Congress and Competition
Abstract
This paper examines the prospect of promoting greater competition in acquiring major weapons systems from the perspective of the Congress. Congressionsl support for competition derives from its promise of both direct and indirect benefits. The primary direct benefits are lower prices and greater technological achievement. An additional perceived benefit stems from the view that competition insures fairness. Among factors militating against support for greater competition are: increasing interest in interservice commonality, the evolution of defense spending into an important tool of social and economic policy, and the relationships of the Congress to the defense industry and the military. The author concludes that Congress would not favor rigid price competition that would close off distributional (non-price and non-performance) considerations. Additionally, a hard-shell of the cost benefits of any advanced competitive acquisition strategy will miss its mark if (1) the strategy clearly reduces congressional flexibility, or (2) it is not supplemented by appeals to considerations other than cost savings.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1977
- Accession Number
- ADA045677
Entities
People
- Michael D. Rich
Organizations
- RAND Corporation