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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FOR FY 1975

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This report recommends the annual active duty end strength for each component of the armed forces for FY 1975 and the annual civilian personnel end strength level for each component of the Department of Defense for FY 1975 and includes an explanation of the relationship between the personnel strength levels recommended and the national security policies of the United States in effect.		

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PART A
OVERVIEW

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Reporting Requirement

This report represents the third annual report to Congress justifying and explaining active duty manpower strengths requested by the Department of Defense. The FY 1973 Military Manpower Requirements Report was prepared in response to P.L. 92-129. A second report was prepared to support the FY 1974 military requirements in response to P.L. 92-436. The basis for this report, for FY 1975, is P.L. 93-155 which expanded the reporting requirement to include justification of civilian manpower, as well as expanding the scope of the report to require more detailed justification of support requirements. Chapter 4 of Title 10, U.S. Code as amended by P.L. 93-155 now reads:

"Section 138 c(3) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress a written report, not later than February 15 of each fiscal year, recommending the annual active duty end strength level for each component of the armed forces for the next fiscal year and the annual civilian personnel end strength level for each component of the Department of Defense for the next fiscal year, and shall include in that report justification for the strength levels recommended and an explanation of the relationship between the personnel strength levels recommended for that fiscal year and the national security policies of the United States in effect at the time. The justification and explanation shall specify in detail for all military forces, including each land force division, carrier and other major combatant vessel, air wing, and other comparable unit, the -

"(A) unit mission and capability;

"(B) strategy which the unit supports; and

"(C) area of deployment and illustrative areas of potential deployment, including a description of any United States commitment to defend such areas.

It shall also include a detailed discussion of (i) the manpower required for support and overhead functions within the armed forces and the Department of Defense, (ii) the relationship of

the manpower required for support and overhead functions to the primary combat missions and support policies, and (iii) the manpower required to be stationed or assigned to duty in foreign countries and aboard vessels located outside the territorial limits of the United States, its territories, and possessions."

In addition, this report contains special analyses requested in the Report of the Senate Committee on Armed Services (Report No. 93-38) accompanying H. R. 9286, the FY 1974 Authorization Appropriation Bill.

An addendum will be provided at a later date which will show the year-to-year changes in the planned allocation of the manpower authorized in each major category to the working level units performing the various missions of the category. This information was requested in the Senate Armed Services Committee report.

The FY 75 Defense Manpower Requirements Report

The FY 1975 Defense Manpower Requirements Report is but one of many reports and testimonies to the Congress in support of the entire defense program. Concentrating on manpower, as it does, it touches on the full range of defense issues, from research and development to base level supporting services to overseas force deployments. Because of this breadth, coverage of some functions must, of necessity, be less than complete. It is highly recommended that this report be read and used along with the FY 75 Defense Report to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense, testimonies by the Secretary of Defense and other principal defense witnesses, as well as the FY 75 Military Manpower Training and Reserve Manpower Requirements reports.

This Report views the Department of Defense as a system whose final product is national security. It is a complex system, composed of many related parts, each of which contributes to the whole. These contributions, or outputs, taken together, form the final product. To produce outputs, any system needs resources. The Defense system is no different. And the most essential of all resources to the Defense system is manpower -- the total workforce (military and civilian) necessary for mission accomplishment. Military personnel provide the capability for the conduct, control and support of combat operations. They also furnish necessary skills and perspectives, based on military expertise formal education and professional experience, to those functions which support the combat capability and shape future force structures. Civilian personnel provide continuity of administration and operations

and afford essential managerial and technical capabilities for support operations. This integrated workforce provides for the use of civilian manpower for the continuity of operations and for some unique skills, and to insure the optimum use of military personnel in the combat structure.

Organization and Content of the Report

This report goes beyond the requirements of the legislation directing its preparation. Its comprehensive nature, including the special analyses, is designed to provide a clear statement of defense manpower needs, how they have been derived, what they will be used for and a substantive justification of these needs. In addition, we wish to provide a vehicle for a more in-depth dialogue with the Congress with the objective of promoting mutual understanding of defense manpower requirements and their importance to national security.

Manpower Categories. Defense resources -- manpower, funds, weapons systems, units -- are managed by means of the ten Major Defense Programs. These programs are "major output" oriented (e.g., Strategic Programs include the resources associated with all aspects of strategic forces). Each such program contains units (thus manpower) performing different functions (e.g., flying aircraft, maintaining aircraft, providing food services, etc.) but all having the same goal (e.g., providing sufficient and effective forces for deterrence). However, many of these activities are common to more than one major program (e.g., base operations are required for strategic, general purpose, and mobility forces programs as well as for central support forces programs such as training and logistics). Since it is important to know how manpower resources are used, we have developed a functional categorization, called Manpower Categories, to better allow us to analyze and explain manpower use. The Manpower Categories are used in this report. A listing of both the Major Defense Program and Manpower Category titles are shown below. Appendix A shows these relationships in greater detail as well as a cross-walk between them.

Major Defense Programs

- I. Strategic Forces
- II. General Purpose Forces
- III. Intelligence & Communications
- IV. Airlift and Sealift
- V. Guard & Reserve Forces
- VI. Research & Development
- VII. Central Supply & Maintenance
- VIII. Training, Medical and Other
General Personnel Activities
- IX. Administration & Associated
Activities
- X. Support to Other Nations

Manpower Categories

- Strategic Forces
- General Purpose Forces
- Auxiliary Forces
- Mission Support Forces
- Central Support Forces
- Individuals

Contents. The report is divided into three major sections.

Chapters I, II and III provide an Introduction, Summary of Manpower Requirements and a Summary of Policy and Strategy considerations. These three chapters can stand by themselves in providing an overview of defense manpower requirements and national security objectives.

Chapters IV through X describe the various kinds of forces we require, given the threats we face, to implement our policies and strategy. Chapter IV deals with Strategic Forces; Chapter V with General Purpose Forces; Chapter VI with Auxiliary Forces; Chapter VII with Mission Support Forces; and Chapter VIII with Central Support Forces. Integral to each of these chapters is a discussion of the means for translating the forces into the manpower required to man them. After force manpower requirements, or the structure spaces, have been determined, the non-structure manpower requirements can be derived. We categorize these non-structure space requirements as "Individuals" and the nature and sizing of Individuals are described in Chapter IX. Finally, Chapter X provides a summary of manpower requirements by Manpower Categories and by Service.

Chapters XI through XVII contain special analyses of important manpower issues. These include Manpower Cost Analysis, Women in the Military, Support Requirements, Military Bands, Enlisted Personnel Inventory Trends, Forward Deployments and Transients. Appendix A, Manpower Data Structure, provides a track of changes in the accounting structure since the FY 74 report, as well as the relationships between the Major Force Program Structure and Manpower Categories. Appendix B displays that military manpower serving in assignments outside of the DoD.

Time Periods. Throughout the report, unless otherwise stated manpower is displayed for the following time periods:

FY 1973 - Actual Strengths
 FY 1974 - President's FY 75 Budget
 FY 1975 - President's FY 75 Budget

In using the FY 73 column it should be recognized the FY 73 actual strengths are lower than previously programmed:

	<u>FY 73 End Strengths (000s)</u>		
	<u>Programmed*</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Military (Active Duty)	2,288	2,252	-36 (1.6%)
Civilian (Direct Hire)	1,012	998	-14 (1.4%)

*FY 73 column, FY 74 President's Budget

Military strengths were lower than programmed because of three primary factors: (a) program changes in anticipation of Congressional reductions; (b) new initiatives by the DoD in restructuring the force; and (c) shortfalls in planned accessions.

Civilian strengths were lower than programmed, primarily because of unusually large retirements during the month of June 1973 to take advantage of the more liberalized retirement rules and retirement pay increases.

These understrengths, therefore, tend to distort the comparison of actual FY 73 strengths with the programmed FY 74 and FY 75 requirements.

Civilian Manpower

As directed by Congress this report displays the civilian manpower requested in the President's FY 1975 budget. This information was requested to assist the Congress in establishing a civilian end-strength employment ceiling for DoD in FY 1975. The civilian requirement has been integrated with military manpower in the Manpower Category tables and discussions. The report displays the Direct Hire and Indirect Hire foreign national civilians associated with Military Functions and Military Assistance Activities. The civilian employment figures exclude the following categories of civilians:

- a. Civil Functions Personnel.
- b. Student and disadvantaged youth employees.
- c. National Security Agency (NSA) employees.

Chapter II discusses the reasons for these exclusions and the definitions of all categories of civilian employment.

Although Indirect Hire foreign national employees have been included in this report, the Department of Defense in submitting the recommended Authorization Act for FY 1975 recommended that the civilian employment ceiling be restricted to Direct Hire Civilians. For this reason tables have been provided which identify separately the Direct Hire civilian strengths requested in the President's FY 1974 budget.

CHAPTER II

SUMMARY OF DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

Defense Manpower Requirements

As required by Section 138(c) of Title 10, United States Code, the Department of Defense requests authority for both Active Duty military and civilian personnel end strengths for each component for the fiscal year 1975. These strength requests are as follows:

FY 1975 DOD MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (End Strengths)

	<u>Military</u> (Active Duty)	<u>Civilian</u> (Direct Hire-Mil Funct)
Army	785,000	358,717
Navy	540,380	323,529
Marine Corps	196,398	(18,120) ^{2/}
Air Force	630,345	269,709
Defense Agencies	(12,935) ^{1/}	<u>75,372</u>
Total Department of Defense	2,152,123	1,027,327

1/ Military assigned to Defense Agencies are included in Service totals.

2/ Marine Corps civilian employees are included in Department of Navy totals.

The military request represents the total Active Duty end strengths required for each Service.

The civilian manpower request shown above is responsive to the requirement in section 138(c) of Title 10 United States Code, which requires that beginning with FY 1975, the civilian personnel end-strengths for each component of the Department of Defense be authorized. The civilian manpower request shown in the above table represents direct hire civilian

personnel (permanent and temporary) employed to perform military functions. The Department of Defense has proposed^{1/} that the authorization established by Congress apply only to this category of civilian manpower. Therefore, excluded from the civilian request are:

1. Employees performing Civil Functions administered by the Department of Defense, including Corps of Engineers Civil Works, Cemeterial Expenses, Wildlife Conservation Program and Postal Construction Program. These employees are paid from separate appropriations distinct from military functions. (29,000 - FY 75 Estimate).

2. Indirect-hire foreign nationals who are hired by host nations in support of U.S. forces stationed abroad. (103,000 - FY 75 Estimate). The authorization request does include those foreign nationals who are employed directly by the U.S. Government.

3. Special employment categories designed to aid students and disadvantaged youth, such as: Stay-in-School Campaign, Temporary Summer Aid Program, Federal Junior Fellowship Program and Worker-Trainee Opportunity Program. Like other federal agencies, the Department of Defense has cooperated in hiring young people for these programs, and believes they should be treated separately to insure their continuation. (22,000 - FY 73 Actual).

4. National Security Agency civilian employees are excluded for reasons of security classification.

Manpower Needs and National Security Policy

The Secretary of Defense in his Defense Report and in testimony to the Committees of the Congress defined the objectives of the Defense Program for fiscal year 1975. Defense manpower, of course, is an integral and essential element of this program. Some of the objectives highlighted by the Secretary of Defense as having a direct bearing on Defense manpower needs includes the following points:

1. Military equilibrium must be maintained during a difficult period of transition from the cold war toward a period of enduring peace.

^{1/}Letters dated Feb. 4, 1974 to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate forwarding proposed legislation for the DoD Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975.

2. The balance of military power in the world today is delicately poised. A significant regression in U.S. military power at this point could upset that balance.

3. It is only by ensuring this equilibrium of military force that we can successfully pursue meaningful detente.

4. We must strive to maintain (preferably at successively lower levels achieved through negotiations) a worldwide equilibrium of military forces to specifically include:

a. a visible strategic nuclear balance.

b. a contribution to a balance of general purpose forces in central Europe where the bulk of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces are arrayed against NATO.

c. a balance of maritime forces to ensure the freedom of the seas and the protection of our sea lines of communication.

d. retention of forces in Asia as a deterrent to those who might risk new hostilities and to provide an umbrella for continued internal development of our Asian allies in an environment that encourages stability and discourages instability.

Manpower Trends

Military Manpower

The following table compares the military manpower requested for Active Forces in FY 1975 with strength in selected prior years.

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL
(End of Fiscal Years in Thousands)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Total DoD</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
1950 (pre-Korea)	1,460	593	382	74	411
1952 (peak Korea)	3,636	1,596	824	232	983
1964 (pre-Vietnam)	2,687	973	668	190	857
1968 (peak Vietnam)	3,548	1,570	765	307	905
1974 (FY 74 Budget)	2,233	804	566	196	666
1974 (FY 75 Budget)	2,174	782	551	196	645
1975 (FY 75 Budget)	2,152	785	540	196	630

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

The FY 1975 military strength request of 2,152,000 is:

- 535,000 lower than the strength at the end of FY 1964 - a pre-Vietnam year.
- 1,396,000 lower than FY 1968, the peak of the Vietnam War.
- 81,000 lower than the FY 1974 strength requested in the President's FY 1974 Budget submitted to Congress in June 1973.

We now have fewer divisions, fewer ships and fewer aircraft than in any year since the Korean War. The Department of Defense is especially concerned about the adequacy of our General Purpose Forces. As stated by Secretary Schlesinger in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on February 7, 1974, "I have emphasized the need for

maintenance of our general purposes force structure. While I have indicated we are not in any immediate danger with regard to strategic forces, I should emphasize this general purpose force structure is on the thin side.

Within the limitations of reduced military strengths, the Department of Defense has taken significant initiatives to increase combat structure and combat readiness by reductions in the support establishment, including headquarters, and by eliminating defensive strategic forces which do not contribute to our overall security. The major force changes are as follows:

1. Land Forces

Army -- increase active Army divisions from 13 to 13-1/3, add new battalions, and convert certain Reserve component infantry units into armored and mechanized units.

2. Naval Forces. For the first time in many years, we will be adding almost as many new ships to the fleet as we will be retiring, thus beginning to reverse the trend that brought us from 951 commissioned general purpose ships in 1968 to a low of 518 ships in FY 1974. This trend will continue in the years ahead, as funds provided by retiring obsolescent WWII ships result in the number of new ships delivered to the fleet starting to exceed those being retired.

3. Mobility Forces. Increased peacetime crew ratios and maintenance personnel for C-5A and C-141 strategic airlift squadrons will permit an increased wartime aircraft utilization rate, equivalent to a 25 percent increase in the wartime capability of the strategic airlift forces.

In order to provide the necessary manpower to achieve this improved combat capability at the same time as total defense manpower is being reduced, significant manpower savings are being made by reductions in:

1. Army air defense NIKE-HERCULES battalions.
2. Headquarters functions.
3. Intelligence activities.

4. Communications support functions
5. Mission and central Support forces
6. Numbers of trainees and students

Many of the changes reflected in the FY 1975 manpower program were recommended by Congress in recent years. Although we expect to continue to restructure our forces to improve combat capability, Congress is urged to support the military manpower requested in the President's FY 1975 budget. Military manpower which may be saved by future base closings, and additional streamlining of the support establishment are urgently needed to improve our combat capability and correct deficiencies in our General Purpose Forces.

Civilian Manpower

The following table compares the civilian strengths requested for FY 1975 with strengths in selected prior years.

DIRECT HIRE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL (End of Fiscal Years in Thousands)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Total DoD</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy / Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>OSD-JCS and Other Defense Agencies</u>
1950	715	266	293	154	2
1952	1,308	515	481	310	2
1964 <u>1/</u>	1,035	360 <u>1/</u>	332	305 <u>1/</u>	38
1968 <u>1/</u>	1,287	462 <u>1/</u>	419	332 <u>1/</u>	75
FY 73 Actual	998	333	322	270	73
FY 73 Budgeted	1,012	344	325	274	69
1974 (FY 75 Budget)	1,029	356	326	270	76
1975 (FY 75 Budget)	1,027	359	324	270	75

1/ These totals include Army and Air National Guard Technicians who were converted from State to Federal employees in FY 1969. The FY 1964 and 1968 totals have been adjusted to include approximately 38,000 and 39,000 technicians respectively.

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Civilian strengths have decreased from 1,287 at end FY 1968 to 998,000 at the end of FY 1973. The Department of Defense plans to increase civilian employment above the end FY 1973 level for the following purposes:

- Fill vacancies caused by large scale early-retirements at the end of FY 1973.

- Execute the previously approved FY 73-74 civilian-military substitution program (30,000 Direct Hires) and substitute an additional 9,000 civilians for military personnel in FY 1975. Congress has encouraged the Department of Defense to pursue opportunities for using civilians in positions which do not require military incumbents, and this also represents DoD policy.

- Hire additional civilians in FY 1974 and FY 1975 to improve combat readiness (19,000 in FY 1974 and 5,000 additional in FY 1975). These civilian employees will be used for reducing backlogs in depot maintenance and ship overhaul, increased logistics and base operations support activities.

The table below shows the civilian FY 73 and FY 75 budgeted strengths, the size of the increases, and the resulting strengths that would have been reached without the above actions.

DoD FY 74 and FY 75 End-Strength Changes
(Direct Hires - 000s)

	<u>FY 73</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Budget</u>	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Budget</u>	<u>Changes</u> <u>FY 73-75</u>
Ending Strengths	998.0	1028.8	1027.3	+29.3 (2.9%)
Less Increases Due To:				
Civilianization <u>1/</u>	- 1.4	- 30.4	- 39.0	
Force Readiness	<u>-</u>	<u>- 18.7</u>	<u>- 23.8</u>	<u> </u>
Strength Exclusive of FY 74 and FY 75 Civilianization and Force Readiness	996.6	979.7	964.5	32.1 (3.2%)

1/ Excludes 900 indirect-hires programmed in FY 74 for civilianization.

As shown above, civilian manpower has decreased, although less drastically than military manpower. Without the unusually large retirements, increased civilianization and increased readiness initiatives, civilian manpower would have actually decreased by 42,941 spaces between FY 73 and FY 75.

DOD Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>115</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>909</u>	<u>901</u>	<u>929</u>
Land Forces	512	513	537
Tactical Air Forces	165	169	169
Naval Forces	190	178	176
Mobility Forces	43	41	47
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>162</u>	<u>156</u>	<u>139</u>
Intelligence & Security	63	56	48
Centrally Managed Communications	47	49	40
Research & Development	35	33	34
Support to Other Nations	4	5	5
Geophysical Activities	14	13	13
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>342</u>	<u>309</u>	<u>311</u>
Reserve Components Support	14	15	14
Base Operating Support	239	208	212
Crew & Unit Training	36	35	35
Command	52	51	49
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>389</u>	<u>358</u>	<u>346</u>
Base Operating Support	47	42	42
Medical Support	92	83	82
Personnel Support	32	31	31
Individual Training	151	140	131
Command	44	38	37
Logistics	21	21	20
Federal Agency Support	3	4	4
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>326</u>	<u>327</u>	<u>312</u>
Transients	106	90	88
Patients & Prisoners	12	10	10
Trainees & Students	197	215	201
Cadets	10	12	12
<u>Total DOD</u>	<u>2,252</u>	<u>2,174</u>	<u>2,152</u>
Army	801	782	785
Navy	564	551	540
Marine Corps	196	196	196
Air Force	691	645	630

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. This applies to all strength tables throughout the Report. All manpower strengths in the Report are endstrengths unless otherwise specified.

DOD Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct and Indirect Hire Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>11</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>82</u>
Land Forces	39	40	43
Tactical Air Forces	13	14	15
Naval Forces	*	*	1
Mobility Forces	25	24	24
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>127</u>	<u>124</u>
Intelligence & Security	10	10	10
Centrally Managed Communications	16	17	15
Research & Development	87	88	87
Support to Other Nations	5	2	2
Geophysical Activities	10	10	10
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>240</u>	<u>254</u>	<u>255</u>
Reserve Components Support	20	26	26
Base Operating Support	208	212	213
Crew & Unit Training	2	2	2
Command	10	13	13
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>639</u>	<u>658</u>	<u>657</u>
Base Operating Support	99	107	107
Medical Support	41	46	47
Personnel Support	10	11	11
Individual Training	37	43	45
Command	63	63	61
Logistics	389	389	385
<u>Total DOD</u>	<u>1,100</u>	<u>1,133</u>	<u>1,130</u>

	<u>Tot</u>	<u>DH^{1/}</u>	<u>Tot</u>	<u>DH^{1/}</u>	<u>Tot</u>	<u>DH^{1/}</u>
Army	405	333	430	356	431	359
Navy	315	305	318	308	315	306
Marine Corps	19	16	21	18	21	18
Air Force	288	270	288	270	287	270
OSD, JCS, Defense Agencies	73	73	77	76	76	75
Total	1100	998	1133	1029	1130	1027

*Indicates less than 500 spaces.

^{1/} Direct Hire

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

CHAPTER III

POLICY AND STRATEGY STATEMENTS

A. General Policy

U.S. defense policies are directed toward providing adequate military strength to support the basic national security strategy enunciated by the President in the first year of his administration:

- First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

- Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

- Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when required in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

The fundamental objective of U.S. military forces is to deter armed conflict. This requires maintaining a clear and evident capability and resolve to fight, in concert with our allies, at any level of hostilities so that any potential opponent will assess his risk of defeat to be unacceptable. Should deterrence fail, the military objective is to terminate hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its allies, while preserving our security interests.

In order to achieve these objectives, the following concepts are emphasized in the new planning guidance:

- Force Balance. To deter armed conflict it is necessary that the United States and its allies maintain forces which are capable of balancing the major threat -- the military forces of the Soviet Union and its allies. The military balance must be evident and clearly perceptible to us and our allies, potential adversaries, and other nations. The military forces of the PRC and its allies should also be considered, but separately, and not as additive to the primary Soviet threat. It is important that we have such a balance with respect to strategic forces, forces for the European theater, and maritime forces.

- Collective Security. The United States seeks a community of free nations capable of defending itself against common threats. U.S. allies are being encouraged to make equitable contributions to the collective defense effort, and the United States expects increased cooperation from its allies in this regard. In turn, the United States will clearly demonstrate its intentions to honor its treaty commitments. To this end, the United States maintains forward deployed forces and reinforcement capabilities to support its allies in timely collective defense.

- Increasing Combat Forces Capabilities. To develop forces of maximum deterrent and warfighting value in a climate of constrained spending, current defense planning is oriented toward achieving efficiencies in the support area which will free resources for improving force readiness, modernizing existing forces, and adding additional forces. These efforts, however, must necessarily proceed at a deliberate pace, to avoid elimination of needed support and to minimize turbulence.

- Greater Reliance on Reserves. Constrained resources make it necessary to place primary reliance on Reserve forces to supplement active units during emergency situations. Current planning emphasizes development of austere but well-equipped and well-trained reserve forces to perform this function.

The following sections provide additional details on current defense policy for nuclear and conventional forces.

B. Nuclear Forces for Strategic and Tactical Employment

Nuclear forces are maintained for the fundamental purpose of deterring nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies. Our planning for nuclear forces encompasses a wide range of possible employment options in order to prevent conventional conflicts from becoming nuclear and to limit the range of escalation in event of a nuclear conflict. The United States thus seeks to promote nuclear stability by reducing incentives to use nuclear weapons in all crisis situations. Consistent with this objective, current policy calls for structuring U.S. strategic forces in such a manner that:

- will deny opponents any significant advantage which could result from a preemptive attack;

- will maintain the capability to counterbalance any force increases or qualitative improvements which would alter the force balance in favor of an adversary.

- cannot reasonably be interpreted as threatening a disarming first strike.

Theater nuclear forces are planned to provide a wide range of options for defending U.S. and allied interests in situations short of all-out nuclear war. Existence of these forces greatly increases the risk undertaken by an adversary in either initiating conventional conflict or escalating conventional hostilities to the nuclear level. Because theater nuclear forces are maintained primarily as a deterrent, they are not planned with a view to reducing conventional forces.

C. General Purpose Forces

These forces are maintained for deterrence of conventional conflict and successful prosecution of such a conflict if deterrence fails. They are especially important in the present period when possession of secure second strike capability by both the U.S. and the USSR reduces the incentives for nuclear escalation by either side. Planning in this area is oriented toward providing forces which will generally be perceived as capable of dealing with all important conventional threats and which can be employed successfully in a wide variety of contingencies.

In the 1960's, as a result of this planning process, we adopted a strategy and force structure that purportedly enabled us to deal simultaneously with the initial stages of a war in Europe, a war in Asia, and a minor contingency elsewhere. Since 1969, with explicit acknowledgement of the Sino-Soviet split and the President's opening of detailed negotiations with both the USSR and the PRC, the strategic concept has been changed in the following major respects:

We now plan our forces to deal with a major conflict in Europe or Asia and to respond simultaneously to a minor contingency elsewhere. Thus we have dropped one of the big contingencies for which we must be simultaneously prepared and have adopted, in the jargon, a 1 1/2 war strategy instead of the 2 1/2 war strategy of the 1960's.

The change in strategic concept has accompanied the reduction in the baseline general purpose forces. The principal change was the reduction in the number of active Army divisions from 16 1/3 in 1964 to 13 in 1973.

This strategic concept determines the overall requirement for general purpose forces. But the planning contingencies are what generate the specific demand for divisions, air wings, war reserve stocks, strategic mobility and naval forces. The two contingencies that constitute the main basis for force planning are:

- an attack on NATO by the nations of the Warsaw Pact, led by the USSR;
- an attack in either Northeast or Southeast Asia with the direct involvement of the forces of a major power.

Current defense planning also places increased emphasis on structuring flexible general purpose forces which, while retaining adequate capability for a NATO contingency, also have a capability to fight in other types of conflict and other regions of the world. Such flexibility in a portion of our forces is essential to support U.S. diplomacy and strategy in the uncertain international environment which exists now and will probably persist in the future.

U.S. general purpose forces also serve in peacetime by being stationed abroad in fulfillment of diplomatic commitments and to reassure allies of tangible and continuing U.S. support. In general, requirements for such forces are expected to be met by the forces maintained primarily for combat requirements.

PART B FORCES AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

INTRODUCTION

The summary of our strategy discussed in Chapter III provides the framework within which our forces are planned and evaluated. This part of the Report deals with those forces. Before dealing with the major forces in some detail, however, it is necessary to explain how force size and structure are determined. The first step in the planning-programming cycle is to derive a concise and specific set of defense planning criteria from the broad policies and national security objectives set forth by the President. For instance, it is not sufficient for force planning to state that U.S. policy is to insure the protection of Western Europe. In order for precise force programming to follow from the strategy, such details as the assumed length of pre-conflict mobilization must be specified.

The development of this amplified guidance is initiated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, through an iterative process with full participation of his military and civilian advisors, results in the Secretary of Defense approved Defense Policy and Planning Guidance. This guidance is then sent to the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Once provided with the policies, the JCS and Military Services participate in the force planning process in the following manner:

1. The threat is examined; detailed threat estimates are developed.
2. Against the threat, estimates are made of U.S. and allied forces needed to successfully defend against and thus deter an attack by a potential enemy (i.e., prevent him from being confident that he could achieve his objectives at acceptable cost).
3. The present and future forces and capabilities of our allies are then assessed.
4. U.S. forces and capabilities are also assessed.
5. The combined U.S.-allied capabilities are then compared with the threat and assessed as to adequacy.
6. U.S. force planning is adjusted, and coordinated with our allies such that the combined capabilities are adequate to achieve mutual objectives against the threat at a prudent level of risk.

The above steps are performed in an iterative fashion with cooperation among the National Security Council, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Services. The Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose, within the bounds of Secretary of Defense approved strategy, fiscal, and force planning criteria, the mix of forces which will best meet the national security goals. The Secretary of Defense reviews these proposals, using three central criteria: the contributions the forces make to the strategy; the possibility of tradeoffs to increase capability or reduce costs; and the tradeoffs among force structure, modernization, and readiness and support.

Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, and Auxiliary Forces can be viewed as the primary mission forces of the Department of Defense. Integrally related to these mission forces are the Mission Support Forces which provide the essential services and functions required for each mission force unit to operate effectively. Central Support Forces provide various kinds of essential support on a Service-wide basis rather than being tied to particular primary mission areas as is the case with mission support forces.

Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, Auxiliary Forces, Mission Support Forces, Central Support Forces and Individuals are treated as separate chapters. This has been done to facilitate discussion of manpower requirements in terms of how manpower resources are employed. It should be recognized, however, that support by whatever definition, cannot be programmed as a separate entity. Mission accomplishment is dependent on support, both in the short-run and the long-run. Support manpower cannot be treated as a lower priority resources that is less necessary to achieving national security objectives than mission force manpower.

CHAPTER IV

STRATEGIC FORCES

A. The Threat

The growth of the primary strategic threat to the United States -- the capability of the Soviet Union to deliver long-range nuclear weapons against targets in the United States -- has been a matter of grave concern to us. The Soviets have built up their ICBM forces at a rapid rate during the past several years, and they are completing construction of more silos and developing newer type missiles up to the limit of the Interim Agreement. Whether new or modified missiles will be deployed in these silos is not yet clear.

The Soviet ICBM threat is augmented by a substantial nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine fleet that is presently the fastest growing element of the strategic threat. The most numerous component of this fleet is the Y-class, which like the U.S. Polaris, has 16 tubes for launching missiles. A longer range submarine launched ballistic missile has been developed, and is expected to be deployed in the DELTA-class submarine. At the current production rate, the USSR will deploy within two years an operational force of Y-class and DELTA-class submarines larger in size than the current Polaris/Poseidon force.

The Soviet intercontinental heavy bomber force remains at around 140 aircraft (excluding about 50 tankers). Although we believe the Soviet bomber force is targeted primarily against the Eurasian area, we cannot ignore the fact that these aircraft could be employed in strikes against the United States. A new bomber, the Backfire, is undergoing flight tests, but its exact characteristics and future role have yet to be determined.

With regard to the strategic defensive forces of the Soviet Union, there is extensive deployment of aircraft defenses, as well as an ABM system deployed around Moscow. The Soviets have a large inventory of radars numbering in the thousands and a force of several thousand interceptor aircraft. There is a slight trend toward a reduction in the number of these interceptors, but the quality of the force has improved. Four new interceptors have been added since 1964, and these newer models make up a substantial part of the force. In addition, at least four different SAM systems are presently deployed for strategic air defense.

As for the strategic nuclear threat of the Peoples Republic of China, its progress toward achieving an ICBM capability is continuing. We cannot state with confidence just when China will have an ICBM capable of striking the continental United States, but it is estimated that deployment could not occur before 1976, with some 5-15 missiles being deployed by mid-1977.

B. Rationale for Strategic Forces

In planning strategic forces the primary interrelated roles are deterrence of aggression at all levels and, if necessary, appropriate employment if conflict occurs involving the vital interests of the United States. To fulfill our objectives in strategic force planning, we strive to maintain a reliable retaliatory force, placing emphasis on measures that both enhance survivability and assure our ability to penetrate defenses. In addition, we seek to provide reliable early warning capabilities to minimize the likelihood and consequences of surprise, and to provide an effective and reliable command and control system for all strategic forces.

The Strategic Arms Limitation (SAL) agreements, which consist of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms Limitations impose constraints on both the U.S. and the Soviet strategic forces. The ABM Treaty Limits ABM defenses to a low level. The Interim Agreement limits the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs the United States and USSR may have operational or under construction; bombers are not constrained. We must continue to rely on our strategic offensive forces to deter a Soviet nuclear attack. Since we rely on these forces for deterrence, we must insure that they are adequate to convince all potential aggressors that acts which could lead to nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail pose unacceptable risks to them.

Recent analyses of strategic force effectiveness indicate that planned strategic forces should continue to provide sufficient deterrence for the near term. We do have reliable and survivable strategic retaliatory forces, and their capabilities for retaliation today cannot be denied by nuclear attack.

C. Strategic Offensive Forces

The basis for our offensive force planning is the retaliatory capability of these forces. Our forces must be capable of absorbing a surprise Soviet first-strike and still be capable of achieving a decisive reduction of the enemy power and influence and to inhibit post attack recovery. To insure high-confidence in our second-strike capability, we plan a mix of mutually supporting forces: land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers. Such a force mix provides (1) assurance that a Soviet technological breakthrough against any one element will not negate the effectiveness of the entire force; (2) a hedge against failures of any element; (3) a compounding of Soviet offensive and defensive problems in attempting to defeat or defend against U.S. forces; and (4) reinforcement of the viability of each element by the presence of the other, thereby strengthening the credibility of the total deterrent posture and flexible range of attack options.

Land-based missiles have a high alert rate, quick response capability, reliable command and control, and the capability to cover a broad range of targets.

Sea-based missiles are expected to survive through dispersion and concealment. They pose a threat from several directions with their capability to penetrate defenses as enhanced by a short time of flight. They are capable of extending responses over a long period of time because of their high survivability at sea.

Bombers can be launched under positive control, maintain airborne alert for extended periods, deliver large payloads with the accuracy needed to destroy hard targets, restrike targets as necessary, and provide damage assessment of earlier strikes. Continued high survivability of the bomber force is expected with the implementation of "quick start," the B-1, and through the Satellite Basing Program. These programs, designed to counter the potential Soviet SLBM threat, emphasize the concept of reduced reaction time, greater flyaway speed and dispersal of the bomber/tanker force thereby complicating any Soviet attack against bomber bases. Additionally, this dispersal reduces the numbers of alert aircraft at some locations (consequently reducing the numbers of aircraft using the same runway) thereby allowing the total alert force to be launched in a shorter period of time. Bombers also can perform tasks in non-nuclear war, as evidenced by their recent bombing role in Southeast Asia.

We are continuing the program to deploy MIRVs in our Minuteman and Poseidon missiles. Should part of our missile force be unexpectedly degraded by Soviet preemptive action, the increased number of warheads provided by the remaining MIRV missiles will insure that we have sufficient warheads to attack essential targets in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the MIRV program gives us a high confidence hedge against violations or abrogation of the ABM treaty.

Although we are continuing development work on three new strategic offensive systems, the Trident submarine and missile, the B-1 manned bomber, and the advanced ICBM they will not be deployed in FY 75 and no operational manpower is provided for them.

As shown in the following table, strategic offensive forces remain essentially the same during the period FY 73-75, with the exception of the B-52 fleet which is programmed to be reduced slightly in FY 75, because of aircraft aging and budgeting constraints:

	<u>FY 1973</u>	<u>FY 1974</u>	<u>FY 1975</u>
<u>Strategic Offensive Forces</u>			
Bombers:			
B-52 (UE) ^{a/}	397	372	330
FB-111 (UE) ^{a/}	66	66	66
KC-135 (UE) ^{a/}	615	615	615
Missiles:			
Titan II	54	54	54
Minuteman	1,000	1,000	1,000
Polaris/Poseidon	656	656	656
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN)	41	41	41
<u>Active Manpower (000s)</u>			
<u>Military</u>			
Navy	18	18	18
Air Force	71	72	68
Total	<u>89</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>86</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>			
Navy	1	1	1
Air Force	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>

a/ Unit Equipment (UE) is the basis for manning aircraft squadrons.
 — This is less than the Total Active Inventory (TAI), which will remain level from FY 73 through FY 75 except for attrition.

D. Strategic Defense, Control and Surveillance Forces

1. Ballistic Missile Defense

In light of the reduced emphasis on ballistic missile defense as a result of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the deployment and operating costs of the Safeguard system are being minimized. The system is now being deployed in the vicinity of Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota for limited defense of the land-based retaliatory forces. We are continuing R&D on all types of missile defense at a pace adequate to maintain our technological base and to preserve future options.

2. Air Defense

Planning for CONUS air defense underwent a major change during the past year, and air defense forces are being adjusted accordingly. Emphasis on defense against a strategic bomber attack is being reduced and effort is being directed to the missions of providing warning of a bomber attack and peacetime airspace surveillance and control. In times of crisis, CONUS air defenses will be augmented with general purpose and training resources in CONUS for defense of the U. S. We will continue to pursue a broadly-based R&D program to maintain our technological capabilities in air defense and preserve future options.

3. Missile Warning and Space Systems

Early warning of a ballistic missile attack will continue to depend primarily on the satellite early warning system. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars, SLBM detection and warning radars and the "forward-scatter" Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar system will continue to provide back-up support through FY 75.

Information essential to understanding foreign space activities will continue to be provided by the existing USAF Spacetrack system and the Navy's SPASUR system, both of which are tied into the North American Air Defense Command and supported by the Space Defense Center for continuous monitoring of foreign and domestic space activities.

4. Command and Control

The Advanced Airborne Command Post program, initiated in FY73 will be continued. In addition, development will continue on other programs for both Air Force and the Navy to further improve command and control of our strategic nuclear forces.

The programmed forces and manpower for the strategic defensive, control and surveillance missions are shown below:

	<u>FY 1973</u>	<u>FY 1974</u>	<u>FY 1975</u>
<u>Strategic Defensive, Control and Surveillance Forces</u>			
<u>Interceptor Squadrons</u>			
Active Air Force	7	7	6
Air National Guard	20	19	14
<u>Surface-to-Air Missile Batteries/ Squadrons</u>			
Active Army	21	21	0
Army National Guard	27	27	0
Ballistic Missile Defense Sites	0	0	1
<u>Active Manpower (000s)</u>			
<u>Military</u>			
Army	6	5	1
Navy	1	1	1
Air Force	<u>28</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>27</u>
Total	35	34	29
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	6	6	2
Navy	*	*	*
Air Force	7	7	7
Defense Agencies	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	14	14	10

*Indicates less than 500 spaces

E. Manpower Requirements for Strategic Forces

The manpower required by each Service for the strategic forces discussed above is presented in this section. In addition, a more detailed view is provided of the components of the strategic forces for each Service, and the methodology the Service use to compute the manpower required for those components is discussed.

1. Air Force Manpower Requirements

Air Force strategic offensive forces are a mixture of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles assigned to the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to prevent nuclear war through its ability to deliver this nuclear firepower to any part of the world, even if subjected to surprise attack. SAC also has the capability of delivering conventional (nonnuclear) weapons with its aircraft. To perform these missions, there are 23 B-52 squadrons composed of 330 unit equipment (UE) aircraft; 4 FB-111 squadrons composed of 66 UE aircraft; Short Range Attack Missiles; 38 KC-135 tanker squadrons with a UE of 615 aircraft; 6 Titan missile squadrons with a UE of 54 missiles; and 20 Minuteman squadrons with a UE of 1,000 missiles.

Strategic offensive force manpower includes the aircraft/missile crews, the organizational and field maintenance personnel (depot maintenance is included in the Logistics category), weapons system security personnel, and munitions maintenance personnel required to support the weapons systems. Also included are the personnel required to man the necessary command posts and mission planning functions of the squadrons and wings and the squadron and wing staffs who perform such functions as staff intelligence, unit training, flying safety, command and administration. See the Tactical Air Force section for a description of how the manning factors are derived.

Strategic defensive forces contain the aircraft and radars in the Aerospace Defense Command supported by the Air National Guard. These forces are required for surveillance and control of air space. To perform this mission we will reduce to a force of six active Air Force and six Air National Guard F-106 squadrons, two ANG F-102 squadrons, and six ANG F-101 squadrons during FY 75. The ground environment systems include 8 Region Control Centers, 2 back-up interceptor control centers, 5 manual NORAD control centers, and 102 Surveillance radar sites of which the Air Force mans all but 28 located in Canada. There are also 8 FAA/USAF joint use radar sites and 3 ANG radar sites used for strategic defense. Thirty-one Distant Early Warning (DEW) stations are manned primarily by contractor personnel.

The manpower for defensive forces includes the crews, the organizational and field maintenance personnel (depot maintenance is included in the Logistics category), weapons system security, and munitions maintenance personnel required to support the aircraft and missile systems. For the ground environment systems, manpower is required to operate and maintain authorized equipment as well as to perform some 60 functions directly associated with the system. For example, in the case of surveillance radar alone, manpower is needed to perform such functions as command, administration, radar operations, radar maintenance, radio maintenance, crypto maintenance, etc. Personnel are also required to man the wing and squadron staffs as discussed in the offensive forces section

Strategic control and surveillance forces are a mixture of strategic offensive and defensive detection, tracking, control, communications, and surveillance systems. Although the equipment and manpower for these forces are addressed separately, they are an integral part of our offensive and defensive forces. Control and surveillance (C&S) forces consist of the following aircraft: 1 squadron of SR-71s for reconnaissance; 28 Post Attack Command and Control System (PACCS) aircraft which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communication relay, and launch control centers, and 3 E-4A aircraft which are the National Emergency Airborne Command post aircraft located at Andrews AFB, MD. The ground environment includes the NORAD Combat Operations Center in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs which is the nerve center for aerospace defense of the North American Continent; 3 Ballistic Missile Early Warning sites; 8 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Detection and Warning sites; 7 SPACETRACK sites consisting of radars and Baker-Nunn cameras, including the FPS-85 phased array radar at Eglin AFB, FLA; 9 Over-the-Horizon Radar sites with transmitters in the Pacific and receivers in Europe; the ground data system for the satellite early warning program and portions of the national military command and control system. Finally, C&S forces include communications and command and control support equipment associated with the Strategic Air Command forces.

The methodology for determining the various elements of C&S manpower varies widely because of the numerous one-of-a-kind systems identified above. However, the Air Force Management Engineering Program, described in the Support Requirements Chapter, provides a range of manpower measurement alternatives which can be tailored to determine manpower requirements for each of these systems. For example, the manpower associated with the aircraft is based on force levels and activity rates in a manner similar to that described in the Tactical Air Forces section. The ground environment manpower requirements generally are based on equipment authorized and positions which must be manned, taking into account the many associated variables such as contractor support, internal support, climatic conditions and fatigue.

Illustrative of the types of functions which are performed by C&S personnel is the operation of the Eglin AFB FPS-85 phased array radar. Radar operations functions include, but are not limited to : computer operations and maintenance; satellite object identification and analyses; radar operations and maintenance; communications operations and maintenance; and refrigeration/air conditioning.

The Air Force manpower requirements shown in the following table reflect the impact of the reductions in the strategic offensive forces; the loss of one F-106 squadron in FY 75 with the associated restructuring of the dispersed operating bases; and the reduction of six EC-121s.

Strategic Forces

		<u>Air Force Manpower (000s)</u>		
		<u>FY 1973</u>	<u>FY 1974</u>	<u>FY 1975</u>
Military		99	100	95
Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)		<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>
	Total	107	109	102

The strategic manpower totals shown above represent the number of primary mission personnel directly employed in carrying out the Air Force strategic mission. Civilians in strategic forces are administrative personnel and small numbers of maintenance specialists assigned to combat units. There are, of course, substantial numbers of personnel required in a direct mission support role who are involved in the daily operation of strategic aircraft. These requirements are discussed in detail in the Mission Support Forces Chapter.

2. Navy Manpower Requirements

Navy strategic offensive forces consist primarily of the 41 Polaris/Poseidon ballistic missile submarines and their five supporting tenders. Also included are support personnel who provide technical assistance, material support, and program management.

The ships are manned on the basis of the operating, maintenance, and administrative workloads to which Navy manning criteria are applied. The average funded manpower is 24 officers and 250 enlisted men (12 officers and 125 men in each of the two crews for an SSBN). Reduced manpower authorizations are also provided for SSBN's in overhaul or conversion, for that portion of the planned work which is to be accomplished by the crew.

Given these standard factors, the manpower requirements for strategic forces are computed as follows:

<u>Type of Ship</u>	<u>Average Manning Factor</u>	<u>No. of Units</u>	<u>Total Manpower (000s)</u>
SSBN <u>a/</u>	269	41	11.0
Tenders (AS) <u>a/</u>	1,167	5	5.8

a/ Includes active ships and those in overhaul/conversion. Submarines in overhaul/conversion are manned at different levels than active submarines.

Additional personnel are needed to man the support craft (e.g., floating drydocks) and other related activities (e.g., Atlantic Fleet Polaris Material Office).

Strategic control and surveillance forces consist primarily of nine SPASUR sites and 12 TACAMO aircraft (EC-130GQ).

In the Navy Strategic forces, approximately 1,200 civilians are employed in the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) programs in activities of the Strategic Systems Project Office and Naval Ships Systems Command. Approximately 500 are involved in technical management of the FBM effort. These include engineering/technical specialists in such areas as fire control and guidance systems, test and operations, quality assurance and evaluation, and configuration management; financial management and planning personnel; facilities managers; contract negotiators; and general administrative and clerical support personnel. Another 500 civilian personnel are engaged in administration of contracts on-site at contractor plants. The remaining 200 civilians are engaged in missile test and evaluation, and in operating the FBM navigational satellite system.

Navy civilians in strategic defensive programs provide administrative, scientific, technical, and engineering support for the SPASUR satellite tracking and identification system and a number of classified improved communications systems for FBM Command and Control. Civilian staffing is largely determined by technical requirements, the stage of project development, and level of maintenance and repair required for existing systems.

<u>Navy Strategic Forces Manpower (000s)</u>			
	<u>FY 1973</u>	<u>FY 1974</u>	<u>FY 1975</u>
Active Military	19	19	19
Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)	1	1	1

3. Army Manpower Requirements

As a result of a review of military operations to bring about greater efficiency and reduced costs, CONUS surface to air missile defense against manned bomber attack will be phased out by end FY 1975. Army manpower continues to be required in air defense command and control elements for planning and contingency purposes. Military and civilian personnel requested in FY 75 for the SAFEGUARD and Site Defense programs will provide for the manning, installation and test, and support of the Grand Forks, SAFEGUARD site and the continuation of the Site Defense Prototype Demonstration Program. The phased decrease in total personnel reflects the decision that SAFEGUARD is a one-site program, whereas the requested increase in military personnel provides for the tactical manning of this site. Both military and civilian personnel requested in FY 75 will be engaged in the following activities: analysis and feasibility studies to insure that Site Defense system components provide optimum protection against current and future threats; development of coordinated test plans for SAFEGUARD and Site Defense; determination of requirements and specifications for Site Defense test targets; execution of the assigned procurement and production programs for the SAFEGUARD program; conduct of the SAFEGUARD activation program at tactical sites; develop budget supporting data; conduct of the SAFEGUARD and Site Defense configuration management, cost effectiveness, value engineering, product assurance, standardization and safety programs; development of logistic support procedures for the SAFEGUARD deployment; monitor the overall environmental impact of the SAFEGUARD System and the Site Defense programs; and continue evaluation of the SAFEGUARD and Site Defense programs.

Army manpower required for Strategic Forces is shown in the table below:

Army Strategic Forces Manpower (000s)

	<u>FY 1973</u>	<u>FY 1974</u>	<u>FY 1975</u>
Active Military	6	5	1
Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)	6	6	2

CHAPTER V

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

The role of our General Purpose Forces is, together with the forces of our allies, to deter war and to defend allied territory and repel the aggressor if conflict occurs. Ready and deployable General Purpose Forces in peacetime have significant value in deterring war. The size and mix of General Purpose Forces are predicated upon two policy judgments which have been in effect for many years: (1) the security of the United States and protection of our vital interests require forces for forward deployment and forward defense; and (2) strategic nuclear forces, in and of themselves, cannot be relied upon to provide a credible deterrent or a reasonable response to the entire spectrum of aggression which we must be prepared to face.

Our General Purpose Forces are sized so that the United States will be prepared for an initial defense of NATO Europe or a joint defense in Asia against PRC aggression, while providing forces for lesser contingencies and a strategic reserve. In our force planning, we do not attempt to build forces to meet all possible contingencies or to become engaged in numerous different areas simultaneously. By sizing our forces to meet certain major threats, we expect to be able to handle lesser threats with these same forces. The two major areas of concern, and of greatest potential threat, are in NATO Europe and Asia.

A. The Threat in Europe and Asia and U.S. Conventional Strategy to Meet it

1. NATO

Our NATO commitment to the common defense of Western Europe is one of the most significant factors in determining the size of our land tactical air and naval forces. Based on extensive analysis, three successive Presidents have concluded that an initial conventional defense of Western Europe against a full scale conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact is essential to our own security interests. Such a defense remains feasible only with substantial numbers of U.S. forces stationed in Europe, backed up by adequate reinforcement and resupply capability.

The USSR and other Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO are maintained in forward areas with most forces immediately ready for combat. From a Warsaw Pact point of view, these forces are designed to blunt a NATO attack and then seize the initiative. Additional objectives are the

maintenance of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and keeping political pressure on Western Europe. While these forces pose a substantial military threat to NATO, a war is not presently considered likely in Europe. This is based upon our assessment that the Soviets should be deterred from attacking NATO because the present capabilities of NATO's conventional and theater nuclear forces are sufficient to create substantial risk of failure of such an attack to achieve major gains.

a. The Warsaw Pact Threat

While we do not consider aggression by the USSR likely in the present political climate, it is apparent that the politico-economic assumption that the Soviets have a vital interest in preserving the status quo in Central Europe and in retaining their hold on Eastern Europe. A crisis that could lead to a conflict could arise if the political situation substantially changed in a way which threatened the USSR or its hegemony over Eastern Europe, or if a Soviet government saw opportunities for other ways to apply critical pressures on the cohesion of the Alliance. Such a crisis could escalate to hostilities.

Whatever the immediate cause, the crisis could trigger mobilization and hostilities by the Pact and NATO.

b. NATO Conventional Defense

NATO, with the current U.S. contribution, has an adequate conventional capability. This capability will be enhanced significantly if the force improvement actions in progress or under consideration by each of the NATO countries are completed.

If NATO is to deter the Warsaw Pact from judging that offensive military action, or the threat of such action, is an attractive option during a period of political crisis, the NATO forces must possess a total capability to provide an effective defense. There is no major weakness in the NATO posture; the Warsaw Pact cannot realistically assume that the initiation of hostilities is an attractive means of achieving some political objective. The current deployment of NATO forces is considered adequate to deny the Warsaw Pact high confidence that a Pact

attack in the Central Region ^{1/} would be successful. Finally, the Soviet Navy provides the USSR with the capability to support Soviet initiatives on the northern and southern sea flanks of NATO and to threaten the vital sea lanes to Western Europe. The combined U.S. and Allied navies protect the northern sea flanks. Our two deployed aircraft carriers and our land-based air forces, together with NATO naval forces, provide the deterrent to the Soviet naval threat in the Mediterranean.

c. U.S. and Allied Cooperation in NATO

Despite the strain occasioned by differing national interests in the Middle East, the past year has been one of considerable stability in Europe, with expanded cooperation within the NATO Alliance. The Alliance defense has been put on its most solid footing in many years as a result of the NATO Alliance Defense Study (AD-70) efforts, the desire of the Europeans to show that they are definitely shouldering more of the NATO defense burden, and our own efforts to improve the readiness of our forces in Europe. The Total Force Planning Concept is working in NATO. In addition, NATO is involved in a number of diplomatic initiatives toward detente in Europe. The most prominent of these has been MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions). The Department of Defense has played an important role in NATO studies and discussions of MBFR.

That our efforts have been reasonably successful in the past year is, however, no reason for complacency. The common coordinated force improvement must be sustained, because we see no slackening of Warsaw Pact defense efforts.

The NATO AD-70 program continued this past year. Ministers of Defense endorsed the priority areas which had been proposed to them for the further implementation of AD-70 recommendations. Both U.S. and Allied improvements are to be directed into these areas, which include war reserve stocks, aircraft shelters and anti-tank weapons. During the next year, we will continue our discussions of the most efficient and cooperative ways to introduce improvements in these and other areas.

d. Negotiations

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) formally began on July 3, 1973, and is now into its working phase. Formal MBFR negotiations with the Warsaw Pact began on October 30, 1973 in Vienna.

^{1/} The allied countries that contribute to the Central Region include West Germany, BENELUX, United Kingdom, United States, and Canada. The "Southern Flank" is comprised of Italy, Greece, and Turkey, while the "Northern Flank" is Denmark, Norway and Iceland.

Our objective for MBFR is to maintain a stable military balance at lower levels of forces while maintaining undiminished Alliance security.

As we proceed into MBFR talks, it is important that we and our Allies maintain and improve our forces. Any unilateral force reductions or degradation in force strengths will undermine the negotiating position of the Alliance and the opportunity to achieve mutual East-West force reductions. Force improvements programs should continue to go forward before, during, and after MBFR negotiations.

e. Burdensharing

The President has stated that the most important form of NATO burdensharing is Allied force improvements in support of total NATO strategy. However, the Jackson-Nunn Amendment to the FY 74 Armed Service Procurement Bill, as reflected in Section 812 of P.L. 93-155, broadened this traditional concept to include financial assistance. The Amendment requires the Allies to offset U.S. defense expenditures entering the International Balance of Payments in Europe during FY 74, as the result of the deployment of forces in Europe in fulfillment of the treaty commitments and obligations of the United States. Failure to do so would require us to withdraw a percentage of U.S. forces in Europe equal to the percentage by which offset is not provided.

The U.S. has initiated two proposals aimed at satisfying the Jackson-Nunn requirement. First, we are negotiating a new bilateral two-year offset agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany for FY 74-75. A satisfactory agreement should be concluded during the first quarter of CY 1974. Second, we have asked the other NATO Allies to establish a multilateral formula to offset U.S. defense expenditures not covered by a U.S.-FRG bilateral agreement. The NATO Ministers discussed this issue during the December Defense Planning Committee meeting and the Permanent Representatives are giving further attention on possible solutions.

f. Allied Improvement Efforts

Our NATO Allies are fulfilling their end of the bargain whereby the United States would maintain and improve its forces in Europe, given a similar approach by them.

For the year 1974, almost all of our Allies are planning increases in their defense budgets above the 1973 level. Our Allies in the last few years have also taken important steps to modernize the structure and equipment of their forces. These steps are in consonance with the priorities established in the AD-70 study.

The European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) of \$1 billion over five years, announced in December 1970, is being implemented and is on schedule. Most of the total program of aircraft survival measures (i. e., sheltering and other facilities) is already the subject of definite NATO programming and implementing action.

Our Allies have made clear that the maintenance of their force levels and their extensive improvement programs are worthwhile because of the continued U. S. commitment to NATO defense; the high quality of U. S. forces and the critical part they play in NATO defense plans, as well as their link with U. S. nuclear deterrent power. Our Allies have also made clear that efforts to achieve sufficient defense capabilities is a necessary corollary to realistic negotiations on security and cooperation in Europe.

a. Improvements to U. S. Forces in Europe

The United States is continuing in FY 75 the strong effort it initiated in FY 74 to maintain and improve its forces in Europe. Units are now and will remain in FY 75 close to 100% of authorized manning. Perhaps of even greater importance is the fact that the turnover of personnel in our Army units has eased, thus reducing turbulence. In addition, we are continuing to improve combat readiness of U. S. units in Europe through increased training, enhanced equipment maintenance, and better facilities.

Modernization of the equipment of U. S. forces is also progressing well. We will continue to make significant improvements in our anti-armor capabilities. The TOW anti-tank guided missile and the smaller Dragon missiles will be introduced in significant numbers. We are planning to introduce the M60A2 tank with stabilized guns and SHILLELAGH missile launchers with new laser range finder. Also, the stabilized gun turret will be mounted on all M60A1 tanks to provide a shoot while moving capability. Two additional LANCE missile battalions will be deployed this year as replacements for the Honest John rocket battalions.

Our tactical air forces are now composed of F-111 and F-4 aircraft. Most of the shelters authorized in the SHAPE Aircraft and Airfield Protection and the U. S. nationally-funded program have been completed. We are steadily increasing and improving our logistics stocks, and improving unit manning. The same kind of progress applies to our electronic warfare capability. Finally, we hope to further enhance force survivability by increasing the number of available dispersal bases to reduce wartime airbase loading, and are making progress in negotiations over the dispersed based locations.

2. Asia

The United States is a Pacific power. We have territories in the Western Pacific; we have significant economic interests in the region; and we are bound by common interests and treaty commitments to many nations in the area. However, unlike Europe where our allies face a common threat and are bound by a single treaty, our Asian allies face different threats, internal as well as external, and our treaty commitments in Asia are bilateral or involve small groups of allies (ANZUS and SEATO). In addition, those Asian allies who face the most immediate threats are among the developing nations and, therefore, rely heavily on United States economic and military aid. Finally, Japan -- the Asian nation most capable economically of assuming a portion of our defense burden -- is prevented by her constitution, by the political climate in Japan, and by the apprehensions of other Asian nations from assuming an expanded military role in Asia. Consequently, while we continue to encourage regional cooperation in Asia, progress in the near term will be largely confined to the economic and political spheres; as many of our allies will continue to rely heavily on the United States for defense assistance.

In Asia it has been our policy to develop the capability and commitment of Asian allies to assume a greater share of deterrence and defense against both internal and external threats. In doing this, our assistance programs have placed primary emphasis on developing the capability to meet first internal aggression and then external aggression by non-nuclear nations. Measures primarily intended to enhance allied capabilities in a joint defense against a PRC attack have a lower priority.

There has been a continued broadening of contacts between the PRC and other Asian nations, as the region adjusts to the less hostile attitudes which have prevailed in the last year. However, fighting continues in Cambodia and the talks between North Korea and South Korea seem stalemated for the present.

a. Asian Threats and Allied Capabilities

1. In Northeast Asia

The Threat. North Korea, the PRC and the USSR maintain large, well equipped, well trained forces which pose a threat to the ROK. Additionally, the USSR represents a potential threat to U.S. and allied maritime interest throughout the Pacific. In the present political climate of East West detente and Sino-Soviet hostility, we believe both the PRC and the USSR would see aggression as contrary to their interests. In addition, North Korea

could not sustain combat operations without support from one of these nations. The opening of talks between the two Korean governments gave both sides an incentive to avoid hostilities and might have lowered the risk of conflict resulting from miscalculation or overreaction. However, since the talks have stalemated, North Korea has raised tensions by threatening access to offshore islands.

Allied Capabilities. With our assistance, the South Koreans have developed a significant military capability especially in ground forces, which we now believe are adequate for defense against North Korea. In addition, South Korea continues to assume an increasing portion of the cost of its armed forces. They continue, however, to require our materiel assistance to accomplish the goals of the Five Year Korean Modernization Plan.

The current Japanese Five Year Defense Plan continues to improve the ability of the Japanese Self-Defense Force to defend the home islands, without developing an offensive capability which could contravene constitutional prohibitions and popular attitudes. The Japanese forces, of course, receive no financial assistance from the U.S. The Japanese forces do not have the capability to defeat a conventional attack on the home islands by the Soviet Union, and they cannot alone defend Japan's vital shipping from the Soviet submarine threat. On the other hand, we believe the Japanese forces probably are sufficient to contain a conventional attack on the home islands from North Korea or the PRC -- primarily because those two countries lack significant capability to project their forces across several hundred miles of ocean.

2. In Southeast Asia

The Threat. As in Northeast Asia, we consider PRC aggression in Southeast Asia to be unlikely. However, North Vietnam continues to pose a serious threat to South Vietnam and continues to support the communist insurgent forces in Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

Since the total withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from South Vietnam, the GVN has made an effort to improve the quality of its armed forces. These forces now appear capable of preventing a North Vietnamese takeover providing U.S. materiel support continues. Cambodian forces, however, are being severely tested by the communists and are, at best, capable only of reacting to communist initiatives. Continued U.S. materiel support is essential to Cambodia's survival. Thai forces are capable of coping with their present insurgent threat. Nevertheless, the overall situation in SEA remains unstable and dictates continued retention of U.S. forces and bases in Southeast Asia.

b. U. S. Forces for Asia

We continue to maintain balanced, forward deployed ground, air, and naval forces in the Asian theater to serve as deterrent, to reassure our allies, and to provide an initial response if deterrence fails. The political considerations which impact on the U.S. presence in Asia, and especially in Korea, are obviously complex and have assumed increased relative importance. We currently plan to provide materiel, logistics, and intelligence support and additional tactical air and naval support if needed for our Asian allies in contingencies not involving PRC or Soviet forces. We could provide a limited backup ground force capability should this prove necessary. We also maintain the capability to assist our allies with a full range of conventional forces against a PRC attack provided we are not fighting in Europe.

3. Sub-Theater Conflict, Contingencies, and Strategic Reserves

We must face the prospect that conflicts ranging from localized insurgency or guerrilla warfare to the attack by one neighbor against another using conventional arms will continue to threaten the security of certain of our allies through the 1970s. We classify such potential conflicts separately from large-scale conflicts directly involving the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, or the PRC. The U.S. also has other interests throughout the world which could be threatened and result in a sub-theater conflict. Therefore, a portion of our active forces are maintained at high readiness for such contingencies, while the remainder are planned to be responsive to the requirements of theater level conflicts.

B. Land Forces - Forces, Capabilities, Missions and Manpower

1. Summary of Forces

The following table summarizes land forces and manpower:

Land Force Levels

	<u>End- FY 73</u>		<u>End- FY 74</u>		<u>End-FY 75</u>	
	Support		Support		Support	
	<u>Div</u>	<u>Increments</u>	<u>Div</u>	<u>Increments</u>	<u>Div</u>	<u>Increments</u>
<u>Army</u>						
Active						
Deployed	5 1/3	8	5 1/3	8	5 1/3	8
CONUS/Hawaii	7 2/3	6	7 2/3	6	8	6 1/3
Reserve 1/	8	27 2/3	8	27 2/3	8	26
AUS (unmanned) 2/		1/3		1/3		2 1/3
Total Army	21	42	21	42	21 1/3	42 2/3
	<u>Div. Forces</u>		<u>Div. Forces</u>		<u>Div. Forces</u>	
<u>Marine Corps</u>						
Active						
Deployed		1		1		1
CONUS		2		2		2
Reserve		1/4		1/4		1/4
Total Marine Corps		4		4		4

1/ The mix of Active and Reserve units is determined by the mission of each unit, the readiness needed to fulfill that mission, the unit's peacetime location and the resources available. Support units which are not required in the early stages of mobilization are maintained in the Reserve Components or in the Army of the United States (unmanned).

2/ Army of the United States (AUS) units which are required to meet the strategy but which may be activated after M-Day and are provided no manpower in peacetime.

Land Forces Manpower (000s)

<u>Active Military Land Forces Manpower (000s)</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Army	435	433	450
Navy	2	2	3
Marine Corps	75	77	85
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	39	39	43

The FY 75 Land Forces levels shown above include the combined arms organizations shown in the following table:

Combined Arms Organizations in Land Forces End FY 75

	<u>Army</u> <u>Active</u>	<u>Army</u> <u>Reserve</u>	<u>National</u> <u>Guard</u>	<u>Marine</u> <u>Active</u>	<u>Marine</u> <u>Reserve</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Divisions</u>						
Armored	4		2			6
Mechanized	4		1			5
Infantry	2 $\frac{2}{3}$ ^{a/}		5	3	1	11 $\frac{2}{3}$
Airmobile	1					1
Airborne	1					1
Total	12 $\frac{2}{3}$	—	8	3	1	24 $\frac{2}{3}$
<u>Separate Brigades b/</u>						
Armored			3			3
Mechanized	1 $\frac{c/$	1	6			8
Infantry	3	2	8			13
Air Cavalry	1 $\frac{c/$					1
Total	5	3	17	—	—	25
<u>Armd Cavalry Regts 3</u>						
			4			7

a/ The 29th Infantry Brigade (Hawaii National Guard) is designated to round out the 25th Infantry Division.

b/ The 194th Armored Brigade (active) and the 33rd Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard) are provided for school support and are not included in this table showing the composition of Land Forces; manpower for these units is in the Central Support category.

c/ Counts as one-third division.

2. Capabilities of Land Forces. Land Forces are subdivided into two subcategories: Division Forces and Theater Forces. Division Forces comprise the combat divisions and the additional combat and support units required in the theater of operations to sustain the combat operations of the divisions. Division Forces provide the bulk of the combat power to wage land combat in the potential theaters of major warfare. Land combat capability is described in terms of Division Force Equivalents (DFE). Each DFE represents an Army or Marine division, additional combat units, and support units. A single DFE is established for the Army at 48,000 structure spaces. This planning factor provides discipline to the system of designing land forces, precludes unwarranted growth of support units, and provides a constraint against which combat power can be maximized. The idea is to design each division force, and the division forces in total, to obtain maximum deliverable combat power possible. Maximum

deliverable combat power depends on the provision of sufficient support to assure that the combat units can function at their intended levels of output. Too little support will decrease combat power. Theater Forces comprise the combat and support units required in the theater of operations to accomplish missions other than conventional land combat.

a. Army Division Forces.

(1) The Army division is a combined arms organization which includes under a single commander all combat arms (infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation) and some of the support (engineer, signal, supply, transportation, maintenance, and administration) to fight a battle. The Army division consists of about 16,000 men. It includes from 10 to 15 maneuver battalions and four artillery battalions. There are several types of Army divisions; each is designed for a particular role on the battlefield.

Characteristics of Typical Army Divisions

	<u>Objective Mix of Maneuver Battalions</u>				<u>Full TOE Strength</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
	<u>Inf</u>	<u>Mech</u>	<u>Tank</u>	<u>Total</u>		
Armored		5	6	11	16,558	Shock Power in attack
Mechanized		6	4	10	16,267	Mobile Defense or attack
Infantry	8	1	1	10	16,572	All-around capability
Airborne	9		1	10	14,890	Parachute assault; strategic mobility
Airmobile	9			9	17,729	Battlefield mobility

(2) The division cannot operate alone in the theater of war; additional combat units and support units are necessary to allow the division forces to operate against the foe at their intended level of combat power. Divisions are part of the larger structure of the theater of war, which includes army corps and theater army headquarters as higher command levels. Support units, over and above those organic to the divisions, are in the corps and theater organizations. Additional combat units are also in the corps and theater organizations. These additional combat and support units comprise the support increments of the DFE.

(3) Only about sixty percent of the combat power of the division forces is included in the combat divisions themselves. Other combat power is found in the following organizations.

(a) Separate combat brigades are combined arms organizations similar to divisions, except that they are smaller. A separate brigade includes from three to five maneuver battalions and one artillery battalion. Infantry, mechanized, and armored brigades differ by battalion mix. Separate brigades may be employed to provide rear area protection, economy of force in a quiet sector, flank protection, or defense against an attack. A separate brigade may be attached to a division or employed separately under a corps commander.

(b) The air cavalry combat brigade is a new combined arms organization which includes attack helicopters, air cavalry, and air-mobile infantry. The air cavalry combat brigade exploits the capabilities of armed and transport helicopters in land warfare.

(c) The armored cavalry regiment is a combined arms organization consisting of infantry, tank, artillery, and reconnaissance elements integrated at squadron (battalion) level. An air cavalry troop is also included in each regiment. The armored cavalry regiment is designed for such roles as reconnaissance, flank protection, and screening the divisions and brigades.

(d) Separate artillery battalions comprise about one-half the total artillery of the division forces. This non-divisional artillery includes air defense and missile battalions as well as cannon artillery.

(4) The actual conduct of the land campaign is accomplished by the army corps. A corps is a flexible organization which may consist of three to five divisions, one or two separate brigades, one or two armored cavalry regiments, corps artillery, combat engineer and signal units, and a corps support command. The corps support command provides supply, maintenance, transportation, and administrative support.

(5) Support for the one or more corps engaged in a campaign is provided by a theater army support command (TASCOM), which includes engineer, signal, maintenance, transportation, supply, and administrative units. The TASCOM may also include combat units (e.g., separate brigades) if the lines of communication must be protected. The corps and the TASCOM report to the theater army headquarters.

(6) For planning purposes the DFE is divided into the division itself and two support increments. The two support increments in each DFE provide for the corps and TASCOM units needed behind each division in the theater of operations. Each increment is planned at roughly 16,000 structure spaces. The support is divided into two increments to assist in determining which part must be active and which can be in the reserve components or unmanned. Generally, one support increment must accompany the division to the theater of operations to provide combat and support units needed at the start of combat. Another support increment, consisting generally of the same types of units, is needed later on to provide the capability for sustained operations.

b. Marine Division Forces.

(1) The Marine Division force is similar to the Army Division force, allowing for the unique mission and concept of employment for the Marine Corps. The National Security Act of 1947 as amended assigns the Marine Corps the mission of providing "... Fleet Marine Forces or combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign". The Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) is the basic element for the conduct of amphibious operations or land operations ashore. The typical MAF consists of a Marine division, a Marine Aircraft Wing, and supporting elements from force troops.

(2) The Marine division is an infantry division configured specially for amphibious operations; its strength is about 18,000 structure spaces. It includes nine infantry battalions and four artillery battalions. It also includes special units designed to facilitate amphibious operations.

(3) The Marine Aircraft Wing is an integral part of the MAF and operates in conjunction with a division. Close integration of land and tactical air capabilities is an essential ingredient of the Marine Corps capability for amphibious operations. The manpower associated with the fixed-wing portion of the Marine Air Wings is in the tactical air forces category.

(4) Force troops provide additional combat and support units needed to sustain the operations of the division and air wing. Added combat units include tank, amphibious tractor, and artillery battalions. Support units, including a force service regiment, provide transportation, supply, maintenance, and administrative support.

(5) The division and force troops together comprise a division and one support increment under the DFE concept. An additional support increment may be considered as coming from the Navy, which provides construction, medical, and supply support for Marine forces afloat or ashore.

c. Special Mission Forces. There are four subcategories of Theater Forces.

(1) Theater Missile Forces include the surface-to-surface missile units and supporting ammunition supply and maintenance units which provide the theater commander a responsive theater nuclear capability. (The Division Forces also include a nuclear capability because they include dual-capable units which can wage either conventional or nuclear combat.)

(2) Theater Air Defense Forces include surface-to-air missile units and supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units devoted to the theater-wide air defense mission under the control of the theater commander.

(3) Theater Special Operations Forces include units devoted to special missions including psychological operations, civil affairs support, and unconventional warfare on a theater-wide basis under control of the theater commander.

(4) Theater Defense Forces include active and Reserve units provided for the defense of selected critical areas: Alaska, Berlin, Panama Canal Zone, Iceland, and the Caribbean. Provision of specific units for these essential defense missions achieves economies by allowing the units to be tailored for their missions and precludes diversion of Division Forces units from the main theaters in the event of war. The following shows the allocation of these forces:

End FY 75 Theater Defense Forces

	<u>Infantry Brigades</u>	
	<u>Active</u>	<u>Reserve</u>
Alaska	1	1
Panama	1	1
Berlin	1	-
Iceland	-	1
Caribbean	-	1
Total	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>

3. Regional Missions for Land Forces

a. NATO

The most demanding contingency for U.S. land forces is in NATO Europe. Our land force requirements are largely determined by planning for U.S. and Allied conventional forces which, after a period of warning and mobilization, would be able to defend NATO Europe against a mobilized conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact. We plan to continue in FY 75 land force deployments to Europe at their FY 74 level of approximately 198,000.

A large number of Warsaw Pact divisions located in Eastern Europe could be committed against NATO forces. These divisions are predominantly tank or motorized divisions and most are maintained in a high state of readiness. In the event of a major conflict with the Warsaw Pact we plan on deploying many of our active divisions. The length of the NATO frontage to be defended, the European terrain and road network, and the size and high degree of mechanization in Pact forces all combine to make possible rapid advances by attacking forces. For this reason, the early arrival of large U.S. reinforcements is critical to a successful defense of NATO Europe.

b. Asia

We do not plan for the long term to maintain separate large U.S. ground combat forces specifically oriented to Asia. If a large land war involving the United States should occur in Asia, we would be prepared to mobilize, and would initially use our non-NATO-committed forces and, if required, portions of the forces based in the United States and earmarked for NATO. In the future, we expect the emphasis in Asia more and more to be placed on U.S. support to our allies who themselves will provide the required ground forces manpower.

4. Determination of Manpower Requirements. Based on the forces and missions described above, the Army and Marine Corps determine manpower requirements as follows:

a. Active Army

The Army's active manpower requirements begin with a determination of the number of division forces necessary to support the national strategy as detailed by the Planning and Programming Guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. This determination involves a multi-year planning process in which the Army evaluates its needs versus those resources which can realistically be made available and attempts to achieve the optimum balance in its program which will allow achieving the national strategy with a minimum risk. Once the number of division forces the Army can afford has been determined, those divisions must be provided a sustaining capability in the form of support units.

The number and type of support units behind a division varies. However, as explained earlier in this chapter, the Army uses 16,000 manpower spaces for each support increment as a planning factor when designing each division force, i.e., one division plus two support increments.

In the design of an individual division force such factors as type division, probable employment, and intended missions are considered. Units deemed necessary to provide the essential capabilities in support of the division are selected based on these factors. These units include combat units such as: separate infantry, mechanized or armored battalions, armored cavalry regiments, artillery battalions, surface to surface missile units, and separate air defense units. Aviation battalions which afford additional mobility; engineer battalions for barrier construction and river crossing capability; signal support and maintenance units; military police units; direct and general support maintenance units; ammunition storage units, supply and service units, medical evacuation and hospitalization units, petroleum storage units, transportation units and the command control units necessary to organize and direct the efforts of the force are essential to the divisions in a sustained combat environment.

The development of manpower requirements for each of these individual Army units is accomplished and documented through one of two separate but related management systems - the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) system and Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). Both the TOE and TDA system are governed by definitive analytical techniques for the development of manpower and equipment requirements.

The TOE system governs the development and processing of the complete organizational manual for a standard type unit for the Army. The TOE provides specific organizational data required for organizing, equipping and training a type TOE unit for accomplishing its specified mission. The manpower requirements for a TOE type unit are determined essentially as follows:

- a. The mission and desired capabilities of the TOE are determined and the functional entities required to assure mission accomplishment, e.g., firing sections, rifle squads, maintenance teams, mess teams, are identified.

- b. The number of combat type positions required in a TOE are dictated by the firepower desired or number of weapons included. Each weapon has a set number of operators, i.e., one man per rifle in rifle squad, and nine men per field artillery firing section (105mm). Rifle teams or firing sections are aggregated to produce the desired combat capability.

c. The number of personnel required for service and support activities (mess, maintenance, etc.) are determined by application of standard staffing criteria. These criteria are based on engineering data, tests, and experience. For instance, the criteria for mechanical equipment maintenance is expressed in terms of annual maintenance manhours (AMMH) required per item of equipment. The number of such equipment is multiplied by the appropriate AMMH factors, and the results are totaled and divided by a standard manhour availability factor to determine the number of maintenance personnel required.

d. Leadership and supervisory positions are added based on span of control considerations and other experience data.

For example, a table of organization for Field Artillery 155mm firing battery with six howitzers consists of the following:

Field Artillery 155mm (T)
Firing Battery - CONUS

<u>Functional Area</u>	<u>Spaces</u>
Battery Hqs (Admin, Mess, Maint, etc.)	16
Firing Battery Hqs (Opns, Fire Control)	14
Six Howitzer Sections	66
Ammunition Section	9
Communications Section	<u>6</u>
Battery Total	111

Aggregate service support requirements (i. e., maintenance and supply) are determined for units within the force (both within the divisions and support increments) and additional units assigned to the force based on these requirements. For example 155mm ammunition for the cited Field Artillery battery must be shipped, handled and transported to forward depots so as to be available for firing by this and all similar 155mm batteries in the force. Transportation terminal service and truck companies are included in the force therefore to provide this ammunition handling and moving capability. Other support unit requirements are similarly determined.

TDA requirements are developed using similar analytical techniques but each TDA is unique to the specific requirement for which is developed. For example, the TDA for headquarters, 1st U. S. Army

will be different than the TDA for headquarters, 6th U.S. Army. The manpower requirements, however, are determined in the same manner. Using work analyses and manpower surveys based upon the missions and tasks to be performed a specific TDA is developed. Once these documents are developed, they become the basis upon which the responsible commander rests his demand for Army personnel, both military and civilian. Each such commander submits his demand for personnel to headquarters, Department of the Army under the rules of the Army Authorization Documentation System (TAADS) in order to officially establish his organizational structure and his requirements for personnel, equipment and operating funds.

Under current readiness concepts, a unit is considered to be available for deployment after personnel and equipment fill, training, and packing. Availability of a unit for deployment is in part a function of its peacetime manning level. Manning units at less than 100% restricts the amount of effective training the unit can carry out and reduces its combat readiness and deployability.

The table below summarizes the active Army manpower requested for Land Forces by subcategory:

	<u>Army Land Forces Manpower (000s) at End:</u>		
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Military ¹			
Division Forces	384	384	403
Theater Forces			
Missile Forces	13	12	10
Air Defense Forces	14	15	15
Special Opns Forces	11	12	12
Defense Forces	<u>13</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>
Total Theater Forces	51	49	47
Total Land Forces	435	433	450
Civilian			
(Direct & Indirect Hire:)	39	40	44

^{1/} The above table displays only that Army manpower in Division and Special Mission Forces contained in the Manpower planning category of Land Forces. Therefore, the subcategories do not equate to total manpower in the Land Forces Classification System categories of Division and Special Mission Forces.

The increase in the military manpower request reflects the following significant improvements made in Land Forces from FY 74 to FY 75:

- ... Creation of the air cavalry combat brigade as a separate combined arms organization.

- ... Reconversion of the TRICAP division to an armored division.

- ... Addition of up to nine maneuver battalions to provide increased combat power to the forces.

- ... Addition of three ranger battalions to provide increased flexibility for employment.

About 28,000 of the civilian manpower utilized in Army Land Forces are Army National Guard (ARNG) and Reserve Technicians. These technicians are, for the most part, also military members of that reserve component to which assigned. As such, they would be mobilized with the unit. In their technician role, they provide administrative, logistical and training support on a full time basis to improve reserve readiness. The increase of about 3000 civilians from FY 74 to FY 75 results primarily from increases of these technicians. Of the remaining 15,000 civilians, over 13,000 are foreign nationals (10,000 are indirect hires) employed with our deployed forces. They, as well as the remaining 1500 U.S. civilians are employed within the Division Structure in such functional areas as construction engineering, communications and combat support.

b. Marine Corps

The active force Marine Corps manpower requirement, for all manpower categories, is based upon the minimum number of Marines required to man and support the three Marine divisions. The desired fully manned and supported wartime structure of each infantry battalion is based upon a concept of employment which requires four infantry companies plus supporting elements, with three battalions and additional support for each infantry regiment. Three infantry regiments and artillery and support units form an infantry division. The division, with supporting arms and aircraft, forms a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF).

The manpower requested for FY 75 will allow the Marine Corps to man one division fully, man the other two at a reduced level, and provide the essential short term combat support for all three. It will provide sufficient Marine Land Forces to commit two MAFs immediately to combat operations, such as an amphibious assault or forcible entry against a well defended position. Elements of the third MAF could be used as reinforcements, to provide assistance to allies or in a sub-theater level operation.

Marine Corps Land Forces Manpower (000s)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Military	75	77	85 <u>a/</u>
Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)	0	0	0

a/ Includes 1,000 Marines previously reported under Auxiliary Forces.

The fully manned Marine Corps Land Forces structure for three MAFs, capable of being deployed for sustained combat operations, equates to approximately 96,000 Marines. During peacetime certain units required for sustained operations but which are not required for initial deployment, such as bulk fuel companies, searchlight batteries, and selected artillery units are normally manned at reduced strength, assigned to the Marine Corps Reserves or planned at zero strength. The desired peacetime manning of the Marine Corps Land Forces for FY 75 is approximately 84,000 Marines.

c. Navy Role in Land Forces

Navy Land Forces personnel consist of only such military personnel as doctors, chaplains, corpsmen and dental technicians assigned to Marine Corps divisions, regiments and air stations. The Marine Corps does not have such personnel.

Navy Land Forces Manpower (000s)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Military	2	3	3

C. Tactical Air Forces - Forces, Capabilities, Missions, and Manpower

The threat discussed earlier poses a wide range of potential conflict situations in which military response might be required. The tactical air force structure described in this section provides to the National Command Authorities a variety of options, ranging from small, conventional deployments to large scale conventional and/or tactical nuclear operations. These forces are being structured to provide the responsiveness, positive control, and overall capability to meet the requirements of our strategy.

The flexible nature of tactical air forces enables elements of the combat and supporting forces to be deployed as a package to meet threats to our national interests at the level of theater or sub-theater conflict. These contingency force packages can be configured to expressly counter threats to our allies or for minor contingency situations where rapid reinforcement or force presence may be required.

1. Summary of Forces

In order to meet the tactical air portion of national strategy goals, the forces shown in the following table are planned for FY 75. Forces for FY 73 and FY 74 are shown for comparison. As can be seen in this table, all military assets are considered in force planning. For example, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve tactical aircraft are included in the table, and are an integral part of planned deployments.

U. S. Tactical Air Forces FY 73 Actual; Planned FY 74 and FY 75 (End Fiscal Year)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Active</u>			
Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings (TFW)	22	22	22
Air Force Reconnaissance Sq	13	13	13
Navy Fighter/Attack SQ	70	70	70
Navy Reconnaissance Sq	12	13	9
CVA/CVAN/CV	14	14	15
Marine Tactical Air Wings	3	3	3
Marine Reconnaissance Sq	3	3	3
<u>Reserve</u>			
Air National Guard Fighter/Attack Sq ^{a/}	30	28	29
ANG Reconnaissance Sq	7	7	7
Air Force Reserve Fighter/Attack Sq	7	7	7
Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Fighter/Attack Sq	19	18	17

a/ Includes two training squadrons.

U. S. Tactical Air Forces Manpower (000s)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Active Military</u>			
Navy	63	67	68
Marine Corps	28	28	28
Air Force	73	74	73
 <u>Civilians (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Navy	-	-	-
Marine Corps	-	-	-
Air Force	13	14	15

2. Capabilities of Tactical Air Forces

Tactical aircraft have the capabilities to carry out a variety of missions in a conflict. These capabilities include close air support, interdiction, counterair (including air defense), reconnaissance, and special purpose missions.

a. Close Air Support(CAS)

Close air support sorties are flown against enemy forces in close proximity to friendly forces. Primary goals of close air support are: (1) to destroy or neutralize enemy forces close to friendly forces; (2) to attack these enemy forces rapidly after receiving requests for close air support; and (3) to attack other enemy targets near the front line which cannot be engaged by other supporting arms due to time, location, or other constraints. CAS systems should be able to: (1) deliver accurate, lethal fire; (2) provide fire support responsive to the theater commander; (3) survive in likely enemy air defense environments; (4) maneuver well enough to employ tactics on various targets; and (5) carry ordnance in sufficient quantity and variety.

b. Interdiction

On land, interdiction sorties are flown by both land and sea based tactical aircraft against a wide range of targets including: (1) enemy forces maneuvering behind their front lines; (2) enemy lines of communication, and (3) storage and production facilities in rear areas. At sea, land based and sea based aircraft fly interdiction sorties against enemy surface ships such as surface-to-surface missile launching patrol boats, cruisers, and destroyers as well as enemy ports and naval bases.

c. Counterair

Counterair operations are conducted to gain and maintain air supremacy by destruction or neutralization of an enemy's air capability. Offensive counterair operations are normally conducted throughout enemy territory to seek out and destroy aircraft in the air or on the ground, missile and anti-aircraft artillery sites, air bases, air control systems, and other elements which constitute or support the enemy air order of battle. Defensive counterair operations are generally reactive to enemy initiative. Air defense sorties are flown to protect friendly air, sea, or ground forces from enemy air attack. The primary objective is to limit the effectiveness of enemy air efforts to a level permitting freedom of action to friendly forces of all types.

d. Reconnaissance

Tactical reconnaissance resources are a vital part of the information collection capability available to commanders engaged in unilateral, joint, or combined operation in peacetime and in all intensities of warfare. Tactical air reconnaissance operations provide timely intelligence information concerning the enemy's installations, lines of communication, and electronic emissions, as well as the disposition, composition, and movement of enemy forces. Intelligence information is collected, and surveillance of battle areas is carried out day and night and in all kinds of weather.

e. Special Purpose

Special purpose aircraft are used in electronic warfare (detection of and countermeasures against enemy electronic emitters), special operations forces (for example, specifically tailored for unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations), tactical air control (enroute and terminal control of tactical aircraft), and airborne early warning (airborne search radar).

3. Tactical Air Forces Employments

a. NATO

In the NATO central region, Allied ground forces are quantitatively, and in some cases qualitatively, inferior to Warsaw Pact ground forces in a number of major systems such as armor. NATO, however, has a substantial tactical air capability that can assist in countering a pact armored assault. U.S. ground attack aircraft, earmarked to NATO, possess all-weather range, and payload capabilities which could be used to advantage against pact armed units, provided NATO tactical

air forces can achieve a local numerically superior pact air force. The Warsaw Pact has developed a tactical air force with major emphasis on air defense and ground attack and has combined this force with an extensive ground radar network completed by antiaircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles. Most of the central region aircraft would be provided by Allied and U.S. land based tactical air forces.

The NATO southern flank (Greece, Turkey, and Italy) is of increasing concern because of the Middle East situation. Both land-based U.S. Air Force and carrier-based U.S. Navy tactical aircraft would be employed on this flank. In addition, U.S. Marine Corps tactical aircraft are a reserve that would be used in any of the NATO regions.

b. Asia

The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps would provide tactical air support for conflicts in Asia. Because of the proximity of Vietnam and Korea to open seas and the current lack of a serious naval or air threat, the utility of carriers is enhanced in Asia. Problems associated with Asian conflicts include the distance for resupply and the possibility of conflict in two theaters, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Tactical air provides the United States with the ability to provide rapid and significant support in these conflicts without involving substantial land forces. In addition, tactical air forces provide flexibility against the spectrum of conflicts possible in these areas.

c. Sea Lane Protection

Our dependence on sea lines of communication necessitates their protection. Tactical air for sea lane protection (a primary mission of the Navy and a collateral mission for the Air Force) will be provided by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. The mission involves defending both military and support shipping against bombers with air-to-surface missiles and cruise missiles, and from cruise missile firing surface ships and submarines. By using carriers and bases in both the United States and allied countries, U.S. tactical air can provide the defensive umbrella necessary to maintain the sea lines of communication essential in both NATO and Asian conflicts.

d. Contingencies

The high degree of readiness maintained by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force tactical air forces enhances their value in contingency situations. Navy carriers, Marine Corps Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) installations, and the Air Force forward base posture and capability to deploy to and sustain operations from bare bases provide a flexibility that will allow contingencies to be met in almost any part of the world.

4. Determination of Manpower Requirements

The tactical air forces described above represent a demand for manpower from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The methods for determining the levels of manpower required are as follows:

a. Air Force

To perform the tactical Air Force mission in FY 75 there will be 22 tactical fighter wings (69 squadrons) and 13 reconnaissance squadrons in the active force. In addition, the Air Reserve and Guard Forces will have 34 tactical fighter/attack squadrons and seven reconnaissance squadrons. Several other types of special purpose aircraft are also employed in support of the tactical air mission.

Tactical air forces manpower includes the crews, organizational and field maintenance personnel (depot maintenance is included in the Logistics category), the weapons systems security personnel, and the munitions maintenance personnel required to support these weapons systems. Also included are personnel required to man the necessary command posts and mission planning functions of the squadrons and wings, and the manpower assigned to squadron and wing staffs to perform such functions as staff intelligence, unit training, flying safety, command and administration. In the case of the Overseas Air Weapons Control System, manpower is required to operate and maintain the radar equipment and control the aircraft for this system located in Europe. For the Tactical Air Control System and the Southeast Asia Tactical Air Control System, manpower is required to operate and maintain assigned equipment as well as to provide the Forward Air Control and Air Liaison Officers necessary to support Army and allied ground forces.

The primary mission manpower requirements for tactical air wings are derived from a logical building block approach, starting with the individual aircraft and progressing through the squadron and wing levels. To illustrate how this is done, the following example using the A-7 aircraft is provided:

Crews: The crew composition of the A-7 is one pilot. The peacetime crew ratio is 1.1 per aircraft. Crew ratios are based upon: combat readiness requirements; sufficient capability to maintain aircrew proficiency required to accomplish the mission; lead time required to adjust or alter procurement and training of aircrews; operational requirements (type of aircraft and when flying, i.e., nighttime, daytime, 24-hour alert, etc;

and estimates of time lost due to sickness, leave, TDY, and other causes. The 1.1 crew ratio means that for a squadron composed of 24 aircraft, 27 pilots would be required in primary crew positions.

Maintenance: The key determinant in computing maintenance manpower requirements is the maintenance manhour per flying hour factor. This factor is developed by examining maintenance manhour data that are collected daily from each maintenance activity in the Air Force. The maintenance manhour per flying hour factor for the A-7 is 25 hours; i.e., it takes 25 productive direct manhours of maintenance to produce one flying hour. The maintenance manhour factor times the number of flying hours each aircraft must generate per month equals the total productive direct maintenance manhours that must be made available for each A-7 each month. To this must be added manhours for maintenance of the aerospace ground equipment (e.g., starters, generators,) associated with the weapon system. On the average this requires an additional 15% of the maintenance manhours. The manhour requirement developed thus far pertains only to the worker or "wrench turner". It is also necessary to add a factor for maintenance supervision. This factor varies by weapon system and by deployment configuration, but Air Force-wide the factor amounts to 10% of the manhours required to maintain the weapon system and the aerospace ground equipment.

The manhour requirements for maintenance, computed in the above manner, are converted to authorizations by dividing by the number of hours an individual is available for direct productive work in an average month. Air Force surveys have determined that an individual who is on a 10 hour shift, six days a week, is available for work 242 hours per month. ^{1/} This number excludes the time lost for sickness, leave, training, and similar activities. Further, surveys have determined that he is directly productive, doing actual "wrench turning," 60% of this time, with the remaining time devoted to indirect requirements such as standby and cleanup.

To summarize the requirements computation for the A-7

25	Productive Direct Maintenance Manhours/Flying Hour
x50	Flying Hours
1,250	Maintenance Manhours/Aircraft
x24	Number of Aircraft/Squadron

^{1/} Maintenance manning for tactical air forces is calculated on a 60 hour wartime work week using wartime flying hours.

30,000	Maintenance Manhours/Squadron
<u>x1.15</u>	Ground Support Equipment Maintenance
34,500	Manhours for Maintenance of Aircraft and GSE
<u>x1.10</u>	Maintenance Supervision (Planning, Scheduling, Quality Control)
37,950	Total Manhours Required

242	Hours Available for Work/Month
<u>x.60</u>	Productive Direct Manhour Factor
145.2	Direct Productive Manhours/Month

<u>37,950</u>	<u>Productive Direct Manhours Required</u>
145.2	Productive Direct Manhours Available Per Man

=262 Spaces Required for Squadron Maintenance

$262 \div 24 = 10.9$ Maintenance Spaces Per Aircraft

Munitions: These requirements are based on management engineering statistical standards. Included in this area is the manpower required for: loading, unloading, arming and dearming of committed munitions; inspection, testing and maintenance of all aircraft weapons release systems; maintenance, ammunition loadings, activation and deactivation of aircraft gun systems; and a 30 day capability for munitions maintenance, storage and handling. The factor for the A-7 is 6.3 manpower authorizations per aircraft.

Supervision and Wing Staff: These requirements are based on management engineering standards and manning guides. Included are the men required for squadron supervision and the squadron contribution to wing staff. These personnel perform such jobs as command, operations, planning and scheduling, flying safety, quality control on aircrew training and proficiency, etc. Each A-7 squadron requires 16 officers and 30 airmen.

Weapons System Security: These requirements are based on manpower standards. Security personnel are required for entry control, close and distant boundary support, security alert teams, etc. The requirement for an A-7 squadron has been determined to be 37 airmen.

Flying Hours: 50 hours per month (wartime capability).

Application of Factors

(24 aircraft, each flying 50 hours per month, with personnel working 10 hours a day and 6 days a week).

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>	<u>Total</u>
Crew: 24 x 1 x 1.1	27	0	27
Maintenance <u>a/</u> : 24 x 10.9	5	257	262
Munitions <u>a/</u> : 24 x 6.3	3	148	151
Wing/Squadron Staff	16	30	46
Weapons Security	<u>0</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>37</u>
Primary Mission Manpower Required for Typical A-7 Squadron	51	472	523

a/ Manhour factor converted to manpower with 2% as officers.

Manpower requirements for other types of squadrons are calculated in a similar manner. The following table summarizes Air Force manpower required for primary mission Tactical Air Forces.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces Manpower (000s)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Active Military	73	74	73
Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)	13	14	14

The tactical air manpower totals shown above represent the number of primary mission personnel directly employed in carrying out the Air Force tactical air mission. Civilian resources are programmed in the Tactical Forces to those jobs that do not require military personnel. Within the mission elements, (e.g., F-4, RF-4) civilians are primarily utilized in the administrative area; there are also a small number of specialized maintenance personnel assigned to combat units. The majority of civilians in the Tactical Air Forces are to support War Readiness Materiel resources and the Reserve Forces. There are, of course, substantial numbers of civilians required in a direct mission support role who are involved in the daily operation of tactical aircraft. These requirements are discussed in detail in Chapter VII.

b. Navy

To perform the Navy's tactical air force mission in FY 75 there are 15 attack aircraft carriers (CVA/CV) and 14 carrier air wings assigned in the active forces. Each carrier air wing includes the various types of aircraft required. Within the carrier air wing the squadron is the basic command organization. Squadrons are organized to operate and support the assigned number of a single type of aircraft. A carrier air wing is normally composed of two fighter squadrons (12 F-4/F 14 UE), two light attack squadrons (12 A-7 UE, per squadron) one medium attack squadron (12 A-6 UE), plus sufficient numbers of support and special mission aircraft such as E-2, RA-5C and EKA-3.

For each type of aircraft squadron criteria have been established to determine the numbers of aircrew and support personnel required. Methods similar to those described for the Air Force are used. The specifics of the manpower engineering techniques are discussed in the Naval Forces section. The at sea standard work weeks for enlisted personnel of 74 and 66 hours for watchstanders and non-watchstanders respectively apply. These manpower requirements are expressed in published form in a Squadron Manning Document for each type of aircraft squadron.

As an example, the manpower for a 12 A/C A7E squadron is developed as follows:

Aircrew: 19 pilots required, determined by multiplying 1.58 crew ratio by number of aircraft assigned. 1.58 is a resultant based on sortie rate and crew rest limitations for sustained operations.

Ground Maintenance Officers: 4 required, providing continuity and expertise in maintenance and support functions.

Maintenancemen: 195 required, determined by analysis by type squadron of the workload necessary to support operations.

Administrative and Support: 49 required, determined by analysis of administrative workload necessary to support the squadron organization.

A7E squadron total: 268

Total Force A7 Manpower: 7,236 derived by multiplying 268 by number of squadrons, 27 A7 squadrons are assigned. The total requirement for Navy tactical air forces is then computed by multiplying the individual unit factors times the number of units in the force. The following table summarizes the Navy tactical air forces manpower requirements:

<u>Navy TACAIR Manpower (000s) 1/</u>			
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Active Military	63	67	68
Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)	0	0	0

1/ Includes manpower for attack/multi-purpose carriers and associated air wings.

The difference between the FY 74 and FY 75 manpower totals is attributable primarily to the filling out of the crew of the new CVAN, Nimitz, as she becomes operational. No civilians are included in this category. Civilian support of land-based aircraft at Naval Air Stations and Facilities is addressed under Mission Support.

c. Marine Corps

The tactical air portion of the MAFs is composed of the fixed wing fighter/attack aircraft from the three Marine Aircraft Wings (MAWs), each of which can be individually tailored to meet a specific threat. The basic building block for a Wing is the individual squadron; the manpower for each of these is derived in a manner analogous to that used by the Air Force using historically derived planning factors. The manning is continually reviewed to assure that it is consistent with current workload data and programmed flying hours.

Marine Corps TACAIR Manpower (000s)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Military	28	28	28
Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)	0	0	0

D. Naval Forces - Strategy, Missions, Threat, Forces, Capabilities and Manpower

U. S. naval forces planning is less tied to specific theater assumptions than is planning for land or tactical air forces. Accordingly, the strategy and threat for naval forces were not discussed earlier in the NATO and Asian sections of this Report.

1. Strategy and Missions

The principal wartime mission required of U. S. general purpose naval forces is, in conjunction with NATO allied forces in a NATO war, to be able to protect naval forces at sea, military support shipping, and an austere level of economic support shipping against a Soviet conventional interdiction effort. In addition, U. S. forces in the Pacific should simultaneously be capable of supplementing the forces of our Pacific allies to insure that a minimum necessary level of supplies can be maintained against expected threats to the sea lanes.

There also exists a requirement for Naval Forces to be capable of projecting power ashore and responding to small-scale conflicts elsewhere. In this regard, the Navy maintains a capability with its peacetime deployed forces to respond to crisis situations anywhere in the world with appropriate forces.

2. Threat

a. The Soviet Navy possesses a large submarine force including both nuclear and diesel long-range attack submarines. Included in the Soviet submarine force are several classes of cruise-missile launching submarines which appear to have been developed to counter the U. S. and allied surface naval forces.

b. Soviet Naval Aviation possesses long-range, air-to-surface missile-armed bombers which can be projected against both naval forces and shipping in the sea lanes and can be augmented by similar aircraft from Soviet Long-Range Aviation forces. The Soviets also possess a sizable force of long-range reconnaissance aircraft of sufficient range and endurance to be employed into either the Atlantic or Pacific.

c. The Soviet Navy includes a substantial surface force of both combatant and support ships. Although these forces have limited access to the open ocean, they have been increasing their overseas deployments in peacetime and developing the capability for sustained operations in the open ocean. While the Soviets are constructing their first aircraft carrier, they do not yet possess sea-based tactical aircraft and, consequently, lack a strong organic air defense capability. As a result, Soviet surface ships appear most suitable for surprise attacks at the initiation of hostilities or defensive operations within interceptor range of Soviet bases.

3. Planning Assumptions

Planning for general purpose naval forces begins with estimates of U.S. and allied land and tactical air forces needed to meet planned objectives in various areas of the world. These estimates include the requirement for both naval tactical air forces and for amphibious forces. Military shipping requirements are then sized to support the U.S. and allied forces committed in each theater.

Next, the economic support shipping required to sustain the countries allied with the United States during the conflict must be determined. Economic support shipping includes oil, which has recently taken on added significance. An austere level of economic support is envisioned rather than the full peacetime level. In addition, a brief cessation of economic shipping is considered during the early stages of a conflict to allow shipping to be organized into convoys and to allow naval forces to counter the high degree of threat to the sea lanes anticipated early in a conflict.

With "projection" forces and military and economic shipping requirements determined, support force and sea control force requirements can be developed. Support forces (replenishment ships, tenders, and repair ships) are sized to provide logistics and material support to naval forces from forward sites.

Protection forces are sized to provide protection to other naval forces and mercantile shipping against the surface, submarine, and air threat in the areas where naval operations are planned and shipping must transit. The appropriate level of such forces depends on such factors as the number of forces or ships requiring protection, the size and sophistication of the expected threat, and the geography involved. A mix of forces with different types of weapon systems, both land-based and sea-based, is employed. This mix of forces provides defense in depth, takes advantage of geographic "choke points," and achieves a realistic balance among area, barrier, and point-defense forces.

In sizing our naval forces we must take into consideration more than just the level of wartime activity in any one land theater. This is because the Soviet Union may extend hostilities at sea into areas far removed from a concurrent land war where the United States and our allies must maintain essential sea lanes. The Soviet Union may also choose to initiate hostilities at sea with no concurrent land conflict. It is necessary, therefore, to plan U.S. naval forces worldwide.

Finally, in planning U.S. naval forces, the total capabilities of both the United States and our allies must be considered. U.S. and allied land-based aircraft can contribute significantly toward countering threats to shipping and naval forces. Additionally, U.S. allies possess significant naval capabilities, including forces and equipment that have been obtained, financed, or modernized with U.S. assistance. Although few allied ships or aircraft are comparable to the most recent, high technology U.S. forces, many of the allied forces are as capable as older U.S. forces.

An important factor in considering the capabilities of our allies is the coordinated planning required to operate U.S. and allied forces together in a timely and efficient manner in wartime. It is important that we and our allies perceive the threat in the same way in order for U.S./allied operations to be effective. Continuing U.S./allied dialogue and operations are designed to improve coordination and communications between the United States and our allies.

4. Naval Forces and their Capabilities

The following table shows the naval forces existing at end FY 73 and those programmed for FY 74 and FY 75:

U. S. Naval Forces

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Active Ships</u>			
Carriers (CVA & CV)	14	14	15
ASW Carriers (CVS)	2	0	0
Attack Submarines			
Nuclear	58	59	65
Diesel	24	12	10
Surface Combatants <u>a/</u>	238	196	202
Amphibious Forces	68	67	66
Support Forces			
Underway Replenishment	58	49	45
Major Fleet Support	22	22	20
Minor Fleet Support <u>a/</u>	90	85	83
Miscellaneous	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>16</u>
TOTALS	588	518	522
<u>Active ASW Aircraft Squadrons</u>			
Land-based	24	24	24
Ship-based	<u>23</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>24</u>
TOTALS	47	43	48

a/ Naval Reserve Force destroyers and minesweepers are included because of their sizeable active duty nucleus crews.

a. Carriers

(1) In recent years, the carrier force has been undergoing transition. Single-purpose ASW carriers (CVSs) dedicated to broad ocean ASW have been phased out. The attack carriers (CVAs) are being converted to multi-purpose platforms (CVs) combining attack and ASW capabilities. In FY 75, six carriers will be multi-purpose CVs, the remainder CVAs. All CVAs will eventually be converted to CVs.

(2) In their attack role, carriers contribute to tactical aircraft sortie requirements (as discussed in the section on tactical air forces). They have proven particularly valuable in areas where the United States does not have land bases or where land bases are restricted. This is exemplified by the employment of carriers in the Korean War, off Vietnam, and in the several Middle East crises. In direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, strong Soviet surface, air, and submarine naval forces could pose a serious threat to U.S. carrier forces, requiring careful judgment in their employment. This threat was apparent during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. Accordingly, the Navy is continuing to improve its defensive capability of the carrier forces in order to allow the greatest possible latitude in their use.

(3) Attack and multi-purpose carriers also contribute to the protection of vital sea lanes. Carriers provide air defense against guided missiles as well as enemy bomber and reconnaissance aircraft employed against naval forces, convoys, and unescorted shipping. They also provide aircraft for surveillance and reconnaissance roles and to search out and attack enemy surface and subsurface naval forces. In addition, multi-purpose carriers provide an ASW protection.

b. Submarines

The submarine force continues to be modernized in FY 75 as new SSNs enter the fleet and diesel submarines are retired. General purpose submarines are designed primarily to perform anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missions. Because of their unique capabilities, wartime employment of submarines is envisioned in advanced ASW barriers across strategic "choke points" in the transit routes of enemy submarines between homeports and patrol areas. The roles, missions, and characteristics of future submarines are now under study by the Navy.

c. Surface Combatants

(1) Surface combatant force levels have been reduced in recent years in order to fund modernization. Most of the older ships have now been retired, and force levels in FY 75 show a slight increase as new ships enter the operating forces. These forces comprise a wide spectrum of surface ship types that perform a variety of missions. In this category are cruisers, including the nuclear-powered LONG BEACH; conventional and nuclear-powered frigates; "destroyer types," including the new SPRUANCE-class destroyer; and smaller ocean escort ships, including the KNOX-class destroyer escort.

(2) The principal mission of surface combatants is to provide defense of other naval forces and convoys. In this role they provide, in conjunction with other sea control forces, protection against submarine and air attack. Some protection against surface attack is currently provided by the conventional guns on most surface combatants. This capability is limited against the threat of Soviet missile-equipped surface ships, but will be enhanced significantly as the U.S. surface-to-surface missile system (HARPOON) is introduced into the fleet.

(3) Surface combatants can perform a number of additional missions in combat including shore bombardment, search and rescue, air surveillance and control, offensive and defensive patrol, and naval blockade.

d. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Aircraft

ASW aircraft forces include both twenty-four squadrons of carrier-based aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) and 24 squadrons of land-based P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. These aircraft, like submarines, can be used in a variety of roles in the control of the sea lanes in advanced ASW barriers; as area search and destroy forces; and as escorts.

e. Amphibious Forces

These forces provide the capability to perform amphibious assaults in support of strategy for defense of NATO Europe. Equally important, amphibious assault forces provide a high-readiness contingency force for landings with men, equipment, and aircraft integrated for combat. To carry out their missions, amphibious forces generate a requirement for other naval forces for protection (ASW, AAW, anti-surface), ancillary missions (mine warfare, close air support, naval gunfire support), and logistic support (replenishment and repair).

f. Support Ships

Support ships include underway replenishment ships; repair ships and tenders; and tugs, salvage vessels, and miscellaneous auxiliary ships. These forces increase the endurance of naval forces at sea, provide for logistic and material support of naval forces from advanced undeveloped sites, and perform various auxiliary roles. They contribute indirectly to the major missions performed by the Navy.

The Navy recently has taken several steps to increase the efficiency of these support forces as their overall number is reduced. A few support ships are homeported overseas and others have been transferred to the Military Sealift Command (MSC). MSC-operated ships are manned by U.S. civil service crews with small Navy detachments aboard. MSC ships achieve greater time on-station than Navy ships because they are operated and maintained overseas, the crews joining the ships at foreign ports. MSC ships are less expensive to operate than Navy ships, largely because they have much smaller crews. On the other hand, the MSC ships have some reduced capabilities. Accordingly, they probably would be employed in low threat areas in wartime or would have their crews augmented or replaced by Navy personnel to carry out more demanding operations.

5. Determination of Manpower Requirements

a. Navy

After the force level and mix have been determined, the associated force manpower is derived on the basis of workload requirements for specific ship and aircraft types. The primary device for measuring the workload is the Navy Manning Documentation Program. Using accepted work study techniques and manpower productivity criteria, the manpower needed to permit a given class of ship or aircraft squadron to perform its mission is established. These manpower levels are reflected in Ship Manning Documents (SMDs) and Squadron Manning Documents (SQMDs) for each type of squadron or ship.

In developing manning documents, the following workload, manpower productivity, and time available for work (i.e., standard work week, etc.) assumptions are used:

Standard work week for enlisted personnel afloat.

At Sea

Watchstander	74 hours
Non-Watchstander	66 hours

In Port

Watchstander	45 hours
Non-Watchstander	41 hours

Standard work week routine:

	<u>Watchstander</u>		<u>Non-Watchstander</u>	
	<u>At Sea</u>	<u>In Port</u>	<u>At Sea</u>	<u>In Port</u>
Watch	56.00	9.33	--	--
Training	2.00	2.83	3.00	3.00
Service Diversions	2.50	3.37	3.00	3.50
Scheduled Work	13.50	28.67	40.50	31.00
Unscheduled Work		.80	19.50	3.50
Total Work Week	<u>74.00</u>	<u>45.00</u>	<u>66.00</u>	<u>41.00</u>

Service diversions include quarters inspections; sick call; and pay line, administrative and judiciary requirements. They are accomplished during normal off-watch working hours and, therefore, deduct from an individual's capacity to do productive work. These factors have been developed from experience, based on work sampling techniques.

A percentage allowance is also applied to basic productive work requirements to reflect those delays arising from fatigue, environmental effects, personal needs, and unavoidable interruptions which serve to increase the time required for work accomplishment.

Application - 20% factor applied to all maintenance transactions.

Example - 1.00 Maintenance Work Required
x.20 Productivity Allowance

1 hr. 12 min. allotted to complete transaction

A further time allowance for tool drawing, publications gathering, equipment entry, transaction recording, and put away is also used for preventive maintenance efforts.

Application - 30% applied to all Preventive Maintenance transactions.

Example - 1.00 Preventive Maintenance Work Required
x.30 Make Ready/Put Away Allowance

1 hr. 18 min. allotted to complete transaction

The work week on board a ship at sea under wartime readiness conditions that is used for manpower planning is summarized below:

<u>Watchstander</u>	<u>Non-Watchstander</u>
74 Available for Work	66 Available for Work
<u>-56</u> Watchstanding	<u>-6</u> Total Service Diversion
18 Available for Maintenance	60 Available for Maintenance
<u>-4.5</u> Total Service Diversion	(Includes Allowances)
13.5 Available for Maintenance	
(Includes Allowances)	

Using these standards, manning documents are prepared for each class of ship, establishing the manpower requirements. These requirements are further subdivided by pay grade to provide the proper mix of skill levels and to provide for command and supervision. Thus, a DDG-2 class destroyer has a manpower requirement of 338 personnel. Of these, 19 are officers, 22 are chief petty officers, and 297 are other enlisted grades. One-hundred ninety-five of the 338 men are required to continuously man operational positions, and the remainder are needed for maintenance, administration, and support.

This method illustrates the planning used to develop manpower requirements. The actual budget is based on a detailed analysis by individual ship, with special allowances used for ships in conversion and precommissioning status.

In addition to ships and aircraft squadrons, manpower must be provided for such combat support units as Mobile Construction Battalions (Seebes), Underwater Demolition Teams, Fleet Maintenance Assistance Groups (FMAG) and Fleet Support Squadrons. These requirements are based on the tasks to be performed in each unit and the assigned missions. All of these individual requirements for each ship, squadron, and combat support unit are then summed to determine the total manpower needed for Naval Forces, shown in the table below:

<u>Naval Forces Manpower (000s) a/</u>			
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Military	190	177	176
Civilian			
(Direct & Indirect Hire)	*	*	*

* Indicates less than 500 spaces

a/ Manpower for attack/multi-purpose carriers and associated air wings is included with tactical air forces.

b. Marine Corps

The Marine Corps provides security detachments for major Navy vessels. The manpower requirements are derived from the necessity to provide adequate security for special weapons, man part of the secondary battery, and furnish internal and external security while at sea or in port. The manpower required for this mission, excepting that for duty on aircraft carriers, is shown below. The manpower for detachments in aircraft carriers is included under the Tactical Air Forces sub-category.

Naval Forces Marine Corps Manpower (000)

<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
1	1	1

E. Mobility Forces - Strategy, Missions, Forces, Capabilities, and Manpower

1. Strategy

The goal of the total force concept in supporting realistic deterrence is to provide a combination of allied forces and U.S. forces adequate to deter all forms of war. One aspect of this deterrence is the visible ability to bring our forces to bear quickly when it is in our national interest. A major factor supporting this goal is the clear capability, when consistent with our policy, to bring U.S. forces to our allies aid in time to deter or to counter aggression which they alone cannot meet. One means of achieving such a clear capability would be to maintain an adequate level of U.S. forces in each potential trouble spot. An alternative strategy is to maintain a smaller total U.S. force stationed at central locations and provide mobility forces to deploy them quickly. In fact, the goal of strategic mobility forces is to provide flexibility of deployment so that the overall level of general purpose forces is lower than would otherwise be necessary to constitute a realistic deterrent.

2. Missions

The threats to which U.S. forces must respond, and in turn require lift from our mobility forces, range from a minor contingency, requiring one to two brigades, to a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO. We plan on deployments to a minor contingency for the most part being accomplished by the active mobility force. In order to meet deployment requirements in response to a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO, or PRC aggression in Asia, we would rely on full mobilization of Reserve forces and large numbers of commercial aircraft and ships in addition to the active forces.

Present planning for the spectrum of possible deployments utilizes principally military and U.S. commercial assets. However, recognizing the considerable lift assets of our NATO Allies, we have adjusted our planning to include their participation in supporting deployments to NATO.

3. Mobility Forces and Their Capabilities

Mobility forces are comprised of strategic and tactical airlift, sealift, pre-positioned equipment, mobility support forces including air and sea terminals, aeromedical evacuation units, and Air Force Aerospace Rescue and Recovery activities.

a. Airlift

(1) Strategic Airlift

As presently programmed, U.S. strategic airlift resources will provide the basic capability to meet the spectrum of deployment requirements through the 1970s. The FY 75 active strategic airlift force consists of four squadrons of C-5s and 13 squadrons of C-141s. This active strategic airlift force is augmented by four C-5 and 13 C-141 Air Force Reserve associate units. The crews of the associate units fly active force C-5 and C-141 aircraft so as to provide the necessary augmentation of the active force to sustain the increased aircraft utilization rates upon mobilization. In addition to these resources, U.S. mobility forces include approximately 250 long range commercial aircraft in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), 62% of which possess the capability to transport military cargo.

(2) Tactical Airlift

In contrast to the strategic airlift force which provides the deployment capability for U.S. forces, tactical airlift provides contingency airlift support for United States and allied forces. This support includes the movement of unit equipment, resupply and passengers. Our FY 75 active tactical airlift force consists of 16 C-130E squadrons and one specialized ski-equipped C-130 squadron stationed in Alaska. This force structure will be maintained through FY 75. As with the strategic airlift, the active tactical airlift force is augmented by the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. This Reserve force tactical airlift force consists of 27 C-130 squadrons, 5 C-123 and 3 C-7 squadrons.

(3) Rescue and Recovery Activities

Aerospace rescue and recovery units provide the capabilities for rapid global deployment of combat rescue contingency forces as well as geographic search and rescue service. Forces consist primarily of HC-130 aircraft and HH-53/HH-3/UH-1 helicopters.

c. Sealift

We rely heavily on sealift to move the bulk of our equipment and supplies. Massive lift capability is essential. For example, the equipment for an Army infantry division weighs about 30,000 tons, the equipment required for the supporting units for the division weighs about 86,000 tons. The division and its support units consume supplies at the rate of about 2,300 tons per day when in sustained combat.

To meet wartime needs, the Department of Defense relies heavily on U.S. commercial shipping which can be mobilized under Presidential authority. During a NATO contingency, the Department of Defense would also rely on the commercial shipping assets of our NATO Allies.

Under an agreement reached last September, a new procedure has been developed for utilizing NATO allied commercial ships during the early part of a NATO contingency. As part of the new arrangement, some 300 suitable NATO flag ships would be earmarked in peacetime to facilitate their early acquisition in a contingency. In regard to the Sealift Readiness Program, which was proposed in SPANS, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) is attempting to obtain commitments from U.S. commercial shipping industry to make specific numbers of ships available for the early stages of a minor contingency. Request for proposals are being issued with a goal of obtaining 128 ships of which at least 64 would be available within 30 days.

The following table displays the active Ships in the Program IV Strategic Sealift Force:

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Active Strategic Sealift (Ships) <u>a/</u>	53	31 <u>b/</u>	30 <u>b/</u>

a/ Excludes ships under charter

b/ Excludes 25 Landing and Coastal ships in inactive reserve which could be activated during a contingency.

4. Determination of Manpower Requirements

The primary mission manpower required to carry out mobility forces missions is determined by each Service as follows:

a. Air Force

Mobility forces perform the strategic and tactical airlift missions of the Air Force, operate the aerial port terminals for the transportation of cargo and personnel, perform aeromedical evacuation, and provide the aerospace rescue and recovery mission on a global and geographic basis.

Mobility force manpower includes the crews, aircraft maintenance personnel, weapons system security personnel, and airlift support services personnel required to support the forces. The determination of these requirements is accomplished in a manner similar to procedures described in the section on tactical air forces. Airlift support services manpower is distributed throughout the Military Airlift Command airlift wings, support wings, support groups, and various support squadrons and detachments to provide enroute aircraft maintenance, supply support, and airlift command posts. Force personnel are also needed to man the squadron and wing staffs to perform such functions as unit training, flying safety, and command and control. Civilian resources in the Mobility forces are programmed to fill those requirements that do not require military personnel. Unlike Tactical forces, more civilian personnel are utilized in the primary mission elements, e.g., (C-141, C-5); this is due primarily to the method of employing the force. The strategic airlift forces are staged from home bases in the CONUS to perform their global airlift mission, thus the home station can utilize more civilians in their administration and maintenance functions. The aerial port and terminal operations necessary to support the strategic airlift force is also an area that uses a large number of civilians.

The table below summarizes Air Force manpower required for Mobility Forces:

Air Forces Mobility Forces Manpower (000s)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Active Military	42	40	46 ^{1/}
Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)	13	14	14

The increase in manpower from FY 74 to FY 75 results from the increase in active forces maintenance personnel and crew ratios of the C-5 and C-141 from 2.0 to 2.75. This action increases our availability of trained manpower and provides a 25% increase in C-5 and C-141 sustained wartime lift capabilities.

The mobility manpower totals shown above represent the number of primary mission personnel directly employed in carrying out the Air Force mobility mission. There are, of course, substantial numbers of personnel required in a direct mission support role who are involved in the daily operation of mobility aircraft. These requirements are discussed in detail in the Mission Support Forces chapter.

b. Navy

Navy Mobility Forces consist, primarily, of the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Since MSC ships are civilian manned, the only military personnel required for MSC are those in headquarters elements.

Almost all of the civilians employed in General Purpose Forces by the Navy are used in the Mobility Forces area under the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Over 75% of these civilians are Civil Service seamen who crew the Military Sealift Command's nucleus fleet. Their on board number fluctuates with the number of MSC ships in operating status at any given time. The remainder of the civilian force provides shoreside operational support to the fleet and ocean transportation management functions. MSC work requirements are determined by the Departments of Army, Navy and Air Force in meeting their overseas ocean transportation requirements. Using FY 73 as an example, the Army contributed 41% to the total MSC Navy Industrial Fund income of nearly 730 million dollars, Air Force contributed 27% and Navy/Marine Corps 30%. Currently, the Military Sealift Command Controlled fleet consists of 59 Dry Cargo ships, 48 Tankers, 37 Special Projects ships and four Fleet Support ships. The Fleet Support function is a newly developed concept in which ships operate in consort with the combatant fleets. Special Projects ships are operated under the sponsorship of the Navy Oceanographer, Navy Electronic Systems Command, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The decrease in civilian personnel during FY 74 and FY 75 reflect laying up of a number of MSC Civil Service manned ships and a reduction in shoreside staff, due to reduction in DoD component Southeast Asia sealift requirements.

Navy Mobility Forces Manpower (000s)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)	7	6	6

* Less than 500 spaces

c. Army

Army manpower required for Mobility Forces is for the operation of Department of Defense water ports, which provide traffic management services for moving DoD cargo and passengers within CONUS and to overseas commands. Army personnel constitute the Army elements of the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS) -- the Do D single manager for military traffic, land transportation, and common user ocean terminals.

The bulk of the MTMTS workforce (86%) is civilian. The civilian workforce participates in all MTMTS activities -- command and staff, base operations, traffic management, and terminal operations. The military manpower requirements are based on providing a wartime expansion of the sea transportation system, and the career and rotation positions necessary to administer the system during peace and war. The number of positions will vary, based on the number of terminals to be operated and the estimated volume of cargo and passengers to be moved. These factors are reviewed annually, and the manpower needs adjusted accordingly.

Army Mobility Forces Manpower (000s)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Military	1	1	1
Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)	5	5	4

CHAPTER VI

AUXILIARY FORCES

Auxiliary Forces carry out major defense-wide programs under centralized DoD control. These programs include Intelligence and Security, Communications, Research and Development, Support to Other Nations, and Geophysical Activities. The following table shows the military manpower programmed for Auxiliary Forces in fiscal years 73, 74 and 75:

DoD Auxiliary Forces Manpower
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military Personnel</u>			
Intelligence and Security	63	56	48
Centrally Managed Communications	47	49	40
Research and Development	35	33	34
Support to Other Nations	4	5	5
Geophysical Activities	<u>14</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>
Total Military	162	156	139
Military in Defense Agencies included above	9	8	8
<u>Civilian Personnel (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Intelligence and Security	10	10	10
Centrally Managed Communications	16	17	15
Research and Development	87	88	87
Support to Other Nations	5	2	2
Geophysical Activities	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>
Total Civilian	128	127	124
Civilians in Defense Agencies included above	13	13	13

A. Intelligence and Security

This category includes the centralized intelligence gathering agencies of the Department of Defense. Their operations are primarily directed toward the development of national or strategic intelligence for use in strategic planning and national intelligence estimates. In addition to their role of satisfying national intelligence requirements, intelligence units also provide some support to tactical commanders. We plan these activities on a completely integrated basis to insure that there is no unnecessary duplication of effort. As a result of centralized direction,

substantial manpower efficiencies have been achieved without significant impacts on intelligence effectiveness. From a level of 73,000 military and civilians in FY 73, we plan for 58,000 in FY 75, a reduction of 21%.

Intelligence resource policies and controls are exercised by the Secretary of Defense, whose principal advisor in these matters is the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). The specific requirements for the intelligence collection activities are established at many levels. The Services establish their requirements for intelligence to support force planning, and field operations, such as those in Southeast Asia and other contingencies and research and development. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff compiles its own intelligence requirements together with those of the Unified and Specified Commands. These and other strategic guidance policy statements from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) form the basis for budget and manpower allocations. Intelligence consumers, as well as non-DoD members of the Intelligence Community rely heavily on the intelligence provided by DoD. The Director of Central Intelligence, through the medium of the United States Intelligence Board, establishes requirements and priorities for which the intelligence elements of the DoD and Services must apply dollar and manpower resources.

The manning of individual intelligence units is determined by functional requirements, engineered standards, and other manning criteria. These normal manning authorizations are altered from time to time to fit unusual situations. The criteria for these authorizations have been arrived at through experience, and they are modified as broad missions of the staffs change, as science and technology impact on the methods and procedures of intelligence, and as actual combat experience requires. Combat and combat related intelligence units must, of necessity, be manned by military personnel. Also, military experience and expertise have proven essential in the various intelligence planning, management and analysis functions to bring specialized military experience to bear on the intelligence activities. A cadre of civilian personnel is essential for continuity and for specialized skills not routinely available through military sources.

The manpower of the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP) can be divided into two major subcategories according to program responsibility and management:

Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military Personnel</u>			
Consolidated Cryptologic Program/Advanced Program Support	48	42	35
General Defense Intelligence Program/Special Reconnaissance Vehicle Program	<u>15</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>
Total Military	63	56	48
<u>Civilian Personnel*</u>			
Consolidated Cryptologic Program/Advanced Program Support	4	4	4
General Defense Intelligence Program /Special Reconnaissance Vehicle Program	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>
Total Civilian	10	10	10

*Excludes personnel assigned to NSA

1. Consolidated Cryptologic Program/Advanced Program Support. Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) and Advanced Program Support (APS) are managed by the Director, National Security Agency.

The CCP and APS consist of the resources required to carry out the mission of the National Security Agency which involves the performance of highly specialized technical functions in support of the intelligence activities of the United States. Resources included are those authorized and appropriated by the Congress for selected intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Detailed management of these programs is vested in the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service who has been assigned three basic responsibilities for this purpose under the Secretary of Defense:

- Organizing, operating, and managing certain activities and facilities for the production of intelligence information;
- Organizing and coordinating the research and engineering activities of the U.S. Government which are in support of the agency's assigned functions; and
- Regulating certain communications in support of agency missions.

In response to the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasking of July 13, 1973, the National Security Agency prepared a Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) manpower reduction plan that will reduce the CCP by about 6,500 spaces by the end of FY 75. The FY 75 action is reflected in the current President's Budget. The CCP proposal includes consolidations of selected operations worldwide and integration of other sites under the single service executive agent concept. Manpower savings will also be obtained through automation of communications terminals and modifications to hardware which will effect further savings. The cryptologic training program was streamlined through a balanced reduction in staff, faculty, and student pipelines to keep pace with reductions in missions. Headquarters staff and associated support activities underwent additional cuts. Mission reductions were held to a minimum in order to minimize the impact on the intelligence consumer.

2. General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP)/Special Reconnaissance Vehicle Program (SRVP). The GDIP and SRVP are managed by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These programs contain resources for those programs that collect intelligence information by human and technical means, process such data, and produce finished intelligence for intelligence users and decision makers throughout the Department of Defense. The GDIP/SRVP do not contain resources associated with the CCP/APS discussed above. The Defense Intelligence Agency operates the worldwide Defense Attache System with

military representatives from the four Military Services, produces finished intelligence products for Washington level use and manages collection, processing, and production activities specifically assigned by DIA to the Military Departments.

Also in response to the Deputy Secretary of Defense request of July 13, 1973, the Defense Intelligence Agency produced a General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) Manpower Reduction Plan that would reduce the GDIP in excess of 5,000 manpower spaces from the FY 74 President's Budget to the end of FY 78. The FY 1975 portion of the plan (approximately 1,500 spaces) with slight modifications, was implemented in the FY 1975 budget. The total 5,000 manpower space reductions will be achieved by consolidating certain activities, eliminating intelligence functions at several locations, and by reduction of remaining activities. The impact of the plan will be to decrease intelligence production on free world and other forces, decrease intelligence production on many activities of low to medium priority, decrease production of Air Target Charts, reduce certain collection activities and the support associated with both collection and production. By adoption of management improvements, acquisition of additional equipment, and making organizational realignments, the impact on intelligence production against high priority objectives will be minimized.

In summary, the intelligence manpower for FY 74 was reduced by approximately 7,000 spaces while in FY 75 an additional 8,000 spaces will be reduced. Further reductions are planned by FY 78. These significant reductions in intelligence manpower resulting from management efficiencies, technological efficiencies and mission reductions are shown in the following table:

Intelligence and Security Manpower
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	20	16	13
Navy	13	12	10
Marine Corps	2	2	1
Air Force	<u>28</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>24</u>
Total	63	56	48
Military in Defense Agencies included in totals above	6	5	5

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	3	3	2
Navy	2	2	2
Air Force	3	3	3
DIA	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	10	10	10

B. Centrally Managed Communications (CMC)

In discussing the Centrally Managed Communications manpower category, we will first display and describe the total communications functions in the DoD, identified as the Consolidated Telecommunications Program (CTP). Whereas the CTP extends to all communications resources in the DoD that are separately identifiable and measurable, the Centrally Managed Communications (CMC) category reflects integrated, centrally managed systems, such as the Defense Communications System, each Services' Central Communications System, Satellite Communications and Communications Security.

1. Consolidated Telecommunications Program (CTP). The consolidated program consists of all communications resources in the Department of Defense which are separately identifiable and measurable. The Centrally Managed Communications (CMC) consists of about half of the manpower in the CTP. The following table displays the CTP and shows the relationship between the CTP, centrally managed communications, and the manpower categories:

DOD CONSOLIDATED TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROGRAM
(FY 75 End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	7	*
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	20	1
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u> (CENTRALLY MANAGED COMM.)	45 (40)	16 (15)
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	10	5
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>
Totals	86	28
Manpower in Defense Agencies included in totals above	2	4

() Indicates non-add, Centrally Managed Communications included in the CTP.

The CTP facilitates telecommunications management as a cohesive program, avoids duplication of effort, and improves the responsiveness of the communications system to our national command authorities. The CTP does not include telecommunications integral to weapon systems, and some tactical telecommunications personnel which are force related such as those personnel within Army and Marine Corps divisions and on board Navy ships.

The current allocation of resources for telecommunications development and procurement allows for advanced technology affording greater capacity for transmission via communications spacecraft and the automation of terminal and switching facilities. The new space and automation programs, coupled with ongoing ones concerning the technology of communications security with a view toward end-to-end security of all communications and a world-wide effort to consolidate communications center facilities, contribute significantly to the reduction in FY 75 manpower requirements.

2. Centrally Managed Communications (CMC)

This category consists of the centrally managed communications systems of the Services and the Defense Communications Agency. These include key worldwide communications systems of the defense department required to support and implement overall national policy and objectives. They provide dedicated command and control systems and the backbone common-user systems for the National Command Authorities, all elements of DoD, and other governmental agencies authorized to use these systems. This category also includes communications security. Central management avoids duplication of effort and improves the responsiveness of the communication system to our national command authorities.

Command and control of our forces is exercised through the Defense Communications System and the Military Service communications systems. The communications requirements are established based on current and projected deployment of our forces, i. e., number, type and location of installations and the distances between locations. Then, based on prior experience and the expressed needs of the field commander, the required capacity for each of several modes of communications (e. g., voice, teletype, etc.) is determined. Each such operating location is manned based on the number of operating positions to be filled, maintenance manhours required, and the need for administration and support.

Personnel strengths to operate and maintain the systems are not directly correlated to the size of the forces being supported. The total strength of the communications category is determined by the number of operating locations, the manning of each, and additional personnel for supervision and support of the system.

The table below reflects the functional breakout of DoD manpower in centrally managed communications:

DoD Centrally Managed Communications
(Active Duty End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military Personnel</u>			
Defense Communications			
System	1	1	1
Services' Communications			
Systems	40	40	32
Satellite Communications	*	1	1
Communication Security	2	2	2
Engineering and Installation	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>
Military Total	47	49	40
<u>Civilian Personnel</u>			
Defense Communications			
System	1	1	1
Services' Communications			
Systems	11	12	10
Satellite Communications	*	*	*
Communication Security	2	2	2
Engineering and Installation	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Civilian Total	16	17	15

*less than 500 spaces

The decreasing trend in Centrally Managed Communications results from two actions. The first includes reductions in functions such as base closures, Southeast Asia support, engineering, installation and headquarters. In addition, a reduction and transfer of base communications resources to the base operating support manpower categories was accomplished where these reductions are reflected. The realignments are also described in Appendix A, Manpower Data Structure, as more correctly providing the resources to perform the base communication function in direct support of base level missions.

The category Centrally Managed Communications as an integral part of the CTP is summarized below by military department:

Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(Active Duty End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	13	13	10
Navy	10	11	11
Marine Corps	*	*	*
Air Force	<u>24</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>20</u>
Military Total	47	49	40
 Military in Defense Agencies Included in Above Total	 2	 2	 2
 <u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire (000s))</u>			
Army	4	4	4
Navy	4	4	4
Air Force	6	7	6
Defense Agencies	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Civilian Total	16	17	15

*Less than 500 spaces

C. Research and Development

A successful R&D effort must provide two essential products: (1) effective weapons systems to deter war or respond to aggression, and (2) a continuous flow of initiatives and options out of the base of science and advanced technology and into development projects so that we can respond to the continuously changing environment of danger and opportunity. This environment is paced by surging technological improvements the Soviet Union is aggressively making to its forces. A productive R&D process is dependent on an advanced and rigorous base of science and technology. In turn, National defense depends in the long run on the options and initiatives that can be extracted from this science and technology, and the related test and evaluation effort required for successful systems development.

1

This category contains the manpower responsible for carrying out the R&D programs necessary to meet the above objectives. This manpower conducts the work performed in the 115 Laboratories and Test and Evaluation facilities of the DoD and also manages contracted R&D outside the DoD. Within these functions new weapons concepts originate and progress toward becoming weapon systems. This work encompasses virtually all aspects of the physical, biomedical, environmental, and behavioral sciences, plus the engineering disciplines. It is characterized by breadth, complexity and constant change. The DoD R&D workforce is comprised of the following balance of military and civilian manpower (By Service, by function in thousands):

	<u>FY 73</u>		<u>FY 74</u>		<u>FY 75</u>	
	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>
<u>Army</u>						
Laboratories	2	8	2	8	2	8
Advanced & Engineering						
Development Projects	2	8	1	8	1	8
Test Activities	4	6	4	5	4	6
Other	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	9	24	8	24	8	24
<u>Navy</u>						
Laboratories	2	29	2	30	2	29
Test Activities	4	9	4	10	4	10
RDT&E Project						
Ships	1	-	1	-	1	-
Other	<u>*</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	7	39	7	40	7	40
<u>Marine Corps</u>						
Combat Development					<u>1/</u>	
Activities	-	-	-	-	1	-
<u>Air Force</u>						
Laboratories	3	7	3	7	3	7
Divisions	5	7	5	7	4	7
Test Centers	9	6	8	6	9	6
Test Range (Eastern)	1	2	1	2	1	2
Other	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	19	23	18	23	18	23

1/ Transferred from Training to more accurately portray these functions.

* Less than 500 spaces

Military experience and expertise has proven essential in transitioning military requirements through the design, development, test and evaluation phases toward the final production of effective weapons systems. As shown above, military expertise is heavily used in test activities, where they possess and maintain operational skills and professional backgrounds which are unavailable in the civilian labor market, e.g., current naval pilot and flight crew qualifications and aircraft carrier landings. Also, military personnel man RDT&E project ships such as the USS GLOVER (AGDE-1).

Civilian R&D manpower is required to efficiently execute the RDT&E program, to provide essential continuity in the performance of in-house military-oriented research, development, test, and evaluation, to provide expertise not readily available from military resources, and to maintain an adequate in-house capability. Civilian manpower is involved in all aspects of the operation and control of the RDT&E program. Civilian scientific and engineering personnel must be available and have the capability to discover and exploit new developments and ideas that will be beneficial in the efficient operation of the total R&D mission as well as improve the effectiveness of combat forces. In-house personnel must be sufficiently qualified and in sufficient numbers to adequately monitor the contractors engaged in research and development activities. They must also be able to efficiently and economically operate the R&D in-house establishment from the laboratory to the test ranges.

A summary of R&D manpower is shown below:

Research and Development Manpower
(Active Duty End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	9	8	8
Navy	7	7	7
Marine Corps	*	*	1
Air Force	<u>19</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>
Total	35	33	34
 Military in Defense Agencies Included Above	 *	 *	 *
 <u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	24	24	24
Navy/Marine Corps	39	40	40
Air Force	23	23	23
Defense Agencies	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	87	88	87
*Less than 500 spaces			

D. Support to Other Nations

This category consists of that manpower associated with the DoD security assistance program and a diverse group of organizations whose functions involve support to other nations. There are two sets of complementary reasons for continuing the security assistance effort, one political and the other military.

Politically, security assistance provides a major contribution to the maintenance of regional stability. It is also the fundamental mechanism for implementing the concept that U.S. allies can, and should in time, become self-reliant. Self-reliance enhances stability and decreases the probability of U.S. involvement in minor conflicts.

Militarily, the security assistance program makes a significant contribution to overall U.S. national strategy by contributing to the strengthening of the self-defense capability of threatened allies, and thus reducing the magnitude of effort that U.S. forces would need to

devote to aid in their defense. U.S. national objectives are also furthered by security assistance in that it serves to foster favorable military relations with our allies thus helping to induce them to pursue national objectives which are compatible with U.S. military strategy and foreign policy, including joint use of various military support facilities.

The Department of Defense, in conjunction with the Department of State and the U.S. Ambassador to each host nation, individually tailors security assistance activities to meet the needs of the country being supported. Approximately 2,100 of the military in this category (42 percent of the total) are assigned to the 43 MAAGs, Missions, and Military Groups worldwide. MAAGs, Missions, and Military Groups perform basically the same functions. Regionally this manpower is divided about 35 percent in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa; about 15 percent in Central and South America, and about 50 percent in Asia and the Western Pacific.

Of the remaining military manpower about half are associated with headquarters and administrative support activities in Thailand such as: the Military Assistance Command-Thailand (MACTHAI), the U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG), and the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). Less than half are associated with U.S. and foreign military training activities such as: the John F. Kennedy Military Assistance Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the School of the Americas at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone; the MACTHAI Training and Development Detachment at Udorn; and the Technical Assistance Field Teams in Iran. The remaining military personnel are associated with such diverse activities as the Inter-American Defense Board, the United Nations Palestine Truce observer teams, the Four Party Joint Military Team in Saigon, and miscellaneous aircraft maintenance, logistical and administrative support of larger security assistance activities.

The civilian manpower in this category provides administrative and technical support to security assistance programs. Nearly 1,000 civilians are associated with MAAGs, Missions, and Military Groups. The remainder are primarily associated with the military training activities. In keeping with Department of Defense policy, civilian employees fill those positions that do not require military skills.

The manpower devoted to Support to Other Nations is predicated upon the workload at each activity, which is in-turn a function of the magnitude of the security assistance effort in that country. The apparent

increase in the Air Force manpower shown in the following table reflects the difference between people actually assigned to these jobs at the end of FY 73 and the programmed level for FY 74 rather than an increase in planned manpower devoted to Support to Other Nations. The decrease in Navy civilian manpower between FY 73 and FY 74 reflects the impact of disestablishing the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV).

The manpower associated with Support to Other Nations for FY 73-75 is:

<u>Support to Other Nations</u> (End-Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	2	2	2
Navy	*	*	*
Marine Corps	*	*	*
Air Force	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Total DoD	4	5	5
<u>Civilians (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	1	1	1
Navy	4	*	*
Air Force	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>
Total	5	2	2

*Less than 500 spaces

E. Geophysical Activities

This category consists of manpower associated with meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, and navigational activities. These activities provide common services involving geophysical phenomena to the DoD, as well as to other departments and agencies.

Meteorological activities include Air Force weather reconnaissance units, Navy Weather Centers, and Air Force base weather detachments. Also, included are a small number of administrative personnel needed to control the operations of the Air Weather Service and the Navy Weather Service. Approximately 40% of Geophysical Activities manpower is involved in meteorological activities.

Topographic and oceanographic activities involve the preparation, production, and dissemination of maps and charts, and the investigation and evaluation of topographic and oceanographic phenomena. Also included are a small number of administrative personnel needed to control the operations of the Defense Mapping Agency and the Oceanographer of the Navy. Approximately 45% of Geophysical Activities manpower is involved in topographic and oceanographic activities.

Navigational activities include units which provide Defense wide navigational support via the operation of navigational satellite control facilities. Approximately 15% of Geophysical Activities manpower is involved in navigational activities.

Manpower requirements for Geophysical Activities are predicated upon the services performed at each location and the activity level of all organizations serviced by each location. The manpower needed to provide these services is determined using standard work measurement and work week criteria. As in other categories, civilian manpower is used to provide continuity, to obtain skills not readily available from military sources and to fill billets not absolutely requiring military incumbents. Included are professional meteorologists and oceanographers who supplement the small military officer community in manning Weather Facilities; meteorological technicians who observe, collect, record and analyze meteorological and oceanographic data in the development of forecasts and related environmental services; technical specialists who perform diverse functions encompassing ADP operations and maintenance, atmospheric and oceanographic modeling, and environmental data product development and dissemination; and a small staff to perform supervisory clerical and logistics functions.

The manpower devoted to the provision of the Defense-wide services associated with Geophysical Activities for FY 73-75 is:

Geophysical Activities
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	*	*	*
Navy	2	2	2
Air Force	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>10</u>
Total DoD	14	13	13
 Military in Defense Agencies included in total above	 1	 1	 1
 <u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Navy	2	2	2
Air Force	1	1	1
Defense Agencies	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>
Total DoD	10	10	10

*Less than 500 spaces.

CHAPTER VII

MISSION SUPPORT FORCES

Combat forces cannot survive in conflict without adequate support. During peacetime, the readiness of our mission forces and their standard of living are the direct products of the support system.

The manpower displayed in the preceding chapters includes support manpower which is organic to the primary mission forces. Organic support activities are performed by personnel assigned to operating units. Examples include men performing maintenance, supply, and administration in an Army or Marine division or on a ship. Such men are normally trained and equipped to bear arms against an enemy and are an integral part of operating units. Each Service periodically reviews the composition of its operating units in order to increase the effectiveness per man in each such unit and to provide adequate organic support with the minimum of manpower.

Equally essential to mission accomplishment as organic support manpower are Mission Support Forces. Mission Support Forces consist of activities which are not organic to a specific kind of unit (e.g., division, squadron, or ship), but directly support a group of complementary units (e.g., fighter squadrons, reconnaissance squadrons, and tactical airlift squadrons) devoted to a common mission (also known as a Major Defense Program, e.g., General Purpose Forces). Mission Support Forces are categorized separately primarily because they are not fully allocated to a specific kind of operating unit. It should be emphasized that although these units are categorized separately for accounting purposes they are not programmed independently. Mission Support Forces are an integral part of the primary mission forces being supported.

Thus, comparisons of primary mission elements and mission support are of questionable value as managerial or decision-making tools. Our forces are structured to accomplish missions in support of attaining national objectives. The mix of resources required to support these forces is designed to provide required capability at minimum cost. No support resources are applied which are not essential for the accomplishment of the combat mission and the maintenance of an acceptable standard of living for Defense Department personnel. The definition of what can be included in mission elements varies by Service because of differing organizations and missions: for example, the Navy and Air Force tend to be weapons systems oriented, requiring fewer men directly engaging the enemy than do the Army and Marine Corps.

Modern technology has dramatically increased the combat capability of our forces and permitted reductions in the number of personnel directly exposed to enemy fire. At the same time, more complex weapons have increased the requirements for supply, transportation, and maintenance personnel. In addition, systems such as tactical nuclear weapons and helicopter gunships, while very destructive on a per weapon basis, have been added to the force and carry with them large support requirements. The net effect has been a decrease in the percentage of men in direct combat positions.

As discussed in detail in Chapter XIII of this report, there are many ways to define mission and support and no simple relationship can be used as an adequate measure of whether there is a proper balance between mission forces and support. Any description of a mission to support mix merely shows a relationship between essential components of a total combat force capability. Organization and mission differences also preclude the meaningful presentation of support and combat relationships among the Services.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the four sub-categories of Mission Support Forces: Reserve Components Support; Base Operating Support; Crew and Unit Training; and Command.

The following table summarizes Mission Support Forces manpower for FY 73-75:

<u>DoD Mission Support Forces</u> (End-Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Reserve Components Support	14	15	14
Base Operating Support	239	208	212
Crew and Unit Training	36	35	35
Command	<u>52</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>49</u>
Total DoD	342	309	311
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Reserve Components Support	20	26	26
Base Operating Support	208	212	213
Crew and Unit Training	2	2	2
Command	<u>10</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>
Total DoD	240	254	255

A. Reserve Components Support

Reserve Components Support consists of those active duty military personnel and civilians which are dedicated to the overall administration of reserve components units, facilities, training programs, and personnel. Included are activities with area responsibilities such as Army Reserve Readiness Regions and Groups, Naval Reserve Districts, Marine Corps Reserve Districts, Air Force Reserve Regions, and National Guard state headquarters. General administrative activities such as the U.S. Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center, the Naval Reserve Manpower Center, and the Air Force Reserve Personnel Center are included. Personnel associated with the operations and maintenance of Army inactive installation garrisons, Army Reserve Training Centers, National Guard Armories, Naval Reserve Training Centers, Naval Reserve Air Stations, Marine Corps Reserve Training Centers, and Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve air bases are included. Manpower associated with two DoD management headquarters, Chief of Naval Reserve and Air Force Reserve, are included.

The manpower displayed in this category represents only that portion which is not attributable to a specific mission force. The Army has an additional 27,500 civilians in Land Forces directly supporting reserve component units. Similarly, the Navy has 1,100 military associated with Tactical Air Forces and 10,300 military in Naval Forces. The Marine Corps has 1,700 military in Land Forces and 2,500 military in Tactical Air Forces which support reserve units. The Air Force has 500 military and 5,600 civilians in Strategic Forces, 500 military and 13,000 civilians in Tactical Air Forces, and 800 military and 9,200 civilians in Mobility Forces providing reserve component support.

The following table summarizes Reserve Components Support manpower for FY 73-75:

Reserve Components Support
(End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	4	5	5
Navy	8	8	8
Marine Corps	*	1	1
Air Force	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total DoD	14	15	14
 <u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	12	16	16
Navy	3	3	3
Marine Corps	*	*	*
Air Force	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>
Total DoD	20	26	26

*Less than 500 spaces

As shown in the above table, about 65% of the Reserve Component Support manpower is civilian. These personnel provide the necessary continuity of operations by performing a variety of basic support functions in administrative and technical areas. Primarily, they work in such specialties as electronics and radar repair, data programming, public works and clerical support.

B. Base Operating Support

Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces) consists primarily of those organizations which operate installations where mission forces are the principal tenant. However, occasionally centrally managed support activities are conducted at these same installations. For example, approximately 50% of Navy specialized training is performed at fleet operating installations. The Base Operating Support manpower related to these centrally managed support activities is not separately identifiable from the manpower providing services to Navy mission forces.

Base Operating Support manpower frequently provides services to active duty manpower from more than one Service. For example, approximately nine thousand Marines in Base Operating Support are security guards at Naval Stations.

Many active CONUS installations are used by Reserve and National Guard units as well as active forces. For Example, Air Force Reserve strategic airlift squadrons operate from Military Airlift Command (MAC)

installations. The Base Operating Support manpower that provides services to Reserve units at active installations is, in most cases, not separately identifiable.

Base Operating Support includes a wide range of diverse services similar to those provided by local government, utilities, and the "service industry" segment of the civilian economy. Included are: (a) services which directly support forces, active and reserve (e.g., airfield operation, wharf operation, and base supply and transportation activities); (b) services which maintain the installation facilities (e.g., building and road construction and repair, police and fire protection, trash and sewage disposal, and utilities operation); (c) services which directly support operations personnel, military and civilian (e.g., food services, laundries, clothing issue, payroll and administrative activities, and housing); and (d) services which maintain the "standard of living" of servicemen, dependents, and retirees (e.g., commissaries, exchanges, theaters, libraries, religious activities, and sports and entertainment facilities).

The requirement for manpower to perform all of these Base Operating Support services depends upon workload. The relationship of workload and manpower for each Base Operating Support service is based on engineered standards which are periodically revised by the Services. The total manpower requirement is determined from manning documents covering the various types of services performed. See Chapter XIII, for a discussion of this process.

The amount of manpower required in Base Operating Support is dependent upon: (a) the number of installations; (b) the size of the population supported; (c) the composition of the population supported; and (d) the range and level of services provided. The decision to open or retain an installation generates a workload that requires a relatively "fixed" number of people (activities such as road repair or electrical power plants are relatively insensitive to the number of people supported by the installation, but, rather, depend on the existence of the installation). The "fixed" requirements can change over time because of policy decisions to change the level of service provided (e.g., longer commissary hours, off-duty shuttle buses, etc.).


The "variable" portion of Base Operating Support manpower depends upon the size and composition of the population that is being supported. This population consists of active duty personnel and their dependents, and to a lesser extent, retirees and their dependents, Reserve and National Guard personnel, civilian Defense employees, members of other Uniformed Services (e.g., Coast Guard), and Foreign Service personnel and their dependents. The active duty serviceman assigned to an installation, who is accompanied by dependents, is the largest consumer of Base Operating Support services.

Organizational differences among the Services, resulting from the operational differences in the way each accomplishes its assigned missions, significantly impact upon the portion of total Service manpower which must be devoted to Base Operating Support. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Base Operating Support manpower primarily provides "fixed-site" services (e.g., theaters, commissaries, housing, etc.) to self-supporting units. Army and Marine Corps divisions, and Navy ships, provide all "necessary" services (e.g., food services, transportation, supply, etc.) with the manpower assigned to the unit. This support manpower accompanies combat manpower when a unit leaves an installation to execute an operational mission, and thus is categorized as mission manpower. A portion of Base Operating Support manpower for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps is engaged in providing "necessary" services (e.g., food services, transportation, supply, etc.) solely to personnel who are providing "fixed-site" services to the entire installation population.


Conversely, Air Force Base Operating Support manpower not only provides "fixed-site" services to the entire installation population, but also provides all "necessary" services (e.g., food services, transportation, supply, etc.) to the entire population. Air Force operational personnel leave an installation for only a few hours while executing an operational mission (compared to days, or weeks, for the other Services). Air Force support manpower does not accompany operational personnel on operational missions. This support manpower is aggregated into Base Operating Support because it remains at an installation, including those in combat areas; however, it is equally as essential to successful mission accomplishment as support manpower in Army divisions or on Navy ships. Air Force Base Operating Support personnel on Tactical Air Command bases are subject to deployment to combat theaters along with operational units, thus the Air Force must rely more heavily on military personnel in this category than do the Army or the Navy.

The differences in organizational structure among the Services are illustrated in the following comparison of the treatment of typical aggregation categories.

Army, Navy, Marine Corps



Air Force



The trend of decreasing manpower associated with Base Operating Support from FY 73 to FY 74 reflects a portion of the impact of the CONUS installation realignment actions announced by DoD in January 1973. Additionally, for the Air Force, a portion of the decrease results from the programmed reductions in Southeast Asia. The apparent increases from FY 74 to FY 75 are actually changes in the DoD accounting system and are discussed in the following paragraphs.

The increase in Navy manpower between FY 74 and FY 75 reflects the transfer of billets for Fleet Maintenance Assistance Groups (FMAG) in support of the Pacific Fleet from Individual Training. In FY 75, there will be about 3,500 FMAG billets in Base Operating Support (an increase of about 3,100 from end FY 74) for the Pacific Fleet. There are about 700 for an Atlantic Fleet (an increase of about 100) in Base Operating Support. An additional 2,600 Atlantic Fleet FMAGs are included in Naval Forces.

The increase in Army manpower between FY 74 and FY 75 reflects the impact within the DoD programming structure of the creation of the U.S. Army Communications Command (USACC) from the U. S. Army Strategic Communications Command (STRATCOM). With this reorganization, USACC acquired worldwide responsibility for all base communications resources. Similarly, the base communications resources of the Air Force, which are under the overall responsibility of the Air Force Communications Service (AFCS), have been identified to the major commands which they support in the DoD programming structure. These actions resulted in the base communications manpower in this category increasing for the Army from about 4,100 to about 7,700, and for the Air Force from about 2,100 to about 5,100. These increases in Base Operating Support are offset by decreases in Centrally Managed Communications. The base communications manpower in this category remains about 1,800 for the Navy and about 800 for the Marine Corps.

The following table summarizes Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces) for FY 73-75:

Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces)
(End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	36	23	25
Navy	39	36	41
Marine Corps	21	17	17
Air Force	<u>143</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>130</u>
Total DoD	239	208	212
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	95	95	97
Navy	38	39	39
Marine Corps	10	11	11
Air Force	<u>65</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>67</u>
Total DoD	208	212	213

C. Crew and Unit Training

Crew and Unit Training consists of units which provide training to or evaluation of organized crews and units for the performance of a specific mission. This training is direct and operational in nature. It provides the necessary link between the specialized, centrally managed training activities that provide individuals the basic skills to do a job, and the operational units themselves. Here, the individuals are welded into a unit, and skills are sharpened and directed toward mission accomplishment in combat. Where aircraft are involved, advanced training is provided by combat readiness air wings (Navy), Marine combat crew readiness training groups, and combat crew training squadrons (Air Force), in the specific aircraft to be flown into combat, thus making the transition from the undergraduate training aircraft where the basic flying skills are learned to the high performance operational aircraft. When crews leave these units they are ready to join deployed operational units and can fly combat missions. The ground forces of the Army and Marine Corps take new men directly into their units and perform the same function through field exercises and maneuvers. Here, however, individuals are not using unfamiliar, complex air weapons costing millions of dollars. In aviation, the type and scope of operational requirements are so different that combat aircraft training is best accomplished outside the operational unit.

The Army operates specialized warfare centers (e.g., arctic and jungle warfare), and the Navy operates fleet training centers that perform similar types of functions for teams of entire operational units and ship crews.

The manpower levels shown below do not include approximately 4,000 Air Force military spaces involved in crew and unit training for B-52s, KC-135s, and FB-111s. These manpower spaces are categorized as Strategic Offensive Forces since they also have a combat mission. The manpower resources to support Combat Crew Training School (CCTS) are driven by the aircraft involved and the student training loads. The Air Force program was reduced in this year's budget in both FY 74 and FY 75 by reducing the programmed flying hours in the CCTS program.

The student pipeline programmed for Crew and Unit Training is included in the Students totals in Chapter IX. For FY 75 this is about 3,100 in the Navy and 600 in the Air Force.

The following table summarizes Crew and Unit Training manpower for FY 73-75:

Crew and Unit Training
(End-Strength in Thousands)


	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	1	1	1
Navy	13	14	14
Marine Corps	4	3	3
Air Force	<u>18</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>
Total DoD	36	35	35
 <u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	*	*	*
Navy	*	1	1
Air Force	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total DoD	2	2	2 .

*Less than 500 spaces

D. Command

Command (Mission Support Forces) provides manpower for (1) Non-Service organizations, such as International, Combined, and Unified Commands; (2) Service Management Headquarters (including direct headquarters support activities); (3) Operating commands; (4) Service administrative activities; and (5) special activities, such as combat developments and ceremonial activities.

ILLUSTRATION OF COMPARATIVE SERVICE ORGANIZATIONAL ECHELONS



Notes:

1. Organizations above the hatched line are included in the definition of DoD Management Headquarters.
2. Organizations above the dashed line are included in the Command category, along with other activities identified in this section.
3. Numbered Armies are retained in CONUS as administrative headquarters. Overseas theaters have no organization in the chain of command between the theater commander and the corps.
4. The Navy operational structure below the numbered fleet is dependent upon the mission. The structure shown illustrates the relationship between the administrative structure for the duration of an operation. The task organization can interface with the administrative organization at any level depending upon the specific mission (e.g., a task group commander can be a ship commanding officer, a group commander, or a squadron commander).
5. The Fleet Marine Force is under the Fleet Command for purposes of operational control. The Marine Amphibious Force is not manned during peacetime, and draws its manpower during wartime primarily from the peacetime assets of the Fleet Marine Force.

Command (Mission Support Forces) includes a number of echelons of organizations which varies among the Services; similar organizational echelons occasionally are aggregated in different categories. For example, included in General Purpose Forces are operating commands such as Army corps and divisions, and Marine divisions and wings. However, operating commands, such as Navy numbered fleets and ship groups, and Air Force air divisions are included in Command. The illustration on the preceding page depicts the treatment of these organizational echelons for each of the Services.

On October 5, 1973 a review of headquarters requirements was directed with the objective of achieving substantial manpower savings which could be turned into combat capability. The study which is now underway, considers all the major headquarters of the Department of Defense, including the total manpower assigned to the Defense Agencies. The study measures the impact of alternative reductions of 10%, 20%, and 30%. The consolidation and elimination of functions rather than across-the-board reductions is emphasized.

It is anticipated that the initial results of the study will be presented to the Congress in April 1974.

The following subsections describe the various types of activities which are included in the Command (Mission Support Forces) category. It should be noted that the terms Headquarters and Command are not synonymous as the following discussion indicates.

1. Non-Service Organizations

These organizations, include international and unified headquarters and associated administrative support and special activities. The Services provide manpower to these organizations but the JCS determines the number required. Manpower requirements are based upon annual validations of manpower programs by the JCS and periodic manpower surveys predicated on wartime operational rather than peacetime administrative considerations. Included are:

a. International Military Headquarters - These headquarters are responsible for the command and control of operating forces of allied nations in combined military operations. These headquarters are primarily

elements of the military component of NATO. NATO headquarters included are: NATO Military Committee, Supreme Allied Commander-Atlantic, Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, Allied Forces-Northern Europe, Allied Forces-Central Europe, Allied Forces-Southern Europe, and their subsidiary headquarters. Other headquarters included are: Central Treaty Organizations, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and North American Air Defense Command.

b. Unified Command Headquarters - These headquarters are responsible for the command and control of operating forces of all Services in unified and coordinated activities under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included are the headquarters of: Continental Air Defense Command, U.S. European Command, Pacific Command and subordinate headquarters, Atlantic Command and subordinate headquarters, Alaskan Command, U. S. Southern Command, and U.S. Readiness Command.

c. International and Unified Headquarters Support Activities - These organizations include airborne command posts, communications centers, special intelligence activities, and administrative support activities dedicated to and under the control of commanders of international or unified commands.

3. Service Management Headquarters

These headquarters provide Service command and control of deployed (or deployable) forces and forces tasked with the defense of the continental United States. The headquarters elements of the following organizations are included: U. S. Army-Europe and Theater Army Support Command, U.S. Army-Pacific, U.S. Army-Alaska, U.S. Army-Southern Command, U.S. Army Forces Command and CONUS Numbered Armies, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief-Pacific Fleet, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Naval Forces-Europe, Numbered Fleets, Navy type Commands (i.e., naval air forces, submarine forces, cruiser/destroyer forces, amphibious forces, mine warfare forces, service forces, and Fleet Marine Forces), Strategic Air Command, Alaskan Air Command, Aerospace Defense Command, Tactical Air Command, Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Military Airlift Command, and Numbered Air Forces. The support squadrons associated with the above Air Force major air command headquarters are also included.

4. Service Operating Commands

These organizations provide operational and administrative control of operating forces. Organizations included are: Navy ship groups, ship squadrons, ship divisions, operating control areas, fleet air commands, fleet air wings, and carrier air wings; and Air Force air divisions and strategic missile divisions .

5. Service Administrative Activities

These are separate organizations which perform administrative support activities, such as personnel, finance, data processing, judge advocate (legal), inspection, safety, etc. These organizations are differentiated from headquarters, and operating commands (which also have people performing some of these functions) in that they have no control over any force units.

6. Special Activities

The Command category serves as a collector for miscellaneous organizations which, because of the nature of the mission of the organization, or the overall organizational structure of the Services, do not conveniently fit into any other category. Included are:

a. Combat Developments Activities - These activities are engaged in the development testing, and evaluation of new concepts, tactics, organizational structure and equipment requirements, policies, usages of equipment, etc. As such they are a hybrid between research development and administrative support (USMC personnel in this category are reported with the Research and Development portion of Auxiliary Forces.)

b. Ceremonial Activities - These activities consist of Service bands and are primarily associated with unit morale. recruiting and public relations.

c. Mission Evaluation Activities - These organizations evaluate strategic offensive and defensive operational unit effectiveness during daily training exercises. Organizations included are: combat evaluation squadrons (SAC); strategic missile evaluation squadrons (SAC); defense systems evaluation squadrons (ADC); and radar evaluation squadrons (ADC and USAFE).

d. Mission Operations/Control Activities - These organizations operate airborne command posts, tactical warfare centers, special communications activities, specialized security activities, Tactical Intelligence Activities and reconnaissance interpretation activities in direct support of major command overall operations.

e. Logistical Support Activities - These organizations operate special aircraft maintenance activities, munitions activities, aircraft delivery groups, and materiel support activities.

The following table provides a detailed summary of manpower in each of the components of Command (Mission Support Forces) for FY 75:

Command (Mission Support Forces)
(FY 75 End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
<u>Military</u>				
<u>Non-Service Organizations</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>.1</u>	<u>4.5</u>
International Headquarters	3.0	.9	*	1.7
Unified Command Headquarters	1.1	.9	.1	1.4
International/Unified Hqs. Spt	.2	.9	*	1.4
<u>Service Management Headquarters</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>10.9</u>
<u>Service Operating Commands</u>		<u>6.4</u>	*	<u>.8</u>
<u>Administrative Activities</u>		<u>.8</u>		<u>.3</u>
<u>Special Activities</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>.2</u>		<u>6.3</u>
Combat Developments Activities	3.3		<u>1/</u>	.3
Ceremonial Activities		.2		.9
Mission Evaluation Activities				1.4
Mission Operations/Control Activities				.6
Logistical Support Activities	—	—	—	<u>3.1</u>
 TOTAL Military	 10.5	 14.3	 1.8	 22.8

*Less than 50 spaces

1/ Reported under Auxiliary Forces (Research and Development)

Command (Mission Support Forces)
(FY 75 End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
<u>Non-Service Organizations</u>	<u>.3</u>	<u>3.6</u>		<u>.3</u>
International Headquarters	.1	*		*
Unified Command Headquarters	.2	.6		.2
International/Unified Hqs Spt		3.0		.1
 <u>Service Management Headquarters</u>	 <u>2.6</u>	 <u>.7</u>	 <u>*</u>	 <u>3.2</u>
<u>Service Operating Commands</u>		<u>.4</u>		<u>.1</u>
<u>Administrative Activities</u>		<u>.5</u>		<u>.1</u>
<u>Special Activities</u>	<u>.5</u>	<u>*</u>		<u>.8</u>
Combat Development Activities	.5	*		.1
Mission Evaluation Activities				.1
Mission Operations/Control Activities				.1
Logistical Support Activities	—	—	—	<u>.5</u>
 Total Civilians	 3.4	 5.4	 *	 4.4

*Less than 50 spaces

The decreasing trend in Command military manpower between FY 73 and FY 75 shown in the table below reflects continuing DoD efforts to reduce headquarters and headquarters support manpower. The apparent increases in the manpower devoted to Command are discussed in the following paragraphs.

The increase in Air Force military manpower between FY 73 and FY 74 reflects a change to the DoD accounting system. Prior to FY 74 the Air Force manpower associated with international headquarters in Europe was not separately identifiable from other Air Force headquarters manpower. This manpower is categorized under Command Central Support Forces for FY 73 in this report. Reflecting this manpower in Command-Mission Support Forces would show both FY 73 and FY 74 at about 25 thousand military.

The increase in Army civilian manpower between FY 73 and FY 74 reflects the impact that permissive retirement options in May-June 1973 had on actual civilian strength. The programmed civilian strength in both FY 73 and FY 74 is about 4,000.

The increase in Navy civilian manpower between FY 73 and FY 74 reflects the impact of disestablishing the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) and transferring the residual civilian manpower in Saigon to the control of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). This manpower is categorized under Support to Other Nations for FY 73 in this report. This manpower is administering the residual military assistance program in Vietnam. The number of people involved decreases from about 3,700 at end FY 73, to about 3,000 at end FY 75.

Command (Mission Support Forces)
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	12	11	10
Navy	16	14	14
Marine Corps	2	2	2
Air Force	<u>23</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>23</u>
Total DoD	52	51	49
Military in International, Combined and Unified Commands included in total above	11	12	12
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	3	4	3
Navy	2	5	5
Marine Corps	-	-	-
Air Force	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>
Total DoD	10	13	13
Civilian in International, Combined and Unified Commands included in total above	1	4	4

CHAPTER VIII

CENTRAL SUPPORT FORCES

Central Support Forces consist of those activities which are not easily associated with a single Defense mission, and are therefore normally centrally programmed and managed. Included are such activities as depot level supply and maintenance, individual training, "fixed-site" medical facilities, Service departmental headquarters, and support provided to these activities. These activities provide common support services to all Defense manpower, and to other persons (e.g., retirees) and organizations (e.g., the Coast Guard) not directly related to the primary DoD task of providing national security. These activities are programmed and managed centrally to insure that all of the missions of DoD receive the support necessary for successful task accomplishment.

The level of Central Support Forces manpower does not vary directly as a function of the level of mission forces manpower or total military manpower. For example, depot maintenance manpower repairs equipment for Reserve components and allies (under the Military Assistance Program) and maintains war reserve stocks, in addition to serving active force requirements. Individual Training manpower is primarily dependent upon enlistments and skill inventories, rather than total strengths. Medical Support is a function of retirees and their dependents as well as active duty personnel and their dependents. Additionally, there are legislative requirements to retain the level of certain activities (e.g., the number of Naval districts).

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the sub-categories of Central Support Forces, which are: Base Operating Support, Medical Support, Personnel Support, Individual Training, Command, Logistics, and Federal Agency Support.

In Central Support Forces, the civilian composition increases from about 62% in FY 73 to about 66% in FY 75, thus reflecting the continuing DoD effort to civilianize support functions where feasible.

The following table summarizes Central Support Forces manpower for FY 73-75:

DoD Central Support Forces
(End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Base Operating Support	47	42	42
Medical Support	92	83	82
Personnel Support	32	31	31
Individual Training	151	140	131
Command	44	38	37
Logistics	21	21	20
Federal Agency Support	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
	389	358	346
 Military in Defense Agencies included in total above	 5	 5	 4
 <u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Base Operating Support	99	107	107
Medical Support	41	46	47
Personnel Support	10	11	11
Individual Training	37	43	45
Command	63	63	61
Logistics	<u>389</u>	<u>389</u>	<u>385</u>
	639	658	657
 Civilians in Defense Agencies included in total above	 59	 63	 62

A. Base Operating Support

Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) consists of those organizations which either operate individual training or logistics installations, or provide centrally managed Service-wide support (e.g., Navy Public Works Centers, Navy commissary stores, Navy exchanges and Air Force laundries). Because of the multi-activity nature of Defense installations, some central support installations also provide services to mission forces (e.g., B-52s operate from Wright-Patterson AFB, which is a logistics installation).

The utilization of Base Operating Support manpower for FY 75 is:

Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces)
(FY 75 End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
<u>ARMY</u>		
Logistics Installations	1	4
Training Installations	<u>12</u>	<u>20</u>
	13	24
<u>NAVY</u>		
Centrally Managed Services	3	20
Logistics Installations ^{a/}	-	-
Training Installations ^{b/}	2	*
Training Installations ^{c/}	<u>(7)</u>	<u>(5)</u>
	5	20
<u>MARINE CORPS</u>		
Logistics Installations	1	2
Training Installations ^{c/}	<u>(4)</u>	<u>(2)</u>
	1	2
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
Centrally Managed Services	-	1
Logistics Installations	3	14
Training Installations	14	13
Headquarters Installations	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>
	22	31
<u>DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY</u>		
Logistics Installations	-	7

* Indicates less than 500 spaces

() Non-add, manpower included in Individual Training totals.

- a/ The installation operations manpower for Navy shipyards and supply centers are not separable from the manpower performing the mission operations of these installations. Thus, this manpower is included with the logistics manpower. Naval Air Rework Facilities are collocated with Naval Air Stations and are supported by Mission Support Forces Base Operating Support manpower (which is not separately identifiable from support to primary mission forces).
- b/ Approximately 50% of Navy specialized training is conducted at fleet operating installations and is supported by Mission Support Forces Base Operating Support manpower (which is not separately identifiable from support to primary mission forces).
- c/ The Navy and Marine Corps training establishments are organized such that much of what is categorized as training manpower is performing both training support and Base Operating Support services. This "dual" purpose manpower is shown in the Navy and Marine Corps portions of the above table as the numbers in parentheses.

Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) manpower provides the same wide range of services as the Base Operating Support manpower discussed in Chapter VII. The primary distinction between these two manpower categories is "who" is being supported, rather than the services being provided. Thus, the requirement for the Base Operating Support manpower in Central Support Forces is a function of the same parameters as Base Operating Support manpower in Mission Support Forces.

The relative stability of the activities performed within this element allow for the significant employment of civilian manpower. For example, approximately 12,000 civilians are employed in the Navy Public Work Centers which provide comprehensive public works support not only to Navy customers, but also to other Services. The civilian skills employed include civil and electrical engineers who provide professional and technical service; carpenters and electricians who perform building maintenance and repair, sanitation and janitorial personnel; and accountants and management analysts to provide the support for all the functions within the Public Works Centers.

The manpower trends shown below do not fully reflect the impact of installation realignments due to the transfer of base communications resources within the DoD programming structure. The rationale for these transfers was discussed in Chapter VII. These transfer actions resulted in the base communications manpower in this category increasing for the Army from about 2,600 to about 4,200, and for the Air Force from about 400 to about 2,000. These increases in Base Operating Support are offset by decreases in Centrally Managed Communications. The base communications manpower in this category remains about 500 for the Navy and about 200 for the Marine Corps.

The following table summarizes Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) manpower for FY 73-75:

Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces)
(End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	17	14	14
Navy	5	5	5
Marine Corps	1	1	1
Air Force	<u>24</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>22</u>
Total DoD	47	42	42
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	35	46	47
Navy	21	21	20
Marine Corps	2	2	2
Air Force	35	31	31
Defense Agencies	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>
Total DoD	99	107	107

B. Medical Support

Medical Support provides the resources for the operation of Department of Defense "fixed-site" medical activities, and compensation for dependent and retiree care in non-military medical facilities.

The Department of Defense operates 214 hospitals and approximately 400 dispensaries and out-patient clinics with a current total of 33,332 operating beds. The Department of Defense operates these medical facilities to provide necessary care for wounded and ill servicemen. Pursuant to Chapter 55, Title 10, U.S. Code, medical care is also provided to persons who are not in the active military. In addition to active duty members, 7.8 million retirees, dependents and other beneficiaries are eligible to receive medical care from the Department of Defense. Fifty-six percent of out-patient care (total out-patient visits in FY 73 were 49.7 million) and 41% of in-patient care provided in military facilities was devoted to dependents and retirees in FY 73.

Many dependents and retirees either prefer to go to civilian physicians or live in areas where they cannot receive medical care at military facilities due to distance or because of a limited capacity within the medical facility. These people (a figure approximating one million) are reimbursed for a major portion of their medical expenditures through the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). Expansion of CHAMPUS funding over recent years (331% increase FY 68 to FY 75 has enabled the Defense Department to meet the medical needs of the dependent population and the increasing retiree population (242% increase FY 65 to FY 75 estimate) without significant increases in Medical Support manpower.

The number of people needed to staff medical activities is based on detailed workload studies and manpower surveys for each facility. For example, the number of nurses authorized in a hospital depends in major part on the current and historical patient loads and trends. A contractual study, designed to more precisely determine physicians and other health professional requirements, is underway. The rapidly shrinking number of these personnel makes such a determination extremely important. CHAMPUS funding is based on the expected average number of claims per person utilizing CHAMPUS, as well as the growth in the population utilizing CHAMPUS and expected inflation of civilian medical costs.

Within DoD, a Health Personnel All Volunteer Task Force is conducting a study designed to illuminate specific problems associated with the establishment of an all-volunteer military health force for the United States. The Task Force report is placing emphasis on (1) developing the DoD health personnel plan, (2) evaluating methods to estimate the future demands for health services in the DoD, (3) estimating the magnitude of the health personnel procurement and retention problems, (4) evaluating selected alternate patterns of health services, and (5) compensation as a link between supply and demand of health personnel.

A study group consisting of HEW, OMB, and DoD representatives is working with the DoD study group in a comprehensive evaluation of the military health services system. The study, which is to be completed in late 1974, will include an examination of requirements for and supply of professional medical personnel, quality of care, and costs of providing care. The group's report is to make recommendations for modifications necessary to insure that the military health services system will continue to meet DoD health care objectives and complement the President's national health care initiatives.

The following table summarizes Medical Support manpower for FY 73-75. Manpower changes reflect a downward trend in military and a slightly upward trend in civilians. This is due in part to military-to-civilian conversions and a small reduction in the total medical force workload factors, such as time in the hospital and number of patients.

Medical Support
(End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	40	32	33
Navy	20	20	19
Air Force	<u>32</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>30</u>
Total DoD	92	83	82
 <u>Civilian</u> (Direct & Indirect Hire)			
Army	25	29	30
Navy	9	10	10
Air Force	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>
Total DoD	41	46	47

C. Personnel Support

Personnel Support includes manpower to provide miscellaneous services and functions related to active duty military personnel. The major components of this category are: Recruiting and Examining; Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities; Overseas Dependents Education Programs; and Other Personnel Support.

1. Recruiting and Examining

Recruiting and Examining manpower operates about 4,600 recruiting offices, the Service central recruiting activities (e.g., preparation and distribution of mass media advertising), and the 74 Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES). The manpower required for these activities depends on the need for new accessions, the average productivity of a recruiter, and the number of men examined annually at AFEES.

Recruiting manpower has increased about 68% since FY 70 (the last fiscal year prior to the decision by the President to establish an All Volunteer Force). In FY 75, there are approximately 21,400 military personnel and 3,900 civilians associated with recruiting and examining.

2. Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities

Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities manpower performs investigations of applicants for Defense positions requiring security clearance, and operates various programs designed to prevent the compromise of classified information. The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) was created in FY 73 to consolidate the investigative activities under central direction. In FY 75, there are approximately 3,300 military personnel and 1,900 civilians associated with counterintelligence and investigative activities. This represents a 36% reduction from the level prior to the creation of DIS. The Defense Investigative Service is considered to be a DoD management headquarters.

3. Overseas Dependent Education Program

Overseas Dependent Education Program manpower operates the elementary and secondary school systems for the children of military and Defense civilian personnel stationed outside of the United States. In FY 75, this program involved less than 50 military personnel, approximately 7,700 nine-month civilian employees (who are not counted in civilian end strengths).

4. Other Personnel Support

Other Personnel Support manpower is mainly involved in the operation of Army Reception Centers, Disciplinary Barracks (including Rehabilitation and Retraining activities), centrally funded Welfare and Morale Service programs, and the Armed Forces Information Program. Additional activities included are the U.S. Army Field Band, the U. S. Army Band, the U.S. Navy Band, the U.S. Air Force Band, and the USAF Honor Guard. In FY 75, this category contains approximately 5,100 military personnel and 2,100 civilians.

The following table summarizes Personnel Support military manpower for FY 73-75:

<u>Personnel Support</u> (End-Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	16	14	14
Navy	7	7	7
Marine Corps	3	3	3
Air Force	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>
Total DoD	32	31	31
Military in Defense Agencies included in total above	2	2	1
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	5	5	6
Navy	2	2	2
Marine Corps	*	*	*
Air Force	2	2	2
Defense Agencies	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total DoD	10	11	11

*Less than 500 spaces

D. Individual Training

Individual Training manpower consists of the manpower conducting and supporting the formal training and education of officers, enlisted personnel, Service academy cadets, and civilian students in ROTC and

similar programs. The purpose of the individual training function is to impart required skills and knowledge to individuals so that they are prepared to apply these skills in later assignments as qualified members of operational organizations. This focus on the individual distinguishes Individual Training from Crew and Unit Training, a sub-category of Mission Support Forces, and training conducted by operational units in order to achieve and maintain a state of combat readiness. This section will present only a short overview of individual training in the Department of Defense. A more detailed analysis of individual training will be presented to the Congress, as required by P.L. 93-155, in the Military Manpower Training Report for FY 1975.

In order to have a smoothly functioning, efficient and ready military establishment, it must be manned with the right number of personnel, with the proper skills, at the right time. Producing these trained personnel is the task of the training establishment. The rate at which personnel must be trained in a given skill is a function of projected skill requirements versus projected skill inventories. If the inventory of qualified personnel in a skill is forecast to be less than the need, replacements must be trained to fill the projected vacancies.

Individual training is subdivided into five categories, each of which is briefly described in the following paragraphs. In addition, some manpower is related to more than one type of training and is considered to be overall training support.

1. Recruit Training

Recruit training includes all basic introductory and indoctrination training given to all enlisted personnel immediately after entrance into a Service. Reserve enlisted personnel coming on active duty for initial training also undergo recruit training and form a considerable proportion of the training workload. The length of recruit training varies from six weeks in the Air Force to eleven weeks in the Marine Corps. Most graduates of recruit training proceed to initial specialized skill training, where they learn the skills associated with a particular military specialty and become qualified to be productive members of operational units.

2. Officer Acquisition Training

This category includes all types of education and training leading to a commission in one of the Services. The associated manpower includes the faculties and staffs of the Service academies, ROTC instructors, and instructors and staffs in officer candidate schools.

3. Specialized Skill Training

Specialized skill training provides individuals with new or higher degrees of skill in military specialties to match specific job requirements. Participants include graduates from recruit or officer acquisition training learning skills at the basic level and, at the more advanced level, officers and enlisted personnel with some operational experience who are being prepared for jobs of greater responsibility or technical complexity.

4. Flight Training

Flight training includes all training of pilots and navigators, exclusive of combat crew training. Course lengths vary considerably according to the needs of each Service and, in the case of pilot training, the type of aircraft -- jet, propeller-driven, or helicopter -- the student is being trained to fly.

5. Professional Development Education

This category includes educational courses conducted at the higher-level Service schools or civilian institutions to broaden the outlook and knowledge of senior military personnel or to impart knowledge in advanced academic disciplines to meet Service and joint requirements. Almost all of the associated manpower is involved in operating the intermediate and senior Service schools (i.e., command and staff colleges and war colleges) and Service graduate schools (i.e., Air Force Institute of Technology, Navy Postgraduate School).

Individual Training manpower includes only manpower involved in the conduct or support of training. Active manpower undergoing training -- trainees, students, and cadets -- is carried under Individuals, requirements for those personnel are discussed in Chapter IX.

In general, the requirement for Individual Training manpower is based on the number of personnel being trained. The number of personnel required to instruct and support a given student/trainee load is based on work measurement studies and historical experience, codified into staffing guides and similar manning documents. The overall size of the training establishment is sensitive to the number of new Active and Reserve accessions and the rate of retention of experienced personnel.

The following table summarizes Individual Training manpower for FY 1973-75:

<u>DoD Individual Training Active Manpower^{a/}</u> (End Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	65	55	52
Navy	41	44	38
Marine Corps	14	13	12
Air Force	<u>30</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>29</u>
Total	151	140	131
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	16	19	21
Navy	11	14	15
Marine Corps	2	2	2
Air Force	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>
Total	37	43	48

a/ Does not include Active trainees, students or cadets (see Chapter IX): Reserve Component trainees or students; or ROTC cadets in training in civilian status.

E. Command

Command (Central Support Forces) provides manpower for: (1) non-Service Management Headquarters; (2) Service Management Headquarters; (3) Service administrative activities; and (4) special activities, such as, ceremonial activities and Civil Air Patrol.

As indicated previously in discussing Command (Mission Support Forces), a review of headquarters requirements was directed with the objective of achieving substantial manpower savings which could be turned into combat capability.

The result of this study may result in additional manpower reductions in the headquarters manpower covered by Command (Central Support Forces).

The following subsections describe the various types of activities which are included in the Command (Central Support Forces) category. It should be noted that the terms Headquarters and Command are not synonymous as the following discussion indicates.

1. Non-Service Management Headquarters

The category contains manpower assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). These headquarters are engaged in the overall policy formulation; planning, programming, and budgeting; and administration and operational control of the Department of Defense. The Services provide military personnel to the organizations, but the requirement is established by OSD/JCS. The number of people associated with these headquarters is dependent upon the degree of centralization necessary for effective management and the extent of interaction with the Congress necessary to explain defense programs.

2. Service Management Headquarters

These headquarters provide overall policy formulation; planning, programming, and budgeting; and administration of the entire Service. Also included are headquarters which are responsible for the administration of individual training and depot-level logistics activities. Included are: Service departmental staffs (secretariat and Service staff), U.S. Army Materiel Command and Commodity Commands, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Army Health Services Command, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Military District of Washington, U.S. Army - Japan, Naval Materiel Command and Systems Commands, Chief of Naval Training and Training Commands, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Naval District of Washington, Numbered Naval Districts, Commander-U.S. Naval Forces-South, Air Force Logistics Command and Air Materiel Areas, Air Training Command, Headquarters Command and U.S. Air Force Southern Command.

3. Administrative Activities

These are separate organizations which perform centralized administrative support activities, such as: personnel; finance; data processing; judge advocate (legal); inspection; safety; etc. Also included are personnel devoted to public affairs and audio-visual activities.

4. Special Activities in Command

The Command category serves as a collector for miscellaneous organizations which because of the nature of the mission of the organization or the overall organizational structure of the Services, do not conveniently fit into any other category. Included are:

a. Ceremonial Activities - Organizations included are: Service bands; honor guards; the U.S.S. Constitution; etc. The requirements for this manpower are primarily related to public interest in the specific activities of these organizations.

b. Civil Air Patrol - The Department of the Air Force has the mission of providing support to the Civil Air Patrol. The requirements for manpower in this activity are related to the organization of the Civil Air Patrol, currently one wing for each state.

c. Criminal Investigation Activities - These organizations perform functions similar to those associated with the detective divisions and crime laboratories of civilian police departments. These organizations investigate crimes committed on DoD property (including leased space) and assist federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in investigations of alleged crimes involving defense personnel. The manpower requirements are a function of workload and the geographic dispersion of defense installations.

d. Postal/Courier Activities - These organizations transport classified and official correspondence between military installations world-wide. Included are the Army Courier Service and the Air Force Postal/Courier Service.

e. Intelligence Support Activities - Included is the Air Force Intelligence Service which provides managerial support to intelligence operations.

f. Logistic Support Activities - Included for the Air Force are special aircraft maintenance activities, munitions maintenance activities, explosive ordnance disposal activities, and the Air Force Civil Engineering Center. Included for the Navy are organizations which support the Naval District of Washington.

g. Operational Evaluation Activities - Included is the administration and operational evaluation of new Navy weapon systems. These services are performed by the Operational Test and Evaluation Forces.

Command(Central Support Forces)
(FY 75 End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USAF</u>
<u>Military</u>				
<u>OSD and JCS</u> a/	<u>.5</u>	<u>.5</u>	<u>.1</u>	<u>.7</u>
<u>Service Management Headquarters</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>4.6</u>
<u>Administrative Activities</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>5.6</u>
<u>Special Activities</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>.2</u>	<u>3.2</u>
Ceremonial Activities b/		<u>.2</u>	<u>.2</u>	<u>.8</u>
Civil Air Patrol				<u>.2</u>
Criminal Investigation	1.5			
Activities				
Postal/Courier Activities c/	.2			1.7
Intelligence Support				
Activities				.1
Logistical Support Activities		.3		.4
Operational Evaluation Activities		<u>.4</u>		
	<u>10.7</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>14.1</u>
 Total Military				
 <u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
<u>Service Management Headquarters</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>6.4</u>
<u>Administrative Activities</u>	<u>13.1</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>5.0</u>
<u>Special Activities</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>.5</u>		<u>.5</u>
Civil Air Patrol				
Criminal Investigation	1.1			
Activities				
Postal/Courier Activities				.3
Intelligence Support				
Activities				.1
Logistical Support Activities		<u>.5</u>		<u>*</u>
 Total Civilian	 24.5	 16.5	 2.0	 11.9

* Less than 50 spaces

a/ Navy includes 0.1 thousand for unified commands.

b/ Additional ceremonial activities military manpower is included in other categories as follows:

Army - 1.8 thousand, Land Forces; 1.1 thousand, Base Operating Support (CSF); 0.4 thousand, Personnel Support.

Navy - 0.2 thousand, Base Operating Support (MSF); 0.2 thousand, Command (MSF); 0.2 thousand, Personnel Support; 0.1 thousand, Individual Training.

Air Force - 0.9 thousand, Command (MSF); 0.4 thousand, Personnel Support.

c/ Naval Courier Service military manpower (0.2 thousand) is aggregated in Intelligence and Security.

The decreasing trend in command manpower reflects continuing DoD efforts to reduce headquarters and headquarters support manpower.

The following table summarizes Command (Central Support Forces) for FY 73-75:

<u>Command (Central Support Forces)</u> (End-Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	13	11	11
Navy	9	8	8
Marine Corps	5	4	4
Air Force	<u>17</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>14</u>
Total DoD	44	38	37
Military in OSD/JCS included in total above	2	1	1
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	26	25	24
Navy	17	17	16
Marine Corps	2	2	2
Air Force	13	13	12
OSD/JCS	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>
Total DoD	63	63	61

F. Logistics

Logistics includes those centrally managed supply, maintenance, and support activities needed to: (1) procure equipment and supplies; (2) store supplies used by the combat forces and keep centralized inventory control of major equipment and spare parts; (3) maintain the approved equipment inventory by repairing, modernizing and overhauling major systems and components (aircraft, tanks, engines, etc.); (4) provide support services such as preparing and printing equipment repair manuals and cargo shipment.

The manpower needs of our central supply and the maintenance activities depend on the size and activity level of the mission forces, the amount of logistics support provided at unit and installation level, depot maintenance repair rates, and the "cost effectiveness" tradeoff between performing maintenance in Service operated facilities versus contractor operated facilities.

The following table summarizes FY 73-75 logistics manpower by type of logistics operations:

<u>Logistics</u> (End-Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Supply	8	9	9
Maintenance	9	8	8
Logistics Support	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>
Total	21	21	20
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Supply	128	129	129
Maintenance	223	221	218
Logistics Support	<u>38</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>39</u>
Total	389	389	385

In FY 75, 405,000 people will conduct central supply and maintenance operations for DoD. This work force is composed mainly of civilian employees (95%). Military personnel fill primarily supervisory positions throughout the supply and maintenance system.

1. Supply Operations

The personnel employed in supply operations are required to buy, store, distribute, manage, and control the supplies and spare parts used by the Services. In FY 75, approximately 138,000 men and women will perform these operations (8,700 military; 128,800 civilians). The Services' supply manpower needs are based on the size and activity of the equipment inventories and the amount of maintenance performed on these equipments (aircraft, ships, tanks). That is, equipment inventory size and maintenance levels determine the number of parts and supplies needed by the operating units and the repair depots. The larger the equipment inventory and the demand for maintenance, the more parts and supplies are needed to support that inventory and demand. Using standard work measures, the Services translate parts and maintenance demands into manpower needs to manage and control the supply system.

Since FY 69 (peak-Vietnam), inventory levels and maintenance demands have declined. The number of civilian employees needed for supply operations has therefore been reduced. The FY 75 supply operation civilian manpower level (128,800 personnel) is 27% below the FY 69 level.

The number of military personnel in supply operations remains stabilized in FY 75 at about 8,700. This is the level of military manpower the Services believe are needed in peacetime to provide effective supply and inventory control management of a system which provides supply services at over 350 supply depots and control centers worldwide.

2. Maintenance Operations

The personnel employed in maintenance operations repair, overhaul, and modify the Services' major weapon systems and equipment. In FY 75, approximately 226,000 men and women will perform these operations (8,000 military and 218,000 civilians). Maintenance operations manpower requirements are based on the size and activity of the equipment inventories (force structure) and the maintenance repair/overhaul criteria established for each type of equipment. Each of the Services has criteria which state the frequency of overhaul/repair for each piece of equipment based on engineering standards and past experience. For example, based on current standards, the overhaul interval for each Air Force F-4D is 36 months. Thus, in FY 75, about 150 of these aircraft will require overhaul at F-4 organic Air Force or contractor maintenance facilities. Given the demand for F-4D overhauls and the number to be accomplished in organic facilities, the Air Force estimates the maintenance manpower required to conduct the overhauls based on F-4D workload planning and personnel productivity factors.

The total demand for maintenance manpower is determined by summing the individual maintenance demands for all equipment to be repaired or overhauled by the Services during the year.

Since the peak-Vietnam year (1969), inventory and activity levels of our forces have been decreasing. Thus, maintenance demands have declined and maintenance operations manpower requirements have been reduced. The FY 75 maintenance operations civilian manpower level (221,200) is 23% below the FY 69 level. Military manpower levels in maintenance operations have remained stable over the same time period, reflecting the Services' desire to maintain effective management control of the more than 100 depot repair facilities worldwide.

3. Logistics Support Operations

These support personnel perform a wide variety of tasks throughout the logistics establishment. Major tasks include writing and publishing the documents and manuals which describe in detail how to repair/overhaul each piece of equipment in the DoD and overseeing the shipment of cargo from CONUS and overseas ports. Civilian employees perform the basic work; military personnel manage and supervise the various service organizations. In FY 75, approximately 42,000 men and women will perform these operations (3,500 military and 39,900 civilians). Based on planned FY 75 workloads, logistics support civilian manpower levels will be approximately 4% below FY 69 levels.

In summary, logistics manpower needs are based on the size and activity of the force structure and the extent to which we desire to supply and maintain these forces. More importantly, force capability is directly related to the level of maintenance and supply support provided the forces. Performed work and available stocks (spare parts and supplies) determine the readiness of our forces to deploy to combat. The Services continue to plan a high level of maintenance effort through FY 75 to insure that our forces can carry out their primary missions.

The following table summarizes FY 73-75 logistics manpower by Service. Total Defense Agency supply and maintenance manpower is also shown.

Logistics
(End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Army	8	8	8
Navy	7	6	6
Marine Corps	1	1	1
Air Force	5	5	5
Total DoD	<u>21</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>20</u>
Military in Defense Agencies included in Total above	(1)	(2)	(2)
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>			
Army	106	109	107
Navy	153	151	150
Marine Corps	3	3	3
Air Force	82	78	77
Defense Agencies	45	49	48
Total DoD	<u>389</u>	<u>389</u>	<u>385</u>

G. Federal Agency Support

Federal Agency Support includes military manpower assigned to other Federal Departments and independent agencies. The Department of Defense assigns personnel to these organizations (normally on a reimbursable basis) based upon the requests of the receiving organization. Military personnel are only assigned to organizations outside of DoD when there is a clear national security interest involved or at the request of the President. The manpower in this category does not include DoD personnel in direct support of the President who are assigned to Service organizations (except for the Army).

A complete listing of the organizations involved and numbers of people assigned is included at Appendix B. The following table summarizes Federal Agency Support military manpower for FY 73-75:

Federal Agency Support
(Military End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Army	*	*	*
Navy	1	1	1
Marine Corps	1	1	2
Air Force	1	1	1
Total DoD	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>

* Less than 500 spaces.

CHAPTER IX

INDIVIDUALS

Military manpower requirements in each of the Services are of two types: force structure manpower and individuals. This chapter discusses the differences between these two types and describes the Individuals accounts.

To this point, this Report has discussed "structure" manpower requirements for Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, Auxiliary Forces, Mission Support Forces, and Central Support Forces. The word "forces" implies a structure; i. e., force manpower requirements are composed of clusters of jobs organized into units. The number of jobs depends on the mission, structure, and manning criteria of each unit. This chapter will discuss non-structure manpower requirements: the Individuals accounts.

The following hypothetical case is presented to illustrate the requirement for Individuals. Let us suppose that the Services were authorized only enough manpower to fill their structure, or force requirements. Let us further suppose that all of these people were fully trained and present in units. Under those assumptions, the Services would have enough people to perform their assigned missions. But this would be a snapshot, a moment in time, and military forces are dynamic organizations. A man completes his overseas tour and returns home; both he and his replacement are unavailable to perform unit missions while they are traveling. Another man is injured and admitted to a hospital; still another is sentenced to confinement; another is recruited to replace a man leaving service and assigned full-time to a Service school to acquire necessary skills. To not recognize these personnel requirements would result in shortages within force structure units and adversely affect readiness and capabilities. Therefore, each service has an established set of Individuals accounts to keep the units within the forces manned at their authorized strength. Individuals consist of transients, patients, prisoners, trainees, students, and Service Academy cadets.

The principal difference between force structure manpower and individuals is that while the structure may be planned in advance, Individuals accounts can only be estimated. Those estimates are based partly on historical data (e. g., average days per move, or casualty rates) and partly on current manpower plans (e. g., number of enlistments by month). Therefore, while structure can be planned with precision, Individuals must be estimated using averages or ranges because of the uncertainties involved in computing these accounts.

It is important to note that Individuals are not a subset of support. In fact, since the Services draw on their Individuals accounts to replace people in each of the types of forces, shortages in the Individuals accounts will result in manpower shortages in both mission and supporting force units.

The following table summarizes Individuals military manpower for FY 73-75:

<u>Individuals</u> (Military End-Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Transients	106	90	88
Patients/Prisoners	12	10	10
Trainees/Students	197	215	201
Cadets	<u>10</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>12</u>
Total DoD	326	327	312

A. Transients

Transients requirements are a function of the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move program. Transient manpower spaces are provided to account for time consumed during PCS travel which includes travel, leave enroute, and temporary duty enroute. Of these three factors, approximately two-thirds to three-quarters of transient manpower requirements result from leave taken enroute. PCS move requirements are driven primarily by annual losses, imbalances between the supply and demand of specific skills, and manpower levels. Secondary PCS move determinants are tour length policies (particularly for unaccompanied tour zones), career development objectives, and equity considerations. A discussion of PCS moves is presented in Chapter XVII.

The following table summarizes Transients military manpower for FY 73-75:

<u>Transients</u> (Military End-Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Army	22	30	30
Navy	32	25	26
Marine Corps	12	12	12
Air Force	<u>40</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>20</u>
Total DoD	106	90	88

Projected transient strengths for FY 74 and FY 75 are based upon recent historical experience for the average enroute time per PCS move and the projected PCS move program for the fiscal year. The FY 73 transient strengths reflect those persons reported as transients by the Service personnel systems on the last day of the fiscal year. Based upon PCS moves initiated during FY 73, the average transient strength was 29,000, not 22,000 as shown above, for the Army, and 27,000 versus 40,000 as shown, for the Air Force. The Services are currently revising their strength reporting systems in an attempt to avoid these discrepancies in the future.

The Navy transient level for FY 74 and the Air Force transient levels for FY 74 and FY 75 reflect actions taken to satisfy total end strength and fiscal constraints rather than total requirements. The transient understatement included in this year's military manpower request is: Navy 1,500 in FY 74; Air Force 4,500 in FY 74 and 5,500 in FY 75. Accepting this understatement of requirements translates into accepting undermanning of the forces during the fiscal year.

B. Patients and Prisoners

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods. Patient requirements are based upon historical incidence of non-combat casualties and illness relative to the total active duty manpower and combat casualties relative to the active duty manpower in combat zones.

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days. Prisoner requirements are based upon historical incidence of confinement resulting from a conviction and sentencing by a court martial relative to the total active duty strength. The level of prisoner requirements is projected to decrease primarily as the result of decreasing reliance upon draftees and the decision to consider drug and narcotic usage a medical, rather than a disciplinary problem.

The following table summarizes Patients and Prisoners military manpower for FY 73-75:

<u>Patients and Prisoners</u>			
(Military End-Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Patients	7	6	6
Prisoners	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
Total DoD	12	10	10

Projected patient and prisoner manpower levels are programmed at average levels. The number of patients and prisoners is, for the most part, insensitive to managerial action.

The following table summarizes Patients and Prisoners military manpower by Service for FY 73-75. Because of its low incidence of long-term confinement, the Air Force does not utilize a prisoner account.

Patients and Prisoners
(Military End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Army	5	4	4
Navy	6	4	3
Marine Corps	1	1	1
Air Force	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total DoD	12	10	10

C. Trainees, Students, and Cadets

Trainees, students, and cadet manpower spaces represent present investment for future trained individuals. Trainees are individuals undergoing basic military training, Army personnel undergoing Advanced Individual Training and Common Specialist Training, and Navy personnel undergoing Apprenticeship Training are also categorized as trainees. Students are individuals undergoing specialized (including initial skill training, skill progression training, functional training, and officer candidate school), flight, and professional training. Cadets are individuals attending the United States Military Academy, the United States Naval Academy, and the United States Air Force Academy.

The number of trainee and student spaces, both reported and projected, is a function of enlistment patterns, course lengths, and training plans. A comprehensive discussion of the determination of trainee and student loads is included in the Military Manpower Training Report. It should be noted that the trainees and students shown in this report represent only active duty personnel undergoing training while assigned on a permanent change of station (PCS) basis to a school. Trainee and student loads include reserve and guard personnel and personnel undergoing training on a temporary duty (TDY) basis.

As the following table shows, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps planned trainee strengths in FY 74 will be significantly higher than the FY 73 actual trainee strengths. However, the FY 73 actual trainee strengths reflect the actual FY 73 accession pattern. Comparing the FY 73 planned trainee strengths with the FY 74 and FY 75 planned trainee strengths indicates a generally decreasing trend in trainee requirements reflecting reduced accession requirements resulting from decreasing total strengths. The Navy FY 74 and FY 75 and the Marine Corps FY 74 trainee strengths reflect higher non-prior service accession plans which are required to replace anticipated losses if force structure unit manning is to be maintained.

The following table shows a generally decreasing trend for planned student strengths. The FY 73 actual student strengths again reflect the realities of FY 73 accession patterns. The increase in Army students between FY 74 and FY 75 reflects an additional one thousand students needed to support the increased force structure and a one thousand space transfer from transients in the DoD accounting structure (see Appendix A for details).

The increase in Army and Navy academy cadet/midshipmen merely reflects the graduation and commissioning of the class of 1973 in June but the entrance of the class of 1976 not occurring until July.

The following tables summarize Trainees, Students, and Cadets military manpower for FY 73-75:

Trainees
(Military End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Planned)	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u> (Planned)	<u>FY 75</u> (Planned)
Army	63	45	61	57
Navy	11	14	16	14
Marine Corps	15	12	16	11
Air Force	<u>12</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>
Total DoD	101	83	102	92

Students
(Military End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Planned)	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u> (Planned)	<u>FY 75</u> (Planned)
Army	34	29	30	32
Navy	42	36	40	36
Marine Corps	12	12	12	12
Air Force	<u>37</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>30</u>
Total DoD	125	114	113	109

Cadets
(Military End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Planned)	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u> (Planned)	<u>FY 75</u> (Planned)
Army	4	3	4	4
Navy	4	.3	4	4
Air Force	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
Total	12	10	12	12

PART C
SPECIAL ANALYSES

CHAPTER X

SUMMARY OF MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

The following tables summarize, for each service, military and civilian manpower requirements for FY 73, 74 and 75 by manpower category.

DOD Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>115</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>909</u>	<u>901</u>	<u>929</u>
Land Forces	512	513	537
Tactical Air Forces	165	169	169
Naval Forces	190	178	176
Mobility Forces	43	41	47
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>162</u>	<u>156</u>	<u>139</u>
Intelligence & Security	63	56	48
Centrally Managed Communications	47	49	40
Research & Development	35	33	34
Support to Other Nations	4	5	5
Geophysical Activities	14	13	13
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>342</u>	<u>309</u>	<u>311</u>
Reserve Components Support	14	15	14
Base Operating Support	239	208	212
Crew & Unit Training	36	35	35
Command	52	51	49
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>389</u>	<u>358</u>	<u>346</u>
Base Operating Support	47	42	42
Medical Support	92	83	82
Personnel Support	32	31	31
Individual Training	151	140	131
Command	44	38	37
Logistics	21	21	20
Federal Agency Support	3	4	4
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>326</u>	<u>327</u>	<u>312</u>
Transients	106	90	88
Patients & Prisoners	12	10	10
Trainees & Students	197	215	201
Cadets	10	12	12
<u>Total DOD</u>	<u>2,252</u>	<u>2,174</u>	<u>2,152</u>
Army	801	782	785
Navy	564	551	540
Marine Corps	196	196	196
Air Force	691	645	630

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. This applies to all strength tables throughout the Report. All manpower strengths in the Report are endstrengths unless otherwise specified.

DOD Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct and Indirect Hire Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>11</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>82</u>
Land Forces	39	40	43
Tactical Air Forces	13	14	15
Naval Forces	*	*	1
Mobility Forces	25	24	24
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>127</u>	<u>124</u>
Intelligence & Security	10	10	10
Centrally Managed Communications	16	17	15
Research & Development	87	88	87
Support to Other Nations	5	2	2
Geophysical Activities	10	10	10
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>240</u>	<u>254</u>	<u>255</u>
Reserve Components Support	20	26	26
Base Operating Support	208	212	213
Crew & Unit Training	2	2	2
Command	10	13	13
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>639</u>	<u>658</u>	<u>657</u>
Base Operating Support	99	107	107
Medical Support	41	46	47
Personnel Support	10	11	11
Individual Training	37	43	45
Command	63	63	61
Logistics	389	389	385
<u>Total DOD</u>	<u>1,100</u>	<u>1,133</u>	<u>1,130</u>

	<u>Tot</u>	<u>DH^{1/}</u>	<u>Tot</u>	<u>DH^{1/}</u>	<u>Tot</u>	<u>DH^{1/}</u>
Army	405	333	430	356	431	359
Navy	315	305	318	308	315	306
Marine Corps	19	16	21	18	21	18
Air Force	288	270	288	270	287	270
OSD, JCS, Defense Agencies	73	73	77	76	76	75
Total	1100	998	1133	1029	1130	1027

*Indicates less than 500 spaces.

^{1/} Direct Hire

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Army Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>435</u>	<u>433</u>	<u>450</u>
Land Forces	435	433	450
Mobility Forces	1	1	1
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>33</u>
Intelligence & Security	20	16	13
Centrally Managed Communications	13	13	10
Research & Development	9	8	8
Support to Other Nations	2	2	2
Geophysical Activities	*	*	*
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>41</u>
Reserve Components Support	4	5	5
Base Operating Support	36	23	25
Crew & Unit Training	1	1	1
Command	12	11	10
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>135</u>	<u>133</u>
Base Operating Support	17	14	14
Medical Support	40	32	33
Personnel Support	16	14	14
Individual Training	65	55	52
Command	13	11	11
Logistics	8	8	8
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>129</u>	<u>128</u>
Transients	22	30	30
Patients & Prisoners	5	4	4
Trainees & Students	73	91	89
Cadets	3	4	4
<u>Total Army</u>	<u>801</u>	<u>782</u>	<u>785</u>

*Indicates less than 500 spaces

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Army Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct and Indirect Hire Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>6</u> (-)	<u>6</u> (-)	<u>2</u> (-)
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>44</u> (10)	<u>44</u> (10)	<u>47</u> (10)
Land Forces	39 (10)	39 (10)	43 (10)
Mobility Forces	5 (-)	5 (-)	4 (-)
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>32</u> (1)	<u>32</u> (1)	<u>31</u> (1)
Intelligence & Security	3 (*)	3 (*)	2 (*)
Centrally Managed Communications	4 (*)	4 (*)	4 (*)
Research & Development	24 (*)	24 (*)	24 (*)
Support to Other Nations	1 (*)	1 (*)	1 (*)
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>110</u> (41)	<u>115</u> (45)	<u>116</u> (45)
Reserve Components	12 (*)	16 (*)	16 (*)
Base Operating Support	95 (40)	95 (44)	97 (44)
Crew & Unit Training	* (*)	* (*)	* (*)
Command	3 (*)	4 (*)	3 (*)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>213</u> (21)	<u>233</u> (18)	<u>235</u> (17)
Base Operating Support	35 (1)	46 (1)	47 (1)
Medical Support	25 (3)	29 (4)	30 (4)
Personnel Support	5 (1)	5 (1)	6 (1)
Individual Training	16 (*)	19 (-)	21 (-)
Command	26 (1)	25 (1)	24 (1)
Logistics	106 (16)	109 (12)	107 (11)
<u>Total Army</u>	<u>405</u> (72)	<u>430</u> (73)	<u>431</u> (72)
Total Direct Hire	333	356	359

*Indicates less than 500 spaces.
() Indirect Hire included.

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Navy Military Manpower Requirements^{a/}
(Active Duty Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>19</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>255</u>	<u>247</u>	<u>247</u>
Land Forces	2	3	3
Tactical Air Forces	63	67	68
Naval Forces	190	177	176
Mobility Forces	*	*	*
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>30</u>
Intelligence & Security	13	12	10
Centrally Managed Communications	10	11	11
Research & Development	7	7	7
Support to Other Nations	*	*	*
Geophysical Activities	2	2	2
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>77</u>
Reserve Components Support	8	8	8
Base Operating Support	39	36	41
Crew & Unit Training	13	14	14
Command	16	14	14
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>84</u>
Base Operating Support	5	5	5
Medical Support	20	20	19
Personnel Support	7	7	7
Individual Training	41	44	38
Command	9	8	8
Logistics	7	6	6
Federal Agency Support	1	1	1
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>84</u>
Transients	32	25	26
Patients & Prisoners	6	4	3
Trainees & Students	50	56	50
Cadets	3	4	4
<u>Total Navy</u>	<u>564</u>	<u>551</u>	<u>540</u>

*Indicates less than 500 spaces.

^{a/} Includes Navy personnel serving with the Marine Corps.

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Navy Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct and Indirect Hire Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>1 (-)</u>	<u>1 (-)</u>	<u>1 (-)</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	7 (*)	6 (*)	6 (*)
Naval Forces	* (*)	* (*)	* (*)
Mobility Forces	7 (*)	6 (*)	6 (*)
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>50 (1)</u>	<u>48 (1)</u>	<u>48 (1)</u>
Intelligence & Security	2 (*)	2 (*)	2 (*)
Centrally Managed Communications	4 (1)	4 (1)	4 (1)
Research & Development	39 (-)	40 (-)	40 (-)
Support to Other Nations	4 (*)	* (*)	* (*)
Geophysical Activities	2 (*)	2 (*)	2 (*)
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>43 (7)</u>	<u>48 (7)</u>	<u>48 (7)</u>
Reserve Components Support	3 (-)	3 (-)	3 (-)
Base Operating Support	38 (7)	39 (7)	39 (7)
Crew & Unit Training	* (-)	1 (-)	1 (-)
Command	2 (*)	5 (*)	5 (*)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>213 (2)</u>	<u>214 (2)</u>	<u>213 (2)</u>
Base Operating Support	21 (1)	21 (2)	20 (2)
Medical Support	9 (*)	10 (*)	10 (*)
Personnel Support	2 (*)	2 (*)	2 (*)
Individual Training	11 (-)	14 (-)	15 (-)
Command	17 (*)	17 (*)	16 (*)
Logistics	153 (*)	151 (*)	150 (*)
<u>Total Navy</u>	<u>315 (10)</u>	<u>318 (10)</u>	<u>315 (10)</u>
Total Direct Hire	305	308	306

*Indicates less than 500 spaces.

() Indirect hire included.

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Marine Corps Military Manpower Requirements^{a/}
(Active Duty Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>104</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>113</u>
Land Forces	75	77	85
Tactical Air Forces	28	28	28
Naval Forces	1	1	1
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Intelligence & Security	2	2	1
Centrally Managed Communications	*	*	*
Research & Development	*	*	1
Support to Other Nations	*	*	*
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>22</u>
Reserve Components Support	*	1	1
Base Operating Support	21	17	17
Crew & Unit Training	4	3	3
Command	2	2	2
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>23</u>
Base Operating Support	1	1	1
Personnel Support	3	3	3
Individual Training	14	13	12
Command	5	4	4
Logistics	1	1	1
Federal Agency Support	1	1	12
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>36</u>
Transients	12	12	12
Patients & Prisoners	1	1	1
Trainees & Students	24	28	23
<u>Total Marine Corps</u>	<u>196</u>	<u>196</u>	<u>196</u>

*Indicates less than 500 spaces.

a/ Includes Marine Corps personnel serving with the Navy.

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Marine Corps Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct and Indirect Hire Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>10 (3)</u>	<u>11 (3)</u>	<u>11 (3)</u>
Reserve Components Support	* (-)	* (-)	* (-)
Base Operating Support	10 (3)	11 (3)	11 (3)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	9 (-)	9 (-)	10 (-)
Base Operating Support	2 (-)	2 (-)	2 (-)
Personnel Support	* (-)	* (-)	* (-)
Individual Training	2 (-)	2 (-)	2 (-)
Command	2 (-)	2 (-)	2 (-)
Logistics	3 (-)	3 (-)	3 (-)
<u>Total Marine Corps</u>	<u>19 (3)</u>	<u>21 (3)</u>	<u>21 (3)</u>
Total Direct Hire	16	18	18

*Indicates less than 500 spaces.
() Indirect hire included.

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Air Force Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>95</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>114</u>	<u>119</u>
Tactical Air Forces	73	74	73
Mobility Forces	42	40	46
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>74</u>
Intelligence & Security	28	25	24
Centrally Managed Communications	24	25	20
Research & Development	19	18	18
Support to Other Nations	1	2	2
Geophysical Activities	11	11	10
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>185</u>	<u>175</u>	<u>171</u>
Reserve Components Support	1	1	1
Base Operating Support	143	132	130
Crew & Unit Training	18	17	17
Command	23	25	23
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>106</u>
Base Operating Support	24	22	22
Medical Support	32	31	30
Personnel Support	6	6	6
Individual Training	30	29	29
Command	17	15	14
Logistics	5	5	5
Federal Agency Support	1	1	1
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>65</u>
Transients	40	22	20
Patients & Prisoners	1	1	1
Trainees & Students	49	40	39
Cadets	4	4	4
<u>Total Air Force</u>	<u>691</u>	<u>645</u>	<u>630</u>

*Indicates less than 500 spaces.

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Air Force Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct and Indirect Hire Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>8</u> (-)	<u>8</u> (-)	<u>8</u> (-)
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>26</u> (1)	<u>28</u> (1)	<u>29</u> (1)
Tactical Air Forces	13 (*)	14 (*)	15 (*)
Mobility Forces	13 (1)	14 (1)	14 (1)
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>33</u> (1)	<u>34</u> (1)	<u>33</u> (1)
Intelligence & Security	3 (*)	3 (*)	3 (*)
Centrally Managed Communications	6 (1)	7 (1)	6 (*)
Research & Development	23 (-)	23 (-)	23 (-)
Support to Other Nations	* (-)	* (*)	* (*)
Geophysical Activities	1 (*)	1 (*)	1 (*)
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>76</u> (14)	<u>81</u> (14)	<u>79</u> (14)
Reserve Components Support	5 (-)	7 (-)	7 (-)
Base Operating Support	65 (13)	68 (14)	67 (13)
Crew & Unit Training	1 (*)	1 (*)	1 (*)
Command	5 (*)	5 (*)	4 (*)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>145</u> (1)	<u>138</u> (2)	<u>138</u> (1)
Base Operating Support	35 (*)	31 (*)	31 (*)
Medical Support	6 (1)	6 (1)	7 (1)
Personnel Support	2 (*)	2 (*)	2 (*)
Individual Training	7 (-)	8 (-)	8 (-)
Command	13 (*)	13 (*)	12 (*)
Logistics	82 (*)	78 (*)	77 (*)
<u>Total Air Force</u>	<u>288</u> (17)	<u>288</u> (18)	<u>287</u> (17)
 <u>Total Direct Hire</u>	 270	 270	 270

*Indicates less than 500 spaces.

() Indirect hire included.

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

OSD, JCS, and Defense Agencies Military Manpower Requirements^{a/}
(Active Duty Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>
Intelligence & Security	6	5	5
Centrally Managed Communications	2	2	2
Research & Development	*	*	*
Geophysical Activities	1	1	1
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>
Base Operating Support	*	*	*
Personnel Support	2	2	1
Command	2	1	1
Logistics	1	2	2
<u>Total OSD, JCS, Defense Agencies</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>
Army	5	5	4
Navy	3	2	2
Marine Corps	1	1	1
Air Force	5	5	5

*Indicates less than 500 spaces.

a/ These manpower are included in Service data on preceding pages.

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

OSD, JCS and Defense Agencies Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct and Indirect Hire Endstrengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>1</u> (-)	<u>1</u> (-)	<u>1</u> (-)
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>13</u> (*)	<u>13</u> (*)	<u>13</u> (*)
Intelligence & Security	3 (-)	2 (-)	2 (-)
Centrally Managed Communications	2 (*)	2 (*)	2 (*)
Research & Development	1 (-)	1 (-)	1 (-)
Geophysical Activities	8 (*)	8 (*)	8 (*)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>59</u> (-)	<u>63</u> (*)	<u>62</u> (*)
Base Operating Support	7 (-)	7 (-)	7 (-)
Personnel Support	1 (-)	1 (-)	1 (-)
Command	6 (*)	6 (*)	6 (*)
Logistics	45 (*)	49 (*)	48 (*)
<u>Total OSD, JCS, Defense Agencies</u>	<u>73</u> (*)	<u>77</u> (*)	<u>76</u> (*)
Total Direct Hire	73	76	75

***Indicates less than 500 spaces.**

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

CHAPTER XI

THE COST OF MANPOWER

In any organization, attracting and retaining people in the right quantities and with the right qualities costs money. There has been increasing concern expressed about the rising cost of manpower in DoD relative to the total budget. A significant part of this almost universal concern with Defense manpower costs is probably attributable to the relative suddenness with which manpower costs have risen in recent years. The military has long been accustomed to almost unlimited manpower at very low cost. Rather than pay the market price for manpower as other organizations in society have had to do, DoD has been able to take advantage of a special kind of tax, the draft, to acquire the manpower resources needed. One should also recognize that increasing manpower costs are the result of conscious decisions (such as the comparability pay legislation), predictable phenomena (such as retirements), and general economic trends (such as inflation). There is no evidence to support a blanket generalization that manpower costs are too high.

The purpose of this chapter is to show several ways to look at manpower costs and to provide some insight into reasons why manpower costs have recently risen. A building block approach will be used, starting with the largest and most obvious component of manpower costs, the military personnel appropriations, and progressing through civilian personnel costs, reserve personnel costs, retirement costs, and, finally, those support costs that can reasonably be tied to the personnel system.

A. The Components of Manpower Cost

The Military Personnel Appropriations

Because the military personnel appropriations represent the largest component of DoD manpower costs, and because these are the funds most directly related to military strength, the types of payments from these appropriations and the factors that drive the levels of those payments will be discussed at some length.

The military personnel appropriations of the four Services fund various kinds of payments to and for active military personnel. Table 1 allocates the various kinds of expenditures to subcategories based on the primary factor influencing those expenditures. Major influences are:

- Strength of the force expressed in many years.
- Flows into, through, and out of the Services.
- Geographical distribution or deployments of forces.
- Miscellaneous factors such as tour length policies, Service academy strength policies, desertion rates, etc.

The remainder of this section consists of descriptions of the separate kinds of active military manpower costs and the variables that influence their magnitude.

1. Strength Related Costs (\$19,386M)

Strength related costs are those costs which are primarily a function of the size and structure of the military forces. As is evident from Table 1 these costs are by far the largest segment of direct military manpower costs, and are driven for the most part by the overall military strength for a given year. It should be noted at this point, however, that the categorization scheme being used here is an over simplification in that there are interactions among the categories. For example, the strength related costs are influenced by the personnel flows within a given year as well as by the average or end strength for the year. If all of the losses to a Service occur late in a year and all the accessions occur early, the many years for which we must pay are obviously higher than if the reverse situation existed. In the ensuing discussion, key secondary variables that influence the size of a given cost factor are noted.

Basic Pay (\$15,107M) is the only element of compensation received in cash by every military member. It ranges from \$3900/year for a new recruit to \$36,000/year for a four-star officer. The amount of basic pay any member receives is a function of his pay grade and length of military service. For this reason, the total value of basic pay for DoD in a given year is influenced by the grade and length of service distribution of the personnel inventory.

Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) (\$1,763M) is paid to military members who do not occupy government housing, or when public quarters occupied are declared inadequate. In addition to the overall strength, BAQ is a function of the grade and dependency status distributions, and the numbers and condition of units of government housing. The range of BAQ is from \$700/year for a E-1 with no dependents to \$3500/year for a flag/general officer with dependents.

Table 1

FY 75 ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATION SUB-ELEMENT
(TOA in \$ Millions)

1. Strength Related

Basic Pay	\$15,107	
Basic Quarters Allowance	1,763	
Subsistence	1,523	
FICA Contribution	843	
Uniform Maintenance	145	
Serviceman's Group Life Insurance	5	
		\$19,386 85%

2. Flow Related

Initial Uniform Allowances	\$ 145	
Separation Payments	496	
Reenlistment Bonus	322	
Combat Arms Enlistment Bonus	69	
Proficiency Pay	126	
Special Pay (Type a)	44	
PCS Travel (Accession \$160M; Separation \$276M; Training \$77M)	513	
		\$ 1,716 7%

3. Deployment Related

Station Allowances	\$ 171	
Family Separation Allowances	42	
Savings Deposit Interest	4	
Special Pay (Type b)	71	
PCS Travel (Rotational)	849	
		\$ 1,138 5%

4. Other

Pay & Allowance of Cadets/Midshipmen	\$ 58	
Apprehending Deserters	4	
Death Gratuities	11	
Special Pay (Type c)	42	
Incentive Pay	291	
PCS Travel (Operational \$172M; Unit \$42M)	213	
		\$ 619 3%
		\$22,859 100%

Subsistence (\$1,523M) represents both cash payments to military members for food as well as the cost of feeding military men in military messes. Food served in military messes is called "subsistence in kind". All officers are entitled to a cash allowance of \$575/year. Enlisted members either receive cash allowances if a mess is not available or are authorized to mess separately, or receive subsistence in kind through a mess or in the form of field rations. In addition to varying with strength, subsistence costs vary with the number of people assigned to locations where no mess is available, and general food prices.

FICA Contributions (\$843M) are those payments made for Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security) by the Defense Department as the employer of military personnel. Payments are influenced by the levels of basic pay and the Social Security tax rates established by law.

Uniform Maintenance (\$145M) costs are one component of clothing allowances, the other component being initial uniform allowances, covered in the discussion of personnel flow related costs. Uniform maintenance payments are made to all enlisted personnel beginning six months after they enter the service to maintain their prescribed uniform set. In addition, some enlisted personnel receive special payments when assigned to certain units, such as Armed Forces police units, recruiting duty, or ceremonial guard units. These payments are very small.

Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (\$5M) established by Public Law 89-214, is paid for by member premium for the most part. However, the government contributes a small amount for each active military member participating to cover the costs traceable to the extra hazard of active military duty.

2. Personnel Flow Related Costs (\$1,716M)

The second largest category of active military manpower costs, although only about one-twelfth as large as strength related costs, represents those costs influenced primarily by the flows of people through the military manpower system and by the Services' efforts to influence those flows.

Initial Uniform Allowance (\$145M) represents the cost of providing uniforms to enlisted personnel and officer candidates entering active duty, and payments made to Reserve officers or ROTC graduates upon commissioning. There are also several miscellaneous types of payments included such as civilian clothing allowances and payments to Navy enlisted personnel upon promotion to Grade E-7.

Separation Payments (\$496M) are made to personnel leaving the Services under four general cases: they have unused leave accrued for which they receive lump sum terminal leave payments; they are severed for physical disability reasons; they are severed for reasons of unfitness or failure of promotion in the case of officers; or they are Reservists involuntarily released from active duty completing at least five years continuous active duty. The largest component in terms of cost among these four cases is lump sum terminal leave. The value of this component is influenced by the rate of basic pay and the number of days of unused leave, with a maximum of 60 days, of each member leaving the service or reenlisting.

Reenlistment Bonus (\$322M) includes those payments to enlisted personnel who reenlist within three months after discharge or who extend enlistments for at least two years. All reenlistees receive the regular bonus up to a cumulative total of \$2000 over a 20-year period. A variable reenlistment bonus (VRB), which is a multiple of the regular bonus, may be paid at the first reenlistment point to those who reenlist in skill areas that have been identified as short of career personnel. The maximum allowable VRB is \$8,000. The amounts paid out in a year depend on the number of personnel reenlisting; the pay grades and skill areas in which they are serving; the obligated term of the reenlistment; and the anniversary payments for prior years' VRB contracts.

Combat Arms Enlistment Bonus (\$69M) represents payments to Army and Marine Corps personnel who enlist in a combat skill for a period of four years.

Proficiency Pay (\$126M) is authorized for enlisted personnel in critical undermanned skill areas and for those in special duty assignments where the numbers of volunteers are not adequate to meet the requirements. These payments are, in effect, additional incentives to attract and retain people in critical skills and jobs such as computer technicians, heavy construction equipment operators, and nuclear power-plant operators. One additional form of proficiency pay is awarded on a competitive basis to encourage and reward superior performance.

Special Pay - Type a (\$44M) is one of three types. Special pay contains various kinds of entitlements, all of which do not fit into any one of the major categories of the table. For this reason, the suffixes (a), (b), and (c) have been used as shown in the table. Special pay (Type a) is composed of continuation pay for physicians, dentists, and nuclear qualified personnel. It is an additional incentive to attract and retain personnel in these shortage skill areas.

PCS Travel (Accession, Separation, & Training Moves) (\$513M) represents the costs of moving people and their households upon leaving the Service, entering the Service, or for training. Although training moves having no direct relationship to personnel flows into and out of the system (such as an officer being sent to a service college) do occur, 95% of training moves occur because trained personnel are leaving the Services and new personnel must be provided specialized skill training to be prepared to fill the vacancies created. For this reason, training moves are classified here as being driven mainly by losses to the personnel inventory. In addition to payments made for travel actually performed, separation travel payments are made to enlisted members who reenlist immediately upon expiration of their obligated service although no travel is performed.

3. Deployments Related Costs (\$1,138M)

The third category of direct military manpower costs contains those costs which are primarily a function of the geographic location or deployments of military personnel outside the U.S.

Station Allowances (\$171M) represent payments made to certain military personnel serving outside the continental United States to compensate for increased cost of living in the areas designated. These payments take the form of per diem for cost of living, housing, and temporary lodging. The rates of per diem vary by geographical location.

Family Separation Allowances (\$42M) are paid to military members who are serving at duty stations apart from their dependents to compensate for added expenses incident to such separation. A member assigned to a station where dependents are not allowed, on board a ship away from home port for a continuous period of more than 30 days, or ordered to temporary duty away from his permanent station for more than 30 days is entitled to receive the family separation allowance.

Savings Deposit Interest (\$4M) is paid at a rate of 10% per annum on special savings deposits made by military members serving outside the U.S. or its possessions. This savings program will terminate on 30 June 1974 except for members in a missing status.

Special Pay - Type b (\$71M) is composed of hostile fire pay, sea duty pay, and pay for "duty at certain places" designated by DoD. These are payments made to compensate for duty involving unusual hardship, and are primarily a function of overseas deployments of personnel. Because no deployments are involved for those serving on sea duty in and around U.S. ports, sea duty pay does not fit precisely into this category.

PCS Travel (Rotational Moves) (\$849M) covers those costs of moving personnel and their households to or from overseas duty stations. Such travel is the most costly component of permanent change of station travel expense, and is primarily a function of the numbers of military personnel serving outside the U.S. Secondary influences on the cost are tour length policies, loss rates, grade distribution, and marital status of deployed personnel.

4. Miscellaneous Factors Influencing Costs (\$619M)

There are several types of direct military manpower costs that are driven by miscellaneous factors. The total cost is very small, representing only 3% of direct military manpower costs.

Pay and Allowances of Cadets/Midshipmen (\$58M) is a function of the enrollment at the Service Academies. Enrollment is independent of total military strength. As officer strength requirements vary over time, the other sources of officers, such as OCS, ROTC, and direct commissioning programs, are varied to absorb the fluctuations.

Apprehension of Deserters (\$4M) covers the costs of finding and returning military deserters to military control. While the number of deserters would tend to vary with the total strength levels, several other factors also bear on the numbers of deserters. These other factors include the types of people recruited, their assignments, levels or hostilities, and policies on how deserters are to be handled.

Death Gratuities (\$11M) are paid to beneficiaries of military personnel who die on active duty. Such payments vary with the age distribution of the forces and levels of hostilities as well as with overall strength.

Special Pay - Type c (\$42M) is that portion of special pay devoted to increasing the salaries of physicians, dentists, veterinarians, and optometrists. While these types of payments could be viewed as flow related (incentives to attract and retain required numbers), they

are more directly a function of the numbers of physicians, dentists, veterinarians, and optometrists on active duty. The reason for placing these payments in the "Miscellaneous" category as opposed to the strength related category is that medical care levels vary as much or more with dependent and retired populations as with active military strengths.

Incentive Pay (\$29M) includes payments made to personnel engaged in hazardous duty, such as flying, submarine duty, flight deck duty, and parachute jumping. Payments are influenced by the grade distribution of those qualifying for incentive pay as well as by force levels and inventories of qualifying personnel. It is important to recognize that although incentive pay varies with the strength of special populations it does not vary directly with total strength. In fact, it is possible that incentive pay costs might vary inversely with overall strength in a given year. For example, incentive pay for submarine duty is most directly a function of the submarine force levels, and if submarine force levels are increasing at the same time overall force levels are decreasing, submarine duty payments will increase.

PCS Travel (Operational and Unit Moves) (\$213M) represents the cost of moving military personnel, their dependents, and their household goods within the United States (or within another geographical area such as Europe or the Far East) due to individual reassignment to a new duty station or the movement of an entire organized unit to a new duty location. While the number of units located overseas does have some impact on overseas in-theater moves, such operational or unit moves are small in number compared to those in the United States. The primary factors influencing operational and unit moves are tour-length policies, skill imbalances, force basing policies and decisions, and length of initial obligated service.

Summary

It is clear from the above discussion that the primary variable influencing the size of the military personnel appropriations is active military strength. However, it is important to note that 15% of these active military costs (\$3.5 billion) are more directly related to variables other than active duty strength levels. The table below shows the trend in the military personnel appropriations over the past ten years and gives the percentage they represent of the total DoD budget:

The Military Personnel Appropriations as % of DoD Budget
(TOA in \$ Billions)

	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75*</u>
DoD Budget Total	50.7	75.6	80.5	87.1	90.4
Milpers Appropriations	12.3	19.1	22.1	22.6	22.9
% Milpers	24.3%	25.2%	27.5%	25.9%	25.3%

*Throughout this section, the DoD Budget Total for FY 75 represents the TOA of \$92.6B less the contingency fund of \$2.2B to avoid distorting manpower cost percentages downward (see page __ for explanation of Contingency Fund)

As the above table shows, the direct payments to and for active military personnel as a percentage of the total budget are decreasing over the FY 73-FY 75 period.

Civilian Personnel Costs

The second largest component of DoD manpower costs is payments to and for civilian personnel. Unlike the direct cost of military personnel, all civilian compensation is not found in one appropriation. The operations and maintenance appropriations account for the largest part of civilian personnel compensation, both directly, and as the source of funds to reimburse the industrial funds. However, civilians are also paid from RDT&E, military construction, and other non-procurement appropriations.

The major components of civilian personnel cost are salaries, benefits, and separation payments to employees involuntarily separated. The following table shows the compensation to direct hire civilians as a percentage of the DoD budget as well as the cumulative total of active military and direct hire civilian compensation.

Direct Hire Civilian Compensation as % of DoD Budget
(TOA in \$ Billions)

	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75*</u>
DoD Budget Total	50.7	75.6	80.5	87.1	90.4
Direct Hire Civilian Comp	7.3	10.3	13.0	13.8	14.1
% Civilian Compensation	14.4%	13.6%	16.1%	15.8%	15.6%
Milpers + Civilian Comp	19.6	29.4	35.1	36.4	37.0
% MilPers + Civilian Comp	38.7%	38.8%	43.7%	41.8%	40.9%

*See note on the above table.

Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriation

In addition to the payments made to and for active duty military and civilian personnel, payments are made to members of the Reserve Components for drills and active training duty and to reserve officer candidates. The following table displays Reserve Component costs. The rows show the programs for which costs are incurred, or for whom funds are allocated. The columns show the major categories of how the funds are spend by type of expenditure.

The entires in the pay and allowances column cover the same types of payments as for active duty military personnel: basic pay, quarters allowance, incentive pays when authorized, FICA, and officer subsistence. All payments are for active duty time except for that part shown as drill pay in the second row.

The following table shows the Reserve and Guard personnel costs as a percentage of the DoD budget and the cumulative cost percentages for active duty military personnel, civilian personnel and Reserve Component personnel:

Reserve Component Personnel Cost as % of DoD Budget
(TOA in \$ Billions)

	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75*</u>
DoD Budget Total	50.7	75.6	80.5	87.1	90.4
Reserve Component					
Personnel **	.7	.9	1.6	1.7	1.7
% Reserve Comp.					
Personnel	1.4%	1.2%	2.0%	2.0%	1.9%
MilPers + Civpers +					
Respers	20.3	30.3	36.7	38.1	38.7
% Milpers + Civpers +					
Respers	40.0%	40.0%	45.7%	43.7%	42.8%

*See note on page XI-9.

**Includes Reserve Officer Programs (See page XI-11)

Retired Pay

Because payments to individuals already retired make up the bulk of retired pay costs, these costs are an already committed component of the total defense budget in the short term.

COSTS OF RESERVE/GUARD PERSONNEL PROGRAMS FOR FY 75
(TOA in \$ Millions)

	Pay & Allow- ances	Cloth- ing	Subsis- tence ^{a/}	Travel	Stipends	Death Gratu- ities and Dis- ability Benefits	Total
<u>Reserve Components</u>							
Active Duty for Training	627		42	104			
Inactive Duty Drill Pay	793	43 ^{b/}	20	*		4	1629
Program Administration ^{c/}	18						23
<u>Reserve Officer Programs</u>							
Senior ROTC Non-Scholarship	5	5	11	2			23
ROTC-Scholarship	3	2	18	2			25
Junior ROTC		4					4
Reserve Officer Candidates	5	*	*	1			6
Health Professions Scholarship	7	*		3	22		32
Total	1458	55	91	112	22	4	1742

*Less than \$500,000

a/ The subsistence entries for ROTC include both the subsistence allowance of \$100/month while attending a college or university and the cost of subsistence-in-kind while attending summer training.

b/ Active Duty for Training and Drill Pay; it is not possible to separate clothing costs between the categories.

c/ This category represents the costs of Reserve Component officers on active duty for administering Reserve Programs in accordance with Section 265, Title 10, U.S.C.

The cost of retirement annuities is a function of the number of annuitants, the pay levels in effect at time of retirement, and inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). All three of these factors have been increasing in recent years and have, consequently, had a compounding effect on the cost of retired pay. The number of annuitants has increased from 410,853 in FY 1964 to 1,017,271 in FY 1974. At the same time, the basic pay at which an every increasing number of military members have retired has gone up substantially. For example, the basic pay of an E-7 with 20 years service was \$4500/year in July 1964; it was up to \$6000/year by July of 1968, and currently stands at \$9500/year, more than double the 1964 level. These two factors together have provided a much higher base upon which the inflationary adjustments for CPI increases have been applied, resulting in a 375% increase in retired pay between FY 64 and FY 75.

The following table shows the cost of retired pay as a percentage of the DoD budget and the cumulative cost percentage for all direct personnel costs plus retired pay:

	<u>Retired Pay as % of DoD Budget</u> (TOA in \$ Billions)				
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75*</u>
DoD Budget Total	50.7	75.6	80.5	87.1	90.4
Retired Pay	1.2	2.1	4.4	5.2	5.7
% Retired Pay	2.4%	2.8%	5.5%	6.0%	6.3%
Direct Personnel Cost + Retired Pay	21.5	32.4	41.1	43.3	44.4
% Direct Personnel Cost + Retired Pay	42.4%	42.8%	51.1%	49.7%	49.1%

*See note on page XI-9.

Contingency Fund

The DoD budget for FY 1975 contains \$2.2 billion in a contingency fund for anticipated increases in personnel costs: civilian and military pay increases to match wage increases in the private sector and increases in retired pay based on Consumer Price Index increases. These anticipated personnel cost increases were not allocated to the components of personnel cost in the previous discussion of those components. However, to get an accurate picture of the full value

of personnel costs, the contingency fund should be added to both the personnel cost value of \$44.4 billion and the DoD budget total of \$90.4 billion shown in the preceding table. The result of making this adjustment yields an FY 75 personnel cost of \$46.6 billion or 50.3% of the \$92.6 billion DoD budget total:

FY 75 Personnel Cost (Including Contingency Fund)
as % of DoD Budget
(TOA in \$ Billions)

	<u>Without Contingency Fund</u>	<u>With Con- tingency Fund (\$2.2)</u>
DoD Budget Total	90.4	92.6
Personnel Cost	44.4	46.6
% Personnel Cost	49.1%	50.3%

Personnel Costs as a Percentage of Budget Outlays vs. Total
Obligational Authority

To this point the analysis of personnel costs has shown the percentage of the DoD budget accounted for by the sum of the military personnel appropriations, civilian personnel compensation, reserve and guard personnel appropriations, retired pay, and the contingency fund for FY 75. The DoD budget totals used as the bases for these percentages are expressed in total obligational authority (TOA). Another frequently used way of looking at DoD personnel costs is the percentage these costs represent of budget outlays for a given year. The percentage of outlays method, used in The Annual Defense Department Report for FY 1975, yields the following results:

Personnel Costs as % of DoD Budget Outlays (\$ Billions)^{a/}

	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
DoD Budget Total (outlay)	50.8	78.0	73.8	79.5	85.8
Personnel Cost (outlay)	21.5	32.2	40.6	43.1	46.6
% Personnel Cost	42.3%	41.3%	55.1%	54.3%	54.3%

^{a/} The differences between this table and the comparable table shown in The Annual Defense Department Report for FY 1975 (about 1% each year) are accounted for by the different treatment of Defense Family Housing. The Defense Report table includes Defense Family Housing costs; this report treats Defense Family Housing as one component of Personnel Support Costs, dealt with in the next section.

For FY 73-75, outlay comparisons yield a higher personnel cost percentage because personnel costs in TOA and outlays are virtually the same while non-personnel costs (particularly investment costs) are lower in outlays than in TOA.

Personnel Support Costs

There are certain kinds of operations and investment costs that are incurred because DoD has manpower. These kinds of costs are personnel support costs as opposed to weapon systems or hardware-oriented costs. Some of the categories of personnel support costs are obviously people-related in total, such as medical support and family housing. The personnel support components of other categories, notably base operating support, are not so easily identifiable. However, an effort has been made here to account for the personnel support part of base operating support by assuming that half of the operations and investment costs in base operating support (an assumption used only for the purpose of this presentation) are incurred because there are people to be supported on bases.

The costs shown for each personnel support category represent only operations and investment costs that are in addition to the pay of military and civilian personnel since those direct manpower costs have already been accounted for in an earlier section. Each of the categories treated here as a factor in personnel support costs has been dealt with elsewhere in this Report; therefore, no further description is provided of the functions performed within the categories.

The following table shows the separate categories included in personnel support and the non-pay operating and investment costs of each. The data shown for FY 64 and FY 68 are estimated because the civilian pay costs associated with the categories are not available for those years. The percentage of the total operations costs used for FY 64 and FY 68 is based on the average of those percentages for FY 73-75.

Personnel Support Costs as % of DoD Budget
(TOA in \$ Billions)

	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
DoD Budget Total	50.7	75.6	80.5	87.1	92.6
Personnel Support	2.4	3.9	4.6	5.2	5.9
Defense Family Housing	(.5)	(.5)	(.8)	(1.0)	(1.1)
Individual Training	(.7)	(1.3)	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.3)
Medical Support	(.2)	(.6)	(1.0)	(1.1)	(1.3)
Recruiting and Examining	(*)	(*)	(.2)	(.2)	(.2)
Overseas Dependents Educ.	(*)	(*)	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)
Base Operating Spt. (50%)	(1.0)	(1.5)	(1.5)	(1.6)	(1.9)
Other Personnel Support	(*)	(*)	(*)	(.1)	(*)
% Personnel Support	4.7%	5.2%	5.7%	6.0%	6.4%

*Less than \$50 million

Total Manpower Cost as % of DoD Budget
(TOA in \$ Billions)

	FY 64		FY 67		FY 73		FY 74		FY 75
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$
Military Personnel Appropriations	12.3	24	19.1	25	22.1	28	22.6	26	22.9
Civilian Compensation	7.3	14	10.3	14	13.0	16	13.8	16	14.1
Reserve & Guard Personnel Appropriations	.7	1	.9	1	1.6	2	1.7	2	1.7
Retired Pay	1.2	2	2.1	3	4.4	6	5.2	6	5.7
Contingency Fund	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.2
Personnel Support Costs	2.4	5	3.9	5	4.6	6	5.2	6	5.9
Total Manpower Costs	23.9	47	36.3	48	45.7	57	48.5	56	52.5

Summarizing all of the types of manpower costs discussed in this chapter yields the total manpower costs for each of the years as shown in the table on the preceeding page.

B. An Analysis of Military Compensation; 1964-1973

The first section of this chapter dealt with the components of manpower costs in DoD and described how each component has behaved over the past ten years, including each component's share of the DoD budget. The largest component of manpower costs, the payments to and for active duty military personnel, has come under increasing scrutiny in the last five years. The implication of much of the debate on military personnel costs is that these costs are out of balance with the rest of the Defense program. While there is no evidence that there is imbalance, it is a fact that military personnel compensation costs have increased faster than the rest of the DoD budget over the past ten years. As a result, there are those who contend military personnel levels are too high; others think military personnel are paid too much relative to the rest of society; and yet others believe that a top-heavy grade structure is the root of the problem.

To put this debate over active military personnel compensation in perspective, this section is an analysis of the several factors that have caused military personnel compensation to rise by 70% over the ten-year period, 1964 to 1973. The period 1964 to 1973 was selected to provide a framework in which the pre-Vietnam, Vietnam, and post-Vietnam situations can be separated and analyzed.

It has already been shown that the value of the military personnel appropriations went from \$12.3 billion in FY 64 to \$22.1 billion in FY 73. Although this is one measure of the increasing cost of active military manpower, for the purpose of the analysis presented here the measure used is regular military compensation (RMC). RMC consists of basic pay, subsistence, quarters, and the military member's tax advantage gained because subsistence and quarters are not taxable income. RMC was chosen as that measure of military compensation which most nearly equates to "salary" in the civilian sector; it is also the measure used in adjusting military pay scales to correspond with increases in Federal classified employee compensation as provided for in Public Law 90-207.

From FY 64 to FY 73, RMC increased by \$8.3 billion, from \$11.8 billion to \$20.1 billion. There are four factors which have interacted to cause this increase:

- Civilian Sector wage-increase matching
- Comparability
- Grade distribution
- Force size (manpower levels)

The first three factors have caused increases in RMC while the last factor, force size, has offset some of the increases in the opposite direction. The following table summarizes the impact of each factor on RMC over the FY 64 to FY 73 period:

Differences in RMC - FY 64 to FY 73 By Cause
(\$ Billions)

Total FY 64 RMC		11.8 B
Civilian Sector wage-increase matching	+ 6.4	
Comparability	+ 4.5	
Grade Distribution	+ .7	
Force Size	- 3.3	
Total	+ 8.3	
Total FY 73 RMC		20.1 B

The remainder of this section describes each of the four factors influencing RMC.

Components of Increased RMC Costs

The first three factors shown above contribute to an increase in RMC of \$11.6 billion, assuming FY 64 and FY 73 force sizes to be constant at the FY 64 level (2,687,000).

1. Civilian Sector Wage-Increase Matching

Military pay levels are tied to the General Schedule of compensation for Federal classified employees which, in turn, is tied to wage increases in the private sector. This private sector wage-matching has been clearly stated in law as the policy of the Congress:

"(a) It is the policy of Congress that Federal pay fixing for employees under statutory pay systems be based on the principles that --

- (1) there be equal pay for substantially equal work;
- (2) pay distinctions be maintained in keeping with work and performance distinctions;
- (3) Federal pay rates be comparable with private enterprise pay rates for the same levels of work." U.S. Code, Title 5, Section 5301.

As a consequence, as wages in the private sector go up, the Federal Government increases the wages of its classified employees to keep pace. These government civilian wage increases are generally granted annually, and are based on a Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey of salary levels in private industry. By law, when the Federal classified employees receive such salary increases, RMC is increased by an equal percentage.

"Sec. 8.(a) Effective January 1, 1968, and unless otherwise provided by law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act, whenever the General Schedule of compensation for Federal classified employees as contained in section 5332 of Title 5, United States Code, is adjusted upwards, there shall immediately be placed into effect a comparable upward adjustment in the monthly basic pay authorized members of the uniformed services by section 203(a) of Title 37 United States Code." Public Law 90-207.

The following table shows the annual percentage wage increase for private industry as measured by the National Survey of Professional, Administrative, Technical and Clerical Pay:

Private Industry Wage Increases

<u>Year</u>	<u>% Increase in Wages Over Previous Year</u>
1964	-
1965	3.1%
1966	3.3%
1967	4.5%
1968	5.4%
1969	5.7%
1970	6.2%
1971	6.6%
1972	4.4%
1973	5.4%
	<u>54.4%</u> Total Increase

The impact of wage-increase matching on RMC has been \$6.4 billion from FY 64 to FY 73. These wage increases received by the private sector can be separated into two components: inflation and productivity.

Inflation merely means that, for a given amount of money, less goods can be purchased today than in the past. Inflation is normally measured by collecting a history of price data throughout the economy. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is the most common source for such inflation statistics. As shown in the following table, the CPI has increased by 42% from 1964 to 1973.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Consumer Price Index</u>	<u>% Increase in Price Over Previous Years</u>
	<u>Consumer Price Index</u>	
1964	92.9	1.7%
1965	94.5	2.9%
1966	97.2	2.9%
1967	100.0	4.2%
1968	104.2	5.4%
1969	109.8	5.9%
1970	116.3	4.3%
1971	121.3	3.3%
1972	125.3	5.3%
1973 (estimated)	132.0	
		42.1% Total Increase

Since 42% of private industry wage increases can be attributed to inflation, it can be posited that roughly a 42% increase in RMC has occurred because of inflation (\$5 billion). Military wages have had to increase at least 42% to allow military personnel the same purchasing power in 1973 as they had in 1964.

It is apparent from comparing the two above tables that wages in the private sector have increased at a faster rate than CPI inflation (54.4% vs 42.1%). This difference of 12.3% between the wage rate and inflation can be viewed as an increase in the productivity of workers. That is, the amount of goods produced per unit of labor is increasing over and above the increased price of those goods, and 12.3% of that increased productivity is being passed on to workers in the form of higher wages per unit of labor. (The assumption is made here that labor is not increasing its share of income at the expense of owners or government.) This increase in productivity in the private sector, as a component of increased private sector wages, translates into a 12.3% increase in RMC or roughly \$1.5 billion from 1964 to 1973.

2. Comparability

If one assumes that military salaries and private sector wages started from an equal base, wage-increase matching would suffice to keep military pay relatively comparable to civilian compensation over time. However, military pay, especially in the lower enlisted and lower officer grades, was not on a comparable level with civilian compensation prior to FY 64.

"For thirteen years, from 1952 through 1964, the basic pay of enlisted members with less than two years of service was unchanged. During that time there were four consecutive raises in basic pay for other members of the uniformed services (1955, 1958, 1963 and 1964). As a result, there remains today a wide gap between the military pay and civilian pay at the entry level.

"A similar situation existed for officers with less than two years of service. They received no increase in basic pay from 1952 to 1963. In 1964 and again in 1965 these officers did receive a higher percentage of increase than did the remainder of the forces. However, those increases were not sufficient to make up the inequities that had resulted from long years of compensation neglect.

"Since 1966 officers and enlisted members with less than two years of service had received flat, across-the-board percentage increases in the same manner as other military personnel. These increases only permitted the junior members to maintain their relative position; consequently, the old inequity has persisted to the present day." House Report No. 92-82, March 25, 1971.

For these reasons, FY 64 to FY 73 has been a period of "catching-up" in basic pay for personnel of the lower grades. It has also been a period of increases in quarters and subsistence allowances for all personnel.

The next table, displaying the average RMC for each year from FY 64 to FY 73 (assuming the FY 74 grade mix), shows that average RMC has increased by 92.7% over the ten-year period.

Average Regular Military Compensation (Officer and Enlisted)
(Assumes same grade distribution as existing in 1964)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Average RMC</u>	<u>% Increase Over Previous Year</u>
1964	\$4,378	-
1965	4,710	7.6%
1966	4,847	2.9%
1967	5,095	5.1%
1968	5,344	4.9%
1969	5,840	9.3%
1970	6,219	6.5%
1971	7,544	21.5%
1972	7,945	5.2%
1973	8,436	6.2%
		92.7% - Total Increase

The difference in the total military wage increase of 92.7% and the total private industry wage increase of 54.4% equals 38.3%, and this figure represents the military wage increase attributable to comparability. The net impact on military pay costs in FY 1973 of increases over the FY 64 - FY 73 period was about \$4.5 billion.

3. Grade Distribution Changes

The military grade structure has changed in the 1964-1973 period. The following table compares the average RMC, assuming a constant FY 64 grade distribution, with the average RMC under the actual grade distribution existing in each year.

Average RMC Under Constant and Changing Grade Distribution


<u>Year</u>	<u>Average RMC with 1964 Grade Distributions</u>	<u>Average RMC with Actual Grade Distributions</u>
1964	\$4,378	\$4,378
1965	4,710	4,687
1966	4,847	4,645
1967	5,095	4,898
1968	5,344	5,082
1969	5,840	5,549
1970	6,219	6,167
1971	7,554	7,681
1972	7,945	8,182
1973	8,436	8,728

The fact that the actual grade distribution figures are lower than the constant grade distribution figures from 1965-1970 reveals that the average military grade was lower over this period than 1964. This was a result of

the large numbers of low ranking volunteers and draftees brought into the military during the Vietnam war. However, since 1970, the average military grade has been increasing and is at a higher level than was the case in 1964. There are three major reasons for this shift.

First, Medical and Dental officers were exempted from statutory grade limitations in 1967 by Congress. This exemption has resulted in an increased proportion of Medical and Dental Corps officers in grades O-4, O-5 and O-6. Second, since 1968 as a result of a recommendation of the Lennon Subcommittee on enlisted promotion policy, DoD has authorized grade structures that are higher and more closely related to mission requirements. Prior to this action, large numbers of enlisted personnel served in positions which called for grades higher than the ones they held. A third reason is that in a rapidly declining force, which has occurred since 1968/69, the largest part of the strength reductions come from the non-career, lower grade levels. This happens because there are fixed organizational and management functions, staffed predominately by senior career members, which are not eliminated or significantly reduced when forces are reduced. A related reason is the behavior of the inventory. As normal losses occur, accessions are not brought into the services, which automatically raises the grade structure. Where losses are forced, as they have been in recent years to bring strengths down, these forced attrition actions impact mainly on the junior non-career personnel because of tenure rights guaranteed by law or provided as a matter of equity to career personnel who are in the higher officer and enlisted grades. This, too, has caused enrichment of the grade structure. It is to deal with this problem that DoD has submitted legislation to the Congress. For example, the proposed "Retirement Modernization Act" will provide adequate severance and equity pays so that senior enlisted and middle grade officer personnel may be involuntarily separated in an equitable manner during forced reductions. The proposed "selective continuation" legislation will permit the involuntary retirement of senior (O-5/O-6) regular officers, who presently have legal tenure.

Using the actual grade distribution figures, military wages increased by 99.4% over the 1964-1973 time period; or 6.7 more than the 92.7% shown in the preceding table. The increased military pay cost as a result of grade distribution changes amounts to about \$.7 billion. The Department is examining very closely the existing grade structure to insure that it is no richer than that required to meet the combined needs of readiness and personnel management. Some further reduction is contemplated; however, it is interesting to note, particularly in light of frequent very vocal criticisms of the military grade structure, that the cost attributable to grade distribution changes is a very small portion of total compensation cost increases.



Summary Effects (Assuming Constant Force Size)

This section has ignored military force size changes by focusing on average RMC figures with a constant force size (FY 64). The next section will introduce military force size as a variable and discuss the composition of total military pay costs.

The next table and Figure I (representing the graph of the table) indicate the relative effects of wage-increase matching, comparability, and grade distribution on average military pay.

Average RMC

Base Case - 1964 Average RMC	\$4,378
+Inflation civilian sector wage-	1,842
+Productivity increase matching	544
+Comparability	1,672
+Grade Structure	292
= Average RMC in 1973	<u>\$8,728</u>

The above table shows that of the four elements which have been responsible for the increase in average RMC, inflation has accounted for 42% of this increase, comparability 38%, productivity 12%, and higher grade distribution 7%.

Force Size Changes

To this point, in discussing the increase of \$11.6 billion in RMC, the assumption has been made of constant FY 64 force size. However, the actual value of military compensation, as measured by RMC, in any year is a function of the average RMC and the number of military personnel being paid.

When the manyears for any year are multiplied by the average RMC for that year, the result is total RMC for the year. The manyears decreased from 2,693,000 in FY 64 to 2,303,000 in FY 73. This decrease of 390,000 manyears in the force size equates to a decrease of \$3.3 billion in total RMC from what it would have been if forces had remained a constant size at the FY 64 level.

The following table summarizes the impact on military compensation of all of the factors discussed in this section:

Total Military Compensation (RMC) (\$ Billions)

Base case - 1964	\$11.8
+Inflation Civilian-sector wage-	5.0
+Productivity increase matching	1.5
+Comparability	4.5
+Grade Structure	.7
-Force Reductions	<u>3.3</u>
Military Pay Costs (RMC) in 1973	\$20.1

C. An Analysis of Civilian Compensation 1964-1973

The same factors that have influenced military pay costs over the 1964-1973 period have affected DOD civilian wages. Because the nature of each of the factors affecting pay costs over this ten-year period has already been discussed in the military pay analysis, the analysis presented here for civilian pay will deal only with the impact of those factors on civilian pay.

Although it was shown earlier in this chapter that civilian compensation costs for FY 73 were \$13.0 billion, this analysis considers only about 56% of that total: the basic salary costs for General Schedule employees. The remaining 44% is composed primarily of pay for Wage Board employees and General Schedule premium pay and benefits. Further, since the method used here to compare 1964 to 1973 was based on end strength tables by grade and General Schedule pay tables for those two years, the costs shown may not exactly equal the costs incurred because of differences between actual manyears and assumed manyears and between the assumed and actual step distributions. Neither of these characteristics of the analysis should limit its validity, however. Wage Board employees, although not paid on a universal wage schedule, do receive wages based on prevailing private sector wages for similar skills within the local labor markets. For this reason, the same factors affecting General Schedule wage rates will generally affect Wage Board rates in the same ways. With regard to estimating General Schedule basic salary rather than using actual step distributions, any distortion introduced should be minor.

Between 1964 and 1973, the basic salary costs for General Schedule employees increased \$3.6 billion from \$3.7 billion to \$7.3 billion, or 97%. This increase was attributable to the following factors:

Differences in General Schedule Basic Salary - FY 64-FY 73 by Cause (\$ Billions)

Private Sector Wage-Increase Matching	+2.0
Comparability	+ .2
Grade Distribution	+ .4
Labor Force Size	+1.0
	<u>3.6</u>

1. Private Sector Wage-Increase Matching

The same 54.4% increase in private sector wages applies to civilian as applied to military pay increases. Thus, wage-matching has accounted for \$2.0 billion of the increase in General Schedule salaries from 1963 to 1974. This \$2.0 billion can be further subdivided into \$1.6 billion of inflation-driven increase and \$.4 billion of productivity based increase.

2. Comparability

Although there has been some catch-up comparability cost for General Schedule civilians between 1964 and 1973, it has been quite small compared to the military comparability cost (5% vs. 38% of total increase). This indicates that DOD civilian salaries were much closer in 1964 to private sector wages than were military salaries. Thus, there has been only \$.2 billion included in total General Schedule salary increases for comparability.

3. Grade Distribution Changes

The General Schedule grade structure has shifted from 1964 to 1973, just as the military grade structure has. This grade structure change, accounting for about \$.4 billion of the total increase in General Schedule salaries, has occurred mainly because of increasing numbers of technical and scientific positions to keep pace with rapid technological change.

4. Labor Force Size Changes

In the case of General Schedule civilians, the labor force increased by about 66,000 (525,000 to 591,000) between 1964 and 1973. This increase, most of which has resulted from the DOD policy to convert military positions to civilian positions wherever possible, accounts for \$1.0 billion of the \$3.6 billion increase in General Schedule civilian salaries.

Summary Effects

The following table summarizes the effects of the factors which have caused General Schedule civilian salaries to increase between 1964 and 1973:

<u>General Schedule Civilian Salary Costs</u>		
(\$ Billions)		
Base Case - 1964		\$3.7
+Inflation	Private sector wage-	1.6
+Productivity	increase matching	.4
+Comparability		.2
+Grade Structure		.4
+Labor Force Increase		<u>1.0</u>
General Schedule Salary Costs in 1973		\$7.3

CHAPTER XII

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

It is the goal of the Department of Defense to obtain the best qualified people for military service and to utilize them in skills best suited for their aptitudes. The DoD policy of increasing the number of women recruited and increasing the number of career fields open to them assists in recruiting qualified military personnel in an all-volunteer environment as well as supports the national policy of providing equal opportunity to women. In this regard, the Military Services plan to increase the number of female military personnel from 55,400 at the end of FY 1973 to 93,500 by the end of FY 1975. Enlisted women strength during the same period is expected to almost double from 42,600 to 79,400 and will continue to expand during FY 1976-78.

The following table gives a summary of each Service's updated plans:

MILITARY WOMEN END STRENGTHS
(Including Officers in the Healing Arts)
(Thousands)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
1973 (Actual)					
Officers:	1.1	.9	.3	1.2	3.6
Off (Healing Arts):	3.2	2.5	-	3.5	9.2
Enlisted:	<u>16.5</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>15.0</u>	<u>42.6</u>
Total:	20.7	12.6	2.3	19.7	55.4
1974 (Planned)					
Officers:	1.3	1.1	.3	1.4	4.1
Off (Healing Arts):	3.2	2.6	-	3.5	9.3
Enlisted:	<u>25.4</u>	<u>13.2</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>19.8</u>	<u>60.5</u>
Total:	29.9	16.9	2.4	24.7	73.9
1975 (Planned)					
Officers:	1.4	1.1	.4	1.7	4.6
Off (Healing Arts):	3.3	2.7		3.6	9.6
Enlisted:	<u>34.4</u>	<u>17.2</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>25.4</u>	<u>79.4</u>
Total:	39.1	21.0	2.7	30.7	93.5

Non-prior service female accessions necessary to meet the end-strength shown on the preceding table are summarized below:

ACCESSIONS REQUIRED TO MEET END STRENGTHS
(Including Officers in the Healing Arts)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
1973 (Actual)					
Officers:	106	291	75	251	723
Off (Healing Arts):	594	606	-	552	1,752
Enlisted:	<u>8,701</u>	<u>4,861</u>	<u>1,068</u>	<u>6,172</u>	<u>20,802</u>
Total:	9,401	5,758	1,143	6,975	23,277
1974 (Planned)					
Officers:	330	261	60	400	1,051
Off (Healing Arts):	978	648	-	614	2,240
Enlisted:	<u>14,900</u>	<u>6,000</u>	<u>1,210</u>	<u>8,000</u>	<u>30,110</u>
Total:	16,208	6,909	1,270	9,014	33,401
1975 (Planned)					
Officers:	350	200	60	485	1,095
Off (Healing Arts):	755	484	-	480	1,719
Enlisted:	<u>17,200</u>	<u>6,700</u>	<u>1,210</u>	<u>10,000</u>	<u>35,110</u>
Total:	18,305	7,384	1,270	10,965	37,924

Specific actions relating to each Military Department are discussed below.

Army. The Army originally planned to increase the number of Army women from about 21,000 in FY 73 to 24,000 by end FY 78. Because of shortfalls in male recruiting, increased skills opened to women, and success in female recruiting, the Army has revised their enlisted women end strength goal to over 25,000 in FY 74 and over 50,000 by the end of FY 79. Accession goals for non-prior service female enlistments increase simultaneously from about 9,000 in FY 73 to over 18,000 in FY 75.

The annual capacity for female basic training at Fort McClellan, Alabama, was increased to 12,000 in FY 73. In January 1974, an additional capability was established at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. This phased increase in training capacity, together with an Advanced Individual Training School capacity, provides the capability to train over 16,000 women (including Reserve Component women) in FY 74, and about 20,000 in FY 75.

Navy. The Navy has planned for an enlisted end strength of over 13,000 in FY 74 and over 17,000 in FY 75. To meet this goal, accession of non-prior service female enlistments of 6,000 in FY 74 and 6,700 in FY 75 will be required. The recruit training school for women is located in Orlando, Florida, and convenes 46 nine-week classes a year. Weekly inputs range in size from 110 to 165 women.

Marine Corps. Marine Corps plans for increasing the number of military women represent an increase of approximately 17% from FY 73 to end FY 75. They intend to achieve this primarily by improving their retention rate as opposed to increasing their non-prior service accessions. This is necessitated, in part, by the fact that training facilities are extremely limited.

Air Force. Present Air Force plans are to increase women in the Air Force to over 50,000 by end FY 78. The plan requires an increase in recruitment of enlisted women of 2,000 per year for the next five years, starting with 8,000 in FY 74.

New Career Opportunities Open to Women

The plan to increase the number of women in the Services stimulated action to remove many of the barriers to fuller opportunities for women in the Armed Services. For example, the number of occupations open to enlisted women has been greatly expanded, as shown in the table below.

CAREER FIELDS OPEN TO ENLISTED WOMEN

	<u>Percent Open to Women</u>	
	<u>Mid-1971</u>	<u>End-1973</u>
Army	39%	90%
Navy	24%	100%
Air Force	51%	98%
Marine Corps	57%	72%

Army. Women are now qualified to enter training and perform specifically identified jobs in 434 of the Army's 482 enlisted Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs). Those skills excluded (by Army regulations) are combat, combat related, or those otherwise considered too hazardous or arduous. The table, page XII-8, shows the actual FY 73 distribution of enlisted women by DoD Occupational Area. Note, this data indicates that women have been principally utilized in medical, dental, administrative, communications, and clerical positions. However, there has been some recent success in attracting women to other than the "traditional" career fields and the Army anticipates that in the future greater numbers of women will seek to enlist in other fields. The success of the Army's expansion program for women is very much dependent upon attracting them to career fields for which they have not traditionally enlisted. Because women may now volunteer for training in any skills they demonstrate an aptitude, based on test scores, the same as with their male counterparts, and because the Army, like all the Services, does not enlist women in order to meet a specific MOS end strength but an overall female end strength there are no effective means to predict the occupational areas which may in the future attract women.

Army has taken the following actions to enhance military service attractiveness for women in the Army and provide additional opportunities for qualified WAC applicants:

- a. Standardize enlistment options for men and women.
- b. Expand the career fields open to women, to include such skills as military police, helicopter pilot, parachute rigger, and Veterinary Specialist.
- c. Eliminate the restriction on command by female officers to female units; women now may command any unit except combat or tactical combat support types.

d. Integrate all training for women with similar training for men, except enlisted basic training, but including officer basic and advanced branch courses.

e. Identify positions that can be filled interchangeably by men or women. In the past 18 months positions identified as interchangeable have increased from 19,000 to over 95,000.

f. Open ROTC to women. During the school year 73-74, 3,098 women have enrolled in Senior ROTC, and 23,000 girls have enrolled in Junior ROTC.

g. Open the National Guard to women. To date over 1,000 officers and enlisted women are assigned to the National Guard.

h. Expand the role of women in the Army Reserve. To date there are over 235 women officers and 2,200 enlisted women assigned.

i. Equalize the housing and dependency policies pertaining to men and women.

Navy. As reflected in the table on "Career Fields Open to Enlisted Women," Navy has opened all enlisted ratings to women. Also, overseas assignment opportunities have been expanded significantly for women as a result of a world-wide survey and evaluation of suitable billets. The table on page , gives the actual FY 73 distribution of enlisted women by DoD Occupational Area. It exhibits a similar occupational distribution as the other services.

In an effort to fully implement Navy's policy of total equality for women, assignments are made without regard to sex within limits prescribed by law (Section 6015, Title 10, U.S. Code) which currently precludes sending women to sea on combatant ships. In this regard, the Secretary of the Navy sent a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives in early 1973 forwarding a draft of proposed legislation to repeal Section 6015, Title 10, U.S. Code.

Marine Corps. The stress on combat forces, combined with the relative smallness and remotely deployed units of the Marine Corps, has tended to limit the number of women that can be effectively utilized. Despite these factors, the Marine Corps nevertheless is committed to maximizing current opportunities and to opening new ones for Women Marines. The Marine Corps has taken the following actions to accomplish this objective.

a. A program has been established to assign women to U.S. based divisions, wings, and service unit headquarters. The program will place women in non-combat rear echelon billets such as disbursing, data systems, and administration.

b. A review of all non-combat occupational fields has been instituted to determine additional job specialties that can be opened to women. New fields recently open to women include Band, Motor Transportation, Military Police and Corrections, Logistics, and Utilities.

c. Starting in FY 75, women officers of all grades, up to and including colonel will be considered by the same selection boards that consider male officers.

d. The prohibitions in the Marine Corps Manual which limits women officers to succeeding to command only at those activities which have the administration of Women Marines as their primary function have been eliminated.

e. Review of existing Marine Corps regulations and policies that are not constrained by law with the intent to revise or eliminate those which discriminate solely on the basis of sex without rationale and valid justification.

f. Women Officer Basic Course training is now conducted in a coeducational environment, and women attend many of their classes with their male counterpart.

Air Force. To promote increased utilization of military women as an integral part of the personnel resource, the Air Force has (1) planned an increase in their numbers, (2) opened new career fields, (3) expanded locations to which they may be assigned, and (4) revised personnel policies and procedures to make them essentially the same for male and female personnel.

In line with the increase in numbers, all career specialties have been opened with the exception of those directly related to combat. Only three of the 48 officer utilization fields are currently closed to women: pilot, navigator-observer, and missile operations. Similarly, in the enlisted ranks, those areas closed to women are: combat control team operations, defensive fire control systems operations, in-flight refueling, aircraft loadmaster, pararescue recovery, and security. Since the majority of women have historically been assigned to non technical areas, e.g., administration, personnel, supply, special emphasis is being placed on recruiting women for such career fields as engineering, electronics, scientific,

maintenance, and computer technology, where the number of women assigned has been below the number desired. To insure the flow of qualified women, and to facilitate an even distribution into a wider spectrum of job specialties, particularly in the technical areas, procurement goals by specialty have been established. The results of these efforts are rapidly allowing for career field dispersals. In fact, FY 74-75 procurement goals are to have 50% of the enlisted women entering the Air Force to be trained to fill jobs within the electronics and mechanical specialties.

Assignment locations have been expanded overseas and in the CONUS. Officers, enlisted women in grades E-4 and above, and married military women may be assigned anywhere there is available and adequate on or off base housing. Locations for single E-3s and below were increased to 156 in 1973 (a 239% increase since 1968) and are projected to go to 202 in 1975. Approximately 67% of these installations are in the CONUS. Additional installations will continue to be evaluated and opened.

Additionally, the Air Force has reviewed all policies differentiating between men and women and has made changes where there was no legal or rational basis for the differences. The percentage of those women reenlisting who were eligible to reenlist after their first term of service (35.7% in FY 71, 57.8% in FY 72 and 47.9% in FY 73) attests to the progress made in making the Air Force more attractive to women. This rate should continue particularly in view of such retention attractors as the policy to permit women to request waiver of discharge for pregnancy and remain on active duty (92% approval rate since March 1971), and tasteful modernization of the uniform. Overall DoD policy changes which include: equalizing the age for enlistment, providing impartial dependency regulations, allowing full female AFJROTC participation, to name a few, all enhance Air Force life. In 1969, the Air Force was the pioneer in opening AFROTC to college women. Presently there are 180 colleges which offer AFROTC to women with a total FY 74 enrollment amounting to 1,858 female candidates.

The increased strength, dispersal to most installations, increased utilization in almost all career fields and sound personnel management practices are deliberate steps by the Air Force to insure women will be a viable and totally integrated segment of its personnel resource.

FEMALE MILITARY ENLISTED END STRENGTH BY
DOD OCCUPATIONAL AREA a/

	FY-73 (Actual)				<u>DoD Total</u>
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USAF</u>	
1. Infantry, Gun Crew, and Seamanship Specialists	95	10	32	0	137
2. Electronic Equipment Repairmen	31	178	82	214	505
3. Communications and Intelligence Specialists	455	426	47	2,421	3,349
4. Medical and Dental Specialists	3,871	1,828	0	2,719	8,418
5. Other Technical and Allied Specialists	173	263	67	354	857
6. Administrative Specialists and Clerks	7,037	2,015	1,644	8,533	19,229
7. Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairmen	11	8	64	174	197
8. Craftsmen	5	9	8	98	120
9. Service and Supply Handlers	164	30	89	510	793
10. Other <u>b/</u>	<u> </u>	<u>4,068</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>4,068</u>
TOTAL:	11,842	8,835	1,973	15,023	37,673

a/ Occupational Areas as defined in DoD Occupational Conversion Table, DoD 1312.1E. The table is a compilation of all enlisted occupational specialties in use in the Armed Services, arranged under a common Department of Defense occupational grouping and numerical coding system.

b/ Represents Navy personnel (E-3 and below) with the following skill identifiers Seaman/Seaman Recruit, Airman/Airman Recruit, and Fireman/Fireman Recruit. They are serving as apprentices and do not receive occupational specialties until they achieve the grade of E-4.

CHAPTER XIII

SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a better understanding of Defense support manpower requirements. As pointed out earlier, mission accomplishment is dependent on support; therefore, this manpower cannot be treated as a lower priority resource less necessary to achieving national security objectives.

Toward this purpose, this chapter has been divided into two sections:

Section A is a discussion of the Combat-to-Support manpower question.

Section B provides a detailed description of the manpower engineering methods used in determining support manpower requirements.

SECTION A - THE COMBAT-TO-SUPPORT RATIO

A. Introduction

In earlier chapters of this Report we discussed the forces of the Department of Defense and the manpower required to operate those forces. Although a comparison of combat elements and support is inevitable, it is of questionable value as a managerial or decision-making tool. Our forces are structured to accomplish missions in support of attaining national objectives. The mix of resources required to support these forces is designed to provide required capability at minimum cost. No "support" or "overhead" resources are applied which are not essential, directly or indirectly, for accomplishment of the combat mission. Combat-to-support ratios, however constructed, are merely statistical by-products of this force/manpower structuring.

B. Defining the Ratio

There is a wide range of valid answers to the question, "What is the combat-to-support ratio?" There is no "best" definition. The definition of what portions of the total Department of Defense military manpower can be included in combat varies because of differing organizations and missions; for example, the Navy and Air Force tend to be weapons systems oriented, requiring fewer men directly engaging the enemy than do the Army and Marine Corps. Therefore, there are many

ways to define combat and support and no simple ratio can be used as an adequate measure of whether there is a proper balance between mission forces and support.

This Report presents nine different views of combat and support beginning with a very detailed level (i.e., individual skills) and ranging up through the broad level of Major Defense Programs. A detailed discussion of each method is shown below.

Combat Skills. This category includes all individuals whose primary duty is to fire at the enemy. For the Army and Marine Corps, it includes infantry, armor/cavalry, artillery skills, and aircraft crews. For the Navy, it includes unrestricted line officers, torpedomen, fire control technicians, aviation antisubmarine warfare operators, gunners mates, and minemen. For the Air Force, it includes pilots, navigators, aircrew members, and missile launch crews.

Intermediate Combat Units. This category includes units at the battalion, squadron, ship level whose primary mission is to fire at the enemy. For the Army and Marine Corps, it includes infantry, armor/cavalry, and artillery units of battalion or smaller size. For the Navy, it includes combat ships. For all Services, it includes aviation units and missile units, if applicable, of squadron or smaller size.

Major Combat Units. This category covers large organizational elements that engage in combat as an entity even though parts of the organizations may not directly face hostile fire as their primary mission. For the Army and Marine Corps, it includes divisions and their deployed supporting units, separate brigades, regiments, and separate combat units such as artillery, air defense, combat engineers, aviation, target acquisition, and special forces. For the Air Force and Marine Corps Air Units, it includes the total wing structure, including aircraft and missile squadrons, maintenance, munitions, weapons system security and command functions. For the Navy, it includes the fleet structure, encompassing fleet commands, type commands, and all subordinate units.

Manpower Categories (I). This ratio is based upon the manpower category structure dealt with throughout this Report. The number shown is the percentage of total manpower in Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, and Auxiliary Forces. As discussed in Chapters IV, V, and VI, the logic here is that the Services are given primary missions, and they require a certain amount of support, as discussed in Chapters VII and VIII, to accomplish those missions. In addition, in arriving at total manpower, the Services must provide spaces in the Individual accounts (Chapter IX) to keep structure units manned at authorized levels.

Manpower Categories (II). This ratio is based upon the same considerations as Manpower Categories (I) with the exception that Auxiliary Forces are omitted. Therefore, the number shown is the percentage of total manpower in Strategic Forces and General Purpose Forces.

Major Defense Programs (MDP) I, II, IV. This category includes the Five Year Defense Programs I (Strategic Forces), II (General Purpose Forces), and IV (Airlift, Sealift Forces). In addition to combat and combat support units, these programs include all base support, crew and unit training, logistics support, and command and control support necessary to accomplish the missions of the programs.

Operating Forces. This category consists of all combat units, combat support units, and all deployed support. This represents a close approximation of the Operating Forces categories that were previously used in budget presentations to the Congress prior to FY 62, the main categories of which were Operating Forces, Supporting Forces (including special activities), Training Forces, and Individuals (transients, patients, and prisoners).

Force Structure Allowances (I). This grouping is identical to the Manpower Categories (I) discussed above, except for the removal of Individuals from total manpower in computing the percentages. That is, the percentages shown represent Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, and Auxiliary Forces manpower divided by total force structure manpower. The logic here is that support per se is not provided by Individuals. Rather, Individuals spaces are programmed to allow all force units, both combat and support, to maintain the authorized strength levels necessary to accomplish their missions. Actual support of Strategic, General Purpose, and Auxiliary Forces is provided by the Mission and Central Support Forces.

Force Structure Allowances (II). This grouping is identical to the Manpower Categories (II) discussed above except for the removal of Individuals from the total manpower in computing the percentages. That is, the percentages shown represent Strategic and General Purpose Forces divided by total military manpower less Individuals.

Using each of the preceding nine definitions, the table below indicates the percent of total DoD military manpower which could be considered as "combat." Regardless of which definition we use, we see a distinct trend toward a higher percentage of military manpower in jobs and units which make a more direct contribution to our combat forces:

PERCENT OF MILITARY MANPOWER IN COMBAT SKILLS
AND UNITS, DOD, FY 64-75^{a/}

	<u>64</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>75</u>
Combat Skills	*	*	16	17	17
Intermediate Combat Units	*	*	27	27	28
Major Combat Units	*	*	54	54	55
Manpower Categories (I)	*	*	53	54	55
Manpower Categories (II)	*	*	46	47	49
MDP I, II, IV	63	58	59	59	60
Operating Forces	67	63	66	67	68
Force Structure Allowance (I)	*	*	62	64	65
Force Structure Allowance (II)	*	*	54	56	57

a/ Except for the force structure allowance categories, numbers shown are "combat" personnel as a percent of total manpower (including trainees, transients, etc.); for force structure allowance categories, total manpower is reduced by "Individuals."

NOTE: *Data not available.

The categories shown in the table can and do serve to measure general trends in combat-to-support ratios. But this is all they can do. Forces cannot be designed to meet an abstract concept like combat-to-support ratio, but instead must be designed to provide an efficient mix of combat and support units to accomplish the specific tasks assigned.

C. The Development of a Support System

In determining support requirements for its combat forces, each military service considers such factors as its operations plans and policies to estimate the logistical impact of missions; enemy situation; type of combat forces to be supported; terrain and climate; availability in the operational area of medical, transportation, and communications facilities; and special requirements for other Services and allied forces. Additional information is obtained from administrative plans and policies about medical evacuation, material stockage level, in-theater maintenance, construction, and other logistical problems. A simple change in policy can have a very significant impact on the support requirements. For example, an accelerated medical evacuation policy decreases requirements for engineer construction units in the theater (as fewer hospitals need to be built) but increases the need for transportation units, replacement personnel, and medical service in CONUS and elsewhere.

Certain underlying principles are also used in the force structuring process, including:

- Maximizing combat power through advanced technology rather than gross application of American combat soldiers;
- Making forces essentially self-sustaining; and
- Being versatile enough to support our various global commitments.

These principles, which help determine the shape and texture of our force structure, differ from those of other nations. For example, compared to combat forces of other armies, U.S. combat units generally have much greater staying power than most foreign units.

D. Technology and Combat Power

One of our principles is to decrease the number of our men exposed to enemy fire by taking advantage of technology to attain equal or increased combat effectiveness. We have thus been able to reduce our total force, and particularly the percentage of our force dedicated to direct combat.

Looking at the Services individually, it is a fundamental fact that the Air Force, by the very nature of its assigned mission, will never have as high a proportion of its personnel in potential direct contact with enemy forces as the other Services, nor should it. As a basic unit of combat employment, for example, an A-7 squadron has 27 primary aircrew members (pilots); by contrast, the entire complement of a destroyer (about 300), or an infantry battalion (800 to 900) come in contact with the enemy. At the same time, the complexity of Air Force aircraft and equipment demands a relatively high number of personnel for maintenance, launch and recovery. The same A-7 squadron requires 262 maintenance personnel and 151 munitions personnel. This complexity and, consequently, the relative proportion of ground crews to aircrew personnel has been increasing over the years and can be expected to increase in the future. This is appropriate because the effectiveness of weapons systems -- firepower -- has also been increasing, both in absolute terms and relative to the numbers of personnel directly exposed to combat. Not only has firepower increased but, through more sophisticated command, control, and guidance systems (which also increase personnel costs), accuracy of delivery has increased. The effectiveness of the Air Force, then, cannot be measured in terms of proportions of crew members, combat personnel or mission personnel, but must instead be evaluated in terms of capability to respond to the threat: to deploy and to destroy targets.

unproved Army weapons systems such as tanks, attack helicopters, and artillery munitions, have permitted increased combat productivity in terms of effectiveness per man directly exposed to enemy fire. A gross measure of increases in combat productivity is obtained by applying Weapon Firepower Potential Scores (WFP) to the weapons found in 1951 and 1969 Army forces. Based on WFP, the table below shows that the 1969 standard M60A1 tank is nearly three times as effective as the 1951 standard M4A3. (Actual effectiveness may be considerably better since WFP is an index based on the lethal area covered by the weapon. It ignores advances such as armor protection, range, and mobility and compares weapons only on the basis of the lethality of each round and the number of rounds the weapon is expected to deliver.)

WEAPON FIREPOWER POTENTIAL (WFP), 1951-1969

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>% Change in WFP</u>	<u>1969 Times as Effective as 1951</u>
Tanks	1951	M4A3		
	1969	M60A1	+165%	2.7
Anti-Tank Weapons	1951	75mm RR		
	1969	TOW	+350%	4.5
Machine Guns	1951	.30 Cal		
	1969	7.62mm	+ 82%	1.8

WFP scores are potential. The M60A1 tank is a potentially more powerful weapon than the M4A3: it has a larger, more accurate main gun; it provides a far more stable firing platform; its range-finding system enables the gunner to fire with much greater accuracy. Similarly, today's TOW wire-guided anti-tank missile has been demonstrated to be far more accurate than the 75mm recoilless rifle of the Korean War era, and it allows the infantryman a greater stand-off distance from the target. However, these modern weapons require more maintenance, supply, and transportation than did the weapons of the Korean War. More training is required both for the operators and those who must maintain these weapons. Finally, we must continue our research and development programs (which are also considered support) in order to equip our military with the most effective weapons which our technology can reasonably provide.

Using the same years and WFP for comparison, the next table, Unit Firepower Potential (UFP), 1951-1969, shows that a tank battalion in 1969 is nearly twice as effective as it was in 1951 even with 28 percent

fewer tanks. The table also shows that an infantry battalion with only two percent more men is nearly three times as effective as it was in 1951.

UNIT FIREPOWER POTENTIAL (UFP), 1951 - 1969

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Combat Strength</u>	<u>% Change</u>	<u>% Change in UFP</u>	<u>1969 Times as Effective as 1951</u>
Inf Bn	1951	538			
	1969	547	+2%	+186%	2.9
Tank Bn	1951	406 (71 Tanks)			
	1969	294 (54 Tanks)	-28%	+83%	1.8
Div Arty	1951	1623 (72 Tubes)			
	1969	1653 (76 Tubes)	+2%	+600%	7.0

In summary, modern technology has dramatically increased the combat capability of our forces and permitted reductions in the number of personnel directly exposed to enemy fire. At the same time, more complex weapons have increased the requirements for supply, transportation, and maintenance personnel. In addition, systems such as tactical nuclear weapons and helicopter gunships, while very destructive on a per weapon basis, have been added to the force and carry with them large support requirements. The net effect has been a decrease in the percentage of men in direct combat positions since the Korean War.

In non-combat units, technology has also contributed improvements. For example, improved techniques in medical evacuation using helicopters have made it possible to provide earlier and more sophisticated medical treatment to the wounded, contributing, at least in part, to the declining casualty rates experienced in recent conflicts. For example, the table below shows that, while the Vietnam casualty rate was only about 13 percent lower than in the Korean War, the rate for battle deaths was nearly 44 percent lower.

CASUALTY DATA (Annual Rates per 1,000 Soldiers)

	<u>WW I</u>	<u>WW II</u>	<u>Korean War</u>	<u>Vietnam War</u>	<u>Percent Change Korea to VN</u>
Battle Casualties <u>a/</u>	83.5	30.6	22.7	19.8	-12.8%
Battle Deaths <u>b/</u>	16.1	9.2	6.4	3.6	-43.8%

a/ Total killed and wounded in action.

b/ Total combat deaths.

SECTION B - DETERMINATION OF SUPPORT MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

All manpower requirements in the Department of Defense, whether for mission or support areas, are determined basically by: (1) identifying the missions or functions to be performed in each area; (2) reducing these missions or functions to tasks that can be related to measurable manhours and a specific output or workload; (3) determining the required manhours to perform these tasks; (4) dividing these determined manhours by the number of manhours personnel are available for performance of these primary duties; (5) relating this determined manpower to a programmable or predictable output; and (6) publishing a table that provides specific numbers of manpower authorizations identified by required skills to perform a given function at varying workload levels.

Each Service has a capability to determine manpower requirements for both mission and mission sustaining or "support" forces. Specific work measurement techniques and the level of analysis and detail involved will, of course, vary considerably dependent on the type of activity for which requirements are to be determined. Specific examples of methods employed for computing mission manpower requirements have been provided in other chapters of this report. This section describes methods employed by the Services for determining requirements for the sustaining forces described in the Mission Support and Central Support Forces Chapters. Generally, requirements in sustaining functions such as transportation, food service, supply and facilities maintenance are highly subject to determination through application of industrial engineering techniques such as time study, work sampling or similar methods.

Army manpower requirements are generally described in terms of Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) Units and Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) Units, depending on the mission and deployability of the unit. Generally, TOE Units are designed for mobile combat or combat support roles. TDA Units afford the opportunity to tailor manpower requirements to a unique mission to be performed, and are mostly found in support and administrative areas such as base operations and schools.

Navy has in the past determined manpower requirements ashore by means of manpower surveys conducted at shore activities. From 1968 until the summer of 1973, approximately 200 manpower surveys, covering almost 15 percent of support manpower, were conducted. These surveys defined, in a precise and systematic manner, the requirements for manpower for the activity concerned. Since surveys were predicated upon workload existing at the activity during the period the survey was being conducted, a more dynamic and predictive methodology for determination

of support requirements was needed. Therefore, Navy has developed an innovative system of determining support manpower requirements entitled Shore Requirements, Standards, and Manpower Planning System (SHORSTAMPS). SHORSTAMPS is currently undergoing pilot program development and evaluation at preselected Navy commands. An improvement in manpower requirements determination and resource management ashore is achieved by forging a positive linkage between operational capability and manpower requirements.

The Air Force employs a composite manpower requirements determination and allocation process of manpower standards and guides to provide a consistent, objective and regularized process that can be employed at all operational levels to predict future manpower requirements based on programmed/forecasted workloads. Major commands use these standards and guides to translate workloads into total manpower requirements that are entered into each command's manpower allocation and accounting system (MAAS). The MAAS provides output reports to both the commands' subordinate units and to Headquarters, USAF. Reports to subordinate units in the form of unit detail listings (UDLs) reflect manpower requirements in minute detail by such elements as unit, skill title and level, officer, enlisted, civilian, etc., and provide the basis for personnel and manpower management at base and unit levels. Reports to Headquarters, USAF, provide the basis for examining and aggregating manpower requirements according to various management categories such as major force program, manpower categories, weapons systems, etc., to manage the total manpower resource and to develop the Air Force input to the Five Year Defense Plan. Additionally, reports from the Major Commands are used to manage (i. e., assign, train, promote, etc.) the people who perform the work to meet the stated requirements.

Presently more than 60% of total Air Force manpower requirements are based on manpower standards. The remaining requirements, are based on manpower guides. These guides are quantitative expressions of manpower allowed for the accomplishment of essential workloads not yet subjected to manpower standards development, and include a wide variety of validation techniques. There are many reasons why some manpower requirements are determined by guides rather than standards. For example, it would not be cost effective to subject many one-of-a-kind or highly specialized activities to the detailed industrial engineering type analysis involved in standard setting. In such cases manpower surveys or staff estimates are most effective. Also, manpower requirements to support new weapon systems or equipment are projected on a basis of contractor and staff estimates until such time as they are operational and can be subjected to standards development.

Air Force manpower requirements in support areas, because of their essentially industrial nature, are highly subject to determination through industrial engineering applications. Currently, for example, more than 80% of Air Force manpower in base operating support functions has been determined through application of engineered manpower standards.

The following provides a detailed discussion of the procedures employed by the Air Force in developing a manpower standard within the requisitioning activity within Base Supply. These procedures are illustrative of similar procedures employed by the other services to provide the regularized basis for the consistent and objective allocation of manpower.

REQUISITIONING ACTIVITY - BASE SUPPLY FUNCTION

Manpower standards were developed for the Base Supply function in each major command. All 125 base supply activities in the Air Force are covered by manpower standards. Of this 125, 30 Base Supply activities are within the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The following description demonstrates how the Base Supply standard was developed by SAC for its 30 activities as the result of a three-phased process - preliminary phase, measurement phase, computation phase. One management engineering team (MET) was selected as "lead team" to formulate a work measurement plan and conduct other necessary work within the preliminary phase, guide the efforts of seven other teams required in the measurement phase of the study and do the computation of the final standard. This lead team provided a consistent control and review capability to insure that all similar activities identified during the study of seven bases were standardized and that only essential work was considered in the development of the standard.

PRELIMINARY PHASE: All aspects of the Base Supply function were studied by the lead team, including such factors as directives, policies, organization, work methods, procedures, and workloads produced. The entire Base Supply function was then analyzed in terms of not only the specific responsibilities and tasks to be performed, but also the groups of personnel performing homogeneous types of work that basically contributed to the same end product or result. Tasks of these homogeneous groups, or work centers as they are called, were then grouped into categories and listed on a work center description. Figure 1 is an example of the Work Center Description for the Requisitioning function showing six categories of work that directly contributed to the end product.

FIGURE 1

WORK CENTER DESCRIPTION AND STANDARD		AIR FORCE	DATE
		COMMAND (Specify)	
		K	SAC
1. FUNCTION	2. SUBFUNCTION/CODE	3. WORK CENTER TITLE/CODE	
Base Supply	Supplies Management, 4140	Requisitioning, 414202	
1. DESCRIPTION			
4. DEFINITION OF WORK CENTER RESPONSIBILITIES			
<u>DIRECT:</u>			
1. <u>PROCESSES ROUTINE OFF-LINE REQUISITIONS:</u> Receives and processes off-line routine (Urgency of need other than "A" or "B") requisitions.			
2. <u>PROCESSES PRIORITY OFF-LINE REQUISITIONS:</u> Receives and processes off-line priority (Urgency of need "A" or "B") requisitions.			
3. <u>PERFORMS EXCEPTION PROCESSING ACTIONS:</u> Posts additional information to Not Listed - No Federal Stock Number Listed (N/L) requisitions. Purifies records of depot/unit cancellations. Initiates input to add/delete requisition exception codes on item records. Processes requisition exceptions. Receives and processes status correspondence from supply sources requesting cancellations/verifications. Receives and processes Back-Order reconciliation (BAO) cards. Coordinates Uniform Material Management Issue Priority System (UMMIPS) Listing with procedures and Standardization. Coordinates depot reconciliation schedule. Monitors bulk items.			
4. <u>RECEIVES AND REVIEWS NOT OPERATIONALLY READY SUPPLY (NORS) REPORT:</u> Receives, reviews and takes action on NORS Reports.			
5. <u>MONITORS PRIORITY REQUISITIONS:</u> Prepares and maintains Not Operationally Ready Supply (NORS), Anticipated Not Operationally Ready Supply (ANORS)/Not Fully Equipped (NFE), Anticipated Not Fully Equipped (ANFE) Item Status Forms and posts actions.			
6. <u>DETERMINES AVAILABILITY OF NORS ITEMS:</u> Checks with supply locations, Research Section and higher headquarters on availability of NORS items.			

All other duties required of work center personnel were similarly identified such as drafting, typing, filing requisitions and reports and cleaning of the work area. Task definitions were also developed for each category to clearly define and identify work that was to be measured. Figure 2 exemplifies how the first two categories of the Requisitioning work center were further defined.

Also during this preliminary phase, the lead team identified possible workload factors or units of measure that were expressive of or were related to the work being performed in the Requisitioning work center. Some of the workload factors considered were numbers of routine requisitions, numbers of priority requisitions and total requisitions. Provisions were included in the preliminary report that required participating METs to accumulate data on all the workload factors identified in the preliminary report, both during the work measurement period and for a specified historical period. This information, along with the manhour data collected during the measurement phase, provided the basis for computing the manpower standard.

Next, the lead team determined the best approach to measure the manhours required to accomplish the tasks included in the work center description. One or a combination of measurement methods could have been selected, e.g., work sampling, time study, queuing simulation or operational audit. This determination is based on such factors as the nature of the work, the number and location of the workers, and the availability of existing manhour data.

The lead team also identified areas for possible methods or management improvements. Recommended improvements that were accepted by the work center supervisor and which could be placed into effect at the work center level, were made prior to the measurement phase to insure that study results would reflect the most efficient performance methods. Significant work center conditions or standards of operation that would impact on work measurement were also identified and documented.

The preliminary phase culminated in a report that was formally staffed and approved at all levels of command. The approved report, designed as a work measurement plan, became the blueprint for the participating METs to measure manhours and collect related workload data.

MEASUREMENT PHASE: As previously stated there were several methods available for use during the measurement phase. The two methods illustrated in the development of the standard for the Requisitioning work center were sampling and operational audit.

FIGURE 2

WORK CENTER TITLE AND
CODE: Requisitioning - 414202

DIRECT:

1. PROCESSES ROUTINE OFF-LINE REQUISITIONS: Receives off-line routine (Urgency of Need other than "A" or "B") requests from Demand Processing. Assigns off-line requisition number and posts requisition to an off-line requisition log. Prepares a special requisition card (SPR) and coded AOA Requisition and submits to PCAM. Receives key punched AOA requisition card.

2. PROCESSES PRIORITY OFF-LINE REQUISITIONS: Receives off-line priority (Urgency of Need "A" or "B") request from Demand Processing. Assigns off-line requisition number and posts requisition to an off-line requisition log. Prepares a SPR card and AOA card and sends to PCAM. Submits requisition to source of supply by telephone (or other off-line rapid communications system). Receives availability status by off-line rapid communications system. Creates an information card to up-date status on requisition.

Work sampling is employed by taking a large number of instantaneous samples of work being performed, according to the categories of work identified in the work center description. These observations are made at random, preselected times. By the mathematical law of large numbers, the percentages of time observed in each category of work approach the percentages of time actually spent by the workers. This method is very accurate and is economical for measuring large cost, relatively stable functions with standard operations. Sufficient observations are taken during the study of a work center to insure a statistical confidence of 95% with plus or minus 3% accuracy. Stated in other terms, if sampling were continued indefinitely, the results that would be obtained 95% of the time would be within plus or minus 3% of the results already obtained through the study.

Operational audit integrates four techniques -- directed requirement, good operator, historical experience, and best judgment -- into a systematic method for measuring work activity. Directed requirement recognizes that many activities and some positions are required by statute or Air Force directive. The directed requirement may apply to a whole-man position, or to such things as directed frequencies for inspections and even directed time values for an activity, such as the periodic run-up of a standby electrical generator. Good operator technique is based on the selection of a qualified individual and observing the amount of time taken by that person to perform a given activity. Historical experience draws on a documented past experience as a source for frequency and time required to accomplish certain jobs. Best judgment employs the combined experience with judgment of the management engineering technician, the worker, and the work center supervisor to derive time and frequency estimates. This technique is used only in those cases where the required information is not attainable by any other means.

Participating METs used both work sampling and operational audit in determining requirements for the Requisitioning work center which must be manned 24 hours per day, seven days per week. Most of the work was accomplished on the day shift, Monday through Friday; therefore, work sampling was used to measure the manhour requirements of this period. However, since only small numbers of people were assigned to the two night shifts and the weekend shifts; the manhour requirements for these periods were measured by operational audit.

Every day, for a period of fifteen work days, the Management Engineering Technicians entered the Requisitioning Work Center at each of the locations measured at pre-selected, random times. They

observed and recorded the status of each individual assigned to the section. If an individual worker was present and working, the technicians recorded which category of work he was performing. If a worker was not available (sickness, leave, squadron duty, etc.) or was available but not working, he was categorized in one of the non-productive categories.

At the end of the fifteen day sampling period, each technician at each Base Supply activity being work measured summarized the sampling data in a manner as shown in Figure 3. Column B, number of samples, shows the total samples by category for the fifteen day period. Of the total samples, the percentage for each category was computed and recorded in Column C. The percent occurrence for each category was then applied to the total sampled time (15 days) to determine measured time as shown in Column D. Next a leveling factor was applied to measured time to produce the leveled time shown in Column E. (The leveling factor is established through a comprehensive pace rating system and is used to adjust measured time, if necessary, to compensate for the variation in skills and efforts of the workers and also for variations in facilities.) The last column (F) reflects total work center allowed time and includes a personal and rest allowance for such things as coffee breaks and personal needs. The standard Air Force allowance for personal needs and rest is 50 minutes over an eight-hour day.

This total allowed time from the sampling period was then recorded on a data computation sheet, Column B, as shown in Figure 4. Overtime was not observed during the sampling period; however, it would have been added in Column C, if applicable. The fifteen-day time was then converted to average monthly time and recorded in Column E. Next the allowed time determined through other measurement methods was recorded. In this case, the technician conducted a detailed operational audit to determine the monthly allowed time to accomplish the weekend and night shift workloads. This time was recorded in Column G and combined with the monthly time obtained by work sampling to arrive at total monthly allowed time for the work center. The work center manpower requirement for the individual input base, at the existing workload level, was then computed by dividing the total monthly allowed time by the average monthly availability rate that applies to the activity under study. (The availability rate refers to the number of productive manhours that the assigned military/civilians are available for performance of their primary duties.) The Management Engineering Technician also included recommended skill levels by Air Force specialty. These skills and specialties are determined through an analytical process that gives consideration to the measured manhours and tasks to be

FIGURE 3

II. COMPUTATIONS						
	CATEGORY A.	NUMBER OF SAMPLES B.	PERCENT OCCURRENCE $\bar{P}$ C.	TIME		
				MEASURED D.	LEVELED E.	ALLOWED F.
PRODUCTIVE	1. Processes Routine Off-Line Requisitions	62	.021	31.00	31.00	34.60
	2. Processes Priority Off-Line Requisitions	213	.072	106.27	106.27	118.60
	3. Performs Exception Processing Actions	680	.230	339.48	339.48	378.86
	4. Receives and Reviews Not Operationally Ready Supply (NORS) Report	334	.113	166.79	166.79	186.14
	5. Monitors Priority Requisitions	305	.103	152.03	152.03	169.67
	6. Determines Availability of NORS Items	152	.051	75.28	75.28	84.01
	7. Monitors Outstanding Billed-Not Received, Received-Not Billed and Shipped-Not Credited Identification and Follow-Up Program	38	.013	19.19	19.19	21.42
	8. Processes Requisitions Requiring Special Handling	55	.019	28.04	28.04	31.29
	9. Supervision	31	.011	16.24	16.24	18.12
	10. Administration	70	.024	35.42	35.42	39.53
	11. Meetings	14	.005	7.38	7.38	8.24
	12. Training	107	.036	53.14	53.14	59.30
	13. Supply	2	.001	1.48	1.48	1.65
	14. Maintain Equipment	2	.001	1.48	1.48	1.65
	15. Discuss and Receive Instructions	73	.025	36.90	36.90	41.18
	16. Cleanup	44	.015	22.14	22.14	24.71
	17. Travel	27	.009	13.28	13.28	14.82
OTHER	TOTAL PRODUCTIVE	2209	.748	1104.05	1105.54	1233.79
	NONAVAILABLE	293	.099	146.12		
	UNAVOIDABLE DELAY	0	.000	0.00		
	PERSONAL/REST	213	.072	106.27		
	IDLE	237	.080	118.08		
	TOTAL	N = 2952	1.000	1476.01		
	SAMPLES REQUIRED	N' = 787	ABSOLUTE ACCURACY FOR LARGEST $\bar{P}$			.0155

FIGURE 4

STANDARD INPUT DATA COMPUTATION				COMMAND, LOCATION, ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL				DATE	
FUNCTION		SUBFUNCTION/CODE		WORK CENTER/CODE					
Base Supply		Supplies Management, 4140		Requisitioning, 414202					
PRODUCTIVE CATEGORIES	ALLOWED TIME FROM		MONTHLY ADJUSTED TIME (J x D E.	MONTHLY ALLOWED TIME FROM		TOTAL MONTHLY ALLOWED TIME (E + F + G) M.			
	WORK SAMPLING B.	OVERTIME C.		SUBTOTAL (B + C) D.	TIME STUDY F.				
1. Processes Routine Off- line Requisitions	34.60		48.61	34.60	53.10	101.71			
2. Processes Priority Off- line Requisitions	118.60		166.63	118.60	54.63	221.26			
9. Supervision	18.12		25.46	18.12	53.11	78.57			
10. Administration	39.53		55.54	39.53	6.71	62.25			
11. Meetings	8.24		11.58	8.24	4.35	15.93			
TOTALS		1233.79	1733.49	1233.79	595.63	2329.12			
PROPOSED AFSC DISTRIBUTION				MANPOWER REQUIRED (Total Monthly Allowed ÷ 140)		144			
AFSC				NUMBER		REMARKS			
Inventory Management Superintendent 64590				1.000					
Inventory Management Supervisor 64590				1.000					
Inventory Management Specialist 64570				11.174					
Apprentice Inventory Management Specialist 64530				2.000					
Administration Specialist 70250				1.000					
TOTAL				16.174					
I. Adjustment Factor									

performed, officer and enlisted job standards, job difficulty, degree of responsibility, span of management and control and geographical dispersion.

In addition to the manhour data collected in the manner described, the Management Engineering Technicians at each participating location must collect and verify the accuracy of workload factor counts that were identified by the lead team where they will be used in the development of the manpower standard for the Requisitioning work center.

COMPUTATION PHASE: The statistical analysis technique of correlation and regression analysis is the primary method used to develop a manpower standard from the workload factor volume and manhour data measured by the participating METs. The lead team first performs a thorough review of the input teams' data to insure that the data are representative. The lead team then performs correlation and regression analysis using different statistical models and the different possible workload factors to establish a standard which provides the best manhour to workload relationship.

Figure 5 shows the results of the analysis used in the computation of the standard for the Requisitioning work center. The horizontal line at the bottom of the chart represents the workload factor which in this case is "a requisition submitted." The vertical line to the left represents allowed manpower. The points A through G represent the measured manpower required and workload volume as determined by the seven METs participating in the study. The diagonal line on the chart graphically describes the mathematical relationship between manpower and workload. From this diagonal or regression line, the manpower required to perform any given volume of work can be determined.

The work center manpower standard that is derived from this line and that would be used to determine required manpower levels for the Requisitioning work center is shown in Figure 6. During the standards development process, periodic workload reporting systems were established to insure that manpower is allocated consistent with variations in workload overtime. For example, if the total requisitions submitted for a particular base decreased from 8,000 to 7,000 over a consistent period of time, the manpower for the work center would be reduced from 12 to 11 and one Inventory Management Specialist would be deleted from the unit manning document.

Figure 5
REQUISITIONING




FIGURE 6

9. NORMAL HOURS OF OPERATION (Specify separate shifts, if necessary)		1st Shift 0800-1600 2nd Shift 1600-2400 3rd Shift 0001-0800								
24 Hour/7 Day/Week										
6. METHODS										
WORK SAMPLING				TIME STUDY						
X OPERATIONAL AUDIT				OTHER (Specify)						
11. STANDARD										
7. TYPE		X MILITARY			CIVILIAN					
8. WORKLOAD FACTOR				9. STANDARD MANNING EQUATION						
A Requisition Submitted				Y = 4.9382 + .0009571X						
10. WORKLOAD FACTOR DEFINITION										
Total Requisitions Submitted										
11. WORKLOAD FACTOR SOURCE Monthly Supply/Equipment Management Data Report (M32), Transaction Summary Section. Use column titled: "Supplies, Total Number Requisitions."										
12. MANNING TABLE										
AFS		AFSC		1811- WORKLOAD VALUES						
				2717	3843	4968	6093	7219	8344	9467
				MANPOWER REQUIREMENT						
Inventory Management Supervisor	64570	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	
Inventory Management Specialist	64550	3	3	3	4	4	5	5	5	
Apprentice Inventory Management Specialist	64530	3	4	4	4	5	5	6	6	
Totals		7	8	9	10	11	12	13	13	
AFS		AFSC		10512 11557 12602 12985						
				MANPOWER REQUIREMENT						
Inventory Management Superintendent	64590		1	1	1					
Inventory Management Supervisor	64570	2	2	2	3					
Inventory Management Specialist	64550	6	6	6	6					
Apprentice Inventory Management Specialist	64530	6	6	7	7					
Totals		14	15	16	17					

Manpower standards for the other Base Supply work centers were similarly developed, and by using the results of all standards, the lead team developed a program estimating equation (PEE). This mathematical equation aggregated the manpower requirements of all work centers in Base Supply and related these requirements to a programmable factor such as aircraft authorized, flying hours, or base population. This equation is used at major command and HQ USAF levels to program manpower authorizations for the entire Base Supply function. As changes in aircraft inventory, flying hours, etc., are directed or programmed at different bases, the manpower authorizations for Base Supply at those bases are adjusted accordingly.

A final report containing the manpower standard with supporting work measurement and analytical data is prepared by the lead team and forwarded to the major command and HQ USAF for review, approval and publication.

CHAPTER XIV

MILITARY BANDS

In response to the House Appropriations Committee request, the Services have reviewed their requirements and authorizations for bands. This chapter reports on the results of that review. The Committee suggested that the size and/or number of military bands be scaled down to a more reasonable level. This review shows actual and proposed reductions in military bands.

Requirements for Bands. Military bands are an integral part of military life and tradition. As such, they provide support to three military programs:

- Their participation in military ceremonies and parades is believed essential in maintaining the high standards of morale and esprit-de-corps that these activities are designed to achieve.

- Bands are an effective tool in military recruiting programs. They impact the professional image of the military to the potential recruit through radio and television appearances, concerts, shows, and performances at local schools.

- Bands provide support for military - community relations programs. Their public performances, as a public service, project the professional military image and reinforce feelings of national pride and patriotism within the civilian community.

DoD Military Band and Manpower Trends. As shown in the tables below, overall numbers of military bands and the manpower associated with them have been steadily decreasing.

Numbers of Band Activities

	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>Actual</u> <u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>Programmed</u> <u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>Changes</u> <u>FY 68-75</u>
Army	93	91	64	63	63	-28 (31%)
Navy	53	52	43	34	17	-35 (67%)
Marine Corps	15	19	19	19	18	- 1 (5%)
*Drum and						
Bugle Corps	(2)	(7)	(7)	(6)	(6)	
Air Force	39	35	25	25	25	-10 (29%)
Total	200	197	151	141	123	-74 (.38%)

*() included in Marine Corps band totals.

Military Band End-Strength

	<u>Actual</u>			<u>Programmed</u>		<u>Changes</u>
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 68-75</u>
Army	3688	3657	2897	2907	2847	- 810 (22%)
Navy	1298	1328	1219	1057	931	-397 (30%)
Marine Corps	748*	746*	661	660	660	- 86 (12%)
Air Force	<u>1731</u>	<u>1768</u>	<u>1463</u>	<u>1441</u>	<u>1441</u>	-327 (18%)
Total	7465	7499	6240	6065	5879	- 1620 (22%)

* Estimated Historical Data Not Available

Army Band Activities and Manpower Trends. There are presently 63 Army bands or band activities. Army bands are allocated on the basis of large troop populations, major headquarters, and/or special missions. They include three special bands, thirteen division bands, fifteen major command and agency bands, thirty bands assigned to major installations or groups of installations not otherwise authorized a band, an Army Element at the Navy School of Music, and the Old Guard Fife and Drum Corps of the 3rd Infantry. Band organizations may be classified as follows:

1. Special bands. The United States Army Band; United States Army Field Band and The United States Military Academy Band.

2. Organization bands. Bands that are normally allocated on a organization basis (e.g., bands that are organic to the combat divisions and major headquarters). These bands are normally organized in 42-piece configurations with one Warrant Officer Bandmaster (total of 43 authorized personnel). These consist of Division, Major Command and Agency Bands.

3. Separate bands. Bands that are allocated nonorganically based on the troop population of a given installation/activity. These bands are organized normally in either 28 or 42 piece configurations with one Warrant Officer Bandmaster (total of 29/43 authorized personnel).

4. Other Band activities. U.S. Army Element, School of Music; Old Guard Fife and Drum Corps.

Size. With nine exceptions, all Army band activities are structured at either 29 or 43 pieces.

a. Larger band structures are based on the special capabilities required to accomplish their unique missions. Additional spaces are authorized for a herald trumpet section, string group, choral group, and/or stage band as needed.

b. The following table summarizes Army band activities, by type, size and total manpower required:

<u>Type of Band - Army</u>	<u>No. of Type</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Total Manpower</u>
1. <u>Special Bands (3)</u>			
U.S. Army Band	1	257	257
U.S. Field Band	1	160	160
U.S. Academy Band	1	99	99
2. <u>Organizational Bands</u>			
<u>Division Bands (13)</u>	11	43	473
	2	29	58
Major Command & Agency			
<u>Bands (15)</u>	2	72	144
	1	61	61
	1	46	46
	6	43	258
	5	29	145
	24	29	696
3. <u>Separate Bands (30)</u>	6	43	258
4. <u>Other Band Activities (2)</u>			
U.S. Army Element Navy			
School of Music	1	95	95
Old Guard Fife and			
Drum Corps	1	89	89
U.S. Army Band			
Program Support	-	8	<u>8</u>
			2847
Total Army Band Manpower			

Strength Trends. It is important to note that, unlike some other activities, the number of Army Bands did not increase during the Vietnam buildup. Additional requirements were offset by transfer of existing bands from activities with less priority.

The following table depicts Army band reductions and the corresponding manpower strengths.

	<u>Actual</u>			<u>Programmed</u>		<u>Changes</u>
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 68-75</u>
Nos. of Bands	93	91	64	63	63	-28 (31%)
End-Strength	3688	3657	2897	2907	2847 <u>1/</u>	-810 (22%)

1/ Reflects the reduction of 60 spaces in the U.S. Military Academy Band in FY 75.

Because of the importance of Army bands support to the recruiting, community relations, and installation musical requirements, the Army will maintain current band levels and will link future inactivations primarily with installation cutbacks and/or withdrawals of troops from overseas.

Navy Band Activities and Manpower Trends. The Navy completed an in-depth study of all band requirements in December 1973. Reductions have been identified and actions for implementation have been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Results of the study follow.

a. Navy bands continue to prove their greatest effectiveness in support of the recruiting program. Strong emphasis is also being given to Navy band support of retention programs.

b. It is believed that support of Navy's recruiting effort is better provided by smaller tour bands rather than large fleet units. A large consolidated band generally lacks the mobility and diversity needed for recruiting programs.

Size. The Navy Music Program has consisted of band units which ranged in size from 181 in the Navy Band, Washington, D. C. to 17 pieces in those units assigned to at-sea staffs. A reorganization approved by a recent CNO decision will involve a reduction in the number of bands and standardization of bands with similar or unique missions. Excluding special groups and support units, the Navy Music Program is comprised of

two 26-piece shipboard bands, two deployable band pools of 76 musicians, one 34-piece area band, and eight 46-piece area bands. All of these units can function as concert /marching bands and/or as smaller ensembles.

The 26 piece bands can field at least two groups simultaneously.

The 34 piece band can schedule three units at one time, and the 46 piece bands are designed to provide four or more ensembles if required. The two band pools are comprised of a wide variety of ensembles and have a simultaneous performance capability of seven to 10 units. All Navy bands are designed to provide concert band, marching band, stage band, and combo services with a minimum number of personnel. This realignment will permit optimum subdivision into units which are capable of supporting all recruiting and retention efforts in specific geographic areas. The reorganization will be fully implemented by FY 75 and will further reduce musician strength by 126 manpower spaces from FY 74 levels (12%).

The following table summarizes Navy Band Activities, by type, size, and total manpower required:

<u>Type of Band - Navy</u>	<u>No. of Type</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Total Manpower</u>
1. <u>Special Bands (2)</u>			
U.S. Navy Band	1	175	175
U.S. Naval Academy Band	1	66	66
2. <u>Separate Bands (13)</u>			
Deployable Band Pools (Hawaii and Norfolk)	2	76	152
Shipboard Bands (Italy and Japan)	2	26	52
Area Bands (CONUS)	8	46	368
	1	34	34
3. <u>Other Band Activities (2)</u>			
Navy Contingents, CINCSOUTH Multi-national Band (Italy)	1	16	16
Navy School of Music	1	45	45
U.S. Navy Band Program Support	-	23	23
Total Navy Band Manpower			931

Strengths Trends. The following table depicts the number of band activities and associated manpower spaces in the Navy Music Program:

	<u>Actual</u>			<u>Programmed</u>		<u>Changes</u>
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 68-75</u>
Nos. of Bands	53	52	43	34	17	-35 (67%)
End-Strength	1298	1328	1219	1057	931	-397 (30%)

These reorganization actions complete the Navy's program to bring the band program to an effective and efficient level.

Marine Corps Band Activities and Manpower Trends. At the end of FY 75, the Marine Corps will have 12 bands and six drum and bugle corps for a total of 18 musical units. Marine Corps bands (excluding the U.S. Marine Band) are predominantly marching/concert units. Marine bands normally operate as a unit and do not maintain independent rock groups, show bands, or combos. However, individual bands can form and utilize such groups as required. Marine Corps drum and bugle corps are predominantly marching units. While bands are capable of performing a variety of types and styles of music to support many activities, drum and bugle corps are primarily marching organizations with very limited capabilities.

Size. Marine Corps bands and drum and bugle corps vary in size according to their parent unit mission and manning levels.

The following table summarizes Marine Corps Band activities by type, size and total manpower required:

<u>Type of Band - Marine Corps</u>	<u>No. of Type</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Total Manpower</u>
1. <u>Special Bands (1)</u>			
U.S. Marine Band	1	141	141
2. <u>Separate Bands (11)</u>			
Fleet Marine Force Bands	4	36	144
	4	26	104
Training Center Bands	3	36	108

<u>Type of Band - Marine Corps</u>	<u>No. of Type</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Total Manpower</u>
3. <u>Drum & Bugle Corps (6)</u>			
U. S. Marine Corps Drum & Bugle Corps	1	54	54
Fleet Marine Force Drum & Bugle Corps	4	19	76
Supply Center Drum & Bugle Corps	1	19	19
4. <u>Other Band Activities (-)</u>			
U. S. Marine Corps Band Program Support	-	14	<u>14</u>
Total Marine Corps Band Manpower			660

Strength Trends. The following table depicts the actual and planned number of musical units and the associated manpower strengths:

	<u>Actual</u>			<u>Programmed</u>		<u>Change</u>
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 68-75</u>
Nos. of Bands	15	19	19	19	18	-1 (5%)
Drum & Bugle Corps *	(2)	(7)	(7)	(6)	(6)	
End-Strength	748**	746**	661	660	660	-86 (12%)

* () included in Band totals

** Estimated Historical Data Not Available

Marine Corps bandsmen assigned to (FMF) Fleet Marine Force commanders have combat responsibilities and billets. When the parent headquarters is deployed, as was the case for two divisions and an air Wing in Vietnam, the bandsmen provided the headquarters security force. In Vietnam they not only manned the perimeter defense but also provided convoy escort, patrolled areas adjacent to the headquarters compound, aided in casualty evacuation, and worked in civic action projects. With the exception of The Marine Band, all bandsmen in the Marine Corps are trained in basic combat skills. In peacetime, they meet the same annual weapons requalification and training requirements as any other Marine.

Air Force Band Activities and Manpower Trends. There are currently 25 Air Force bands classified as special bands (2), major command bands (5), or Numbered Field bands (18). Air Force bands are organized to allow the simultaneous scheduling and performance of groups within each band. In 1969, the Air Force initiated the area concept of operations for bands and had it fully implemented by FY 72. Under this program Air Force bands support all Air Force musical requirements within a specific geographic area. The area concept has minimized cost by enabling the bands to provide maximum support for all Air Force programs from within the capabilities of each band. Bands are located in highly populated areas throughout the United States to maximize recruiting and community relations programs support as well as serve the on base military community.

Size. Air Force bands vary in size from 35 to 223 members. Band size is determined by standard instrumentation requirements for each component sub-group and by requirements for increased performance capabilities at major commands. For example, the United States Air Force Band in Washington, D. C. has additional spaces for a string group and a choral group. Each major command and numbered field band (regionally located) has the following mandatory units:

1. Marching/ceremonial band: Designed to fulfill all military ceremonial requirements as well as performance at official civic functions and public parades.
2. Concert band: Intended to perform at high schools, colleges, civic concerts, and patriotic programs as well as base recreation activities.
3. Show/dance band: Usually composed of 16 to 20 instrumentalists to provide a variety of music to satisfy Air Force musical support at base recreation and social events as well as high schools, colleges, and civic concerts.
4. Protocol combo: Composed of three to six instrumentalists to provide background, dinner, and dance music as required, at base recreation and social events.
5. Popular music combo: Composed of four to eight instrumentalists specializing in the latest in popular music. It may be scheduled at school concerts in conjunction with recruiting programs.

With the exception of one 35 piece band, each major command and field band is established to provide simultaneous performances by two or more units. This is not intended to prevent bands from utilizing their fully

authorized strength in a major parade or concert; however, normal operations should be conducted in the multi-unit manner explained below:

1. 45 piece band: Concert/marching band and popular music combo.
2. 60 piece band: Concert/marching band and show/dance band.
3. 70 piece band: Concert/marching band, show/dance band, and Protocol or Popular music combo.

The following is a summary of Air Force Band activities by type, size and total manpower required:

<u>Type of Band - Air Force</u>	<u>No. of Type</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Total Manpower</u>
1. <u>Special Bands (2)</u>			
U. S. Air Force Band	1	223	223
U. S. Air Force Academy Band	1	99	99
2. <u>Major Command Bands (5)</u>			
USAFE Band	1	70	70
SAC, TAC, MAC & ATC Bands	4	60	240
3. <u>Numbered Field Bands (18)</u>			
CONUS	13	45	585
Hawaii, Alaska & Western Pacific	4	45	180
Panama Canal Zone	1	35	35
4. <u>Other Band Activities (-)</u>			
U. S. Air Force Band Program Support	-	9	<u>9</u>
Total Air Force Band Manpower			1441

The incorporation of the area concept of operations and the reorganization of bands to allow simultaneous performance of groups within bands, has resulted in the following reduction in the number of bands and associated manpower:

	<u>Actual</u>			<u>Programmed</u>		<u>Changes</u>
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 68-75</u>
Nos. of Bands	39	35	25	25	25	- 10 (29%)
End-Strength	1731	1768	1463	1441	1441	-327 (18%)

The FY 74 level reflects a reduction of the USAF Academy band by 21 spaces. Additional reductions that are being studied for possible implementation by FY 75 include three additional spaces from the Air Force Academy Band, 10 spaces from the 752nd Air Force Band in Alaska, a reduction in the 504th Air Force Band (NORAD), and others which could further reduce band strength in FY 75.

DoD Multi-Service Bicentennial Band

The 1975-1976 time frame will be a period marking both the Nation's and the Military Services' 200th birthdays. It is expected that the demand for military ceremonies and parades will be extremely high during that period. In view of this anticipated demand and in view of the support provided to these ceremonies by the military bands, the Department of Defense has included in the FY 1975 budget request an end strength augmentation of 130 bandsmen. As these end strengths will be used to create a new "premier" inter-service band for the two-year bicentennial period, they are not included in the above discussion. At the end of the two-year bicentennial period, these augmented end strengths for bandsmen would be eliminated and the bandsmen absorbed within previously programmed strengths.

Creation of this new "premier" inter-service band to support the bicentennial would be in consonance with P.L. 93-179 which calls for agency cooperation with bicentennial activities.

CHAPTER XV

Military Personnel Inventory Trends

This Chapter is in response to the Senate Armed Services Committee request to describe personnel inventory trends, gains and losses, and personnel policy changes. The Chapter has two distinct sections. In the first section there is a description of changes in the composition of our military forces -- strengths, educational attainment, sex and racial composition. The mental ability of the enlisted force is compared to that for current accessions.

The second section discusses changes in the composition of the enlisted force with respect to its career/first-term content. The effects of the length of initial terms of service in determining accession needs is described along with the Service's ability to lengthen the initial term. Service policy changes which affect the recruitment and retention of new personnel are mentioned in the appropriate sections of the analysis.

Characteristics of the Force

Total Strength

The DoD FY 1973 strength total of 2.25 million was 1.3 million below the Vietnam peak of about 3.5 million reached at the end of FY 1968. This reduction was accomplished in the short period of only five fiscal years (FY 69-73). In contrast during the five fiscal years following the Korean War Peak (FY 53-57) military strengths had declined only 840,000. Active Force strengths are currently lower than at any point since the end of the Korean War. The projected FY 1975 end strength of 2,152,000 is about one-third million lower than the Post-Korean low at the end of FY 1960.

By the end of FY 1973, the post-Vietnam strength reductions had been substantially completed in the Marine Corps but the other Services were faced with further reductions by the end of FY 1975. The following chart shows military end-strengths for selected prior years and the FY 1974-75 strength programmed in the President's FY 1974-75 budget.

Selected Fiscal Year End Strengths

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Total DoD</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
1960 (Post Korean Low)	2,476	873	618	171	815
1964 (Pre-Vietnam)	2,687	973	668	190	857
1968 (Vietnam Peak)	3,548	1,570	765	307	905
1973	2,252	801	564	196	691
1974 (Projected)	2,174	782	551	196	645
1975 (Projected)	2,152	785	540	196	630

Officer and Enlisted Strengths

The smallest proportionate changes occurred in the commissioned officer ranks which increased from the FY 1964 pre-Vietnam level of 321,000 to 388,000 in FY 1968. This increase of 21% or 67,000 compares to the enlisted force increase of about one-third or 782,000 from FY 1964 to FY 1968. By the end of FY 1973 the number of commissioned officers on active duty totalled 300,000 a decline of 21,000 or 6.5% from the pre-Vietnam level. Enlisted strength at the end of FY 1973 totalled 1,921,000, a decline of 417,000 or 18% from the FY 1964 level. Further reductions in both commissioned officer and enlisted strength are programmed for FY 1974 and FY 1975. One out of four of the budget program reductions from FY 1973 to FY 1975 is in officer strength.

Military Personnel on Active Duty by Type

FY 1964 - 73

Fiscal Year	(In Thousands)			
	Commissioned Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted	Officer Candidates
1964	321	16	2,338	12
1965	323	16	2,305	12
1966	332	17	2,733	13
1967	362	23	2,981	12
1968	388	28	3,120	13
1969	388	31	3,028	13
1970	373	30	2,651	13
1971	346	25	2,330	14
1972	314	22	1,976	12
1973	300	21	1,921	11

Education

The Military Services prefer to recruit high school graduates for their enlisted ranks and college graduates for their commissioned officer ranks. In common with the civilian sector, however, the Services recognize that many non-high school graduates can perform satisfactorily as enlisted personnel and that non-college graduates can make successful officers.


At the end of calendar year 1972, 84.5% of the commissioned officers on active duty were college graduates. This was an increase of about one-fifth from the 69.4% reported in December 1963. The proportion of college graduates in the officer ranks has continued to increase steadily as shown below.

Proportion of College Graduates Among Commissioned
Officers Selected Dates 1963-1972

End of Calendar Year:	1963	1965	1967	1969	1971	1972
Proportion of College graduates:	69.4%	72.3%	72.9%	76.3%	82.1%	84.5%

Approximately 81% of the military enlisted personnel now on active duty have graduated from high school or have obtained a high school completion status through the GED program.^{1/} This percentage has steadily increased over time from only 52.6% in 1952, to 72.7% in 1962, and to a peak of 85.6% in December 1971.

ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL
WITH HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA OR GED EQUIVALENCY
DECEMBER 31, 1952 - DECEMBER 31, 1972



^{1/} As of June 30, 1973, approximately 10% of the current Army enlisted force, 11% of the Navy enlisted force, and 6% of the Air Force enlisted force had earned their high school completion status through the GED program. During FY 1973, over 75,000 service people obtained high school completion status via the GED program.

By comparison, of the male population aged 18-44, 73.8% have completed four years high school. 1/ The primary source of the military enlisted force is among non-college youth. Of the non-college population age 18-44, only 59.8% completed high school. 2/

Mental Ability

One of the measures used to describe the quality of manpower in the enlisted force has been the mental ability groupings obtained from administration of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). This test was designed as a mass screening instrument to measure adaptability to a military training environment. Each Service also administered its own aptitude tests to select men for occupational training and assignment. With the end of the draft the need for a general ability test became less important as an enlistment screen as the Services offered increasing numbers of training guarantees. The Services have been moving away from use of the AFQT and have begun utilizing aptitude tests as their primary screening instruments. Today only the Marine Corps uses the AFQT as the primary enlistment screen although it also uses supplementary aptitude tests. In effect the Army, Navy and Air Force have moved their aptitude testing for assignment to occupational training and placement from the post enlistment stage to a pre-enlistment point. For comparison purposes these aptitude test scores have been converted to AFQT groupings in the following table.

Mental Category of the Total Enlisted Force as of
June 30, 1973 Compared to New Enlisted Accessions,
July - December 1973

(Percent)

	Total Enlisted Force (June 30, 1973)			New Accessions (July - December 1973) Mental Group		
	I&II	III	IV	I&II	III	IV
Total DoD	41%	44%	14%	34%	55%	11%
Army	32	48	19	28	53	19
Navy	52	36	12	38	58	3
Marine Corps	35	53	12	34	58	7
Air Force	45	44	11	43	57	1

1/ Source: Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics, Educational Attainment: March 1972, Series P-20, No. 243, November 1972, p. 13

2/ Ibid

Women

At the end of FY 1973 more than 55,000 women were on active duty with the four Military Services including officers in the healing arts. This total was 7,000 above the peak reached in the Korean War and 29% above the total at the end of FY 1971. Current service plans indicate that the number of women on active duty will continue to increase. By the end of FY 1975 the total number of military women is expected to increase to 93,500. Further increases beyond FY 1975 are also expected. Chapter XII provides a detailed discussion of the increasing role women are assuming in our military forces.

Women as a Percent of Total Active Duty Force

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>1964-1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
<u>Percent</u>	Average 1.1	1.4	1.6	1.9	2.4

Race

Since the end of FY 1949 there has been a five fold increase in the number of black officers in the Military Services, however, the 8,100 black officers on active duty at the end of FY 1973 represented only 2.4% of the total officer force. This proportion was 40% below the proportion of blacks among the total population of college graduates aged 25-54 (the general age group covered by the officer ranks). Further increases in the proportion of black officers can be expected as long as current trends in the proportion of blacks among accessions to ROTC and other college training programs continue. In FY 1969 only 3% of the accessions to these officer training programs were black, by 1973 the proportion had increased to 7%. In the population of 18-24 year olds enrolled in college, about 9% are black.

Both the number and proportion of blacks in the enlisted ranks have increased since 1949. However, unlike the officer ranks the 14.1% black content in the enlisted ranks at the end of FY 1973 was above the proportion of blacks in the general population aged 17-44 which is 11.0%. In the first six months of FY 1974 about 21% of the new enlisted accessions were black. The proportion of blacks among total enlistees is expected to increase gradually over the next several years reflecting the larger proportion of blacks among new accessions than among the total force.

**Blacks as a Component of Military Strengths
Selected Rates 1949 - 1973**

	June 30 1949	Dec 31 1965	June 30 1968	Dec 31 1970	June 30 1973
Numbers (In Thousands)					
Officer	1.6	6.4	8.7	8.4	8.1
Enlisted	105.5	260.7	309.2	270.9	270.8
Total	107.1	267.1	317.9	279.3	278.9
Percent of Total					
Officer	0.9%	1.9%	2.1%	2.2%	2.4%
Enlisted	7.5	10.5	9.9	11.0	14.1
Total	6.7	9.5	9.0	9.8	12.4

Factors Affecting Gains and Losses

Background

During the past decade the major factor affecting the number of accessions in a given year has been the annual change in requirements. As we move into an environment where strength requirements stabilize, accession needs will more closely equal losses as strengths remain relatively constant. This section discusses recent trends in gains and losses with particular emphasis on the enlisted force since enlistees comprise 85% of the inventory and 95% of annual accessions.

The following definitions apply to the terminology used in this section:

Initial Enlistment Term. The contractual period of active duty required of an enlistee with no prior military service.

First-Term Force. The number of enlistees on active duty who have not completed four years of active service.

Career Force. The number of enlistees on active duty who have completed a minimum of four years of active duty without regard to the length of the initial enlistment contract.

Accession Rate. The ratio of accessions to end strength in a given year.

Gains from and Losses to Civil Life

Accession from civil life increased significantly during the Vietnam build-up period. Accessions increased from 512,000 in FY 1965 to more than 1 million in FY 1966 and ranged between 888,000 and 979,000 during FY 1966-1969. The large number of accessions during this period caused separations to increase during FY 1968-1972. It was not necessary to replace all of the separatees because the requirements for new entrants was declining.

At the end of FY 1966 nearly one-third of the personnel on active duty had less than one year of service. By the end of FY 1975 this proportion is expected to fall to about one out of five.

Net Gains and Losses

(In Thousands)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Gains from Civil Life</u> <u>(Inductions in Parenthesis)</u>	<u>Losses to Civil Life</u> <u>1/</u>	<u>End Strength</u>	<u>Accession Rate</u> <u>(Gains as a % of</u> <u>End Strength)</u>
1964	600	(151)	2,687	22.3
1965	512	(103)	2,655	19.3
1966	1,003	(340)	3,094	32.4
1967	888	(299)	3,376	26.3
1968	979	(340)	3,548	27.6
1969	915	(265)	3,459	26.4
1970	737	(207)	3,065	24.0
1971	660	(157)	2,714	24.3
1972	502	(27)	2,322	21.6
1973	543	(36)	2,252	24.1
Projected				
1974	448	(0)	2,174	20.6
1975	463	(0)	2,152	21.5

1/ Includes deaths.

Enlisted Inventory Trends

a. First-Term Force. The sharpest changes have been in the size of the first-term force. The rapid expansion of the military forces in the FY 1966-68 time period resulted in an increase of 916,000 or 68.3% in the size of the first-term force. The reduction of force levels since FY 1968 has resulted in a decline of 1,154,000 first term personnel by the end of FY 1973.

The FY 1973 first-term enlisted force was 48.9% below the June 1968 peak and 187,000 or 13.9% below the FY 1965 total. Further reductions in the first-term enlisted force are expected and by the end of FY 1975, the number of first-term enlistees is expected to be 52% below the FY 1968 peak.

b. Career force. The sharpest drop in the enlisted career force occurred in FY 1968 when the number of career enlisted personnel declined 62,000 or by 6.7%. By 1973 the annual decline had slowed to only 10,000 or 1.3%; however, the 767,000 careerists still on active duty was significantly below the FY 1965 level (197,000 or 20.4%).

Enlisted Inventory Trends - FY 1965 to FY 1973
FY 1965-FY 1973

	Number (000s)			Index (1965 = 100)		
	Total	1/ First-Term	2/ Career	Total	1/ First-Term	2/ Career
<u>June 30:</u>						
1965	2,305	1,341	964	100.0	100.0	100.0
1966	2,733	1,774	959	118.6	132.3	99.5
1967	2,981	2,056	925	129.3	153.3	96.0
1968	3,120	2,257	863	135.4	168.3	89.5
1969	3,028	2,201	827	131.4	164.1	85.8
1970	2,651	1,836	815	150.1	136.9	84.5
1971	2,330	1,534	796	101.1	114.4	82.6
1972	1,976	1,199	777	85.7	89.4	80.6
1973	1,921	1,154	767	83.3	86.1	79.6

1/ Includes Reserves called to extended active duty; approximately 30,000 in 1968, and 8,000 in 1969.

2/ "Career" personnel defined as those having completed four or more years Active Federal Military Service.

c. Outlook. The movement of men into and out of operating units, resulting from the one-year tours of duty in Southeast Asia made continued service in the military less desirable and was a contributing factor to the overall decline in the career force. With the return to a more stabilized assignment pattern and the cessation of hostilities, the Services should be able to restructure their career forces to meet current program needs.

Career Force - First-Term Force Size

Under the direction^{1/} of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&RA), the Services have been developing comprehensive personnel management plans that among other things set forth the desired distribution of career and first term personnel to man their authorized missions.

In establishing the desired size of its career force each Service considers its manning requirements under its authorized force structure. A sufficient number of experienced personnel must be retained to provide effective leadership and technical competence in the active force in the event of rapid augmentation to meet national emergencies. This requirement for experienced personnel translates broadly into the career force. Service determinations of desired experience levels are made on an occupational (career management field) basis; thus a Service which requires a larger proportion of technically trained personnel will have a relatively larger career force than a Service with requirements for smaller proportions of technically trained personnel. Although the size of the career force is frequently addressed in terms of its ratio to the total force, the Services develop their career requirements by skill area on a numerical basis designed to fit their authorized manpower program.

The first-term force size is derived from consideration of the number of personnel needed to fill non-career requirements as well as to provide a sufficiently large pool of personnel from which career force needs can be met.

Trends in Career Force Size

At the end of FY 1973 both Army and Navy had smaller career forces relative to their desired experience levels while the Air Force had more careerists on active duty than desired. The Marine Corps' career force was approximately in line with its desires.

^{1/} ASD (M&RA) memorandum dated December 23, 1968, Subject: Enlisted Force Management System Guidance.

Army's career strength position deteriorated sharply between FY 1971 and FY 1973 primarily as a result of its rapid strength reductions in the latter part of FY 1972. In order to meet Congressionally mandated strength reductions Army instituted an across-the-board six month early release program for first-term personnel in January 1972. As a result of the early release program a significant number of men were forced to make career decisions early and, unwilling to make a new commitment to Army at that time, opted for early release.

The declines in Navy, and Marine Corps career forces appear to have ended. The decline in Army's career force has slowed and with a more stablized future Army should begin to rebuild its career force. The Marine Corps career force is approximately in line with the desired size although imbalances among skill areas still exist.

The Air Force's career force size stems from the Korean build-up which resulted in a substantial increase in Air Force career strength. As this Korean personnel peak reaches retirement eligibility in the mid 1970's the Air Force will be able to bring its career force ratio into line with desired goals.

Trends in Enlisted Career Force Size ^{1/}
(In Thousands)

<u>Service</u>	<u>FY 1965</u>	<u>FY 1968</u>	<u>FY 1971</u>	<u>FY 1973</u>	<u>Service Desired Ratio at Average Strength Range</u>
DoD Total					
Total Enl Str.	2,305	3,120	2,330	1,921	-
Career Str.	964	863	796	767	
% Career	41.8	27.7	34.2	39.9	
<u>Army</u>					
Total Enl Str.	855	1,402	972	682	
Career Str.	292	266	253	230	^{2/}
% Career	34.2	18.9	26.0	33.7	40
<u>Navy</u>					
Total Enl Str.	586	674	542	490	
Career Str.	229	214	194	198	
% Career	39.1	31.8	35.8	40.4	44
<u>Marine Corps</u>					
Total Enl Str.	173	283	191	177	
Career Str.	58	52	47	47	
% Career	33.5	18.4	25.1	26.9	26
<u>Air Force</u>					
Total Enl Str.	690	762	625	572	
Career Str.	385	362	302	288	
% Career	55.8	47.6	48.3	50.3	40

^{1/} Personnel with four or more completed years of service.

^{2/} Army defines its career force as consisting of personnel with three or more completed years of service. However, for comparative purposes Army's career force proportion has been stated in terms of personnel with four or more years service.

Although the Services' career forces are close to desired levels overall, there are a number of imbalances. Career force shortages in some occupational fields are offset by surpluses in other fields. Thus, although the overall situation appears reasonably satisfactory, there are problems since a man trained as an infantryman cannot be assigned to duty as, say, an occupational therapy specialist. In order to induce the reenlistment of men into shortage skill areas, the variable reenlistment bonus has been employed to provide a differential monetary incentive. Under present legislation however, the differential applies only to the first reenlistment while the basic reenlistment bonus must be paid to all reenlistees-even for men who reenlist in occupational fields that do not present career manning problems. A selected list of occupational specialties in which variable reenlistment bonuses are currently employed to increase entrants into the career force is shown below:

Selected Occupational Specialties with Career Manning Shortages

ARMY

Communications Security Specialist
Armor Crewman
HAWK Continuous Wave Radar Repairman
Target Aircraft Control System Mechanic
Legal Clerk

NAVY

Aviation Fire Control Technician
Aviation Anti-Submarine Warfare Operator
Boiler Technician
Mineman
Steelworker

MARINE CORPS

Interrogator
Electronic Countermeasures Operator
K6-13 Fixed Plant Technician
Off-Line Equipment Operator
KC-130 Aircraft Flight Engineer
Red-eye Gunner

AIR FORCE

Precision Measure and Equipment Technician
Missile Facilities Specialist
Command and Control Specialist
Missile Electronic Equipment Specialist
Defense Fire Control System Operation

The "Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act of 1974" currently under consideration by the Congress would enable the Services to reenlist personnel in occupational groupings in which there are no career force manning shortages without payment of a bonus and will improve the effectiveness of the existing bonus authority by permitting bonus payments for personnel completing a second or subsequent enlistment term who have less than 11 years of service.

This latter provision is a key element in the Services' plans to improve career manning in critical skill areas. As mentioned above, under current legislation no differential reenlistment bonuses are authorized after the first reenlistment has taken place thus an individual who completes a second or subsequent reenlistment at the end of six, seven or eight years service can not be offered a differential monetary incentive to reenlist. This inability to offer a differential payment at a critical decision point has resulted in a shortfall in mid-career manning objectives. The authority to offer differential incentives to personnel after their initial enlistment term in critical skills as proposed in the "Bonus Revision Act of 1974" will permit the Services to reduce the career force shortages in critical skill areas and improve overall career force management.

First-Term Accession Requirements

Within the context of a fixed military personnel requirement (and thus a constant size career force), the annual accession total is determined by the length of time a new recruit can be expected to remain in the first-term force.

Non-prior service personnel enter the first-term force and either return to civilian life as veterans at or prior to the end of their initial enlistment term or enter the career force after completing four years of active duty. The first-term force, then, is replaced at a periodic interval which is determined by the length of time each new accession can be expected to serve in the first-term force. If each accession had an initial enlistment term of four years and


was not separated from service until the end of that four year period, on the average the annual accession requirement would be one-fourth of the first-term force. However, all enlistees do not enlist for an initial enlistment term of four years nor do all enlistees remain in service until the end of their initial enlistment terms. A significant proportion of enlistees (at least one-fifth) have failed to complete their initial term of service in the past for such reasons as unsuitability, hardship, physical condition or disciplinary reasons. These early separatees are known as attrition losses. As a result of attrition four year enlistees can be expected to spend on the average about 3.5 years in the first-term force.

For various reasons, the four Military Services utilize a mix of two, three, four and six year initial enlistment terms. The Army, Navy, and Air Force currently have initial enlistment terms of six years, all four services offer four year enlistments, the Army, Navy and Marine Corps have enlistment programs that permit enlistees to contract for two and three year periods of active duty. The mix of initial enlistment terms offered by a Service is dependent upon its needs to meet deployment requirements as well as its technical training requirements. The longer term enlistments generally involve assignments to specific training assignments for extensive periods of time. Over a four year period considering attrition and reenlistment potential, the expectations are that a enlistee entering for an initial two year term would remain in the first-term force for 2.24 years, and a three year initial enlistee for 2.88 years.


The mix of initial enlistment tours employed by a Service is a major determinate of the number of separations in subsequent years. For example, separations in FY 1976 will be composed for the most part of two year personnel accessed in 1974, three year accessions in 1973, four year accessions in 1972 and six year accessions in 1970.

With the end of the draft, the Services (particularly the Army - which no longer has substantial numbers of two year draftees) have been able to increase the average length of initial service commitment. Comparative data on the length of initial service commitments for FY 1971, FY 1973 and the first half of FY 1974 are shown in the following graphs. The chart on Army's combat arms accessions shows the dramatic changes in the average initial term of men entering Army's combat arms as a result of enlistment incentives (guaranteed assignments, etc.) and then the introduction of the bonus for four year enlistments. The resultant decline in anticipated FY 1976 Army Combat Arms accessions of 15,000-20,000 is a direct result of the longer initial enlistment terms in FY 1973 and FY 1974.

ENLISTED ACCESSIONS NON-PRIOR SERVICE MEN



ENLISTED ACCESSIONS NON-PRIOR SERVICE MEN



EFFECT OF REDUCED TURNOVER ARMY COMBAT ARMS

AVERAGE INITIAL TERMS OF SERVICE



5 MONTHS 21 MONTHS



FY 1971:

5 MONTHS 33 MONTHS



FY 1974:

- **INCREASED UTILIZATION PER TRAINING DOLLAR: 57%**
- **ESTIMATED REDUCTION IN FY 1976 ACCESSION REQUIREMENTS
DUE TO REDUCED TURNOVER: 15,000-20,000**

The effect of different career force ratios and the mix of initial enlistment terms upon the annual accession rate is shown in the following table. The assumption underlying the table is that total, career force and first-term force strengths remain constant over time.

1/
Enlisted Accession Rates Under Varying Career
Force Ratios and Terms of Initial Enlistment 2/

<u>Career Force as</u> <u>a Percentage of</u> <u>Total Force</u>	<u>All four or</u> <u>more years</u>	<u>65%-4 yrs</u> <u>35%-3 yrs</u>	<u>25%-4 yrs</u> <u>75 %-3 yrs</u>	<u>25%-4 yrs</u> <u>50%-3 yrs</u> <u>25%-2 yrs</u>
25	21.6	23.0	24.8	26.2
30	20.2	21.4	23.1	24.4
35	18.7	19.9	21.5	22.7
40	17.3	18.4	19.8	20.9
45	15.9	16.9	18.2	19.2
50	14.4	15.3	16.5	17.4

1/ Accessions as percentage of Total Enlisted Force.

2/ Career Force defined as those with four or more years of service.

For example the accession rate for a Service with 25% of its enlistees in the career force and enlisting all of its personnel for a four year term would be 21.6%. The same service would have an accession rate of 14.4% if it had a career force ratio of 50%. The 7.2% differential in accession rates for a Service with a total enlisted force of 500,000 means that 36,000 fewer accessions on an annual basis would be needed to maintain strengths with the 50% career ratio than with the 25% career ratio. However, career force increases would result in aging of the force and consequent increases for pay, and allowance, medical care, and retirement.

Similarly the effect of increased initial terms of service can be seen by examining the accession rates for a Service with the same career force ratio but a different mix of initial enlistment terms. Using the same example of a 25% career force content, the annual accession rate if all enlistees enter for at least a four year term (21.6%) would increase to 26.2% under a situation where one-fourth enter for four years; one-half enter for three years; and one-fourth enter for two years. The 4.6% differential resulting from the different terms of service translates to a 23,000 differential in annual accessions in the case of a total enlisted force of 500,000.

Civilian-Military Comparison

A comparison of military accession rates with a turnover measure computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for manufacturing industries is shown in the table below. Despite considerable comment concerning "high" turnover rates in the military, the data indicate that, in reality, the overall military accession rate is about one-third lower than experienced by civilian manufacturing industries. A principal reason for the lower accession rate in the Military Services is the fixed term of initial service - i.e., two, three, four, five or six years - which does not exist in the civilian sector. The highest turnover rates in the civilian sector are typically for young inexperienced personnel while the great majority of military separatees are experienced personnel with a minimum of two years of service. A 1968 study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed that only 22% of the men aged 25-29 had remained with the same employer more than five years. The 22% remaining with the same employer for more than five years compares favorably with the FY 1973 DoD first-term reenlistment rate of 24%.

Military and Civilian Accession Rates

<u>Year</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>New Hires In Civilian Manufacturing Industries</u>
1964	22.3	31.2
1965	19.3	37.2
1966	32.4	45.6
1967	26.3	39.6
1968	27.6	42.0
1969	26.4	44.4
1970	24.0	33.6
1971	24.3	30.0
1972	21.6	39.6
1973	24.1	46.8

NOTE: Year shown is fiscal year for military; calendar year for civilian manufacturing industries.

The military accession rate is computed by dividing the annual officer and enlisted accessions from civil life by military end strengths.

The new hire rate for manufacturing industries represents the number of individuals hired for the first time by individual companies divided by average number of employees. Monthly rates were added to obtain the annual rate.

Personnel Policies and Changes

Recognizing the reduced accession and training costs that result from longer initial terms of service, the Services have emphasized the recruitment of personnel for longer initial enlistment periods. The inducement (other than the combat arms bonus offered by the Army and Marine Corps for four-year infantry, armor, and artillery duty) generally includes a guarantee as to training and/or location of initial assignment. The trade-off between long and short initial enlistment terms is one that requires further analysis. The typical enlistee is a 17 to 19 year old who according to survey data is seeking an occupational training or an occupation in which to make a career. In the civilian sector, these young adults are frequent job-changers and their tenure on a specific job is low. Thus shorter enlistment tours appear to be an attractive enlistment inducement, but they increase future requirements. Because Army faced a specific recruitment problem under its standard three year assignment guarantee program it lowered the minimum enlistment period to two years for a guaranteed assignment to Europe or training in a limited number of occupational areas.

In the past year the Army tightened its optional early release programs for seasonal employment and return to school. Under these programs personnel have been released up to 90 days before the end of their contractual period. Termination of these programs will increase the length of service for the first term personnel concerned and reduce accession requirements by a minor amount.

Outlook

The stabilized force levels anticipated over the next several years should result in lower accession requirements both in numbers and as a percentage of total strength. Passage of the "Bonus Revision Act of 1974" and implementation of the authority to increase reenlistment bonus differentials and to pay additional incentives at the end of the second

enlistment term should result in a better match of career force requirements and manning in critical skills. The enlistment bonus provisions of the "Act" should provide the Services with a sufficiently large pool of first-term volunteers for duty in critical skill areas to insure that Service reenlistment objectives for sustenance of the career force can be met.

The increased average term of service that will result from the elimination of the draft and increased proportion of three, four and six year enlistments should reduce future accessions and the training loads and costs associated with high accession rates.

CHAPTER XVI

FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

A. Rationale for Forward Deployments

We maintain forward deployments of our forces in order to:

- Help deter aggression by demonstrating to potential enemies and to our allies the U.S. resolve to honor its commitments:

- Enable the United States to assist our allies in collective defense in the event they are attacked; and

- Provide the President with the flexibility necessary in responding promptly to contingencies.

At the end of FY 73, we had about 550 thousand military personnel stationed in foreign countries, including those stationed aboard ship. Of the 550 thousand, approximately 323,000 were in Europe and related areas, and 149,000 were in the Western Pacific area. Vietnam withdrawal has been completed and the only military personnel there are assigned to the military attache office.

With the Vietnam ceasefire, and as the forces of our allies are further modernized and improved in consonance with the Nixon Doctrine, we may anticipate adjustments in our deployments. However, these changes will be undertaken only after full consultation with our allies, and only when our collective security interests permit.

In determining whether forces are to be deployed overseas or retained in the United States, a number of factors must be considered. There are clear advantages and disadvantages of overseas deployments, so a balance must be struck for each area which depends on the threat, the military requirements peculiar to the area, costs, and political considerations.

The advantages of forward deployments include:

- Immediate availability in the event of a crisis;

- Greater assurance to our allies of the firmness of our commitments;

- Greater deterrent to a potential enemy; and
- Reduced requirement for mobility forces.

The disadvantages include:

- Additional costs related to personnel moves and other aspects of operating foreign bases;
- Balance of payments costs;
- Potential political problems caused by the presence of large numbers of American personnel in a foreign country; and
- Adverse impact on morale of military personnel when separated from families.

The advantages of forward deployment are greatest for our land forces. Land forces depend on heavy and bulky weapons and support equipment. Moving large land forces rapidly (e. g. , within 30 days) from the United States to a conflict area, therefore, requires large and very costly airlift forces, or a mix of airlift and forward positioning of major equipment items. Even if less rapid reinforcement is acceptable, sealift needs could be large.

Tactical air forces are less dependent on forward deployments for immediate employment during a crisis because additional planes can be quickly flown into existing airfields and operate under bare base concepts where only a suitable runway and water supply are available. For this reason, we have forward deployed a relatively smaller percentage of our tactical air forces than ground forces.

Navy forces forward deployed consist primarily of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and the 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific. The 6th Fleet and Air Force tactical units provide the major U. S. contribution to Allied defense of the southern NATO flank and serve as a significant counterweight to the Soviet influence in the Mediterranean area. The 7th Fleet, Air Force tactical air forces and forward deployed Army and Marine Corps forces support our Asian allies. Naval forces with their embarked Marine Amphibious Forces, constitute a mobile, responsive, capability to employ land, sea, and air forces in crisis situations.

The political impact of changes in forward deployment cannot be ignored. Where we have had troops stationed in a particular country for

a decade or more, the sudden removal of those troops can have a destabilizing political effect, regardless of the analytical rationale or assurances of continued commitment which may accompany the redeployments.

B. NATO Deployments

U.S. forces deployed in NATO Europe are now our largest overseas deployment. We have deployed in the European theater at the present time an Army combat force of 4 1/3 divisions and 21 Air Force fighter/attack squadrons.

In addition, many of our CONUS based forces, including Navy ships, the dual-based REFORGER Army units, and the CRESTED CAP Air Force units, are firmly committed to NATO.

The FY 75 budget provides for the maintenance of our current force capabilities in Europe in order to demonstrate to our European Allies that we are doing our full share in the common defense, and that we expect them to maintain and improve their own forces. This policy is consistent with the President's pledge of December 3, 1970, that:

"...given a similar approach by the other Allies the United States would maintain and improve its own forces in Europe and would not reduce them except in the context of reciprocal East-West action."

In NATO, the firmness of the U.S. commitment is important for political and military stability. Our Allies will continue to display anxiety about any unilateral U.S. reduction in forward deployed forces.

At the present time, we contribute to the ground forces 193,000 men of the roughly 770,000 NATO central region forces. This 770,000 man force for NATO is opposed to over 900,000 Warsaw Pact forces. The NATO Alliance has the ingredient of a capability to continue to deter, and even to handle a hypothetical attack by the forces of the Warsaw Pact located in the NATO guidelines area, and the additional 30 divisions that the Soviets might bring up from the Western USSR under hypothetical circumstances. That conventional capability requires improvement. It requires strengthening.

If our allies do their share, we can have a conventional capability to which the United States must make a reasonable contribution. If we were to remove our forces, the balance would be upset.

As the United States presses the nations of Western Europe to provide more military forces so that the relative share of our contribution shrinks, the share our allies perform should not be underestimated. At the present time, the European partners of NATO contribute about 80 percent of the forces in the European Area. They contribute 90 percent of the ground forces, 80 percent of the Naval forces and 75 percent of the air forces there.

The European countries, like the United States, are faced with competing demands for their resources, including the skilled manpower necessary to maintain modern arms. The resurgence of concern about the Soviet threat that followed the Czech crisis, the necessity they felt to persuade the United States to keep substantial forces in Europe, and the hope for a mutual force reduction with the Warsaw Pact have succeeded in arresting some downward trends in Allied forces and given them a renewed resolve to improve those forces.

Our NATO Allies continue the spirit of assuming on their own more of the defense burden. As noted earlier, almost all of our Allies are planning increases in their defense budgets over the 1973 level. Many of the force improvements recommended in the NATO AD-70 study are being implemented. The European Defense Improvement Program initiated in December 1970, and totaling over \$1 billion for five years, continues to provide improvements in communications, aircraft shelters, anti-tank weapons and war reserve stocks.

General East-West agreement on the scenario for parallel Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has been reached. There is full participation by our NATO Allies.

C. Western Pacific Deployment

We currently have air, ground and naval forces deployed in Asia. These forces include: A U.S. Army division and a USAF tactical fighter wing in Korea; additional USAF elements in the Republic of China, Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines; elements of a Marine division/wing in Japan; and naval forces in the Western Pacific. These forces perform both military and political functions.

Militarily, U. S. forces in Asia offer deterrence, initial defense and support. Our forces are kept at levels and in locations that are intended to deter the use of military force in Asia by the PRC, the USSR, North Korea, or North Vietnam. Should deterrence fail, these forces, in conjunction with those of our allies, would provide the initial defense of the region. Our forces in Asia also provide the forward logistical bases which would be necessary to support U.S. and allied operations. Finally, our forces perform military functions, like the manning of communications facilities, that are necessary during periods of peace.

Politically, U.S. deployments in Asia, such as those in Thailand, symbolize our commitment to peace and stability in the region. In addition, those forces demonstrate our intent to honor our existing mutual defense treaties.

During 1973, there were reductions in U.S. forces in Asia, primarily in our elements based in Thailand and on Taiwan. Further reductions are intended, subject to the improvement of the security situation in Southeast Asia. However, any rapid, unilateral withdrawal of U. S. forces forward deployed in Asia would be the cause of major concern on the part of our allies and could undermine the political and military stability of the region.

D. Summary of Present and Planned Deployments

The following tables summarize our present and planned deployments.

a/

TOTAL MILITARY MANPOWER BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
(000s)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Total Military Manpower	2252	2174	2152
Total U. S., Territories and Possessions, Southeast Asia^{b/}	1768	1694	1674
Europe and Related Areas	323^{c/}	317	317
Western Pacific	149	153	153
Other Foreign Countries/Areas	12	9	9
Navy/Marine Corps Forces Deployed Afloat-included in above	<u>(58)</u>	<u>(64)</u>	<u>(64)</u>
Total Foreign Countries/Areas, less Southeast Asia	484	480	478

a/ All geographic areas include Navy and Marine Corps units afloat in those areas.

b/ Southeast Asia strengths have been included here due to classification.

c/ Presidential/SecDef guidance stipulates the Services/JCS may not plan to have an authorized strength in Europe and Related Areas in excess of 319 thousand military. The FY 73 actual strength reflects the realities of personnel assignment procedures where replacements enter the theater (but not their unit of assignment) prior to the departure of outgoing personnel.

FY 75 STRATEGIC FORCES

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
<u>OFFENSIVE</u>		
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
1054 ICBM	CONUS	Deter attack on the U.S. and its allies.
28 Bomber Squadrons (B-52/FB-111)	1 Guam ^{a/} 26, CONUS	Deter attacks on the U.S. and its allies.
38 Tanker Squadrons	1 SEA 3 - Canada, Spain Alaska 34 - CONUS	
<u>NAVY</u>		
41 SSBNs	Charleston, S. C. Rota, Spain Holy Loch, Scotland Guam	Deter attack on the U.S. and its allies.
<u>DEFENSIVE</u>		
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
6 Interceptor Squadrons	CONUS	Restrict unauthorized overflight of U.S. and defend against small bomber attacks.

a/ Two B-52 squadron equivalents support SEA requirements on a rotational basis.

**PRIMARY
APPLICABLE
TREATY**

**STRATEGY
SUPPORTED**

**OTHER
POTENTIAL
DEPLOYMENTS**

Interim Offensive
Forces Agreement

Maintain an adequate second-
strike capability to deter
an all-out surprise attack
on our strategic forces.

Provide no incentive for
the Soviet Union to
strike the United States
first in a crisis.

Prevent the Soviet Union
from gaining the ability
to cause considerably
greater urban/industrial
destruction than the
United States could
inflict on the Soviets
in a nuclear war.

None

Potential for worldwide
contingency deployments

Potential for worldwide
contingency deployments

Interim Offensive
Forces Agreement

Worldwide

NORAD Agreement

Peacetime air
space surveillance
and control

Worldwide

sis.

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2

FY 75 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

ARMY DIVISIONS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
1st Armored Division 3d Armored Division 3d Infantry Division (M) 8th Infantry Division (M) Bde, 1st Infantry Division (M)	West Germany	Force presence. In concert with allied and other U.S. forces, deter Warsaw Pact aggression. Failing that, stop any Warsaw Pact ground attack and stabilize the military situation without major loss of NATO Territory.
1st Infantry Division (M) (REFORGER) (Minus 1 Brigade) 2d Armored Division 4th Infantry Division (M)	Ft. Riley, Kansas Ft. Hood, Texas Ft. Carson, Colorado	Early ground combat reinforcement for NATO forces.
1st Cav Division (TRICAP) 9th Infantry Division 101st Airborne Division (Aml) 82d Airborne Division 197th Infantry Brigade	Ft. Hood, Texas Ft. Lewis, Washington Ft. Campbell, Kentucky Ft. Bragg, N.C. Ft. Benning, Georgia	To provide Strategic Reserve and ground forces for world-wide deployment.
2d Infantry Division	South Korea	Force presence. Provides ground combat and security forces for South Korea.
25th Infantry Division	Hawaii	Pacific Command Ground Combat Reserve

PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY

STRATEGY SUPPORTED

OTHER POTENTIAL
DEPLOYMENTS

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

A treaty, signed April 4, 1949, by which the partners agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and . . . each of them acting in accordance with constitutional processes . . . attacked by taking forthwith individually and in concert with the other partners such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed forces.

North Atlantic Treaty
4 April 1949.

Our NATO strategy seeks to deter all forms of aggression against NATO through the maintenance of a full spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear military capabilities and application of a forward defense concept.

Same as above.

These forces are applied to the requirements for meeting minor contingencies and providing for a strategic reserve and assistance to allies.

Worldwide

Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral agreement, signed October 1, 1953, whereby each party "recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties . . . would be dangerous to its own peace and safety" and that each Party "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its own constitutional processes."

Forward deployed U.S. forces are an integral link in the spectrum of deterrence and demonstrate to enemies and allies the U.S. resolve to honor commitments. Should an attack occur, these forces allow the U.S. to assist allies in timely defense.

Worldwide

SEATO

Provides force for Pacific Area Contingencies. Provides force presence.

Worldwide

FY 75 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

NAVY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT

	<u>UNIT</u> ^{a/}	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY</u>
4	Second Fleet & Western Atlantic CVAs/CVWs	U.S. East Coast & Western Atlantic	Maintain Atlantic sea lanes in NATO conflict.	NATO
67	Surface Combatants		Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of NATO land war.	
1	Amphibious Ready Group ^{b/}		Provide crisis management or contingency force in Atlantic.	
10	VP Squadrons		Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Atlantic.	
	Associated Support Ships & Attack Submarines			
	Sixth Fleet	Mediterranean	Maintain Mediterranean sea lanes in NATO conflict.	NATO
2	CVAs/CVWs		Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of NATO land war, particularly any Warsaw Pact initiatives against the NATO southern flank.	
17	Surface Combatants		Provide crisis management or contingency force in Mediterranean.	
2	Amphibious Ready Group ^{b/}		Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Mediterranean.	
	VP Squadrons			
	Associated Support Ships & Attack Submarines			
	Middle East Force	Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean	Provide peacetime naval presence in Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.	
	1 Flagship ^{c/}		Provide limited contingency force in the area.	
	2 Surface Combatants			
	Third Fleet and Eastern Pacific	U.S. West Coast & Eastern Pacific	Maintain Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict.	NATO
6	CVAs/CVWs		Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces to reinforce Western Pacific forces and in support of Asian conflict.	Various Pacific Mutual Defense Aid Treaties.
56	Surface Combatants		Provide crisis management or contingency force in Eastern Pacific and to reinforce Western Pacific forces.	
0	Amphibious Ready Groups ^{b/}		Provide peacetime naval presence in Eastern Pacific.	
3	VP Squadrons			
	Associated Support Ships & Attack Submarines			
	Seventh Fleet & Western Pacific	Western Pacific	Maintain Western Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict.	NATO
3	CVAs/CVWs		Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of Asian conflict.	Various Pacific Mutual Defense & Aid Treaties
25	Surface Combatants		Provide crisis management or contingency force in Western Pacific.	
2	Amphibious Ready Groups ^{b/}		Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Western Pacific.	
4	VP Squadrons ^{d/}			
	Associated Support Ships & Attack Submarines			

^{a/} Figures shown are approximate averages. Most ships are rotated to distant assignments from U.S. homeport units selectively homeported overseas, including one CV homeported in Japan.

^{b/} An amphibious ready group (ARG) is one-ninth of a Marine amphibious force (MAF). It consists of 3 to 5 the ARGs forward deployed (in the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific and periodically in the Caribbean) with Marine units embarked).

^{c/} Notice has been given to terminate homeporting arrangements for the flagship destroyers deploy on a rotational basis from U.S. East Coast homeports. U.S. by units forward deployed in the Western Pacific.

^{d/} Includes VP detachment in Alaska.

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	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY</u>	<u>STRATEGY SUPPORTED</u>	<u>OTHER POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS</u>
	Maintain Atlantic sea lanes in NATO conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of NATO land war. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Atlantic. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Atlantic.	NATO	Provide for initial defense of NATO Europe. Provide for the protection of naval forces and shipping. Provide a strategic reserve.	Redeployment worldwide possible. Provides capability for rapid reinforcement of NATO in Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.
	Maintain Mediterranean sea lanes in NATO conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of NATO land war, particularly any Warsaw Pact initiatives against the NATO southern flank. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Mediterranean. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Mediterranean.	NATO	Provide for initial defense of NATO Europe. Provide for the protection of naval forces and shipping. Provide appropriate forward deployment of U.S. forces.	None planned.
Indian Ocean	Provide peacetime naval presence in Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Provide limited contingency force in the area.		Provide appropriate forward deployment of U.S. forces.	Redeployment worldwide possible. Force provides limited military capability.
	Maintain Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces to reinforce Western Pacific forces and in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Eastern Pacific and to reinforce Western Pacific forces. Provide peacetime naval presence in Eastern Pacific.	NATO Various Pacific Mutual Defense & Aid Treaties.	Provide for joint defense of Asia (Korea or Southeast Asia). Provide for protection of naval forces and shipping. Provide a strategic reserve.	Redeployment worldwide possible. Provides capability for reinforcement of either NATO or Western Pacific forces.
	Maintain Western Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Western Pacific. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Western Pacific.	NATO Various Pacific Mutual Defense & Aid Treaties	Provide for joint defense of Asia (Korea or Southeast Asia). Provide for protection of naval forces and shipping. Provide appropriate forward deployment of U.S. forces.	Redeployment worldwide possible. Deployment of entire force elsewhere unlikely due to need of U.S. naval presence in the Western Pacific.

ships are rotated to distant assignments from U.S. homeports. Mediterranean and Western Pacific forces, however, contain a few including one CV homeported in Japan.
a Marine amphibious force (MAF). It consists of 3 to 5 amphibious ships with a Marine battalion landing team embarked. Only the Western Pacific and periodically in the Caribbean) are actually constituted, (the amphibious shipping operated as a squadron

homeporting arrangements for the flagship in Bahrain effective October 1974. The two basis from U.S. East Coast homeports. U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean have twice been augmented Western Pacific.

FY 75 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (MAF)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
<u>I MAF</u> (1st Marine Division/3d Marine Aircraft Wing Team, plus supporting force troops elements.)	Camp Pendleton, Calif/MCAS, El Toro, Calif. and MCB, 29 Palms, Calif.	Pacific Command Reserve Together with Navy Components of the amphibious team provide ground/air combat forces to project sea power ashore.
<u>II MAF</u> (2d Marine Division/2d Marine Aircraft Wing Team, plus supporting force troops elements.)	Camp Lejeune, N. C./MCAS, Cherry Point N. C. and MCAS, Quantico, Va. Fwd deployed units; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Mediterranean, Caribbean	Atlantic Command Reserve Provide to CINC's ground/air combat forces with an amphibious forcible entry capability.
<u>III MAF</u> (3d Marine Division(-)/1st Marine Aircraft Wing Team, plus supporting force troops elements.)	Camp Butler, Okinawa/MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan and MCAS, Futema, Okinawa South China Sea	Pacific Command Reserve Provides forward deployed combat force in the Western Pacific Provide to CINC's ground/air combat forces with amphibious forcible entry capability.
<u>1st MARINE BRIGADE</u> (Regimental Landing Team 3/Marine Aircraft Group 22, plus supporting force troops elements.)	Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii	Pacific Command Reserve Early reinforcement of forward deployed forces in the Western Pacific Provide to CINC ground/air combat forces with an amphibious forcible entry capability.

PRIMARY
APPLICABLE
TREATY

STRATEGY
SUPPORTED

OTHER
POTENTIAL
DEPLOYMENTS

SEATO Bilateral Mutual
Defense Treaties

Provides forces primarily for
Pacific area contingencies.

To NATO/Worldwide

These forces can be applied to
the requirements for meeting
major or minor contingencies
worldwide and providing
assistance to allies.

NATO

Provides forces primarily for
Atlantic and European (NATO)
Area contingencies.

To Pacific Command/
Worldwide

Provides forward afloat de-
ployed force presence in the
Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean
areas and the Caribbean area.

These forces can be applied to
the requirements for meeting
major or minor contingencies
worldwide and providing
assistance to Allies.

SEATO Bilateral Mutual
Defense Treaties

Provides forces for Pacific
area contingencies.

To NATO/Worldwide

Provides forward afloat de-
ployed presence in the Western
Pacific.

These forces can be applied to
the requirements for meeting
major or minor contingencies
worldwide, and providing
assistance to Allies.

SEATO Bilateral Mutual
Defense Treaties

These forces could be applied
to meeting minor contingency
requirements.

To NATO/Worldwide

FY 75 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
ACTIVE AIR FORCE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

<u>UNIT</u> <u>(Fighter/Attack Squadron)</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
21 Squadrons	U.K., West Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, and Spain	Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction for a NATO conflict.
11 Squadrons	Southeast Asia, Philippines, Okinawa, and Republic of Korea	Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction for an Asian conflict.
37 Squadrons	CONUS, Alaska and Iceland	Provide reinforcement of tactical air capability in Europe and Asia.

PRIMARY
APPLICABLE
TREATY

STRATEGY SUPPORTED

OTHER POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS

NATO	To deter aggression in Europe. To insure that we have the capability to conduct an initial conventional defense of NATO.	None planned.
SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	To deter aggression in Asia. To insure that we have the capability, in concert with allies, to conduct a conventional defense of Asia against a threat including the PRC.	Can be redeployed worldwide.
-	Europe and Asia Strategies Minor Contingencies.	Can reinforce NATO or Asian allies. Can also be used for minor contingencies.

CHAPTER XVII

PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION MOVES

Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves are an integral part of military manpower planning. For example, all personnel need a certain amount of training when they enter the military. It is more efficient to conduct this training at a few sites throughout the United States than it would be to train each individual in a duty unit. Therefore, individuals are moved from their homes to a training center. An individual may subsequently move from the training center to a school to acquire additional skills, and he eventually moves from the training establishment to a duty unit. Similarly, moves are needed to maintain skill balance in the force, and to rotate individuals to and from overseas areas. Finally, those who are separated from the Services are moved back to their homes.

The report of the House Appropriations Committee on the FY 74 Defense Appropriations Bill stated, "The Committee directs that the submission of the fiscal year 1975 budget request for permanent change of station travel have uniform move accounting policies and that to the extent possible the fiscal years 1973 and 1974 columns of that budget be revised on a similar basis," Thus, DoD has revised its PCS move counting criteria such that all travel from the point of origin to the final destination is considered to be one move. In many cases, an individual will actually make several sub-moves separated by temporary duty for training, processing, etc. These were previously considered, in some cases, to be separate moves. This change in the PCS move counting criteria does not impact upon the requirement for transients or the total requirement for PCS travel funds in the Military Personnel appropriations. The tables at the end of this appendix summarize the FY 73-75 PCS move program using both the current and the previous counting criteria.

The remainder of this appendix discusses the six categories of PCS moves -- separation, accession, training, rotational, operational, and organized unit; and the factors which influence the requirement and/or restrict managerial control of PCS moves.

Separation Travel

These are PCS moves of individuals leaving active duty. These moves include all travel from the last duty station, whether overseas or in the Continental United States (CONUS), to the serviceman's hometown. Individuals who reenlist immediately upon separation from the Services receive payments from PCS funds, however, these payments are not counted as separation moves.

Separation move requirements are a function of the number of personnel completing tours of obligation (these numbers vary in a cyclic pattern due to changes in prior year accession patterns) who do not choose to remain in the military. Separation moves are also a function of retirements and reductions in force size. For a given planned force level, projected separation moves are relatively "fixed" unless there are increases in "first term" retention. Thus, the Services have no direct control over the number of separation moves.

In FY 75, separation moves comprise approximately 27% of total DoD PCS move requirements. Separation moves, in addition, generate a "chain reaction" of PCS moves in other categories to maintain planned force levels. For example, a vacancy in a unit resulting from a separation is normally filled by moving a trained man into that position from somewhere else in the force. This replacement requirement accounts for approximately one-third of all operational and rotational moves. Similarly, separations create vacancies in specific skills which generate training move requirements, and they create vacancies in total strength which generate accession move requirements. The extent of this "chain reaction" varies among the Services, but taking DoD as a whole, it is the dominant factor in PCS move requirements.

Accession Travel

These are PCS moves of individuals entering active duty. These moves include all travel from the serviceman's hometown to the first duty station, whether overseas or in CONUS (or initial entry schooling of twenty weeks or more).

Accession move requirements are a function of total annual separations and changes in total structure strength between fiscal years. For a steady state strength level, accession move requirements would be driven entirely by separations. Thus, in the short run, accession moves can only be reduced by reducing total strength. In FY 75, accession moves comprise approximately 27% of total DoD PCS move requirements.

Training Travel

These are PCS moves of individuals receiving initial entry training (for courses of twenty weeks or more), flight training, advanced skill training, and professional development training.

Since some individuals enter and/or leave the training system via accession or rotational moves, the number of training moves does not equal the total number of individuals entering and leaving training in a fiscal year.

Training move requirements are a function of the training program, which in turn is based upon imbalances between skill requirements and skill inventories. Thus, training moves can only be reduced by altering the training program to the detriment of skill balance. In FY 75, training moves comprise approximately 7% of total DoD PCS move requirements.

Rotational Travel

These are PCS moves of individuals going from CONUS duty stations (or schools of twenty or more weeks duration) to overseas stations, or returning from overseas to CONUS and remaining in the Service. Individuals going overseas after initial entry training of less than twenty weeks do so as an accession move. Individuals returning from overseas for discharge/separation do so as a separation move.

Rotational move requirements are a function of overseas strength levels and the length of overseas tours (and separation from overseas which cannot be replaced by persons traveling as accession moves). Thus, there are two areas of managerial planning action which can be taken to reduce rotational move requirements. First, reduce the total number of personnel overseas, with the effect upon PCS moves being greatest when reductions are made in unaccompanied tour areas. Currently, about 28% of total DoD military manpower is assigned outside of CONUS, with about 17% of overseas manpower in mandatory unaccompanied tour areas. Second, extend the tour length policy for a given area. Currently, unaccompanied tour length policy varies from 12 to 18 months depending on location; accompanied tour length policy varies from 24 to 36 months depending on location. In FY 75, rotational moves comprise approximately 29% of total DoD PCS move requirements.

Operational Travel

These are PCS moves of individuals going from one duty station to another within the same theater (e.g., CONUS or Europe). Operational moves include individuals reassigned within a given theater as the result of force structure changes (e.g., unit activations, inactivations, reorganizations, etc.). Operational moves are primarily a function of requirements to balance grade and skill inventories with vacancies.

Since the requirements for the previous categories of moves are more severely constrained, it is usually operational moves which must be reduced when PCS funds are inadequate to support the PCS move requirements. This tends to result in severe morale problems and sub-optimal utilization of manpower. In FY 75, operational moves comprise approximately 9% of total DoD PCS move requirements.

Travel of Organized Units

These are PCS moves of personnel assigned to units which are transferred from one location to another. Organized unit moves do not involve individual time lost in transit since the assigned task of the unit is to move to a new location. Organized unit move requirements are a function of known changes in projected force positioning due to operational requirements. In FY 75, organized unit moves comprise 1% of total DoD PCS move requirements.

Summary

The following tables summarize for each Service, the FY 73-75 PCS move program using both the current and previous accounting system.

ARMY

Permanent Change of Station Travel Program a/
(Military Member Moves in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Current Move Counting Criteria</u>			
Accession Travel	252.0	226.4	243.3
Training Travel	27.6	29.2	24.1
Operational Travel	61.6	54.9	49.4
Rotational Travel	220.2	190.3	185.1
Separation Travel	250.5	238.1	225.8
Travel of Organized Units	<u>9.2</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>6.1</u>
Total PCS Moves	821.2	746.9	733.9
 <u>Previous Move Counting Criteria</u>			
Accession Travel	246.0	221.3	238.0
Training Travel	27.6	29.2	24.1
Operational Travel	61.6	54.9	49.4
Rotational Travel	368.1	321.9	320.1
Separation Travel	250.5	238.1	225.8
Travel of Organized Units	<u>9.2</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>6.1</u>
Total PCS Moves	963.0	873.4	863.6

a/ Excludes Military Academy Cadet accession and separation moves.

NAVY

Permanent Change of Station Travel Program a/
(Military Member Moves in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Current Move Counting Criteria</u>			
Accession Travel	136.2	110.7	115.4
Training Travel	28.3	28.3	28.2
Operational Travel	49.1	70.0	51.8
Rotational Travel	35.5	52.6	54.6
Separation Travel	154.8	126.0	122.2
Travel of Organized Units	<u>3.2</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>5.6</u>
Total PCS Moves	407.1	396.0	377.9
 <u>Previous Move Counting Criteria</u>			
Accession Travel	136.2	110.7	115.4
Training Travel	32.9	32.9	34.6
Operational Travel	49.1	70.0	51.8
Rotational Travel	30.9	48.1	48.3
Separation Travel	154.8	126.0	122.2
Travel of Organized Units	<u>3.2</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>5.6</u>
Total PCS Moves	407.1	396.0	377.9

a/ Excludes Naval Academy Midshipman accession and separation moves.

MARINE CORPS

Permanent Change of Station Travel Program
(Military Member Moves in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Current Move Counting Criteria</u>			
Accession Travel	60.3	60.7	54.3
Training Travel	4.4	6.7	6.7
Operational Travel	13.3	10.9	13.4
Rotational Travel	67.6	64.2	65.5
Separation Travel	<u>65.0</u>	<u>61.4</u>	<u>55.0</u>
Total PCS Moves	210.6	203.9	194.9
<u>Previous Move Counting Criteria</u>			
Accession Travel	113.5	115.2	103.2
Training Travel	2.6	2.7	2.7
Operational Travel	13.3	10.9	13.4
Rotational Travel	67.6	64.2	65.5
Separation Travel	<u>65.0</u>	<u>61.4</u>	<u>55.0</u>
Total PCS Moves	262.0	254.4	239.8

AIR FORCE

Permanent Change of Station Travel Program a/
(Military Member Moves in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
<u>Current Move Counting Criteria</u>			
Accession Travel	113.3	87.6	90.0
Training Travel	91.9	79.0	74.2
Operational Travel	52.7	60.1	58.0
Rotational Travel	199.6	207.5	209.2
Separation Travel	145.4	131.0	103.4
Travel of Organized Units	<u>3.3</u>	<u>12.5</u>	<u>7.0</u>
Total PCS Moves	606.2	577.7	541.8
 <u>Previous Move Counting Criteria</u>			
Accession Travel	113.3	87.6	90.0
Training Travel	168.6	143.7	137.7
Operational Travel	52.7	60.1	58.0
Rotational Travel	226.7	235.2	230.9
Separation Travel	145.4	131.0	103.4
Travel of Organized Units	<u>3.3</u>	<u>12.5</u>	<u>7.0</u>
Total PCS Moves	710.0	670.1	627.0

a/ Excludes Air Force Academy Cadet accession and separation moves.

APPENDIX A

MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

A. Changes to the Manpower Categories

The categorization of manpower used in this report has been revised slightly from that contained in the FY 74 report. This action was taken to promote clarity of presentation and a more comprehensive portrayal of the programmed usage of manpower which is, of course, the underlying determinant of manpower requirements. These revisions consist of the creation of two new categories and changes in the contents of existing categories. The table on the following page displays the transfers between categories associated with these revisions.

Two categories were created to clarify the usage of a portion of DoD support manpower. Reserve Components Support was created to pull together into one category those personnel which are associated with the overall administration of the reserve components. These personnel operate reserve training centers, national guard armories, reserve/guard installations, reserve districts/regions, and state advisor offices. The requirement for these spaces is predicated upon the existence and structure of the reserve components. Therefore, they are displayed and discussed collectively.

The second new category is Federal Agency Support. This category was created to clarify the distinction between personnel assigned to DoD headquarters and administrative activities and personnel assigned to other federal departments and agencies. Although some of the military personnel assigned outside of DoD are occupying administrative positions, the bulk of them are associated with operational tasks. For example, of the total manpower in Federal Agency Support; 39% are security guards for the Department of State, 25% are involved in research and development projects for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, and the Atomic Energy Commission; and 10% are involved in personnel support activities for the Selective Service Commission and the Veterans Administration. Rather than display these personnel in the manpower category most closely related to the function performed, they are collected in one category to facilitate management and control of non-DoD military manpower requirements.

In addition to the obvious necessity of changing the contents of some categories when Reserve Components Support and Federal Agency Support were created, the Defense data structure has also undergone evolutionary change resulting from continuous efforts to improve Defense planning and management. The table on the following page displays the audit trail to current manpower category for each activity transferred, and the manpower involved. Following the table is a brief discussion of the rationale for transfers due to this management planning emphasis.

Audit Trail for Activities Transferred
(Endstrengths in Thousands)

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Activity</u>
<u>Due to Category Creation</u>		
Base Operating Support (MSF)	Reserve Components Support	Inactive Installations G
"	"	Reserve Air Stations/Tra
"	"	Reserve Districts
"	"	Reserve/Guard Air Bases
Crew/Unit Training	"	Reserve Training Centers
"	"	Reserve/Guard Training U
Command (MSF)	"	Readiness Regions/Guard
"	"	Reserve Districts
"	"	Reserve Regions/Guard Ad
Individual Training	"	Reserve Training Divisio
Command (CSF)	Federal Agency Support	Personnel Assigned Outsi
"	"	"
"	"	"
"	"	"
<u>Due to Management Planning Emphasis a/</u>		
Intelligence/Security	Land Forces	Tactical Intelligence
"	"	"
"	Tactical Air Forces	"
"	Command (MSF)	"
Centrally Managed Communications	Base Operating Support (MSF)	Base Communications
"	"	"
"	Base Operating Support (CSF)	"
"	"	"
Support to Other Nations	Command (MSF)	Military Assistance Tea
Geophysical Activities	Mobility Forces	Aerospace Rescue/Recove
Base Operating Support (MSF)	Tactical Air Forces	Command/Control Communi
Crew/Unit Training	Trainees/Students	CRAW/CRAG/FASO Students
"	"	CCTS Students
Base Operating Support (CSF)	Logistics	Supply Depot Operations
Individual Training	Research/Development	MCDEC Operations
"	Base Operating Support (MSF)	DATC San Diego
Command (CSF)	Command (MSF)	International Military
"	"	"
"	"	"
"	Base Operating Support (CSF)	Navy Exchanges
"	Logistics	Construction Contract S
"	"	Defense Personnel Suppo
Transients	Trainees/Students	Initial Entry Officers
Trainees/Students	Land Forces	Initial Entry Enlisted

*Less than 50 spaces.

a/ For rationale see following pages.

Activities Transferred Between Categories
(Strengths in Thousands)

Activity	Service	Military			Civilian		
		FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75
Active Installations Garrisons	Army	.4	.4	.4	2.9	3.5	3.5
Active Air Stations/Training Detachments	Navy	4.3	4.3	4.2	1.7	2.1	2.1
Active Districts	Marine Corps	.4	.5	.5	.1	.1	.1
Active/Guard Air Bases	Air Force	.5	.5	.5	2.6	3.3	3.3
Active Training Centers	Navy	3.7	3.6	3.3	.8	.8	.8
Active/Guard Training Units	Air Force	.1	*	*	1.1	1.1	.8
Active Regions/Guard Advisors	Army	3.6	4.6	4.6	5.1	7.5	8.1
Active Districts	Navy	.3	.3	.3	.1	.1	.1
Active Regions/Guard Advisors	Air Force	.5	.6	.5	2.5	2.6	2.6
Active Training Divisions/Centers	Army	*	*	*	4.4	5.0	5.2
Personnel Assigned Outside DOD	Army	.5	.5	.5	-	-	-
"	Navy	1.0	1.3	1.3	-	-	-
"	Marine Corps	1.1	1.2	1.6	-	-	-
"	Air Force	.6	.6	.6	-	-	-
Special Intelligence	Army	-	-	2.7	-	-	.2
"	Marine Corps	-	-	.7	-	-	-
"	Navy	-	-	.1	-	-	-
"	Navy	-	-	1.0	-	-	1.6
Communications	Army	-	-	2.0	-	-	1.2
"	Air Force	-	-	1.8	-	-	.9
"	Army	-	-	.8	-	-	.8
"	Air Force	-	-	.8	-	-	3.0
"	Navy	-	-	-	-	3.0	3.0
Primary Assistance Teams	Air Force	3.5	3.4	2.9	.4	.3	.3
Space Rescue/Recovery Squadrons	Air Force	1.3	1.2	1.2	*	.1	.1
Command/Control Communications	Navy	2.7	3.2	3.1	-	-	-
CRAG/FASO Students	Air Force	1.3	.6	.6	-	-	-
Students	Army	-	.9	.9	-	7.9	8.4
Supply Depot Operations	Marine Corps	-	-	.7	-	-	-
Operations	Navy	-	.3	4.8	*	*	*
San Diego	Army	2.7	3.0	3.0	.1	.1	.1
National Military Headquarters	Navy	.8	.9	.9	*	*	*
"	Air Force	.1	1.7	1.7	*	*	*
"	Navy	.7	.6	.7	2.7	2.8	3.8
Exchanges	Army	.2	.2	.2	4.6	5.3	5.4
Construction Contract Supervision	DSA	-	-	-	1.6	1.6	1.6
Base Personnel Support Center	Army	-	-	1.0	-	-	-
Local Entry Officers	Marine Corps	-	-	4.8	-	-	-
Local Entry Enlisted Personnel							

RATIONALE FOR TRANSFER OF ACTIVITIES DUE TO MANAGEMENT PLANNING EMPHASIS

Tactical Intelligence - Concurrent with the recent reorganization and consolidation of intelligence and security activities, those signal intelligence units whose primary wartime role is general tactical intelligence collection were categorized with the forces which they directly support. Consequently, these resources were transferred from Intelligence and Security to Land Forces, Tactical Air Forces, and Command. During peacetime, these units will continue to perform strategic intelligence collection functions for the Chief of the Central Security Service, National Security Agency.

Base Communications - With the creation of the U. S. Army Communications Command (USACC), the responsibility for base communications was consolidated from the theater commanders and the former U. S. Army Strategic Communications Command (STRATCOM). The base communications resources of the Air Force, which are the responsibility of the Air Force Communications Service (AFCS), have been identified totally to the major commands which they support. These actions resulted in a transfer of resources from Centrally Managed Communications to Base Operating Support.

Military Assistance Teams - With the disestablishment of the Military Assistance Command - Vietnam (MACV) the residual military assistance operations were placed under the direct control of the U. S. Pacific Command (PACOM) thus causing a transfer of resources from Support to Other Nations to Command.

Aerospace Rescue/Recovery Squadrons - These squadrons primarily perform global search and rescue operations in support of all DoD and U. S. commercial flying operations. Since they are under the operational control of the Military Airlift Command they have been placed in Mobility Forces for planning and review purposes rather than Geophysical Activities.

Command/Control Communications - These resources perform the communications functions of the command, control, and communications (C3) activities of the major commands. As such, they are integral to mission accomplishment and are more appropriately categorized with Tactical Air Forces, as are command and control resources, rather than Base Operating Support.

Crew/Unit Training Students - The student personnel assigned to Air Force Combat Crew Training Squadrons (CCTS), Navy Combat Readiness Air Wings and Groups (CRAW/CRAG), and Navy Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Groups (FASO) were inadvertently included in Crew and Unit Training in the FY 74 report. In this report they are included in the Students category.

Depot Operations - With the decision to operate some Army supply depots through the industrial fund appropriation, the base operating support manpower at those installations were aggregated with supply operations manpower to facilitate financial control. Thus, these resources appear in Logistics rather than Base Operating Support.

MCDEC Operations - The personnel at the Marine Corps Development and Education Center (MCDEC) at Quantico devoted to projects funded by the RDT&E appropriation are not directly associated with training activities. Therefore, these resources were transferred from Individual Training to Research and Development.

DATC San Diego - The mission of the Navy Development and Training Center (DATC) San Diego has been reoriented and expanded to provide maintenance support and training to ships in the San Diego/Long Beach area, and to administer the Fleet Maintenance Assistance Groups (FMAGs) for the Pacific Fleet. These FMAGs are located in detachments at shore activities in San Francisco, Pearl Harbor, and San Diego. This activity's primary mission is now to provide shore rotation billets for deprived ratings and improved intermediate maintenance capability under the management of the fleet commander. These resources have been moved from Individual Training to Base Operating Support.

International Military Headquarters - These Activities are related to the planning for and operational control of specific missions rather than the overall administration of defense activities. Thus, these Command resources have been transferred to Mission Support from Central Support Forces.

Navy Exchanges - Navy exchanges are base operating support functions rather than headquarters and administrative activities. Thus, these resources have been transferred from Command to Base Operating Support.

Construction Contract Supervision - These personnel are essentially overseeing the procurement of real property. Procurement of equipment has always been considered to be a logistic rather than an administrative activity. Henceforth, real property procurement will be categorized in Logistics rather than Command.

Defense Personnel Support Center - The DPSC in Philadelphia is responsible for the centralized procurement of clothing, textiles, and foodstuffs. This function is similar to the procurement of equipment and is therefore considered to be a logistic rather than an administrative activity. Thus, these resources were transferred to Logistics from Command.

Initial Entry Officers - Army officers attend an Officer Branch Basic Course in a temporary duty status upon initial entry onto active duty, and thus in the past have been considered to be transients. Since these courses last about ten to twelve weeks, it was decided that this extensive enroute training time distorted both the transient and student accounts for planning and accounting purposes. Thus, these resources have been transferred from Transients to Students.

Initial Entry Enlisted Personnel - Prior to FY 75 projected Marine Corps trainee strength was based upon the average load for the fiscal year. Beginning with FY 75 the projected trainee strength is based upon the expected recruit depot trainee population at the end of the fiscal year. Thus, the manpower in Land Forces is increased to offset the reduced Trainee strength. If actual Marine Corps accessions for FY 75 reflect the current plan, this transferred manpower will be in divisions and force troops at the end of the fiscal year.

B. Major Defense Programs and Manpower Categories

As stated in Chapter I, there are two ways to view manpower. The manpower requirements shown in each section of this Report explain "how" manpower will be used (e.g., some manpower operates aircraft, some operates installations, some plans for and manages resources, etc.). Thus, in this Report manpower requirements are displayed from the "input" point of view. However, manpower can also be displayed by the total devoted to the various missions of DoD. This is an "output" point of view. The "outputs" of the Defense financial system are called Major Defense Programs and have been provided to the Congress as part of the Military Personnel and Operations and Maintenance appropriations justification for several years.

Major Defense Programs contain many resources of different types that directly relate to the performance of a Defense mission (or program). These resources include both units which execute the mission (e.g., SAC aircraft) and units which sustain mission capability (e.g., SAC base personnel). Manpower categories, on the other hand, include

units performing similar activities (e.g., installation operations) associated with the performance of several missions (e.g., strategic offensive, tactical air, and mobility).

The following summary matrices are provided to illustrate the allocation of FY 75 manpower "inputs" in each manpower category to the various "outputs" represented by Major Defense Programs. Adding down a column gives the total manpower devoted to one of the ten Major Defense Programs. Adding across a row gives the total manpower performing a type of activity (i.e., a manpower category) for all Major Defense Programs.

Army Manpower Requirements
(FY 75 End Strengths in Thousands)

Manpower Categories	MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS												
	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		VII
	Strategic Forces		General Purpose Forces		Intelligence and Communications		Airlift and Sealift		Guard and Reserve Forces		Research and Developments		Cent Supply Maint
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	1	1			*	1							
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>													
Land Forces			450	15					*	28			
Tactical Air Forces													
Naval Forces							1	4					
Mobility Forces													
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>													
Intel/Sec					13	2							
Centrally Managed Communication					10	4					8	24	
Research/Development													
Support to Other Nations													
Geophysical Activ's					*								
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>													
Reserve Components													
Support									5	16			
Base Operating Spt			19	92	6	5							
Crew/Unit Training			1	*									
Command	*		7	3									
<u>Central Support Forces</u>													
Base Operating Spt					1	3							1
Medical Support													
Personnel Support					2	1							*
Individual Training													1
Command													8
Logistics					*								
Fed Agency Support													
<u>Individuals</u>													
Transients													
Patients/Prisoners													
Trainees/Students													
Cadets													
TOTAL	1	1	476	111	32	15	1	4	5	44	8	24	10

*Less than 500 spaces.

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

II General Purpose Forces		III Intelligence and Communications		IV Airlift and Sealift		V Guard and Reserve Forces		VI Research and Developments		VII Central Supply and Maintenance		VIII Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities		IX Admin and Associated Activities		X Support to Other Nations		Total	
Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
		*	1															1	2
50	15					*	28											450	47
																		450	43
				1	4													1	4
		13	2															33	31
		10	4					8	24									13	2
																		10	4
		*														2	1	8	24
																		2	1
																		*	
19	92	6	5			5	16											41	116
1	*																	5	16
7	3																	25	97
																3	*	1	*
																		10	3
		1	3							1	4	12	40					133	235
		2	1									33	30					14	47
												12	5					33	30
										*	*	52	20					14	6
		*								1	7	2	2	8	16			52	21
										8	102			*	5			11	24
														*	5			8	107
														*				*	
												30						128	
												4						30	
												89						4	
												4							
6	111	32	15	1	4	5	44	8	24	10	113	238	97	9	21	5	1	785	431

unding.

2

Navy Manpower Requirements^{a/}
(FY 75 End Strengths in Thousands)

	MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS									
	I		II		III		IV		V	
	Strategic Forces		General Purpose Forces		Intelligence and Communications		Airlift and Sealift		Guard and Reserve Forces	
Manpower Categories	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	19	1								
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>										
Land Forces			3							
Tactical Air Forces			67						1	
Naval Forces			165	1					10	
Mobility Forces							*	6		
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>										
Intell/Sec					10	2				
Centrally Managed Communication					11	4				
Research/Development										
Support to Other Nations									7	40
Geophysical Activ's					2	2				
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>										
Reserve Components										
Support									8	3
Base Operating Spt			41	39						
Crew/Unit Training			14	1						
Command	*		13	5		*				
<u>Central Support Forces</u>										
Base Operating Spt										3
Medical Support										
Personnel Support					*	1				
Individual Training					*					
Command						1				1
Logistics					*					6
Fed Agency Support										
<u>Individuals</u>										
Transients										
Patients/Prisoners										
Trainees/Students			3							
Cadets										
TOTAL	19	1	306	45	24	9	*	6	19	3
									7	40
										10

*Less than 500 spaces

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

^{a/} Includes Navy personnel serving with Marine Corps.

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

al se s	III Intelligence and Communications		IV Airlift and Sealift		V Guard and Reserve Forces		VI Research and Development		VII Central Supply and Maintenance		VIII Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities		IX Admin and Associated Activities		X Support to Other Nations		Total	
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
																	19	1
1			*	6	1	10											247 3 68 176 *	6 1 6
	10	2															30 10	48 2
	11	4					7	40							*	*	11 7	4 40
	2	2													*	*	* 2	* 2
39 1 5		*			8	3									1	*	77 8 41 14 14	48 2 39 1 5
	*	1							3	20	2 19 7 38 2	* 10 1 14 2		5	9		84 5 19 7 38 8 6 1	213 20 10 2 14 16 150
											26 3 47 4						84 26 3 50 4	
45	24	9	*	6	19	3	7	40	10	174	148	28	7	9	1	*	540	315

Ing.

line Corps.

2

Marine Corps Manpower Requirements^{a/}
(FY 75 End Strengths in Thousands)

	MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS													
	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		VII	
	Strategic Forces		General Purpose Forces		Intelligence and Communications		Airlift and Sealift		Guard and Reserve Forces		Research and Development		Central Supply and Maintenance	
Manpower Categories	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
<u>Strategic Forces</u>														
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>														
Land Forces			83						2					
Tactical Air Forces			26						2					
Naval Forces			1											
Mobility Forces														
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>														
Intel/Sec					1									
Centrally Managed Communication					*						1			
Research/Development														
Support to Other Nations														
Geophysical Activ's					*									
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>														
Reserve Components														
Support									1	*				
Base Operating Spt			17	11										
Crew/Unit Training			3	*										
Command			2											
<u>Central Support Forces</u>														
Base Operating Spt													1	2
Medical Support														
Personnel Support					*									
Individual Training														
Command														
Logistics					*								1	3
Fed Agency Support														
<u>Individuals</u>														
Transients														
Patients/Prisoners														
Trainees/Students														
Cadets														
TOTAL			131	11	1				4	*	1		2	5

*Less than 500 Spaces

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

Includes Marine Corps personnel serving with Navy.

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

II General Purpose Forces		III Intelligence and Communications		IV Airlift and Sealift		V Guard and Reserve Forces		VI Research and Development		VII Central Supply and Maintenance		VIII Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities		IX Admin and Associated Activities		X Support to Other Nations		Total	
Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
83						2												113	
26						2												85	
1																		28	
																		1	
		1																2	
		*																1	
								1								*		*	
		*																*	
																		*	
17	11					1	*											22	11
3	*																	1	*
2																		17	11
																		3	*
																		2	
																		23	10
										1	2	*	*					1	2
		*										3	*					3	*
												12	2					12	2
		*								1	3			4	2			4	2
																		1	3
												12						36	
												1						12	
												23						1	
																		23	
131	11	1				4	*	1		2	5	51	3	6	2	*		196	21

to rounding.

serving with Navy.

Air Force Manpower Requirements
(FY 75 End Strengths in Thousands)

Manpower Categories	MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS													
	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		VII	
	Strategic Forces		General Purpose Forces		Intelligence and Communications		Airlift and Sealift		Guard and Reserve Forces		Research and Developments		Central Supply and Maintenance	
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
Strategic Forces	94	2			1	*			1	6				
General Purpose Forces														
Land Forces														
Tactical Air Forces			72	2					1	13				
Naval Forces			12	*	3	*	31	5	*	9				
Mobility Forces														
Auxiliary Forces														
Intel/Sec					24	3								
Centrally Managed Communication					20	6								
Research/Development											17	21	1	2
Support to Other Nations														
Geophysical Activ'e					11	1			*	*				
Mission Support Forces														
Reserve Components														
Support									1	7				
Base Operating Spt	46	24	59	32	12	2	12	9						
Crew/Unit Training	3	*	12	1			2	*						
Command	7	2	11	2		*	2	1						
Central Support Forces														
Base Operating Spt													3	1
Medical Support														
Personnel Support					2	*								
Individual Training														
Command													1	
Logistics					*								4	7
Fed Agency Support														
Individuals														
Transients														
Patients/Prisoners														
Trainees/Students			*				*							
Cadets														
TOTAL	150	28	167	37	72	12	48	15	2	34	17	21	10	9

*Less than 500 spaces

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

II	III		IV		V		VI		VII		VIII		IX		X		Total	
General Purpose Forces	Intelligence and Communications		Airlift and Sealift		Guard and Reserve Forces		Research and Developments		Central Supply and Maintenance		Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities		Admin and Associated Activities		Support to Other Nations			
Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
	1	*			1	6											95	8
																	119	29
2	2				1	13											73	15
2	*	3	*	31	5	*	9										46	14
																	74	33
	24	3															24	3
	20	6						17	21	1	2						20	6
																	18	23
	11	1			*	*									2	*	2	*
																	11	1
																	171	79
					1	7											1	7
59	32	12	2	12	9												130	67
12	1			2	*												17	2
11	2		*	2	1										2	*	23	4
																	106	138
									3	15	14	13	5	3			22	31
	2	*									30	7					30	7
											4	2	*				7	2
											29	8					29	8
	*								1	3	2	1	12	8			14	12
									4	77							5	77
													1				1	
																	65	
											20						20	
*				*							1						1	
											39						39	
											4						4	
167	37	72	12	48	15	2	34	17	21	10	97	142	31	18	11	4	630	287

unding.

2

Defense Agencies Manpower Requirements^{a/}
(FY 75 End Strengths in Thousands)

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS														
	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		VII	
	Strategic Forces		General Purpose Forces		Intelligence and Communications		Airlift and Sealift		Guard and Reserve Forces		Research and Development		Central Supply and Maintenance	
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
<u>Manpower Categories</u>														
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	*	1												
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>														
Land Forces														
Tactical Air Forces														
Naval Forces														
Mobility Forces														
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>														
Intell/Sec					5	2								
Centrally Managed Communication					2	2					*	1		
Research/Development														
Support to Other Nations														
Geophysical Activ's					1	8								
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>														
Reserve Components														
Support														
Base Operating Spt														
Crew/Unit Training														
Command														
<u>Central Support Forces</u>														
Base Operating Spt														7
Medical Support														
Personnel Support					1	1								
Individual Training														
Command														
Logistics					1	1							1	48
Fed Agency Support														
<u>Individuals</u>														
Transients														
Patients/Prisoners														
Trainees/Students														
Cadets														
TOTAL	*	1			10	14					*	1	1	54

*Less than 500 spaces.

Detail May not add to totals due to rounding.

^{a/} Military personnel are included in Service strengths.

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

General purpose uses	III Intelligence and Communications		IV Airlift and Sealift		V Guard and Reserve Forces		VI Research and Development		VII Central Supply and Maintenance		VIII Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities		IX Admin and Associated Activities		X Support to Other Nations		Total		
	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
																		*	1
		5	2															8	13
		2	2					*	1									2	2
																		*	1
		1	8															1	8

ending.

service strengths.

APPENDIX B

**Military Manpower Serving Outside The
Department of Defense**

TOTAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Military Manpower Serving Outside of the Department of Defense (Individual Manpower Authorizations-End Strength)

	FY 1973		FY 1974		FY 1975	
	Officer	Enlisted	Officer	Enlisted	Officer	Enlisted
	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total
Departments						
Agriculture	11	2	1	3	1	3
Commerce	4	-	9	-	9	-
Interior	3	-	2	-	1	-
Justice	64	14	6	20	6	20
Transportation	39	1,171	58	14	58	14
State		1,210	42	1,323	49	1,676
						1,725

Federal Agencies

Atomic Energy Commission	33	2	33	1	32	1
Canal Zone Government	40	2	41	3	41	3
Environmental Protection Agency	2	-	2	-	2	-
General Service Administration	11	-	11	-	11	-
National Aeronautical & Space Administration	90	108	87	151	94	151
National Science Foundation	117	672	107	651	107	609
Selective Service Commission	224	2	100	-	93	-
						245
						716
						93

Other Organizations

Executive Office of the President	45	3	40	4	40	4
Classified Activities	95	275	110	232	110	232
Miscellaneous Activities	75	32	87	64	84	60
						144

Total Reimbursable & Non-Reimbursable

	853	2,283	3,136	736	2,466	3,202
						3,511

NOTE: Excludes military personnel providing medical care to Veterans Administration patients in military medical facilities (281 military personnel in FY 75)

Military Manpower in Support of Foreign Military Sales Programs (End Strength)

	FY 1973		FY 1974		FY 1975	
	Officer	Enlisted	Officer	Enlisted	Officer	Enlisted
	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total
Foreign Military Sales Personnel	86	143	229	175	207	508
(Included in Miscellaneous Activities Above)	(34)	(27)	(61)	(60)	(60)	(56)
						(116)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Military Manpower Serving Outside of the Department of Defense (Individual Manpower Authorizations-End Strength)

Departments	FY 1973			FY 1974			FY 1975		
	Officer	Enlisted	Total	Officer	Enlisted	Total	Officer	Enlisted	Total
Agriculture	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1
Commerce	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Interior	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Justice	-	-	-	4	20	24	4	20	24
Transportation	6	-	6	7	-	7	7	-	7
State	5	1	6	5	1	6	5	1	6
Federal Agencies									
Atomic Energy Commission	9	1	10	10	-	10	10	-	10
Canal Zone Government	38	2	40	40	3	43	40	3	43
Environmental Protection Agency	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
General Service Administration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
National Aeronautical & Space Administration	13	-	13	16	-	16	16	-	16
National Science Foundation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Selective Service Commission	174	2	176	70	-	70	64	-	64
Other Organizations									
Executive Office of the President	15	-	15	11	1	12	11	1	12
Classified Activities	7	46	53	17	52	69	17	52	69
Miscellaneous Activities	55	20	75	51	22	73	51	22	73
Total Reimbursable & Non-Reimbursable	322	72	394	232	99	331	226	99	325

Military Manpower In Support of Foreign Military Sales Programs (End Strength)

	FY 1973			FY 1974			FY 1975		
	Officer	Enlisted	Total	Officer	Enlisted	Total	Officer	Enlisted	Total
Foreign Military Sales Personnel (Included in Miscellaneous Act. Above)	56 (33)	78 (20)	134 (53)	104 (35)	178 (18)	282 (53)	120 (35)	190 (18)	310 (53)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Military Manpower Serving Outside of the Department of Defense
(Individual Manpower Authorizations-End Strength)

	<u>FY 1973</u>			<u>FY 1974</u>			<u>FY 1975</u>		
<u>Departments</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
Agriculture	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Commerce	11	2	13	9	3	12	9	3	12
Interior	3	-	3	1	-	1	1	-	1
Justice	2	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	2
Transportation	28	-	28	26	-	26	26	-	26
State	5	82	87	8	124	132	10	154	164
<u>Federal Agencies</u>									
Atomic Energy Commission	9	1	10	8	1	9	8	1	9
Canal Zone Government	2	-	2	1	-	1	1	-	1
Environmental Protection Agency	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1
General Service Administration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
National Aeronautical & Space Administration	16	9	25	16	-	16	16	-	16
National Science Foundation	116	672	788	106	651	757	106	609	715
Selective Service Commission	9	-	9	7	-	7	6	-	6
<u>Other Organizations</u>									
Executive Office of the President	15	1	16	15	-	15	15	-	15
Classified Activities	6	-	6	10	1	11	10	1	11
Miscellaneous Activities	7	7	14	28	42	70	27	38	65
<u>Total Reimbursable & Non-Reimbursable</u>	230	774	1,004	238	822	1,060	238	806	1,044

Military Manpower In Support of Foreign Military Sales Programs

	<u>FY 1973</u>			<u>FY 1974</u>			<u>FY 1975</u>		
<u>Foreign Military Sales Personnel</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
(Included in Miscellaneous Act. Above)	1	7	8	25	42	67	25	38	63
	(1)	(7)	(8)	(25)	(42)	(67)	(25)	(38)	(63)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (MARINE CORPS)

Military Manpower Serving Outside of the Department of Defense
(Individual Manpower Authorizations-End Strength)

Departments	FY-1973			FY 1974			FY 1975		
	Officer	Enlisted	Total	Officer	Enlisted	Total	Officer	Enlisted	Total
Agriculture	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Commerce	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Interior	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Justice	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Transportation	3	-	3	3	-	3	3	-	3
State	20	1,088	1,108	20	1,198	1,218	25	1,521	1,546
Federal Agencies									
Atomic Energy Commission	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Canal Zone Government	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Environmental Protection Agency	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
General Service Administration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
National Aeronautical & Space Administration	3	-	3	3	-	3	3	-	3
National Science Foundation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Selective Service Commission	10	-	10	7	-	7	7	-	7
Other Organizations									
Executive Office of the President	3	-	3	3	-	3	3	-	3
Classified Activities	7	2	9	4	-	4	4	-	4
Miscellaneous Activities	-	-	-	5	-	5	5	-	5
Total Reimbursable & Non-Reimbursable	46	1,090	1,136	45	1,198	1,243	50	1,521	1,571

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Military Manpower Serving Outside of the Department of Defense
(Individual Manpower Authorizations-End Strength)

Departments	FY 1973			FY 1974			FY 1975		
	Officer	Enlisted	Total	Officer	Enlisted	Total	Officer	Enlisted	Total
Agriculture	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Commerce	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Interior	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-
Justice	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Transportation	27	14	41	22	14	36	22	14	36
State	9	-	9	9	-	9	9	-	9
Federal Agencies									
Atomic Energy Commission	15	-	15	15	-	15	14	-	14
Canal Zone Government	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Environmental Protection Agency	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1
General Service Administration	11	-	11	11	-	11	11	-	11
National Aeronautical & Space Administration	58	99	157	52	151	203	59	151	210
National Science Foundation	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1
Selective Service Commission	31	-	31	16	-	16	16	-	16
Other Organizations									
Executive Office of the President	12	2	14	11	3	14	11	3	14
Classified Activities	75	227	302	79	179	258	79	179	258
Miscellaneous Activities	13	5	18	3	-	3	1	-	1
Total Reimbursable & Non-Reimbursable	255	347	602	221	347	568	224	347	571

Military Manpower In Support of Foreign Military Sales Programs
(End Strength)

	FY 1973			FY 1974			FY 1975		
	Officer	Enlisted	Total	Officer	Enlisted	Total	Officer	Enlisted	Total
Foreign Military Sales Personnel	29	58	87	46	287	333	62	280	342