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CORRECTION PROGRAM

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FINAL REPORT

VOLUME III: PROGRAM ANALYSIS

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Study examines the Army Correction Program to assess management, cost effectiveness and achievement of objectives. It recommends revision in organization and procedures to improve management and cost effectiveness of the systems and facilities. The Study examines the history of the Army Correction program and assesses system compliance with correctional standards and requirements of public law and military regulations. It provides an in-depth analysis of vocational training at the US Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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

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1.0 ANALYSIS OF ARMY CORRECTION OBJECTIVES

The analysis of the objectives of the Army Correction Program, as presented in this chapter, consist of three major components:

(1) Examination of the conformity of the Army correction objectives stated in Army Regulation 190-47 with the Department of Defense Instruction 1325.4 and with Chapter 48 of Title 10, U.S. Code.

(2) Assessment of the degree of consonance of the Army correction objectives with the current concepts, practices and trends in the field of correction in the civilian sector of the United States, and

(3) Evaluation of the extent to which the Army correction objectives are at present being met.

There is yet another issue pertinent to the analysis of Army correction objectives, which is the cost/benefit aspect of the objectives. The question to be resolved is whether it is possible to suggest modifications in the objectives stated in AR 190-47 which will significantly improve the benefit/cost ratio of the Army Correction Program. This issue has been discussed in Chapter 2 of this report.

1.1 The Conformity of Army Correction Objectives With Title 10 and DODI 1325.4

Sections 951 and 954 in Chapter 48 under Title 10, U.S. Code (5 July 1968) provide a statutory basis for the administration of military correctional facilities and treatment of prisoners. Under this law, the Secretary of each armed force has the authority to establish correctional facilities for the confinement of offenders. The Secretary concerned is required to:

(1) Designate an officer for each armed force under his jurisdiction to administer military correctional facilities.

(2) Provide for education, training, rehabilitation and welfare of offenders confined in a military correctional facility of his department.

(3) Provide for organizing and equipping offenders selected for training with a view to the honorable restoration to duty or possible reenlistment.

(4) Assign an officer in command to each major military correctional facility for the custody and control of offenders confined within the facility, and prescribe regulations directing the officer in command to use-fully employ the offenders as considered best for their health and reformation with a view to their restoration to duty, enlistment for future services or return to civilian life as useful citizens.

(5) Establish a system for the remission or suspension of the unexecuted part of the sentences of selected offenders who merit such action.

(6) Establish a system for the restoration to duty of such offenders who have had the unexecuted part of their sentence remitted or suspended and who have not been discharged.

(7) Establish a system for the reenlistment of such offenders who have had the unexecuted part of their sentence remitted and who have been discharged.

(8) Consider establishing a system for the retention of selected offenders beyond expiration of normal service obligation in order for them to voluntarily serve a period of probation with a view to honorable restoration to duty.

In short, the spirit of the law emphasizes the reformative and rehabilitative aspects of correction rather than the punitive aspect. Education, training, reformation, provision for the welfare of offenders, restoration to duty wherever feasible and possible reenlistment are encouraged. An effort to return the offenders to civilian life as useful citizens is called upon. Provision is granted for the remission or suspension of sentence for selected offenders who deserve such consideration and for their subsequent restoration to duty or reenlistment as appropriate.

To implement this act, the Department of Defense issued Instruction 1325.4 on 7 October 1968 prescribing guidelines for the treatment of military prisoners and the administration of military correctional facilities. The principles governing confinement of Military personnel as formulated in the DODI include statements such as "Discipline should be administered on a corrective rather than a punitive basis...." Accordingly, it prescribes that one of the recommended ways to offer maximum opportunity to punitive discharge prisoners for acquiring occupational skills is to bring them within the financial and managerial jurisdiction of the Federal Prison Industry. The DODI further prescribes that: "the program for prisoners who are to be returned to civil life by punitive discharge and who are not transferred to Federal institutions should include a reasonable opportunity to promote self-improvement through educational and vocational training, and in useful work of value to the government, within the limitations of available facilities and personnel." All this is in conformity with the emphasis placed on "preparing for return to civil life those whose sentences include punitive discharge and are considered non-restorable."

For prisoners whose sentences do not include punitive discharge, a program of useful valid work, military training and instruction within the limitations of available facilities and personnel is mandated. For prisoners considered restorable,

the instruction calls for correctional treatment programs and evaluation including intensive military training designed for their successful restoration to duty. The DODI also stresses the importance of using common policies and criteria for selecting prisoners for participation in restoration training programs. In selecting prisoners for participation in restoration training programs, the relevant considerations as listed in the DODI are:

(1) Potential for further military service,

(2) Mental and physical fitness for military service, and

(3) Assessment as to whether a restoration will have an adverse effect on the spirit and good name of military service.

Thus, it appears that the instructions for the treatment of prisoners whose sentences do not include a punitive discharge are also in conformity with Title 10, U.S. Code.

The current objectives of the Army Correction Program, as outlined by Army Regulation 190-47 are as follows:

(1) Return to military duty the maximum possible number of military prisoners whose sentences do not include a punitive discharge as morally responsible and well-trained soldiers with improved attitudes and motivation toward their obligation to self, the United States Army and the nation.

(2) Return to civilian life, or restore to duty, as appropriate, the maximum possible number of military prisoners whose sentences include a punitive discharge, as morally responsible and well-trained individuals with improved attitudes and motivation who are capable of assuming responsibilities associated with their return to civil life or military duty.

(3) Identify and release from Army confinement facilities, through separation from service, or transfer to another

appropriate Army confinement or correctional facility or the Federal correctional system, military prisoners who will not respond or are incapable of effectively responding to Army correctional treatment, retraining or discipline.

Both (1) and (2) of the objectives are in direct conformity with DODI 1325.4. The third objective does not seem to follow directly from the DODI, and in that sense is not compelling. However, it does not contradict the DODI or Title 10. The DODI prescribes a "reasonable" opportunity for prisoners to promote self-improvement. It can be interpreted that the prisoners who will not respond or are incapable of effectively responding to Army correctional treatment, retraining or discipline are those that have failed after being given a "reasonable" opportunity. As such, their separation from service does not contradict DODI.

1.2 Consonance of Army Current Objectives With Those Of Civilian Correction

As regards the objectives of corrections in the civilian sector, one begins with the observation that the civilian society, in an attempt to secure the rights and well-being of its citizens, has created certain laws, and has taken upon itself the responsibility for administering justice under such laws. In the process of administering justice, an offender who breaks a law is punished as prescribed by the judicial system. A review of the literature (See Volume II) indicates that throughout the history of correction, there have been at least two schools of thought regarding the goal of imprisonment--one has emphasized the punitive aspect, and the other has emphasized the corrective aspect. Depending on the variations in the numerous factors contributing to the social consciousness within the society, one of these objectives, during the course of time, has gained prevalence as the fundamental purpose of incarceration. At the present time and over the past

decade, the "rehabilitative" model has in theory and in practice dominated the civilian correctional system at the national level and the vast majority of states. To be sure, there have been some recent suggestions in the literature of the civilian correction community of new corrections models (e.g. Fogel's Justice Model), which are intended as alternatives to the prevalent themes of rehabilitation and reintegration. However, at the moment it is premature to predict what impact these proposals will have on the dominant objectives of civilian corrections.

As to the Army correction objectives, one observes that in addition to the normal spirit of law prevalent in the civilian sector, there are specific rules that apply to Army personnel in order for the Army to be capable of exercising the largest possible measure of force at will of the nation.[1] As such, the responsibility of enforcing such rules is borne by the Army. A person in the Army who breaks a law (either Army law or civilian law) enters the Army corrections system if the Court-Martial so prescribes and if the convening authority (Commander) so approves. The rehabilitative nature of the objectives of the Army correction system is evident from AR 190-47. Without question, these guidelines and objectives are in close conformity with the current concepts and practices of corrections which dominate in the civilian sector.

1.3 Extent to Which Objectives Are Being Met

The three objectives of the Army Correction Program are not entirely separable, either for evaluation purposes or indeed for policy-making purposes. The processing of prisoners at the confinement facilities (ACF's or ICF's) and the USARB is guided by Objectives (1) and (3). Similarly, the processing of prisoners at the USDB is guided by Objectives (1), (2), and (3). Therefore,

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[1] Lorry, Stuart H., Defeated: Inside America's Military Machine, Random House, New York, 1973, p. 258.

an analysis of the extent to which the objectives of the Army Correction Program are being met must begin with an analysis of the prisoner processing systems and conclude with an evaluation of the results of such processing relative to the objectives of "ideal" processing systems which fully attain these objectives. The following sections will examine the extent to which the objectives of the Army Correction Program are being met at three functional areas:

(1) Screening of non-restorables from among the non-punitive discharge sentenced prisoners,

(2) Preparation of non-punitive discharge sentenced prisoners for return to duty,

(3) Preparation of punitive discharge sentenced prisoners for restoration or discharge.

1.3.1 Proper Screening of Non-Restorables Among the Non-Punitive Discharge Sentenced Prisoners

In order for the screening process to be "proper", it is necessary that the non-punitive discharge sentenced prisoner population be optimally divided into two mutually exclusive sets -- one consisting of the non-restorables who are to be expeditiously released, and the other consisting of those that are to be returned to duty. This optimality in screening can be violated in two possible ways. An overzealous attempt to return to duty the maximum possible number of soldiers would tend to return a larger number of individuals than appropriate, thereby increasing the cost to the Army in terms of wasted training efforts, unsatisfactory future performance and possible future commission of crime. On the other hand, an overzealous pursuit of promptly identifying and expeditiously discharging the non-restorables would tend to release from the Army, those who could have been restored if given the opportunity to improve their attitude/behavior. Such excesses, in turn, would necessitate a

number of new recruits in order to maintain the required force level -- thereby adding to the Army's cost.

In the Army Correction Program, the screening of offenders is carried out both at the installation level as well as at the United States Army Retraining Brigade (USARB), at Ft. Riley, Kansas. Hence, the relevant question is whether an optimal screening is conducted in a uniform fashion throughout the installations as well at the USARB in order to promptly identify the non-restorables. The most direct way to measure the effectiveness of the Army Correction Program screening process is to conduct two tests, wherein the first test examines the post-return performance of those prisoners that are returned to duty to determine how many of them ultimately receive a less than honorable discharge, and the second test selects a random sample of those who are discharged less than honorably, and on an experimental basis, returns them to duty to observe if indeed they perform unsatisfactorily. However, while the first test can be conducted in a straight forward fashion, the second test may involve a major disturbance in the existing operational mode of the Army corrections system. As such, it is an unrealistic proposition. Therefore an alternative approach has been taken which is described below.

It was observed that during the 15-month period from July 1975 to September 1976, a total of 1,620 prisoners were sent from the CONUS* installation confinement facilities to the USARB. Out of these 1,620 prisoners, 975 were discharged at the USARB as non-restorable. Table 1.1 illustrates the breakdown of these numbers on an installation basis. It was found that the percent of non-restorables among the populations sent to the USARB from various installations varied over the range of 30% to 74.6%, with an average figure of 60.2%. Had the policy of sending to the USARB all prisoners whose sentences are longer than 30 days and do not include punitive discharge been strictly followed at all installations, the conclusion from

* The Continental United States

the findings of Table 1.1 would have been quite surprising to the extent of being implausible -- namely, that there is a wide geographical distribution to the nature of prisoners as reflected in their respective restoration potentials. However, a researcher is spared this surprise when the observation is made that not all prisoners who were eligible to be assigned to the USARB were actually assigned to the USARB. Some of them were directly sent back to duty, and some received an administrative discharge. Table 1.2 illustrates the number of prisoners at CONUS installation facilities who were eligible for the retraining program but were not assigned to the USARB over a period of 15 months -- from July 1975 to September 1976 (i.e. the same period over which data for Table 1.1 are collected). Table 1.2 indicates that the percent of prisoners actually assigned to the USARB from among the eligible candidates varied from 18.9% to 99.2% over the various installation facilities. This indicates that the process of selecting prisoners to be assigned to the USARB lacks uniformity across the installations.

Conceptually, a screening process consists of two components. The first component involves the use of an assessment or rating system where an assigned rating reflects a measure of the "performance" or potential "capability" of an individual candidate with respect to others. The second component is the establishment of a reasonable acceptance/rejection criterion. Those candidates with ratings lower than the established criterion fail to pass the screen, by definition. The others pass the screening process. As regards the screening of non-punitive discharge prisoners who were eligible for assignment to the USARB, it is obvious from Table 1.2 that the second component, namely the acceptance criterion, is not uniformly established at the installation level. This lack of uniformity manifests itself in a wide variation in the percentage of prisoners actually assigned to the USARB from among the prisoners that were eligible to be sent to the USARB.

TABLE 1.1 Discharge Level at USARB on Prisoner Shipments from Installations (July 1975 to September 1976)

Arranged in Descending Order

PARENT POST	Assigned to USARB Retraining	Discharged from USARB as Non-Restorable	% Discharged
1. Riley	118	88	74.6%
2. Lewis	76	55	72.4%
3. Bliss	100	67	67.0%
4. Ord	87	58	66.7%
5. Carson	197	129	65.5%
6. Benning	89	57	64.0%
7. Polk	19	12	63.2%
8. Campbell	140	85	60.7%
9. Meade	81	49	60.5%
10. Sill	32	19	59.4%
11. Leonard Wood	22	13	59.1%
12. Hood	330	191	57.9%
13. Bragg	218	114	52.3%
14. Gordon	86	30	34.9%
15. Dix	15	5	33.3%
16. Knox	10	3	30.0%
TOTAL:	1,620	975	60.2%

TABLE 1.2 Fraction of Eligible* Prisoners Actually Assigned to the USARB (July 1975 to September 1976)

Arranged in Descending Order

PARENT POST	Number Assigned to USARB	Number Eligible But Not Assigned to USARB	TOTAL	% of Total Assigned to USARB
1. Riley	118	1	119	99.2%
2. Polk	19	1	20	95.0%
3. Bragg	218	21	239	91.2%
4. Campbell	140	14	154	90.9%
5. Gordon	86	11	97	88.6%
6. Hood	330	46	376	87.8%
7. Meade	81	18	99	81.8%
8. Benning	89	23	112	79.5%
9. Carson	197	69	266	74.1%
10. Bliss	100	50	150	66.7%
11. Lewis	76	40	116	65.5%
12. Ord	87	75	162	53.7%
13. Sill	32	33	65	49.2%
14. Leonard Wood	22	24	46	47.8%
15. Dix	15	37	52	20.8%
16. Knox	10	43	53	18.9%

Eligible prisoners, according to AR 190-47, are those without punitive discharge who will have 6 months or less confinement remaining on arrival at the USARB. However, since a number of installations do not usually assign to the USARB those prisoners whose sentences are shorter than 30 days, this group of less-than-30-day-sentenced prisoners has been excluded from this analysis for the purpose of homogeneity of data.

A question, however, still remains as to the uniformity (or lack of it) of the first component, namely system of assessing the eligibility of prisoners. It can be mathematically demonstrated that if there was a uniform system for selecting USARB transfers, there should exist a high degree of correlation between the percentages of eligible prisoners actually assigned from various installations to the USARB and the corresponding percentages of prisoners discharged at the USARB as non-restorable. In order to detect and verify the existence of this correlation, the CONUS installation facilities were ranked (from first to 16th) in two ways. First, they were ranked, as shown in Table 1.1, according to the percent of prisoners discharged at the USARB as non-restorable from among the number of prisoners assigned from them to the USARB. Secondly, they were ranked, as shown in Table 1.2, according to the percent of prisoners actually assigned from them to the USARB out of their prisoner population that was eligible for the USARB assignment. Figure 1.1 illustrates a scatter diagram, where the straight line describes the correlation that should have existed under ideal circumstances, and the dots indicate the actual scatter that occurred in practice. It is interesting to observe that only at the extremes (i.e. Ft. Riley, Ft. Dix and Ft. Knox) there was conformity between reality and the ideal situation. But in the region in between, there was no correlation between the percent of eligible prisoners assigned and the percent of prisoners discharged at the USARB as non-restorable. This observation is intuitively appealing in the sense that in the extreme case where little or no screening is done, a high percent of the prisoners would surely be expected to be rejected at the USARB, whereas on the other extreme, if few or no prisoners are sent to the USARB, then sure enough few or none will be rejected at the USARB. Thus, the actual observations at the two extremes of Figure 1.1 can be easily reconciled. It is only in the region between the two extremes where subjective screening is evident and it is precisely in this region where randomness abounds.

FIGURE T.1: Scatter Diagram For Percent Discharged at the USARB Against Percent of Eligible Prisoners Assigned to the USARB



This analysis clearly proves that not only is the acceptance/rejection criterion of prisoner screening non-uniform or non-existent among the various installations (as indicated earlier), but also the subjective evaluation of the restoration potential of a prisoner is non-uniform among the various installations. In other words, both the components of screening process, as defined earlier, exhibit a non-uniform distribution over the various installation facilities. Since the screening processes are different at different installations, they cannot all simultaneously be equivalent to any optimal screening procedure. Hence the conclusion is that the Army Correction screening process, as it is practiced today, does not optimally separate the two sets, namely those that are to be returned to duty and those that are to be discharged. Therefore, Objective (3) of the Army Correction Program is not being met. Some insight into the imperfections of the screening process can be gleaned from the summary analysis of the data in Table 1.2 which reveals that of the prisoners from FORSCOM installations who were eligible for assignment to the USARB, 82% were actually assigned there, while TRADOC installations assigned significantly fewer of its eligible prisoners (62%) to the USARB. The reason(s) for and the efficacy of this difference between the two commands with operating responsibility for the Army Corrections Program are matters which should be fully explored by the Army.

1.3.2 Maximum Possible Return of Non-Punitive Discharge Sentenced Prisoners as Improved Soldiers

One of the missions of the Army Retraining Brigade at Ft. Riley, Kansas as interpreted from AR 190-47 is to provide the specialized correctional treatment, care, training and custodial supervision necessary to prepare military prisoners for return to military duty with improved attitudes. Thus, the effectiveness of the retraining program should be reflected in a "better" post-restoration performance of prisoners channeled through the USARB

TABLE 1.3 OBSERVATIONS PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF USARB TRAINING PROGRAM

Observations	Assigned To U.S.A.R.B.	Graduated[1] From U.S.A.R.B.	Returned Directly From ICF And ACF
Sample Population	1,620 (set=100%)	645 (set=100%)	1,029 (set=100%)
Losses[2] at 0 month	60.2%	0%	0%
Losses at 6 months	3.9%	9.9%	36.6%
Losses at 9 months	3.9%	9.7%	9.9%
Losses at 12 months	6.0%	15.0%	15.1%
Losses at 15 months	3.2%	8.1%	6.4%
Losses at 18 months	6.8%	17.0%	8.4%
Losses > 18 months and population still in service	16.0%	40.3%	23.6%
Honorable Discharge and population still in service	23.0%	58.0%	32.0%
General Discharge	77.0%	12.0%	24.0%
Less than Honorable Discharge		30.0%	44.0%
Average Months Served (After Release)	-	16.7	11.4
Promoted or Recommended for Promotion	35.0%	88.0%	30.0%

[1]The 645 trainees who graduated from the USARB are included in the 1,620 trainees assigned to the USARB.

[2]Losses refer to all separations from the Army, before Graduation

when compared with the post-return performance of a similar group of prisoners who are eligible for the retraining program, but are returned directly to duty from installations. For the purpose of comparison, a "control group" was defined as the set of prisoners who were eligible for the retraining program, but who were instead directly returned to duty from installations. The other group of prisoners, namely those that were channeled through the USARB, were defined as the "test group." The results of a comparison between the groups are illustrated in Table 1.3. It was observed that out of a sample population of 645 prisoners who graduated from the USARB during the period July 1975 to September 1976, approximately 88% were recommended for promotion and 58% have honorable standing or received honorable discharge. The average length of stay of USARB graduates was approximately 17 months. In contrast, during approximately the same period, out of a population of 1,029 prisoners who were returned from confinement facilities directly to duty bypassing the USARB, 30% were recommended for promotion, and 32% have honorable standing or received honorable discharge. The average length of stay of the control group was approximately 11 months. Clearly, the USARB graduates performed significantly better than the control group. A Chi-Square analysis assigns 99.99% statistical confidence in the hypothesis that USARB graduates are "better" as a group than those returned to duty directly from installations. This proves that the USARB functions as an effective screening device such that the percent of "well-trained soldiers with improved attitudes and motivation" among the USARB graduates is higher than the percent of similar soldiers among direct returnees from the installations. However this is not the issue at hand.

The real issue is whether the USARB is returning the maximum possible number of individuals from among those <u>assigned</u> there, as good soldiers with improved attitudes and motivation. It should be recognized that it is unrealistic to expect that the USARB would convert every prisoner it receives into a good soldier. In fact, the data in Table 1.3 indicate that out of the total population

assigned to the USARB, 35% were recommended for promotion and only 23% have honorable standing or received honorable discharge. The remaining 77% received less than honorable discharge which included 60.2% who were discharged as unrestorable at the USARB. By comparison, from among the ICF and ACF population that was directly returned to duty bypassing the USARB, 30% were promoted and 32% received honorable discharge. Assuming that the attributes of the control group and the test group were identical, it follows that the USARB training program did not increase the likelihood that any given individual assigned to the USARB would be returned as an improved soldier. (This is because of the high probability that the individual would be discharged at the USARB as unrestorable.) It is only for those individuals deemed restorable by the USARB (and hence, allowed to graduate) that the probability of good performance was significantly greater than that of an average prisoner at the confinement facilities. Hence, the demonstrated contribution of the USARB was not in converting "bad soldiers" to "good soldiers" but in screening them out expeditiously.[2] This screening led to a "highly select" restorable population that graduated from the USARB which was significantly superior (in terms of promotability, length of stay and type of discharge), to the intake population of the USARB and significantly superior to the restorable prisoner population that was returned to duty directly from ACF's and ICF's. It should be noted that the comparison suffers an incompleteness in the sense that the personal attributes and the nature of crimes committed were not matched between the two groups of prisoners, namely those who were assigned to the USARB and those who were returned to duty directly from confinement facilities. The results presented here are based on the assumption that the personal attributes and the crime types are comparable between the two prisoner groups.

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[2] This conclusion is based on data collected during the period July 1975 to September 1976. Since September 1976, modifications have been introduced in the training program which have been labeled as "the fine tuning of the old program". The impact of this modification has not been considered in this study.

As in any other screening process, the selection conducted at the USARB cannot be expected to be "perfect" in the strict mathematical sense of the term. One of the standard ways to quantify the level of imperfection is in terms of the two kinds of errors that may occur:

(1) Type 1 error (i.e. an individual who should have been discharged is allowed to graduate, which leads to unsatisfactory performance after he is restored), and

(2) Type 2 error (i.e. an individual who, if properly encouraged and trained, would have graduated, but is discharged by mistake).

These errors can be computed only if one can define a number of measurable attributes of a prisoner that would uniquely determine whether he should be discharged or restored. It does not seem likely that any such definition exists. However, a number of definitions that hold in a limited sense can be enunciated. For example, one can argue that those who, after being restored to duty, were less than honorably discharged should not have been allowed to graduate from the USARB. Similarly, those who might have received an honorable discharge should not have been discharged expeditiously at the USARB. It should be emphasized that many such criteria for expeditious discharge and restoration can be defined which are equally valid. However, based on the definition stated above, one can express Type 1 errors as the conditional probability that an individual eventually receives a less than honorably discharge, given that he graduated from the USARB. Similarly, given that a person was discharged as non-restorable, the measure of a Type 2 error is the conditional probability that he would have eventually received an honorable discharge had he been allowed to graduate. Calculations based on the data of Table 1.3 indicate that the Type 1 error committed by the USARB was 30% and Type 2 error was 15%. In other words, for every 100 individuals discharged as non-restorable,

there are 15 that should not have been discharged before completion of the program, and for every 100 individuals graduated from the USARB, there are 30 who should have been discharged. It should be emphasized that these numbers are based on the rather narrow definition of the restoration and rejection criteria mentioned above, and, on the assumption[3] that the prisoners assigned to the USARB (i.e. the test group) and those returned directly from confinement facilities bypassing the USARB (i.e. the control group) are like populations. However, the magnitude of these errors are well within the limits of an acceptable screening system.

In view of the above, the USARB has performed well in its effort to return the maximum possible number of prisoners as good soldiers (at least through superior screening, if not through converting "bad soldiers" to "good soldiers"). The conclusion is that the Army has performed well with respect to Objective 1. By the same token, because a substantial number of prisoners from confinement facilities were not assigned to the USARB, but were returned directly to duty and ultimately received a less than honorable discharge, the Army has not met Objective 3 to the best of its ability. Restoration to duty directly from the confinement facilities does not result in the early identification and expeditious discharge of unrestorable prisoners.

1.3.3 Maximum Possible Preparation for Punitive Discharge Sentenced Prisoners As Capable Individuals

A prisoner whose sentence includes a punitive discharge can be discharged at the installation level or assigned to the United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, where the prisoner serves the sentence which is usually followed by a discharge from the Army. A small percentage (less than 10%) of the prisoners are restored or returned to duty in which case they are assigned to the USARB for the retraining program.

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[3] Further studies are recommended for checking the validity of this assumption

Thus, there are two questions to resolve:

(1) Are the maximum possible number of prisoners at the USDB who show restoration potential actually being assigned to the USARB from the USDB?

(2) Are the maximum possible number of prisoners at the USDB who are discharged as civilians, being prepared as well-trained individuals capable of assuming responsibilities of the civilian life?

These issues are discussed in the following paragraphs.

1.3.3.1 Prisoners With Punitive Discharge Sentence Considered for Restoration

As mentioned in Section 1.3.1, a direct way to measure the effectiveness of the screening process that selects those considered for restoration is to increase, on an experimental basis, the percentage of prisoners actually assigned to the USARB from the USDB from among the USDB prisoners who request such restoration, and then to observe their performance. But this method was not pursued in this study due to the disruptive impacts which might have occurred as a result of such an experimental attempt. Instead, the following data were collected.

The annual historical summary (RCS CSHIS-6(R2)) of the USDB for the period 1 July, 1975 to 30 September, 1976 states that during the fiscal year 1976, 1,489 applications for restoration were received and 117 persons were actually assigned to the USARB. The group of USDB prisoners who are assigned to the USARB consists primarily of those prisoners whose sentences do not include a punitive discharge. Only a limited number of prisoners whose sentences include a punitive discharge are considered for restoration. The USARB report indicates that out of the USDB prisoners assigned to the USARB, approximately 38% were discharged prior to graduation as non-restorable. On the assumption that a substantial portion of these USDB prisoners assigned to the USARB were those whose sentences did not include a punitive discharge

(and hence they were assigned to the USARB in a routine fashion without any screening), their discharge rate of 38% compares favorably with the average prior-to-graduation discharge rate of 60.2% at the USARB (See Table 1.3). This is indicative of the success of the rehabilitation program conducted at the USDB for such prisoners. However a rather small percentage of USDB prisoners whose sentences included a punitive discharge were assigned to the USARB. The correlation line of Figure 1.1 indicates that this percentage can be increased without any deterioration in the existing success rate of such prisoners at the USARB. Hence it is recommended that this percentage be increased so that a larger number of prisoners with punitive discharge sentence are reconsidered and given another change, especially if they show promise and request such restoration.

1.3.3.2 Prisoners With Punitive Discharge Sentence Discharged As Civilians

An important aspect of the USDB program is to provide training (such as vocational and educational) to those who are to be discharged from the Army at the termination of their sentences, so that they could assume their civilian responsibilities with improved attitudes and motivation. To determine how well this objective is being met, the following analysis was performed.

A population of 146 prisoners released prior to July 1976 from the USDB was selected on a stratified sample basis so as to contain 75% civilian offenses with sentences longer than 12 months, and 25% military offenses with sentences longer than six months. This percentage mix is fairly representative of the present USDB population. Four sets of data were collected on the selected population:

(1) Pre-release institutional data,
(2) Two-week follow-up data,
(3) Three-month follow-up data, and
(4) Six-month follow-up data.

As can be expected, the data were censored in the sense that out of the 146 individuals selected for the study, 91 completed the three-month questionnaire, and 66 completed the six-month questionnaire. The data collected for this study are illustrated in Table 1.4. These data constitute a subset of a study at present being conducted at the USDB on post-release performance.

TABLE 1.4 Attributes and Performance of USDB Releasees For Evaluating Impact of USDB Training Programs

Attributes	Question # In USDB Questionnaire Form
PRE-RELEASE DATA	
(A) Age at first arrest	1
(B) Number of previous arrests	32
(C) Age at release	34
(D) USDB educational program (1=yes)	37
(E) USDB voc. training cerfiticate (1=yes)	39
(F) First job arranged by USDB (1=yes)	41
TWO-WEEK FOLLOW-UP DATA	
(G) Attitude toward USDB (3=most positive)	4
(H) Average weekly income	10
(I) Police contact (1=arrested)	12
THREE-MONTH FOLLOW-UP DATA	
(J) Average weekly income	7
(K) USDB training used on job	17
(L) Unemployed days	27
(M) Attitude toward USDB (3=most positive)	32
(N) Police contact (1=arrested)	33
SIX-MONTH FOLLOW-UP DATA	
(O) Attitude toward USDB (3=most positive)	17
(P) Level of unemployment	20
(Q) Average weekly income	22
(R) USDB training used on job	28
(S) Police contact (1=arrested)	41

The following observations were made from the data (for details, see Appendix A):

(1) In approximate figures, some 80% of the population participated in educational programs, 60% participated in vocational training programs of any kind and only 36% received vocational training certificates.

(2) One-third of the population had no jobs on release, almost half of the population was placed in jobs through the help of families and friends, less than 5% of the population received job placement through the USDB, and the remaining population (approximately 15%) was employed through various employment offices.

(3) Approximately 10% of releasees were rearrested over a period of six months following their release. This percentage was calculated on the assumption that the rate of arrest among those who did not respond to the survey questions was the same as the rate of arrest among those who responded and provided the data base.

(4) Average weekly income during the first two weeks was approximately $40, which increased to approximately $80 and $100 by the end of the three months and six months, respectively.

(5) Out of a population of 66 individuals who completed the six-month follow-up questionnaire, 24 received vocational training certificates at the USDB, while 42 had no vocational training certificate. Out of the population of 24 who had vocational training certificates, approximately 80% earned more than the above stated average weekly income figure of $100. Out of the population of 42 who had no vocational training certificates, only 57% earned more than $100 per week. The corresponding contingency

table yielded a Chi-Square value of 2.36 implying that approximately 90% statistical confidence (according to Chi-Square test) could be attached to the hypothesis that the USDB vocational training program was positively correlated with the earning capacity over the follow-up period. Mann-Whitney U Test[4] performed on the same data yielded a U-value equal to 238. The corresponding standardized statistic was approximately equal to 1.6 implying that 95% confidence (according to Mann-Whitney Test) could be associated with the hypothesis that the USDB vocational training was positively correlated with earning capacity. This positive correlation was also confirmed by the covariance matrix illustrated in Appendix A.

(6) The covariance matrix illustrated in Appendix A also implies that the USDB image, as reflected in the attitude survey, was positively correlated with income, employment level and use of USDB training on the job. It should further be noted that no significant correlation was detected between the USDB educational program and earning capacity over the follow-up period.

From the above observations, two important findings emerge. One is that the percent of USDB releasees rearrested within six months after their release was approximately 10%. This is lower than the corresponding figure typical of the civilian correction system. A study on the post-release follow-up of releasees from the maximum security prison in the State of

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[4]Gibbons, Jean D., Nonparametric Statistical Inference, McGraw Hill, 1971, Chapter 7, p. 140.

Connecticut revealed that 25% were rearrested within six months after release.[5] This leads to the conclusion that the USDB is performing better than a typical civilian correction system in its rehabilitative measures. However, it should be emphasized that the figure 10% was based on the assumption that those USDB releasees who did not respond to the survey had similar post-release arrest patterns as was evidenced by the survey data. There is a reasonable probability that this assumption may turn out to be untenable.

The second finding that emerges out of the above listed observations is that while the vocational training certificate had a positive correlation with earning capacity and hence, rehabilitation of a releasee, the educational training program did not exhibit any such correlation. Yet, 80% of the prisoners participated in educational programs while 60% participated in vocational training programs. Further, almost half of the people participating in vocational training programs did not succeed in getting a certificate of completion. Thus, there is scope to improve the vocational training program encouraging increased participation and assuring higher rates of successful completion. There are a number of ways to achieve this, but a low-cost approach is to develop companion prison industries which provide realistic work opportunities for graduates of the vocational education programs. An increased participation in the vocational training program will further improve the performance of the USDB in meeting its objective of returning to civilian life the maximum possible number of its prisoners as well-trained individuals capable of assuming civilian responsibilities.

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[5] Christie, Robert J., et. al., "Study of the Economic and Rehabilitative Aspects of Prison Industry," Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice, Contract, #J-LEAA-033-75, September 1976, for ECON Inc.

[6] Ibid.

1.4 Major Conclusions and Recommendations

(1) The objectives of the Army Correction Program as stated in Army Regulation 190-47 are in conformity with DODI 1325.4 and with Chapter 48 of Title 10, U.S. Code. Objectives 1 and 2 follow directly from the DODI. Objective 3, though not mandated by the DODI, is not at variance with it either.

(2) The objectives of the Army Correction Program are in conformity with the current concepts and practices of correction in the civilian sector. There are, however, a number of new concepts being proposed for the civilian correction system, but it is too early to make any comments in that regard.

(3) Of the non-punitive discharge sentenced prisoners who were restored to duty directly from the ACF's and ICF's, only 32% received an honorable discharge. Thus, there is only a limited effort to screen out non-restorables at this level of the Army Correction Program. In the case of the USARB which engages a more extensive screening effort, we find that only 15% of the prisoners who are discharged as non-restorable would have received an honorable discharge had they been allowed to graduate the training program. We conclude that within the present day limitations on the capabilities to identify potential restorables, Objective 1 has been successfully met by the Army.

(4) The screening done at various facilities does not exhibit any uniformity. It is recommended that this process be standardized.

(5) The ability of the USARB training program to train a "bad soldier" to be a "good soldier" has yet to be demonstrated. However, the USARB plays an important role in uniformly administering an efficient screening mechanism to select restorable candidates who are restored after graduation. Many non-restorables are discharged at the USARB. Thus, the graduates from USARB have a better all-around performance record than an average prisoner returned directly to duty from a confinement facility. In fact, 58% of the USARB graduates ultimately receive an honorable discharge. However, because a high percentage (72%) of prisoners from confinement facilities who were directly returned to duty bypassing the USARB ultimately received a less than honorable discharge, it is clear that the Army has failed to meet Objective 3. It is recommended that this process of directly returning prisoners to duty from confinement facilities be discontinued to the maximum extent possible so as to allow for prompt identification and discharge of non-restorable prisoners at the USARB.

(6) The USDB has performed better than a typical civilian counterpart in rehabilitating its prisoners who are released as civilians (i.e. in meeting Objective 2). However, this performance can be and should be further improved by putting increased emphasis on the vocational training program and by providing realistic work opportunities to its inmates. Of all the programs at the USDB, it is the vocational training certificate that is most significantly correlated in a positive way with income, employment level and the USDB image.

(7) At the USDB, only 7.8% of the prisoners requesting restoration are granted assignments to the USARB. This percentage should be increased and the results of such changes monitored. This will allow the USDB to better meet Objective 2 without any negative side effects.

2.0 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ARMY CORRECTION PROGRAM

The economic analysis is aimed at providing at least a partial answer to the question as to whether the current Army correction system is cost-effective. It also provides a partial answer to the question as to whether any alternative plan meant to fulfill a different set of objectives could yield greater net benefits (benefits minus costs) than the current system. The answers to such questions are claimed only to be partial because the pertinence of any economic analysis is only limited to the costs and benefits that are quantified within the analysis. In reality, there usually exist certain intangible costs and benefits that are difficult, if not impossible to accommodate in the analysis.

Examples of non-quantifiable costs and benefits in the present study of the Army Correction Program include:

(1) The negative impact (cost to the Army) on unit discipline/effectiveness of restoring to duty large numbers of prisoners who subsequently commit additional crimes, and

(2) The positive impact (benefit to Army) on the recruitment process, in a draft-free environment, of emphatic and consistent pursuit of genuine, effective rehabilitative efforts throughout all phases of the Correction Program.

In this study an attempt has been made to develop an economic model for the Army Correction Program on those offenders whose sentences do not include a punitive discharge. Regarding the offenders sentenced with a punitive discharge, only a few speculations are made as to some feasible, cost-effective ways to deal with them. This is because a definitive analysis of

this offender group requires data that is not available to the study team and for which there is no satisfactory proxy, namely data on the impact of assigning an increasing number of offenders from the United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) to the United States Army Retraining Brigade (USARB) who request such an assignment after serving their time at the USDB.

In the recent past there have been some in-house efforts within the Army to take a critical look at the cost-effectiveness of the Army Correction Program. One such effort was made by Patrick R. Lowrey,[7] who asserted: "In the future, the Army simply cannot afford to support a corrections program of questionable success and benefit to the Army and the Nation." As alternatives to correction, he suggested that those offenders found guilty of civilian-type offenses should be transferred to the Federal system, and that those guilty of military-type offenses, if earnestly desirous of continuing their military service, should be returned to duty on suspended sentence, whereupon additional misconduct would necessitate dismissal. If, on the other hand, the offender is of a habitually criminal nature, he/she should be punitively discharged from the service.

There are a number of issues that have to be resolved before such an alternative can be accepted as the most cost-effective mode of conducting the Army Correction Program. First, one has to examine whether the Army can continue, on an indefinite basis, to transfer to the Federal system all offenders found guilty of civilian-type offenses without having to pay for it sooner or later either directly or indirectly through budget adjustments. Secondly, the issue is not whether an offender has committed a civilian-type crime or a military crime. It is a question of

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[7] Lowrey, Patrick R., "Military Confinement: Needless Luxury or Viable Necessity," USAWC Military Research Program Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, May 1975, p. 76.

whether an offender, after being returned to duty, will perform satisfactorily. It is conceivable that an offender committing a certain type of civilian crime can be more successfully restored than an AWOL (absent without official leave) type offender who has the minimum restoration potential as indicated by historical data. Thus, an automatic transfer to the Federal system of all offenders committing civilian-types of crimes may not, in the long run, be more cost-effective for the Army than maintaining the USDB in the sense that there may be a transfer of an equivalent amount of budget from the Army to the Federal system.

Regarding the offenders guilty of military crimes, Lowrey essentially suggests a screening mechanism to differentiate those offenders who are earnestly desirous of continuing their Army careers from the habitual offenders. But the questions remains as to how to implement this screening. Screening operations conducted at different installations will, in all probability, be non-uniform as discussed in Section 1.3.1. Further, a fixed policy of returning to duty with a suspended sentence all first-time offenders guilty of military crime may not be cost-effective because it may lead to returning more "negative elements" than "positive elements". Thus, assuming that no effort is spent on training (which incidentally, will be at variance with AR 190-47, DODI 1325.4 and Title 10, U.S. Code), the question still remains as to how to conduct the screening between the "positive elements" and the "negative elements" in a uniform and most cost-effective fashion. This question, among other things, has been considered in the economic model discussed in the following section.

2.1 Economic Model

The overall economic model is divided into three topics, namely: the structure of the model, the various cost factors included in the model and the evaluation of various policies

with the help of the model. These three topics are presented below.

2.1.1 Structure of the Model

The flow chart of the overall Army Correction Program is illustrated in Figure 2.1. A simplified version of it is depicted in Figure 2.2 which deals with the essentials of the flow pattern of post-trial sentenced prisoners. The numerical values associated with them were obtained in bits and pieces from a number of sources including Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) headquarters at Ft. Monroe, Virginia, Force Command (FORSCOM) headquarters at Ft. McPherson, Georgia, the United States Army Retraining Brigade (USARB) at Ft. Riley, Kansas, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel (ODCSPER) at the Pentagon, and the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) at Alexandria, Virginia. These numerical values correspond to a portion of calendar year 1976 (i.e. 1 January 1976 to 31 August 1976).

List of Variables

T = Total number of post-trial sentenced prisoners

N_1 = Number of post-trial sentenced prisoners either returned directly to duty from confinement facilities or discharged at confinement facilities (as opposed to being assigned to the USARB, the USDB or the civilian correction system)

N_2 = Number of post-trial sentenced prisoners assigned to the USARB

P_1 = Number of post-trial sentenced prisoners assigned to the USDB

P_2 = Number of post-trial sentenced prisoners transferred to the civilian correction system

FIGURE 2.1: Flow Chart of the Army Correction Program



of this assumption

D_1 = Number of post-trial sentenced prisoners released from installation and area confinement facilities for immediate discharge or pending discharge, where discharge was connected to the offense for which they were confined.

D_2 = Number of prisoners discharged at the USARB as non-restorable.

A_1 = Number of post-trial sentenced prisoners directly returned from installation and area confinement facilities to active duty (not including any prisoners belonging to the set D_1).

A_2 = Number of prisoners restored to duty from the USARB.

H_1 = Number of prisoners belonging to the set A_1 who eventually received an honorable discharge.

H_2 = Number of prisoners belonging to set A_2 who eventually received an honorable discharge.

H = Total number of post-trial sentenced prisoners (excluding the sets P_1 and P_2) who eventually received a less than honorable discharge.

L_1 = Number of prisoners belonging to the set A_1 who eventually received a less than honorable discharge.

L_2 = Number of prisoners belonging to the set A_2 who eventually received a less than honorable discharge.

L = Total number of post-trial sentenced prisoners (excluding the sets P_1 and P_2) who received a less than honorable discharge.

FIGURE 2.2 Simplified Version of Post-Trial Prisoner Flow



From the above definitions, the following equations follow:

$$T = N_1 + N_2 + P_1 + P_2$$

$$N_1 = A_1 + D_1$$

$$N_2 = A_2 + D_2$$

$$A_1 = H_1 + L_1$$

$$A_2 = H_2 + L_2$$

$$H = H_1 + H_2$$

$$L = L_1 + L_2 + D_1 + D_2$$

$$N_1 + N_2 = H + L$$

Note that in the simplified flow chart, the finer details such as the two-way flow of prisoners between the USDB and the USARB, and the re-transfer of prisoners from the USARB to the confinement facilities have been ignored. The average daily prisoner populations (arranged over the calendar year 1976) at the various facilities that correspond to the prisoner flow pattern illustrated in Figure 2.2 along with their respective capacities and their expenditures over the fiscal year 1976 are presented in Table 2.1.

TABLE 2.1 Breakdown of Average Daily Population, Capacity and Annual Expenses

ITEMS	CONFINEMENT FACILITIES	USARB	USDB
Average Daily Population	701 (482 pretrial, 219 post-trial)	476	1,200
Capacity	3,071	800 *	1,343
OMA** Expenses	$ 669,000	$1,508,000	$ 4,003,000
MPA*** Expenses	$26,541,000	$4,735,000	$ 7,583,000
Total Expenses	$27,210,000	$6,243,000	$11,586,000

* 800 refers to the inside capacity. The USARB has an an additional outside capacity of 400.

** Operation and Maintenance Account.

*** Military Personnel Account.

The essential questions to be answered are:

(1) Is the current practice of the separating post-trial sentenced prisoners into two major groups, those processed at the USARB (N_2) and those processed at the confinement facilities (N_1) cost-effective, i.e. is the ratio N_1/N_2 optimal?

(2) Is the current practice of the USARB in separating the potential restorables (A_2) from the non-restorables (D_2) cost-effective, i.e. is the ratio A_2/D_2 optimal?

(3) If answers to Questions (1) and (2) are in the negative, what should the above ratios be in order to ensure cost-effectiveness?

(4) Should the USDB be replaced by (or transferred to) the Federal or State Correction Systems?

(5) Should all post-trial prisoners whose sentences do not include punitive discharge be immediately returned to duty on suspended sentence?

(6) Should all post-trial prisoners whose sentences do not include punitive discharge be immediately given administrative discharge?

The model has been used to attempt answering these questions. It should be emphasized that all the answers are based on economic considerations. No normative statements based on human values are sought in this analysis.

2.1.2 Cost Factors Used in Economic Model

In order to resolve the questions posed in the previous section on an economic basis, it is necessary to introduce the following cost factors:

(1) C_1 = Annual cost of operating the installation and area confinement facilities. Three values of C_1 are estimated corresponding to three different modes of operation, namely: (1) all prisoners belonging to set N_2 are transferred to set N_1; (2) the ratio N_1/N_2 is maintained at the same value as it assumed in 1976; and (3) all prisoners belonging to the set N_1 are transferred to the set N_2. These values are \$27,490,000; \$20,460,000; and \$8,545,000 respectively. For details, see Appendix B.

(2) C_2 = Annual cost of operating the USARB (excluding costs due to escorted transportation of prisoners). The value of C_2 is estimated for some three different situations. If all prisoners belonging to the set N_2 are transferred to the set N_1, C_2 becomes zero. If the ratio N_1/N_2 is maintained at the value as it assumed in 1976, C_2 becomes \$5,932,000. If all prisoners belonging to the set N_1 are transferred to the set N_2, C_2 becomes \$6,160,000. For details, see Appendix B.

(3) C_3 = Average cost of transportation associated with assigning an individual from a confinement facility to the USARB, estimated to be \$270. For details, see Appendix B.

(4) C_4 = Cost associated with the fact that an individual prisoner who should have been discharged from the Army has instead been returned to duty. This cost is difficult to quantify because, first of all, there is no unique way to define who should have been discharged, and secondly, there are various intangible costs, for example, the counter-productive impact of an undesirable soldier on unit discipline and effectiveness. However, in a restricted sense, C_4 has been estimated as not less than \$3,130. For details, see Appendix B.

(5) C_5 = Cost associated with the fact that an individual prisoner who should have been restored to duty has instead been discharged. This cost, like C_4, is difficult to quantify. However, in a restricted sense, it has been estimated to be at least \$4,576. For details, see Appendix B.

The numerical values ascribed to the above cost factors represent 1976 costs expressed in 1976 dollars. Note that the

benefit associated with the discharge of a prisoner who should not be restored, and the benefit associated with the fact that a "good soldier" is restored are omitted from the analysis in order to avoid double counting. In order to clarify this concept, assume two hypothetical cases representing two extremes, namely:

(1) all post-trial prisoners are summarily discharged, and

(2) all post-trial prisoners are returned to duty.

In the first case, the non-optimality arises from the fact that a number of "good soldiers" who should have been restored are summarily discharged, thereby incurring the cost C_5. In the second case, the system is non-optimal because a number of "bad soldiers" are also being returned thereby incurring the cost C_4. In the optimal situation when only the "good soldiers" are being returned and the "bad soldiers" are being discharged, both the costs C_4 and C_5 become zero, thereby reaching operational optimality. Conversely, in the worst possible situation when the "good soldiers" are being discharged and the "bad soldiers" are being returned, the two costs add up and assume the highest value. The task at hand is to determine the cost associated with various decision alternatives. This is presented in the following section.

2.1.3 Policy Evaluation Using Economic Model

The model is used to estimate the cost of the Army correction program (excluding the USDB operation) under six option alternatives.

Option A: Streamline Confinement Facilities

Maintain the same N_1/N_2 ratio as illustrated in Figure 2.2, and try to decrease the overstaffing at the installation and area confinement facilities.

Option B: Abolish USARB and Decentralize Training

Abolish the USARB and incorporate training facilities within the installation and area confinement facilities to the extent it is feasible.

Option C: Pretrial Only at Confinement Facilities

Maintain only pretrial confinement facilities at installations and assign all post-trial prisoners either to the USARB or the USDB. Reallocate excess capabilities at confinement facilities so as to ensure their most productive use, such as consolidation with Military Police and JAG Office.*

Option D: Return Offenders to Duty on Suspended Sentence

Abolish USARB and return the entire post-trial prisoner population (excluding P_1 and P_2) directly to active duty with a suspended sentence. In other words, A_1 becomes equal to 1,253 + 1,402 = 2,655 (see Figure 2.2).

Option E: Expeditiously Discharge Offenders

Abolish USARB and expeditiously discharge the entire post-trial prisoner population (excluding P_1 and P_2).

Option F: Maintain Status Quo

Maintain a "status quo" situation. In other words, keep the staffing level identical to that of 1976, and continue the policy of assigning some prisoners to the USARB and some others back to duty after they serve their sentences at ACF's and ICF's.

The costs under the six different options are presented in Table 2.2.

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*If all excess capacities at confinement facilities are productively reallocated, the situation, in an economic sense, becomes equivalent to closing down all excess capacities.

TABLE 2.2 COST BREAKDOWN UNDER SIX DIFFERENT OPTIONS

COST FACTORS	COSTS UNDER VARIOUS OPTIONS (In Millions of Dollars)					
	OPTION A	OPTION B	OPTION C	OPTION D	OPTION E	OPTION F
C_1	20.46	27.49	8.54*	8.54*	8.54*	27.21
C_2	5.93	0	6.16	0	0	5.93
C_3	0.70	0	1.10	0	0	0.70
C_4 **	4.77	8.94	2.21	8.94	0	4.77
C_5 ***	1.78	0	2.88	0	4.34	1.78
TOTAL:	33.64	36.43	20.89	17.48	12.88	40.39

* In Options C, D and E, the pretrial facilities have to be maintained.

** The cost associated with C_4 is calculated on the basis that 42% of USARB graduates and 68% of those returned directly from confinement facilities bypassing the USARB eventually receive less than honorable discharge (See Table 1.3).

*** The cost associated with C_5 is calculated on the basis that 15% of the population discharged at the USARB would have received honorable discharge if returned to duty (See Section 1.3.2).

It follows from Figure 2.2 that the least expensive option is Option E which implies that every offender adjudged guilty (excluding those assigned to the USDB) ought to be expeditiously discharged from the Army. The corresponding annual cost (excluding the cost associated with the USDB) is approximately $13 million. Conversely, if every offender is returned to duty on suspended sentence, (i.e. Option D), the annual cost (excluding the cost associated with the USDB) is approximately $17 million. However, these two numerical values of the costs associated with Options D and E are calculated on the basis

that the cost factors C_4 and C_5 assume their lowest possible values (namely, \$3,130 and \$4,576 respectively). In reality, there is every possibility that values of C_4 and C_5 will be much larger if one takes into account all the intangible costs previously described. To emphasize the point, the cost of returning a soldier to duty who eventually receives a less than honorable discharge is not only the money wasted in terms of his salary, but a whole range of negative impacts that such an action is bound to have. Similarly, the cost of discharging a good soldier is not only the expenses that are currently incurred to find his replacement, but also the negative impact that is bound to occur as a result of such a practice which is contrary to civilian concepts of correction as well as to Title 10, U.S. Code. This will, at the very least, increase the recruitment cost. In the worst possible case, it may even make it impossible to meet the recruitment quota. Thus, the amounts \$13 million and \$17 million represent the lowest bounds on the costs associated with Option D and Option E. The actual costs, in all probability, are much higher. In fact, it can be easily deduced from the figures appearing in Table 2.2 that it only takes C_4 to exceed \$4,720 for Option D to be more costly than Option C. It is highly probable that in reality, the cost of returning a "bad soldier" (i.e. C_4) exceeds \$4,720 when all the intangible costs are taken into account. Thus in reality, it is highly probable that Option C is less costly than Option D. In the same vein, Option E is probably more costly than Option C when all the intangibles are taken into account. These intangibles include not only the accentuation of the difficulty in meeting recruitment quotas, but also other problems arising from the fact that Option E is in clear violation of AR 190-47, DODI 1325.4, Title 10, U.S. Code, the civilian concepts of correction and the social concept of fairness. Thus, the cost analysis indicates that Option C is the most likely candidate for meeting the criterion of optimality in a realistic sense. It should be noted that Option C is in complete

conformity with AR 190-47. In 1976, the Army followed Option F which did not meet Objective 3 satisfactorily, and maintained an excess of idle capacity at the installation and area confinement facilities. As a result, the overall cost (excluding the USDB) was $40.39 million, as indicated in Table 2.2.

The facts that are readily apparent from Table 2.2 are:

(1) If the Army decreases the staffing at the installation and area confinement facilities to a "reasonable" level and maintains both pretrial and post-trial facilities at the confinement facilities, the annual savings will be the difference between Options F and A, i.e. $6.75 million.

(2) If the Army abolishes the USARB and introduces correctional and training facilities at the installation and area confinement facilities, the annual savings will be the difference between Options F and B, i.e. $3.96 million.

(3) If the Army reduces the confinement facilities to the minimum level needed to provide only pretrial facilities, and assigns all post-trial prisoners with sentences not including punitive discharge to the USARB, the annual savings will be the difference between Options F and C, i.e. $19.50 million.

(4) The extreme steps of either returning every offender to duty on suspended sentence or giving every offender an expeditious discharge will, in all probability, be more expensive than Option C (which allows an annual savings of $19,50 million) when all the intangible costs are accommodated.

Thus the optimal course of action for the Army regarding post-trial prisoners is to assign as many of them to the USARB or the USDB as possible. The confinement facilities should be used primarily for pretrial prisoners. All the excess capacities (both space and staff) at the confinement facilities should be reallocated for alternative utilization. For example, they can be consolidated with Military Police and Judge Advocate General office. These consolidated facilities can be called Military Justice Centers, only portions of which are to be used for confining pretrial prisoners. Thus if the excess capacities can be put to productive use to provide alternative services, the economic impact of such measures on the Army Correction Program will be equivalent to the closure of the said excess capacities.

2.2 Economic Considerations Regarding Prisoners With Punitive Discharge Sentences

At present, the Army sends the bulk of its punitive discharge sentenced prisoners to the USDB. A question arises as to whether the Army should transfer all prisoners whose sentences include punitive discharge to the civilian system with the hope that such a measure will be more economical.

The cost associated with the USDB in the fiscal year 1976 was $11.586 million ($4.033 million OMA and $7,583 million MPA) and the average daily population 1,200 (see Table 2.1).

Thus, the annual expenditure per prisoner at the USDB during the fiscal year 1976 was approximately $10,000 (approx. $27. per prisoner day).

In the Federal and State civilian correction system, the annual expenditure per prisoner varies over a wide range from institution to institution. Typically, the range is anywhere between $8,000 - $20,000. Thus, the USDB compares very favorably with the civilian correction system regarding cost per prisoner. Now it is unlikely that the Army can indefinitely transfer to the already over-burdened civilian correction system, all prisoners who are currently being assigned to the USDB without having to pay for it sooner or later, either directly or indirectly through budget adjustments. This amount, in all probability, will not be less than the current USDB budget, because as mentioned earlier, cost-wise, the USDB is functioning very favorably compared to its civilian counterpart. Hence, no worthwhile cost saving is anticipated on a long-term basis in transferring punitive discharge sentenced prisoners to the civilian system instead of assigning them to the USDB.

However, certain recommendations can be made to improve the cost-effectiveness of the USDB. Essentially these include:

(1) Increase the number of people on work release programs.

(2) Increase the number of people assigned from the USDB to the USARB for restoration consideration.

(3) Increase the scope of the vocational training programs so as to improve their revenue-generating capability.

Expansion of the work release program will directly contribute to revenue generation. Assigning more people to the USARB for restoration will, most probably, have a positive impact in the sense that it will decrease the requirement on new recruitment to fill the Army quota. The possibility of increasing revenue by expanding the scope of vocational training has been discussed in detail in Volume IV of this report. As has been stated in Section 1.3.3.2, the expansion of the vocational training program will also improve the rehabilitation potential of those who are discharged as civilians.

2.3 Major Conclusions and Recommendations

(1) Taking all costs into account, (both direct costs which are measurable as well as indirect costs arising from intangible factors), the Army Correction Program that is most likely to be optimal is to use the installation confinement facilities for pretrial prisoners only (with a corresponding change in their staff strength) and to assign all prisoners sentenced with non-punitive discharge to the USARB, while prisoners sentenced with punitive discharge are assigned to the USDB. Further, all excess capacities at confinement facilities -- space as well as staff -- are to be optimally reallocated (for example, the creation of "Military Justice Centers" at installations which will primarily consist of Military Police, JAG Office, and pretrial confinement facility). If all excess capacity is effectively reallocated, the situation, in an economic sense, will be equivalent to the closing down of all excess capacity. This policy does not require any change of objectives. It will lead to an annual savings of $18 million in direct costs (i.e. not including the intangibles) compared to the amount spent in 1976.

If the indirect costs (i.e. the costs arising from intangible factors) are ignored, the cost-effective policy is to expeditiously discharge all individuals adjudged guilty. This policy will only require the maintenance of a skeletal pretrial facility. However,

this policy will be at variance with AR 190-47, DODI 1325.4, Title 10, U.S. Code, the current civilian concepts of correction and the social concepts of fairness. Further, this policy, in all probability, will make it more difficult to fill the recruitment quota. Thus, the indirect costs of this policy are very high. Hence, it is not recommended.

(3) The policy of returning every prisoner sentenced with non-punitive discharge back to the Army is not an optimal policy because of the high percentage of the "undesirable" elements being returned. This increases the indirect cost to the Army.

(4) The transfer of punitive discharge sentenced prisoners to the civilian system cannot, in the long run, be expected to be less costly than maintaining the USDB. This is because it is most likely that the transfer of these prisoners to the Civilian Correction System will, sooner or later, cause a corresponding transfer of budget from the Army to the Civilian Correction System. The costs that will be incurred on these prisoners if they are transferred to the civilian system are not likely to be less than the USDB budget. Further, the Army will forego the chance of generating additional revenue at the USDB, which is realizable if the Army expands the scope of the USDB vocational training program to include training in mass production of marketable products.

(5) There are three areas where the USDB can improve its cost-effectiveness:

(a) Expand work release programs,

(b) Increase the percent of people assigned to the USARB for restoration, and

(c) Expand the scope of the vocational training program to make it more revenue-generating.

3.0 MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

The Mentoris Company has conducted an analysis and evaluation of the organizational structure and distribution of functions, the administrative policies, procedures, methods and systems and the applications of management line and staff functions of the Army Correction Program. Site visits were conducted at the United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the United States Army Retraining Brigade (USARB) at Ft. Riley, Kansas and area confinement facilities (ACF's) located on continental United States (CONUS) installations, at Ft. Dix, New Jersey, Ft. Knox, Kentucky, and Ft. Ord, California. In addition, information was secured through interviews with Department of Army personnel at the Pentagon on the organizational structure of the Army Correction Program. Section 3.1 presents a description of the organization, management and performance of the current Army Correction Program. Section 3.2 presents our recommendations for organizational and management changes designed to achieve more efficient and economical operation of the Army Correction Program. Detailed descriptions of the organization and function of the individual confinement/correctional facilities which the study team visited are presented in Appendix C.

3.1 Organization/Management Overview of The Army Correction Program

Figure 3.1 depicts the current organization of the Army Correction Program. The Correction Program in the Army is the staff responsibility of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). In turn, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has established a "Corrections Branch" the function of which is to meet the Deputy Chief's staff responsibilities in corrections.



FIGURE 3.1 Overview of the Army Correction Organization

The Corrections Branch at DCSPER has the following specific responsibilities:

(1) Establish Army Correctional policy and procedures.

(2) Establish policy concerning protection of Federal witnesses on Army installations.

(3) Monitor Army confinement/correctional facility construction.

(4) Establish policy and activities on clemency, parole and restoration to duty of military prisoners.

(5) Coordinate with Federal and state correctional agencies.

(6) Coordinate joint service use of military confinement facilities.

The authorized staff of the Corrections Branch consists of two Majors, one who serves as Branch Chief and one Action Officer, two civilian employees grade GS-11 who serve as Case Analysts, and one civilian clerical staff member.

In effect, the primary thrust of this branch is the development of appropriate systemwide policies to meet the changing requirements of the Army, and the translation of these policy changes into Army Regulations pertaining to corrections. The Corrections Branch has no responsibility for management of the Army Correction Program; day-to-day management of correctional facilities is the responsibility of the individual major commands (MACOM's). Neither does the Corrections Branch at DCSPER have the oversight responsibility for the management of the Army Corrections Program; MACOM's on CONUS have established their own correctional staffs at headquarters level to oversee the management of correctional facilities at the installation level which are under the direct management of the installation commander.

There are two MACOM's in CONUS, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Force Command (FORSCOM). TRADOC has management responsibility for eight confinement facilities and for the USDB and the USARB. At the TRADOC headquarters level at Ft. Monroe, Virginia, the corrections management staff is under the direction of a Lieutenant Colonel. FORSCOM has management responsibility for nine confinement facilities and maintains a corrections management branch at FORSCOM headquarters at Ft. McPhersen, Georgia which is also under the direction of a Lieutenant Colonel.

Management of Army Correction Program is subject to the application of four general policies. These are:

1. All Army confinement and correctional facilities will be operated and administered on a corrective rather than punitive basis. Military prisoners will be treated in accordance with their individual needs. The goal is to help them solve their problems, to correct their behavior, and to improve their attitudes toward themselves and toward society.

2. Military prisoners will not be subjected to any form of punishment while confined except as specifically provided by law and regulation.

3. The dignity of the individual will be respected in the handling of military prisoners.

4. Personnel assigned to operate and administer Army confinement and correctional facilities will be selected in accordance with established uniform criteria; specifically trained in procedures and techniques concerning leadership, custody, and correctional treatment of military prisoners; and fully oriented, prior to assuming such duties, to insure complete understanding of the mission, objectives, and policies established by this regulation.

In addition, Paragraph 1-6 of AR 190-47 specifies the MACOM management responsibilities as follows:

(a) Implementation and execution of the Army Correction Program within the policies established.

(b) Supervision of the operation and administration of Army transient, installation and area confinement facilities, correctional facilities, and hospitalized prisoner wards.

(c) Health services support to Army Correctional facilities.

(d) Supervision of the handling of military prisoners within their commands.

(e) Logistical support to confinement and correctional facilities located within their commands.

(f) Selection, processing, and transferring military prisoners to correctional facilities in accordance with the criteria established in this regulation.

(g) Conducting annual technical staff inspections of confinement and correctional facilities and providing HQDA (DAPE-HRE-CR) with a copy of the inspection report.

For purposes of this study contract, the two MACOM's which manage facilities within the Continental United States (CONUS) were the major focus of attention of the management analysis of the Army Correction Program.

3.1.1 Systemwide Performance

The most important factor affecting systemwide performance of the Army Correction Program is size of the prisoner population relative to the capacity of the various facilities and the size of correction staff which operate them. Table 3.1 describes prevailing conditions in the facilities visited by The Mentoris Company. In the case of the USARB and the confinement facilities, prisoner populations are well below the standard capacities. Staff to prisoner ratios range from 0.7 to 1.07 at the USDB and USARB to well over 4.0 at Ft. Dix, Ft. Knox and Ft. Ord. Unusually high staff to prisoner ratios also prevail at the

TABLE 3.1 Facility Prisoner Populations and Capacities

	Standard Capacity	Average Prisoner Pop* Jan-Nov 76	Authorized Staff Including Civilian Personnel	Staff/ Prisoner Ratio
USDB	1,250	1,163	821	0.71
USARB	1,200	412	442	1.07
FT. DIX	416	34	169	4.97
FT. KNOX	162	48	209	4.35
FT. ORD	171	42	174	4.14

* Based on last day of month figure.

other confinement facilities. The imbalance between confinement/correctional populations and capacities creates problems within the Army Correction Program. Management practices which promote the efficiency and effectiveness of individual facilities do not generally enhance the effectiveness of the Army Correction Program and vice versa. The specific problems that arise from this systemwide imbalance are discussed later in this chapter, together with recommendations for change. At this stage, we wish only to highlight the underlying problem and to emphasize that it is not a transient phenomena.

Figure 3.2 shows the prisoner population by month, from May 1975 to November 1976 of the USDB, the USARB and the total prisoner population in the confinement facilities of FORSCOM and TRADOC.

USDB

During this period USDB has shown a fairly stable prisoner population. A slight decline (10%) in prisoner population has occurred in the past eight months from a high of 1,215 prisoners in March 1976, to a present population of 1,091 in November 1976.

USARB

During the course of 1975, the trainee population at the USARB remained around 500. Since the beginning of 1976 the population of the USARB has gradually declined. A low point was reached in July 1976, when 306 trainees were present. The gradually rising trainee population from July to the present is explained by a change in operating policy at the USARB in which trainees are kept in Phase I of their training program an additional two weeks before a decision is made as to whether they should be recommended for Phases II and III of the program, or whether they should be sent to the Discharge Unit.

FIGURE 3.2 Prisoner Population by Month* For 18-Month Period, May 1975 to November 1976



* As of Last Day of Each Month

FORSCOM

The confinement facilities operated by FORSCOM show a gradual decreasing prisoner population from a high above 600 in August 1975 to a low of around 300 in November 1976.

TRADOC

TRADOC confinement facilities have shown a gradual decline in prisoner population from a high above 400 in June 1975 to less than 200 total prisoners in November 1976.

Confinement Facilities - Prisoner Populations

The distribution of pretrial and post-trial prisoners at various confinement facilities were examined. Over the previous 18 months, there has been a significant drop in the percent of pretrial prisoners found at confinement facilities on CONUS. Figure 3.3 shows a breakdown between the percent of pretrial prisoners held at TRADOC and FORSCOM confinement facilities. The figure also shows that FORSCOM facilities seem to be holding a higher percentage of pretrial prisoners over the 18-month period than TRADOC, i.e. TRADOC is retaining more of its post-trial prisoners in lieu of transferring them to the USARB.

In order to gather some insight into the variability and the operation of different confinement facilities, data on the percent of pretrial at Ft. Dix and Ft. Knox were each graphed over the past 18 months against the TRADOC percent of pretrials. Figure 3.4 shows that while the pattern at Ft. Dix closely follows that of TRADOC, Ft. Knox retained a significantly higher percentage of pretrial prisoners throughout the entire 18-month period. Specifically, while the percentage of pretrial prisoners in TRADOC has dropped from 79% to 53% over the 18-month period examined, the percent pretrial prisoners at Ft. Knox has essentially remained constant, with relatively minor variations about the 90% level.

FIGURE 3.3 % Pre-Trial at Confinement Facilities



FIGURE 3.4 % Pre-Trial At Selected Study Sites Compared To All TRADOC Confinement Facilities



To summarize, the systemwide imbalance between the capacity of the individual facilities and their respective prisoner populations has been both pronounced and growing steadily worse over the 18-month period from May 1975 through November 1976. It is also observed that the percentage of post-trial prisoners who are retained at the confinement facilities in lieu of being transferred to the USDB has, in general, increased as the post-trial prisoner population at the installations has decreased. Individual confinement facility commanders, e.g. at Ft. Knox, have responded to the "negative population pressure" in substantially different ways. While the USDB has remained substantially unaffected, the USARB has experienced a declining prisoner population. All of the above demonstrates that the Army Correction Program is not now functioning as a system, but rather as a collection of individual confinement/correctional facilities. As noted in Chapter 1, the major impacts of this lack of uniformity are not only to deny equal justice to military prisoners, but also to the extent that post-trial prisoners are diverted from the USARB, the Army forgoes the use of an effective screening device for the early identification and release from the Army of those prisoners who will not or are incapable of responding to the Army Correction Program. Other direct dis-benefits to the Army Correction Program that stem from the lack of a system response to the decreasing prisoner population are discussed in Section 3.2, together with recommendations for system change.

3.1.2 Performance at Confinement Facilities

A thorough study of AR 190-47 has clearly established that the performance standards governing the Army Correction Program exceed in detail and scope, the correction performance standards presently applied in the civilian sector. Indeed, a comparison of the draft standards of the American Correction Association and the regulations governing the Army Correction Program is provided in Table 3.2 which demonstrates that AR 190-47 reflects far more enlightened standards of correction performance than is found in the civilian sector. Further, only a few discrepancies between regulations and actual operations were observed during site visits to the ACF's, the USARB and USDB. While variations were apparent in the performance of the ACF's, nevertheless, these variations were generally within the constraints of the regulations. There are however, two areas where the performance of the Army Correction Program can be substantially improved at the confinement facility level.

One of the most striking features observed during site visits to the various confinement facilities were instances in which prisoners detained in pretrial confinement for offenses of a minor nature were to be found in custody grades which appeared to be well in excess of those required to reasonably assure their presence at their forthcoming court-martial. For example, most of the prisoners at Ft. Knox, Kentucky were being held for pretrial confinement and most of them were in medium security quarters.

While medium/maximum security quarters clearly assure a high likelihood that a prisoner would remain in custody prior to his/her court-martial, there seems to be an obvious conflict with policies embodied in AR 190-47 which state that military prisoners will not be subjected to any form of punishment while confined except as specifically provided by law. If pretrial confinement consists of medium security custody or higher custody grades, the risk of escape is certainly minimized, but at the cost of violating

TABLE 3.2 Illustrative Comparison of ACA Draft Standards[8] With Army Regulations On Inmate Housing

STANDARD 11.1	AR 190-47
"4. The physical environment of a new institution should be designed with consideration to: (a) Provision of privacy and personal space. (b) Minimization of noise. (c) Reduction of sensory deprivation. (d) Encouragement of constructive inmate-staff relationships."	3.1 "(2) Minimum standards applying to buildings used for billeting or close confinement of prisoners follow: (a) Separate accomodations will be provided for officer prisoners and non-commissioned officer prisoners in a detained, adjudged or approved adjudged status. (b) Cells to be used for disciplinary and administrative segregation will be at least 6 feet wide, 8 feet long, and 8 feet high (inside measurements). There should be sufficient disciplinary and administrative segregation cells adequate to house prisoners equal to 15% of the facility capacity, based on the standard allocation. Means for artificial lighting will be provided to the same extent (a minimum of 10-foot candles) provided prisoners not in segregation. A minimum of 10 cubic feet of air per minute (CFM) will be circulated per cell. The air in each cell will be maintained at approximately 70°. A prison-type toilet and lavatory will be provided in each cell. The floors, walls and celinings of these cells will be of smooth surface and free of physical hazards. Windows and doors will be of maximum security type. The use of chains or padlocks in securing cell doors is strictly prohibited..."
STANDARD 2.5	3.2 "Fire Prevention and Protection - Fire prevention and protection will be provided in accordance with AR 420-90..."
"....The facility should provide each inmate with: (1) His own room or cell of adequate size. (2) Heat or cooling as appropriate to the season to maintain room temperature in the comfort range. (3) Natural and artificial light. (4) Clean and decent installations for the maintenance of personal cleanliness. (5) Recreational opportunities and equipment ..."	3.3 "Space allocation for prisoners - Criteria to be used in determining space allocation for prisoners in Army confinement and corrections follow: ..."

[8] National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, "Corrections," Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S.Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., January 1973.

the intent of the Army Correction Program, not to mention the cost of operating pretrial confinement facilities. Standards of custody should be defined in AR 190-47 with clear criteria established for use by each ACF staff for decisions on custody grade.

The second area where the performance of the Army Correction Program can be substantially improved is in the correctional programs of its confinement facilities. During the course of the study, The Mentoris Company interviewed inmates at each of the sites where field visits were conducted (see Appendix D for a description of the survey findings at the various facilities). One clearly uniform finding that emerged from these interviews was the negative reaction of the inmates to the correction programs at confinement facilities. Moreover, our analysis of the data from these facilities shows that the duration of stay at these facilities is quite short, which, by itself, argues that investment in correctional programs at these confinement facilities is likely to be of little value to anyone. We recommend that the Army delete the correctional aspects of its confinement facilities. Furthermore, we recommend that all post-trial prisoners be transferred to the USDB or the USARB; exceptions to this policy should be limited to the most unusual circumstances and only where these are explicitly provided for in Army Regulations.

3.2 Analysis and Recommendations

The following discussion provides detailed reorganization recommendations with accompanying analysis of the problems and deficiencies in the Army Corrections Program which prompt these recommendations.

3.2.1 Systemwide Reorganization Recommendations

(1) Consolidate corrections staff and responsibilities into one Corrections Management Activity at the DA level

Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 48, Section 961, paragraph (b), subsection (1), states that "The Secretary concerned shall - (1) Designate an officer of each armed force under his jurisdiction to administer military correctional facilities established under this chapter ..." This provision of the U.S. Code establishes the statutory basis for consolidating staff/line responsibilities for the Army Correction Program under one officer with centralized administrative responsibility. The need for centralization became apparent to us during the course of the site visits.

Widespread lack of communications and program coordination was observed at the facility level. One ACF visited had instituted a diverse and meaningful work program while at another, KP was essentially the only work assignment available to prisoners. At present there is no uniform policy to evaluate programs or to conduct ongoing evaluation of post-restoration performance. In addition, no uniform implementation of confinement policies was observed, and it was found that DCSPER staff is not responsible for the evaluation of facility compliance nor does the DCSPER staff have routine access to facility compliance information on which to assess the impacts of regulation changes.

Under the current organizational arrangement, corrections policy decisions must be made at the HQDA level. Close communication between operations management at the MACOMS and DCSPER staff

is encumbered by geographical distance. Also, the Army-wide policy on correction lacks an over-all systems approach. This is evidenced by the fact that the capacity and staff in Army correction have not decreased in conformity with the decrease in prisoner population over the past two years. Also, as evidenced by Figure 3.5, while the total number prisoners in the installation confinement facilities has decreased, the percentage of sentenced prisoners held by these facilities has increased.

(2) Assign CONUS MACOM corrections operations branches to the Consolidated Corrections Management Activity at the DA level and abolish the line functions at the MACOM's.

If both line and staff functions for the operations of the Army Corrections Program are located at the DA level, the staffs of the MACOM's correction management branches can be assigned to the consolidated management activity and the branches abolished at each MACOM.

At the present time, duplicate staff with duplicate functions are found at TRADOC and FORSCOM. Given the current level of prisoner populations at TRADOC and FORSCOM installations, this is both uneconomical and inefficient. We have found that reports pass through these offices from the facilities where data is summarized by the staffs using nonstandard procedures. Discrepancies, when finally aggregated at the DCSPER level, cause systemwide reporting errors. Moreover, due to a lack of centralized monitoring, the content and format of the monthly status reports from these facilities do not always conform to Army Regulations.

FIGURE 3.5 Prison Population vs. Sentenced Prisoners At CONUS Confinement Facilities (ACF's and ICF's)



(3) Move budget authority and line operation responsibility for the USDB and USARB from TRADOC to the Consolidated Corrections Management Activity at the DA level.

Currently, the USDB and the USARB are managed through TRADOC. With the establishment of a centralized Corrections Management Activity at the DA level, the management of these facilities should be shifted as well. Along with the line operating responsibility, budget responsibility should be moved in order to maintain functional budget authority with the responsible management group.

During the study we observed that only the USDB had a budget that could be termed adequate for facility management in such a way that cost savings programs could be effectively implemented at the facility level. Even this budgeting system had problems, indicated by the fact that the Air Force was billed differing amounts each quarter. These amounts typically rose and fell in a cyclical fashion each year. In addition, at the ACF's we visited, there were no line item functional budgets. This lack of budgeting information precludes any fiscal management making cost saving programs or program evaluation based on cost benefit analysis impossible at this level.

The USDB and USARB are Army-wide functions with potential for U.S. inter-service functional capabilities (the USDB already handles Air Force and U.S. Marine corrections requirements). Further inter-service functions would further dilute the rationale for maintenance of these installations under a particular CONUS MACOM (Major Command in the Continental United States). A

recent GAO[9] report pointed out wide variations in types of services and programs available to prisoners from the different service branches. At present, long-term Navy prisoners are still being housed at a separate facility. We feel that reorganization would provide for an opportunity to study the cost-effectiveness of housing Navy personnel at the USDB, especially if the population at this facility begins to drop over the next year as has the total Army prisoner population.

(4) Transfer the responsibility for the Research and Evaluation Unit presently located at the USARB to the Consolidated Corrections Management Activity at the DA level.

A core staff of research and evaluation experts in Army corrections have been assembled at the USARB. These staff can be effectively used to develop an Army-wide corrections program planning and evaluation function at the DA level. At present there is no systemwide evaluation of people returned to duty from the various facilities.

For example, there currently exists no capability for systemwide evaluation of program effectiveness, population trends, trends by type of crime, or post restoration performance. The System has no capability for proactive

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[9]Comptroller General of the United States, "Uniform Treatment of Prisoners Under the Military Correctional Facilities Act Currently Not Being Achieved." Department of Defense, May 1975.

planning to counteract effects of external changes such as end of the draft or the expeditious discharge program. Lack of systemwide coordination and monitoring authority is further evidenced by the fact that the USARB was experiencing only an 11% return of Enlisted Evaluation Reports (EER's) on people returned to duty. By regulation, this form is to be returned within a specified time after reassignment and is used to evaluate program performance. After instituting an intensive follow-up program consisting of letters from the Commandant of the USARB and phone calls, the return rate was increased to only 54%. This indicates a low level of cooperation at the installation level which could be improved by strong central management.

In addition, if this group were centralized at the DA level, they could work more effectively with the highly qualified psychologists and sociologists at the USARB and the USDB. to conduct studies on innovative programs in corrections. We have seen copies of numerous small studies on various topics which were done over the years. At present the USDB is conducting a fair size follow-up study on releasees. With central coordination and planning, the larger studies, with slight modification, could have served several research purposes related to system performance. The small studies properly designed could have reflected systemwide needs rather than those of a single facility.

3.2.2 Recommendations For Change at the ACF and ICF Level

The following recommendations are predicated upon the assumption that the Army will continue the operation of confinement facilities despite continued reductions in the prisoner population at these facilities.

(1) Combine wherever feasible the pretrial confinement function with the operations of a "Military Justice Center" at each post where an ACF or ICF is currently operating.

The Military Justice Centers would be under the management control of the Post Commanders and through them, the MACOMS. Several factors that exist in the current system have led us to this recommendation. These include:

Reduced populations at post ACF's and ICF's.
High staff to prisoner ratios at the installations compared to the USARB and USDB,
Downward trends in population appear to be continuing,
Excess of facility capacity at operating ACF's and ICF's. (As of November 1976, totals CONUS ACF's, ICF's and TICF's were operating at 16% of standard capacity),
Possibility of manpower requirements in other functional areas (for example, Military Police) where correctional specialists can be appropriately assigned, meeting at the same time the contingency requirements.

Military Justice Centers would provide a means of efficiently dealing with these problems. Correction specialists can assume Military Police duties instead. ACF's and ICF's can be renovated for joint occupancy including the MP's and JAG offices. Military justice for all pre-sentenced prisoners would be unified under a single management authority.

(2) Military Justice Centers should combine the functions of the Post JAG, Military Police and Pre-sentence Confinement

The existing installation facilities may be modified wherever appropriate, to provide space for JAG and Military Police functions. The

decision for such a modification will have to be contingent on the local installation conditions and on the need for maintaining the capacity to meet contingency requirements.

Those prisoners whose sentence includes confinement following court-martial would be sent to the USARB or the USDB as appropriate. The only exception would be a short holding period while arrangements for transportation are completed. No prisoner would serve out his sentence at an ACF or an ICF. Exceptional individual circumstances could be allowed for in policies regarding the movement of these sentenced inmates to the USDB or the USARB. With few sentenced prisoners at confinement facilities, the need of 95C corrections specialists will be significantly reduced. Where appropriate, excess 95C personnel can be reassigned to the 95B classification at the same Military Justice Center.

By physically combining the Military Police with the JAG office at the same site as the confinement facility, savings in transportation costs and staff time allocated for transportation functions can be realized. The extent of these savings is contingent on site-specific analyses of transportaiont costs, and are not estimated as a part of this study. We do estimate that considerable staff savings for confinement would be realized since there would not be the need to maintain dual staff for sentenced and unsentenced prisoners at each facility. (See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the cost savings.) Since the USARB and USDB are both operating below standard capacity (40% and 81% respectively) all post-trial prisoners could easily be accommodated there.

(3) As part of the establishment of these Military Justice Centers, each should have a line item functional operating budget.

Operating costs of the ACF's and ICF's are currently absorbed through individual post operating budgets. Efforts to identify and isolate the operating costs of the individual confinement facilities have not been found to be satisfactory. At present, the Army does not have a clear accounting of the costs of operating its corrections program. Information on the costs of operating the pretrial confinement component of the corrections program is needed in order to carry out ongoing evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the corrections program. Through establishing functional line item budgeting procedures at the post level, budgets and costs of confinement operations can be reported to the Corrections Management Division for periodic review and appropriate adjustment.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Means and standard deviations of the variables selected for the evaluation of the impact of the USDB training programs on prisoners released from the USDB as civilians (see Section 1.3.3.2) are presented in Table A-1 below. This is followed by Table A-2 representing their covariance matrix. The alphabets signifying the variables correspond to the alphabetical expressions illustrated in Table 1.4.

TABLE A-1 Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in Evaluating USDB Training Programs

VARIABLE	MEAN	S.D.	VARIABLE	MEAN	S.D.
A	18.67	3.90	K	0.29	0.46
B	1.42	1.93	L	26.97	35.11
C	22.58	2.84	M	1.97	0.74
D	0.77	0.42	N	0.06	0.24
E	0.36	0.48	O	2.03	0.70
F	0.05	0.21	P	1.91	1.40
G	2.12	0.75	Q	99.23	65.37
H	39.56	56.34	R	0.15	0.36
I	0.02	0.12	S	0.06	0.24
J	81.72	68.70			

TABLE A-2 Covariance Matrix Of Variables Used In Evaluating USDB Training Programs

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
A	1.000	-.498	.457	-.084	-.179	.207	-.059	-.077	-.053	.324	-.231	-.232	.060	-.208	.111	-.228	-.018	.146	-.323
B	-.498	1.000	.129	.120	.063	-.086	-.131	-.127	-.092	-.201	.278	.283	-.023	.143	-.101	-.014	.122	-.116	.275
C	.457	.129	1.000	-.056	.036	.084	.118	-.202	-.201	.231	.024	-.091	.147	-.277	.122	-.308	.172	.064	-.210
D	-.084	.120	-.056	1.000	.109	.118	.039	.021	.067	-.071	.185	.081	.076	.138	.180	-.009	.050	.229	-.014
E	-.179	.063	.036	.109	1.000	-.014	.298	-.019	-.094	.231	.006	-.097	.287	.072	.193	-.200	.271	-.056	.072
F	.207	-.086	.084	.118	-.014	1.000	-.035	-.005	-.027	.032	.183	-.008	.108	.249	.095	-.038	.120	-.092	.249
G	-.059	-.131	.118	.039	.298	-.035	1.000	.137	-.186	.188	.210	-.234	.527	-.041	.516	-.164	.131	.157	-.126
H	-.077	-.127	-.202	.021	-.019	-.005	.137	1.000	-.088	.250	-.140	-.167	-.027	.004	.024	.001	.153	.058	.093
I	-.053	-.092	-.201	.067	-.094	-.027	-.186	-.088	1.000	-.149	-.079	.224	-.163	.488	-.005	.008	-.037	-.052	-.032
J	.324	-.201	.231	-.071	.231	.032	.188	.250	-.149	1.000	-.253	-.417	.419	.012	.193	-.488	.520	.403	-.028
K	-.231	.278	.024	.185	.006	.183	.210	-.140	-.079	-.253	1.000	.045	.298	.259	.357	.042	-.124	.011	.119
L	-.232	.283	-.091	.081	-.097	-.008	-.234	-.167	.224	-.417	.045	1.000	-.237	.013	-.176	.260	-.269	-.144	.044
M	.060	-.023	.147	.076	.287	.108	.527	-.027	-.163	.419	.298	-.237	1.000	.096	.681	-.254	.333	.017	.010
N	-.208	.143	-.277	.138	.072	.249	-.041	.004	.488	.012	.259	.013	.096	1.000	.263	-.120	.180	.070	.468
O	.111	-.101	.122	.180	.193	.095	.516	.024	-.005	.193	.357	-.176	.681	.263	1.000	-.279	.198	.103	-.011
P	-.228	-.014	-.308	-.009	-.200	-.038	-.164	.001	.008	-.488	.042	.260	-.254	-.120	-.279	1.000	-.480	-.124	-.075
Q	-.018	.122	.172	.050	.271	.120	.131	.153	-.037	.520	-.124	-.269	.333	.180	.198	-.480	1.000	.276	.200
R	.146	-.116	.064	.229	-.056	-.092	.157	.058	-.052	.403	.011	-.144	.017	.070	.103	-.124	.276	1.000	-.107
S	-.323	.275	-.210	-.014	.072	.249	-.126	.093	-.032	-.028	.119	.044	.010	.468	-.011	-.075	.200	-.107	1.000

APPENDIX B

The numerical values assigned to the various cost factors used in the economic model described in Section 2.1.2 are developed below.

B.1 C_1 = Annual cost of operating the installation and area confinement facilities.

(1) The actual cost of operating the installation and area confinement facilities during the Fiscal year 1976 has been reported in a 1977 internal memo of DAPE-HRE-CR on "Army Corrections Cost Effectiveness Review" to be $668,831 OMA and $26,541,554 MPA. They add up to the total figure of $27,210,385 which corresponds to Option F in Table 2.2.

(2) While the total capacity (i.e. the maximum daily population that can be normally accommodated at the installation and area confinement facilities) is 3,071, their average daily population during the Fiscal year 1976 has been 701, consisting of 482 pretrial and 219 post trial prisoners. On the assumption that the average daily population at the installation and area confinement facilities will stabilize at a level of approximately 700 individuals over the foreseeable future, the DA Plan for modification of the Army Confinement System allowed for manpower reductions of 24 officers and 625 enlisted personnel. The corresponding savings are computed on the basis of $20,452 per officer (the Annual Composite Standard Rate of O-3 grade as reported in AR37-108, Chapter 17, effective 1 October, 1976), and $10,014 per enlisted position (E-5 grade, Ibid.). This leads to a saving of $6,749,598. Subtracting this figure from the cost of operating the installation and area confinement facilities during the fiscal year 1976, one gets $27,210,385 - $6,749,598 = $20,460,787. This corresponds to Option A in Table 2.2.

(3) If only pretrial facilities are maintained at installations and all post-trial prisoners are assigned to the USARB or the USDB, the average daily population will, in general, be less than 500 individuals. In 1976, the average daily pretrial population was 482. It is deemed possible to still maintain the capacity of confining an average population of 500 pretrial prisoners after the following adjustments are made:

(a) Reallocation of all excess capacities to other activities such as Military Police and JAG Office. As explained in the main body of this report such reallocation is economically equivalent to the closure of all excess capacities, namely 5 ACF's, 2 ICF's and 4 TICF's identified in a proposal by HQDA that was not implemented. Hence the reduction data provided in that proposal have been used in this analysis.

(b) Further reduction of 20 officers and 449 enlisted persons in the ICF's that remain open.

(c) Redesignation of four area confinement facilities at Forts Bragg, Dix, Ord and Sill as ICF allows for a further reduction of 11 officers and 354 enlisted persons. The reduction of 11 officers will be as follows: 5 in Ft. Bragg, 3 in Ft. Dix. 2 in Ft. Ord, 1 in Ft. Sill. The reduction of 354 enlisted men will be as follows: 124 in Ft. Bragg, 92 in Ft. Dix, 100 in Ft. Ord and 38 in Ft. Sill.

The corresponding cost savings are as follows:

5 ACF's	@	$1,484,397	=	$ 7,421,985
2 ICF's	@	1,016,656	=	2,033,312
4 TCIF's	@	133,562	=	534,248
31 Officers	@	20,452	=	634,012
803 En. Men	@	10,014	=	8,041,242
				$18,664,799

The total cost savings subtracted from the cost of operating the installation and area confinement

facilities incurred in 1976 yields: $27,210,385 - $18,664,799 = $8,545,586. This corresponds to Options C, D and E in Table 2.2.

(4) It has been assumed that if the USARB is abolished and the prisoners who are at present being assigned to the USARB are instead retained at the installations with training and correctional treatments built into the installation and area confinement facilities as far as feasible, the total manpower requirement at the installation and area confinement facilities will remain the same as in 1976. The cost of maintaining the ACFs and ICFs will increase only slightly because of the OMA expenditure increasing at the ratio of $1.61 per person day (DA estimate). The increase in the average daily population at the ACFs and ICFs under such circumstances will depend on the average length of confinement of the prisoners who, under the present system, are being assigned to the USARB. Assuming that they will be confined over the same length of time at the ACFs and ICFs as they currently spend at the USARB, the average daily population at the ACFs and ICFs will be 701 + 476 = 1,177 (see Table 2.1). This increase in the average daily population by 476 will correspond to an increase in the OMA cost by $279,721. Thus the cost of maintaining the ACFs and ICFs will be $27,210,385 + $279,721 = $27,490,106. This corresponds to Option B in Table 2.2.

B.2 C_2 = Annual cost of operating the USARB

(1) USARB financial statements reveal that the cost of maintaining the USARB during the fiscal year 1976 has been as follows:

Personnel	$719,755	
Escort Travel	$310,793	
Other OMA	$477,236	
Total OMA		$1,507,784
MPA		$4,734,906
	Total	$6,242,690

Since escort travel expenses have been separately accounted in this analysis, the cost of maintaining the USARB has been computed as $6,242,690 - $310,793 = $5,931,897. This corresponds to Options A and F in Table 2.2.

(2) If the installation and area confinement facilities are designated to hold only pretrial prisoners and all post trial prisoners are assigned to the USARB or the USDB, it is estimated that there will be an increase of approximately 1,500 prisoners annually being assigned to the USARB over the current assignment level. (DA report on "Army Corrections Cost Effectiveness Review"). Assuming a ratio of 40% restored to duty and 60% discharged as unrestorable (See Table 1.3), 600 individuals out of the 1,500 will be restored, and the remaining 900 will be discharged. Assuming that a person to be discharged spends six weeks* after he arrives at the USARB (Two weeks of screening and four weeks of discharge procedure), and a person to be restored spends nine weeks at the USARB, the corresponding person days is 600 x 42 + 900 x 63 = 81,900 days, which implies that the average daily population at the USARB will increase by 224 over the 1976 average level of 476, thus making it 700. Since this is within the current capacity of the USARB (See Table 2.1), it will not require any additional MPA funding. This OMA cost will increase by an

*The USARB report states that the average stay at the USARB of a discharged person is 55.9 days. However it is felt that this process can be shortened to six weeks.

amount of $2.75 per additional person day (DA estimate), which will amount to $2.75 x 224 x 365 = $224,840. Thus the cost of maintaining the USARB (excluding the escort travel cost) will be $5,931,897 + $224,840 = $6,156,737 which corresponds to Option C in Table 2.2.

(3) If the USARB is abolished, the cost of maintaining it has been assumed to be zero which corresponds to Options B, D and E in Table 2.2.

B.3 C_3 = Average cost of transportation associated with the assignment of one prisoner from an installation to the USARB.

During the fiscal year 1976, the number of prisoners assigned to the USARB was 2,601. The cost for one way transportation of the prisoners (excluding escort) was $274,748. Assuming 40% of them were restored to duty, the one way transportation cost is multiplied by 1.4 to yield $384,647. Thus travel cost per individual (excluding escort) is approximately $150. The escort travel expenses for the fiscal year 1976 as stated in the USARB financial report was $310,793, which implies $120 per individual assigned. Hence the total transportation expenses associated with the assignment of an individual prisoner to the USARB is $150 + $120 = $270. Under Options A and F in Table 2.2 the total number of prisoners assigned to the USARB is 2,601. Hence the travel cost is approximately $700,000. Under Option C, the total number of prisoners assigned to the USARB is estimated to be approximately 4,100. The corresponding travel cost is approximately $1.1 million. Under Options B, D and E the travel cost has been assumed to be zero because these options abolish the USARB.

B.4 C_4 = Cost of Restoring a soldier who Should Have Been Discharged.

A rather restricted view has been taken in an attempt to quantify the lower bound on this cost. The actual cost is difficult

to determine because of the various intangibles involved. A soldier who should have been discharged has been defined as one who after being returned to duty, eventually receives a less than honorable discharge. On the assumption that such a soldier is an "undesirable element", his value is at best zero. Thus the minimum cost associated with the return of a "bad soldier" is the money wasted on him from the time he returns to duty to the time he receives a less than honorable discharge. Since a restored soldier starts at the E-1 rank, his Annual Composite Standard Rate (effective 1 October, 1976) is $6,260. Table 1.3 indicates that the bulk of such discharges occur by six months. Hence the money wasted on such a soldier during his typical stay of six months is $3,130. It should be emphasized that this figure represents the lower bound of the cost. The actual cost, in all probability, is much higher.

During the fiscal year, 1976, the number of soldiers assigned to the USARB was 2,600 and the number of soldiers directly returning to duty from installation and area confinement facilities is estimated as 1,600. Assume that 40% of those assigned to the USARB were restored to duty and 42% of those restored eventually received less than honorable discharge (See Table 1.3). Assume further that 68% of those returned directly to duty eventually received less than honorable discharge.

Under Options A and F in Table 2.2, the total number of soldiers who should be discharged but are instead returned is given by: $2,600 \times 0.4 \times 0.42 + 1,600 \times 0.68 = 1,525$. This corresponds to a minimum cost of $4,773,250.

Under Options B and D the total number of soldiers who should have been discharged but are instead returned is $4,200 \times 0.68 = 2,856$, which corresponds to a minimum cost of $8,939,280.

Under Option C, the number of similar soldiers is $4,200 \times 0.4 \times 0.42 = 706$, which corresponds to a minimum cost of $2,209,780.

Under Option E since each person adjudged guilty is given an expeditious discharge, this cost becomes zero.

B.5 C_5 = Cost of Discharging a Soldier Who Should Have Been Restored.

Like C_4, this cost is difficult to estimate because of the various intangibles involved. An attempt has been made to estimate the lower bound of this cost. A soldier who should have been restored has been defined as that soldier who, if restored, would have eventually received an honorable discharge. The discharge of such a soldier necessitates recruiting his replacement. Various costs associated with recruitment of one person as provided by HQDA, DAPE-PBB are as follows:

Recruiting	$ 1,132
Training (BCT and AIT)	4,134
PCS travel	301
Clothing Bag	340
MPA for leave enroute to duty station	306
Total	$ 6,213

This amount is multiplied by a factor of 1.3 to accommodate the attrition among new recruits. The cost of one "effective" recruitment is $8,077.

The duty commitment of an AIT graduate is 30 months, whereas the average months served by the USARB graduates is approximately 17 months (See Table 1.3). This cost associated with the replacement of the lost service is $8,077 ÷ 30 x 17 = $4,576.

As mentioned earlier, the figure $4,576 is the minimum cost of discharging a soldier who should have been restored. The actual cost is much higher because of the intangibles involved. The cost figures associated with C_5, as illustrated in Table 2.2 are computed on the basis of the estimate that 15% of soldiers discharged at the USARB have restoration potential (See Section 1.3.2) under Options A, D and F. Under Option E all soldiers who returned to duty and eventually received an honorable discharge will be expeditiously discharged without being given a chance to

return to duty. Under Options B and D, since every soldier is returned to duty the cost associated with C_5 is zero.

APPENDIX C - SITE VISIT REPORTS

FORT DIX ACF

ORGANIZATION

Ft. Dix Area Confinement Facility is located on Ft. Dix, a TRADOC installation in south central New Jersey. The general organization of the facility follows for the most part the organization for this type of facility specified in Army Regulation 190-47. A copy of the current organization chart follows as Figure C.1 The blocks with dotted lines indicate sections for which there is no authorized staff but for which there is staff on hand. These blocks are additions to the chart shown in the Army Regulations.

As shown on this chart there are three principal branches that report to the Commanding Officer. Each of these branches have different functions and responsibilities.

Prisoner Motivation and Development Branch

- maintenance and preparation of Correctional Treatment files
- statistical reports required by the Fort, TRADOC and ODCSPER
- coordination of transportation required to receive prisoners
- correspondence
- planning and preparation of all training and education programs
- diagnostic testing
- conducting regular counseling of prisoners
- evaluation of prisoners as to their potential for further military service
- liaison between prisoners and outside services
- establishment and operation of work programs
- upkeep of the physical facility and area beautification

FIGURE C.1 CONFINEMENT FACILITY ORGANIZATION (FT. DIX, N.J.)



AREA CONFINEMENT FACILITY MISSION: To provide custodial supervision, professional evaluation, counseling, training, employment, and welfare activities necessary to prepare military prisoners for return to military duty or for correctional treatment to improve their attitudes.

Prisoner Service Branch

- procurement, distribution and accounting for health and comfort supplies
- processing of new arrivals
- procurement, storage preparation and serving of food to prisoners and cadre
- preparation and audit of the ACF budget
- procurement, storage and accounting of all ACF property
- processing and security of all prisoners' private property
- processing of all incoming and outgoing mail

Correctional Supervision Branch

- custody, control and supervision of all prisoners and of guards assigned to the branch
- inspection of prisoner and guard personnel
- investigation of all infractions of rules by prisoners and guards
- investigation of all prisoner complaints against guards
- conduct of monthly shakedown at the Facility
- provision of perimeter security of the ACF, and manning of the guard towers when required
- supervision of prisoners on work detail
- provision of prisoner escorts
- control of all persons entering the Facility

STAFFING

The current authorized strength of the Fort Dix ACF as of November 1976 is based on a prisoner population of 60. Total staffing of the facility is:*

	Authorized
Officers	5
Enlisted	164

The following table shows the staffing by branch and by rank.

---

* Organization of the Fort Dix Area Confinement Facility, 15 September 1976, ATZDPM-C.

STAFFING BY BRANCH

Command	Authorized	Assigned
	2 Officers	2 Officers
	1 Enlisted	1 Enlisted
Prisoners Motivation and Development Branch		
	1 Officer	1 Officer
	15 Enlisted	21 Enlisted
	1 SP	1 SP
Correctional Supervision Branch		
	1 Officer	2 Officers
	128 Enlisted	123 Enlisted
Prisoner Service Branch		
	1 Officer	1 Officer
	19 Enlisted	25 Enlisted

TABLE C.1 - Staffing

OBSERVATIONS

Population

At the time of our visit (18, 19 November, 1976) there were 160 staff and a current population of 25 prisoners. For the previous 18 months, the average number of prisoners on the last day of the month was 40. There has been a steady decline in the number of prisoners at the facility; the prisoner population of 74 in July, 1975 has declined to a level of 24 in November, 1976.

Intake Process

When a prisoner arrives at the Fort Dix ACF he first spends two days in In Processing. During this time the prisoner's medical forms are initiated, he receives a hair cut, is issued uniforms and his personal property is secured. During this period the new prisoner meets with one of the staff counselors who interviews him to determine his individual problem and needs. The prisoner's educational needs are also assessed by a diagnostic test and those prisoners requesting it are scheduled for the GED program.

When this initial processing is completed the prisoner joins the general population. His housing and work assignments are determined by the degree of custody required, and the prisoner's willingness to sign a waiver which allows the staff to co-mingle him with sentenced prisoners.

Programs

The facility maintains a daily roster of work details to which prisoners who do not have appointments related to the disposition of their case are assigned. The list of details is as follows:

Kitchen police
Front office cleaning
Wall locker repair
Facility painting
Services sewing machine oper.
Lower garden
Dispensary
Mess hall clerk
Facility chapel
Area beautification
Air multi-purpose room
Other R&U details
Supply
Library
Supervision
Counseling
Treatment/CTF

In addition to work details, the following educational programs are available:

Typing
G.E.D.
Remedial reading

At the time of The Mentoris Co.'s site visit to the facility most prisoners were assigned to KP. The typing class was no longer active. GED classes were presently being scheduled two days per week. These classes are conducted by a teacher from the Post educational services. Work details such as wall locker repair, and sewing machine operation have not been active recently due to declining prisoner population.

After the initial counseling session conducted during in-processing, prisoners are seen by a counselor twice per week. However, prisoners in segregation are seen daily. The counselors assist the prisoner with personal and family problems. Drug problems are referred to the Ft. Dix House and psychological problems are referred to the Fort's Mental Hygiene Unit or the Psychiatric Hospital. The counselors prepare writeups of these sessions but these tend to be general in nature because of privacy of the individual.

Regular training for cadre is provided at the facility. Typical subject sessions include Operations, Priorities of Force, Guard Mount, Pro Life Run, Emergency Plans and Procedures, Safety Briefings, Drug and Alcohol Abuse as well as General Rap sessions.

Personnel

During the visits Mentoris Company staff conducted an informal discussion session with members of the cadre with no officers present. A number of areas were explored and it was evident that there was good morale. The only objection of the cadre was that the segregation cells had been closed. They felt that they were unable to maintain good discipline among the prisoners when they

would not be placed in segregation if the disciplinary infraction warranted such action. The Fort Dix confinement facility is staffed with well-trained personnel who manifest professional awareness of the highest order. Standard Operating Procedures were current and lower ranking personnel were aware of their provisions.

It is of interest to note that assignment to the stockade was no longer looked down upon by others on the post and the majority of the cadre seemed very satisfied with their working conditions and with their current responsibilities.

An exception to this was the social workers assigned to the facility. They feel that their assignment to the ACF is too long. Because the prisoners are there for relatively short periods they have little opportunity to do longer term counseling. Crisis intervention is more the norm. They stated that this type of counseling gives decreasing job satisfaction as time goes on. They suggested that the counselors be rotated with social service work at the main installation possibly every six months.

Plant

The building is well designed and it provides both cells and dormitories with a total capacity of 400. The supporting services such as food service, administrative, and intake appear to be adequate. There is a briefing and training room located at the front of the building outside the security area which serves many useful purposes.

Excellent provisions have been made for programs such as educational, library, recreation and religious services.

The facility has an all purpose recreation room which is used to provide at a minimum 30 minutes of physical training per day regardless of weather conditions. There is also an exercise area outside the facility. Other recreational activities include weekend movies and a library.

The physical plant evidenced a superior state of maintenance. All locking devices were operational in cell block and dormitory areas to include exit and corridor doors throughout the facility support areas. In view of the current low population of 25 inmates the permanent type floor plan for the Fort Dix facility provided more than adequate space for custodial housing and programs.

Security

Incident Report records reveal that the last escape at this facility occurred during January, 1974. Only two assaults (prisoner on guard) are recorded for the past three years and in these instances correctional officer victims lost no time off the job for injuries. Senior non-commissioned officers could not remember the last prisoner suicide attempt.

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FORT KNOX ACF

ORGANIZATION

The Area Confinement Facility (ACF) at Ft. Knox, Kentucky is organized as shown in figure 2-1 , page 2-9, of AR 190-47. A copy of this figure is shown as follows:

FIGURE C.2 **CONFINEMENT FACILITY ORGANIZATION** (FT. KNOX, KENTUCKY)



STAFFING

The staff assigned to the operation of the Ft. Knox ACF is described in Table C.2 which follows. During the course of the site visit at Fort Knox, conducted by Mentoris Company staff on 2, 3 December, 1976, information was gathered on the distribution of the assigned personnel to the various branches of operation of the ACF. Population at the time of the site visit was approximately 50 prisoners. Copies of monthly reports (CSGPA-1364) were secured for each of the previous 18 months. In this period total prisoner population varied from a high of 77 prisoners on 31 July 1975 to a low of 35 prisoners on 30 April 1976. For the previous 12 months, as of the last day of the month, the average prisoner population was 46 prisoners. On inspection, there was no significant pattern of variation of prisoner population discernible for this period.

The Ft. Knox ACF, at the time of site visit, was under the command of a Major, with a newly assigned First Lt. Executive Officer. A First Lt. was in charge of the Prisoner Services Branch. The Correctional Supervision Branch, headed by a Master Sgt. consisted of four prisoner guard platoons, made up of 18 men each, serving in a Prisoner Guard Section, plus additional 95-C Correction Specialists serving in the Correctional Supervision Section. Out of the total of 156 assigned 95-C Correction Supervisors or Correction Specialists, 34 were detailed to duty outside of the Area Confinement Facility.

The Prisoner Services Branch, consisted of:

- Processing Section - six men
- Mail Room - two men
- Administration - five men
- Food Service Section - eleven men
- Supply Section - three men
- Property and Funds Section - four men

TABLE C.2 USAARMC/Fort Knox Area Confinement Facility

Staffing

MOS	AUTH	ASSIGNED	AVAIL FOR DUTY	TDY	LEAVE	HOSP	SPCL DUTY	REMARKS
95B-Provost SGT	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1 out-processing (retirement)
95C-Corr Supv/Corr Spec	169	156	119	0	3	0	34	34 detailed to Co, PMO, CQ
94B-Cook	11	11	11	0	0	0	0	
91G-Corr Couns	3	6	6	0	0	0	1	1 detailed to IAH
91B-Medic	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	
76Y-Supply Spec	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	
75B-Pers Clk	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
73D-Accountant	3	3	2	0	0	0	0	1 out-processing (PCS)
71B-Clk Typist	8	7	7	0	0	0	0	
71F-Mail Clk	2	0	0		0	0	0	
71L-Admin Spec	1	0	0		0	0	0	
71M-Chap Asst	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	
TOTALS	204	188	149	0	4	0	35	

OFFICERS ASSIGNED			OFFICERS AUTHORIZED	
LTC - 1	MPC		LTC - 1	
MAJ - 1	MPC		MAJ - 3	
CPT - 1	CH		CPT - 0	
1LT - 2	MPC		1LT - 1	
TOTAL 5			TOTAL 5	

The Motivation and Development Branch has no officer in charge, but is headed by an SFC. This branch consists of the following sections:

- Employment Section - nine men
- Appointment Section - two men
- Education Section - two men, plus the assistance of a part-time civilian emplohee of the Army providing professional services support
- Training Section - three men
- Counseling Section - seven men

Outside professional support services from the Post include:

- two Psychologists
- one Administrator
- eleven Engineer workers, who supervise the work program at the installation
- one Environmental Health Supervisor
- one Chapel organist
- one Hospital medic for fill-in
- three JAG Officers

The ACF has one full-time Chaplain assigned and another Chaplain on a rotating assignment at all times. A Chaplain Assistant works for them. A Provost Sgt. is currently assigned, but on the day of the site visit, the assigned Provost Sgt. was out processing for retirement and the Sgt. in charge of prisoner service, a 95-C Corrections Supervisor was acting as Provost Sgt.

Operation Review

During the course of the site visit, a walk-through tour was conducted, with briefings by each of the enlisted personnel in charge of the sections. An opportunity was made available for the consultant to discuss the operation of the various sections with the supervisors and normal operating activities within the sections were discussed. The facility was examined in terms of its repair, maintenance, suitability, and functional performance.

OBSERVATIONS

Population

The Ft. Knox ACF is designed to house 235 prisoners, with an emergency maximum housing of 420 prisoners. For the past year, the average prisoner population has been 46. At the present time, the authorized cadre strength for the ACF is a total 209 officers and men. Of these 209 authorized staff, 169 enlisted personnel have the MOS of 95-C. There are currently 156 95-C personnel assigned to the ACF, and 119 were available for duty at the time of the site visit. 34 other 95-C's assigned to the ACF were detailed to CO, PMO, CQ.

Programs

The Employment Program consists of shops for the repair of electric fans, floor buffers, venitian blinds, and window screens. The ACF repair shops are operated using a combination of staff from the Post Engineers who act as supervisors and trainers for inmates. Eleven civilian employees of the Post Engineers Group are employed in these repair operations. In addition, on an intermittent basis a wood yard for chopping and splitting fire-wood and a wash rack for auto wash are in operation.

The Counseling Program has six Behavioral Science specialists who were reported to conduct at least daily interviews with each and every prisoner. The Sergeant in charge of the Counselling Section is completing his work on a Masters Degree in Sociology. The Specialists working with this Sergeant all have a minimum of a Bachelors Degree in a Social Science field and four of the five were reported to be also pursuing Masters level work in such fields as Public Service, Psychometry and Education Psychology.

A full-time Chaplain is assigned to the ACF. He reported that he conducts a special counseling program for prisoners. which he described as employing "behavorial modification" practices with religious instruction.

Plant

The facility was observed to be old, and the site of the facility in relation to post housing and traffic patterns on adjoining streets have changed considerably since the structure was built. The site now fronts one of the main post auto entrances, and is adjacent to more recently constructed post housing. The installation's present proximity to traffic and housing has required specific exceptions to AR 190-47 for continued operation, according to personnel interviewed at the Fort. Further, special exceptions to procedures regarding guard actions in the event of a prisoner escape have had to be put into effect to assure that no guard will fire his weapon in the direction of adjacent post housing.

USARB

ORGANIZATION

The Organization of the United States Army Retraining Brigade (USARB) is shown in Figure C.3. As indicated on this chart the major divisions of the facility are:

- Two Training Battalions
- Headquarters Command
- Personnel and Administrative Services Division
- Resource Management Division
- Operation and Training Division
- Legal Division
- Research and Evaluation Division
- Social Work Division
- Chaplain Division

Also reporting directly to the Office of the Commander are the:

- Public Affairs Office Special Correspondence Branch
- Race Relations/Equal Opportunity
- 7th Step Program

Training Battalions

The two training battalions consist of two units each. Each unit is in turn composed of two leadership teams. Each of these leadership teams works with an assigned group of trainees during the entire seven-week training cycle. The teams continually observe the trainees during the program and participate in the process of evaluating the trainees' potential for return to duty. They also provide day-to-day custody and control of the trainees and are responsible for reporting on the progress of each trainee.

Headquarters Command

There are several major functions which this division has responsibility for. These include:

FIGURE C.3 - US ARMY RETRAINING BRIGADE
FORT RILEY, KANSAS 66442
STAFF DIRECTORY

AUGUST 1976



1. Providing housing, logistical and administrative support for all trainees who are to be discharged. This includes counseling and preparation for entry into civilian life.
2. Processing of all new trainees, which includes initial screening, evaluation counseling, legal assistance and problem assessment.
3. Physical security of the camp.
4. Preparing trainees both physically and mentally for the following seven weeks of the program.

Personnel and Administrative Services Division

This division has responsibility for the administration of records for both trainees and personnel assigned to the USARB. They maintain correctional treatment files, distribute mail and process records for the reception or release of prisoners. They are also responsible for personal property of the prisoners assigned to the brigade.

Resource Management Division

The staff of this division has responsibility for the financial operation of the branch, including budget preparation and accounting. They also provide for the procurement, receipt, storage, distribution, and accounting of supplies and equipment. A food services supervisor provides guidance to the food services staff.

Operation and Training Division

This division has responsibility for all training and educational programs conducted at the USARB. As part of this responsibility they provide the actual instruction of the trainees during the various classes. They prepare any training aids used as part of the classroom instruction. The schedule of program of instruction currently being conducted by this division is as follows:

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

PHASE I

TITLE	HOURS
MILITARY AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT	
Purposes of Confinement	2
Benefits of an Honorable Discharge	1
Counseling/Initial Interviews	32
Orientation (Chaplain/SJA)	2
SUB TOTAL	37
INDIVIDUAL GROWTH	
R & E Evaluation	1
Leave and Earnings Statement	1
Personnel Information	1
Evaluations	2
Introduction to Counseling	1
Human Interaction Patterns	1
Decision Elements in the Alternatives Facing You	2
SUB TOTAL	9
PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING	
Physical Fitness Training	5
Organized Athletics	6
SUB TOTAL	11
FIELD AND RELATED TRAINING	
Drill and Ceremonies	2
Preparation for Inspection	6
Inspections	8
SUB TOTAL	16
COMMANDER'S TIME	
Unit Commander	4
Team Commander	7
SUB TOTAL	11
ADMINISTRATIVE	
In Processing/Clothing Inventory/Appointments	16
Quartermaster Sales	2
PX	2
Brigade Briefing	5
SUB TOTAL	25
TOTAL	109

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

PHASE II

TITLE	HOURS
MILITARY AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT	2
Human Self Development	2
Stress	1
Seventh Steps Counseling	2
Small Group Counseling (including orientation & training)	11
SUB TOTAL	16
INDIVIDUAL GROWTH	
GED/GED Classes (Counseling/Appointments/Unit Activities)	16
Film - "Second Effort"	1
Making Personal Changes	2
Human Growth and Development	2
Success	3
"How to Get Along..."	5
Money Management	1
SUB TOTAL	30
PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING	
Physical Fitness Training	11
BPFT #1	2
Swimming Test/Drown Proofing	2
Swimming Instruction (non-swimmers)	6
Bowling	2
SUB TOTAL	23
FIELD AND RELATED TRAINING	
Map and Compass Training	3
Confidence Course	3
Introduction to Rappelling	1
Land Navigation	4
Survival Training	4
Self Defense Training (Hand to Hand Combat)	2
Leadership (1 and 2)	2
Training Reinforcement/Athletic Competition	6
SUB TOTAL	25
COMMANDER'S TIME	
Team Commander	9
SUB TOTAL	9

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

PHASE II

TITLE	HOURS
ADMINISTRATIVE	
Trainee Reception	1
Processing and Orientation	10
Diagnostic Testing	4
Recreational Services Orientation	2
Safety Briefing	2
SUB TOTAL	19
TOTAL	122

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

PHASE III

TITLE	HOURS
MILITARY AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT	
Race Relations	10
Human Self Development	5
Hazards of Alcohol and Drug Abuse	2
Getting Along on the Job	1
Deception in Advertising	1
Family Problems and Solutions	2
Military Social Assistance Organizations	2
New Unit Adjustment	1
Military Justice	2
Seventh Step Counseling	8
Small Group Counseling	19
SUB TOTAL	54
INDIVIDUAL GROWTH	
GED/GED Study Hall (Counseling/Appts./Unit Activities)	36
Becoming an Independent Person	1
Problem Solving Process	2
U.S. Government	1
Abilene Tour (*1)	4
Religious Retreat (TBA)	(6)
"How to Get Along..."	1
SUB TOTAL	45
PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING	
Physical Fitness Training	19
APFT	4
Athletics (Organized competition)	6
SUB TOTAL	29
FIELD AND RELATED TRAINING	
Confidence Training (Bear Pit, Cross Country, Hill Climb)	4
Obstacle Course	6
Leader's Reaction Course	4
Orienteering Course	4
Mountaineering Techniques (Rappelling, Climbing/Suspension Traverse)	8
Reconnaissance and Patrolling	24
Escape and Evasion	6
Self Defense Training (Hand to Hand Combat)	4
Care and Cleaning of Weapons	2
Water Training (*2)	(4)
Training Reinforcement/Athletic Competition	16
Leadership (3,4,5,6)	4
Cross Country Navigation	3
SUB TOTAL	85

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

PHASE III

TITLE	HOURS
COMMANDER'S TIME	
Team Commander	33
SUB TOTAL	33
BASIC COMBAT TRAINING (*3)	
M16A1 Rifle	8
Hand Grenades	2
BPFT (*4)	3
Proficiency Testing	1
SUB TOTAL	14
ADMINISTRATIVE	
Finance Out Processing/Briefing	3
Program EValuation (R & E)	2
Issue of CIF Equipment	1
Turn in Equipment	2
Safety Briefing	3
Quartermaster Sales	3
Camp Funston PX	2
SUB TOTAL	16
TOTAL	276
GRAND TOTAL	507

(*1) Eisenhower Center and Museum.
(*2) During warm weather months.
(*3) This training is given to only those individuals who have not completed BCT.
(*4) Accomplished as part of the normal training program.

Legal Division

This division provides legal advice and assistance to the commander. Also, services for trainees with any personal legal problems are provided by the staff.

Research and Evaluation Division

Staff of the division design and conduct various research and evaluation studies at the USARB. They conduct regular program evaluation studies for each group of trainees who complete the training program. As well, they analyze the performance of trainees returned to duty from Enlisted Evaluation Reports (EERs) that are returned. The management information system of the USARB is also the responsibility of this division.

Social Work Division

This division has responsibility for providing counseling services to prisoners. As part of this responsibility they assign a social worker to each of the Leadership Teams of the training battalions. They conduct both individual and group counseling sessions with the trainees during their stay at the USARB and they also act as instructors for some of the classes which the trainees attend. The social worker actively participates in the evaluation of the individual trainee's potential for restoration to duty.

Chaplain Division

This division provides religious support to the trainees and facility personnel as requested.

In addition to these divisions an active chapter of the 7th Step Program is operated at the facility. This organization is composed of civilian ex-convicts who meet with groups of people who have

gotten in trouble and counsel them about the consequences of continued misbehavior based on their own personal experience.

STAFFING

Staffing of the USARB is authorized as follows:

	Authorized
Officers	55
Warrant Officers	2
Enlisted	320
Civilians	65
Total Staff	442

Of the 320 enlisted personnel 84 had an 95C MOS.

The staffing of the organizational components is shown in the Table C.3 which follows.

TABLE C.3 USARB STAFFING

DIVISION	PERSONNEL TYPE	AUTHORIZED
Headquarters	Officers	4
	Enlisted	2
	Civilians	3
Training Battalions	Officers	17
	Enlisted	104
	Civilians	-
Headquarters Command	Officers	13
	Enlisted	150
	Civilians	-
Personnel & Administrative Services Division	Officers	5
	Enlisted	21
	Civilians	34
Operating & Training Division	Officers	2
	Enlisted	20
	Civilians	3
Legal Division	Officers	5
	Enlisted	3
	Civilians	3
Research & Evaluation Division	Officers	1
	Enlisted	3
	Civilians	6
Social Work Division	Officers	8
	Enlisted	7
	Civilians	3
Chaplain Division	Officers	4
	Enlisted	4
		1
Resource Management Division	Officers	-
	Enlisted	7
	Civilians	9

OBSERVATIONS

Programs

In June 1976 a new Commander was assigned to the Retraining Brigade. This has resulted in some modification of the programs of the USARB. At present all trainees spend two weeks in the processing unit. Initial counseling and evaluation are begun during this period. Following this initial period the trainees enter Phase II of the program. The only exceptions to this are those who exhibit intractable behavior and whose records indicate no restoration potential. In this instance they are sent directly to the Discharge Unit.

The aim of the program according to several of the staff members interviewed is to provide the correctional thrust necessary to modify behavior or to make permanent adjustments in attitudes. The program is designed to build physical confidence accompanied by an improved awareness of the type of behavior and attitudes which the individual manifests which lead him towards problems. This is accomplished by both small and large group counseling and courses directed towards teaching the trainee how to deal with personal problems such as finance.

At the end of each nine-week training session (Phases I, II and III) the Research and Evaluation Division meets with the trainees prior to their transfer from the USARB. The trainees are asked to evaluate the program and to write in their own words a statement about what the trainee felt was the most important thing he learned during his stay.

In addition to the regular training program, an active GED program is conducted for trainees who do not have a high school diploma or its equivalent. In addition to the GED program any trainee who has not completed basic training is enabled to do so as part of the program.

The discharge unit also maintains a regular program designed to assist the individual's transition to civilian life. Classes are conducted on Veterans Benefits, U.S. Citizenship and three classes on the world of work. Regular counseling sessions are also conducted. The length of time spent in the discharge unit is dependent on several factors including whether the trainee waives his physical exam, waives his right to a board hearing or whether he has reached the time to his minimum release date. The average stay in the discharge unit in recent months is around 24 days.

From the time of their arrival prisoners are referred to as trainees. There are no guards on the gates in the training battalions. However, there are guards at the discharge unit since prisoners who still have time to serve on their sentence are under confinement and are housed separately from those who have completed their sentence but are awaiting discharge.

Eighteen months of trainee population data indicate no discernable cyclical pattern or declines in total populations.

USDB

ORGANIZATION

The United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) is located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This facility currently houses Army, Air Force and Marine prisoners. The organization of this facility as specified in Army Regulations 190-47 is shown in Figure C.4, which also includes a more detailed organization chart constructed from the current staffing report.

As the chart shows, the main organizational components of the USDB are:

- Office of the Commandant
- Staff Judge Advocate
- Staff Chaplain
- Headquarters Company
- Resource Management
- Logistic Services
- Custody
- Classification
- Training
- Mental Hygiene

A brief description of the responsibilities of these divisions follows:

Office of the Commandant - The Commandant is responsible for the overall operation of the facility and coordinates the activity of all personnel including Army, Air Force, Marine and civilian through the Directors of the nine major divisions. In addition to this, this office also has as part of its function day-to-day responsibility for the Inmate Mail Branch, the Investigation Division, the Administration Division and the Discipline and Adjutant Board.

FIGURE C.4

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE USDB



The Headquarters Company has primary responsibility for the discipline, welfare, education, training and recreation for all Army personnel assigned or attached to USDB. An additional responsibility is operation of the Supply Branch.

The Staff Chaplain is responsible for specialized activities related to the individual religious needs. Religious services in several denominations are provided. In addition the Chaplains provide individual and group counseling, special religious classes and retreats, visiting inmates in segregation and making contact with outside social agencies such as the Red Cross when family problems exist.

The Staff Judge Advocate furnishes general legal services to the USDB including the Commandant, military personnel and prisoners. Areas where services are provided include appellate review, tax problems, divorce and domestic matters, and civil legal problems of a general nature.

The Office of the Director of Resource Management has fiscal responsibility for the operation of the USDB. Activities include the supervision of, receipt, disbursement and accounting for all monetary transactions involving appropriated and non-appropriated funds. This office also has personnel and manpower management responsibilities for both military and civilian staff.

The Director of Classification is responsible for implementing the inmate's correctional treatment program. Personnel administration, prisoner programs, employment and services, and parole/restoration responsibilities fall under this Director.

The Director of Custody has responsibility for the custody control, discipline, care and security of all inmates at the USDB and for inmates assigned to the Munson Army Hospital. Counseling is provided to inmates by Domicile Counselors who report to the Director. The Alcoholics Anonymous Program also functions under the direction of this office. The Special Services Division conducts all sports and recreational activities.

The Director of Logistic Services provides for the day-to-day operation of the facility. Responsibilities include maintenance, food service, supply and other service related functions. Several maintenance functions such as masonry work, carpentry, and electrical work are carried out by individual branches who train and employ inmates in these functions. This division also has responsibility for the laundry and dry cleaning branches.

The Director of Training is responsible for the administration and operation of the academic and vocational education programs and the Vocational Farm. This office has two main divisions under it, the Academic Division and the Vocational Division. The Academic Division provides educational counseling, GED classes, correspondence study and the Associate Arts Degree Program operated in conjunction with the Highland Junior College. The Vocational Division administers a program which provides skill training to inmates in 18 trades and occupations.

The Director of Mental Hygiene is responsible for the divisions of Psychiatry, Psychology and Social Work. There are four major areas of responsibility and service which include inmate evaluation and processing, inmate treatment and services, staff consultation and training and research. In support of these areas, activities such as testing, psychiatric evaluations and preparation of social histories are performed. These divisions provide recommendations on restoration, clemency, paroles and institutional assignments. Treatment to inmates who require it is provided through both individual and group therapy. In addition, research studies on a variety of topics related to the operation of the USDB and its prisoner population have been performed.

STAFFING

The USDB staff is composed of Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Civilian personnel. Current staff levels by division are shown in Table C.4. Total staff is as follows:

	Authorized*
Officers	39
Warrant Officers	2
Enlisted	485
Civilian	136

*Included in these numbers are 149 Air Force or Marine personnel assigned to the USDB. The number is periodically adjusted based on the numbers of prisoners from these services assigned to the USDB.

The staff at the USDB represents a wide range of MOS's. Within the guard force and the special security branch, who have primary responsibility for inmate custody, all of the staff have a 95-C MOS. The mental hygiene unit also have well trained staff to carry out their function. The vocational training instructors are mainly civilians who have experience working in the trades they are teaching. The use of civilians in this capacity provides a stable labor force not subject to reassignment. Instruction in the academic division is provided by accredited teachers in both the GED and Associate Degree Programs.

OBSERVATIONS

Programs

The Mentoris Company Staff and consultants visited the USDB on two separate occasions. During the first visit we toured the facility and observed the general operation of the installation. From these visits and from various documents gathered at this time we found a well staffed, secure, well maintained facility with

TABLE C.4 STAFF LEVEL OF THE USDB

ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENT USDB	REQUIRED AND AUTHORIZED STRENGTH							
	OFFICERS		ENLISTED		CIVILIAN		TOTAL	
	R	A	R	A	R	A	R	A
1. OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT	2	2	2	2	1	1	5	5
Inmate Mail Branch	0	0	3	2	7	7	10	9
Investigation Division	1	1	16	13	0	0	17	14
Administration Division	2	2	3	3	2	2	7	7
Discipline & Adj. Board	1	0	2	1	0	0	3	1
TOTAL	6	5	26	11	10	10	42	36
2. STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE	3	2	5	4	3	11	11	9
TOTAL	3	2	5	4	3	11	11	9
3. STAFF CHAPLAIN	4	4	5	4	0	0	9	8
TOTAL	4	4	5	4	0	0	9	8
4. HEADQUARTERS COMPANY	2	2	15	15	0	0	17	17
Cadre Training	1	1	5	5	0	0	6	6
Supply Branch	0	0	4	4	0	0	4	4
TOTAL	3	3	24	24	0	0	27	27
5. DIRECTOR OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2
Budget Division	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2
Manpower Management Division	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Inmate Personal Property Division	1	1	7	6	5	5	13	12
Vocational Training Fund Branch	0	0	6	3	10	4	16	7
Inmate Welfare Fund Branch	0	0	4	3	1	1	5	4
TOTAL	1	1	17	12	21	15	39	28

TABLE C.4 (Continued)

ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENT USDB	REQUIRED AND AUTHORIZED STRENGTH							
	OFFICERS		ENLISTED		CIVILIAN		TOTAL	
	R	A	R	A	R	A	R	A
6. DIRECTOR OF LOGISTIC SERVICES	1	1	2	2	1	1	4	4
Supply Division	1 WO	1 WO	8	3	7	7	16	11
Laundry Branch	0	0	4	3	0	0	4	3
Dry Cleaning Branch	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Maintenance Division	1	1	2	1	0	0	3	2
Carpentry/Paint Branch	0	0	7	7	0	0	7	7
Mason Branch	0	0	5	5	0	0	5	5
Electrical Shop Branch	0	0	6	5	0	0	6	5
Plumbing Shop Branch	0	0	5	5	0	0	5	5
Machine Shop Branch	0	0	5	4	0	0	5	4
Preventive Maintenance Shop Branch	0	0	3	3	0	0	3	3
Training Aid Fabrication Branch	0	0	3	2	0	0	3	2
Cons. Inmate Dining Facility	1 WO	1 WO	23	23	0	0	24	24
Local Parolee Dining	0	0	4	4	0	0	4	4
Vocational Farm Dining	0	0	3	3	0	0	3	3
TOTAL	4 (2WO)	4 (2WO)	81	70	8	8	93	82
7. DIRECTOR OF CUSTODY	1	1	0	0	1	1	2	2
Operations Division	1	1	11	9	0	0	12	10
Correction Guard Force Branch	0	0	76	57	0	0	76	57
Special Security Branch	0	0	24	19	0	0	24	19
Special Services Branch	0	0	18	15	2	2	20	17
Domicile Treatment Division	4	3	187	141	0	0	191	144
Maximum Security Division	1	1	40	34	0	0	41	35
Local Parolee Unit	1	1	25	20	0	0	26	21
TOTAL	8	7	381	295	3	3	392	305

TABLE C.4 (Continued)

ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENT USDB	REQUIRED AND AUTHORIZED STRENGTH							
	OFFICERS		ENLISTED		CIVILIAN		TOTAL	
	R	A	R	A	R	A	R	A
8. DIRECTOR OF CLASSIFICATION	2	2	0	0	4	4	6	6
Inmate Personnel Division	1	0	4	2	1	1	6	3
Military Records Branch	0	0	3	0	6	6	9	6
Correction Records Branch	0	0	0	0	7	7	7	7
Out Processing Branch	0	0	1	0	8	8	9	8
Files and Distribution Branch	0	0	2	0	4	4	6	4
Inmate Pay Branch	0	0	2	1	0	0	2	1
Inmate Program Division	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Class Boards Branch	0	0	1	0	13	13	14	13
Clemency Branch	0	0	0	0	5	5	5	5
Management and Assignment Branch	0	0	2	2	1	1	3	3
Employment/Pre-Release Services Div.	1	0	6	3	0	0	7	3
Parole/Restoration Division	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Parole Branch	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3
Restoration Branch	0	0	1	0	2	2	3	2
TOTAL	6	3	22	8	54	54	82	65
9. DIRECTOR OF TRAINING	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3
Academic Division	1	1	8	5	10	10	19	16
Learning Center Division	0	0	1	1	2	2	3	3
Vocational Training Division	1	0	2	2	0	0	3	2
Vocational Training Activities	0	0	53	37	25	22	78	59
TOTAL	3	2	65	46	38	35	106	83
10 DIRECTOR OF MENTAL HYGIENE	1	1	0	0	4	4	5	5
Psychiatry Division	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	2
Psychology Division	2	2	3	3	0	0	5	5
Social Work Division	6	5	8	8	4	4	18	17
TOTAL	11	10	11	11	8	8	30	29
TOTAL STAFF USDB	47 2 WO	39 2 WO	637	485	145	136	831* 149 Are now Army posit (AF, MC)	672

numerous programs in operation. Both the academic and vocational programs appeared to be well designed and operated. The Division of Mental Hygiene and Staff Judge Advocates Office also appeared to be well staffed and managed.

We were especially impressed with the job placement efforts that are carried out involving prisoners to be released to civilian life. In this program, inmates are assisted in preparing resumes and then distributing these to business organization in the area where they plan to settle upon release. A listing has been prepared, by State, of the various government and community agencies which provide help to ex-offenders, and the addresses of major corporations who are headquartered in the State.

We have not included in the report details on numbers of inmates in programs or statistics on services provided since this is thoroughly documented in the Annual Historical Summaries prepared by the USDB each year.

We did, however, on our second visit, conduct a thorough study of the operation of the vocational shops. The results of these studies are detailed elsewhere in this report.

FORT ORD ACF

ORGANIZATION

Unlike the efforts mounted at Fort Dix, New Jersey and Fort Knox, Kentucky, the site visit to Fort Ord, California ACF was not carried out with the purpose of extensive evaluation of the management structure and function. Rather the organization and functioning of the Fort Ord ACF was examined on a comparative basis to that of Fort Dix and Fort Knox. The organizational structure of the ACF at Fort Ord was found to reflect specifications found in AR 190-47.

STAFFING

Total staffing and staff by functional groups are presented in Table C.5. At the time of the site visit there were 36 prisoners at the facility.

OBSERVATIONS

Operations at the Fort Ord ACF were found to compare directly with those observed at Fort Dix and Fort Knox in terms of their organization and function. Fort Ord's prisoner population like that at Fort Dix and Fort Knox is considerably lower than the capacity of the facility and the present staffing pattern would indicate. The Fort Ord ACF is a modern facility comparable to Fort Dix.

STAFFING BY BRANCH

Command	Authorized	Assigned
Total	2 Officers 6 Enlisted	2 Officers 6 Enlisted
Prisoner Motivation and Development Branch		
Total	1 Officer 48 Enlisted	1 Officer 23 Enlisted
Correctional Supervision Branch		
Total	0 Officer 94 Enlisted	0 Officer 79 Enlisted
Prisoner Service Branch		
Total	1 Officer 19 Enlisted	1 Officer 22 Enlisted
Total	4 Officers 167 Enlisted	4 Officers 130 Enlisted

TABLE C.5 - Staffing

APPENDIX D - INMATE INTERVIEWS

A series of focus group interviews were conducted with prisoners at confinement facilities and the USDB. A group interview was also conducted with trainees at the USARB.

These interviews had as their original purpose, the gathering of opinions of prisoners relative to the correctional program so that a "second opinion" could be heard about program performance. A prisoner cannot, in general, be expected to have high praise for the system. Further, there is enough reason to doubt the credibility of a good portion of their statements. We did not make any attempt to check the validity of the statements made by prisoners. As such we are not in any position to draw any serious conclusions from these interviews. However, they are presented here as a point of interest.

ACF Detainees (Pretrial)

The pretrial detainees at Ft. Dix and Ft. Knox spent most of their confinement in pre-trial meetings with counselors and lawyers. The little time left was spent in maintenance duties of the facilities. These men were able to perceive the quality of lock-up by intermingling with sentenced inmates at the ACF's. The men at Ft. Dix who felt they would be convicted, expressed desires to be assigned to other confinement facilities rather than Ft. Dix. The Ft. Knox detainees, who also spent most of their day in pre-trial preparation, did not express anxiety about remaining at the Ft. Knox facility. Therefore, they remained somewhat optimistic about their future.

ACF Prisoners

These men clearly stated that they believe that confinement is purely a lock-up procedure. They all recited the Army Regulation that confinement should be rehabilitative and contructive with emphasis placed on returning the soldier to either military

or civilian life as a rehabilitated person better able to deal with society. Although the prisoners know that this is stated in the regulations, they do not believe that the Army really means this. They state as supportive evidence that in their opinion there is no "real" attempt at therapeutic counseling, no vocational work programs that they feel will help them on the outside, and that the educational programs are not up to par in their judgment. The Ft. Dix prisoners were especially bitter, since the only work programs available were facility maintenance programs or KP. Many of the prisoners said they did not have enough to do each day, and spent much of their time just sitting around.

The Ft. Knox prisoners were occupied much of the day and felt that they were at least working as much as they should be. But they, as well, did not see where they were being prepared for the outside world. Both prisoners at Ft. Dix and Ft. Knox felt that they were in confinement for short periods of time and that this may be the reason why there were no true rehabilitative programs.

Prisoners at the ACFs repeatedly downgraded the quality of each corrections program including the GED course, vocational programs, and counseling. They felt that the GED course was very elementary and almost everyone passed, and that the vocational course was incomplete and did not give a person a well-rounded trade. Most inmates said that they felt the counseling program was superficial. The general description of the counseling program was that the program is designed to help an inmate with financial problems and legal problems, but never touches upon the problems that brought the inmate to confinement. A major complaint was that the counselors are all military personnel and the inmates feel that these are not the people who can help them in an objective manner with their military problems. Inmates report that the counselors view their work as just a job within the service and are not as involved in helping a prisoner as a civilian might be.

USARB Trainees

These men expressed the view that the Army was not attempting to reach them in terms of the reasons for their present assignment. They reported that they are told upon entering the USARB that equal time would be given to counseling as to military fitness programs. These men said that in their opinion counseling programs were almost non-existent once the heavy emphasis was started on physical retraining activities. They believed that the Army's answer to keeping a trainee out of trouble was to make the trainee so tired he would have no energy for getting into trouble.

However, the men serving at the USARB felt that the retraining they were receiving would definitely help them once they were reassigned to military duties. They felt this, not because they felt they were being rehabilitated, but because they were spending their confinement in activities that were as close to their future military time as possible. They did not feel that they would have to make a big readjustment into Army life.

USDB Prisoners

These men felt more satisfied about the way they spent time in confinement than did ACF inmates. But like the USARB trainees, they did not see confinement at the USDB as a corrections process. They reported that prisoners receive a two-week orientation period upon entering the USDB, at which they are given the impression that they will be counseled to enable them to understand why they got into trouble. The men report coming away from this orientation period very optimistic that they will leave the DB with a clearer understanding of themselves and the world around them.

It is unclear at what point this optimism breaks down, but it is not long before they reported that the prisoner sees that the emphasis is on keeping busy and not on counseling or preparation for return to civilian life. The men are unable to relate daily work programs and vocational training with rehabilitation.

They said that they were told that they would leave the USDB with good trade skills, but they reported that they were not getting the full benefit of the programs available at the facility.

Summary Observations

All prisoners in Army corrections programs expressed some dissatisfaction with their programs during the course of group interviews. AWOL offenders blamed the Army for their problems. Other offenders were less likely to do this. ACF inmates in general complained about the lack of meaningful corrections programs or activities, but inmate responses varied from site to site. Activities which kept ACF prisoners (as opposed to pre-trial inmates of ACF's) busy and constructively occupied reduced complaints.

Trainees at the USARB were more satisfied with their programs than either ACF inmates or USDB prisoners. In general, the trainees seemed satisfied with their program and looked forward to return to duty. USDB prisoners, on the other hand, were generally displeased with the programs offered them at the USDB, in terms of the extent to which they perceived the program would help them upon return to civilian life. While they were aware of the extensive program at the USDB to which they had access, they felt that inadequate effort was made by USDB staff to relate program elements to personal rehabilitation.

As we stated in the beginning of this Appendix, we did not expect the prisoners to praise the system since any one in confinement is never really happy to be there. What we did find significant in all of these discussions was that the prisoners had with one exception no substantive complaints about the correctional facilities. Only the Ft. Dix inmates who complained of no work programs other than KP had a specific complaint that was verifiable.

Therefore in our judgment, the "second opinion" we set out to obtain about program performance could not realistically be termed a negative one.