Strategic Breakout as a Soviet Policy Option.
Abstract
The author examines the assumption that the Soviet Union is unlikely to violate the SALT agreements because any incentive to do so would be overriden by the military and political costs of breaching the agreements and the far greater benefits of compliance. He suggests that there are Soviet incentives for covert and overt buildup within or without treaty constraints. His analysis of strategic breakout (which he defines as large-scale violation of the SALT treaty) is concerned with objectives and motivations for such an action, and the conditions fostering a change in direction. An important factor is an understanding of Soviet military decisionmaking. He notes that, even without a formal treaty, breakout may be defined as a form of military buildup 'breaking away' from an informal strategic accommodation with the U.S.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 1977
- Accession Number
- ADA046107
Entities
People
- Abraham S. Becker
Organizations
- RAND Corporation