problems. These problems, for the most part, also exist at the Service level. Although referred to earlier in this study, these problems can be summarized as follows:

1. The increased requirement for congressional information has caused top-level decision makers to divert a significant amount of their time to congressional affairs.

2. The OSD and Service staff workload related to congressional affairs has increased significantly.

3. The increasing multitude of congressional sources requiring information, the variety of DOD activities furnishing information to Congress (OSD, Services, budget offices, program offices, headquarters, field activities, etc.) and the congressionally imposed prohibition of a central liaison activity (Appropriations Committee deals only with comptroller activities; "staffers" contact field activities directly, etc.) combine to provide a tremendous potential for inconsistency and redundancy in reporting.

4. At the OSD level it is difficult (often impossible) to maintain current information relative to congressional actions and intentions. This problem is exacerbated by:

- a. poor institutional memory,
- b. limited retrievability of information that is available,
- c. inconsistency of categories reported (particularly true in the reporting of staff workload indicators),
- d. lack of a comprehensive data base, and
- e. multi-channel reporting to Congress.

Although incomplete, these problems are indicative of the impact of recent congressional reforms on Defense management. They also suggest that potential solutions may lie in the set of relationships between the people involved, the organizational structures and management technology. Although addressed separately in later sections for convenience, the people, organizational structures and management technology are all inextricably interrelated.

Considerations Involving the Participants. Perhaps no other activity within the Department of Defense is as "people" dependent as the DOD-congressional interface. Consequently, considerations for improving the internal efficiency of this activity must include the people involved.

The personalities and management styles of senior DOD officials affect legislative affairs activities both internally

and externally. In an environment not always characterized by rationality, at least from the DOD perspective (see Chapter III), individual relationships, traditions and courtesies take on added importance. For example, when asked to characterize significant aspects of the DOD-congressional interface, a senior staff member of the Senate Appropriations Committee responded: "the personalities of [senior DOD officials] who transmit information to the committee members and staff are very important. Eighty to ninety percent of those involved are very good, but there is always that ten percent... faith and trust is very important." A senior staff member of the House Appropriations Committee, when asked a similar question, observed that "staff and Members like to view themselves as business managers and like to be treated as such [when dealing with senior DOD officials]."

Although personalities of senior DOD officials are important externally, they appear to have reduced significance within DOD's internal hierarchical organization. The management styles, however, can have an impact; particularly the style set by the Secretary of Defense. For example, the issue of internal efficiency must be addressed somewhat differently in a centralized environment than in one typified by decentralization. Consequently, a clear understanding of the Secretary of Defense's legislative affairs management methodology is essential.

In the past, most of the control of legislative affairs activities has been decentralized; located within the Services. This arrangement can work fairly efficiently using the existing structure if the Secretary of Defense is primarily interested in information concerning broad policy issues; leaving the details to the Services. This presumes that an efficient method exists for aggregating the details. However, if the Secretary perceives a need for more detailed information, and expects the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs or other OSD staff activities to maintain this capability, then more control of the effort would be required at the OSD level.

The Office of the Assistant to the Secretary for Legislative Affairs is not currently staffed to provide the detailed information which would accompany a more centralized approach to the management of legislative affairs activities. Moreover, it is not clear that efficiencies would be gained from large-scaled centralization. The existence of a capability to furnish detailed information concerning legislative affairs activities at the OSD level does not mean that this capability will cease to exist at the Service level. More likely, an effort to centralize would build in redundancies and would potentially increase staff work, since the Services would remain the source of DOD information. Further, any attempt to increase the size of the OSD staff to accomodate increased centralization of legislative affairs activities most likely would meet

congressional resistance. Congress has traditionally opposed centralization of Defense legislative affairs activities. Additionally, the Services probably would not willingly participate in a move towards centralization. Most likely this would be viewed by them as an erosion of their capability to influence their budgets.

The preceding should not be construed to mean that a more centralized approach is not feasible. Certain aspects of the system may, in fact, function better when centralized. OSD does, from time-to-time, need access to details. Limited centralization may speed staff reaction time. However, any consideration of a move towards centralization should recognize the inherent "people problems."

Regardless of chosen management style, a clear articulation of the role of the Secretary of Defense and his staff vis-à-vis the roles of the Services and Agencies is an essential ingredient to improved efficiency. If consonant with the management style of the Secretary of Defense, a statement such as this could serve as a realistic base from which further actions to improve internal efficiency could precipitate. It is this author's opinion that the current set of DOD directives do not adequately serve this purpose.

Members of Congress and their staffs must also be recognized for their roles in this process. The increase in staff-years devoted to legislative affairs activities is

directly linked to congressional staff increases and the resulting complex set of interpersonal relationships. Defense officials and staff should not assume that Members of Congress or their growing committee staffs understand the DOD position. An improved continuing education process is needed if DOD is to reduce unnecessary and redundant requests for information. Some congressional staff members appear to be aware of this need. A senior congressional staff member with many years of DOD experience observed that "it is incumbent upon OSD and the Services to educate [Members and] congressional staffs to make reasonable requests for information." He noted that the growing, younger congressional staff may not understand the DOD position. He also implied that a reverse situation may also exist--that DOD officials and staff may not understand the congressional position. For example, he advised that DOD and the Services should let the action officers handle specific, detailed questions, particularly for the members of the Senate. He specifically advised against senior officials serving in this role unless technically qualified. He went on to suggest that communications be couched in "lay language," devoid of acronyms and DOD terminology.

Although relevant, these specific suggestions are not significant in themselves. However, their implications are. These comments appear to be a tactful way of saying that continuing education is needed on the part of all participants and, more importantly, that most of the education must be accomplished by DOD.

The research associated with this paper has indicated that OSD and the Services are aware of their educational responsibilities but have concentrated on one side--educating Congress and its staff. Consequently, additional internal education concerning the congressional perspective may be warranted. Periodic briefings relating to current legislative affairs activities may be beneficial, especially for key senior staff members and all new senior officials. A short course on congressional operations may prove useful.

Continuing improvements in the overall education of Congress and its staffs must also be encouraged. Particular attention should be directed towards improving the understanding of committee staff members, whose numbers and power have increased dramatically in the past six years. OSD and the Services appear to be adequately fulfilling their roles as congressional educators*, however, improvements can be made at the margin. For example, a concentrated effort to provide information concerning the cost of specific information requests may prove useful. An effort such as this could be directed towards information requests coming from individual Members of Congress. Many times, individual Members of Congress submit requests for Defense information different in content and format than that being routinely furnished the oversight committees; causing a significant amount of additional staff work.

* The Army appears to have been very successful with its coordinated approach to congressional education.

Estimates of the staff hours required for such requests could be made fairly easily as could the associated staff costs. The objective of such an effort would be to channel most of the DOD legislative affairs staff work towards providing Defense-related information to the Armed Services Committees, Appropriations Committees and Budget Committees.

A first reply to individual congressional requests for information exceeding some predetermined cost threshold might contain the following information:

1. A brief cost estimate of the staff work required to provide the requested information.
2. Copies of similar information that is currently available. Preferably this would be information previously submitted in different format to one of the congressional committees having Defense responsibilities (HASC, SASC, HAC, SAC, SBC, HBC).
3. A personal letter suggesting that currently available information be used if at all possible, in lieu of a costly DOD staff effort to provide additional information.

A second letter from the individual Member of Congress may ultimately force DOD to provide the requested information. However, there are potential benefits to be gained by DOD regardless of the outcome. If the first reply is successful, a major staff effort will have been avoided and the information presented will be consistent with other information provided Congress. If the first reply is unsuccessful, DOD will have

at least served its education role and provided the individual Member of Congress with an estimate of the costs of his/her information requirements. This action may serve to temper similar future requests. Finally, even if unsuccessful, the first letter will have delayed the work, allowing the DOD staff to address other pressing issues.

Individual Members of Congress cannot be expected to willingly accept the above proposal. In Congress, where information is power; unique information tends to provide unique power. The above proposal would tend to curb the flow of unique information to individual Members and could be viewed by some as a potential, if not real, erosion of their power base. Therefore, a decision to implement this proposal cannot be taken lightly. DOD must be prepared to convince Congress that this action is a real attempt to reduce the growth in staff work associated with legislative affairs activities and not an attempt to withhold information from selected Members. The above proposal may be more favorably considered as a part of a collection of actions designed to reduce the staff-years devoted to legislative affairs activities.

The Structural Problem. One of the major impediments to improved management of Defense legislative affairs activities has been (and continues to be) the increased interdiction of the DOD organizational structure by Congress, especially by the growing congressional staff. Some level of interdiction must

be expected when a hierarchical organization interfaces with a horizontally organized, pluralistic body. However, current levels appear excessive.

The increased amount of information being demanded by the congressional staffs, new committees, the Congressional Budget Office and the GAO, when combined with the fact that these activities tend to request information from any source they choose, down to the installation level, serves to exacerbate the growth in DOD staff-years devoted to legislative affairs activities. This situation should be viewed with concern by both Congress and DOD, for it complicates any internal DOD effort directed towards improvement.

The Department of Defense must take the initiative if structural improvements are expected, for there is little incentive for Congress to do so. In this regard, any action initiated by DOD must be realistic and carefully considered; for congressional staff members could view any attempt to reduce interdictions as an attack on their internal personal power base.

Nonetheless, there are some actions which could reduce interdictions. A first step, requiring little investment, might include the use of moral suasion by the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries to convince the congressional leadership that it would be beneficial to reduce the current level of indiscriminate interdictions. Data in Chapter III could be used to partially support this case. Unfortunately, it is difficult, if not impossible, to aggregate information trends on requests for information by individual Members of Congress.

A second step, taken in conjunction with the use of moral suasion, might be a DOD recommendation to Congress that a congressional clearing house for Defense-related information be established. An activity such as this could provide the focal point for all requests for DOD information coming from individual Members of Congress, leaving the information flow to the committees relatively unchanged. Constituent requests for information could be handled as in the past. The clearing house function would be that of providing information on Defense subjects to individual Members of Congress. The information furnished would be essentially that furnished the committees and their staffs. Hopefully, this would reduce the number of individual requests submitted to DOD for large amounts of information. Such an action would reduce the wide variety of required formats.

The Congressional Research Service appears to be a logical activity to provide this service, for it is already involved on a limited, but growing, basis. The technology and structure already exists within this organization. The information could be formatted and easily transmitted to the individual Member through the automated system of the Library of Congress (LIDS, see Chapter V), using the information provided the committees by DOD as a data base. Another important argument for a system such as this is the fact that the CRS was established and staffed (nearly 800 people) to do just this--provide information to Congress.¹

The limitations of these two steps are self-evident. They have no force; they are only suggestions which may or may not be viewed favorably. On the other hand, they appear to be worth discussing.

A third and more realistic step to gain some degree of control over the problem caused by congressional interdiction might involve a coordinated program to improve DOD's capability to retrieve and store information relating to congressional requirements. If unable to reduce the numbers of interdictions and the amount of information requested, an alternate to a congressional information clearing house might be an internal data bank available to OSD and the Services, containing congressional information requests and the information ultimately provided to Congress by DOD as well as other information. Since much information is provided on an informal basis or formally in verbal format, a comprehensive system would be nearly impossible to implement. A system that captures for easy reference most of the formal communications with Congress would be a major improvement, and more realistic. Knowledge of the interdiction can in itself serve as a measure of control. A system such as this, if properly constructed, could provide quick reference for staff officers to information requested by and furnished to Congress. It also would provide a means of aggregating information pertaining to the types and numbers of requests by individual Members, committees or staffs. As an illustration, answers to questions such as what types of questions has Senator "X"

asked in the past six months or what manpower information has recently been furnished to Committee "Y" at the request of congressional staff member "Z" could be answered quickly. Further, workload data related to DOD legislative affairs activities could easily be stored, aggregated and quickly retrieved.

This type of system would not be a panacea; it would not stop or even reduce the interdictions by Congress. It would present the capability, however, to obtain information quickly concerning congressional interdictions and to aid staff members charged with answering congressional information requests. Such a system would also have the potential to reduce redundancies and inconsistencies. A staff officer charged with providing information to a Member of Congress, committee or staff member on a particular subject would be able to query the system and find information on this subject that has been previously provided other Members, committees and staffs. A bibliographic service such as this, combined with document access, could serve as a very useful device to help reduce the time a staff member spends researching a subject prior to drafting the required staff response. A useable information storage and retrieval system could blunt the "shotgun" effect of the uncoordinated congressional requests for information by helping OSD and the Services to understand who in Congress is asking what question, who in DOD is being asked, the subjects of congressional interests, the formats of requested information,

the staff activity preparing the response (to include the name of the staff member), the hours devoted to each request and the location of the document provided Congress. A system providing this type of service would represent a significant improvement in the current level of management technology applied to legislative affairs activities. The next section addresses such a technological improvement.

Potential Improvements in Management Technology. The constraints noted in the previous two sections suggest that most improvements in the efficiency of DOD legislative affairs activities must come from improvements in management technology. Even if Congress agreed to all of the previous suggestions relating to the participants and the organizational structures, implementation would not likely be very rapid. As indicated in Chapter II, changes come slowly in Congress.

The use of technology to improve efficiency is not without precedent in DOD. The Defense technological imperative has been a driving force in weapons system acquisition and force development for years. However, within DOD's legislative affairs activities, new management technology has not gained wide acceptance; except in the area of constituent inquiries which is an external service. The technology used to manage this critical component of the ultimate DOD resource allocation system has changed little in recent years.

New management technology is being applied in other DOD activities. For example, the availability of new mini- and

micro-computer based information storage and retrieval systems has caused some DOD activities to consider the use of this management technology to improve the efficiency of internal correspondence control systems. The Army is installing such a system, based on the Inforex File Management System 5000, within the Secretariat and the Office of the Chief of Staff. This system is being installed as a mechanism to improve correspondence control. Part of the system is already operational. The Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison is now programmed to be included in this new system.

Based on the Army's experience, OSD has programmed the same system for FY 1978 to be used for correspondence control within the Office of Correspondence and Directives. If successful, the system will be expanded to automate the publication of directives and for use within the offices of the assistant secretaries. At this writing, the Navy and the Air Force had no firm plan for changing their existing systems.

Although not originally conceptualized for this purpose, the systems being programmed by the Army and OSD could form a foundation for a Defense Legislative Affairs Information Bank (DLAIB). The Inforex system being used by the Army is much more than a sophisticated, computerized filing system. It also can provide other management related services if formatted properly. It has the potential to provide all of the desirable services mentioned in the previous section:

a quick bibliographic service for the staff, fast document location and retrieval, the capability to aggregate information by almost any category (committee member, congressional staff, subject, date, key word, etc.), the capacity to collect consistent legislative affairs workload data for use in justifying staff devoted to this effort and the capability to collect data for use in estimating costs of congressional requests for information.

The use of the systems being programmed by OSD and the Army as a base would require a new effort--coordination of computerized information storage and retrieval systems. Currently there appears to be no clear requirement within OSD to coordinate the implementation of these small computer based systems to insure compatibility. Moreover, there seems to be little coordination within the Services to insure that Service systems can communicate internally. Further, no one within OSD appears to know what the capabilities of the existing and programmed DOD information storage and retrieval systems are. Consequently, an effort to establish a Defense Legislative Affairs Information Bank using the currently programmed OSD and Army systems as a base would require, as a first step, the designation of a central coordinating activity with the power to establish a compatible system. The current lack of capability to effectively manage and coordinate DOD information systems is not a new topic. In a report issued in 1976,


the GAO suggested that OSD improve its management of information systems by giving more power to the office currently responsible for this task (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Administration).²

Given the establishment of a central coordinating activity within OSD, a Defense Legislative Affairs Information Bank could be established in a variety of ways. This study will address only two possibilities. These are only two points on a spectrum of possible designs. They are presented as a hopeful stimulant to technological innovation in legislative affairs activities.

A Defense Legislative Affairs Information Bank could be established by requiring OSD and the Services to establish compatible computer-based information storage and retrieval systems for maintaining, as a minimum, all written communications from Congress and all official written replies regardless of the source of the request. Within such a system, congressional information requests and their replies could be processed and stored by each Service and OSD. The system would be open to the extent that each Service could enter any other Service storage system or the OSD system and retrieve official Defense information that has already been provided Congress and its staff. Entry could easily be controlled using access codes. For example, inter-service access might only include the document, the requesting activity, the Service action office and action officer; omitting workload and cost data. Workload and cost data might

be made available to OSD using consistent reporting categories which permit aggregation. Figure 2 is a diagram of the information flow inherent to this system.

Figure 2
DEFENSE LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS INFORMATION BANK
(Proposal 1)



A proposed system such as this would build on the systems being programmed by OSD and the Army and would allow each service to manage its own system. Further, the Services and OSD

could use these systems for other internal information storage and retrieval purposes, such as correspondence control, publishing of regulations, etc. The Army and OSD should require no additional outlays above those currently programmed, except for the costs associated with connecting the systems. The undiscounted, uninflated ten-year hardware costs of a system identical to the one currently programmed by OSD is \$585,000.³ These costs are further broken down as follows:

1. Procurement of an Inforex Mini-computer and associated Equipment.

● Control unit	\$40,000
● Disc drive (3)	60,000
● Disc controller	15,000
● Tape drive	10,000
● Terminals (5)	25,000
● Line printer	15,000
● Serial printers (3)	15,000
● Adapters and misc.	<u>15,000</u>

\$195,000

2. Procurement of Microfiche Equipment

● Camera	30,000
● File equipment	90,000
● Reader/printer	3,000
● Fiche and carriers	<u>26,000</u>

\$150,000

3. Rental of High Speed Microfiche Copier (10 years, current dollars) \$240,000*

Total cost of hardware \$585,000

Total cost w/o high speed copier \$345,000

*Optional

These ten-year hardware costs represent a significant capability to store and retrieve information--up to 5.8 million pages. Considerable savings could probably be made if the system was to be used only for legislative affairs activities. Personnel costs appear to be negligible, for Army experience indicates that existing clerical personnel can be trained to operate the new equipment. Without a high speed copier, the total hardware cost for implementation within the Air Force and the Navy would be about \$690,000 if the Inforex-based system was used. This represents about 1.2 percent of the current annual manpower costs associated with Defense legislative affairs activities.⁴


It is impossible to satisfactorily quantify the many potential benefits of the proposal. The current system cannot adequately identify the total staff-years devoted to legislative affairs activities. Consequently, no well-defined base exists from which meaningful comparisons can be made. However, based on the incomplete DOD estimates for fiscal year 1975, quoted by the GAO (note 2, Table 12); the proposal would be justified on a cost-benefit basis if it improved the internal productivity of legislative affairs activities by 1.2 percent. A conservative estimate of the costs associated with a 1.2 percent reduction in staff-years is \$690,000. A similar information storage and retrieval system being tested by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, is expected to improve productivity by at least ten percent.⁵ The

system could also be justified with no reduction in staff years, but with an increase in the level of work accomplished.

Perhaps one of the most significant potential benefits would be the improved capability to identify and aggregate the Defense staff years devoted to legislative affairs activities. Ancillary benefits such as reduction in file space, correspondence control, classified document inventory and cataloging of regulations would depend upon the needs of each Service.

A Defense Legislative Affairs Information Bank could also be established without requiring the Services to maintain separate systems. The Inforex-based information storage and retrieval system being programmed for use within the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) could be expanded to provide this capability. According to the OSD justification documents, this system can be expanded to provide storage and access to 9.8 million pages without taking up additional floor space. With an expanded capability, the Navy and Air Force could be given storage space within the OSD system for documents pertaining to legislative affairs activities. Cathode ray tube terminals (CRT) and printers could be placed in the Air Force and Navy legislative affairs activities, giving direct access to the system. When required, copies of documents could be provided by the Army and OSD, using the microfiche printers. The Army would not require additional assets, nor would the Army need to store information in the OSD system, for their existing system with its planned

expansion already has this capability. Figure 3 is a diagram of this proposal.



The major expenditures that would be required for the Army interface would be the cost of linking their system to the OSD system and to the terminals in the other Services; and the cost of providing copies of stored documents when required.

This second proposal, like the first, would limit inter-service accessibility to official information provided Congress.

The Air Force and the Navy could make inputs to the system through their CRT terminals, by using word processing units or by manually providing copies of the documents to OSD.

The major costs of this second proposal are those associated with the procurement of CRT terminals and printers. Based on prices listed in the Inforex Authorized ADP Schedule Price for 1976, the cost of five terminals and one serial printer would be:

Terminals (5)	\$25,000
Serial printer	5,000
Misc. equipment	<u>2,000</u>
Total costs	\$32,000

The total cost of hardware associated with this proposal could be expected to be less than \$150,000, including the possibility that OSD would require additional equipment for their expanded role (disc drives, microfiche file equipment, fiche, etc.). This represents about 0.3 percent of the annual legislative affairs manpower costs, using the OSD estimate for FY 1975 as a base.

The costs and benefits of both proposals discussed in this section are clearly incomplete. A more detailed analysis would be required if the establishment of a Defense Legislative Affairs Information Bank is to be seriously considered (to include potential internal bureaucratic resistance). Although such an analysis is beyond the scope of this study, the partial estimates provided herein concerning the systems hardware

costs suggest that a more complete effort might clearly present a viable alternative to the current system. Relative to the magnitude of the Defense-related resource decisions that are being made in Congress, the hardware costs associated with these potential technological improvements appear infinitely small. In this respect, the costs have even less significance when one considers the fact that a system such as either of the two proposed in this section, would have no reason for existence except to improve the way DOD provides Congress decision information--information that is to be used in the ultimate Defense resource allocation system.

Conclusions. The data presented in this study clearly document a growing Defense management problem--one that impinges on all other Defense activities. The growth in size and quality of the congressional staffs and their increasing demands for information on Defense programs and activities has caused the Department of Defense to direct an enormous amount of human resources to legislative affairs activities. Over 1500 congressional staff years are now devoted to Defense analysis.* DOD currently devotes over 2300 staff years to information gathering activities required by Congress. The past trends and recent congressional actions and proposals indicate no near-term relief. More important, however, is the fact that with the increased congressional staff activities and flow of information, no one in DOD can adequately monitor the process,

* Includes the GAO, CBO, CRS and congressional staffs.

except perhaps for a few major issues. For example, identical supplemental questions were submitted to Secretary of Defense Brown who testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on 24 February 1977 and General Alexander Haig, USA, who testified before the SASC Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel on 1 March 1977. The discovery of this duplication was due to chance alone. No DOD system is currently capable of quickly displaying these types of redundancies.

Needless to say, the growing congressional bureaucracy thrives on the decentralized, fractionalized methods of obtaining information from OSD and the Services, and upon inter-Service competition. The congressional ability to interdict the DOD system at almost any level fosters a "divide and conquer" tactic. While Congress may view these actions as necessary improvements in its capability to perform its constitutional duties, DOD, nonetheless, is burdened with the resulting (and growing) management problem.

The growth in the congressional staff and its tendency to be a consumer of enormous amounts of Defense information appears to have created four interrelated problems within DOD:

1. An increased amount of top management is devoted to congressional affairs.
2. The OSD and Service staff workload related to congressional affairs has increased significantly.

3. A tremendous potential for inconsistency and redundancy in reporting exists due to the increase in congressional sources requiring information, the variety of DOD activities furnishing information and the congressional prohibition of a central liaison activity.

4. Current information concerning congressional actions and intentions is difficult (often impossible) to maintain.

Potential solutions to these problems appear to lie in the set of relationships between the participants in the process, the organizational structure involved and the use of improved management technology. In a complex interface such as the one that DOD maintains with Congress, no "single" solution appears to be appropriate to any problem. In this respect, in hopes of stimulating innovations in the management of legislative affairs activities, this author has presented a "menu" of proposed actions which may improve the efficiency of the process. Judgments as to the mix and appropriateness of the proposals are left to the individual reader. The following is a synthesis of the proposals presented in this chapter:

1. The Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense should disseminate a clear definition of the current role of the SecDef vis-a-vis the roles of the Services and Agencies in the performance of legislative affairs activities. A clear understanding of the Secretary of Defense's legislative affairs management methodology is essential if efficiencies are to be gained.

Different management styles require different approaches to this problem. Further, the roles appear to be quite dynamic. Participants in the process need to be aware of the "ground rules" as they occur. Consequently, the timeliness of dissemination becomes very important. The current DOD directives and instructions appear inadequate and ill-suited for this purpose.

2. OSD and the Services. An improved and continuing legislative affairs education program should be considered by DOD. The program should concentrate initially on improving DOD staff awareness of congressional operations, mores and information requirements. The program should then move to improve the education of Members of Congress and their powerful staffs. The congressional staff should be continually reminded of what constitutes a "reasonable" request for information.

3. OSD and the Services. Congress should be continually informed of the cost of information. As a minimum, routine cost estimates should be provided when individual Members of Congress request information that will generate an OSD/Service staff effort above some predetermined cost threshold. This effort should concentrate on reducing the variety of information formats requested by individual Members by encouraging the use of information provided the committees.

4. The Secretary of Defense and Service Secretaries. The Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries should actively use moral suasion to convince Congress that it would be beneficial

to both sides to reduce excessive structural interdictions.

Reducing the number of DOD staff years devoted to legislative affairs activities should be a common goal of Congress and DOD. The Secretary of Defense and Service Secretaries should continually remind the congressional leadership of the inefficiencies and redundancies that are generated by indiscriminant staff interdictions of the DOD hierarchy. Congress also should be apprised periodically of the growth in DOD staff workload indicators and be persuaded to help reduce the trends.

5. The Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense should recommend to Congress that a congressional clearing house for DOD information be established. This activity should serve as the focal point for all requests for DOD information coming from individual Members of Congress. Hopefully, this would reduce the number of direct individual requests for large amounts of unique DOD information. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) with its large and growing staff, appears already to have most of this mission and capability. For the most part, the CRS could use the DOD information furnished the committees as its data base.

6. OSD and the Services. OSD and the Services should strongly consider the application of improved management technology to legislative affairs activities. Specifically, this application should include an improved DOD capability to store, retrieve, index, aggregate and manipulate information relating to the needs of Congress.

The establishment of a Defense Legislative Affairs Information Bank should be considered. A useable information system such as this could blunt the "shotgun" effect of un-coordinated congressional requests for information by helping OSD and the Services to understand who in DOD is being asked questions, the subjects of congressional interests, the formats of requested information, and the activity providing the response. Existing and programmed mini-computerized correspondence control systems within OSD and the Army could be used as a base for this effort. As a minimum, this system could provide DOD staff with a quick bibliographic service, fast document location and retrieval, the capability to aggregate information by almost any category, the capacity to collect consistent legislative affairs workload data and the capability to collect data for use in estimating costs of congressional requests for information.

Regardless of the perceived feasibility of the foregoing proposals and the level of top-management attention given to the problem, if there is no slackening of the growth in congressional information demands and if Congress continues to refuse to discipline its system for requesting Defense information, then, as a minimum, one or more of the following actions will necessarily occur:

1. DOD and the Services will be forced to degrade the level of information provided Congress.
2. DOD and the Services will be forced to divert additional staff resources to legislative affairs activities.

3. To improve efficiency, DOD and the Services will upgrade the management technology being applied to legislative affairs activities.

The above observations and others in this and preceding chapters suggest that postponing improvements in the efficiency and management of legislative affairs activities may not be in the best interest of the Department of Defense. The alternative to improvement appears to be increased "microscopic" management by Congress and its staff.

APPENDIX

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND SUBCOMMITTEES FREQUENTLY REQUESTING DEFENSE INFORMATION

Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC)

- Subcommittee on Defense
- Subcommittee on Military Construction
- Subcommittee on Public Works
- Subcommittee on Foreign Operations

Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)

- Subcommittee on Arms Control
- Subcommittee on General Legislation
- Subcommittee on Intelligence
- Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel
- Subcommittee on Military Construction Authorization
- Subcommittee on National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves
- Subcommittee on Preparedness Investigating
- Subcommittee on Research and Development
- Subcommittee on Tactical Air Power

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Senate Committee on Government Operations

Senate Budget Committee (SBC)

Ad Hoc Task Force on Defense

Senate Public Works Committee

House Appropriations Committee (HAC)

- Subcommittee on Defense
- Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
- Subcommittee on Military Construction
- Subcommittee on Public Works

House Armed Services Committee (HASC)

- Subcommittee on Investigations
- Subcommittee on Military Compensation
- Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities
- Subcommittee on Military Personnel
- Subcommittee on Research and Development
- Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical
Materials
- Special Subcommittee on Intelligence

House Budget Committee (HBC)

- Task Force on National Security Programs

House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee

- Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation
and Environment

House Committee on Government Operations

House Public Works and Transportation Committee

House Foreign Affairs Committee

NOTES

Chapter I

1. U.S. General Accounting Office, Suggested Improvements in Staffing and Organization of Top Management Headquarters in the Department of Defense, (Washington: 20 April 1976), p. 94.

Chapter II

1. Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956), p. 11.

2. Allen Schick, "Congress and the 'Details' of Administration," Public Administration Review, September/October 1976, p. 517.

3. Quoted to John E. Dawson, "Origins of the Federal Budget Process: The Challenge of Particularism and Synthesis," Armed Forces Comptroller, April 1975, p.2.

4. Schick, p. 517. Note: Although the language of the Act impacts on numerous lines in the budget, the specificity is considerably broader than that experienced in the 1880's. Conditions are rarely imposed on amounts smaller than one million dollars.

5. Formerly the Legislative Reference Service. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 changed the name and broadened its functions.

6. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Legislative Oversight and Program Evaluation, Seminar, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976), p. 74.

7. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 22 November 1975, p. 2544.

8. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Improving Congressional Control Over the Budget, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973), p. 219.

9. Ibid., p. 217.

10. Schick, p. 517.

11. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Improving Congressional Control Over the Budget, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973), p. 297.

12. Debt receipts, contract authority, borrowing authority and permanent appropriation are examples.

13. See Anne Hessing Cahn, Congress, Military Affairs and (a Bit of) Information, American Politics Series, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974), for a discussion of congressional information requirements after the ABM debates.

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1. Executive Office of the President, Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1977, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976), p. 157. Note: this number excludes congressional employees.

2. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Defense Department Report, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, FY 1977, (Washington: 1976), p. 254.

3. U.S. General Accounting Office, Suggested Improvements in Staffing and Organization of Top Management Headquarters in the Department of Defense, (Washington: 20 April 1976), p. 94.

4. U.S. Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1976, Report No. 94-446, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), p. 26-32 and U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1976, Report No. 94-517, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), p. 30.

5. U.S. Department of Defense, Legislative Influence Upon Defense Management, Staff paper, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary, fall 1975.

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1. Data obtained from Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, Plans and Operations Division, 5 October 1976.

2. Estimate furnished by OASD (Comptroller), Deputy for Audit.

3. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, Congressional Research Support and Information Services, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974), p. 3.

4. Ibid., p. 4.

5. Department of the Air Force, HQ Operating Instruction 172-9, 10 March 1975. Note: Excludes the Military Construction Authorization Act which is the responsibility of the Director of Civil Engineering.

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1. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., United States Statutes at Large, Public Law 93-344, Title VI, Section 601, 93rd Congress, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974), p. 27, 28.

2. U.S. General Accounting Office, Programs in Improving Fiscal, Budgetary and Program-Related Information for the Congress, Report to the Congress (Washington: 30 August 1976), p. 1.

3. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on House Administration, Library of Congress Information Resources and Services, Report (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976), p. 32.

Chapter VI

1. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on House Administration, Library of Congress Information Resources and Services, Report (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976), p. 5, 6, 104.

2. U.S. General Accounting Office, Suggested Improvements in Staffing and Organization of Top Management Headquarters in the Department of Defense, (Washington: 20 April 1976).

3. This estimate is based on OSD cost estimates (OASD-Admin.) and the Authorized ADP Schedule Price List (for Inforex systems, 1976).

4. This percentage is based on the conservative GAO estimate of 54.5 million dollars for FY 1975.

5. The Army is testing a system called the Operations Management Information System (OPTIMIS) for use within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army. Although similar in capability, this system is different than the Inforex-based system being used within OSA and the Office of the Chief of Staff.

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