


RELATIONSHIPS OF ATTITUDE FACTORS TO THE CAREER DECISION OF FIRST TERM MILITARY MEMBERS

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by Captain Gary Hughes, M.S., United States Air Force
Arthur B. Sweney, Ph. D., Wichita State University

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
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The Relationships of Attitude Factors
to the Career Decision of First Term
Military Members



by

Gary Hughes, M.S. Captain, United States
Air Force
Arthur B. Sweney, Ph. D.
Wichita State University

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
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CONTENTS

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE	1
An Analysis of Recent Enlistees	2
The Meaning of the All-Volunteer	7
Personnel Problems	10
Foreign Experiments	14
Alternatives to Military Service	17
Purpose of the Study	19
Limitations and Assumptions	19
II. METHODOLOGY	21
Subjects	21
Method of Data Collection	22
Statistical tools Used	23
Hypotheses	26
III. RESULTS	28
Frequency Count and Means of Responses	28
Two-Way Discriminant Analysis	36
Seven-Way Discriminant Analysis	38
Correlated Data	40
Factor Analysis	45
IV. DISCUSSION.....	49
Significant Positive Attitudes	49
Significant Negative Attitudes	51
Differences in Officer and Enlisted Attitudes	55
V. CONCLUSIONS	59



TABLES

1. Service Entry Reasons of Enlisted Volunteers by Education and Race
2. Per Cent of First-Term Regular Enlistees Who were Draft Motivated - by selected characteristics
3. Means of Positive Variables
4. Means of Negative Variables
5. Means of Socio-Economic and Geographical Backgrounds
6. Frequency Count of Positive Variables (Officers)
7. Frequency Count of Positive Variables (Enlisted)
8. Frequency Count of Negative Variables (Officers)
9. Frequency Count of Negative Variables (Enlisted)
10. Frequency Count of Socio-Economic and Geographical Backgrounds (Officers)
11. Frequency Count of Socio-Economic and Geographical Backgrounds (enlisted)
12. Variables which are Significant and can Predict Group Membership in Either Officer or Enlisted Group
13. Number of Cases Classified into a Particular Group
14. Variables Which are Significant and Can Predict Group Membership in a Particular Rank
15. Number of Cases Classified into a Particular Group
16. Correlated Variables with Respect to Career Intent
17. Correlated Variables with Respect to Subject's Rank
18. Correlated Variables with Respect to Service Entry without Draft Threat.
19. Factor I (Career Enthusiasm)
20. Factor II (Career Irritants)
21. Factor III (Job Related Irritants)
22. Factor IV (Leisure Time)

ABSTRACT

A study of the desirability of a military career was conducted through an investigation of the variables which influence the decision of first term airmen to terminate or reenlist. 84 officers and 70 enlisted men representing the basic personnel structure of a operational unit in the Air Force were surveyed using an instrument specifically designed for the study. Four factors were extracted: (1) career enthusiasm, (2) career irritants, (3) job-related irritants, and (4) leisure time in the Air Force. In addition, the socio-economic and geographical background of the men were collected. The results indicated a significant difference between officers and enlisted men with respect to the perceived inducements required for a positive career decision. Also, career irritants were cited as more of a causal factor for negative career decisions than job dissatisfaction.

PREFACE

As we are all aware, today there is a great deal of emphasis being placed on making the military service a desirable career for young men in America. With our nation about to undertake the task of establishing an all volunteer armed force, it is necessary to investigate what can be done to enhance the image of the military. At the present time, most airmen usually join the service to avoid the draft or so they can utilize the GI Bill benefits once they leave the service. Very few airmen, especially enlisted men, join the service with the idea of making it a career. However, once they are in the military, many find the service life desirable and continue to pursue a career in the armed forces. It is contended that there are definite relationships between factors such as attitude, performance, job satisfaction, and certain demographic factors when applied to an airman's career intentions. If it is proven true that there are definite relationships in these areas, it will have many implications with respect to recruiting, motivating, and retaining young men to serve in the military.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

As we are all aware, today there is a great deal of emphasis being placed on making the military service a desirable career for young men in America. With our nation about to undertake the task of establishing an all-volunteer armed force, it is necessary to investigate what can be done to enhance the image of the military. At the present time, most airmen usually join the service to avoid the draft or so they can utilize the GI Bill benefits once they leave the service. Very few airmen, especially enlisted men, join the service with the idea of making it a career. However, once they are in the military, many find it desirable and continue to pursue a career in the armed forces. It is contended that there are definite relationships between factors such as attitude, performance, job satisfaction, and certain demographic factors when applied to an airman's career intentions. If it is proven true that there are definite relationships in these areas, it will have many implications with respect to recruiting, motivating, and retaining young men in the military.

An Analysis of Recent Enlistees:

In order to increase the retention of highly qualified young men in our armed forces today, it is necessary to formulate a basis from

which the problem can be attacked. It is obvious that they had some reason for joining the military in the first place whether it be voluntary or not. Perhaps the best method of securing more career military man can best be discerned by understanding these mens' motivations for entering the military.

Moskos (1964) conducted a survey of active duty servicemen that presents the service entry reasons of enlisted volunteers. The motivations of the volunteers were grouped into four categories: (1) personal, to get away from home, mature, travel; (2) patriotic, to serve one's country; (3) draft-motivated, to choose time of entry or branch of service; and (4) self-advancement, to learn a trade or receive an education or to make the military a career. These reasons for service entry among volunteers are broken down by educational level and racial background in Table I.

Almost all variation between educational levels (here regarded as an indicator of class background) is found in the differing incidence of draft-motivated versus self-advancement reasons (though there is also a somewhat greater likelihood for those with less than high school, compared with those of higher education, to mention personal and patriotic motivations.) Thus self-advancement was mentioned by only 15.6 per cent of those with some college, 23.6 per cent of the high school graduates, and most often by those with less than high school -- 27.8 percent.

More recent surveys indicate that the number of draft induced enlistments are even higher. Table II compares the results of two surveys conducted by the Department of Defense (1964-1968). It should be noted that draft motivation rose from 38 percent in 1964 to 54 per cent in 1968.

TABLE I
SERVICE ENTRY REASONS OF ENLISTED VOLUNTEERS
BY EDUCATION AND RACE

Category	Personal	Patriotic	Draft-Motivated	Self-Advancement	Total (N)
Less than High School	32.5	14.0	25.7	27.8	100.0 (7,824)
White	33.2	13.5	27.5	25.8	100.0 (6,913)
Black	26.7	17.8	12.5	43.0	100.0 (911)
High School Graduate	27.9	10.5	38.0	23.6	100.0 (23,197)
White	27.8	10.9	39.5	21.8	100.0 (20,757)
Black	28.8	7.1	25.5	38.6	100.0 (2,440)
Some College	27.8	10.5	46.1	15.6	100.0 (8,648)
White	27.5	10.7	47.2	14.6	100.0 (7,947)
Black	30.8	7.7	34.0	27.5	100.0 (701)
Total White	28.8	11.4	39.1	20.7	100.0 (35,617)
Total Black	28.7	9.4	24.5	37.2	100.0 (4,052)

Indications are that today it probably exceeds 60 per cent. In the context of a completely volunteer force, this has serious implications. Can true enlistments be raised sufficiently to offset the loss of these men?

In estimating the number of required recruits for military service, the concentration is only the Army's manpower deficits. This procedure assumes that if the Army's manpower demands can be met the other services will be able to staff their forces with volunteers. Although the other branches have at times resorted to the draft, the Army has perennially been the prime recipient of inductees. Today only the Army uses draftees, and solving the procurement problems of an all-volunteer force necessitates first solving the Army's manpower problems.

TABLE II

PERCENT OF FIRST TERM REGULAR ENLISTEES WHO WERE DRAFT MOTIVATED --
BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS

	1964 Survey	1968 Survey
Total	38%	54%
Service		
Army	43%	58%
Navy	33	55
Marine Corps	30	36
Air Force	43	58
Age Group		
17-19 Years of Age	31	48
20 and Over	58	70
Education		
Less than High School	23	33
High School Graduate	40	50
Some College or More	58	72
Race		
White	39	55
Negro	28	42

U.S. News and World Report (1971) points out that chiefs of all the services stress the need for "high quality" manpower.

But it is pointed out that 24 per cent of all the men entering military ranks in the three years after Oct. 1, 1966, were accepted under "new standards" -- that is, they scored well below average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test.

For the most part, these men were educationally deficient -- previously considered unqualified for military service except in time of grave national peril. The reduction in standards was imposed upon the military by the then Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara.

Of the total of 246,042 "new standards" men, 53 per cent were volunteers and 41 per cent were black. The Army, which took 163,342 of the men listed in the educationally deficient category, assigned 66,560 of them to the combat arms, mostly as infantrymen. The Marine Corps took 26,712 and assigned 14,958 to combat occupations. The Navy and the Air Force used very few in combat roles.

Only one service--the Air Force--has conducted an in-depth study of what kinds of men volunteer as enlistees. Among findings in a survey of 41,098 basic airmen, completed last August:

1. At the time of enlistment, 71 per cent were supported by parents working at nonprofessional jobs, including 14.7 per cent whose fathers were laborers and 31 per cent whose fathers were skilled craftsmen.
2. Only 4 per cent had graduated from college, though 80 per cent were high school graduates. The rest were dropouts.
3. Forty-one per cent came from homes valued at between \$10,000 and \$20,000; 27 per cent from homes valued at less than \$10,000; 24.5 per cent from homes valued at more than \$20,000, and 7.5 per

cent from apartments. A large majority came from comparatively small communities.

4. Of the 41,098 airmen studied, 97 per cent said they regarded the Air Force and the Navy as "safer" services than the Army or Marine Corps.

An unidentified Air Force general speaking in U.S. News and World Report (1970) says: "With the draft, we have been riding pretty high on the Army's coattails. Our recruiters have been finding people standing in line, waiting to sign up. But if there is nothing to stay out of, like the Army, we're going to have to beat the bushes. I would be amazed if the program for an all-volunteer force works.

One of the things that concern the Air Force most, though, is the caliber of recruit it might get in an all-volunteer force.

We think the brightest youngsters now try to avoid the Army and thus volunteer for the Air Force, which needs higher I.Q.'s to maintain aircraft, radar and sophisticated weapons systems. If they stop coming to us when the draft ends, then the Air Force will be in serious trouble indeed."

Alsop (1971) feels that the Navy and the Air Force have taken advantage of the unlikelihood of combat to attract volunteers. But both the Air Force and the Navy have also played the "enlist with us and you won't have to fight" game. As a result, according to Pentagon studies, a lot of men in both are draft-motivated (51.5 per cent Air Force, 48.9 per cent Navy). And we do, after all, need an Air Force and a Navy and, presumable, an Army, too.

In a scathing verbal thrust at the Gates Commission on the "All-Volunteer Armed Force" Barnes (1970) senses that the Gates Commission "forgot to talk to any GIs who did enlist during the past decade or two. The kind of army it

envisions might well be worth thinking about if we were still in the 1930's. Then, the army was small--microscopic by current standards--and unemployment was high. Recruiters were literally turning people away. Today they're not so choosy."

Statistics bear out the fact that volunteers are not appreciably happier in the army than draftees. For example, despite bonuses for reenlisting that run as high as \$10,000, the Army's reenlistment rate for first-term volunteers is only 14.6 per cent. This compares with a reenlistment rate of 7.4 per cent for draftees.

Barnes (1970) also states "if military service could really be made a rewarding opportunity, there would be little reason to do away with the draft. The truth is that military service is, and for the foreseeable future will be, a burden, and the lot of the enlisted man will remain, to varying degrees only, unpleasant."

A final reason for enlisting in the armed forces is mentioned in U.S. News and World Report (1973). Contrary to the consensus of a number of youth and the general anti-military sentiment in our country today a recent survey conducted by the Army revealed that less than a year ago, the "desire to serve my country" ranked eleventh. It now has moved up to sixth. Said one colonel: "Maybe we are seeing a revival of old-fashioned patriotism." That, military men say, would do more than anything else to make possible a smooth transition to an all-volunteer military service in this country.

The Meaning of the All-Volunteer Concept to the Armed Forces.

The impact of the all-volunteer concept will have a monumental impact on all of our armed services. The obvious problem of recruiting highly qualified individuals without the threat of a draft motivating them is staggering in its implications. As mentioned earlier, the majority of enlistees and

officers who make the service a career most generally entered the service with a "wait and see" attitude. Only military academy graduates as a group indicate that a majority of them intend to pursue a military career. This being the case, if affirmative action is not taken to recruit high caliber men and women, then it follows that after a period of time there will be no highly qualified members to retain. The armed forces must make as its goal, the enlisting of competent intelligent and dynamic individuals rather than the recruitment of so many warm bodies.

If the United States is going to have an effective and viable all-volunteer armed force, it is necessary that we attract and retain young men of the highest caliber. It is also necessary that they secure these men in adequate numbers. As Butler (1971) points out, quantity is central to the feasibility of an all-volunteer armed force. Without enough individuals to fill the ranks, an all-volunteer armed force is impossible.

Mr. Butler states that to maintain an armed force of 2.5 million, approximately 500,000 new accessions are required each year. Historically, we could expect 350,000 of these to be supplied by first term enlistments and 150,000 by induction. In the absence of the draft, however, we would lose not only the 150,000 inductees but also many thousands of first-term regular enlistees motivated to enlist because of the draft. With this in mind, it is most important that the major dissatisfactions that are evidenced by the men presently serving in the armed forces be eliminated or at least somewhat lessened.

The elimination of dissatisfiers in the military should also improve the quality of people who choose the service as a career. A military force derives its vitality from the experience and capabilities of its personnel.

No organization can function effectively with minimally qualified people. A military restricted to an input level just sufficient to meet minimum aptitude scores would lack provision for the career element of the force, with its cadre of combat leaders, technicians, and men of higher skills.

The All-Volunteer has its share of proponents and opponents from both sides of the political spectrum. Califano⁽¹⁹⁷¹⁾ believes that "the long-term maintenance of an all-volunteer force of two million or more paid mercenaries fighting our wars is no more likely to provide the sense of common commitment necessary for national cohesion than it is likely to build the personal character of the affluent teenagers in suburban America whose daddies' dollars and influence have bought their way out of military service."

Yale (1971) asserts "the heavy accent on pay incentives serves to highlight critical obstacles to the concept of the volunteer army. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the rugged, adventurous types that a volunteer force would find most desirable would not be attracted primarily by higher pay. Of equal or greater importance are professional pride, prestige, an elite status."

An editorial in Commonweal (1970) indicated partiality toward a volunteer army. Their feelings being that it would be a blow against the militarisation that now extends throughout our national life into almost every American family. Further, the officer corps and senior non-commissioned officers are now, by and large, volunteers; we see little disadvantage in making the lower ranks also voluntary. Clancy (1971), although favoring an overall volunteer force stresses that it will be easier to attract enlisted men than officers. A 2.5-million-man force would require from 40,000 to 50,000 new officers annually. Under the present system, officers are

recruited largely through ROTC programs and are mostly college graduates. About 400,000 men graduate from college each year. That number will rise to half a million by 1980. This means that the armed services will have to attract 10 per cent of the annual crop of male graduates. This could be the toughest part of the volunteer army. And no one has yet come up with a plausible solution to the problem of how the armed forces will get the doctors and dentists it needs without a draft.

Money is one of the prime considerations discussing an all-volunteer force. The Gates Commission (Time 1970) estimates that to hold a force of 2,500,000 volunteers it would cost about \$3.3 billion a year more than is now spent to support an active-duty force of 3,300,000 men. The extra funds would go toward raising military salaries and increasing such fringe benefits as housing and food allowances. Men with special skills would also be given extra pay. The commission's figures are sharply at odds with previous Pentagon estimates, which put the price of ending conscription as high as \$17 billion a year.

All these things being considered whether one is for or against the all-volunteer armed forces is somewhat academic. The threat of a draft today is almost nil even without the total all-volunteer concept largely because the military is cutting back its manpower due to the end of the Viet Nam War. However, when the current manpower has been sufficiently depleted and the military looks for new recruits, it had better insure that the proper steps were taken, in order to attract and retain high quality individuals.

Personnel Problems

The greatest dilemma facing the armed forces today is recruiting and retaining the best possible people. The personnel problem facing the military cannot be solved by giving its members artificial inducements. A more basic problem exists and the military must find out what the people

really do want, not merely what higher echelon staff officers envisage as the needs.

There have been considerable advances in the humanization of military life and many more are still needed. Ognibee (1971) points out the recent pay bill which greatly benefitted to younger servicemen. The raises which would have increased the pay of enlisted men with less than eleven years of service and of officers with less than four. The raises could be justified on the basis of equity alone, since the military pay adjustments of recent years had, by design, disproportionately benefited the older career servicemen--a not so subtle way of maintaining the need for a draft.

Although pay is considered a dissatisfaction when it is too low, most industrial psychologists agree that it is not in and of itself a motivator. A few people in authority in the military have taken this to heart and attempted to satisfy the serviceman's other needs. Time (1970) reports that Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, is somewhat of an innovator in responding to the needs of his men. He has issued orders which allow men to wear beards and mustaches, has installed beer machines in the barracks, and more or less has tried to eliminate the "Mickey Mouse" regulations which he labeled demeaning and abrasive. Zumwalt says (Newsweek 1970) "I have yet to be shown how neatly trimmed beards and sideburns or neatly shaped Afro haircuts contribute to military delinquency or detract from a ship's ability to carry out its combat function." The Air Force (Time 1970) takes a more relaxed attitude toward all of the talk about humanizing military life, claiming, with some justification, that the interdependence of officer-pilots, enlisted crews and mechanics has long promoted an informal closeness. "There's no saluting in the flight line," observes a mechanic at Randolph Air Force Base. Indeed, enlisted personnel have normally lived in two- or three-man rooms since the 1950s, and their technical expertise has earned them better treatment than in other services.

A major personnel problem concerns the military's relationship with congress. The military (Saturday Review 1972) has ignored congressional instructions to restrain what has been called the "grade gallop"--the vast expansion in the services' high-level officer ranks that has taken place during the Vietnam War. A recent congressional report revealed that, although the services now have 900,000 fewer officers in uniform than at the end of World War II, there are about 5,000 more colonels, lieutenant colonels, navy captains, and commanders. In 1945 the United States had slightly more than 2,000 senior admirals and generals in uniform to lead more than twelve million personnel. As of mid-1971 the armed forces could count 1,330 such top-level officers for 2.7 million then in uniform. The army, with 130,000 fewer men today than it had in 1964, still has 2,800 more colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors. Its forty-four three-star generals on active duty are more than were in the service at the end of World War II and also more than were serving in 1970, when the service had 300,000 more men. Thirteen per cent of the men in uniform today are officers, more than twice the ratio of twenty-seven years ago. The proportions amount to, in the words of Sen. William Proxmire of Wisconsin, "an outrageous situation."

Perhaps, instilling pride in the military is one of its major personnel problems today. Alsop (1970) indicates that pride is at least as important as pay. Men do not live by bread alone, and they do not become soldiers for bread alone either. The problem of pride is complicated by the temper of the times. There has, perhaps, never been a time when a uniform carried with it less prestige. This is partly because the war in Vietnam has produced no victory, and no bands or bugles to welcome home the conquering heroes. It is partly because many liberal intellectuals have been at pains to foster contempt for the military.

Altmeyer (1970) believes that the military is becoming a welfare state. He believes that several steps could be taken to straighten out this mess:

1. The military should refuse to recognize or subsidize a soldier's family. (Many foreign armies do this with good results.)
2. All government-run businesses and government-enforced monopolies should be eliminated. In the few remaining relatively isolated posts, bids could be taken from private companies, or preferably, on-post competition encouraged.
3. Free medical care should be limited to combat zones and underdeveloped countries, or at least limited to soldiers in uniform. If the government believes servicemen are too irresponsible to provide for their dependents, civilian medical insurance could be required, as automobile insurance already is.
4. Military pay would have to be increased substantially, but the pay raise would be a fraction of what is now wasted on featherbedding, duplication of effort and inefficiency.

If these reforms were enacted, individual responsibility would be encouraged, volunteers would be attracted by the higher pay and greater freedom (thus making easier the abolition of the draft). The military would be free to get on with the business of defending our country, and the over-burdened taxpayer would not have to pay for one of the most wasteful welfare states in the world.

Morris Janowitz (1972) suggests an area that could help retention of personnel in the armed forces. He feels that the existing world-wide personnel system which leads to continuous, excessive, expensive, and disruptive rotation can no longer be justified. Instead, the armed forces, and particularly the ground forces, will have to develop a modern version of the

British regimental system -- or in the present context a modified brigade system. Each man would have a basic unit and a significant portion of his military career would be spent within that brigade. For the Army, a home port concept; and, for the Air Force, a home basis would serve as the equivalent.

Although stability with respect where one lives is fairly important in a person's career decision, there seem to be other factors which are more important when choosing the service, especially the Air Force, as a career. A study conducted by Faye Shenk (1970) of the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory indicated that the most important factor in making the service a career was job satisfaction. It must be noted here that Miss Shenk's study involved officers and not enlisted men. This could be very relevant when assuming that job satisfaction is the most important factor. This study showed that ranking near the top of the list were such factors as: working under competent supervisors, having a sense of accomplishment, and having an opportunity for rapid advancement. Least important factors were represented by such factors as early retirement, travel, having a definite work schedule, and settling down in a certain area. In summation, if an officer sees little chance of obtaining in the Air Force those rewards which are important to him, he will not be inclined to make a career of the military.

Foreign Experiments

It is an acknowledged fact that countries all over the world are having trouble keeping their soldiers satisfied. However, it appears that other countries may be doing more to keep the individual soldier happy than is the United States. An article, published by the Minister of Defense of West Germany (1970) indicates that many changes have occurred with respect to the individual soldier's rights. For example, the West German soldier is

permitted to wear civilian clothes when off duty, to wear his hair as he pleases, and to shave or grow a beard as he chooses, provided that his military functions are not impaired. This is a significant step in improving the image of the military, especially to the young people who are now becoming eligible for military service.

Great Britain and Canada (U.S. News and World Report, 1971) are among the world leaders in establishing an armed force of all volunteers. In an effort to attract the 43,000 enlisted volunteers needed each year, the British have introduced two major reforms:

1. The minimum period of enlistment has been reduced from six to three years. Aim is to overcome the reluctance of young men to join the services for a long period without any experience of military life and without a chance to leave if they dislike it.
2. A radical new "military salary" plan has been introduced in the past year to make pay competitive with wages in comparable civilian jobs. When this plan is fully implemented in April, it will mean an increase in a private's pay of about 95 per cent—from \$19.75 weekly to \$37.80. It will also mean an increase of 285 million dollars in Britain's defense bill.

In the year that the new pay plan has been in effect, enlistments totaled about 39,000—a rise of 5,000 from the previous year.

The manpower shortages are felt acutely in some of the most critical fields—medical officers and administrative and technical specialists. The Navy has trouble recruiting seamen for a career that takes them away from home much of the time.

There is an accompanying failure to attract qualified young men as career officers for the Army. Sandhurst, the West Point of Britain, has only 510

cadets this year, with nearly 400 openings unfilled.

Even with a higher pay scale, Britain faces these problems--

1. There is widespread antimilitary sentiment, a political and psychological climate that regards "defense" as of little importance.
2. The "old Army" image of "spit and polish" keeps many recruits away.
3. Physical and mental standards are so high that 50 per cent of volunteers are rejected.

Judging from British experience (America, 1970), the inducement will have to be considerable to field an all-volunteer armed force. But this is as it should be to offset the danger, the enforced discipline and the dislocation in family life that professional military personnel have to endure. The pain of armed service should cost the whole society that benefits from defense, not just those who commit themselves to provide it.

The Canadian all-volunteer defense force (U.S. News and World Report, 1971) has four applicants for each opening-but it is still in trouble. The big reason: Too few are qualified for the "specialist" ratings a modern military force requires.

Canada's armed forces are small and getting smaller. Hacking away at manpower has been going on since 1964, when there were nearly 120,000 in uniform. Now there are 90,000, and the goal of about 82,000 is expected to be reached by 1973.

The country has gone a step further than an "all volunteer" force. It has integrated its forces, even to ordering all elements into the same uniform. This unification move is to save the Government an estimated 500 million dollars a year.

In Canada, a private can now make up to \$527 a month; a sergeant, \$840; and a chief warrant officer, \$1,065.

There are other advantages: the privilege of living off the military post, the opportunity to become a physician, dentist, or dietitian at Government expense.

But the U.S., working toward an all-volunteer force, could well ponder Canada's experience. As summed up by Gen. Frederick R. Sharp, Chief of the Defense Staff--

"In a small, professional military force, selectivity is important. The forces have to attract men who can learn to use the newest and most sophisticated equipment. For that caliber, the forces have to compete with private industry.

"Men have to be given the same advantages in pay, opportunity, and professional challenge as they would get outside the military establishment.

"After we get through training a man, we have to compete with private industry to hold him."

Alternatives to Military Service

With the advent of the all-volunteer concept, there has been much discussion on a possible alternative to our nation's youth. Biderman (1971) feels that the word "armed", must be taken out of the designation of the forces of the United States. He feels that the military should become more or less a "national service". This would enhance the image of the military as a savor of lives rather than a taker of lives. Dr. Biderman feels that it may be easier to restore the military as a major vehicle for national service by adapting it to the social morality and social urgencies of modern civilization. In so doing, perhaps the military would appear to be a more attractive and meaningful career to the young men and women of America.

Eberly (1971) fully endorses a National Volunteer Service if it had the following basic features:

1. Service opportunities would be available to all young people. The main criterion for admission would be willingness to serve.
2. Each participant would both serve and learn. Learning would range from development of specific skills to growth in self-knowledge, problem solving, and working with people.
3. Service activities would be directed and financed at the local level to the extent permitted by available resources, and would include projects organized and directed by young people. Thus, maximum local initiative would be encouraged.
4. There would be a transition phase. Growth of national volunteer service would be constrained by identification of useful tasks, finding enough trainers and supervisors, and obtaining sufficient funding. The transition phase would permit experimentation with various techniques and activities.
5. Participation in national volunteer service would be viewed as fulfillment of a person's service obligation. Thus, satisfactory completion of national volunteer service -- for the same period of time as needed to complete one's military service obligation -- would place participants in the same draft category as veterans of military service. Also, if armed forces manpower requirements were to be met solely by volunteers, there would be no need to relate civilian service to military service since both would be manned by volunteers.

Although the likelihood of the establishment of a national volunteer service is not great, This author feels that it was necessary to note its possibility because of its likely appeal to the nations' youth. Also, if the services cannot cope with their current recruitment and retention problem, a national volunteer service may be the answer.

Purpose of the Study

This study is designed to find out exactly what causes a man or woman to want to make the service a career and conversely what drives so many outstanding individuals out of the military. It should give the military organization an indication as to where its problem lies and give it a starting point from which to attack the problem. Studies which have been conducted by the Air Force recently reveal that the quality of career enlisted men has been deteriorating in the past few years. In order to counter this trend, it is necessary to find out what the higher caliber men feel is lacking in the military and therefore what can be done to rectify the situation. Therefore, this author feels that a study such as this will be very important because it will enable the Air Force to see what characteristics in non-career individuals caused them to be dissatisfied with the Air Force. Once this is done, career officers and non-commissioned officers can possibly adopt leadership styles and motivational concepts that appeal to these high quality airmen who might reenlist if they were exposed to effective leaders.

Limitations and Assumptions

Although the problem of attracting and retaining good people is the problem of all the services, it is not within this author's scope of time and resources to conduct a study involving all the branches of the service. Therefore, this study is specifically designed to measure the attitudes of personnel in the United States Air Force. From this the author assumes that all the branches of the military can learn from the insights gained from a study of one particular branch. The reason for the preceeding assumption being that this author feels that the military atmosphere is somewhat universal in all services, differing mostly with each branch's specific mission.

Furthermore, the civilian populace from which recruits must be obtained generally view the military as one large organization rather than specific branches. Public opinion is generally either pro-military or anti-military rather than, for example, pro-Army or anti-Army. Therefore, this author further assumes that if one branch of the service is seen in a more favorable light by the public, the entire military organization will be looked upon more favorably.

CHAPTER II

Methodology

Subjects

The subjects of this study were 154 officers and enlisted men of the 381st Strategic Missile Wing stationed at McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas. All the subjects were Titan II missile combat crew members or had served in that capacity at one time during their service tenure. The officer subjects were either the Missile Combat Crew Commander (MCCC) who was either a first lieutenant or a captain or the Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander (DMCCC) who was either a second or first lieutenant. The enlisted subjects included the Ballistic Missile Analyst Technician (BMAT) and the Missile Facilities Technician (MFT). The enlisted member's rank varied from Airmen (E-2) to Staff Sergeant (E-5).

This method of subject selection allowed for some representation of the personnel structure of a basic operational unit within the Air Force. It also afforded an opportunity to collect data on an entire operational unit that is made up almost exclusively of first term airmen. For the purposes of this study, all the subjects tested had between two and five years total military service, which enables them to be classified as first-term airmen. The premise that all subjects are first term airmen is important to this study because the study's purpose is to relate certain variables to a person's career intent. If an individual has more than five years total service, the author assumes that the individual is a career man and is relatively satisfied with his situation. This study's purpose is to find what must be done to induce the first term airmen to pursue a career in the military.

Method of Data Collection

The instrument used to collect data for this study was the BSR test developed by Hughes and LeBlanc(1972) (See Appendix A). The test is specifically designed to measure attitude factors involving career decisions in the military. It has a total of 48 questions, each designed to examine a particular variable. The first 36 questions are statements about the Air Force way of life and the respondents are given a choice of five answers to any particular statement: i.e., strongly agree, agree, undecided, disagree, and strongly disagree. The statements given in the first 36 questions relate to various subjects such as pay, fringe benefits, leadership in the Air Force, inspections, discipline, personnel policies, etc. Through these statements the subjects can give their views and attitudes on what they think is good and bad with respect to the way of life in the Air Force.

It should be noted here that the BSR was designed to eliminate as much of the subjective bias as was possible. Although there are obviously some leading questions and semantic problems in this instrument, the questions of a leading nature were distributed equally among statements that favor the Air Force and those that find fault with the Air Force. The author feels that any bias introduced that was prejudicial to a choice favoring Air Force life was sufficiently offset by statements that were derogatory in nature. For example, one statement reads: Fear is the major motivational technique used in the Air Force, and this type of statement is counterbalanced by a statement such as: NCO's are usually very good supervisors. Since any study on attitudes is going to introduce some of the researcher's bias, a concerted effort was made in the design of this instrument to offset any inclination toward securing a particular response from the subjects.

The last twelve variables measured by the BSR were in the form of questions. They are concerned mostly with questioning the subjects' attitude

towards the Air Force in general, his geographical, social and economic background prior to entering the service, and to what extent the draft influence his decision to join the Air Force. Through this type of question, the author hopes to develop a composite profile of the typical person who will become a career military man.

The BSR test was distributed to the subjects during a pre-departure briefing prior to their going on alert at their various missile complexes. The author explained to the subjects that their answers would be held in strict confidence and that they should display complete honesty in answering the questions. They were asked to include their rank and crew position on the test since it was imperative that the officers and enlisted men could be separated when analyzing the data. This author then read the instructions on how to take the test to all the subjects, answered all questions concerning the test, and lastly, monitored the test as it was given to the subjects.

Statistical Tools Used

The data collection lent itself well to three separate methods of analysis. The first method of analysis employed was a stepwise discriminant analysis. Actually there were two discriminate analyses run on the data. The first was a two-way analysis which separated the subjects into officer or enlisted man. The second analysis went even further and broke the rank into seven categories ranging from Airman E(2) thru staff Sergeant (E-6) in the enlisted ranks and second lieutenant (O-1) thru captain (O-5) in the officer ranks. What is desired through this type of analysis is the classification of an individual into a particular group by evaluating calculated linear functions, then finding the group for which the value is the largest.

The second method of analysis employed was the correlation matrix . This correlation matrix was computed from raw data variables utilizing Pearson's Product Moment Correlation (r). Correlation is defined as the measure of relationship between two or more variables which have an independent and dependent relationship. The intercorrelation matrix data used in this study was helpful in determining how each particular variable was associated with a person's career intent. Each variable was also correlated against a person's rank so that it was possible to see if a response to a particular variable was largely due to the rank of the subject. Through this method of analysis, it was possible to ascertain how each variable affected a person's intent to make the Air Force a career, and also, how a person's rank affected his attitude toward particular variables. This analysis should prove most important when personnel programs are developed by the Air Force in hopes of retaining good individuals. By showing that a person's attitudes and desires often change with his rank, perhaps the Air Force can adopt a policy which recognizes these differences and changes with respect to the differing needs of officers and enlisted men.

The third method of analysis applied to the data was factor analysis. Factor analysis is a statistical method of extracting a number of common factors from a large number of measures. The purpose is to simplify a set of explanatory variables which are generated from complex and unexplored areas of scientific research into a relatively small number of independent factors with which the whole set of complex variables can be understood. In a more exact science, the task of researcher is to develop a theoretical and statistical model which describes a scientific phenomenon in question and then the empirical data are collected, analysed, and tested against the model. In a less exact science, like the subject matter of this study and many other areas of social sciences, however, the subject matters are not sufficiently

well structured and controlled to permit the formulation of relatively precise a priori theory or model against which the empirical data can be tested. In this situation the use of factor analysis makes it possible to discern some regularity and order from the set of complex variables. In short, factor analysis makes it possible to reduce the dimensionality of a set of complex variables by grouping the variables with similar characteristics and thus it is possible for a researcher to identify fundamental and meaningful dimensions of a multivariate domain.

This analysis extracted four factors from the data and they include:

1. Career Enthusiasm
2. Career Irritants
3. Job Related Irritants
4. Leisure Time in the Air Force

It should be noted that these factors were rotated utilizing Kaiser's "Varimax" factor rotation method. The factors were rotated because most unrotated factor matrices provide information which is difficult or impossible to interpret. A principal factor matrix and its loadings account for the common factor variances of the observed variables, but they normally do not provide meaningful information. This occurs because a large number of variables are heavily loaded on a limited number of factors. By rotating the factors, it is possible to reduce the number of variables which are highly loaded on each factor and thus make each factor clearly emerge in the multidimensional space as a unique factor. Consequently, it is much easier to identify and interpret the content and nature of each factor than the factors in an unrotated factor matrix. As much as an emerged factor is a construct, a name or meaning has to be attached to the construct by finding the common characteristics which are shared by the variables with high factor loadings on the factor. This was done

in this study and in the previously listed factors indicated the names assigned to each factor.

One final method of analysis applied to the raw data was a frequency count of the responses to each question. Although a list of the means and standard deviations of each variable was compiled through a computerized printout, the author felt that a more in-depth study of the exact responses was needed. This analysis enabled the author to determine what statements listed in the instrument elicited the greatest number of strongly agree and strongly disagree responses. This could prove most important in determining what really causes an individual to have certain career intentions. It should also point out some of the differences between the feelings of officers and enlisted men and should provide a more meaningful insight into the attitudes of the subjects than a table of means would do.

Hypotheses

The first hypothesis purported by the author is that the reasons for returning or separating from the military are significantly different between officers and enlisted men. If proven true, this theory would have great implications with respect to the needed changes in personnel programs designed to retain these officers and enlisted men. All efforts at retaining men in the service will have to be specifically designed to help see to the needs and desires of both groups, i.e., officers and enlisted men, as long as these needs and desires will not deter the military from accomplishing its assigned mission.

The second hypothesis stated is that the objections to an Air Force career voiced by most airmen are related to Air Force policies rather than dissatisfaction with an individual's particular job. If proven true, this hypothesis

could also have far-reaching implications. The civilian industry has long been plagued with the problem of making jobs more meaningful and acceptable to employees. Various job enrichment programs have been undertaken by civilian industry in order to upgrade the quality of jobs. This is evidenced by the fact that there is a considerable use in the number of industrial psychologists and consulting specialists employed by many civilian firms. If its proven that the Air Force's biggest problem is not with enrichment of jobs but rather with improvement of overall personnel policies then the Air Staff can adjust its thinking to attack the real problem.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Frequency Count and Means of Responses

For the purpose of this part of the study, the subjects were divided into two groups; officers and enlisted men. The officers consisted of 84 subjects and the enlisted men consisted of 70 subjects. A frequency count of the responses to the variables entered in the ESR was made and a comparison made between the officer and the enlisted men's responses. The range of scores varied from 1 to 5 with the number 1 indicating strongly agree; 2 indicating agree, 3 indicating undecided, 4 indicating disagree, and 5 indicating strongly disagree.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the first 36 variables entered in the BSR were in the form of statements with which the respondents could reply in a range from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The last 12 variables of the BSR were in the form of questions that the respondents were given five possible answers with which to respond. The variables were divided also into two groups. The first one included those which when responded to in an affirmative manner, i.e., #1, strongly agree, indicated favor with the Air Force. The second group included those variables that when responded to in an affirmative manner indicated disfavor with the Air Force. This was necessary because the means of the responses would be meaningless without knowing the basic content of each variable. An example of a statement from the first group would be: NCO's are usually very good supervisors. A response of agreement to this statement would indicate a favorable attitude towards the Air Force. An example from the second group would be: Fear is a major motivational technique used in the Air Force. An affirmative response to this particular variable would indicate displeasure with the Air Force.

It should also be noted that variables number 42 and 45 are not included in either group because they are questions of a demographic nature which give an indication of the subjects socio-economic and geographic background, and they will be discussed separately.

Table three indicates the means of responses for officers and enlisted men for variables that when answered affirmatively indicate favor with the Air Force, i.e., #1 indicating strong agreement thru #5 which would indicate strong disagreement. These variables shall hereafter be called positive variables.

TABLE 3
MEANS OF POSITIVE VARIABLES

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	MEAN	
	Officer	Enlisted
1. Challenging and rewarding jobs	3.035	3.186
2. Career Security	2.333	2.329
3. Fringe Benefits	2.262	2.614
6. Salary Commensurate with Job	2.881	3.586
7. Treatment of 1st Termers by Career Airmen	3.238	3.314
8. Equitable Distribution of Workload	3.595	3.500
9. Competent and Effective Leadership	3.167	3.171
11. Leisure time in AF	2.595	2.770
13. Medical Benefits	2.012	2.343
14. Medical Treatment	3.369	3.443
19. Stable Work Schedule	2.940	2.729
20. Recreational Facilities	2.702	2.857
22. Reassignment Policy	3.500	3.400
23. Respect for the Military by Civilians	3.785	3.914
24. OER/APR's accuracy	4.250	3.900
26. Military Job	3.071	3.200
27. Military as "Builder of Men"	3.583	3.514
28. Discipline is Good for Self Respect	3.071	3.271
30. NCO's as Supervisors	2.643	2.843
31. Rules and Regulations Are Good	2.870	2.871
32. Military Experience	2.810	2.857
33. Personal Welfare	2.702	2.771
37. No Draft Motivation	3.250	3.200
38. Rewarding Career in AF	2.964	3.171
39. Hours worked per Week	3.929	3.414
41. Favorable Attitude after leaving Service	2.357	2.857
43. Pay as a Career Incentive	3.250	3.300
44. Career Intentions	3.143	3.857
46. Social Standing	3.143	3.686
47. Parental attitude toward AF	2.548	2.829
48. Working Conditions in AF	3.190	3.300

Table four indicates the means of responses for officers and enlisted men for variables that when answered affirmatively indicate disfavor with the Air Force. In this table #1 would indicate the greatest disfavor and #5 the least disfavor. These variables shall hereafter be called negative variables.

TABLE 4
MEANS OF NEGATIVE VARIABLES

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	MEAN	
	Officer	Enlisted
4. Success in Civilian Careers	2.381	2.086
5. Pay Is Important	2.786	2.243
10. Inspections are Worthless	3.262	3.171
12. Barracks should be Discontinued	2.702	2.257
15. Long Hair is Permissible	2.190	1.786
16. Influence from Friends	3.524	3.614
17. Fear as a Motivator	2.952	2.629
18. Emphasis on "Image"	2.345	2.071
21. Inspections (Frequency)	2.286	2.429
25. Fraternization is Harmful	3.548	4.171
29. Success in the AF Requires No Intelligence	2.738	2.829
34. Discipline is Overdone	3.095	2.871
35. Little Appreciation for Doing a Good Job	2.796	2.500
36. Aggression	2.702	2.629
40. Resentment of Authority	3.357	3.100

For the purpose of this study the author has assumed that a mean score of 2.5 or less would indicate a general agreement with any particular variable. Also, a mean score of 3.5 or greater was taken to indicate a general disagreement with any variable. Variables which did fall into these ranges of mean scores were considered to be of value in determining what the subjects found most favorable and unfavorable with regards to the Air Force. Also, a difference of .5 or more in the mean scores of the officers and enlisted men was considered a substantial difference of opinion. A further analysis and discussion of the particular differences will follow in the next chapter.

Also included in the study were two variables designed to measure socio-economic and geographical backgrounds of the subject. Variable #42 indicates family income prior to entering the service ranging from #1 (less than \$5,000) to #5 (greater than \$15,000). Variable #45 indicates geographical background ranging from #1 (Farm or Ranch) to #5 (City over 100,000 pop.). Table 5 shows the socio-economic and geographical means of the subjects.

TABLE 5

MEANS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
AND GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUNDS

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	MEAN	
	Officer	Enlisted
42. Socio-Economic Background	3.024	2.957
45. Geographical Background	3.881	3.429

The above table indicates that the prior civilian income of officers was slightly greater than \$10,000 a year and the prior civilian income of enlisted men was slightly less than \$10,000 a year. It also indicates that the officers tested came from cities with a population of from 25,000 to 100,000 and the enlisted men came from slightly smaller cities.

In order to amplify the results obtained by the mean scores, a frequency count of the responses to the variables covered in the study was made. Table 6 shows the frequency count of variables that when answered affirmatively showed favor towards the Air Force (positive variables). The frequency count displayed in this table reflects the responses given by the officers tested in this study. The responses in the table are labeled one through five. The following values are assigned those numbers: #1, strongly agree; #2, agree; #3, undecided; #4, disagree; #5, strongly disagree.

TABLE 6

FREQUENCY COUNT OF POSITIVE VARIABLES
(OFFICERS)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	VALUES				
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Challenging and rewarding jobs in AF	8	28	13	26	9
2. Career Security	21	34	14	13	2
3. Fringe Benefits	21	38	13	12	0
6. Salary Commensurate with Job	6	41	7	21	9
7. Treatment of 1st Termers by Career Airmen	1	24	24	27	8
8. Equitable Distribution of Workload	2	16	14	35	17
9. Competent and Effective Leadership	5	20	22	33	4
11. Leisure time in AF	10	43	10	15	6
13. Medical Benefits	31	34	9	8	2
14. Medical Treatment	4	20	17	28	15
19. Stable Work Schedule	1	37	20	19	7
20. Recreational Facilities	2	49	10	19	4
22. Reassignment Policy	1	22	19	21	21
23. Respect for the Military by Civilians	1	5	20	45	13
24. OER/APR's accuracy	1	6	5	33	39
26. Military Job	3	34	17	16	14
27. Military as "Builder of Men"	1	8	28	38	9
28. Discipline is Good for Self-Respect	4	26	26	20	8
30. NCO's as Supervisors	2	37	36	8	1
31. Rules and Regulations Are Good	2	35	26	17	14
32. Military Experience	4	33	30	13	4
33. Personal Welfare	5	46	14	10	9
37. No Draft Motivation	12	21	8	24	19
38. Rewarding career in AF	3	26	37	9	9
39. Hours worked per Week	1	4	26	20	33
41. Favorable Attitude after Leaving Service	15	40	21	3	5
43. Pay as a Career Incentive	9	21	15	21	18
44. Career Intentions	13	18	21	10	22
46. Social Standing	4	16	38	19	7
47. Parental attitude toward AF	24	10	39	10	1
48. Working Conditions in AF	10	23	13	20	18

Table 7 shows the frequency count that reflects the responses given by the enlisted men in this study. The responses in this table are labeled in the same manner as they are in Table 6, and once again are a count of the positive variables.

TABLE 7

FREQUENCY COUNT OF POSITIVE VARIABLES
(ENLISTED)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	VALUES				
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Challenging and rewarding jobs in AF	1	28	7	22	11
2. Career Security	12	35	10	10	2
3. Fringe Benefits	9	28	16	11	5
6. Salary Commensurate with Job	2	13	17	18	19
7. Treatment of 1st Termers by Career Airmen	0	21	12	27	8
8. Equitable Distribution of Workload	0	18	12	26	13
9. Competent and Effective Leadership	1	27	12	17	12
11. Leisure time in AF	6	30	16	13	4
13. Medical Benefits	17	28	13	7	4
14. Medical Treatment	1	17	15	22	14
19. Stable Work Schedule	1	37	17	13	4
20. Recreational Facilities	1	34	15	11	8
22. Reassignment Policy	0	17	17	24	11
23. Respect for the Military by Civilians	0	7	7	39	16
24. OER/EPR's accuracy	0	8	11	29	21
26. Military Job	0	27	14	15	13
27. Military as "Builder of Men"	1	13	19	19	17
28. Discipline is Good for Self-Respect	2	20	11	27	9
30. NCO's as Supervisors	5	18	30	14	2
31. Rules and Regulations Are Good	2	30	17	14	16
32. Military Experience	4	26	20	12	7
33. Personal Welfare	2	36	10	17	4
37. No Draft Motivation	10	18	7	14	20
38. Rewarding Career in AF	1	17	28	14	9
39. Hours worked per Week	6	9	21	16	17
41. Favorable Attitude after leaving Service	4	23	26	10	6
43. Pay as a Career Incentive	7	14	15	16	17
44. Career Intentions	4	8	15	8	34
46. Social Standing	0	6	25	21	17
47. Parental attitude toward AF	21	3	20	17	8
48. Working Conditions in AF	5	19	12	15	8

With respect to analyzing the frequency count, the author has assumed that; when responses which indicate agreement or strong agreement (#1 and 2) exceed the number of responses indicating disagreement or strong disagreement (#4 and 5) By a ratio of greater than 3:1, the results are significant. This is also the

case when disagreeing responses exceed agreeing responses by the same ratio. Further comments on the significance of certain responses will be made in the following chapter.

Table 8 shows the frequency count of variables that when answered affirmatively showed disfavor towards the Air Force. The frequency count displayed in this table reflects the responses given by the officers tested in this study. The responses are labeled the same as in the tables showing the positive variables.

TABLE 8
FREQUENCY COUNT OF NEGATIVE VARIABLES
(OFFICERS)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	VALUES				
	1	2	3	4	5
4. Success in Civilian Careers	21	17	37	9	0
5. Pay is Important	12	28	15	26	3
10. Inspections are Worthless	5	13	22	41	3
12. Barracks should be Discontinued	15	26	18	20	5
15. Long Hair is Permissible	20	41	12	9	2
16. Influence from Friends	2	17	15	40	11
17. Fear as a Motivator	11	21	16	28	8
18. Emphasis on "Image"	22	30	12	17	3
21. Inspections (Frequency)	19	35	18	11	1
25. Fraternization is Harmful	3	20	9	33	19
29. Success in the AF Requires No Intelligence	11	30	15	25	3
34. Discipline is Overdone	3	17	33	29	2
35. Little Appreciation for Doing a Good Job	11	24	23	25	1
36. Aggressiveness	11	33	12	27	1
40. Resentment of Authority	0	4	47	31	2

Table 9 shows the frequency count that reflects the responses given by the enlisted men in this study. The responses in this table are labeled in the same manner as they are in Table 8, and again are a count of the negative variables.

TABLE 9
FREQUENCY COUNT OF NEGATIVE VARIABLES
(ENLISTED)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	VALUES				
	1	2	3	4	5
4. Success in Civilian Careers	26	17	22	3	1
5. Pay is Important	26	21	5	13	4
10. Inspections are Worthless	4	17	14	32	2
12. Barracks should be Discontinued	17	29	11	12	0
15. Long Hair is Permissible	37	20	5	6	1
16. Influence from Friends	4	9	7	36	13
17. Fear as a Motivator	12	28	7	20	2
18. Emphasis on "Image"	30	19	8	12	0
21. Inspections (Frequency)	22	31	13	12	1
25. Fraternization is Harmful	3	4	6	21	32
29. Success in the AF Requires No Intelligence	13	18	9	25	4
34. Discipline is Overdone	1	31	15	21	1
35. Little Appreciation for Doing a Good Job	9	32	11	17	0
36. Aggressiveness	5	34	12	16	2
40. Resentment of Authority	1	9	42	17	0

The frequency count of the socio-economic and geographical background of the subjects are found in Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 pertains to officers and Table 11 to enlisted men.

TABLE 10
FREQUENCY COUNT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
AND GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUNDS
(OFFICERS)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	VALUES				
	1	2	3	4	5
42. Socio-Economic Background	20	15	13	17	22
45. Geographical Background	5	2	25	18	37

TABLE 11
FREQUENCY COUNT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
AND GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUNDS
(ENLISTED)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	VALUES				
	1	2	3	4	5
42. Socio-Economic Background	13	11	22	14	9
45. Geographical Background	7	7	23	14	18

The values assigned the socio-economic variable in the preceding two tables were based on the family's yearly income and are indicated as:

1) less than \$5,000, 2) \$5,000 - 7,000, 3) \$7,000 - 10,000, 4) \$10,000 - 15,000, and 5) Over \$15,000. The answers given by the officers may be somewhat erroneous due to misinterpretation of the question. The author was looking for the yearly income of the family in which the subject was raised. However, some of the officers interpreted the question as meaning the family which they themselves headed. As a result, there were twenty officers who responded that their annual income was less than \$5,000, which is credible if one assumes that they were college students just prior to entering the military.

The values assigned to the geographical variable in the preceding two tables were based on the subjects residence prior to entering the military and are indicated as: 1) Farm or ranch, 2) in the country, but not on a ranch, 3) Town or small city (less than 25,000), 4) City (25,000 - 100,000) and 5) Large city (100,000 or more). The results from the frequency count of this variable are quite consistent with the means of the same variable.

Two-Way Discriminant Analysis

As with the previous section, this portion of the study also divided the subjects into two groups. These groups consisted of officers and enlisted men.

The purpose of the discriminant analysis was to determine if the two groups differed significantly in their responses. An F ratio was computed in this step-wise analysis to test the significance of the function. Each variable was examined by adding one variable at a time to the function. Table 12 shows the variables that were significant with respect to predicting group membership. These variables are significant at the .01 level. It should also be noted here that all the other variables, although not significant in relationship to group membership, did not, in fact, harm the status of the group identity.

TABLE 12
VARIABLES WHICH ARE SIGNIFICANT AND
CAN PREDICT GROUP MEMBERSHIP IN EITHER OFFICER
OR ENLISTED GROUP

VARIABLE	VARIABLE CONTENT	(SIGNIFICANT AT .01 LEVEL)
6.	Salary Commensurate with Job and Responsibility	
39.	Hours Worked per Week	
5.	Pay is Important	
44.	Career Intentions	
43.	Pay as an Incentive	
46.	Social Standing	
29.	Success in AF Requires No Intelligence	
15.	Lack of Long Hair	
30.	NCO's As Supervisors	
45.	Geographical Background	

The discriminant analysis shows that the two groups (officers and enlisted men) are distinctly different in their attitudes with respect to the aforementioned variables. These variables indicate a significant difference of opinion between the two groups.

The two-way discriminant analysis further involves the classification of the respondents into one of the two possible groups - (officers or enlisted men).

A two-by-two matrix was made to show the number of cases that were classified into a particular group. This matrix is shown in Table 13.

TABLE 13

NUMBER OF CASES CLASSIFIED
INTO A PARTICULAR GROUP

Pre-Selected Groups	Officers	Enlisted
Officers	77	7
Enlisted	6	64
.....		

As Table 13 indicates, in a great majority of cases, the individuals responded in a manner that would place them in their proper group.

Seven-Way Discriminant Analysis

In addition to the discriminant analysis which divided the subjects into officers and enlisted men, another analysis was undertaken to divide the men into seven specific ranks. The seven-way analysis divided the subjects into the following ranks: second lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, airman, airman 1st class, buck sergeant, and staff sergeant. The step-wise analysis was performed in the same manner as with the two-way analysis. Table 14 shows the variables that were significant with respect to predicting group membership and again they are significant at the .01 level.

TABLE 14
VARIABLES WHICH ARE SIGNIFICANT AND
CAN PREDICT GROUP MEMBERSHIP
IN A PARTICULAR RANK

VARIABLE	VARIABLE CONTENT	(SIGNIFICANT AT .01 LEVEL)
44.	Career Intentions	
43.	Pay as a Career Incentive	
15.	Lack of Long Hair	
39.	Hours Worked Per Week	
3.	Fringe Benefits	
22.	Reassignments	

The first four variables listed were also indicated as significant in the two-way analysis. The last two, variables numbers 3 and 22, however, were indicated only as being significant in the seven-way analysis.

The seven-way analysis also involved the classification of the respondents into one of the seven possible groups. A seven-by-seven matrix was made to show the number of cases that were classified into a particular group. This matrix is shown in Table 15.

TABLE 15
NUMBER OF CASES CLASSIFIED
INTO A PARTICULAR GROUP

Pre-Selected Groups	2Lt.	1Lt.	Capt.	Amn.	ALC	Sgt.	SSgt.
2Lt.	19	0	1	0	0	0	0
1Lt.	6	24	4	0	0	1	1
Capt.	0	4	21	1	0	0	1
Amn.	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
ALC	0	1	0	0	25	2	0
Sgt.	2	1	1	0	1	25	1
SSgt.	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
.....							

The preceding table indicates that in the seven-way analysis the subjects again responded in a manner which was consistent with other members of their particular rank.

Correlated Data

A correlation matrix was made of the variables represented in this study. Its purpose was to show which variables were highly correlated, either positively or negatively, with other variables entered in the testing instrument. The correlated variables shown in Table 16 represent that portion of the total intercorrelation matrix which related career intent with the other variables that were represented in this study. Many of these variables show a strong relationship to a person's career intent. The variables in Table 16 are entered in order of absolute magnitude of correlation with a person's career intent.

TABLE 16

CORRELATED VARIABLES WITH RESPECT TO CAREER INTENT

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	CAREER INTENT
43. Pay as a Career Incentive	.80
41. Favorable Attitude After Leaving Service	.55
26. Military Job	.55
1. Challenging and Rewarding Jobs in AF	.52
37. No Draft Motivation	.51
38. Rewarding Career in AF	.47
33. Personal Welfare	.45
48. Working Conditions in AF	.42
46. Social Standing	.42
28. Effect of Discipline on Self-Respect	.39
3. Fringe Benefits	.37
32. Military Experience	.34
31. Rules and Regulations are Good	.33
14. Medical Treatment	.29
20. Recreational Facilities	.29
23. Respect for Military by Civilians	.29
25. Fraternization is Harmful	.27
9. Competent and Effective Leadership	.26

TABLE 16, (Cont.)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	CAREER INTENT
22. Reassignment Policy	.24
47. Parental Attitude Towards AF	.23
42. Prior Civilian Income	.23
6. Salary Commensurate with Job	.22
13. Medical Benefits	.21
7. Treatment of 1st Termers by Career Men	.21
27. Military as "Builder of Men"	.16
30. NCO's as Supervisors	.15
16. Influence from Friends	.15
8. Equitable Distribution of Workload	.15
2. Career Security	.14
11. Leisure Time in AF	.12
36. Aggressiveness	.07
5. Pay is Important	.07
19. Stable Work Schedule	.04
39. Hours Worked Per Week	.01
24. OER/APR Accuracy	-.02
45. Geographical Background	-.03
21. Inspections (Frequency)	-.10
40. Resentment of Authority	-.23
10. Inspections are Worthless	-.24
18. Emphasis on Image	-.24
12. Barracks Should be Discontinued	-.27
17. Fear as a Motivator	-.28
35. Little Appreciation for Doing a Good Job	-.30
15. Long Hair is Permissible	-.36
34. Discipline is Overdone	-.39
29. Success in AF Requires No Intelligence	-.44
4. Success in Civilian Careers	-.72

The highest positive correlations shown in Table 16 include the variable; pay as a career incentive. This particular variable sought to find out whether a person would stay in the military if his pay were equal to his civilian counterpart. This very high correlation seems to indicate that people who want to make the service a career, also are inclined toward a service career if the pay were comparable to their civilian counterpart. Conversely, the people who are leaving the service would still leave regardless if they were making comparable pay to that of their civilian counterparts. Other highly positively correlated variables with respect to career intent include; a person's

attitude toward the service after he becomes a civilian; the lack of draft motivation; a person's feeling toward his military job; and a person's attitude towards finding a challenging and rewarding job in the Air Force.

The highest negatively correlated variables include: the likelihood of success in civilian careers; the belief that success in the Air Force requires no brains; discipline is overdone; little appreciation for a good job; and the lack of longer hair. A strong belief in the above variables would indicate a person who was definitely not career minded with respect to the Air Force.

Table 17 represents that portion of the total correlation matrix which related the rank, either officer or enlisted, with the other variables of the study. Its purpose is to show if there is any significant correlation between a person's rank and his responses to the variables.

TABLE 17
CORRELATED VARIABLES WITH
RESPECT TO SUBJECT'S RANK

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	RANK
6. Salary Commensurate With Job	.30
46. Social Standing	.29
25. Fraternization is Harmful	.28
44. Career Intentions	.27
41. Favorable Attitude After Leaving Service	.26
3. Fringe Benefits	.19
13. Medical Benefits	.18
47. Parental Attitudes Towards AF	.14
30. NCO's As Supervisors	.12
38. Rewarding Career in AF	.12
28. Effect of Discipline on Self Respect	.11
23. Respect of Military by Civilians	.09
1. Challenging and Rewarding Jobs in AF	.08
20. Recreational Facility	.08
11. Leisure Time in AF	.07
26. Military Job	.07

(continued)

TABLE 17 (Cont.)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	RANK
16. Influence from Friends	.06
33. Personal Welfare	.06
48. Working Conditions in AF	.06
7. Treatment of 1st Termers by Career Airmen	.05
14. Medical Treatment	.05
21. Inspections (Frequency)	.05
32. Military Experience	.05
43. Pay as a Career Incentive	.04
8. Equitable Distribution of Workload	.03
22. Reassignment Policy	.03
31. Rules and Regulations are Good	.03
2. Career Security	.02
29. Success in the AF Requires No Intelligence	.02
9. Competent and Effective Leadership	.00
37. No Draft Motivation	.00
42. Prior Civilian Income	-.01
27. Military as "Builder of Men"	-.02
36. Aggressiveness	-.04
10. Inspections are Worthless	-.07
4. Success in Civilian Careers	-.08
19. Stable Work Schedule	-.10
18. Emphasis on Image	-.13
34. Discipline is Overdone	-.14
35. Little Appreciation for doing a Good Job	-.15
17. Fear as a Motivator	-.15
24. OER/APR Accuracy	-.17
45. Geographical Background	-.18
15. Long Hair is Permissible	-.19
40. Resentment of Authority	-.20
5. Pay Is Important	-.20
12. Barracks Should be Discontinued	-.21
39. Hours Worked Per Week	-.22

Although none of the variables showed an exceedingly high correlation, it is important to observe that the highest correlated variable with respect to rank is salary commensurate with job. This correlation would seem to indicate that the subject's feelings toward their salary varied with their particular rank; i.e., officers are more inclined to say that their salary is commensurate with their job whereas enlisted men feel differently.

Table 18 includes the variables as they are correlated with a person's willingness to enter the military without the threat of a draft. The purpose

of this table is to show if the attitudes toward military life are significantly different between draft-induced members and "pure" volunteers.

TABLE 18
CORRELATED VARIABLES WITH RESPECT TO
SERVICE ENTRY WITHOUT DRAFT THREAT

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	NON-DRAFT MOTIVATION
1. Challenging and Rewarding Jobs in AF	.54
43. Pay as a Career Incentive	.54
41. Favorable Attitude after Leaving Service	.52
44. Career Intentions	.51
28. Discipline Is Good for Self-Respect	.49
46. Social Standing	.46
48. Working Conditions in AF	.46
26. Military Job	.46
38. Rewarding Career in AF	.45
32. Military Experience	.36
20. Recreational Facilities	.34
3. Fringe Benefits	.33
14. Medical Treatment	.33
27. Military as "Builder of Men"	.33
33. Personal Welfare	.32
7. Treatment of 1st Termers by Career Airmen	.30
22. Reassignment Policy	.26
25. Fraternisation is Harmful	.26
31. Rules and Regulations are Good	.26
23. Respect for Military by Civilians	.24
47. Parental Attitude towards AF	.22
6. Salary Commensurate Towards Job	.20
13. Medical Benefits	.20
16. Influence from Friends	.20
30. NCO's as Supervisors	.19
9. Competent and Effective Leadership	.19
36. Aggressiveness	.18
39. Hours Worked Per Week	.18
8. Equitable Distribution of Workload	.16
24. OER/APR Accuracy	.16
2. Career Security	.15
19. Stable Work Schedule	.15
42. Prior Civilian Income	.14
5. Pay Is Important	.11
45. Geographical Background	.09
40. Resentment of Authority	-.12

Continued

TABLE 18 (Cont.,)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	NON-DRAFT MOTIVATION
21. Inspections (Frequency)	-.16
12. Barracks Should be Discontinued	-.19
10. Inspections Are Worthless	-.29
18. Emphasis on Image	-.29
35. Little Appreciation for Doing a Good Job	-.31
15. Long Hair is Permissible	-.33
34. Discipline is Overdone	-.41
29. Success in the AF Requires No Intelligence	-.42
4. Success in Civilian Careers	-.42

Factor Analysis

Factor analysis was applied to the data to generate constructs which help examine the attitudes of the subjects of the study. Table 19 outlines the first factor obtained from the factor analysis of the study. This particular factor had the largest number of variables loaded on it and was labeled "Career Enthusiasm" by the author. Variables included under this factor which are worthy of note include those which have a high negative loading. These variables, although not classified as irritants, appear to have a definite detrimental affect on a person's career enthusiasm. As expected, the highest positively loaded variable on the first factor was the subjects career intentions. If the subject has indicated he plans to pursue a career in the military, chances are he will show enthusiasm toward that career. Other highly loaded variables include a person's attitude toward finding a career in the Air Force challenging and rewarding and his feelings toward his present military job.

TABLE 19

FACTOR 1 (CAREER ENTHUSIASM)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	LOADING
1. Challenging and Rewarding Career	.70
2. Career Security	.33
3. Fringe Benefits	.56
4. Success in Civilian Career	-.75
14. Medical Treatment	.43
16. Influence from Friends	.27
22. Reassignment Policy	.43
23. Respect for the Military	.33
26. Military Job	.70
28. Discipline is Good For Self Respect	.61
29. Success in Military requires No Intelligence	-.56
32. Military Experience	.57
33. Personal Welfare	.60
34. Discipline is Overdone	-.52
35. Little Appreciation for doing Good Job	-.40
37. No Draft Motivation	.68
38. Attractive and Rewarding Career in AF	.68
41. Favorable Attitude after leaving Service	.67
42. Prior Civilian Income	.27
43. Pay as Career Incentive	.81
44. Career Intentions	.81
46. Social Standing	.57
48. Working Conditions	.60

Table 20 shows the loadings of the variables on factor #2. Factor 2 is labeled "Career Irritants" Highest loaded variables on this factor include excessive inspections and lack of longer hair being allowed.

TABLE 20

FACTOR 2 (CAREER IRRITANTS)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	LOADING
5. Pay (Importance)	.42
10. Inspections (Purpose)	.49
12. Barracks Should be Discontinued	.46

Continued

TABLE 20 (Cont.)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	LOADING
13. Medical Benefits	.34
15. Long Hair is Permitted	.54
17. Fear as a Motivator	.52
18. Too Much Emphasis on Image	.43
21. Inspections (excessive)	.59
25. Fraternization is Harmful	-.35
31. Rules and Regulations are Good	-.48
40. Resentment of Authority	.33

Factor 3 specified several irritants that are job oriented and affect career attitudes. The variables loaded under this factor all seemed to relate to problems encountered by the subjects in their specific jobs. These irritants are those which could be encountered in a civilian job as well. Table 21 shows the variables loaded on factor 3.

TABLE 21
FACTOR 3 (JOB RELATED IRRITANTS)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	LOADING
6. Salary Commensurate with Job	.35
7. Treatment of 1st Termers by Career Airmen	.59
8. Equitable Distribution of Work	.47
9. Competent and Effective Leaders	.53
19. Stable Work Schedule	.56
24. OER/APR's Accuracy	.56
27. Military as "Builder of Men"	.37
30. NCO's as Supervisors	.48

Factor 4 loaded variables that considered the leisure provided by the Air Force. Table 22 shows the loadings on factor 4. It is interesting to

see that, although there is a rather high loading for recreational facilities, the leisure time in the Air Force is represented by a highly negative loading. Apparently the subjects felt the facilities were available but the time to utilize them was not.

TABLE 22

FACTOR 4 (LEISURE TIME)

VARIABLE NUMBER AND CONTENT	LOADING
11. Leisure Time in AF	-.34
20. Recreational Facilities	.47
36. Aggressiveness	.54
39. Hours Worked Per Week	.43
40. Resentment of Authority	.32
45. Geographical Background	-.30

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

Significant Positive Attitudes

Although the purpose of this study was to establish what changes should be made in the military structure in order to retain the highest caliber individuals, a mention of what 1st term members find attractive about the military is in order.

The greatest inducement offered to stay in the military appears to be the security inherent in a military career. The subjects of this study consistently agreed that a career in the military offered a greater degree of security than most civilian jobs. Proponents of the theory "X" style of management would revel in the situation provided in the military. To them, security is utmost in the minds of employees. Unfortunately, at least for the military, many of today's youth no longer envisage security as being the epitome of what is desired in a career. This is especially true when the security of a career is not guaranteed as a reward for effective and efficient production, but rather as a result of a person merely being under the employ of the United States' armed forces. This type of security tends to benefit the incompetent without sufficiently rewarding the highly effective individual. It presents an environment where mediocrity is not only condoned but accepted as the general method of doing things.

Unfortunately, this type of security does not lend itself well to honest and forthright criticism by individuals in the military. The only way that

this type security can be guaranteed is for individuals not to, so to speak, "rock the boat." It rewards the "yes" men, especially in the junior officer and airmen ranks, and ostracizes those who oppose existing policies; no matter how valid the criticism. Because of this, although most first term military members agree on the substantial security offered by a military career, the great majority of them still leave the service after one term.

A second positive attitude shown by the subjects indicate a strong agreement that the fringe benefits in the military exceeded those given by civilian industry. It was generally conceded that the military offered superior fringe benefits in the areas such as commissary privileges, BX privileges, access to free recreational facilities, educational opportunities, etc. A possible reason for the fringe benefits not contributing significantly to the retention of high quality young men is this: considerable numbers of the young first term officers and airmen are either unmarried or have a very small and young family. Due to this, they do not realize the monetary savings incurred by the various fringe benefits because they do not take advantage of them near as much as the older servicemen. Most of the young people in America today are not very concerned with something that will benefit them five or ten years from now; they want to see something that is going to benefit them now.

A final positive attitude conveyed by the subjects was also in the area of fringe benefits, but more specific. This final area was medical benefits. Most of the subjects agreed that the medical benefits provided by the Air Force exceeded those offered in any civilian industry. Their feelings were certainly based on a solid foundation; the military incurs the cost of a serviceman's and his dependent's illness completely. The service member continues to draw full pay even though ill and not able to work. Dental

care is also extended to a serviceman for all dental problems and to his dependents for minor dental work.

Unfortunately, the subjects of the study believed that the medical treatment given by military doctors was not nearly as good as the treatment given by civilian doctors. This rather disheartening observation substantially dilutes the impact of free medical treatment when weighed against a person's career decision. When problems arise concerning one's health, the general attitude is to get the best treatment regardless of cost. Therefore, the potentially good retention inducement of free medical benefits is considerably lessened by the lack of quality shown in the medical treatment.

Significant Negative Attitudes

The major irritants toward a military career include those areas which could be labeled "Mickey Mouse." This slang term is used when discussing various military policies, which first term members deem unnecessary and essentially dysfunctional. "Mickey Mouse" policies are felt by most first termers to be outmoded customs and traditions whose main function is harassment of the troops, often for no better reason than a superior's personal gratification. The "Mickey Mouse" policies abhorred by most first term members, especially enlisted men, include: strict haircut rules, too frequent inspections, and the general condition of life in a military barracks.

In contrast with the thinking of high echelon decisionmakers and most career men in the Air Force, this study indicated that hair is most important to first term military members. This is especially true of young enlisted men. The unanimity with which the subjects felt that long hair should be allowed, as long as it was neat, was greater than on any other statement on Air Force life entered in the testing instrument. This was true of both officers

and airmen. It appears that the strict personal appearance rules made by the Air Force are designed not so much for neatness but rather for standardizations. Unfortunately, the standards set up by the Air Force are perceived by most first termers as being representative of the styles which society at large dispensed with ten years ago. Since the first termers must exist in a variety of roles, i.e. airman, community member, church goer, peer group member, etc., they want to dress and look in a manner acceptable to the entire environment in which they live, not just the military environment.

A second area of "Mickey Mouse" met with considerable disapproval by the subjects of this study was in the frequency of inspections. It is interesting to note that the subjects of the study were in mild disagreement with the statement that inspections were worthless. However, there was general unanimity in the feeling that they were excessive in number. So it appears that the great majority of first term members are not antagonistic towards inspections that are designed to serve a specific function, such as an Operational Readiness Inspection which is used to gauge a unit's capability to accomplish its assigned wartime mission. However, they are quite antagonistic towards the frequency of harassment-type inspections which really serve no purpose except to further alienate the first-term airmen from the careermen who instigate these various inspections.

Another major irritant expressed by the subjects of this study was the continued use of barracks by the military. The majority of individuals felt that the military should discontinue the use of barracks. This opinion was especially vehement from the enlisted members of the study. Part of the reason for such resentment of barracks life lies in the fact that the individual rooms in the barracks are virtually always susceptible to inspection from anyone ranging from the First Sergeant to the Wing Commander. This lack

of privacy and the restrictive policies with respect to painting and decorating the rooms are most irritating to single enlisted men.

The men who live in the barracks resent the fact that their married counterparts are allowed to live off base and draw extra pay for doing so. They cannot accept the reasoning that barracks life improves discipline and can create a comradeship among the men. This is often the reason cited by high officials for maintaining the barracks. The barracks dwellers cannot seem to fathom why they need to improve their discipline and esprit de corps, while their married counterparts live off base, apparently having maintained a sufficient level of discipline and military bearing by virtue of the fact that they are married. Any reasonable man cannot see any equality or justification for this type of reasoning. The men living in the barracks resent the fact that they are subjected to rules and regulations, enforced by men who are not subjected to those particular rules and regulations.

Other irritants expressed by the subjects were concerned with the policies encountered on the job. These include the inequitable distribution of the workload and the inability of the Officer Effectiveness Report (OER) and the Airmen Performance Report (APR) to give a truly accurate picture of an individual's performance compared with that of his peers. The former irritant, inequitable distribution of the workload, could possibly be unique to the subjects of this study. Since they were all missile crew members who work 24-hour alerts, they must by necessity accomplish all additional duties such as classroom instruction, race relations seminars, commander's calls, etc., on their off-duty time. Whereas, individuals who work a normal eight hour day in the Air Force can attend such functions during their duty hours, crew members must attend, as mentioned, on their own time. This, obviously, would lead them to believe that there is, indeed, inequities in the distribution of

work.

The subjects vigorously disagreed that OEF /APR's really measure an individual's performance in relationship to that of his peers. This is one problem that the Air Force readily admits having. The astronomical rate of inflation, that has crept into the present rating system has the promotion boards in a most unenviable position. It is generally conceded by most raters in the Air Force that, unless they give their men the highest possible rating, they will not get promoted. It is obvious that everyone cannot be that "one in a hundred" who is truly outstanding and far exceeds his contemporaries in every way. Yet the large majority of officers and enlisted men are rated in just that manner by their superiors. As mentioned earlier, the Air Force does recognize the problem and a new method of rating is presently being tested at various bases.

Two other significant negative attitudes, with respect to career intentions, were found to be prevalent among the subjects of this study. The more a first term member perceives his chances of succeeding in civilian life as very good; the less likely he is to be interested in a military career. Secondly, the subjects of this study believed that the respect accorded the military by civilians was at a rather low ebb.

It is indeed a sad commentary on the state of our present military system, when individuals who think that they have outstanding capabilities tend to fulfill them in civilian careers and not in the military. If the only persons who stay in the military are those who feel that their chances for success as civilians is limited, then we are indeed in dire straits. In this study, it was found that the correlation between a positive military career intent and a person's perceived chances of obtaining a successful civilian career was an astounding $-.72$ correlation. The implications of this

statistic are quite clear. If a reasonable chance for success in civilian life is enough to drive a man out of the military, then obviously there must be something lacking in the military or he would attempt to obtain his measure of success there.

It also appears that the first termers feel that the military no longer commands the respectable image that it once did among the civilian populace. The effects of the long and agonizing Viet Nam conflict have been most harmful to the image of the military establishment. The anti-military feeling in this country reached its peak during the later days of the Viet Nam war. Regretably, this anti-military feeling has now been replaced by apathy with the end of the war. The general mood of the country indicates a weariness over the war and a general attitude of "lets forget it" as well as all things which remind us of it, including the military. Even the patriotic incentive to join the military has been somewhat diminished by this attitude.

Since most military members are so much a part of the civilian community, it is obvious that the disrespect shown the military by civilians, whether it be real or perceived, does have a definite detrimental effect on a positive attitude towards a military career. Everyone likes to be proud of the work they do and to be respected for it by others.

Differences in Officer and Enlisted Attitudes

A discriminate analysis of the data obtained in this study indicated some significant differences in the attitudes of officers and enlisted men in particular areas. (See Table 12, Chapter 3). The area which showed the greatest amount of discriminability between the two groups was in the notion that their salary was commensurate with their job and responsibility.

While the officers generally feel that their salary is commensurate with their jobs and responsibilities, the enlisted men strongly disagree with that premise. Many enlisted men feel that their chances for economic advancement in the military are not even close to achieving parity with their chances for economic growth as a civilian. Unfortunately, the many pay raises seen in the military over the last five years have been on a percentage basis exemplifying the cliché that "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer." In order to offset this inordinately low salary level for low ranking enlisted men, the Air Force has the policy of offering attractive re-enlistment bonuses to first term airmen. This bonus may range from \$2,000 to \$8,000 depending on the airman's particular skills. Surprisingly, many first term members view this bonus as an explicit example of the "carrot-stick" philosophy of management and show considerable disdain for the policy. Additionally, many members do re-enlist to collect a quick \$8,000 only to terminate their careers at the eight year mark as opposed to the normal four year obligation. It appears obvious that the salary levels of officers are on an equal level to that of their civilian counterparts; what is now needed is that same parity for the enlisted men.

To go along with the aforementioned disparity, another area of significant difference lies in the importance of pay to the officers and enlisted men. Whereas the officers took the attitude that pay was not too important to their career decision, enlisted men considered it most important. The reason for this difference of opinion is rather obvious. The officers indicated the relative unimportance of pay because their salary would be approximately the same if they were middle managers in a civilian environment. The enlisted men, however, considered pay very important to their career decision because they feel that they deserve more money than they are getting in the

military. Pay in itself may not be a sufficient incentive to retain good men in the military, but a lack of proper monetary compensation is certainly an incentive to leave the service.

A third area of difference in officers and enlisted men was in the number of hours worked per week by each group. It is most interesting to note that the officers indicated that they worked on an average of ten hours more per week than the enlisted men and yet the enlisted men were considerably more determined to leave the service than were the officers. This would seem to indicate that most of the men's reasons for leaving the service were not based on the fact that they were overworked.

A fourth area of disagreement between the responses given by the officers and enlisted men dealt with their perception of their social standing in the military compared to their social standing as a civilian. The officers generally agreed that their social standing in the military was comparable to what they would expect it to be in civilian life. The officers in this study were all college graduates and the assumption is that they would generally have gotten respectable jobs as civilians. The enlisted men, however, indicated that their social status in the military was considerably less than what it would be as a civilian. Whether this is actually true or not is not the point: the point is that they perceived it to be true and herein lies its importance. The social standing which a man has in relationship to his peers is almost as important as the job which he performs. If a man feels that he is in the lower strata of society in the military, he is apt to seek employment elsewhere where he can improve his status.

The final area of discriminability which will be discussed is the career intentions of the officers and the enlisted men. Whereas most officers are somewhat undecided about making the military a career, the vast majority of

first term enlisted men have made up their minds; they are getting out of the military. A study conducted by Belt and Parrott (1972) indicated that first term enlisted men tend to make the decision to leave the service quite early in their career, whereas officers tend to take longer to make such a decision. This is probably the reason for the high degree of discriminability shown by this particular variable. Belt and Parrott further state that the decision to stay in the service is generally made during the last year of their enlistment by both officers and enlisted men.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

It was hypothesized that there were significant differences between the officers and enlisted men with respect to their needs if they were to remain in the military for a career. This study proves this to be true, and the most significant of all differing attitudes was concerned with the inequities seen in the pay scales of officers and enlisted men.

This situation must be altered if the services want to retain the best enlisted personnel. Since the officers of this study seemed to be satisfied with their pay, the Air Force must realize that the real need for pay increases lies in the lower enlisted ranks. Although a first step has been taken in this direction because of studies made by the Gates Commission, further raises are needed in the lower enlisted ranks. The pay raises needed not be astronomical but at least substantial enough so that these lower ranking men do feel that their salary is commensurate with their job and responsibilities.

A second area that must be changed is in the present method of performance appraisal being utilized in the Air Force. The idea that the present system of Officer Effectiveness Reports and Airmen Performance Reports truly reflects an individual's performance in relationship to his peers was met with near unanimous disagreement by the subjects of this study. Although the Air Force is presently testing a new instrument for use in performance appraisal, this

new method is merely an expansion of the old system. The new instrument merely enlarges the "word picture" of the individual being rated but still leaves blocks that range from poor to outstanding which are to be marked with an "X" in the appropriate block by the rater. All this will do is make the problem more sophisticated, not solved.

This author proposes that the services should adopt a system of rating that had but three choices: promote; do not promote; or promote well ahead of his contemporaries. The former would be indicated if an individual was performing his job in a competent manner and it could be reasonably assumed that he would perform effectively in the next high rank. This is the area where the vast majority of individuals would fall. The latter two choices would have to be justified with documented evidence as to why the individual was recommended for either no promotion or a very quick one. This would eliminate the glossy verbiage presently entered on most performance reports and replace it with hard facts about an individual's accomplishments and potential.

Also in regard to performance appraisal, this author feels that an individual should have the opportunity to have one rater's report thrown out of his records prior to meeting a promotion board. The present system can cause a man with an outstanding record to be passed over for promotion because of bad reports from one rating official. This type system leads to a military of "yes" men and apple polishers because they realize that one bad report can ruin their careers. A personality conflict with one superior during a twenty or thirty-year career can halt a man's career progression under the present system. It is indeed a system where job security is based not on effective work and honest criticism, but rather on adhering to the policy of "don't make waves."

Another area where changes must be made is in the career irritants indicated by the subjects of this study. These include the strict personal appearance rules, the general way of life in the barracks, and the frequency of inspections which serve no useful purpose. It was hypothesized that these career irritants were more of a cause for people leaving the service, especially enlisted men, than was dissatisfaction with one's particular job. The author believes that this hypothesis was proven true in that there was an even split of responses when the subjects were asked if they liked their military job, yet they were nearly unanimous in their disdain for haircut rules, barracks life, and the excessive number of inspections.

This author likes to think of the needs of today's first term members in a manner consistent with Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory. Maslow believed that humans experience needs on five levels: survival needs; safety needs, belonging needs; self-esteem needs; and finally self-actualization. If a person were sufficiently deprived of one of the lower needs, i.e. food, water, etc., he would direct his fullest concentration on that need and almost completely disregard needs that were higher up the ladder such as belonging or self-esteem needs. The elimination of various irritants to military life can be considered synonymous with the more basic needs expressed in Maslow's theory. The three major irritants cited earlier indicate a desire by the men to satisfy their needs for safety, i.e. a private room in barracks, and belonging, i.e. wearing hair like their civilian counterparts. The desire to find a rewarding and challenging job in the Air Force, since it does fall into the self esteem and self-actualization areas, is not as urgent a need as eliminating the career irritants. At the present time many individuals who like their jobs still leave the service because of the irritants. This author contends that the first area to be attacked with

respect to the retention problem is the irritants, then a job enlargement or job enrichment program may be undertaken if it is found that it is necessary.

A final area which requires attention by the military is in the improvement of its image in the eyes of civilians. Since all military members were at one time civilians, it is most important that the military present itself as an attractive and rewarding place in which to pursue a career. Now, more than ever, the military must lift its shroud of secrecy and become more a part of the civilian community. With the draft no longer a threat to America's young, the military must present itself in an image that can compete with civilian industry. The best way to do this is to keep abreast of the times and realize the needs and wants of today's youth. Whenever they are not prejudicial to good order or the effective accomplishment of the mission, then the military should induce a little more flexibility in their policies to adjust for these various wants and needs.

In conclusion, it must be said that the military does indeed have a problem of monumental proportions confronting it. Without the draft, the military must, in and of itself, provide an environment which will be looked upon favorably by the bright young men and women of America. The military does not have the luxury of time in dealing with this problem. If significant changes aren't made immediately, the military may find itself full of individuals of marginal abilities who feel that their only chances for success lies in what outstanding individuals will view as the lowest rung on the occupational ladder. This will indeed be a catastrophic situation, not only for the military, but for the entire country as well.

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Appendix A

Behavioral Science Research Questionnaire

	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Unde-</u> <u>cided</u>	<u>Dis-</u> <u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Disagree</u>
1. The Air Force offers as many challenging and rewarding jobs as civilian industry does.	A	B	C	D	E
2. A career in the Air Force would be generally more secure than a career in civilian life.	A	B	C	D	E
3. The fringe benefits offered by the Air Force are greater than those offered by civilian industry.	A	B	C	D	E
4. You, personally, would be more successful in a civilian career than a military career.	A	B	C	D	E
5. Pay is a very important factor in my career decision.	A	B	C	D	E
6. My salary is commensurate with my job and my responsibilities.	A	B	C	D	E
7. Most career airmen treat first-termers with respect and understanding.	A	B	C	D	E
8. The workload in most Air Force units is distributed in an equitable manner.	A	B	C	D	E
9. Most of my superiors are highly competent and effective leaders.	A	B	C	D	E
10. Inspections are a waste of time.	A	B	C	D	E

	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Unde- cided</u>	<u>Dis- Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
11. You get more free time in the Air Force than in most civilian careers.	A	B	C	D	E
12. The Air Force should discontinue the use of barracks.	A	B	C	D	E
13. Medical benefits provided by the Air Force exceed those provided by civilian industry.	A	B	C	D	E
14. The medical treatment given by Air Force personnel is equal to that given by civilian doctors.	A	B	C	D	E
15. The Air Force should allow longer hair as long as it is kept neat and groomed.	A	B	C	D	E
16. Your friends have a great influence on your career decision.	A	B	C	D	E
17. Fear is the major motivational technique used in the Air Force.	A	B	C	D	E
18. Too much emphasis is placed on "image" rather than doing a good job in the Air Force.	A	B	C	D	E
19. Most jobs in the Air Force provide a fairly stable work schedule.	A	B	C	D	E
20. The Air Force provides sufficient recreational facilities.	A	B	C	D	E
21. There are too many inspections in the Air Force.	A	B	C	D	E
22. The Air Force makes an effort to reassign personnel with respect to their personal preferences.	A	B	C	D	E
23. Civilians have a great deal of respect for military personnel.	A	B	C	D	E
24. OER/APR's truly measure your performance relative to your co-workers.	A	B	C	D	E

	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Unde-</u> <u>cided</u>	<u>Dis-</u> <u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Disagree</u>
25. Fraternization between officers and enlisted men is detrimental to military discipline.	A	B	C	D	E
26. I like my military service job.	A	B	C	D	E
27. The service makes men out of boys.	A	B	C	D	E
28. Military discipline has a good effect on a person's self respect.	A	B	C	D	E
29. Success in the military service does not require little intelligence.	A	B	C	D	E
30. NCO's are usually very good supervisors.	A	B	C	D	E
31. There is a good reason for most military rules and regulations.	A	B	C	D	E
32. Military service experience usually changes a man for the better.	A	B	C	D	E
33. The military service tries its best to look out for the welfare of its people.	A	B	C	D	E
34. There is too much discipline in the military service.	A	B	C	D	E
35. The work I do is seldom appreciated.	A	B	C	D	E
36. I don't like to wait for things I want.	A	B	C	D	E
37. If there had been no draft and you had not had any military obligations, do you think you would have entered the service?					

1. Definitely Yes
2. Probably Yes
3. Not sure
4. Probably Not
5. Definitely Not

38. How would you rate the military's efforts to provide an attractive and rewarding career?

1. Outstanding
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
5. Very Poor

39. How many hours do you normally work per week on your regular job?

1. Less than 40
2. 40-49 hrs.
3. 50-59 hrs.
4. 60-69 hrs.
5. 70 or more hrs.

40. Do you ever resent people in authority over you?

1. Always
2. Frequently
3. Sometimes
4. Very seldom
5. Never

41. After you go back to civilian life, what do you think your attitude will be toward the service?

1. Very Favorable
2. Fairly Favorable
3. I'm not sure
4. Fairly unfavorable
5. Very unfavorable

42. What was your family's yearly income just before you entered the service?

1. Less than \$5000
2. \$5000 - \$7000
3. \$7000 - \$10,000
4. \$10,000 - \$15,000
5. Over \$15,000

43. Would you stay in the service if you were making as much money as your civilian counterpart?

1. Yes, I definitely would
2. Yes, I probably would
3. I don't know
4. No, I probably would not
5. No, I definitely would not.

44. What are your plans when your present tour of duty is completed?

1. Definitely will remain in the service
2. Probably will remain in the service
3. Undecided
4. Probably will not remain in the service
5. Definitely will not remain in the service.

45. What kind of place did you live in prior to entering the military?

1. Farm or ranch
2. In the country, but not on a ranch
3. Town or small city (less than 25,000)
4. City (25,000 - 100,000)
5. Large city (100,000 or more)

46. Compared with your social standing as a civilian, how do you rate your social standing as a military member?

1. Much better in the military service
2. A little better in the military service
3. About the same
4. A little worse in the military service
5. Much worse in the military service.

47. What would be your parent's attitude if you decided to make the Air Force a career?

1. Not applicable
2. Extremely pleased
3. Somewhat pleased
4. Somewhat displeased
5. Extremely displeased.

48. Have the working conditions in the Air Force been as acceptable as those you would have anticipated in civilian employment?

1. Definitely yes
2. Probably yes
3. Uncertain
4. Probably no
5. Definitely no.