Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria and Tanzania: A Study of the Success and Failure of Civil Leadership in Africa.
Abstract
The purpose of this research was to examine objective conditions in two Sub-Saharan African countries to determine if there are recurring circumstances which cause the indigenous military to seize power on factors that preclude military intervention. It is felt that an understanding of these factors will permit a military or civilian analysis to develop appropriate policies for the United States to follow toward the independent countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. A historical survey was conducted to determine if there were identifiable factors in the histories of Nigeria and Tanzania that either caused or precluded military intervention. The basic hypothesis, which was derived from those formerly postulated by Professor Claude E. Welch, Jr., is that military intervention in African politics is most likely when: the prestige of the major political parties wanes coupled with disharmony among leading politicians; there is little likelihood of external intervention and countries nearby have suffered military intervention; the society is not integrated and suffers from declining economic conditions; government corruption and inefficiency are rampant; and the army feels it has a political role. The Nigerian case tended to validate this hypothesis. Conditions within the country deteriorated to such an extent that military intervention was inevitable. Tanzania also tended to validate the basic hypothesis in that the conditions suffered by Nigeria did not exist in sufficient number or severity to cause military intervention.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 16, 1977
- Accession Number
- ADA043725
Entities
People
- James L. Collins
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College