Moscow - The Principle of the Objective.

Abstract

This study analyzes the German failure to decisively conclude Operation Barbarossa by capturing Moscow, asking whether this failure was the result of disregard for the principle of the objective. The failure at Moscow was the first significant setback for the German Army in World War II. The role played by the notion of the objective in the pre-World War II German Army is investigated along with the backgrounds and personalities of the principal military and civilian leaders involved in the campaign. These background chapters provide the insight needed to understand the relationship that existed between the tactical commander and his superiors during the detailed planning and execution of Operation Barbarossa.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 10, 1977
Accession Number
ADA042869

Entities

People

  • Michael C. Deprie

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Cyber
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Carbonate Esters
  • Civil War
  • Crystal Structure
  • Employment
  • Far East
  • Far Infrared Radiation
  • Maglev
  • Military History
  • Mobile Operating Systems
  • Operating Systems
  • Quantum Cascade Lasers
  • Second World War
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  • United States
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Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies