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RELIABILITY OF MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEMS USING TRIPLE MODULAR REDUN--ETC(U)

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RELIABILITY OF MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEMS USING
TRIPLE MODULAR REDUNDANCY

by

John F. Wakerly

Technical Note # 61 ✓

April 1975

DIGITAL SYSTEMS LABORATORY ✓

Departments of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Stanford University

Stanford, California

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ABSTRACT

Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is a classical technique for improving the reliability of digital systems. However, applying TMR to microcomputer systems may not improve overall system reliability because voter circuits may contribute as much to system unreliability as the microprocessors themselves. We examine the issues that affect the effectiveness of TMR for microcomputer systems, including voter unreliability, considerations for transient recovery, and reliability of semiconductor memory systems. With careful application TMR can improve the mission time of a small system by a factor of three or more.


INDEX TERMS: large scale integration (LSI)
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microcomputers
reliability
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
1. INTRODUCTION

Triple modular redundancy (TMR) has been used in a number of systems to increase reliability for highly critical applications [1,2]. TMR is applied to a nonredundant system by partitioning the system into a number of modules, triplicating the modules, and placing majority voters at the interfaces between modules. In a TMR system, errors produced by any single faulty module are masked by a simple majority vote. As shown in Fig. 1, the effects of single voter failures can be overcome by triplicating the voters. There are no critical single-point failures in the system of Fig. 1, that is, the system will continue correct operation in spite of any single module or voter failures.

For reasons of cost TMR in the past has only been applied to systems for highly critical applications. However, the decreasing cost of computer processor and memory hardware is increasing the feasibility of TMR as a means of improving reliability in general-purpose systems. Of course, for some systems it can be argued that improving processor and memory reliability is of minor importance because most failures are attributable to peripherals and input/output subsystems. However, in addition to the fact that peripheral and input/output reliability have been studied elsewhere [3], there is a strong argument to support the development of reliable processors and memories. In many situations the most practical way to increase system reliability is by providing standby



(a) Nonredundant system



(b) TMR version

Fig. 1

spares that can be activated automatically upon failure of primary units [1,4,5]. Obviously sparing schemes can increase reliability only if the error detection and automatic switching mechanisms are themselves very reliable [6]. Hence the development of inexpensive ultra-reliable processors can provide a new way of implementing "test and repair" functions for any system with spares (digital or otherwise).

The thought of applying TMR to microcomputer systems raises some interesting questions. First of all, since a microprocessor is just a single chip, it is not clear that reliability can really be increased in a system that must use many voter chips constructed from the same unreliable technology as the microprocessor itself. Secondly, a microprocessor is a rather complex sequential machine with only limited access to its internal state. When a transient failure causes one of the replicated microprocessors to get out of synchronization with the others, it is not clear that the system will ever be resynchronized so that additional transients can be tolerated. Thirdly, the reliability of semiconductor memory systems associated with microprocessors must be considered.

2. MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEM MODEL

We will use the simple model of a microcomputer system shown in Fig. 2. The system consists of simply a microprocessor and a memory containing programs and data. Data, address, and control outputs of the microprocessor are connected to the memory; data and control outputs of the memory are connected to the microprocessor. Connections to peripherals are ignored; for the TMR system it is assumed that each peripheral interface has voters which monitor the I/O commands given by all three triplicated processors.

A typical LSI microprocessor is the Intel 8080 [7]. The 8080 is an 8-bit processor in a 40-pin package. It has 16 address lines, an 8-bit bidirectional data bus, and 9 control lines entering and leaving the chip. The data bus must be externally split into two one-way buses for voting to be applied, and hence there are a total of 41 lines in an 8080 system that could be voted on. Since three voter circuits (Fig. 3) can be placed on a single 14-pin package, it is conceivable that a TMR 8080 system could have 3 8080 packages and 41 voter packages (triplicated voters) or 14 voter packages (non-triplicated voters). Since a large percentage of integrated circuit failures are related to problems in packaging and I/O pins rather than circuit complexity, it is quite conceivable that the total voter unreliability in a TMR microcomputer system could approach or even exceed the microprocessor unreliability. In such a system the use of TMR could actually decrease the overall system reliability. After introducing some reliability concepts, we will give a simple analysis that shows this.




Fig. 2 Microcomputer system model.




Fig. 3 Voter circuit

3. RELIABILITY CONCEPTS

The reliability of a component or system is a function of time $R(t)$, the probability that the component or system has not failed at time t . For individual components of an electronic system it is commonly assumed that failures after burn-in have a Poisson distribution, so that the reliability of a component is given by the formula $R(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$. The parameter λ depends on the component and is called the failure rate. Typical SSI circuits have failure rates of 10^{-6} to 10^{-8} failures/hour, while failure rates of LSI circuits such as 1024-bit memories have been reported in the range 10^{-5} to 10^{-6} failures/hour [8,9].

Individual component failures in a system are assumed to be independent, so that the system reliability is the product of the component reliabilities. For example, in a system composed of n identical components with failure rate λ_c , the system reliability is $R_{sys}(t) = (e^{-\lambda_c t})^n = e^{-\lambda_{sys} t}$, where $\lambda_{sys} = n\lambda_c$.

Explicit identification of the time dependence of reliability is often omitted in reliability expressions. Hence reliability is indicated simply by R , and it is understood that the reliability at some time t can be obtained by substituting the value of $R(t)$ for every occurrence of R in an expression.

For complex systems it is useful to have a single number that characterizes the system reliability rather than a continuous function

of time. Sometimes the mean time to failure (MTF) is used to provide this characterization. The MTF is defined as the integral from time equals 0 to infinity of the system reliability. For components the MTF is therefore simply the inverse of the failure rate; for any system the MTF can be derived from the reliability expression. A parameter that has been found to be more useful than MTF for evaluating ultra-reliable systems is the mission time. The mission time for a system with reliability $R_{\text{sys}}(t)$ is defined to be the value of t such that $R_{\text{sys}}(t) = R_f$, where R_f is some predetermined final reliability. The value used for R_f depends on the application but a typical value is .95. The mission time indicates the amount of time it takes for the reliability of an initially perfect system to degrade to R_f [10].

In comparing ultra-reliable systems with each other and with non-redundant systems, the mission time improvement factor (MTIF) is often used. The MTIF is the ratio of the mission times of a redundant system and the corresponding nonredundant system [10].

The reliability of a TMR system can be calculated by partitioning the system into a number of cells such that errors on the outputs of a cell are corrected by voters at the inputs of subsequent cells [11], as indicated for the simple system of Fig. 1. Then the individual cell reliabilities are calculated, where a cell is considered to be operating correctly if at least two out of three of each of its triplicated output lines is correct. The system operates correctly if and only if each cell operates correctly, and so the system reliability is the product of the cell reliabilities.

The simplest type of cell has one triplicated module type and voters at the inputs of the modules; two of these cells comprise the system in Fig. 1. If R_v is the voter reliability and R_m is the module reliability, then the cell reliability is $R_{\text{cell}} = (R_m R_v)^3 + 3(R_m R_v)^2(1 - R_m R_v)$, since two out of three of the cell outputs are correct if and only if two out of three of the voter-module pairs are working correctly. If there are n module inputs then n voters are used for each module and R_v^n replaces R_v in the expression above.

4. TMR MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY

As we indicated in section 2, a typical microprocessor might have 40 or more lines to be voted upon when TMR is applied. In a small system consisting of a microprocessor and a small number of memory circuits, the voter unreliability could be greater than the microprocessor and memory unreliability. Suppose the reliability of the microprocessor/memory module is R_m and the reliability of a single voter is R_v . If n voters are required then the total voter reliability is R_v^n , and this can be related to the module reliability by a factor k such that $R_v^n = R_m^k$. The factor k could be in the range .1 (very reliable voters) to 2 or more (voter reliability per pin comparable to microprocessor reliability). For example, suppose a microcomputer system uses one microprocessor and four memory chips, each with failure rate $\lambda_m = 10^{-6}$. If the voter failure rate is $\lambda_v = 10^{-7}$, then 40 voters produce a value of k of .8.

A simple reliability analysis of the TMR microcomputer indicates that the system functions properly if at least two out of three of the replicated voter/module subsystems function properly. Hence the TMR system reliability is

$$\begin{aligned} R_{\text{sys}} &= (R_m R_v^n)^3 + (R_m R_v^n)^2 (1 - R_m R_v^n) \\ &= (R_m^{1+k})^3 + (R_m^{1+k})^2 (1 - R_m^{1+k}). \end{aligned}$$

The reliability of the nonredundant system is simply R_m . The mission time improvement factor (MTIF) for the TMR system can be calculated as a function of k , as shown in Fig. 3a for a final reliability $R_f = .95$.

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


Fig. 3a Mission time improvement factor for a TMR microcomputer system.

For the perfect voter case ($k=0$), the theoretical maximum MTIF of 2.84 is obtained, but for imperfect voters ($k>0$) the MTIF can be much less. For example, if the module and total voter unreliabilities are equal ($k=1$), the MTIF is only 1.42, and for $k=2$ the redundant system actually has a lower mission time than the nonredundant system.

The preceding analysis shows that voter reliability can be a critical factor in TMR microcomputer systems. One way to reduce the effects of voter unreliability is to reduce the number of voters. For example, a triplicated microprocessor/memory system could be designed with no voters at all. The three copies would be initialized to the same starting state and would run in synchronization from a common (fault-tolerant) clock. Since the peripherals are assumed to have their own voters, each peripheral would monitor the I/O commands of all three copies and would perform the operations dictated by the majority. However, consider the behavior of this system in the presence of transient failures. A transient failure can cause a microprocessor to get out of synchronization with the others, and a second transient can cause system failure unless the microprocessor is resynchronized. The problem with the no-voter scheme is that there is no coupling among the replicated microprocessor/memory systems, and hence there is no mechanism for resynchronization after transients. In the next section we present a system organization that has the minimum number of voters required for resynchronization after transients.

5. SYSTEM STRUCTURE FOR RESYNCHRONIZATION

A transient failure can have an arbitrary effect on the state of a microprocessor, and after the transient disappears the affected processor may continue to have the incorrect state. If a second transient failure affects a different processor before the correct state of the first is restored, then two processors will produce incorrect outputs and the TMR system will fail. This certainly runs contrary to the desire to make the system tolerate short transients by the use of TMR. For multiple transients to be tolerated, the system must be structured so that each replicated processor frequently receives a synchronizing sequence during normal operation [12].

Suppose that voters are placed at the master reset input and the data inputs of each microprocessor, as shown in Fig. 4. The address, data out, and control lines of each microprocessor go directly to the corresponding memory module without any voting. This configuration has the minimum number of voters needed to provide re-synchronization after transient failures. For example, suppose a transient failure causes several registers of one microprocessor and several words in the corresponding memory module to contain incorrect data. Each of the incorrect registers is resynchronized with correct data when it is loaded from memory, since the voters insure correct memory output regardless of any possible errors in the state of one of the memories. Once the microprocessor is resynchronized, the memory is resynchronized by loading the incorrect memory words from the microprocessor.




Fig. 4 Minimum TMR microcomputer configuration for resynchronization.

Of course, it is possible that a transient failure can affect not only the register state but also the program state of a microprocessor. In general the microprocessor can attain any erroneous state and before being resynchronized it can create arbitrary errors in the corresponding memory module. It is this possibility that necessitates a voter on the master reset line of the microprocessors. Associated with each microprocessor is some interface circuitry that can be instructed by the software to initiate a hardware reset. Periodically the software would cause such a reset to occur, and since the reset line is voted on, a completely unsynchronized microprocessor must still obey the reset command. The reset command causes the microprocessor to begin executing a routine at some fixed location. The routine in this case must be a synchronizing routine that first initializes all of the processor registers from memory, and then corrects any possible errors in a single memory module by sequentially reading and then rewriting every word in the memory.

There are certain hardware/software tradeoffs involving synchronization. For example, if voters are placed on the address, data and control lines between the microprocessor output and memory input, then a single erroneous processor cannot cause bad data to be written into the corresponding memory module. Thus the software resynchronization process need not assume the worst case, that arbitrary errors have been created in the memory. On the other hand, the voting hardware is more expensive and unreliable.

An alternative to the system structure of Fig. 4 places voters on the data inputs lines to the memory rather than on the data output. This

structure still allows synchronization, since an error in a processor register will be masked when it is written into memory, and memory can still be re-initialized by reading and then rewriting every memory word. This structure might even seem better than Fig. 4 because it prevents a single faulty processor from writing incorrect data into memory. However, the structure of Fig. 4, which places voters on the memory outputs rather than inputs yields significantly higher reliability when a semiconductor memory system is used.

6. SEMICONDUCTOR MEMORY RELIABILITY

The semiconductor memory module of a microcomputer system can be modeled as shown in Fig. 5. There is some shared address decoding and driving circuitry, an array of memory chips, and perhaps some shared output circuitry. The memory array consists of ns 1-bit by w -word memory chips arranged in an $n \times s$ matrix to form the n -bit by ws -word array. If the memory chip reliability is R_c and the reliability of the common circuitry is R_d , then module reliability is $R_c^{ns} \cdot R_d$ and it would appear that the reliability of a TMR memory system is

$$R_{sys} = (R_c^{ns} R_d)^3 + 3(R_c^{ns} R_d)^2 (1 - R_c^{ns} R_d) \quad (1)$$

The above analysis neglects the organization of the memory array. In a system such as Fig. 4 where there is a voter for each bit of the memory output, the system fails only if there is a simultaneous error in a single bit position of two of the triplicated memory modules. Consideration of the memory array structure hence leads to the more accurate reliability formula,

$$R_{sys} = R_d^3 (3R_c^2 - 2R_c^3)^{ns} + 3R_d^2 (1 - R_d) R_c^{2ns} \quad (2)$$

This expression reflects the fact that at each position in the array of Fig. 5, two out of three of the replicated memory chips must be working, independent of other positions in the array.

The reliability expression above always produces a reliability value greater than or equal to (1). The improvement obtained by using (2) decreases as the reliability of the memory array (R_c) relative to the common circuitry (R_d) increases. For example, if $R_c = 1$ the formulas are




Fig. 5 An n -bit by ws -word semiconductor memory module.

identical. But for typical semiconductor memory systems, the common circuitry comprises only about 10-15% of the total, and so the reliability value obtained by considering the structure of the memory array (2) is significantly higher than that obtained by simple analysis (1). A typical example is shown in Fig. 6.

The TMR memory reliability indicated by (2) is more accurate than (1), but it is still not complete. A complete memory system analysis must be somewhat more complex, taking into account voter reliability, the placement of voters for the memory system inputs, and the possibility of having different chip types within the memory array. For example, (2) may be modified to take into account voter reliability, yielding the expression,

$$R_{sys} = R_d^3 [R_v^3 (R_c^3 + 3R_c^2(1-R_c))^S + 3R_v^2(1-R_v)R_c^{2S}]^n + 3R_d^2(1-R_d)(R_v R_c^S)^{2n} \quad (3)$$

The reliability improvement of Eqn. (2) and (3) over Eqn. (1) is only obtained when there are voters on the memory outputs. If voting is applied after data has been routed through a processor, then (2) and (3) do not apply. In such a system, a single bit error in the memory output can produce multiple bit errors in the resulting processor outputs, invalidating the assumption used in deriving (2) and (3).

The reliability of a TMR memory system should be compared with a memory system that attains single fault-tolerance by using a single-error-




Fig. 6 TMR memory system reliability.

correcting code. Both systems are guaranteed to correct any single failure in the memory array, but analysis has shown that the TMR system is more reliable because it corrects a larger number of multiple failures. For an 8-bit memory system, coding requires 4 redundant memory bits per word while TMR requires 16. On the other hand, the coded system requires a separate copy of the common input circuitry (Fig. 5) for each bit to tolerate single failures in the common circuitry. In addition, the output decoder for the coded system is much more complex than a few TMR voters, and it must be triplicated if the memory system is being interfaced to a TMR processor, or in any case duplicated if decoder failures are to at least be detected. Hence for small fault-tolerant memory systems that are to be interfaced to a TMR processor, TMR appears to be a much better choice than coding [13].

7. TMR MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEM RELIABILITY

The reliability of the TMR microcomputer system of Fig. 4 can be analyzed by using Eqn. (3) from the previous section, by including the microprocessor reliability as part of the common circuitry term R_d . The reliability of a system with no voters or with voters between the CPU output and memory input can be derived using Eqn. (1). Fig. 7 shows the reliability of these three possible TMR implementations of a nonredundant microcomputer with 1K bytes of memory using typical failure rates. All three TMR systems have higher reliability than the non-redundant system, and improve the mission time by a factor of about 3. Among the TMR systems, the implementation with voters at the memory output (TMR CPU-memory-voter) is most reliable, for the reasons discussed in the previous section. The system with voters between CPU output and memory input (TMR CPU-voter-memory) is less reliable than a system with no voters because of voter unreliability. However, the CPU-voter-memory system is actually more reliable if transients are considered because of its ability for resynchronization.

The reliability curves for similar implementations of a system with more memory (8K bytes) are shown in Fig. 8. It can be seen that in this case there is little difference between the no-voter and CPU-voter-memory implementations because the major contribution to system unreliability is from the memory chips. However, a substantial improvement over these implementations is obtained in the CPU-memory-voter implementation, because of the greater number of memory failures tolerated.




Fig. 7 TMR microcomputer system reliability.




Fig. 8 TMR microcomputer system reliability.

8. CONCLUSION

Triple modular redundancy, if carefully applied, is an effective way of increasing the reliability of microcomputer systems. Application of TMR to microcomputer systems must take into account the fact that voters may be as unreliable as microprocessors themselves, that microprocessors are complex sequential machines that require resynchronization after transients, and that special considerations apply to reliability of semiconductor memory systems used with microprocessors. We have shown two examples of small microcomputer systems in which TMR improves the mission time by a factor of three or more.

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