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THE NATURE OF MILITARY ADVICE AND ITS ROLE IN FORMULATION OF NA--ETC(U)
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# THE NATURE OF MILITARY ADVICE AND ITS ROLE IN FORMULATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, 1945-1973

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Individual Research Paper
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Naval War College
1972-1973

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

Coming on the heels of what history may judge as the most unpopular war the United States has ever fought, an analysis of military advice and professionalism within the overall context of civil-military relations is likely to be met with a wide range of reactions from various segments of the American body politic. Certainly at this writing, there exists a great instability of opinion concerning the appropriate role of the military in today's society.

> For some Americans, the military is not only unmentionable, it is unthinkable . . . . For them it is an automatic given that the very existence of the military is at best a necessary evil in a disordered world and at worst an expensive and competing impediment to social progress in a disordered land.[1]

The disaffected youth, particularly those who were opposed to the draft, may consider the subject of this analysis irrelevant since the war (and draft) has been terminated, while others may view it as a pedantic exercise given their belief that the entire military establishment is irrelevant to the most basic needs of today's world. The segment of society that remains particularly concerned with the relationships among major groups in our society may exhibit an academic interest in analyzing military advice and professionalism in hopes of determining to what degree the military was responsible for the policies which caused and perpetuated the United States

embroglio in Vietnam. The followers of anti-war (and perhaps anti-military) liberals such as Galbraith, McGovern, and Fulbright may reject such an analysis since many seemingly sound solutions to what they consider the "problem of the military" have already been laid out in general outline by their leaders (e.g., Congress must reassert its constitutional duty to control military adventurism; the prominence of the military element must be greatly curtailed, if not eliminated, both at home and abroad because its excess has been the major cause of domestic instability and world insecurity; and the humanitarian needs of the American society ought to have a much greater priority on United States resources than do the alarmist assertions and demands of militarists who have endorsed the United States role of "world policeman". But for many Americans, the need of a viable military establishment is well-known and accepted as a necessary part of our society given the world in which we live. The reaction of the military establishment and their sympathizers to this analysis may easily be one concern born of frustration - since so much has been written and advocated on the subject but so little has been clarified and accomplished to define specifically the legitimate uses of United States military power.

The main cause of these discordant opinions within America may appear to have been the United States involvement in Vietnam. It was during this involvement that the clash of opinions, expressed through militant action, threatened to polarize the major dissenting groups in America permanently. However, the longer range cause,

which conditioned, and perhaps generated, these divergent views seems to have been the constantly changing and ill-defined relationship between military advisers and the civilian decision-makers since 1945. While the termination of the Vietnam war has lowered the voices in dissention, it is doubtful that the root causes of anti-military sentiment has disappeared with the shooting war. My thesis is that there is no rockbed of consensus in the American society as to what role the military profession should play in the major decisions of that society. This is not meant to suggest that if a consensus were found to define that role, it become immutable. The degree of participation by the military will be conditioned by both international and domestic events. But the issue here is one of attaining a consensus and without some minimum of consensus, by both the principal actors and the observing public, there can hardly be an accommodation between the dissenting groups, nor can there be logical base upon which to formulate a rational policy for national security.

Under the rather imprecise heading of "civil-military relations," historians, social scientists and journalists have produced literally hundreds of books and articles in response to the spectacular expansion of the United States national security policy process since World War II. The novel, complex, multi-dimensional and global nature of post-war United States security interests has stimulated a large portion of the numerous discussions on the subject by the scholarly community. Vast changes were made, in a relatively short period of time, in the manner of formulating national security policy. Within

a few years after the end of the war, diplomacy and military potential no longer sufficed as the prime instruments through which national security was ensured. New elements of national security included military and economic assistance to other nations, international competition in technological advancement, internal economic policy, peacetime military and political alliances, disposition of existing military forces, planned distribution of national resources, and development of a credible military strategy. Thus, many scholars devoted their energies to defining and analyzing these new elements and to describing the inter-relationships involved.

Despite the voluminous discussions and studies regarding civil-military relations, few scholars have attempted to define precisely what the relationship between the military professional and the civilian decision-maker should be. A great deal of literature exists which examines civil-military relations from the standpoint of "Prussianism," the "garrison state," the "military mind," the "closed military caste system," "excessive military influence," and the "military industrial complex." Each of these phrases betrays a bias of fear - fear that the military will, if given too much freedom, impose an alien and authoritarian value system on the American society. It is certainly true that after World War II the military profession achieved a greater voice in the highest councils of government, and it may also be true that many observers were persuaded that the military profession itself was the cause of its greater, and perhaps excessive, influence. The heavy demand which the military placed on national

resources and the tax dollar, the creation of a large peacetime military establishment, the growing number of peacetime military alliances, the almost daily reference to the internal and external dangers that Communism presented to the United States society, and the awesome contemplation of a nuclear exchange with the U.S.S.R., all contributed to the fear of placing too much power in the authoritarian hands of the military. But a cursory review of the post World War II historical events show that both domestically and internationally, there was perhaps a certain inevitability and a legitimate need to include the military more comprehensively in the decision-making process. Internationally, the United States (as the most powerful democracy emerging from World War II) elected not to return to the isolationist tendencies of the 1930's but to use its power to defend societies not under communist influence and hopefully to prevent another world conflagration. As the champion of non-communist societies, the United States decided to defend the war-torn but democratically oriented nations against encroachments upon their free societies. The decisions made to use our diplomatic prestige, economic action and our military power as an influential force in world affairs were not military decisions but obviously the decisions of a successive line of postwar Presidents.

It was the general belief of political leaders that the security of the United States was deeply involved with the security of other societies, particularly those which were democratically oriented. Therefore, United States assistance to preserve these societies was

a conscious decision, based upon the concept of power politics, to enhance our security. While preservation of freedom was the keynote of our policy, the threat was thought to be grave enough to justify United States alliances with non-democratic (but also non-aggressive) governments. Even though the rationale for our policy may have been cloaked in moralistic tones and in the rhetoric of idealism - - - the perception on the part of United States civilian leaders of the security threat to all societies by communism was the major impetus underlying United States actions in the international arena. The United States has reacted vigorously to all expansionist movements by communist nations by employing both military and non-military means in a succession of incidents. In many instances these incidents were viewed as "crises" and it has been charged that the United States has turned "emergency into obsession" and became the policeman of the world against what it perceived to be the global evils of communism. And not without some justification.

When this policy of 'protectionism' of friendly nations and containment of communism was brought to full fruition, the United States military establishment was larger than ever before in peacetime and was consuming an unprecedented peacetime share of the budget and resources than ever before. By virtue of its size and power, the military assumed the proportions of a major group in the national policy-making councils during peacetime. It became obvious that some institutional procedure had to be created to account formally for the views of the military professional in policy formulation. The National

Security Act of 1947, its Amendment in 1949, and the reorganizations of the Defense Department in 1953 and 1958 routinized the inclusion of military advice on major issues of national security at the highest level of government. Thus, the entry of the military into a more prominent position in the national security policy-making club was a natural and logical consequence of the international environment (as viewed by the highest civilian authorities) and of the pervasive impact of a large peacetime military establishment on the American society. Now, after twenty-five years of examination and soul searching regarding the potential excesses which the military could have thrust on the American society, the fear of a militarily-dominated society in American can be put to rest. The frequently dragged out specter of a dominating military establishment in the United States has not become a reality since 1945. It should be noted that there are some groups who have claimed that military considerations have dominated United States responses to international events. To the extent that this is true, it still remains clear that the United States continues to be governed by civilian leaders and has not lost its freedom of choice as to how to respond to challenges to national security. It should also be noted that in virtually all instances where military action was selected as the proper response, the United States was reacting defensively to the military initiative of another nation. The military establishment itself (defined as the Department of Defense, its assets, personnel and institutions) has not produced a militaristic society - - that is, one which is largely authoritarian, subordinates

all national priorities to military considerations, aggressively employs military solutions to most international problems (despite Korea and Vietnam), and readily accepts limitations on its civil liberties and political choices in the name of military security.

The evidence on this point is rather weighty. The United States has, in fact, maintained and even strengthened its coveted principle of civilian (political) control of its military establishment. It has become apparent that the military profession has not been an unbridled monster but a responsible group deeply committed to the theory and practice of civilian control. The virtual disappearance of the earlier (and very vocal) fear of militarism may be attributed to a number of historical events which have reassured the American public that the military was responsive to the constitutional principle of civilian control: the immediate dismissal of General MacArthur by the President in 1951 (supported fully by the JCS), the widely praised performance of General Marshall in discharging his duties as Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, the election and reelection of General Eisenhower to the presidency (his tenure witnessed our extrication from Korea and carefully limited United States involvement in other major military ventures), the centralization of control over the JCS and over the entire military establishment by Secretary of Defense McNamara (with surprisingly little opposition from the military), and the obvious political control of military operations in the Vietnam war by President Johnson. It is also significant to note that during the high points of communist intrasigence in the

1950's (when alarmism was at its zenith), President Eisenhower thoughtfully withheld United States military support from three hot spots in the Cold War (Dien Bien Phu, the Suez crisis and the Hungarian Revolt), decreased the size of the Army and Navy, and found himself under attack by John F. Kennedy in the 1960 presidential campaign for neglecting defense strategy and national security.

Aside from these historical events, there have been other equally important political and strategic changes to reinforce the subordinated position of the military in our society. Civilian intellectuals have stepped into (or have been invited to participate in) the evaluation of the military threat and the formulation of military strategy and defense policy - - areas traditionally reserved for military professionals; there has been a noticeable decline in the prestige in all levels of the military profession; and, perhaps most significantly, we now seemed to have arrived at a point where defense experts and analysts are most concerned that too frequently political leaders may be tempted to employ a military solution to international problems and that they may expect far too much from the application of military means. Thus, the alarmist trend in evidence, particularly from 1945 to 1960, seems to have subsided - - at least insofar as the military establishment was feared to threaten the freedom and political style of the American society (i.e., militarism in the Vagts' sense).

While we are less concerned today with the threat of a garrison state, the security of the United States is still not assured in the present technologically changing and politically realigning world.

The military establishment continues to compete vigorously with other national priorities for the tax dollar, industrial and technological capabilities and other national resources. For these reasons, the subject of "civil-military" relations will, and perhaps should, remain very much alive in our open society. We can expect continued scholarly interest and discussions on the subjects of arms and men, war and peace, defense and diplomacy, and strategy and policy. However, the central issue now is the adequacy (or the superfluity to some) of our national security policy and the rationality of the process used in its formulation. Furthermore, owing to the crucial role that the military establishment plays in national security, we can expect the major focus of this interest to be on the "appropriate" role for the military in the formulation of national security policy.

One might have assumed that by 1970 the precise role of military advice in policy-making would have been well defined and understood by the principal actors and the public. This had not occurred. The nature and role of military advice has taken many forms and shapes since 1945. In several dimensions, there have been radical departures from pre-World War II concepts of military advice. And there is some evidence to support the contention that the military profession itself has been transformed radically since the inter-war years. Perhaps the causes of these radical departures in the substance and content of military advice and the transformation of the image of the military professional is partly attributable to the assertion (postulated by Bletz) that the United States has never understood the role of the

military in its society except in time of war.[2] There is a certain familiarity in that assertion which almost intuitively many people would agree with. Despite the apparent appeal of this notion, it could be argued further that the United States today is uncertain about the role of its military even in the time of war (e.g., Vietnam).

History gives testimony to the American public's favorable reaction to the military in times of clearly recognized danger such as 1917-18 and 1941-45. Perhaps even the height of the cold war in the 1950's, there was generally a positive public attitude towards the professional military. These are the obvious "peaks" of military popularity: But equally obvious is the rejection of the military immediately after the passage of that danger. The public disregard of the military in the interwar years and immediately after World War II represents the "valleys" of public support for the military. So far, Bletz's assertion appears justified. And the cause of these peaks and valleys of support seem to be proportional not only to the public's awareness of the danger, but also the degree of participation by the public in military organizations. Applying elementary psychology to these situations there is a kind of inevitability to the sequence of reactions. To wit: the United States citizen perceives danger, participates (if not happily at least willingly) in the organization designed to eliminate the danger, and naturally supports the organization of which he is a part. Having eliminated the danger and terminated his participation, the citizen withdraws his support of the organization. The military professional who stays in the service and endures these peaks

and valleys is left with understandable confusion, but he nonetheless accepts the fickleness of the public as one manifestation of a free society.

> Just as Americans have been uneasy about the role of an espionage agency in a democracy, they have always been confused, contradictory, and controversial about their professional officer corps. And their officers know it . . . . (If America's professional soldiers are sometimes embittered by the treatment they receive from their civilian brethren, they are apparently never lastingly so).[3]

In the passage of almost 30 years since World War II, we have seen that military advisers have played various roles in the policy-making function. They have been feared and repressed; they have been praised and given greater voice; they have been used politically in support of the Administration; they have publicly criticized Administration policy; and at times they have been all but replaced by non-professionals. In many cases, their role has been greatly conditioned by the stability and instability of the international scene which is, of course, somewhat inevitable. In other situations, their role has been shaped by the widely different expectations that successive civilian national authorities had of them. And within the military profession itself, there has emerged no consistent view of what professional military advice should consist of and how it should be formulated. Given these many variables and inconsistencies, it is naturally difficult to form a consensus regarding the proper role of the military in the policy making councils of government. It is Huntington's view that, "The exact character of the relationship which

should exist between statesman and the military officer cannot be defined precisely."[4] However, I suggest a study of military professionalism and advice in these past 28 years can shed some understanding of what is expected of military advisers and how they may best prepare themselves to render more appropriate military advice to those ultimately responsible for national security.

To this end, this research effort proposes to review the past associations between top military leaders and a succession of United States Presidents. Perhaps the central question may be succinctly stated as follows: Has the military advice given the President met with his needs and expectations? If it has not met both, perhaps some suggestions can be made to establish a better alignment between military advice and the consumer. It is most probable that this research effort will produce an incomplete answer to this question in terms of comprehensively identifying the causes and reasons for the evaluated performance of post-war military advisers. Nonetheless, the data, events and theories to be examined will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of the role for the military adviser, or hopefully at least will provoke further consideration of the subject. The subjects to be specifically explored include the military as a profession and the responsibilities of that profession; the perceptions of top military advisers regarding what their profession demands of them; the expectations and requirements for military advice by those public officials who have been responsible for national security - - principally the President and the Secretary of Defense; and the actual performanc of top military advisers in

fulfilling these expectations and requirements.

In a study of this scope, the dangers are that it can be made so broad as to be lost in abstractions or that it can be made too narrow so as to approach insignificance. The attempt is made here to fall upon a middle ground between detailed descriptions and soaring theory. The central point in all descriptions, examples and case studies is that of the performance of military advisers versus the expectations of top national authorities. Several methods and techniques of research have been combined to highlight the pertinent facts and opinions on this subject. First, extensive use has been made of biographical data on principal actors; second, historical facts have been analyzed and reported where relevant; next, interviews with people who have been operatives in the advisory function have been conducted for purposes of gaining perspective in the policy making process; finally, the theories of leading researchers and scholars have been examined and compared with the existing data and facts for support or non-support.

The study is concentrated primarily on the 1945-1972 period but, for the purpose of gaining a historical framework on the role of the military profession and military advice, it also extends liberally to previous years, particularly the inter-war period of 1919-1939.

One remaining task is the problem of definitions. If one examines the literature it becomes obvious that even the rather straightforward term "military" means various things to various people. Confusion reigns when some writers speak of military men as "civilianized" and

civilians as "militarized," some differentiate between professional and non-professional military men, and others refer to "political" generals and "uniformed" civilians. The problem of ambiguity also extends to other crucial terms in this analysis such as "national security" and "military advice."

For my purposes, I would like to borrow Lewis Edinger's excellent description of the word "military":

> . . . that group in the state which has legitimate, primary and specific responsibility for the organized and planned employment of the state's physical force against other states. A military man, accordingly, is any legitimate member of this group . . .[5]

To this I would add that my use of the word "military" applies to uniformed members of the military profession while the "military establishment" includes much more in that it comprises the total sum of military assets, institutions and personnel (civilian or uniformed) employed by those institutions.

"National security," as defined by Clarke and Legere, "is a condition which assures the protection of a nation, its institutions and the sources of its power from domestic and foreign enemies."[6] While recognizing that today's increasingly complex and interdependent world frequently blurs any tidy distinctions between the roles of politics, diplomacy, economics, technology and military affairs in national policies, it would appear that this concept of national security places emphasis on the "protection" and "power" functions within a state. Thus, the most significant aspects of national security are considered to be a nation's military and economic resources

and the strategy through which these resources are brought to bear on the international scene. This in no way degrades the many other aspects or ingredients which contributed to the whole of national security. Diplomatic overtures, political action, economic measures, and cultural and social programs are all important and should be applied in some coordinated fashion to gain the maximum effect in enhancing a nation's security. In most situations, military power and strategy are not the day-to-day vehicles through which national security policy is implemented. Nonetheless, it is widely believed that the effectiveness of these other ingredients rest largely on the military and economic "clout" which the nation possesses and on the outside world's perception of how these two elements will be used (a credible national strategy). Stating this conversely, a nation's diplomatic, political, cultural and social actions may be admired and respected; however, other nations can ignore such actions, and indeed do violence to them, without fear of harm to themselves if it were not for a perceived threat of reprisal in some stronger form.

Most crucial to this examination is the definition of military advice which bears heavily on the formulation of strategy mentioned above and on the military force structure of the nation. Since military advice is the central issue in this inquiry, it would be presumptive at this point to attempt a complete definition of the term. Accordingly, only general parameters of military advice can now be enumerated. For purposes of this study, military advice encompasses the series of recommendations presented by the professional

military leaders of the nation to the Secretary of Defense and ultimately used by the President in making decisions regarding the content of military strategy and the constitution of the nation's armed forces. Admittedly this is a narrow view of military advice - - both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, we are concerned only with the advice given by the Chiefs of the branches of service, both individually and collectively as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), by the Chairman of the JCS, by the Commanders of unified forces in the field, and any other military professionals who have had a special relationship to the President. Substantively, the decisions made regarding threat assessment, strategy and force structure constitute a very small portion of the total number of decisions on defense matters; however, all decisions on national defense (weapons systems, research and development, manpower levels, location and deployment of forces, ad infinitum) rest firmly on the three pillars of threat assessment, strategy and force structure. Therefore, this inquiry is limited to advice given only on these subjects. While the professional military also has a commitment to give advice to the Congress and the public, this will be touched on only tangentially since the current locus of power on national defense decisions does not stray too far from the White House. Special mention should be made concerning non-military groups who advise the President on defense matters - - namely, the group collectively known as "defense intellectuals" and "scholar-strategists." The impact of this group has been a large one at the highest governmental level and no study on military advice would be considered complete without an examination

of the inter-relationship between them and the professional military. So, in this dimension, the rigid parameters placed around military advice must be relaxed to accommodate the effect of this recent phenomena.

## CHAPTER II

## A CONCEPT OF THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL

Among the many anti-military groups in today's society, there is an underlying theme which seems to challenge the qualifications of the military as a legitimate professional group operating as a part of, and for the benefit of, that society. This basic theme has deep roots in our democratic heritage and can be attributed to a number of causes. First, and perhaps the foremost, is the ideological legacy dating from colonial days based on the belief that a professional army was primarily a tool of a tyrants, despots and the other power-seeking rulers used to perpetuate their regimes. Indeed, history gives testimony to this in that armed forces have been continually used to supress the common man in his centuries-old quest for greater political freedom. The American experience in founding the Republic was one which firmly reinforced this concept to the degree that it caused the newly independent colonies to devise measures to prevent against the excesses of a highly organized military force. The constitutional prohibition against the quartering of troops in citizen's homes, the right of the citizen to bear arms, the stringent controls placed on financing a standing army and navy, and the decentralization of the armed forces by creating state militias are all historical examples of the negative reaction to "professional" armed forces in America.

Second, and equally significant, is the American experience in the Revolutionary War which seemed to prove that citizens, filled with

a fervent spirit to defend their life-style and their homes, were capable of defeating professional armies. Upon closer examination of military history, this notion may appear to be somewhat extravagant since the "embattled farmers" and the citizen in the ranks of the Continental Army participated in few battles which resulted in clear cut military victories for them in the traditional sense. However, the eventual routing of the British Army from the colonies emerged as the central fact supporting this notion. The naval history of the Revolutionary War lends further support to this macrocomic evaluation of the citizen versus the professional combatant. The hastily formed Continental Navy and the privateers were quite successful in disrupting British shipping destined for colonial shores. Noteworthy is the fact that the privateers (comprised of and led by non-professional combatants) were more successful than the professional Continental Navy. The privateers took some 600 prizes compared to less than 200 accredited to the Navy.[1]

Following the war, the fledgling republic dismantled its Navy and, in the face of a possible attack by France in 1793, Albert Gallatin expressed the belief that the "bravery of the mass of the people," even without a navy, would be sufficient to defeat the French invaders.[2] This is the genesis of the great faith Americans have traditionally placed in the use of citizen-soldiers. This faith could be said to have been reinforced by observing the Napoleonic wars which followed shortly after the American Revolution. Napoleon, with certain variations, capitalized on mass citizen armies whose basic strength was a tenaciousness

founded upon the belief that the citizen-soldier was fighting to preserve the personal freedoms he gained in the French Revolution. And, similar to Gallatin, Napoleon tended to neglect the importance of naval forces. Nonetheless, adding to the American Revolutionary War experiences, the outstanding military successes of Napoleon's citizen armies and his military dominance of continental Europe for almost 20 years could only serve to strengthen the notion of the inherent superiority of the citizen versus the professional in the armed forces.[3] To the extent that it did, military professionalism was downgraded and its legitimacy as a profession was under suspicion.

Apparently, there was thought to be an alternative to the maintenance of large standing armed forces without significantly degrading national security. This alternative prevailed in the United States throughout the 1800's. The United States, in conformity with its anti-professional military ideology, adhered to the concept of a small standing army and generally neglected the development of a navy which could clearly protect the nation. Ideology was not, of course, solely responsible for these events. Certainly they were in part attributable to the geographical position of the nation and the relative security it afforded United States territory from foreign encroachments. In today's world, this geographical security is all but disappeared but the ideological factors seem to have a permanence that few others possess. The anti-professional military bias shows up in all major wars in that volunteers and conscripts formed the bulk of United States military forces. Similarly, the rec uitment of officers (particularly

those of high rank) from civilian life was deemed appropriate to the ideological sympathies of the nation. This trend was perpetuated from the Civil War through the Spanish-American War and into both World Wars by the political appointment of many officers from the civilian professions. Morris Janowitz also acknowledges this traditional American pattern by what he terms the "civilianization" of the armed forces. He refers to this civilianization as the dominant trend in United States civil-military relations since the Root reforms and the mobilization for World War I.[4]

These historical trends validate the ideological legacy which is manifested today in the public uncertainty as to the need of a professional military and indeed in the public confusion regarding the professional existence of the military. If citizens constitute the bulk of modern armies and if the soldiers are frequently led into combat by civilians-turned-officer, why was it necessary to maintain a peacetime professional army and navy? The expansion of industrial production for military supplies and naval stores during World War I and World War II seemed to only reinforce the notion that wars could be handled on a case-by-case basis. Until the post World War II era, little advance war planning was accomplished mainly due to the following rationale: Since the United States was not vulnerable to a sudden and undetected invasion, if an attack were to come, there would be enough warning time to mobilize, train and equip the forces required to preserve the nation. Naturally, this concept was changed radically with the advent of the age of jet aircraft, inter-continental missiles,

rapid communications and weapons of mass destruction. In the span of two decades, the geographical factors which contributed to the "Fortress America" idea, once so fundamental to United States military policy, became obsolete. The enormous effect of these changes on the military profession will be taken into account in subsequent chapters. However, much of the public attitude concerning military professionalism is rooted in the generally accepted ideology of relying on non-professional armed forces.

This ideology did not go completely unchallenged, however, and a peculiar type of dualism seems to have emerged which has shaped the composition of the American military and has contributed to the confusion in public attitudes. The dualism involves the Washington-Hamilton concept of the military versus the Jefferson-Jackson concept. While the concept of Jefferson and Jackson, calling for citizen armies raised in mass only in times of emergency, has held a large public following, the competing Washington-Hamilton concept calling for a small professional army with an extremely professional officer corps has also been attractive to the American public. It is on the basis of the latter conception that military service academies were created. This dualism is expressed by the public's tacit acceptance of some degree of professionalization in the officer corps but its concurrent rejection of professional armed forces. The cadre of professional officers were distinct from the rest of society but "the military was based on an ethos of citizen participation."[5]

But the Civil War brought this dualism into headlong conflict.

> West Point-trained officers, fighting on both sides, were used to leading only regulars, and had problems adjusting their tactics to unskilled volunteers. They tried complicated tactics that their inexperienced troops couldn't follow. Both sides made many blunders this way.[6]

The result was an attempt to reinforce the Jefferson-Jackson tradition by creating a program to train "citizen" officers (or reserve officers) who could bridge the gap between the regular military organization and the volunteers and drafted enlisted men. The origin of this program is found in a stipulation of the Morrill Act of 1862 which provided for "something of a military education" at Land Grant colleges.[7] The Reserve Officers Training Program (ROTC) can be considered the fruition of this reinforcement of the Jefferson-Jackson tradition. Since 1916, when the ROTC came into existence in roughly its present form, it has provided an accommodation between the two competing military concepts. On the one hand service academies were established and supported (and sometimes revered) whose sole purpose was to educate and train a small professional group of military officers. On the other hand, the ROTC program was created to train a large group of volunteer reserve officers, most of whom entered active military service. This dualism reflects the American contradictory attitude not only towards the entire military but also towards its officer corps and has created the basic division sometimes described as the "professional" and "non-professional" officer corps. Thus, the American public has supported each of these opposing concepts simultaneously, although to varying degrees and on different levels, through most of its history.

In further testimony to the dubious historical qualifications of the United States military as a profession, Zachary Taylor wrote,

> The axe, pick, saw and trowel has become more the implement of the American soldier than the cannon, musket or sword.[8]

It cannot be denied that the United States military expended its expertise in many areas which were far removed from war, violence and combat during the 1800's. The expeditions of Lewis and Clark, Lieutenant Zebulon Pike, Captain Benjamin de Bonneville and Admiral Richard Byrd; the medical research of army doctors - the most famous of which was Walter Reed; the use of the army in early railroad engineering and construction; the Corps of Engineers responsibility for internal navigation and flood control; Commodore Perry's negotiation of a treaty with Japan ending the Tokugawa insularity; the army's management of the Civilian Conservation Corps in the 1930's; the pioneering aviation work by the army; and the navy's development of shipbuilding yards all contributed to a non-professional aura of military service.

Against such a background, it is most difficult to determine when, if ever, the United States military became professionalized. The concept of professionalism was not fully developed even in the eyes of the military prior to 1900. Captain Denis Mahan stated,

> The trouble with the United States as a country was that we are perhaps the least military, but not behind the foremost as the most warlike.[9]

It has been suggested that the development of a military profession in the United States is closely related to the growing appreciation

of the relationship between the military and foreign policies of the nation.[10] Before the American expansion in the Atlantic and Pacific around the turn of the century, there was little need to ensure coordination of military and foreign policies. Prior to that time, foreign policy was conservative and isolationist, there were practically no external threats to national security, and the size of military forces and the thrust of United States military policy had little bearing on other national matters. With the possible exception of the naval mission to protect seaborne commerce, the United States military was not a group of major importance to the society. However, following the expansion of American interests beyond the shores of the continental United States, concepts of foreign and military policies were expanded and enlarged. It is generally conceded that at this point in time, when foreign and military policies became somewhat interdependent, that the military gained in significance and military professionalism came into existence.[11]

It would be appropriate, at this time, to inquire into the prerequisites (or criteria) of professionalism and to evaluate the United States military for compliance with those prerequisites. Combining the ideas from several sources, a good deal of agreement can be found that there are three prerequisites any group must possess if it is to be considered a profession: They are (1) its members possess a high degree of specialized, theoretical knowledge; (2) its members perform their tasks in accordance with certain ethical rules; and (3) its members are held together by a high degree of corporateness which

stems from common training and collective attachment to certain doctrines and methods.

There exists a host of military theoreticians, the best known are Bourcet, Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Corbett and Couhet. These men, as have many others, studied the classical battles of the past, innovated to make the lessons of history applicable to contemporary warfare, and established basic concepts for a modern warfighting capability. They were concerned with both theory and practice - - with military strategy, tactics and techniques. Their published works constitute the backbone of "specialized, theoretical knowledge." This body of knowledge is disseminated to aspiring members of the profession through formal instruction in the military academies and in ROTC courses and it is continually refined and updated by the various war colleges. Thus the existence of a body of specialized military knowledge, along with the means to disseminate and refine it, qualifies the United States military to meet the first prerequisite. And it would appear that the establishment of the war colleges, which gave the United States military full participation in developing the specialized knowledge, signals the late 1800's as the time of incubation of the profession.

The second prerequisite pertaining to performing "tasks in accordance with certain ethical rules" is met in several ways. The traditions and customs of the United States military services which regulate the conduct of its members provides a portion of their ethical rules. The provisions of the Geneva Convention codifying the laws and

customs of warfare provides another portion of the ethical rules. For the United States, the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, providing a complete system of standards for behavior and punishment for deviations, and the Code of Conduct, regulating the conduct of prisoners of war, also meet the prerequisite for ethical rules. In addition, the observance of political neutrality in domestic affairs relates to the concept of ethics for the American military.

Lastly, the "corporateness which stems from common training and collective attachment to certain doctrines and methods" is embodied in the similar training programs, the pledge to support the Constitution (representing a doctrine and method of governing the American society), and in the agreement among the services to operate within the corporate JCS system for resolution of service differences and for rendering advice to civilian decision-makers. That the United States military meets this prerequisite can also be shown in a negative sense. There is a widespread and persistent belief that the values instilled by military training and long military service are alien to our democratic society. To the extent that these values set the military apart from society in some kind of special category, it attests to the separateness, the corporateness and the cohesion of the military.

Thus, the military does fully qualify as a legitimate profession despite its critics denials and despite its relatively late development. Nonetheless, there are some aspects which are rather unique to the military profession. A comparison of the profession of arms to those of law or medicine would indicate firstly that there is no individual

or direct client relationship in the military as there are in these other professions. General MacArthur noted this in 1919 when he said,

> In many businesses and professions the welfare of the individual is the chief object, but in the military profession the safety and honor of the state becomes paramount.[12]

There are other professions which, more often than not, have groups as opposed to individuals as clients. Examples of these professions would include the academic and clerical. However, even these professions can and do have provisions for individual consultation in their daily practice, and it is accomplished in a direct, face-to-face manner. In contrast, the military has no such provisions and remains isolated from society in this regard. Even when the top military leaders render military advice to individuals it is only within a closed group (the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, the National Security Council and the President) - all who are superiors in one form or another rather than patients, patrons or plantiffs. If it is true that the state (and its society) is the client of the professional military expert, the client-expert relationship exists only indirectly - that is, through the highest national public servants who are ultimately responsible to the society at large. These public servants are both arbiters of defense policy and brokers for the military in dealings with the public. The significance of this lies in the facts that (1) military professional expertise is not open to public scrutiny on a daily basis, (2) the military professional is isolated from the day-to-day modus operandi of society and (3) the only contacts with

society afforded the military profession is between its top leaders and the highest governmental officials in an environment with extremely sensitive political connotations. This isolation of the professional military expert from normal participation in society and direct accountability to the public causes some rather unique effects and demands on the profession. Without an easy and frequent interface, it causes a general lack of understanding by the public of what military expertise consists of and how military policy and strategy are formulated. This brings some to believe that military recommendations are arrived at through some esoteric means.[13] It causes alarm that the military lies outside the control of society. It demands that the military profession, at the highest level, be amenable to civilian control. And because of its relative professional isolation, it demands that the military maintain a professional integrity which is above reproach and a dedication to the preservation of a democratic society. Janowitz recognizes this professional isolation in a democracy.

> The military are professionals in the employ of the state. They are a small group, and their careers are distinct from the civilian careers. In fact, being a professional soldier is incompatible with any other significant political or social role. The military leaders obey the government not because they believe in the goals of the war, but because it is their duty and their profession to fight. Professional ethics as well as democratic parliamentary institutions guarantee civilian political supremacy. The officer fights because of his career commitment.[14]

A second aspect which distinguishes the military profession from others involves its factionalization. The military is split into many factions and these divisions are both horizontal and vertical.

The vertical divisions involve the sources from which professional officers are drawn. In aggregating the several sources into three major categories, the services derive their officers from the service academies, ROTC and some form of officer candidate school (OCS). The backgrounds of officers produced by each of these sources vary widely in scope: from the highly professional military education of the academies, to the liberal art of highly technical education in the ROTC, to some (or perhaps no) college education from the remaining source (OCS, aviation cadet program, officer training courses, etc.). Given this wide range of background and given the differing levels of commitment to a military career normally represented by these diverse sources - it is difficult to think of the professional officer corps as a homogeneously trained and educated entity in the same way as the medical or legal professions appear to be. Another obvious vertical division involves the service affiliation. Vast differences exist between the technical skills required to run a ship, fly an aircraft and maneuver a battalion.

In the horizontal dimension, there are widely different skills required at different levels in a full military career. As a junior officer, the skills required are primarily those of a technician. As the officer progresses to the intermediate level (field grade rank), his horizons broaden and he becomes less concerned with the technical skills of physically operating a small unit and its equipment and more concerned with techniques of application and employment. Moving up to a third level, he finds himself repeatedly involved in managing assets

and distributing the resources of ever-larger organizations. At the highest level, that of a senior general officer or flag rank, his professional expertise must now encompass almost an entirely new world. In 1919 Admiral Sims gave some indication of the totally different requirements of the professional at the highest level when he cautioned that

> . . . an officer may be highly successful and even brilliant, in all grades up to the responsible positions of high command, and then find his mind almost wholly unprepared to perform its vitally important functions in time of war.[15]

At the highest level, the military professional is now involved in nationally important responsibilities in various high level service, joint and international commands and in other top policy-making roles in the defense establishment. He is expected to have a working understanding of the contemporary international scene, with emphasis on United States objectives and programs, and on politico-military factors. He must have a balanced perspective of the dynamic forces in the contemporary world and of the importance of cooperation among the branches of the armed services and all other agencies and instruments involved in our national security.[16] And, most recently, the military professional must have a working understanding of economic analysis as it relates to the military sphere.

Granted other professions may have similar increases in responsibility as higher levels are reached (viz: intern, surgeon, hospital director, chief of public health service); however, the magnitude of change between levels and the range of expected duties not only appear

to be much larger in the military profession, but in order to pursue a full career, the military professional is expected to progress from one level to the next level. In contrast, the medical or legal professions do not necessarily take movement from level to level as a form of increased professionalism. There is some evidence that greater professionalism in civilian life is achieved through increased specialization rather than the career generalization involved in moving from one level to the next. Another facet of a horizontal division within the military profession is that the primary role of the military changes depending on the state of world affairs. If there is war, directing military operations is paramount. In peace, professional advice to the civilian authorities is primary. The professional officer must be continually prepared to do both.

Finally, another aspect of the horizontal division is stated excellently by Samuel Huntington:

> Not all officers are professional military officers. The professional military officer is distinguished from other officers by his skill and by his commitment. The skill is, in Harold Lasswell's phrase, the management of violence. Or, as a distinguished British officer recently put it: 'The function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force to the resolution of a social problem.' The commitment is to the management of violence as a career. The technological revolution has proliferated the methods of managing violence, but even so only a part of the officer corps consists of professional military officers. Many officers are specialists - albeit relatively primitive ones - in the management of violence, but they have no commitment to officership as a career. Others make a career out of officership but specialize in skills not directly related to the management of violence. Some officers possess neither military skills nor career commitment. Quite obviously all four types of officer are essential to the modern officer corps.[17]

Morris Janowitz adds his recognition of several degrees of professionalism by stating that some officers remain in the military for reasons other than career commitment.

> Their loyalty to the military establishment begins to depend more and more on conditions of employment rather than on the commitment to the organization and its traditions.[18]

This diversity and factionalization in the professional officer corps bears on the concept of the "military mind." This concept frequently implies a certain monolithic quality to all military men. However, the horizontal and vertical divisions, based on great divergencies in background, education, qualifications and commitment, splinter the alleged monolithic profession. Quite obviously, each military man is not made out of the same mold. But the concept has persisted, and it seems to retain a certain implicitness, that military men (perhaps only those who make the commitment to a military career) have similar outlooks, similar objectives and similar approaches to problems by virtue of their common military training and education. Normally, when the phrase "military mind" is used, it is applied in the perjorative sense and denotes a rigidity of thinking and a strong proclivity to use violence or stern measures to solve most problems which arise. Certainly after years of continuous association with things military, a professional will adopt a certain perspective and habit of thinking which will cause him, during the course of his perusal of a problem, to evaluate the implications this problem will have on his profession and to consider the possibility of applying the

expertise of his profession to resolve the problem. Indeed, if he did not do so, he could be accused of being unprofessional. It is precisely his duty to engage in such ruminations and it is certainly the response expected of him. The very fact that his professional expertise is sought at the highest level indicates that military solutions are considered a viable alternative to other non-violent methods available. His recommendation as to how to best resolve the problem may or may not include military action. But not to have voiced his professional opinion on the effects of the application (or non-application) of force would be a dereliction of duty. The military professional has this responsibility. The responsibility of accepting his recommendations lies elsewhere.

Despite the unique or special qualities (mentioned earlier) which contrast the military profession from others there are still some valid parallels that can be drawn by comparing the military and other professional endeavors. Huntington equates the military to other professions:

> The skill of the physician is diagnosis and treatment; his responsibility is the health of his clients. The skill of the officer is the management of violence; his responsibility is the military security of his client, society.[19]

But the idea of equating the military mind to the "legal mind" or the "medical mind" has been rather difficult to accept given the negative, but popular, connotation of the military mind. Edward Glick noted that,

. . . in universities and other centers of intellect a sociologist, social psychologist, or psychiatrist who studies crime is usually called a criminologist; he is never called a criminal. Similarly, a lawyer who choses to practice criminal rather than civil law is called a criminal lawyer and not a criminal. Certainly no one dares to suggest that the longer criminologists study crime or criminal lawyers defend criminals, the greater will be the likelihood that they will absorb the attributes of the people they study or defend. And no one says that they want lots of crime so that they can get more contracts, consultations, and clients.

Yet the same social critic who can remain rather unemotional about criminologists, criminal lawyers, crime, and even criminals, often quickly exhibits great emotional bias against the military practitioner.[20]

There is logic and objectivity in evaluating the military profession in much the same way as we do other professions. And, just as with other professions, it could be stated that the military mind can be a positive factor which enhances military professionalism rather than detracting from it. Bletz makes this point in relating his findings after extensive research which includes surveying some 200 professional military officers in the National War College classes of 1968 and 1970. He suggests that there are most decidedly positive contributions of the military mind. Recognizing that the discussion of the military mind is often a highly emotional one, he makes two basic points: First there is a large difference between the military mind and a militaristic one. To the militaristic mind, he attributes the well-known criticisms of rigidity of thought, rejection of new ideas, reliance on tradition, inaedquate weighting of non-military factors, and an authoritarian approach to most social issues. The military mind, he defines as one

> . . . which is conditioned by training, education, experience, and intellect to recognize and place in perspective the military implications inherent in a given national security problem.[21]

In essence, the military mind is an enlightened one that is devoid of the negative qualities of the militaristic mind. Second, there has come into existence a new form of military mind - one which recognizes the heavy impact of modern military policy decisions on the civilian realm. The new military mind, which has emerged since the mid 1960's, has increased qualities of flexibility of mind, analytical thought processes, creativity and imagination. The military professional, possessed of the new military mind, knows his responsibility to inject into his deliberation a careful study of the effect of a given military action on the surrounding society. In short, the old military mind operated on the principle of military expediency whereas the new one operates with a larger perspective - an awareness of the complicated politico-military relationships involved and an increased knowledge of key non-military fields.[22]

Admittedly, there is a certain idealism involved in Bletz's qualities and attributes of the new military mind. However, there is good evidence (to be shown later) that such a trend towards the establishment of a new military mind does exist. And this trend is perhaps more a result of demands made upon the military profession than anything else. Therefore, the new military mind becomes a prerequisite for true military professionalism.

There is a military mind. Without it military professionalism, as defined in this study, would be a myth. The military professional must constantly strive to improve his military mind and be constantly alert to the dangers of the militaristic mind. The civilian community must fully comprehend the difference between the proponents of rationalism and irrationalism in any other profession or social grouping. The politico-military equation will be well served by the militaristic one.[23]

In concluding this discussion of the military professional, a central point which must be addressed is: What is meant by professionalism and what constitutes military professionalism? Abrahamsson states,

Professionals profess. They profess to know better than others the nature of certain matters and to know better than their clients what ails them or their affairs. This is the essence of the professional idea and the professional claim.[24]

In grand overview, the military professional can be described as one who pursues a career dedicated to service to the nation. Commitment to a military career is an essential ingredient of professionalism. His prime responsibility is the security of the national society at all times. In peace, his role is to maintain the highest possible degree of military preparedness, to formulate military policy and defense strategy, and to advise higher authority in all military matters which relate to national security. In war, his role is to control and direct military operations to accomplish the objectives stated by higher authority. His integrity and credibility are perhaps the most important facets of his profession, for without these his ability to perform effectively as either a commander or an adviser is all but destroyed.

The qualifications that military professionals possess are accumulated over years of service in a variety of jobs. The early years of a professional are spent learning and applying tactical or operational principles. He gains indispensable knowledge from this experience which he must apply throughout his career. He, as an operator, solves tactical problems and learns the results which can be expected from the application of force. He becomes a well-trained technician who not only knows how to employ tactical weapons systems but what specific results can be expected from their employment. As he progresses through these early years, he expands on this knowledge in several ways: He becomes involved with the employment of larger units of force, as well as with a greater variety of weapon systems, and he experiences the teamwork and discipline required to successfully accomplish the assigned mission. Moving through the early intermediate years, the professional receives schooling and experience in the management process. Through staff work he gains a working knowledge of the procedures used to create, train, equip and deploy forces. He becomes familiar with the planning factors which must be used in the orderly employment of forces - the time-space relationships. He gains experience in the feasibility of employing alternative systems. And by the close of his intermediate years (perhaps some 15 years of service), learns the responsibilities of commanding a unit of men and forces in the field which can be employed independently. Up to this point, the military professional has been concerned mainly with operations - the

employment of forces. Through joint training exercises, he has evaluated and refined his technical expertise. If he has experienced combat, his professional credentials are further advanced. At this point, those officers who show greatest potential for greater responsibilities are given further schooling to broaden their perspectives. This may involve post-graduate civilian education, attendance at the various professional schools, or both. It is from this group that the future top military leaders are drawn. This becomes a critical phase for the officer because he becomes involved in a new and much broader environment. He learns to appreciate the effects of military policy and strategy on the international scene; he gains an awareness of the close relationship of the nation's military establishment with other segments of American society; he operates within the formal politico-military organizational structure; he becomes a participating member in formulating military strategy; he experiences larger commands and learns to manage and employ ever-increasing amount of human and material resources; he grapples with the relationship between appropriate force structures and a credible strategy; his parochial tendencies become somewhat mitigated by assignments to joint and international staffs; and he becomes exposed to the intricacies and complexities of balancing competing claims on the nation's resources.

Admittedly, this is a heady list of experiences. And it should be noted that the officer who progresses through these periods of his profession will experience some overlap. The different tasks at different levels are not rigidly compartmentalized. Preparation for each level

may be started years before. It is a flowing evolution. In all probability, those officers who attain and hold general or flag rank will have gained the full measure of experience as described above. And these are the professionals we are concerned with - the top military leaders who advise national authorities on national security. They have the qualifications required to perform their task, and their military expertise is founded upon years of professional training, education, experience and intellect. It is on this extensive and comprehensive background that military experts stake their claim to professionalism.

# CHAPTER III

## THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ADVICE IN THE UNITED STATES

American military leaders have it as their professional duty, derived from constitutional arrangements, to advise national authorities on matters of military security. "National authorities" are considered to be the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress. As Commander-in-Chief, the President is the prime recipient of military advice. The Secretary of Defense (who in effect is the Deputy Commander-in-Chief) has no direct constitutional authority but derives his authority from the President and from legislation enacted since 1947. The Congress, under its investigative powers, has the right to call military witnesses in connection with its legislative duties. Throughout our history, the requirement for military advice has varied greatly - both in terms of amount and substance. The factors which have determined "how much" and "what kind" of advice are far too numerous and diverse to explain in detail. However, some factors appear to have much greater weight or greater permanence than others. Generally speaking, the frequency and amount of advice has been most dependent, firstly, on the changing personal and institutional interests of national authorities and secondly, on the relative security of the nation.

While no responsible President can afford to completely disdain or ignore his military experts (particularly in wartime), there are

numerous historical examples of widely differing levels of acceptance on the part of the recipients. The degree of acceptance is often related to the quality and credibility of the advice. Prior to this century (and prior to the professionalization of the military), the United States military services were not organized to provide military advice on a routine or systematic basis. Obviously, every President has it within his power to determine what role the military will play in governmental decisions, but it is of historical interest that there was no concept within the military of the specific relationships involved even during wartime. Without such a concept of what the relationship ought to be, it is impossible for the military to organize a staff which can consistently provide the necessary support to accomplish the advisory function adequately. And without proper staff support, the quality and credibility will suffer. Therefore, the military must have a clear idea of what is expected of them if they are to function effectively. For example, during the Civil War the *ad hoc* arrangements between the military hierarchy and the President took whatever form and shape Lincoln wanted. Civil War historians have frequently noted the confusion with regard to the responsibilities of the General-in-Chief (Halleck) to his President. The Generals-in-Chief in the nation's previous wars (Washington, Dearborn and Scott) never expounded a concept of their duties except to command their armies.[1] Thus, there was no precedent to follow. It would be unthinkable today to see a recurrence of the situation wherein the President makes informal and unannounced visits to the Defense Department to read military cables upon which he

would base many military decisions as Lincoln did. Woodrow Wilson also took great interest in his responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief but, in contrast to Lincoln, was predisposed to a large degree of independence from his military experts. Wilson's anti-military outlook surfaced when he threatened to abolish the Navy's General Board and the Joint Army and Navy Board after they appealed a presidential decision on the transfer of gunboats in the Pacific in 1913.[2] Further, Wilson ordered the Joint Board not to meet again without his permission; that permission was not given for two and one half years.[3] After World War I had started, there were continuous discussions in the United States concerning military preparedness in this country. Holding out against a growing avalanche of criticism, Wilson refused to substantially increase the Army and Navy until United States entry into the war was publicly announced. In late 1914, he admonished his critics,

> We have never had, and while we retain our present principles and ideals we never shall have, a large standing army.[4]

And later, his disdain for professional advice during World War I is noted by his comment, ". . . this war, being completely unprecendented, was therefore, in a sense, a war for amateurs."[5] (It is interesting to note that substantially the same idea has been expressed by the defense scholars from the civilian community in referring to the concept of nuclear war and the formulation of defense policy in the late 1950's). Franklin Delano Roosevelt took a different approach to military advice in World War II, in that he relied heavily on the professional military.

Roosevelt kept personal and daily contact with military leaders and, in effect, removed the Secretaries of War and Navy from any meaningful position in the chain of command.

> The President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated strategy. The Secretaries of State, War and Navy played marginal roles. Unlike the military chiefs, they did not regularly attend the great wartime planning conferences between Roosevelt and Churchill.[6]

The above examples of presidential-military relations concern wartime situations prior to World War II. Most Presidents, following traditional public attitudes, have tended to rely more heavily on the military in emergencies (although in differing degrees) and to generally disregard them when the threat has passed. However, it is also true that peacetime Presidents have fashioned their relationship with the military in their own distinctive way just as is done in wartime. This is merely a reflection of the fact that each President has his own political style. Even when institutional advisory machinery exists (as it has since shortly after World War II) a President may completely bypass the existing organizations and substitute his own procedures for consultation and advice. The post-war presidential relationships with the military will be analyzed in detail in Chapter V. It is sufficient for the moment to note that there existed a set pattern of heavy reliance on the military for wartime decisions and a general neglect of the military in peace, and that in both peacetime and wartime the status of military experts and their degree of participation has been mainly a product of presidential preference. These two facts have

tended to prevent the emergence of a clear and consistent conception of the "appropriate" relationship between the military and the Commander-in-Chief.

The same variances can be seen in Congressional preferences for military advice. The mood of Congress has varied between one of attempting to control military policy or strategy (as in the later states of the Civil War) to one of almost completely relinquishing its role in influencing military matters (as in World War II). Naturally, the amount of military advice given will be based on the degree of institutional interest Congress displays in things military. While Congress is of only tangential interest to this analysis of military advice, it is important to recognize that there exists an inter-relationship between Presidential and Congressional preoccupation with military advice which has a significant influence on the nature of that advice. A Congress which is both *highly interested* and highly critical of military or defense policy frequently causes the President to enlist his military leaders in defesnse of administration policies. Military advisers then become political supporters of the President. Thus, Congress can either influence a reluctant President to greater accommodation with the advice of military experts or cause the military advisers to alter their recommendations. However, such political (or partisan) use of professional military experts reduces the autonomy of the professionals and perhaps calls their very professionalism into question. This situation has existed several times in the post World War II period.

With regard to the state of relative national security and its effect on the amount of advice rendered, it is obvious that in periods of war military advice must be given continuously to conduct daily operational matters in the prosecution of the war. In peacetime, however, the amount of advice is dependent largely on the threat perceived. In this century, the low ebb in military advice was reached in the early 1930's. Nationally, there existed a certain euphoria after the victorious American crusade in World War I to "make the world safe for democracy." The threat to peace was eliminated and future threats were to be reconciled by highly moralistic means, - League of Nations, Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, etc. The lack of a credible threat to the physical security of the nation during the 1920's and early 1930's and the severe societal dislocations caused by the economic depression relegated the military to a position of political isolation. But World War II completely reversed the position of the military. These two periods, one of neglect in the 1920's and early 1930's and the other of total reliance in the 1940's, reflects the traditional American attitude toward the military in peace and war. It would have been natural to assume the tradition would continue after World War II and indeed there was initially an overwhelming demand to disarm as quickly as possible. However, the period of the 1950's and 1960's ushered in a totally new requirement for reliance on the military in times of relative peace. These new requirements on the military have not been altogether satisfactorily met. The revolutionary ch nge in civil-military relations

in peacetime has produced a great deal of confusion for all concerned - in the military, in civilian national leadership, and in the public and its congressional agents. In this new environment, there has been no set pattern in American treatment of the military profession as there was in the two previous decades and, as a consequence, the amount of military advice requested by national authorities has varied considerably - not only between successive administrations but also sometimes during the tenure of a single administration.

Turning to the nature and the substance of military advice, these also have been conditioned by a large number of diverse factors; however, perhaps the most significant of these factors are (1) the view held by the military professionals themselves of what their role should be, and (2) the increased complexity of military strategy and defense policy after 1945. In examining the historical evidence in support of these factors, the starting point again coincides with the turn of the century when United States military professionalism came into its own. With the passing of the Spanish-American War, there started a cresendo of activity at the national level designed to better prepare the military leaders for their advisory role and to provide clear channels of communication for the advice. The creation of various agencies for military advice paralleled the growth of an international conscience by America and her leaders. American interests now included territories in the Caribbean, Hawaii, and the Philippines, plus a greatly expanded international trade. In order to provide defense for these new and widely scattered areas, the Joint

Army and Navy Board was established in 1903 by agreement between the two service Secretaries (War and Navy). Its overall duty was to "take cognizance of questions referred regarding joint Army and Navy policy relative to National Defense."[7] In 1919, the Joint Board was given a statutory basis and was expanded somewhat with the addition of the Joint Planning Committee whose purpose was to investigate, study, confer freely and report on questions of defense and military policy. A concept of preparation for military advice was announced:

> Determination of such questions on national defense can have no validity unless it is connected with a revised scheme of defense based upon an estimate of the international situation, our national policies and total resources for defense.[8]

With the military getting its house in order organizationally, the parameters of military advice became better defined. Also the channels of communication were made explicit: The service chiefs were principal advisers to their respective Secretaries, who in turn were responsible to the President. In the event of service disagreement, the President was to be the arbitrator. As General MacArthur stated in 1934,

> In any plan, project or program involving joint or cooperative action on the part of the two defense services and in which opposing professional viewpoints cannot be composed by their designated representatives, there is only one authority that can and should be permitted to intervene; namely, the President. The issues involved are far too serious in their effects on national security to permit any lesser authority, either professional or civil, to take the responsibility of this decision . . . . In other words, the board constitutes in theory and in practice an ideally organized defense staff of professional men for the President of the United States.[9]

In formulating military advice, it was recognized from the very outset that the international situation, national policies, and total resources were to be considered by the military. However, the military profession to this date is still uncertain and divided on the issue of what factors should be considered, and to what degree should they be evaluated, in the process of composing military advice. An Army officer writing in the Naval War College Review (April 1972) takes exception to the fact that the JCS should ". . . base their advice not on narrow military considerations alone but on the broad-guaged political and economic factors as well."[10] It is his contention that the military should not stray too far from "purely military" considerations in its advisory role.

The history of this division can be easily traced since proponents of both sides have been (and are still) fairly vocal in supporting their respective views on the nature and parameters of military advice. Traditionally, the two differing rationales underlying the formulation of military advice have been termed the "self-determinist" approach and the "subaltern" approach. The "self-determinists" are rather independent and feel the professional military should determine all defense strategies and the supporting force structure requirements based on their assumptions of national objectives. Their task is to inform political leaders what forces are necessary to achieve a certain level of security after they have made their own analysis of diplomatic, political and economic considerations. Politicians are free to disregard their advice, but only at their own peril. The "subalterns"

are more docile and accommodating. Their function is to accept the force levels established by the political leaders and to determine how the given forces can be made most efficient. "Subalterns" do not consider it proper for military men to determine how much defense the nation needs or how much it could afford to have - - their task is merely to ensure that forces allotted to them are efficiently integrated for maximum effectiveness. Subalterns are the more conservative of the two, and they find justifications for their position in the military virtue of obedience and their dedication to the "apolitical" nature of the military.

The Joint Board was committed to "self-determinism" by including non-military factors in its deliberations. That the Joint Board understood this is clear from its correspondence with the Secretary of War in 1931:

> The factors which go to make up our national policies, including the basic policy of national defense, depend to such a degree upon our *international relations* both political and economic, that a consideration of them is necessary to a correct evaluation of the Philippines from a military standpoint.[11]

Also the original charter of the Joint Planning Committee encouraged consideration of international events, national policies and economic and industrial resources. Despite these clearly stated concepts advocating the "self-determinist" approach, the interwar period found the professional military working both sides of the street. Throughout the tenures of both the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) in the Hoover Administration, these officials

advised the President in the apparent role of "self-determinists." Essentially their advice was to constantly "warn him that American military strength was below the safety level," based on their perception of the international situation and United States national interests.[12] But at the same time, General Summerall (in 1929) acted as a "subaltern" by responding very sympathetically to Hoover's request for an Army survey of all military activities in order to obtain a reduction in military expenditures. In a letter to his commanding generals, Summerall let it be known he supported Hoover and the aims of the survey.[13] While support for the Commander-in-Chief is an expected response from military leaders once a decision is made, it is incumbent on these professionals to act consistently in the advisory function and not to support reductions while at the same time decrying a lack of military preparedness. Several events indicate that Summerall continued to act alternately as a "subaltern" and as a "self-determinist." In the role of the former, he more than tacitly supported the President in connection with the Army survey by initiating an attempt to prevent the American Legion from passing a resolution criticizing Hoover "for mingling in military affairs and for his efforts to reduce military expenditures."[14] In the role of the latter, the CSA "wrote an article urging Army officers to enlighten the public on military matters, suggesting that if they are careful, they could do so without openly criticizing their superiors."[15] In the same vein, Summerall's final report as CSA (which was considered a "masterpiece") reviewed the history of military policy and concluded with sounding a warning

because he feared United States security was in danger militarily. Summerall frequently stated his disagreement with the national policy of reverting to unpreparedness after a war because it only leads to inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the next war.[16]

Regarding naval advice, the Navy was mostly "self-determinist." They openly criticized Hoover's military policy to the extent that after a year of this activity, the President wrote the Secretary of Navy as follows:

> As you know, I have been sorely tried during the whole past year by members of the Navy appealing to public prejudice as against the civilian control of the military arm of government, and the time has come when some action must be taken to introduce a higher realization and sense of duty on the part of naval officers than they have hitherto displayed.[17]

Two months later, Hoover imposed censorship on naval criticism which did not stop it but merely forced it underground. The criticism was continued by interest groups outside the military (the Navy League, American Legion, etc.). However, the CNO himself was rather docile stating that "when peace prevails, statecraft dominates and when war is imminent, it would be unwise not to permit the counsel of (military) technicians to control."[18] He sympathized with most of Hoover's policies despite the fact that the Navy was not allowed to build up to the level authorized by international agreement in the naval conferences after World War I.

Throughout the interwar years the Joint Board was the main vehicle through which joint military advice was formulated. Their largest task was the development of War Plan Orange against potential Japanese

aggression. Originally, in 1924, the plan (calling for defense of the Philippines) was justified on the Joint Board's evaluation of the political and commercial value of maintaining control over the Philippines. The plan was based as much on such factors as "potential commercial center" of the Philippines, "national prestige," "the Open Door Policy," "United States sovereignty and obligations," and "political stability" as it was justified on strategic considerations of military value.[19] Military planners were making political and economic assumptions, if not judgments, in formulating military advice - definitely a "self-determinist" stance. It should be noted that military and foreign policy were not coordinated during the formulation stage until late in 1935 largely because the State Department refused representation on the Joint Board. Therefore, in formulating military policy to support the national interest, military planners did not have the benefit of professional support from foreign policy experts. The result was that Hoover consistently told Congress that the national defense situation was satisfactory, even when his military advisors warned him that American strength was below the safety level. Lack of coordination between the military and the State Department was one cause of this disconnect between the President and the military. And it resulted in different conceptions by civilian leaders and their military advisers on the sate of national defense preparedness.

> National advisors might be concerned about their inability to protect American commerce throughout the world; Hoover recognized the impossibility of doing so. Army or Navy advisors might base their apprehensions on the precarious position of the

> Philippines; Hoover knew that the islands were indefensible and thus avoided the anxiety of trying to formulate a defense for them. He believed that while the balance of power was maintained, the American continents would be safe from foreign attack. Should the United States attempt to assert hegemony elsewhere, she would upset world stability and perhaps lead the world toward a new arms race or even war.[20]

President Hoover, it might be stated, was very concerned with national preparedness; however, given his disposition to favor peaceful means of statecraft, his view that geography made the United States relatively secure, and his overriding preoccupation with the economic depression, military views and advice were not given high priority despite the growing instability on the international scene throughout the 1930's. This merely reflected the different assumptions made by the military experts and their commander-in-chief when they both made judgments on the same set of political and economic facts. This problem is inherent in the "self-determinist" approach to military advice. For without close coordination with the political experts on the assumptions involved in the national interest, military advisers may arrive at far different conclusions than their civilian counterparts.

President Roosevelt had an entirely different approach to military and economic policy, both domestically and internationally. He initiated an immediate build-up of naval forces due to his belief that international developments warranted larger forces and that spending money at home would help the depressed economy. Inasmuch as Roosevelt gradually increased the Army and Navy during the 1930's,

there were few official disagreements between the President and his military advisers. There is hardly a need for a vociferous "self-determinist" when both military and civilian leaders share the same view internationally. Since the military were getting more forces, the "subaltern" role could suffice. That the Army Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of Naval Operations under Roosevelt were basically all "subalterns" can be attributed in large part to this reason. It should be noted, however, that even "subaltern" military advisors may disagree with the President. General Marshall did as Deputy CSA in 1938. This situation will tend to occur whenever the professional military feels that civilian decisions are too technical and interfere with the military effectiveness of the forces allotted. In the fall of 1938, Roosevelt felt it was not clear when, where or how the nation might be called on to exert military force. With the growing power and aggressiveness of Germany and Japan dominating the international scene, Roosevelt suddenly encouraged the War Department "to plan not for what the reluctant Congress might possibly concede but for what actually might be needed for defense" - what kind of defense to design - what kinds of weapons to order first.[21] The dawn was breaking on the age of advanced technology and the increasing complexity and mixtures of weapons systems signaled that a new and more important role would be played by military experts in governmental decisions. Heretofore, the American experience in military policy was basically two-dimensional (land and sea), technologically unsophisticated, and limited geographically in scope: Naval policy was the coastal defense of the United States

and its possessions and the protection of commerce; and Army policy encompassed continental defense and some degree of defense of Panama, Hawaii and the Philippines. Within this limited scope of military policy, Presidents before Roosevelt could easily understand the details of military tactics, strategy and policy in peacetime and the choices were relatively simple ones. The advancing technology and the new dimension of airpower, coupled with possible military involvement in yet other foreign areas, complicated the process and called for a greater reliance on the technical skills of professional military experts. The requirements for military advice were rapidly enlarging in the technical arena; however, there grew to be a subtle inter-relationship between the means used and the ends achieved. (Not until the nuclear age would this relationship become clear to all).

But in the pre-1938 tradition of deciding the details of military policy, Roosevelt elected to build airplanes to solve the problem of an aggressive Germany. He was "thinking in terms of helping Britain and France build air strength that might be sufficient to hold Hitler in check, or to defeat him, if war came, without United States participation."[22] Warplanes were a deterrent whereas ground forces were not, Roosevelt announced in a meeting with his military advisers, and he wanted to rapidly build 10,000 airplanes. Most of these would go to Britain and France. Turning to General Marshall, the President asked, "Don't you think so George?" Marshall apologized but said firmly, "I don't agree with that at all."[23] The President wanted only combat planes while his Army advisers wanted an effective

fighting force across the board. The "subaltern" reasoning was clear and the opposition to Roosevelt was strong. The Army felt planes were worthless without men to fly them and troops to hold the ground for them.

> FDR complained that he asked for war planes and his planners (advisers) offered him almost everything else instead.[24]

The outcome, as might be expected, was a program for 6000 (vice 10,000) planes and Congress was urged to provide more money for other things wanted by the services. However, the President would not authorize even modest manpower increases in ground forces (which was called a "military requirement" by the War Department).

Clearly, it can be seen that regardless of which approach is taken - - either the "self-determinist" or the "subaltern" - - military advisers may find themselves in disagreement with their superiors. While "self-determinists" will find their disagreement concerns the proper way to evaluate non-military factors which leads to divergent assumptions on the role and use of military forces, "subalterns" will find they disagree on the basis of an appropriate force structure required to accomplish a certain degree of national security. Among the contemporary defense experts, we find one (with a rather large following) who feels the military expert should not use either approach. Alain Enthoven apparently believes the military expert should be confined to strictly operational employment since he is neither qualified to evaluate non-military factors and make strategic assumptions nor is he qualified to determine force

structures and weaponry. Speaking of those he considers military professionals, Enthoven says,

> Graduates of the military academies and war colleges cannot state with any precision what strategy and force posture may be needed to support certain foreign policy objectives, because there are no great immutable military laws to determine these requirements . . . .[25]

Enthoven's lack of confidence in the military professional is further explained by his testimony in Congress:

> . . . I think you have to recognize that the question of what the overall forces of the United States should be has got to be a balancing of a lot of factors. There is no such thing as a pure military requirement. I think that as soon as you get away from very localized, specialized, precisely defined tactical situations, and get to the worldwide problem of how many forces we ought to have, I think you get a balance between the capability of the military forces, the opposing forces, and our political and strategic objectives.[26]

Obviously, to Enthoven, neither of these approaches suffice as a basis for formulating military advice for they can easily produce disagreements at the highest level of government and they both are possibly beyond the qualifications of military experts. If such is the case it would be fair to conclude that neither of these two approaches can define the proper role of the military expert in determining national security policy. Further, neither of these approaches present much hope of producing a consensus on the degree of participation by the United States military in major decisions of society. What is suggested, then, is that there may be another approach to the formulation of military advice which would produce fewer disagreements and contribute to the formation of a fairly stable

consensus on the proper role of the military in United States society. Before structuring a new approach to military advice, it would be appropriate to review briefly the expanded requirements for contemporary military advice and then to outline the basic elements of present day military advice.

CHAPTER IV

## COMPLEXITIES IN FORMULATING MILITARY ADVICE SINCE 1945

Against a background of uncertainty regarding the appropriate type of military advice in the American political process, the United States entered the post World War II era with new responsibilities and interests. National security became of paramount interest and concern to the society and, for the first time, the military was to assume a major role over an extensive period in times of peace. The historical evolution of United States national security policy since 1945 has been documented countless times, and little purpose would be served by a detailed recapitulation of its growth at this time. It is sufficient to note that the United States was catapulted into the center of a new world environment which, due to the almost immediate post-war hostility of the U.S.S.R., rapidly became unstable and threatening to United States security interests. The expanding hegemony of the U.S.S.R., backed by the world's largest military establishment in terms of manpower, could only be checked by the power of the United States. Despite the monopoly of atomic power possessed by the United States, American policy-makers had no strategy or policy objectives aimed at preventing the Soviet expansion. Privately and among themselves, government officials admitted in 1945 that a tougher line must be taken against the Soviets. Harriman, Lovett, Marshall, Keenan, and Byrnes were of this persuasion and were instrumental in

eventually establishing the policy of containment. Halberstam noted,

> The lesson of history from Munich to Berlin was basic, they decided: one had to stand up, to be stern, to be tough.[1]

Toughness was thought to be firm diplomatic and economic measures backed by military potential, and it was soon realized that possession of the atomic bomb was not, in itself, sufficient military power. So there was to be no return to the peacetime tradition of no standing army. In fact, within a few years, a separate and third military department was added and a National Military Establishment was created. Much as President Truman tried to curb military spending while maintaining sizable peacetime forces, successive crises (Iran, Greece, Turkey, Berlin and Korea) initiated the perception on the part of civilian leaders that even larger forces would be necessary to keep the communists in check. So long as communism threatened what was considered the "free world," the United States peacetime military arsenal had to at least match the perceived threat.

Perhaps what was not clearly understood was that the policy of containment would permanently divide the world and create the long term need for large military resources to underwrite that policy. The threat of perennial war, known as the Cold War, witnessed a rapidly spiraling arms race bringing with it vastly more complex weapons systems as well as an unprecedented growth and duplication in military operational missions. In the 1950's, the nuclear strategy of deterrence supported the policy of containment. This strategy required the military to be technically knowledgable in new areas of

military specialization - electronics and computerization, space systems, missile technology, nuclear energy and its effects, advanced communications, etc. To meet this requirement, the military established and/or sponsored a network of training and education programs to prepare its non-combatant personnel for over 1500 technical skills.[2] In the 1960's, the concept of flexible response expanded on this strategy by increasing the size of conventional forces. The technology of conventional means of warfare became even more sophisticated through greater research and development efforts. To function effectively as a military adviser, a working understanding of this vastly expanded military technology was a prerequisite. This required at least a passing acquaintance with many rapidly developing fields of specialized technology and skills.

At the same time, the military adviser had to become more of a generalist as the United States military had become committed to protect over 40 nations throughout the world. Many of these nations had contrasting cultural, economic, political and military systems. The large number of overseas bases, the deployment of United States forces virtually worldwide, the military assistance and training programs to foreign nations, and the formal military alliances were all new to the American military experience. Managing these expanded and far-flung forces, programs and bases called for economic and political sensitivity on the part of military experts. Small military decisions and incidents, particularly in foreign lands, could have large scale repercussions in many non-military areas. Consequently,

military advisers had to broaden their perspectives by integrating the political and economic aspects in formulating their military recommendations.

In yet another major dimension, the post World War II military adviser was required to expand his horizons. This involved re-thinking the concept of military victory. The nuclear age brought its own complexities with an expanded fear of nuclear holocaust. Total victory, if achieved in a total nuclear war, was too staggering a thought to seriously contemplate, and the concept of limited war led to the goal of limited victory. The idea of limited victory was not easily assimilated into the conceptual baggage of the military as was shown by the MacArthur-Truman controversy in 1951. The achievement of pre-set political goals in a limited war seemed to prove that there was a substitute for complete military victory (in the MacArthur sense). But even as late as 1959, there is evidence that the "massive retaliation" syndrome, in its most crude form, was still in existence by some members of the JCS.[3] In order for the military adviser to be credible in this environment of a possible total nuclear war, he had to divest himself of many traditional attitudes regarding military victory and adapt to the new sophistication of a limited victory concept. And this called for reeducation regarding politico-military relationships. The basic change in military thinking that was required is succictly summed up as follows,

> In total war the objective was identified as the relatively fixed factor while the level of conflict necessary to achieve the objective was the major

> variable. In limited war, on the other hand, the level of conflict was identified as the relatively fixed factor, due primarily to the nuclear threat, and the objective was the variable. Further, . . . objectives are limited as a means of keeping the conflict short of total war and limitation of objectives is not an end in itself.[4]

This reorientation in military thinking was to be accomplished against the background of a fast changing scenario. After World War II there were different requirements for military advice with each change of administration, there was an accelerated rate of change in weapons technology and military tactics, the threat varied with changing alignments in military alliances, the enemy capability periodically changed in form and shape, and United States policy underwent considerable revision. If the principal military experts could have understood the totality of the nature of these changes during their tenure as advisers, they may have been more relevant than they have been in their recommendations. But this criticism is not intended to single out the military as particularly unaware group in our society. With regard to these multi-dimensional changes taking place and the supercharged rate of change, the military was not alone in failing to comprehend the magnitude of what was taking place. Other groups in society suffered equally under the "crisis of adaption" as noted by Alvin Toffler in Future Shock:

> Many of us have a vague 'feeling' that things are moving faster. Doctors and executives alike complain that they cannot keep up with the latest developments in their fields. Hardly a meeting or conference takes place today without some ritualistic oratory about 'the challenge of change' . . . . The disturbing fact is that the vast majority of people, including educated

> and otherwise sophisticated people, find the idea of change so threatening that they attempt to deny its existence. Even many people who understand intellectually that change is accelerating, have not internalized that knowledge, /and/ do not take this critical fact into account in planning . . . .[5]

So the military has not been alone in struggling to perceive the effects of change; however, in that the professional military plays a large role in the making of national security policy and that national security policy has been the center of public debate, the successes and limitations of the military have been more open to public scrutiny than most other groups in American society. Given the transformation of military thinking on victory, the kaleidoscopic and accelerating background, and the lack of consensus as to the proper role for military advice in national decision-making, it is readily apparent how the formulation of military advice became an exceedingly complex function. Before reviewing the effectiveness of that advice in the post war era, a discussion of the content of military advice is most germane.

Routinely, post-war advice had had three basic elements: First, it starts with an assessment of the military threat to national security; second, it involves a determination of the appropriate strategy to meet that threat; and lastly, it concludes with a series of recommendations regarding the force levels and weapons systems to effectively support that strategy. These are the programmed responses expected of the military profession and the vast majority of military staffs in Washington are continuously involved in structuring these elements.

Over and above these basic elements, another type of military

advice is frequently sought by national authorities, particularly when the nation is faced with a security crisis. In this case, the military is asked to comment on the capability of existing forces to meet the crisis at hand and, not infrequently, is requested to evaluate the effects of employing forces in the context of the situation. This ad hoc type of advice, in distinction to the basic advice routinely expected, is formulated almost "on the spot." It consists of professional judgments concerning the specific danger presented to the nation and the anticipated results of applying military force in a specific and well-defined situation. There are choices to be made by national authorities not only between weapons systems and tactics but between variable combinations of military and non-military measures which could be used to counter the threat. Should the emphasis be placed on military action, or should diplomatic and/or economic measures be applied as the primary means? Certainly to the degree that one type of action is emphasized, the range of the remaining type of actions becomes more circumscribed. In other words, in order to react adequately to meet the crisis, but not to over react and cause further problems, a certain blend of interrelated actions must be prescribed. In discussing such precise and delicate alternative measures, the military member in the President's advisory council must be able to understand and evaluate the effects of applying varying degrees of non-military actions if he is to participate effectively as a member of the advisory body. It is under these circumstances primarily that the military professional must be educated in more than

the "pure military requirement." The decision as to how to respond to the threat could be crucial and, while it is made under the duress of crisis, the credibility of the military professional is affected by the quality of advice rendered. To a lesser degree, it is affected by the actual results of the measures employed. Robert A. Lovett commented on the quality and credibility of military advice as follows:

> Military advice is only one - - although on occasion, the most necessary - - type of guidance needed today and the decision-making process involves a system of checks and balances in the Executive Branch deliberately designed to keep any one economic or social group or any one governmental department from becoming dominant. Therefore, every judgement made at the decisive level requires a weighing of several often-conflicting and competing factors.
>
> For these reasons, the ability of the military expert to give wise advice - - and to get it listened to by policy-making officials - - depends in great measure on his possessing knowledge in key non-military fields and in seeing issues in broad perspective.[6]

Returning to the three basic elements of military advice with which the military adviser is continuously concerned, we find that even here it is more than just the pure military requirement which is needed. In addressing the first of these, it is obvious that a threat assessment is a relative thing in several dimensions. Obviously, comparing airplane versus airplane, battalion versus battalion, or warship versus warship between one's own forces and those of the enemy is a relative thing. (The simple comparisons mentioned above should not obscure the fact that such an assessment is rather omnibus and pervasive in that such things as relative training, morale, mobility, firepower, logistics, resources, command and control, etc.,

must be orchestrated into the overall evaluation.) Beyond this, however, is another relativity that is even more difficult to grapple with. This is the relationship between enemy capabilities and our national interests. Does the enemy's military capability in a certain area of the world directly affect a vital national interest of the United States? If it does, then it is a bona fide threat which must be countered with strategy and forces. But certainly potential enemies may have capabilities which neither bear on United States national interests nor necessarily impair national objectives. It should also be recognized that this is never a static condition since the dynamics of the international environment cause our interests and objectives to change which, in turn, affects the magnitude of the threat. But in evaluating foreign military capabilities, we find that a particular capability is a threat only when it relates to our current national interests and objectives. And the basic problem encountered in this relationship is one of recognizing what these national interests and objectives are at any given point in time.

To many who have not given this problem considerable thought and research, it may appear that the military professional has merely to listen to the pronouncements of our political leaders and these interests and objectives will become clear. There is considerable controversy on this point as witnessed by the following statements from scholars and former officials who have been immersed in this problem. Writing in 1931, Charles Beard referred to the basic problem of defining those vital national interests when he said,

> Nor is the term 'defense' self-explanatory. Defense of what? Defense of the people residing in the continental United States? Defense of all the races and nationalities inhabiting American dependencies in the Caribbean and the far Pacific? Defense of all the American citizens in China or any other country on the globe where disorders are likely to do damage to their persons and property? Defense of American merchant vessels on the high seas and in all the ports of the world? Defense of American investments wherever they may be in danger? Although a former Secretary of the Navy once declared that the arms of the Government must be strong enough to hold all these territories, persons, things, and intangibles within their embrace, it cannot be said as yet that this theory has been formally adopted as a national resolve. If it were accepted, nothing very precise would be settled, for it covers too many imponderable factors . . . .[7]

Paul Warnke, in addressing the same subject today, makes a similar point:

> In his most recent State of the Union Message President Nixon referred to his policy as having been 'carefully and deliberately adjusted' so that 'where our interests or our treaty commitments are not involved our role will be limited.' But this neither defines our interests nor explains when and how they may be protected by military power. It suggests, moreover, that our interests and our treaty commitments are not synonymous.[8]

On defining national security, Charles Schultze says,

> Yet, clearly there is a consensus among the American people, shared by all but the most extreme fringe -- that in some way or the other the United States has basic national security interests which extend beyond the guarantee of our own territorial integrity. Unfortunately, from the standpoint of precision and simplicity those interests revolve principally around intangibles, uncertainties, and probabilities rather than around concrete threats readily foreseeable and easily grasped.[9]

Apparently, the concept of national security is vague enough in

today's world to permit the widest of interpretations as shown by comparing the following two statements made by Morgenthau and Gottlieb (respectively):

> The vital interests of the U.S., as of any nation, are twofold: military security from attack by other nations and security of its domestic institutions. The excellence and vitality of a nation's domestic institutions will avail it little if it is unable to defend itself against foreign aggression, . . . .[10]

> . . . I would suggest that in defining national security one criterion must receive top priority. In this age of overdeveloped weapons systems and under-developed social systems, the needs and aspirations of our people - - good jobs, health and child care, education, mass transit, and clean water and air - - can afford to come first. Otherwise there might not be a viable society to defend if some nation were so foolish as to attack us.[11]

The flavor of these quotations indicate that what one expert considers the primary threat to national interests ( and therefore a national security problem) may not be the main threat to another expert. Various interpretations will continue to abound and whatever the professional military advances as a threat will be met, in all probability, with some amount of criticism. However, in the absence of more precisely defined national interests, it would seem that such criticisms of the military can be diminished by expanding the horizons of military advisers so that they are able to consider and astutely evaluate as many non-military factors as possible in assessing the threat. Those who possess a large perspective of their environment are usually credited with the capability of offering better quality advice. The

proof of this lies in the "statesman" status accorded to such soldiers as Marshall and Taylor who were unique because of their ability to understand the impact of military issues on contemporary society. Nonetheless, it appears that a threat evaluation has many political ramifications. It is not a purely military subject.

> . . . the issue of threat perception is a 'pre-military' matter which at its very core is political, and that the final structure of national security policy is a balance between the political and military elements.[12]

If we are to accept this proposition, the military cannot produce a credible threat assessment unless they are able to grasp the many diverse issues involved in national security.

Also relative to a credible evaluation of the threat is the issue of "capabilities versus intentions." Historically, most military planners feel very uncomfortable with evaluating the intentions of potential enemies. If has been claimed that planning for such an important thing as the security of the nation must be done on a more concrete basis than what may prove to be the whim of intention. If a foreign nation has the capability to endanger United States security interests, then it has been assumed that this is a definite threat regardless of that nation's stated or implied purposes, peaceful intent. It is largely due to this fact that critics of the military frequently charge that the military profession practices "alarmism" a despicable facet of military professionalism.[13] This practice has also been termed the "greater than expected threat" or "overselling the threat." Various reasons are hypothosized why this practice exists; however, the most

logical reason centers around the reluctance of the military to evaluate potential enemy's intentions. It is suggested here that, in actual practice, the military does evaluate intentions - at least insofar as deciding which nations are potential enemies and which are not. For example, the British and French nuclear capabilities are not considered a threat whereas the Soviet one is a threat. Is there not an implicit evaluation regarding the intentions of all three nations in such a determination? (To brush this aside with the comment that if we can deter or defend against the Soviet threat we have done likewise to the others is to miss the point, since we do not plan against the possibility of simultaneously meeting all three threats.) Looking deeper into this reluctance, we find that it is only the intentions of the communists that the military is reluctant to evaluate. This could be considered a manifestation of the United States emphasis on anti-communism, but another consideration that may be more significant is the announced goal of communism to spread its system throughout the world. Until this intention is denounced, there are many in the military (as perhaps elsewhere) who will continue to take the announced communist intention at face value and continue to advocate a wide range of United States military responses - from nuclear deterrence to an adequate war fighting capability against the full spectrum of Soviet military capability anywhere in the world.

But the fundamental question regarding threat assessment remains: If military analysts do not attempt to evaluate the probabilities

involved in enemy intentions, is it not possible that our strategy and force structure are either greatly more than required or grossly less than required for any given period of time? This is the inherently unanswerable question of "How much is enough?" Since some observers feel that there is little probability of the Soviets attacking, for example, in Western Europe, our forces there are claimed to be too large and thus represent wasted United States resources. General Goodpaster, the Commander-in-Chief of United States forces in Europe, testified before Congress in 1970 and displayed the ever-present reluctance to adjudge the enemy intention in initiating such an attack:

> There remains an open question whether they would do it, and why would they do it. But they have the capability for doing it, and our job is to provide some kind of guard against an unbalanced capability of that kind.[14]

The military views the basic problem as one which is grounded in the fallacy of assuming that enemy actions can be programmed. If one assumes he can predict enemy intentions, he may be overlooking the dynamics of action, reaction and interaction between adversaries. As General Goodpaster stated:

> I think what we have to do is recognize the wide range of choices that an enemy will have, and then we have to make suitable provision against all of the options open to him, ranging from very small up to very large.
>
> If you do not do that, if you leave some option open to him and he is an intelligent analyst, and leader, and the Soviets have those characteristics, he would shape his plans to take advantage of your areas of weakness.[15]

Thus, the emphasis will remain on the capabilities aspect rather than intentions in threat assessment. There are other reasons that this emphasis should remain. In this day of sophisticated military equipment and long production lead times, it is obvious that enemy intentions may change much more rapidly than can countervailing force structures. Forces must be structured more in relation to permanent capabilities rather than to transient intentions. But it is equally true that some evaluation of intention is necessary if the military is to wisely allocate its resources. The "heating up" and "cooling down" cycles that existed in the Cold War can be viewed in the form of trends. If such trends can be recognized and evaluated in its early stages (such as the current "detente" in Europe), defense expenditures and resources may diminish somewhate or at least may stabilize. To the extent that trends in intention can be recognized, the professional military expert must be able to interpret events which indicate a nation's intent. At the very least, some capability to discern events which signal departures from traditional intent must exist. While some events may be obviously military in nature (such as force deployment or technological development), many such events lie outside the traditional realm of military considerations - such as increased trade, more frequent contacts through cultural programs and tourism, revised political alignments, new foreign policy objectives, a greater willingness to negotiate differences, etc. The military expert, if he is to attain credibility, must take cognizance of these non-military factors and assimilate them into his final recommendations. Not to do so, or to

attempt to formulate military policy without first analyzing these factors, would most likely produce narrow and unrealistic advice suffering from the single factor fallacy. So it appears that the basis of threat assessment is not an either/or situation but a judicious combination of capabilities and intentions whenever possible. But there can be little doubt that the emphasis should be on capabilities if a low degree of risk is to be maintained.

Turning to the second basic element of military advice, that of determining the strategy to meet the threat, we find that in the years immediately following World War II, military policy and strategy were in a state of flux. As the United States emerged from the war, each service was anxious to carve out a role and mission for itself compatible with the overall strategy. In the late 1940's, containment emerged as the basic foreign policy goal. But before the Korean War "the goal of containment had been pursued primarily by economic and diplomatic means, not by military ones."[16] The Soviet Union was "pressured" by the West to withdraw occupation forces from northern Iran in 1946, the Truman Doctrine sent economic aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947, the Marshall Plan was inaugerated in 1948 to rebuild Western Europe and reinforce it against communism, and the United States supported the establishment of political organs such as the Council of Europe and the Western European Union. The first postwar sign of what is now called the militarization of American foreign policy was a direct result of the Berlin Blockade in 1949. This dramatic event was met not by a direct military retaliation, but by

an attempt to defeat the purposes of the Blockade by non-violent means. However, the leaders of the West saw in the Berlin Blockade that communist intransigence included resort to military actions. The reaction of the West was to form a military alliance for the North Atlantic community. United States membership in NATO marked the first time in American history that the United States entered a military alliance in peacetime. But the transformation of American containment policy to one of heavy reliance on military means was not yet complete, for NATO was considered a political organization as much as it was a military one. Events in Asia were to heighten the realization that a serious military threat was being mounted by the forces of communism. The ideological threat of communism was progressively becoming more and more a military threat. The military victory of Mao Tse-Tung on the Chinese mainland in 1949 gave testimony to this. But it was the Korean War, initiated by an aggressive communist invasion of South Korea, which was the final impetus leading to the militarization of American policy. Prior to this war, economic and diplomatic efforts on the part of the West were evidently effective enough to contain communism and, if they were to continue to actively pursue their objectives of converting the world to communism, the Soviet and Chinese leaders were forced to resort to military means. Reluctantly, the West responded in kind. The alternative, it was felt, was to surrender territory and people to communism at the point of a bayonet.

The consequence of this train of events intensified the Cold War

and made military policy and strategy the backbone of United States national security policy since 1950. The strategic functions of containment in the Cold War became massive retaliation (deterrence), defense of Western Europe, continental defense, preparation for limited wars, and building a general war mobilization base.[17] From 1950 on, the formulation of military strategy became of paramount concern to national leaders. As the number one issue in public policy, military strategy gained the attention of many segments of the American society. The military profession, in the years prior to 1950, found itself readjusting to internal events of major proportions. The "unification" of the services produced far-reaching organizational changes and disrupted the customary channels of communication and influence, the shrinking defense budget created intense interservice competition, and the revolutionary advances in technology strained the traditional patterns of military thinking. Therefore, as a result of these internal adjustments going on with the military and the non-military emphasis of American policy, the military profession was neither prepared nor was it required to play a role of major significance in national decisions until after 1950.

The suddenness of the arrival of the Korean War propelled military advice onto center stage. However, viewed historically, this demand was far more significant than the customary United States reliance on the military during wartime in that it was now recognized that there would be a long term requirement for military expertise in dealing with the persistent and blobal communist expansion. And in placing this

new requirement on the military, civilian leaders may well have been asking the military to assume a role it neither fully understood nor was adequately prepared to fill. It is also fair to say that perhaps the civilian leaders were somewhat unsure of the direction United States policy should take despite the apparent commitment to containment. Naturally, this created further obstacles to formulating military advice. The Truman-MacArthur controversy during the Korean War lends credence to this, in that the policy of containment seemed to have been temporarily abandoned after the forces of the United Nations Command successfully defended South Korea and proceeded to push north towards the Yalu River.

> At the same time Washington announced its intention to establish a unified Korean state. The war, in short was no longer being fought for the limited goal of restoring the status ante quo. The new policy was tantamount to 'rolling back' communism rather than merely 'containing' it . . . . /It was not until later that/ America concluded that it had been a mistake to try to unify all of Korea and quietly abandoned the goal of 'liberation.'[18]

General MacArthur, believing that the revised policy of liberation was better than the original one of containment, carried his case to the public after containment was reestablished as the policy goal and, for this reason, was relieved of his command by the President. There were further such incidents where announced revisions of foreign policy goals could have been misleading. The Eisenhower-Dulles pronouncements encouraging liberation movements among the "captive nations" of Eastern Europe in the mid 1950's is another example. There was widespread belief that the United States would provide support for

rolling back communism in this fashion. Yet, no tangible United States support was given during the riots and minor revolts in Eastern Europe during the 1950's nor was any military aid offered when the Hungarian Revolt was brutally supressed by the Soviets in 1956. Again in the 1960's, after the Korean experience produced a strong public aversion towards limited wars, the official policy was to avoid such entanglements in the future. This was true particularly in Asia where it was axiomatic that the United States could neither afford to fight nor expect to win in a land war on that continent. Yet the prolonged United States entanglement in Vietnam contradicted both of these policies. Against such a background of inconsistency in policy pronouncements, it was most difficult to forge a specific military strategy to support national security policy. Accordingly, the military strategy that evolved was not tailored to a specific national goal, but became an "umbrella" type of strategy which could accommodate a variety of national security policy goals. The "two and one-half war" strategy of the 1960's was the product. The United States was to have the military capability to fight a major war in Europe, a major war in Asia, and a limited conflict elsewhere. But military strategy was even more omnibus that the $2\frac{1}{2}$ war strategy indicates since the strategic capabilities included massive nuclear retaliation, nuclear and conventional limited war, continental defense, industrial mobilization plans, stockpiling of strategic resources, military sales, training and assistance to foreign nations, defense of Western Europe with in-place forces, a worldwide presence of United States

military power, and military commitments to help defend over 40 nations.

To the extent that military professionals were responsible for this omnibus military strategy, it is fair to say that they attempted to respond as best they could to the policy pronouncements of successive administrations. However, it would appear that since 1950 the United States has simply added capability upon capability to its original military strategy in the attempt to reduce the risks inherent in the many divergent threats presented by communist nations. In advising the national authorities what strategies were appropriate to meet the perceived threats, the military professionals were acting within their own area of competence. But when the national authorities were less than explicit in clarifying the policy goals and national interests which were to be protected, the military expert was required to make his own assumptions on national policy and interests. They were not adequately prepared to do this nor were they unanimous in believing that this was their legitimate role. Walter Millis cited this as a weak point of the JCS.

> After 1947, the nation looked to the JCS to provide militarily sound answers for two broad and basic questions: How much of the nation's total resources should be devoted to military preparation? How should the determined amount be allocated among the services, the various weapons systems, the rival strategic theories? These questions were inherently unanswerable . . . . It is asking too much of any military body to return technically 'sound' replies to questions such as these; it was certainly asking too much of JCS.[19]

The JCS have not been able to answer these questions to the

satisfaction of national authorities. In the House Committee on Appropriation Report on Defense Appropriations for FY 1960, the following indictment is made:

> . . . it is obvious from the testimony of the respective members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military officers throughout the hearings, previously quoted, that there is considerable difference of opinion (on the proper balance between general war and limited capabilities) . . . . Differences of opinion are natural and understandable, but the testimony clearly indicates that there is something wrong in our present military planning. It seems quite apparent in this regard the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a corporate body, is not providing the kind of advice and leadership which this nation requires.[20]

The generally unknown character of nuclear warfare further questioned the relevance of traditional military experience. This opened the door for civilians, who felt at least equally qualified as the JCS to examine strategic implications of nuclear warfare and deterrence, to enter the blossoming discipline of strategy. The fact that the defense establishment itself contracted "think tanks" to which it could farm out the complex imponderables of national security and strategy further legitimized the civilian intellectual intrusion into military strategy and diminished the stature of the military professional.[21]

The cost of huge resources required for modern defense and warfare brought about public debate and caused other civilians to examine the defense posture and the stated military requirements.

> What came into question was not merely the wisdom of military recommendations, but the very foundation upon which those recommendations rested - - the (military) claim to sole possession of the ability to determine what forces were necessary for military security.[22]

Thus, the "scholar's debouch into strategy" began - - and it continues unabated today.[23] No longer was strategy the special preserve of military professionals, and the cause was largely laid to military unresponsiveness (or inability) to probe and analyze the challenges of modern defense in a systematic or routinized way. Unfortunately, the military did not respond prior to 1960 with enough vigor to dispel the disparaging idea "that military judgement is esoteric and deserves a privileged position in the market place of ideas."[24]

Thus, the military advice offered on military strategy has been inadequate since World War II and the military profession must accept some of the blame. Inconsistency and poor definition of policy goals by national authorities should also take some of the blame. While heavy demands were placed upon the military, they simply did not respond as they were expected. The strategy recommendations which were offered tended to emphasize some major mission for each of the four services rather than a coherent and integrated plan to utilize military forces with maximum effectiveness. Over and above the problems caused by the inability to ferret out realistic national policy and interests, the military profession was not philosophically oriented nor organizationally staffed to deal with the non-military world around them. And without such a capability the military cannot provide sound answers to the civilian leadership. But the national authorities will continue to ask these questions on military strategy and the military profession must prepare itself to respond in better fashion than it has. Given the difficulty in interpreting specific national

objectives, the revolutionary developments in weapons technology, and the close relationship between military programs and foreign and economic policy since 1945, the modern military adviser must be made to rise above narrow service parochialism and treat strategic issues with a broad perspective of the many factors which consititute national security. Not to do so will continue the relatively poor performance of the past with respect to advice on military strategy.

The final basic element of military advice requires a series of recommendations concerning force structure and weapons systems to implement the adopted military strategy. In that the strategy since 1945 has been little more than an amorphous gathering of the military roles and missions of the several services, the advice on weapons selection has tended to augment or expand each service's capability to perform its mission. The total effect has been that each service has received most of the forces and weapons asked for, but many duplications have occurred in both of these areas since there exists no one in the military profession who can play the role of final arbiter for all the services. Despite the attempts of a strong Secretary of Defense (MacNamara) determined to eliminate duplication among the services, duplication remains. Today, the United States military is composed of four separate air forces, two naval organizations and two gound fighting services, each with proprietary interests in their own independently developed weapons systems. This fact by itself speaks volumes about the adequacy of military advice regarding both force structure and weapons selection.

In reaction to the national insecurity caused by what was considered a massive Soviet nuclear and conventional threat in the 1950's, the procurement of weapons for the United States military proceeded at a headlong pace. The affluence of America was perhaps nowhere more obvious than in the huge amounts of weaponry and the ever-growing size of the defense establishment (particularly after 1960). In pursuing the domestic goals embodied in the "Great Society" and in prosecuting an escalatory war half-way around the globe, the United States was apparently capable of procuring both guns and butter. The central question was, however, how long could this continue? The bountiful resources of America gave the illusion that they were limitless. Today, the illusion has been destroyed and it has become obvious that hard and responsible choices should have been made (and must still be made) in the allocation of these resources. These choices, of course, are not to be made by the military - just as the choice between "guns or butter" and "guns and butter" are not military choices. However, it is necessary for the military adviser to be well informed regarding the many national issues which lie outside the narrow realm of his professional expertise. He can no longer remain unconcerned regarding the cost of forces and weapons, while championing the cause of military security. The needs and goals of the domestic society are very much interrelated with military policy. The Department of Defense is very unique as a government agency. While its actions are directed to the international environment, the resources from which it draws its strength come from the

domestic arena. It has a foot in both camps.[25] And the strength of the military depends on the strength of both material, economic and human resources at home. Therefore, the professional who recommends what military capability is required must keep his eye on his sources of strength. If he is to make responsible and credible military recommendations, he must understand the context of the situation and as well as the specific issue upon which his advice is sought. For a military adviser to do otherwise invites irresponsibility resulting in waste which may in fact degrade rather than enhance future national security. The requirement of military men to be aware of the effects of their recommendations for force levels and to consider these effects in making recommendations was brought out clearly in the following exchange between Senator Fulbright and General Burchinal (Deputy Commander in Chief of United States Forces in Europe) when the latter was questioned on United States force levels in Europe.

> Senator FULBRIGHT. . . . In making your analysis and recommendations with regard to keeping our troops in Europe, is the effect upon our economic situation here at home taken into consideration?
> General BURCHINAL. Yes, sir. All commanders in Europe have been very firmly impressed with the requirement for absolute economy in our operations in Europe, and I think you could characterize our command structure and our forces in Europe today as being totally cost conscious because of the economic problems the United States is having.
>
> Senator FULBRIGHT. . . . I just wonder just how thoroughly you do feel your responsibility to make a judgment as to the effects on the economy of these expenditures.
> I was a little surprised that you said you did. I thought the attitude, your attitude

would be that was for the political leaders to make that judgement.
General BURCHINAL. I don't agree with that, sir. I feel that we in the military share that responsibility.

Senator FULBRIGHT. . . . But do you think that the continued support of Western Europe, even though they are in better shape to pay for it than we are at the present time is necessary and overriding even to the detriment of our domestic economy which is now threatened with collapse.
General BURCHINAL. I cannot make that ultimate determination. I do know that our commitment in Western Europe is important. I know that it is glue in the alliance - - is what keeps the alliance the cohesive and integrated Military Establishment that it is.
Senator FULBRIGHT. If you don't make that determination who do you think should.
General BURCHINAL. I would assume it would be done here in Washington, sir, through the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the Congress reviewing the risks that are involved. . . . . The decision belongs in Washington. I can make recommendations from my vantage point in view of my responsibilities there.[26]

## CHAPTER V

## EXPECTATIONS VERSUS PERFORMANCE IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ADVICE

Since 1945 the constant state of flux in the international environment has not obscured the fact that a definite evolutionary pattern has emerged in United States national security policy. This is true despite the fact that rather large fluctuations have occurred in actions and attitudes on the part of the major powers on foreign policy issues. This is to say that there has been an identifiable pattern of international events which has produced a corresponding pattern in the evolution of United States national security policy. In substance, national security policy is merely a reaction to world events and can be thought of as a mirror image of the contemporary international environment. Of course, that mirror image may have some distortions in it due to imperfections of the reflector. National authorities may misinterpret events, may neglect or fail to see significance in some, or may erroneously react to others. In this respect they would correspond to a mirror with imperfections. Nonetheless, the civilian leaders will strive to keep national policy aligned with their perceptions of the evolving world scene. If their perceptions are accurate, a rational policy can be said to exist. However, if they are not, the direction of the nation's security policy may be grossly out of touch with reality.

If there is one overriding facet of United States post war security policy, it is the stress that has been placed on communication.

And this emphasis seems to have come about by deliberate attempt rather than by accident. What is meant is that the United States has persistently tried to publicly communicate the nature of its interests and objectives to the world. Distilling the major errors leading to both World Wars, the United States has consistently acted with resolve not to repeat them. Had Kaiser Germany been clearly informed that not only Britain but also the United States would willingly fight to prevent single nation domination of Western Europe, Germany may have been less willing to militarily underwrite the rather wanton Austrian adventurism. And had Hitler Germany been unequivocally informed that the British, Russians and Americans would combine their military efforts to deny Hitler his war aims, there is cause to believe that Germany may have been deterred from military aggression in 1939. The post war experience of Korea has further reinforced this notion but in a negative way. The Korean invasion occurred six months after Secretary of State Acheson announced that South Korea was of little strategic importance to United States security interests. Naturally, there are many who feel that this announcement in effect told the communists that all of Korea could be theirs if they so desired. The question remains, however, whether the communist invasion would have occurred at all had the United States announced its intention to defend Korea. Judging by United States foreign policy responses to international events since that time, the United States has clearly answered that question with a strong negative. Apparently United States leaders were convinced that other nations were listening and

reacting to clearly announced policy. The rapid accretion of public commitments to defend other societies, the obvious openness in Dulles policy called "brinkmanship," the announcement of the massive retaliation policy, the creation of another NATO-type organ in Southeast Asia, the resolute pronouncements of intent to defend Formosa and the Pescadores - all these responses were intended to clearly indicate United States intentions. Miscalculation of intent had to be minimized if war was to be prevented. Public acknowledgement of United States interests became a vital part of national security policy. It became obvious that only through a clear understanding on the part of potential aggressors of how the United States would react to international initiatives could war with the United States be avoided.

Aside from this overriding facet of clear communication of intent in United States national security policy, the evolutionary pattern of the policy since 1945 can be identified. It involves four sequential generations each of which can be accounted for chronologically. They were not policy shifts that occurred gradually but they were definite shifts as we transited from one generation to another. They also correspond in a general way to changes in administration. The period 1945 to 1951 marks the first generation which was one of increasing awareness of communist intransigence marked by mutual ideological propaganda, economic initiatives, and worldwide political and diplomatic realignments. Containment was the keynote of Western policy and the atom bomb represented the military potential backing this policy but the major United States responses were economic, ideological

and diplomatic measures. The years from 1951 to 1961 mark the next generation. Containment remained as the fundamental policy; however, after the Soviets developed their own atomic and hydrogen weapons, this policy was backed by the concept of massive retaliation. Slowly this concept became moderated and gave way to nuclear deterrence as the decade wore on but the United States response was increasingly military force or the threat of its use. This second generation witnessed large variations in overall relations between East and West: From the hot war in Korea to the detente of the mid 1950's to a reheating of the Cold War as the nuclear arms race between the United States and U.S.S.R. accelerated. The third period, 1961 - 1968, found the United States expanding its deterrence policy to include deterring conventional, as well as nuclear, conflicts. This policy expansion was in direct response to the Soviet announcement in 1960 that wars of national liberation were a legitimate means to spread communism. United States military entry into the escalating Vietnam war was the ultimate proof of United States resolve to prevent all manner of communist expansion. National security planning was based on the military concept that two and one-half wars may have to be fought simultaneously. If the United States did not prepare herself for this eventuality, then it was thought that there would exist a high degree of risk to national security. The final period of 1969 to the present has been a period of detente marked by the United States initiative to negotiate differences by the recognition that communism was no longer monolithic, by the reduction of United States war

fighting capability from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $1\frac{1}{2}$ wars, by the gradual drawdown of United States forces worldwide, and by the downward revision of the degree of United States support given to the defense of other nations as represented by the Nixon Doctrine.

Breaking down overall United States national security policy into these four generations since 1945 has obvious implications for the role of professional military advice. Without making judgement on the accuracy, reality or effectiveness of national security policy itself, but taking these generations of policy as the direction consciously intended by national authorities, it is of central importance to evaluate whether professional military experts proferred advice which was relevant to these major directions of security policy. If they have, then the United States military professional has performed well; If they have not, then there are several suggestions that should be made to make this advice more relevant to the needs of national authorities. By reviewing the succession of crises which has challenged United States security since 1945 in relation to the parameters and direction of the existant generation of national security policy under which the United States was operating, we can hope to evaluate the effectiveness of military advice.

Continuing the practice of World War II relationships between the military and national authorities, the military was continuously included in top level policy making after 1945. This is true even before the National Security Act of 1947 formalized the inclusion of the military in formulating high level policy in the National Security

Council (NSC). The mission of Generals Marshall and Wedemeyer to China in 1945-47 was to stop the civil war and effect a compromise between Chiang's Nationalists and Mao's Communists. The decision to force the two parties into compromising their differences was made by the State Department and the President. Marshall recommended withholding United States aid to Chiang in an effort to coerce him to negotiate with Mao. But his opinion was that the problem was basically "unsolvable" since "we cannot afford to withdraw entirely from our support of the Chiang Kai-shek government and neither can afford to be drawn in on an unending drain on our resources."[1] General Wedemeyer, as Marshall's successor as the Presidential envoy to China in 1946, emerged from the Orient challenging the State Department objective of forging a coalition government composed of Nationalists and Communists. Wedemeyer

> informed Marshall immediately that such an objective was impossible of attainment because of the completely differing nature of the two organizations and the fundamental fallacy of assuming that there could be political association with any Communist group without ultimate absorption by it.[2]

Both of these generals were required to make policy recommendations that had little to do with pure military requirements. National security considerations were, of course, involved. But their duties carried them far afield from threat assessment, military strategy, and force and weapons advice. Similarly, the three generals who administered the occupation forces in Germany, Austria and Japan (Clay, Clark and MacArthur) were heavily involved in making policy decisions that were outside the realm of normal military matters.

Matters such as the program of de-Nazification, setting up basic economic systems, establishing democratic social reforms and the supervision of the drafting of new consitituions have little obvious relation to overall military expertise. Their jobs were basically ones of high level civil administratiors. The point to be made is that professional military men have been directed to perform wide-ranging advisory functions which have required them to evaluate a myriad of non-military factors in making their policy judgments. Here, then, is another testimony to the range of expectations most national authorities had of military advisers during the period 1945-51. Certainly Truman had such expectations of them. Yet there is evidence that he also feared that the military might have played too large a role in policy-making. Some have commented that his acceptance of the NSC system was based on this fear for he saw the NSC as a means to control the highly popular generals and admirals and that it would formalize military inputs to national decision-making.[3]

The number of top military officers holding important government posts in the 1945-51 time frame can be partly attributed to the fact that the United States lacked a senior civil service with prestige and competence in defense problems. The United States had many civilian leaders who were very knowledgeable in domestic matters as a result of their service during the depression; however, they were not yet at ease in dealing with national security problems. As America traveled from isolationism to globalism during the war years,

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THE NATURE OF MILITARY ADVICE AND ITS ROLE IN FORMULATION OF NA--ETC(U)
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
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NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

it was the military leaders who benefited most in broadening their perspectives. Therefore, they were frequently called upon to serve in positions requiring an admixture of domestic, international and military expertise during periods of crisis. Radway explains it this way:

> It was easier to win support for the proposition that generals and admirals required a broad knowledge of world affairs than that diplomats needed information about new weapons and war plans.[4]

The appointment, and congressional acceptance of Marshall as Secretary of State (and later as Secretary of Defense) bears this out.

Shortly after the close of World War II, General Ridgway was assigned as the United States representative to both the Military Staff Committee and the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations. After he observed Soviet initiatives in these U.N. bodies for ten months, he submitted a written memorandum to his superiors which evaluated the Soviet objectives in pressing for United States abandonment of atomic weapons, for general disarmament, and for an inequitable formula for contributing national peacekeeping forces to the U.N. Security Council. In his conclusion, he stated:

> In short, the Russians were sponsoring a plan for unilateral disarmament of the United States, under the guise of a plea for general regulation and reduction of araments by all nations. It was a plan to strip us of our present technological and scientific superiority and to elevate the USSR to the position of dominant military power in the world . . . /by reducing/ all the world's armaments to those assigned to the United Nations /which were to be predominantly Russian forces/.[5]

This report was submitted to General Eisenhower (Chief of Staff), then forwarded through the Secretary of the Army to the Secretary of State, General Marshall, who gave it his full approval. Ridgway was later informed by Marshall in 1947 (which was later reaffirmed by Under Secretary Dean Acheson) that this document became basic guidance in the formulation of United States policy.[6] These examples clearly illustrate the wide-ranging significance of advice given national authorities by military professionals and what was expected of them by national authorities in the 1945-1951 time frame.

The next generation of security policy resulted from the Korean experience which indicated communist expansion aims included resort to military aggressiveness. This brought about a change in policy at the end of the Truman administration. It was decided that the policy of containment should become more militant. This is precisely what the military leaders, as well as the State Department, had asked for in an earlier study. In January 1950, Truman authorized the State and Defense Departments to study an overall review of American foreign and defense policy. This study was prompted by the Chinese takeover on the mainland and by the Soviet development of the atomic bomb. Within three months this was completed, sent to the National Security Council, and entitled NSC 68. It was considered one of the first comprehensive statements of national strategy and called for

> an immediate and large scale build up in our military and general strength and that of our allies with the intention of righting the power balance and in the hope that through means other than all-out war we could induce a change in the nat re of the Soviet system.[7]

However, Truman shelved this study calling for a defense budget of $35 billion (vice the $15 billion then approved) until the communist invasion of Korea. Then it was brought out of the files and implemented, which marked the inauguration of a new militancy in American policy.[8] National security policy was entering its second generation.

The Eisenhower administration continued the build up of United States military strength while ending the Korean conflict. But the Eisenhower emphasis revolved around strategic nuclear forces as announced in the strategy of massive retaliation. No doubt United States nuclear weapons were the biggest advantage over the Soviets; however, the growing defense budget was also of major concern to Eisenhower and nuclear forces represented more "bang for the buck." The implementation of the massive retaliation strategy required the build up of strategic airpower, resulting in most of the defense budget going to the Air Force. The strategic emphasis was nuclear and the force structure reflected the dominance of strategic airpower to the general neglect of conventional land and naval forces during this generation of national security policy. It should be noted that in contrast to the Truman administration, during the Eisenhower presidency there was a marked decline in the number of professional military leaders who were appointed to top policy posts. Truman had Marshall, Bradley, Clark, Wedemeyer, MacArthur and Clay in top policy making posts. Eisenhower relegated his top military leaders to the more restricted role of pure military technicians. He did not attempt to curry favor with the military neither did he want independent (or

divergent) opinions from the JCS. His style was to expect his military advisers to bring pure military advice to the council table - a throwback to the "subaltern" approach. And he used the NSC system extensively to forge policy recommendations. With this as an overview of policy and political style, we can examine the nature of military advice offered during the period of 1952-1960.

Following the Korean armistice in 1953, the Eisenhower administration found itself involved in yet another major decision regarding military action in Asia. The United States gave the French more than $1.2 billion in aid, supplied hundreds of mechanics and technicians, and provided airlift for troops to help preserve their colonies in Indo-China during 1950-54.[9] In August of 1953, the NSC decided American policy was that "the loss of Indochina would be critical to the security of the United States."[10] Although this policy was never officially revised by the NSC, the United States refused French requests for United States intervention on their behalf in April, 1954. Eisenhower decided, at that time, he would not intervene without both support from the British and approval by the Congress. He received neither. So the United States did not go to France's aid despite the critical military situation at Dien Bien Phu, the NSC's opinion that the whole of Southeast Asia would follow the fate of Indo-China, and the political importance of preventing a French defeat on the eve of the Geneva Conference. After the fall of Dien Bien Phu to the communist forces on May 7th and after the start of the Geneva Conference (convened on May 12th to restore peace to Indochina),

Eisenhower again seriously considered United States intervention but, for the second tim decided against it. The professional military advice Eisenhower recieved on this subject came on May 20th. The JCS said that:

> Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces to that area would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities.[11]

If the President were to decide to intervene on political grounds, the military experts were prepared to advise him. They lined up as follows: Admiral Radford (Chairman, JCS) and Admiral Carney (Chief of Naval Operations) both favored carrier air strikes (as did Dulles); General Twining (Air Force Chief of Staff) agreed and went so far as to suggest dropping one or two atomic bombs around Dien Bien Phu; and General Ridgway (Army Chief of Staff) strongly opposed any intervention because of his fear of being drawn into a ground war in Asia. Thus, only the Army advised against making the policy decision to attempt to rescue Indochina through military action.[12] This was conflicting advice among the President's military experts but it was, above all, based on individual decisions that involved only military considerations. Recall that the JCS overall assessment was that Indochina was not militarily significant to United States security interests and that any intervention should be limited in scope. Their disagreement only surfaces when they were required to comment on how best to achieve United States intervention if that was what the President ordered. While the Army disagreed that intervention

should occur, Ridgway's disagreement was based on the purely military consideration that the United States could not afford to get involved in a land war in Asia. Due to his most recent experiences as the Commander of U.N. Forces in Korea, as well as to the demonstrated American distaste for such limited conflicts as in Korea, the "no land war in Asia" belief was widely supported both within and outside the military profession.

But the central fact established in the Indochina crisis is this: In the first major presidential decision on the use of military forces in response to international events of the Eisenhower administration, the military advisers did not venture very far into non-military areas in formulating their advice. This was to be a trademark of this generation of national security policy under Eisenhower. His political style dictated this parameter of formulating military advice and the professional military responded accordingly. It was Eisenhower's expectation that each member of his advisory council speak from the pure expertise they represent: economic advisers should talk of trade, finances, monetary and fiscal matters; military advisers should deal with assessment of threat, combat situations and force requirements; diplomats should address themselves to strictly political matters; etc. When these differing institutional opinions were presented in NSC deliberations, the final arbiter was in the person of the President. Very clear and perhaps narrow definitions of responsibilities on the part of his advisers marked the Eisenhower administration. Some have considered this staff organization excessively rigid. Yet this was

the method of control used for this period - each department was given a large degree of independence and autonomy in developing their respective (and perhaps parochial) viewpoints. And from their presentations in the NSC, the alternative choices of policy responses would be made available to the President for his decision.

In one case, Ridgway refused to have his military advice colored by "playing politics" as he called it. In his autobiography, Ridgway states:

> As a combat soldier I have been shot at from ambush, and bombed by planes which I thought to be friendly, both of which are experiences that are momentarily unsettling. I do not recall, however, that I ever felt a greater sense of surprise and shock than when I read in President Eisenhower's State of the Union message in 1954 that:
>
> 'The defense program recommended for 1955 . . . is based on a new military program unanimously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.'
>
> As one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who most emphatically had not concurred in the 1955 military program as it was presented to the people, I was nonplused by this statement. The fact is the 1955 budget was a 'directed verdict', as were the Army budgets for 1956 and '57. The force levels provided in all three were not primarily based on military needs. They were not based on the freely reached conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They were squeezed between the framework of arbitrary manpower and fiscal limits, a complete inversion of the normal process.[13]

The significance of Ridgway's comments is that he felt the proper way to structure "the military program" (forces and strategy) was on the basis of "freely reached conclusions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." What is not defined, of course, is exactly what is meant by "freely

reached conclusions." However, it is obvious that in his opinion the JCS were not to consider manpower and fiscal limitations. And from his comments, one must assume Ridgway thought that if he did so, it would be "playing politics." Perhaps in Ridgway's view only purely military considerations constituted the proper basis for JCS advice. If this is so, the military can frequently expect to have their advice rejected as it was in this case. In that national security is a relative thing, there must be a balance between what is militarily desired and what is politically and economically feasible. To neglect considering the political, economic, or even social, sides of the equation is to place the adviser on a different frequency or wave length than the recipient of the advice and to court rejection by the recipient. As will be seen in both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations, when this happens the President will move quickly to replace the advisers who lack such basic understanding. Indeed, Ridgway was not selected for the customary second term as Army Chief of Staff. And when General Taylor was nominated to replace him, he was interviewed by both the President and the Secretary of Defense on his loyalty to civilian leadership.[14]

This idea of loyalty was also noted in Ridgway's book in that he, as Army Chief of Staff, was called on to publicly support the President's decision on force structure even though he disagreed with these decisions. Again referring to the military program of 1955, Ridgway comments as follows

> Later, the efforts of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs were directed toward securing the unanimous assent of the country's top military men to these pre-set plans.
>
> . . . . For I say in all earnestness and sincerity that throughout my two years as Chief of Staff I felt I was being called upon to tear down, rather than to build up, the ultimately decisive element in a properly proportioned fighting force on which the world could rest in its hopes for maintaining the peace, or, if the catastrophe of war came, for enforcing its will upon those who broke that peace.
>
> Repeatedly, I was called upon to take actions and advocate policies, which, if continued, might eventually so weaken the United States Army it could no longer stand, strong in its pride and free to fulfill its role as an effective instrument of national policy alongside of its sister services. If these policies were not arrested, it could no longer fulfill its commitments around the world.[15]

Apparently, Eisenhower and his Secretary of Defense expected the military to be docile "subalterns." Whether the President agreed with or rejected the advice of his military experts was of small consequence to the President during this period since the image he projected was that of the nation's foremost military expert. Perhaps for this reason, Eisenhower expected his military advisers to publicly endorse the adequacy of whatever force structure had been decided through the political decision-making process. And while those military professionals who served the President during this period acted in accordance with that approach for the most part, it is obvious many did so only with great frustration. Ridgway was not alone in facing the dilemma of presenting a professional dissenting opinion to the President yet being duty-bound to obey and support

the President's decision since he is the Commander-in-Chief. But how far should a professional officer go in carrying his case to the public? Frequently, he has little choice when Congress officially requests his professional opinion in legislative hearings. In such cases, he may change his opinion - perhaps prostituting it - or openly disagree with the President. Of course, some officers may use the vehicle of Congressional testimony to plead their case in the hope that the public debate thus generated may change the President's decision. Other choices the professional officer may make are represented in the actions of Generals Taylor and Gavin. General Taylor, after serving as Army Chief of Staff, left the service and recorded his protest to the current military policy and strategy in his book The Uncertain Trumpet. General Gavin chose to resign in outright protest over the diminished Army role in national strategy. It is interesting to reflect that all three men were from the Army - the service that was least benefited by the nuclear massive retaliation policy. One may be tempted to reach the conclusion that parochial service interests dictated their disagreements with the administration over military forces and strategy. Many have claimed that such parochialism in the recent past has discredited the military professional and lowered their prestige at the highest levels. Major General Dale Smith, who retired from the Air Force, wrote the following on this subject.

> Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once remarked: 'A man is bound to be parochial in his practice, and to give his life and, if necessary, his death for

> the place he has his roots.' It should strike nobody as odd that Army, Navy and Air Force officers cannot agree on the way a future war should be waged or how the Department of Defense should be organized. Members of other professions tend to regard the world in the light of their professional learning and habits. Why should one expect military men to behave differently? . . . . /Is it/ any wonder that a military man of a certain school - Army, Navy or Air Force - considers the major peace-keeping or war-winning force to be that force which he understands best and which he has been studying for most of his professional life? These differences of view are not hypocritical. They are sincerely and firmly held; just as are the views of the physician, the businessman, the lawyer, the advertiser and the diplomat.[16]

General Smith not only attempts to explain the causes of parochialism but in the above remarks, he goes on to justify parochialism. To many, the explanation portion can be easily digested but the justification of narrow minded parochialism may appear to be excessive. It would be a fine goal to attempt to minimize the intellectually honest, but service oriented, disagreements which arise. However, recognizing that we live in an imperfect world, the procedures of the JCS have been fashioned in an attempt to accommodate the advocacy system that exists. And in all advocacy systems, there will be winners and losers - the problem of how to deal with the loser would seem to be of considerable importance.

Since 1945, a little reflection points out that there have been no long term losers among the military services. Each has had its zenith and each its nadir. The system has the appearance of self-adjustment. But the most significant point to be made regarding

service disharmony is the injury that is done to the credibility of military advice when disagreements are stifled and unanimity is enforced on the JCS. Attempting to force the JCS to harmonize their views into a single military position before forwarding them to national authorities fails to consider

> the differing environments, experiences and operational requirements of military professionals in the many suborganizations involved . . . . Therefore efforts to create such a position lead to low-quality, least common denominator solutions which have been the typical product of JCS planning procedures. These 'solutions' will seldom, if ever, be accepted fully by top strategists . . . .
>
> The system designed to secure unanimity . . . produces papers of such dubious substance as to almost ensure the rejection of their (JCS) policy recommendations on important strategy issues.[17]

Military advice suffered also from a political stigmatism which came to be associated with the JCS. In revising United States military strategy upon taking office, Eisenhower thought a clean break was necessary with the Truman military policy. One rather momentous action taken upon his assumption of office was his wholesale replacement of the four principal members of the JCS. General Taylor explains two effects of this action:

> Whatever the justification for the mass exodus of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this event was profoundly disturbing to most professional military men. It suggested that the Joint Chiefs belonged to the Administration in power and were expected to be the spokesman for its military policy. This concept of role was quite different from that previously accepted. Heretofore the Joint Chiefs had been regarded as a nonpolitical body charged with giving professional advice to

> the Secretary of Defense, to the National Security Council, and to the President. It had been thought that they should give their advice with limited, if any, attention to political or economic factors, since these components of the national strategy had qualified spokesmen elsewhere in the governmental structure.[18]

The two effects are (1) the politicizing of the JCS and (2) the requirement for the JCS to expand the parameters of military advice to include consideration of non-military factors. In regard to the latter point, the basic JCS vehicle used to transmit their written advice was the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). This was submitted annually to the Secretary of Defense and consisted of Volume I on Strategy and Volume II on Forces. In formulating the JSOP, the traditional method was to first make assumptions (in the absence of any clear definition) regarding national interests and objectives. Reflecting such judgments in Volume I, the JCS would structure the forces in Volume II which they felt were required to implement the strategy. No economic or domestic factors were considered and for this reason the JSOP has been called the military "wish list" or "shopping list." After submitting the JSOP to national authorities, fiscal constraints on the defense budget were given the JCS which, as would be expected, invariably diminished the forces recommended in the JSOP. And during the Eisenhower years, these fiscal constraints were rigidly applied. Since the national economy was of primary concern to the President, he would, through his Secretary of Defense, impose a percentage of the budget to each service to insure not only that the budget was not exceeded but that

the services could support the current strategy with a proper mix of forces. The usual figures for the Eisenhower administration was around $40 billion total budget, with the approximate split of 46% for the Air Force, 28% for the Navy and 23% for the Army.[19] But these figures were not in conformity with the pure military advice rendered by the JCS through the JSOP. Obviously, then, the military advice given was not realistic, or at least did not meet the expectations of national authorities.

In overview, the large discrepancy between the JSOP force recommendations and the forces actually given the military, the political use of the JCS by the administration, the heated parochial arguments between the services over strategy and forces, and the military recommendations to intervene in Indochina in 1954 all indicate that the pure military advice given during the 1952-60 time period was of little importance or relevancy to national authorities.

The next generation of national security policy covers the period 1961-68. It is distinctive due to a quantum jump which occurred in military strategy and capability. The strategy of flexible response officially replaced massive retaliation. While the strategic nuclear capability retained its former emphasis, it did so under the concept of deterrence. It was recognized that massive retaliation only deterred nuclear war and the United States had no deterrent capability for conventional wars. The Kennedy administration remedied this by enlarging conventional ground forces

and tactical air forces, increasing tactical airlift, and converting the Army's Special Forces (Green Berets) to an expanded counter-insurgency role. All this was in general conformity with General Taylor's concept of flexible response. The United States was to have the capability to deal with any aggression at whatever level it occurred, whether it be insurgency, limited conventional war, or any escalation of it to the ultimate strategic nuclear response.

Following the Eisenhower practice, Kennedy replaced the principal members of the JCS; however, he did it in more gradual fashion by replacing them as their terms expired. This action was not a blatant political move since the President relied more on a strong Secretary of Defense to keep the JCS in line. Kennedy's expectations of the JCS is indicated by his statement in 1961:

> I regard the Joint Chiefs of Staff as my principal military advisor . . . . I expect their advice to come to me direct and unfiltered . . . . While I look to the Chiefs to present the military factor without reservation or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the overall context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern.[20]

For the period of the 1960's then, "military advice" was considered to include much more than pure military factors. Military leaders were expected to have a part in the orchestration of all aspects of national security policy. These aspects embraced national objectives, military strategy, force requirements, and national resources.

However, Kennedy's opinion of the JCS as his principal military

advisers is indicated by his appointment of General Taylor to the White House as a Special Military Assistant in 1961. Taylor was, in effect, interposed between the President and the JCS. Subsequently, Taylor came out of retirement to become Chairman of the JCS. His views corresponded more to those held by the President regarding both strategy and military advice. Taylor said the

> . . . stream of advice stems from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and flows upward also (sic) to the Secretary of Defense, and in some cases to higher authority . . . . The matters which flow in this stream are usually of multi-service rather than uni-service interest. They bear on such broad subjects as the objectives of our national and military strategy; the requirements in military forces of all arms to support the national strategy; and the use of our national resources to create and maintain these forces.[21]

There is a certain imprecision in the use of the phrase "bear on such broad subjects as . . . ." But it is clear that the principal military advisor in the 1960's considered his job to extend beyond the strict confines of military matters.

A true perspective of the effectiveness of military advice in the period 1961-68 can be shown best by a review of the phenomena called the "McNamara Revolution." With the investment of the Kennedy Administration came the most complete renovation of military advice in this century - - both substantively and procedurally. Frequently referred to as the "McNamara Revolution," the new Secretary of Defense consolidated authority and centralized his power over the military establishment. This is in marked contrast to the rather weak Secretaries who served under Eisenhower. President Kennedy, and later

President Johnson, had full confidence in McNamara and gave him full power to refashion the Department of Defense. This required no new grants of authority, only the full implementation of the accumulated (but largely dormant) powers existing in his office. The basic McNamara conception of military advice was that all JCS recommendations should be formulated in much the same way as business recommendations were developed in private industry - - that is, defense recommendations should be based on reproducable, analytical techniques rather than on intuitive and psychological arguments as they had been so frequently in the past.[22]

McNamara's initial contacts with the JCS confirmed his suspicions of traditional forms of military advice. In response to one of his earliest requests for extensive studies by military agencies, he found:

> First, each document tended to reflect the institutional perspective of the office *drafting* it, and second, most seemed to rely on verbal, conventional wisdom instead of hard, fresh analysis.[23]

Similarly, McNamara's first meeting with the President and the five members of the JCS produced added reservations. All were summoned to the White House to discuss the deteriorating situation in Laos in early 1961.

> On that occasion, the President found himself exposed to five divergent but vigorously defended military points of view. This unsettling experience followed shortly after the Bay of Pigs episode, which began to engender some loss of confidence in the JCS on the part of the President and his defense secretary.[24]

In reviewing the confluence of these events and criticisms as McNamara took office, one is certainly impressed that some changes were needed in the formulation of professional military advice if the military was to retain public confidence and credibility. The new secretary instigated changes "which widened the participation of officials in the development of military policies by denying to certain professional military groups the privilege of deciding without explaining".[25] The DOD officials who were central to this widening participation in decision-making under McNamara were the DOD Comptroller, a systems analysis expert (later to be appointed Assistant Secretary), the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (ISA), and the Director for Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E).[26] The confidence which the Secretary placed in the men holding these positions naturally diluted (if not negated) the advice he received from the JCS. Furthermore, from the large pool of civilian intellectuals (social and physical scientists, economists and historians) who were most anxious to contribute their ideas and talents to defense policy-making, many found their way into DOD itself, DOD contractual "think-tanks" (IDA, RAND, CNA, RAC, etc.), or academic research centers (Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, MIT, Harvard, Princeton, Chicago, Stanford, Columbia). To the extent that these individuals were employed or their products utilized by McNamara, the status of the JCS was diminished in regard to their role as strategists and defense policy-makers.

Essentially, McNamara, by the force of his personality and his

executive competence, was determined to gain control over the defense establishment. Given the proclivities for parochialism by the Service Chiefs in regard to programs, priorities and resources, the new secretary did not feel the JCS was prepared to advise him with the kind of information he needed to discharge the responsibilities assigned to him by public law. With only minor organization changes, he established management tools which could give him the degree of control he needed to fulfill his duties. These management tools were "systems analysis" and the "planning, programming and budgeting system" (PPBS). It is not my purpose to analyze these two management techniques in detail at this time. However, in that they were new methods used to formulate military advice, the following capsule descriptions are provided to indicate their impact on the nature of military advice.

Systems analysis is a decision-making technique that operates in a broader area requiring human judgment. It contributes to decision-making in the economic dimension. Calculations may be precise, but the results of an analysis may be erroneous because it is too narrow or too broad in scope, it is based on the wrong assumption, or it is addressed to the wrong question. This thumbnail description is borrowed from Wesley Posvar:

> . . . in the economic dimension, it becomes necessary to evaluate a whole panoply of possible 'systems,' in the form of missions, programs and weapons, according to their 'cost-effectiveness.' The resources for defense . . . must then be distributed among these systems . . . . So systems analysis for national defense may be defined as the study of major security programs, or 'systems,' . . . in order to facilitate the allocation of resources among those systems.[27]

The PPBS is a device to marry budgeting and military planning. Defense budgeting before 1961 consisted essentially of a presidential imposition of a dollar figure for the military establishment. It remained for the defense secretary to allocate this figure among the three services, each of which normally asked for more than its allotted share. Thus, the defense secretary found himself in the position where he had "to make major decisions on forces and programs without adequate information and all within a few weeks allocated to his budget review."[28] The inadequacy of this budgeting system was also recognized by General Taylor who told Congress in 1960:

> If we are called upon to fight, we will not be interested in the services as such. We will be interested rather in task forces /unified commands/, those combinations of Army, Navy, and Air Force which are functional in nature . . . . But the point is we do not keep our budget in these terms. Hence it is not an exaggeration to say that we do not know what kind and how much defense we are buying with any specific budget.[29]

The PPBS combined the existing budgetary and military planning functions through the vehicle of programming. Basically, programming is best viewed as a series of military-economic studies: a methodical costing out of alternative ways (basically weapon systems and force postures) to achieve military support for national objectives. The tool used in performing these military-economic studies is systems analysis. Typically the PPBS worked as follows: JCS military requirements were forwarded to DOD in the form of the JSOP, DOD applied the programming function to the JSOP to determine cost effectiveness of the various and sometimes overlapping force requirements, the Secretary reviewed

the recommended forces and programs and issued a five year force structure financial program which was binding on the Services. To provide flexibility in the PPBS procedure, reclamas from the services to DOD were allowed, but the ultimate decision of the Secretary was final.[30]

These changes to defense planning have been widely acclaimed as extraordinarily useful procedures in that they have rationalized the processes of defense decision-making and have contributed to better quality military advice in some areas. However, the PPBS which incorporates system analysis has definite limitations: it is far from infallible and it certainly should not be considered a panacea regarding eliminating controversies within DOD. Over and above mechanical errors which may result from faulty data, inaccurate predictions on performance and erroneous cost estimates, it is still possible for two system analysis agencies, using the same data and analyzing the same problem, to arrive at contradictory conclusions. Differing underlying assumptions and varying parameters regarding time, scope or mission allocation are several reasons which may account for these opposing results. Any such divisiveness between DOD and the services (or for that matter, between the services) may be considered a further detriment to the credibility of military advice. Thus, any claims that are made regarding the salutory effect of systems analysis upon military advice must be carefully prescribed and well defined.

Perhaps more significant to the role of military advice is the

fact that these new procedures do not assist in any direct way in selecting the "best" or "a winning" military strategy - - nor do they contribute substantively to the myriad of defense "policy" decisions - - both of which are central to the type of military advice required since the 1960's. Systems analysis, as an economic technique, is neutral to war subjective policy decisions as well as toward the purposes to which the technique is applied. The need for intuitive judgments based on professional experience is still required. Even if the most imaginative utilization of systems analysis were assured, many very important decisions would not be subjected to mathematical or other verifiable methods.[31] Moreover, the systems analyst in comparing two weapons systems possessing similar capabilities for destruction but differing operational limitations (e.g., surface-to-surface missile versus aircraft), may select one on the basis of marginal cost. However, in his preoccupation with economy, he may have knowingly or unknowingly selected the system which narrows the range of strategy options.[32]

In reviewing the renovations instituted by McNamara and his successors in the 1960's, it becomes clear that the role of the JCS in rendering military advice was changed in that they were required to render two types of military advice: pure military advice regarding the constitution of the nation's military force structure and a broader type of advice concerning the complex relationship between national objectives and military strategy. Divergent JCS views in the former category were minimized (or resolved when apparently

irreconciliable) by a strong Secretary of Defense using economic analysis. In the latter category, divergent views were more difficult to overcome for several reasons. First, views regarding the "proper" strategy for the nation were (and are still) largely judgmental and not readily subject to quantification or rigorous analytical examination. Second, the divergencies of views emanated from basic philosophical differences among intellectually honest military professionals as to the best means to accomplish varying degrees of national security. And lastly, each view could be readily supported by any number of civilian defense experts in the scholarly community.

In specifics, the impact of the McNamara Revolution was rather large on the first category of pure military advice and somewhat indirect regarding the broader type of military advice. An indirect impact, however, is by no means obscure for it is clear that if the means (military forces) at one's disposal is limited or rearranged, the range of actions (strategies) which can be effectively pursued is, by consequence, limited or changed.

The last generation of national security policy was ushered in with the Nixon administration. One of the first tasks of the new President was to revitalize the NSC (which had fallen into general disuse during the Kennedy-Johnson years) and order an extensive reexamination of our international commitments (National Security Study Memorandum #3) with a view to reevaluate United States military policy and adjust accordingly. He assumed office with the pledge of extricating United States forces from Vietnam and with the commitment

to replace confrontation between East and West with an "Era of Negotiation." He immediately de-escalated in Vietnam and commenced building bridges to ford the chasms of misunderstanding or hostility which characterized former United States relations with communist nations. The result of these assorted efforts on United States security policy was characterized by the provisions of the Nixon Doctrine which announced that while the United States would honor its treaty commitments, it would no longer automatically commit its manpower to the defense of other nations if they were to be attacked. Henceforth, United States policy would be to help strengthen indigenous forces and give all the required material aid to counter such attacks. This new direction, coupled with the reevaluation of commitments, signalled the end of the militant containment policy which, in turn, had a large impact on military strategy: The United States revised its military planning from the capability to fight two and one-half wars to one and one-half wars. But the primary emphasis on deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, was retained in the overall strategy. The maintenance of this deterrent was also justified as a "bargaining chip" in the era of negotiation. The motto of national security policy was: Negotiate from a position of strength.

The position of the JCS in the new administration had changed in a major way. No longer was a strong Secretary of Defense enforcing unanimity upon the professional military leaders and no longer were the views of the JCS modified or diluted before reaching the White House. The formalistic use of the NSC system assured the JCS a

voice in major national security deliberations. It would be a gross exaggeration to say that the JCS replaced the powerful civilian McNamara team as the principal defense spokesman for national security matters, but it is fair to acknowledge that the JCS did regain some of their former routine access to discussions at the White House level. That the JCS did not assert itself more strongly than it did at this time can be traced to the fact that the former power center focused in McNamara's systems analysis office was not completely disbanded with the change in administrations. The systems analysis office continued to function, albeit with less emphasis than before, but many former systems analysts were transformed to the NSC staff and other positions within the White House staff. Therefore, the locus of power on defense issues shifted towards the White House with the change in administrations. But there was a renaissance of the JCS. Colonel Donovan commented:

> In contrast to the practices of the McNamara regime in the Pentagon, Secretary Laird is reportedly giving considerably more weight to the advice and judgment of the Chiefs of Staff. The civilian defense analysts and "whiz kids" have either been downgraded or replaced. The National Security Council machinery, revitalized and managed by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, now provides a formal channel for the Joint Chiefs to express their own views to the White House. Under McNamara, military advice that reached the White House was usually and "agreed" Pentagon position reflecting the views of the Secretary and his civilian analysts.[33]

After eight years under the McNamara system, the JCS had learned that in order to be credible in their advice, they had to justify all

their recommendations on military strategy, force structures and weapons systems with analytical techniques that were validated by the civilian hierarchy. In order to do so, each of the services had created a systems analysis office of their own to counter McNamara's burgeoning staff. The cummulative effect of this was to improve the data and analytical methodology for service and JCS decision-making. And when the new Secretary of Defense under Nixon de-emphasized his systems analysis office, the services were better prepared and were able to pick up the slack.

A fine example of the new and more credible methodology for making military recommendations was given in the Air Force's testimony in Congress by Major General Bray in 1971. In commenting on how the Air Force determines the precise number of fighter squadrons which are needed to fight a NATO war, General Bray first listed three traditional methods of determining force structure, which all were essentially static measurements. The first method was "matching capabilities" which considers numbers of airplanes, sortie rates, pay loads, range and other static factors in relation to the target objectives. The second method, called "generating sorties," tries to determine the requirement for the number of sorties required in the major functional areas such as close air support, interdiction and counter-air, escort, etc. By applying planning factors (which are established by experience gained in previous operations and exercises) to each of these areas, the number of sorties needed in each functional area are established. The total number of sorties

are then translated into squadrons which then constitute the requirement. The third method, "matching airframes," is an extension of the first method by making substantive judgments as to how the enemy will allocate his forces.

> . . . . In matching of airframes you go through the same sort of static measurement, measuring the capabilities and numbers of the different aircraft, and then you make judgments as to how the enemy and yourself will allocate your force.
>
> You will make an arbitrary judgment that his first priority is, for example, attacks against airfields, and you sort of carry that judgment all the way through the time period that you are analyzing. You make judgments as to what strategy and tactics the enemy is using, and you make your own decision then as to how you will employ your force, and from this, come out with a requirement for numbers of airframes required to meet the enemy threat.
>
> Now, again, there are deficiencies in that procedure, in that it has you applying what you think the enemy is going to do with no way of enforcing what he in fact is going to do. And if you guess wrong, your results are going to be substantially wrong.[34]

Noting that deficienceis existed in all three methodologies, a fourth and more sophisticated, reproducible technique was devised:

> . . . . We do have a technique, a computer war game which we call a TAC Contender, in which we establish the effectiveness of air forces, enemy versus friendly, in the air battle situation.
>
> What we have tried to do is take it on a day-to-day, two-person, dynamic-war-game situation, and say in those circumstances with his numbers, what the situation is, what would be the optimum strategy for him to employ today and what would be our ultimate strategy in deploying forces. How many aircraft on counter air, how many on close air support, how many on interdiction.

> How you allocate the forces derives completely from the range of success of your forces in the various allocation configurations. This sort of analysis is the first we have ever done.
>
> It is a vast improvement in our view, and we can run different warning times; whether we have had 7 days' warning or 23 days' warning, we can vary the sortie rate generations relative to the enemy's. We can allow him to mass his forces on one day toward a particular allocation and see how we would respond.
>
> We don't know if he would--but we describe this on a day-to-day basis as being the optimum strategy. If he deviates from that, we can take advantage of it, supposedly, if we are smart enough and if our judgment factors are quick enough to respond and improve the status of our forces.
>
> . . . . In other words, we attempt to remove the standard judgment factor in matching overall airframes and vary the allocation of forces day by day as the situation should have dictated to the enemy and ourselves.
>
> And you can do these with computer runs to see which is the best way; that is, what is the best way he can allocate his force to get the best results out of it.
>
> Now, again, this is what we think is the best, the most sophisticated way yet of making force-structure analysis. And right after I have said that, we will certainly admit it is not the end, itself. There are recognized deficiencies in it. And there are still judgments that have to be applied.[35]

In this same Congressional hearing, the Army related similar computerized and sophisticated war gaming techniques in developing force structures. The point to be made relevant to military advice in all this is that the military profession no longer stakes its claim to expertise simply on the basis of accumulated experience in

operational matters. Professional judgment today consists of a judicious blend of technical competence, sophisticated analytical techniques and subjective judgments based on operational experience regarding the most effective way to employ forces. These are the military skills which are developed throughout a service career.

During the first term of the Nixon administration, the military services had the opportunity to demonstrate their professional expertise and regain some of their credibility. However, the services have also shown an increased awareness regarding non-military factors impinge on military advice. Under the present NSC system, the individual services are required to review the basic NSC document which precedes presidential decisions. This document, called the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM), is normally authored by the NSC staff and is initiated in response to any matter which requires a presidential decision. The document is a comprehensive study, usually requiring many redrafts to include the viewpoints of all the reviewing agencies. Subjects of such studies will have significant economic, political and diplomatic ramifications in addition to the military aspects. Typical subjects would include the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control, the question of making available military equipment, or products with military value, to various allied and non-allied nations (particularly significant under the Nixon Doctrine), the effects of base closures in foreign lands, the policy implications with regard to storage of nuclear weapons abroad, the political effects of United States dominance in the NATO military command structure,

comparitive costs and savings involved in redeploying NATO committed forces to the United States, etc. There can be no doubt that the manifold non-military overtones which emerge in all such national security studies must be analyzed, weighed and commented upon by military reviewers. Therefore, under the present system, the individual service staffs must view United States military security against a background of other considerations. If little or no regard would be shown for these other considerations in their review of the NSSM, certainly the military recommendations made would have little impact. The evidence suggests that, under the Nixon administration, the professional military has displayed a more universal approach in their military advice as is suggested by their gradual, but perceptible, increase in prestige.

In overview, the performance of professional military advisers during the four post-war generations of national security policy indicates a undulating and inconsistent pattern. The successive generations started with the all-inclusive type of military advice by highly respected World War II military leaders on a wide variety of national security issues which confronted Truman. Next, under Eisenhower who was considered the nation's foremost military expert, the substance of advice was expected to be purely military and the advisers were encouraged (if not required) to give unqualified support to the political decisions made. But the military profession itself was inconsistent in its approach to advice. On the one hand, some military advisers withdrew to th historically prevailing

concept of the "subaltern" approach by thinking it improper to consider non-military aspects of national security issues. On the other hand, these same advisers (e.g., Ridgway, Gavin and Taylor) disagreed rather vehemently with the political decisions made on national security. It appears, then, that the military forfeited their right to object on the grounds that they admittedly would not evaluate or recognize non-military factors which affected, and perhaps determined overall military policy. The substance of advice under these circumstances could hardly be relevant to the needs of national security. The third generation found military advisers generally unprepared for rendering the advice expected (with the exception of Taylor who at this time expanded the foundation of his advice). The Kennedy expectation for military advice was initially that of the "self-determinist" approach. When he found the military not capable of providing well-rounded advice, the JCS went into almost total eclipse behind the McNamara regime. Johnson's actions appeared to endorse and perpetuate this treatment of the professional military. Military advice was downgraded under a storm of criticism and the defense intellectuals stepped into the breach. Not meeting the expectations of national authorities, military advice was not relevant. The last generation under Nixon has shown an increased awareness by the professional military of the complex, inter-related and multi-dimensional nature of military advice. After being given a larger voice in national security policy formulation, the military has once again made its advice more relevant to the needs of national authorities.

## CHAPTER VI

## CONCLUSION

Military advice, regardless of whether it was accepted by national authorities, was held to be of central importance in formulating national security policy since 1945. As noted previously, Radway said that because he was "engrossed in the quest for security, the United States shifted from economic to military instruments of policy" by 1950.[1] Adam Yarmolinsky adds to this point by stating:

> It is hard to conceive, under the circumstances, how reasonable men in the executive branch could have developed or espoused any policies other than those emphasizing military security, enemy capabilities and readiness for worst contingencies . . . . It is fair to say that if American foreign policy became partially militarized, the blame should not be laid primarily on the military establishment but on Presidents, civilian policy makers . . . and on the situation in which they found themselves.[2]

Stephen Ambrose also points out that while national security policy has become militarized, it has not done so because of the advice given by military professionals. He cites the different responses by two presidents in the two similar situations of Berlin and Vietnam.

> In the cases of Berlin and Vietnam, each President could pick and choose from divided military advice. That Kennedy was active, even belligerent, while Eisenhower was peaceful, even passive, reflected their own styles and the interest groups they responded to, not the influence of the military. Eisenhower did not use military force to oppose Castro, while Kennedy intervened in Cuba twice, but neither acted solely, or even mainly, on military advice.[3]

Richard Barnet similarly acknowledges the militarization of American policy but takes a much larger step in stating that the American society itself (and the dominant values it espouses) is predisposed to war and that neither the military advisers not the civilian policy makers are solely to blame for what he terms the "permanent war" that the United States has known since 1940. He states that the roots of a generation of war are buried in the "drives within our society that impel us towards destruction."[4]

All four of the commentators quoted above admit to one central fact and that is the United States has, whether motivated by some kind of inevitable determinism or by purposeful conviction, been drawn into greater dependence on violence as a means of attempting to cope with a succession of wide-ranging international problems. But at the same time, those in American society who have been most concerned with and most directly affected by the "management of violence" - the professional military - steadily declined in status and prestige during most of the post-war period. Samuel Huntington correctly noted in 1963 that:

> Military leaders and military institutions were less powerful in the Truman administration than they were during World War II. They were less powerful under Eisenhower than they were under Truman. They are less powerful now under Kennedy than they were under Eisenhower. This constant decline in power and influence of the military profession is the single most important trend in civil-military relations in the past 15 years.[5]

How can one account for this dichotomy? It is generally conceded as a truism that when a particular profession rises in importance or

increases its activity within the society it serves, its members are accorded a larger voice and more prestige. That profession is generally considered to be the beneficiary of such greater societal involvement. Yet we can see clearly that this has not been the case with the military profession. The military has been continuously downgraded while the role of military advice in formulating national security policy seems not to have been less important, but increasingly more vital, during the last 28 years. It would be prudent to assume that its role of military advice cannot substantially diminish in the highly armed and nuclear environment in which we will continue to live. The question is who is to render the future military advice - the military profession or others?

The fundamental nature of military advice has changed drastically since 1945. Military men are now asked to consider non-military factors in defense policy deliberations. Even when they were not specifically required to do so by national authorities (as under the Eisenhower administration), they were roundly criticized by the scholarly and defense intellectual groups for not doing so. The consequent expansion of the foundation of military advice has, quite naturally, altered the nature of advice given. This can be seen in several dimensions. With respect to formulation of military strategy, higher levels of abstraction have been produced by the scholarly community due to the obscurities presented in conceptualizing the scenarios of a war in the nuclear age. Witness Herman Kahn's escalation ladder with some 44 rungs ranging from "ostensible crisis" to a nuclear "spasm."[6] These kinds of

considerations differ markedly in complexity and sophistication for the pre-1945 ruminations regarding military strategy. On the other hand, the use of systems analysis has had the effect of simplifying the processes of selecting weapons systems and force structures, at least insofar as economic considerations were concerned. However, the weapons and forces selected caused a "reverse flow" effect impacting on the strategies, if not determining them. So in effect, the nature of military advice has been simplified regarding economic choices in hardware and forces but has become more complex regarding decisions on military strategies, policies and objectives.

From this analysis it can be readily seen that the nature of military advice has assumed proportions which require additional special skills to be possessed by the adviser, namely economic analysis, conceptualization of varied defense scenarios for the future, and a keen understanding of domestic needs, social attitudes and resources. To meet these new challenges, two new constituencies were added to the primary defense policy-making body of the JCS. As was shown, these constituencies were civilian social scientists, economists and defense intellectuals employed by DOD. Granting the argument that systems analysis is merely a tool which still requires professional judgment in its application, a fundamental question is which of these groups should render the intuitive judgments which are constantly required regarding all aspects of the multi-dimensional nature of modern military advice? If these groups are not mutually exclusive, perhaps the question is which group should be the most influential in rendering military advice?

Until the military profession can develop, within itself, a consensus on the expanded nature of military advice, there is little hope of making their advice more relevant to the needs of our society. Certainly the military experts are professionally competent in the technical sense and are most influential in developing tactical military policy. However, it is equally obvious that the military as a group have not had an identifiable intellectual tradition to handle interrelationships of military/political problems. It is generally conceded that military professionals are men of action rather than theory, and it follows that while they are well prepared to advise on what can be done, they ostensibley have had a limited capability to advise on what should be done.[7]

It has been a strongly held belief within the military that when any civilian leader regularly and frequently overrules military advice from his professional experts, there is something grossly wrong and the advisers should resign or be replaced. General Taylor feels, however, that the military element in national security is so important as to continuously require the responsible voice of a professional military spokesman.[8] The logic of this is brought out clearly in the following statement.

> The military man spends a lifetime managing the means of warfare. He is constantly exposed to problems unique to his profession - - management of personnel and materiel, mobility, mechanics of the use of force control, etc. He gains a sense (both analytic and intuitive) of what is possible and what is not possible in given situations; and - - although he can be grossly wrong - - he will normally have a better idea about strict operational feasibilities than will his civilian strategy teammates.[9]

The failures of the military to provide relevant advice has been dealt with in preceding chapters. In brief recap, the reasons for these failures relate to the following problems: (1) the difficulties in identifying national interests and objectives, (2) the divergencies of professional opinion within the JCS on how to cope with various security problems, (3) the degrading of credible military advice when unanimity is imposed upon the JCS, (4) the lack of consensus within the military profession of what should legitimately be the content of military advice, (5) the inability of the JCS to conceptually deal with the complex domestic and international political ramifications of war in the nuclear environment, (6) the dilemma of loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief versus professional integrity in advocating a dissenting opinion, (7) the time-lag in developing professional techniques of analysis to support military recommendations, (8) the inadequate capability to consider domestic needs, attitudes and resources and to evaluate their impact on military programs, and (9) the lack of perception and flexibility by the military which is needed to correctly interpret and meet the differing requirements of new administrations. While it has been noted that in the most recent generation of national security policy the military profession has attempted to solve or eliminate some of these problems, there are some which seem incapable of solution. This should not be interpreted as saying improvements are impossible, for these problems can be minimized through a clear recognition of their existence. One such problem appears innate in the human experience and is illuminated by the following comment:

> . . . . The slowness of social adaptation in the midst of rapid technological change poses one of the most serious threats to civilization. This is a problem inherent in government and indeed in all human organization. The time-consuming process of education and experience people must go through to become capable of making judgments carries them into a strange new world in which the lessons are already obsolete. To a certain extent, conceptual lag is inherent in the human condition, . . . .[10]

Perhaps the most omnibus conclusion that can be drawn is that the military profession has not prepared itself to produce the type of professional which is required for the role of adviser at the highest councils of government. Perhaps due to the "inherent conceptual lag" mentioned above, there is no assurance that previous training, education and experience can adequately prepare professionals to meet the rapidly changing requirements of a demanding profession. And perhaps the comment of Forrest Pogue on General Marshall's preparation for high level professional duties is still operative today:

> He had attended military schools which fitted him to be a lieutenant or colonel but there was no way then - and perhaps not now - to train a general or Chief of Staff. Neither specified courses nor years of apprenticiship were enough for that.[11]

It is true that at the turn of the century, no institution (civilian or military) provided the proper education in international relations, social values, psychology of leadership or economic analysis required for high staff and command duties. Therefore, Marshall prepared himself in the following way:

> Lacking such instruction, the officer of an earlier era had to train himself. And for this he needed a belief in himself, an intense desire to know, the capacity to grow the trait of self-discipline and a compulsion to excel in his chosen field.[12]

But this is personal and individual effort. There should be some institutional method of preparation.

It is not suggested that there has been no progress recently in repairing the situation regarding adequate preparation for professional advice at the highest level. Certainly the continuing modernizing of the curricula at all three military academies and service war colleges has resulted in a vastly broadened education, the creation of such professional educational institutions such as the National War College, the widening of the recruitment base for officers from a broad spectrum of academic disciplines from the nation's universities (supported by the ROTC Distinguished Graduate regular commissioning program), the establishment of a large post graduate program for the officer corps, and the expanded opportunities for officers to apply for academic sabbatical leaves for in-depth studies in specialized fields. In addition to these expanded educational opportunities, the personnel policies of the several services have created other opportunities for career broadening. These include the Foreign Area Specialist Training program (FAST) in the Army and their counterpart programs in the Navy and Air Force; the career broadening assignment policy of selected officers taking on duties with the State Department, White House Staff, NSC, and Department of Defense; the exchange tours with

foreign military services; and tours of duty on international staffs such as NATO and the U.N. These improvements represent a noteworthy attempt by the military to stay abreast of the expanded requirements for military advice. However, the question remains: Was it too little, too late? It may be that a generation of military leaders will hold top advisory positions before the improved educational programs will made its full impact felt. It may also be that the advances made, impressive as they are, are not keeping apace of the more rapidly changing environment. This is a case of always playing catch up - the conceptual time lag - and never truly getting on top of events in the making, let alone anticipating and planning for future events. An interesting initiative which could prove useful for the military to pioneer would be the ideas of Alvin Toffler in his discourse on "The Strategy of Futureness."[13] Some small steps have been taken along these lines in forecasting alternative military futures and strategies; however, a bolder step may be required:

> The men who rise in management are expected, with each successive promotion, to concern themselves with events further in the future . . . . /yet in our educational system/ the student is focused backward instead of forward. The future, banned as it were from the classroom, is banned from his consciousness as well . . . .
>
> If the contemporary individual is going to have to cope with the equivalent of millennia of change within the compressed span of a single lifetime, he must carry within his skull reasonably accurate (even if gross) images of the future.[14]

In the same vein Toffler talks of games which

> . . . introduce the players to various technological and social alternatives of the future and forces

> them to choose among them. It reveals how technological and social events are linked to one another, encourages the player to think in probabilistic terms, and, with various modifications can help clarify the role of values in decision-making.[15]

Such an addition in professional military education may produce great advantages for future military advisers by allowing them to feel more comfortable with futuristic events when they occur, and giving them the recognized benefits of improved performance when the individual has some notion of what may come next. If in the past some emphasis had been placed on the stagnation in military thinking upon entry into the nuclear age may have been precluded. But this suggestion would be helpful in remedying only some of the identified problem areas of military advice.

Another suggestion to eliminate the unwanted excesses of parochialism would be to diminish the separateness of the military academies. One method of doing so would be the establishment of a three year National Security Academy to be attended in lieu of the first two years at the service academies. The Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, and other security agencies could also send its future employees to this Academy, and upon graduation all agencies could send their future employees to an appropriate school for specialization (West Point, Annapolis and Air Force Academy for the military branches).[16] The effect of this may be to cause the students to think along government, or overall, national security lines rather than along narrow service lines.

> And when some of these students become our future generals, admirals, and senior diplomats, these same three years of study might enhance that broad outlook that they will have to have to work well together in the best interests of our nation.[17]

Regarding the central question of who is to provide the major portion of military advice, all members of the military profession should feel the urgency of reestablishing their place in the center of the stage. Analytical techniques employed by civilian intellectuals of all descriptions obviously have a role to be played. Respect should be accorded to theory and quantification and the credentials and motives of those who use them. But respect should also be acknowledged for professional insight and intuition gleaned from years of association with the particular profession. Despite what many scholars and scientists say, too much objectivity may be bad because only

> a certain amount of subjective interest can call intuition into play, and intuition can furnish leads to more understanding.[18]

Because of the pervasiveness of the military in American society and its profound economic and political impact, the military profession will remain as a central issue of public debate, and the profession cannot afford to let that debate go unnoticed. Professional judgments on military affairs, and the defense and advocacy of these judgments within our society, will continue to be required. Who should prepare themselves to be better qualified to render such judgments.

> A judgment is an expression of belief based on one's entire training and experience and is inevitably both 'moral' and 'analytical,' 'technical' and 'political,' 'subjective' and 'objective.'[19]

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE | READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM |
|---|---|
| 1. REPORT NUMBER (9) Research paper, | 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER |
| 4. TITLE (and Subtitle) (6) THE NATURE OF MILITARY ADVICE AND ITS ROLE IN FORMULATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, 1945-1973 | 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED |
| | 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER |
| 7. AUTHOR(s) Masson, R.W., LCOL, USAF (10) Richard William Masson | 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) |
| 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS | 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS |
| 11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Center for Advanced Research Naval War College Newport, R.I. 02840 | 12. REPORT DATE (11) 1972-1973 |
| | 13. NUMBER OF PAGES ~~53~~ (12) 153p. |
| 14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) Naval War College Newport, R.I. 02840 | 15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED |
| | 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE |

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

A-UNLIMITED DISTRIBUTION; AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

The study assesses the historical associations between top military leaders and a succession of United States Presidents, focusing specifically on the decisions regarding threat assessment, strategy, and force structure. Each Administration has created a different position for its military advisors in the policy-making function, each seeking an undefined, "appropriate" role for the military in the formulation of national security policy. Beginning
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

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with a concept of the military professional, the study traces the historical background of professional military advice, defines the complexities inherent in its formulation, and draws conclusions relating to expectations versus performance since 1945. Essentially, the study surveys the period 1945-1973 but draws selectively on historical relationships prior to World War II.