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

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AMERICAN IMAGES OF ARABS: A DATA-BASED ANALYSIS

by

Eugene Michael Mensch II

March 1978

Thesis Advisor: John W. Amos II

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This study identifies and analyzes American images of Arabs. It is a content analysis of nine years of the New York Times (1967-1975), which: (1) determines whether the American image of Arabs is unfavorable, neutral, or favorable, (2) identifies the favorable and unfavorable images, (3) identifies trends as the images change and as they apply to specific Arab nations or peoples, and (4) analyzes these findings and assesses their importance in future policy formation.

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AMERICAN IMAGES OF ARABS: A DATA-BASED ANALYSIS

by

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B.A., Washburn University, 1968

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the
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ABSTRACT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION..... 10

II. IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE..... 11

A. PERCEPTION, BELIEF SYSTEMS AND IMAGES..... 11

B. IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS..... 12

C. IMAGES OF ARABS AND THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR..... 15

III. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION..... 18

A. METHODOLOGY..... 18

B. ORGANIZATION..... 21

IV. AMERICAN IMAGES OF ARABS..... 22

A. CATEGORIES..... 23

B. THEMES..... 24

1. Arabs Are or Support Terrorists..... 24

2. Arabs Are Factionated and Disunited..... 25

3. Arabs Are Militant and Belligerent..... 27

4. Arabs Are Anti-U.S. or Pro-Soviet..... 29

5. Arab Governments Are Defective..... 30

6. Arabs Are Realistic and Moderate..... 31

7. Arabs Are United, In Agreement..... 32

8. Arabs Are Willing to Negotiate..... 34

C. SUMMARY..... 35

V. EGYPT..... 46

A. IMAGE CATEGORIES..... 47

B. THEMES..... 48

1. Egyptians Are Militant and Belligerent... 48

2. Egyptians Are Anti-U.S. or Pro-Soviet.... 50

3. Egyptians Are Unreliable and Bellicose... 52

4. Egyptians Are Unyielding..... 54

5. Egypt's Military is Defective..... 56

VI. JORDAN..... 66
A. IMAGE CATEGORIES..... 66
B. THEMES..... 67
1. Jordanians Are or Support Terrorists..... 68
2. Jordan Is Anti-Terrorist/Extremist..... 70
3. Jordan Is Factionated and Disunited..... 72
4. Jordan Wants Peace..... 74
5. Jordan is Militant and Belligerent..... 75
VII. SYRIA..... 83
A. IMAGE CATEGORIES..... 84
B. THEMES..... 85
1. Syrians Are Militant and Belligerent..... 85
2. Syrians Are or Support Terrorists..... 87
3. Syrians Are Unyielding..... 90
4. Syria Is Anti-U.S. or Pro-Soviet..... 92
5. Syria's Military is Defective..... 93
VIII. LEBANON..... 100
A. IMAGE CATEGORIES..... 101
B. THEMES..... 102
1. Lebanese Are or Support Terrorists..... 102
2. Lebanon Is Factionated and Disunited..... 104
3. Lebanon Has a Defective Government..... 106
IX. IRAQ..... 113
A. IMAGE CATEGORIES..... 114
B. THEMES..... 115
1. Iraq Has a Defective Government..... 115
2. Iraq Is Anti-U.S. or Pro-Soviet..... 117
3. Iraq Is Militant and Belligerent..... 118
X. SAUDI ARABIA..... 125
A. IMAGE CATEGORIES..... 126
B. THEMES..... 127
1. Saudi Arabia Is an Oil Blackmailer..... 127
2. Saudi Arabia Is Progressive..... 129
3. Saudi Arabia Is Pro-U.S..... 130
4. Saudi Arabia Is Realistic, Moderate..... 131

XI. LIBYA..... 137
A. IMAGE CATEGORIES..... 138
B. THEMES..... 139
1. Libya Is an Oil/Economic Blackmailer..... 139
2. Libya Is Militant and Belligerent..... 140
3. Libyans Are or Support Terrorists..... 141
4. Libya Has a Defective Government..... 142
XII. OTHER ARAB NATIONS..... 149
A. IMAGE CATEGORIES..... 149
B. THEMES..... 150
1. Defective Government..... 150
2. Factionated and Disunited..... 152
3. Are or Support Terrorists..... 153
XIII. PALESTINIANS..... 160
A. IMAGE CATEGORIES..... 161
B. THEMES..... 162
1. Palestinians Are Terrorists..... 162
2. Palestinians Are Militant..... 165
3. Palestinians Are Disunited..... 166
4. Palestinians Are Anti-U.S. or Pro-Soviet. 168
5. Palestinians Are Unyielding..... 169
XIV. CONCLUSIONS..... 175
Appendix A: CODE SHEET..... 184
XV. NOTES..... 185
XVI. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY..... 188
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST..... 190
LIST OF FIGURES..... 8

LIST OF FIGURES

1. Aggregate -- Frequencies by Referrent..... 36
2. Aggregate -- Frequencies by Year..... 37
3. Aggregate -- Categories by Year..... 38
4. Aggregate -- Referrent by Category..... 39
5. Aggregate -- Frequencies by Theme..... 41
6. Aggregate -- Themes by Year..... 42
7. Egypt -- Frequency by Year..... 59
8. Egypt -- Images by Period..... 60
9. Egypt -- Images by Year..... 61
10. Egypt -- Themes by Year..... 62
11. Jordan -- Frequency by Year..... 77
12. Jordan -- Images by Period..... 78
13. Jordan -- Images by Year..... 79
14. Jordan -- Themes by Year..... 80
15. Syria -- Frequency by Year..... 95
16. Syria -- Images by Year..... 96
17. Syria -- Themes by Year..... 97
18. Lebanon -- Frequency by Year.....109
19. Lebanon -- Images by Year.....110
20. Lebanon -- Themes by Year.....111

21. Iraq -- Frequency by Year.....120

22. Iraq -- Images by Year.....121

23. Iraq -- Themes by Year.....122

24. Saudi Arabia -- Frequency by Year.....133

25. Saudi Arabia -- Images by Year.....134

26. Saudi Arabia -- Themes by Year.....135

27. Libya -- Frequency by Year.....144

28. Libya -- Images by Period.....145

29. Libya -- Images by Year.....146

30. Libya -- Themes by Year.....147

31. Other -- Frequency by Year.....155

32. Other -- Images by Referrent.....156

33. Other -- Themes by Year.....157

34. Palestinians -- Frequency by Year.....170

35. Palestinians -- Images by Year.....171

36. Palestinians -- Themes by Year.....172

I. INTRODUCTION

Although the study of images and their effect on the perception of decision-makers in international relations is not new, there has been little specific attention devoted to images of Arabs. Those efforts at identifying American images of Arabs have been either issue or time specific and have not been sufficiently broad or deep in their scope to provide one with what the images actually are. (See, for instance, Suleiman's and Wagner's studies cited below and in note 21.)

The purpose of this paper is to take an in depth look at exactly what images Americans have of Arabs. The specific objectives are to:

(1) Determine whether the images of Arabs that are created by a comprehensive news medium are favorable, neutral or unfavorable.

(2) Determine what the favorable and unfavorable images are.

(3) Identify trends as the images change and as they apply to specific Arab nations or groups of people.

(4) Be able to analyze these findings and draw conclusions relative to future policy formulation and analysis.

II. IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

A. PERCEPTION, BELIEF SYSTEMS AND IMAGES

The starting point in the decision-making process of any actor is his perception of reality. This perception, in the most general sense, ". . . has something to do with [his] awareness of the objects or conditions about [him],"[1] and is dependent on the actor's unconscious inferences. Thus, "Out of transactions with the environment, a pattern of unconscious assumptions is built and the total of these constitute the individual's world. . ."[2] This "world" or perception of reality, constitutes the actor's belief system. It is essential to realize that the belief system is not reality itself but what the actor thinks reality is. His belief system is comprised of many "images" of the past, present and future. These images, according to Ole R. Holsti, ". . . may be thought of as the set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received."[3] As long as the actor's images are close to the "truth" or facts, he can depend upon decisions he makes based on these perceptions to produce expected results (though not always favorable -- they are expected). However, as K. E. Boulding remarked, "If our image of the world is in some sense 'wrong,' of course, we may be dissapointed in our expectations. . ."[4] These incorrect images are latent in the actor's belief system, and when a fact which does not fit into the belief system of images is recognized by the actor, dissonance occurs. Leon

Festinger, in explaining his theory of cognitive dissonance, notes that dissonant relationships produce two reactions:

> The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance.
>
> When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance.[5]

In the extreme, a strongly held incorrect image or belief can produce a "perceptual defense" whereby ". . . features of the world which are repugnant to a particular person may not be perceived."[6] Expanding from an individual to a group belief, Festinger notes that, "It sometimes happens that a large group of people is able to maintain an opinion or belief even in the face of continual evidence to the contrary."[7]

Thus images: (1) are something that cannot be avoided by the actor, (2) help the actor order the mass of stimuli he receives, (3) when they are close to "reality" produce "expected" results in the decision-making process, and (4) when they are wrong, produce dissonance which is either reduced, resolved or avoided by the actor.

B. IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Images play an important role in international relations. National images are those that ". . . a nation has of itself and of those other bodies in the system which

constitute its international environment."[8] Just as for individuals, there is a link between these national images and international relations:

> decision-makers act upon their definition of the situation and their images of states -- others as well as their own. These images are in turn dependent upon the decision-maker's belief system and these may or may not be accurate representations of reality.[9]

Thus, national images and belief systems can also produce expected or unexpected results in international relations depending on how close to reality the images and beliefs are. In his latest study of Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Robert Jervis shows that as any other individual, ". . . when a statesman has developed a certain image of another country he will maintain that view in the face of large amounts of discrepant information. . ."[10]

Nations can use images to further national interests or objectives. Again, Robert Jervis:

> A symbolic victory can lead others to see high resolve and risk-taking in a state's behavior. This image is apt to make other states retreat or act cautiously in conflicts with the first state. Similarly, saving face can contribute to later successes. If in a major defeat a state salvages enough to credibly claim that its efforts were not wasted, or its policies completely mistaken, others will not be able to count on the state's avoiding similar situations. This image can then provide the

state with a significant degree of deterrence.[11]

It is because images are not reality that a state can ". . . consciously influence others' images of it without paying the price of altering its basic behavior and sacrificing other goals, including the goals these images are designed to serve."[12]

When nations are in conflict, either active or "cold war," images take on added importance. The protagonists will generally ". . . internalize a stereotype of their enemy that consists exclusively of evil or contemptible characteristics, but, on the other hand, of themselves and their allies as possessors of the best human qualities."[13] Once this is accomplished, as Jervis points out, ". . . an actor can use the image he claims he has of the other to justify certain actions that otherwise would lead the other to adopt an undesireable image of him."[14]

Images can also make tools out of states. Images become dysfunctional when they do not coincide in some way with reality. Decisions based upon inaccurate images, whether created by the deception of another national actor or not, will not fulfill expectations. Holsti notes the two-edged sword of inaccurate images. "Erroneous images may also prove to have a distorting effect by encouraging the reinterpretation of information that does not fit the image . . ."[15] even when the information is correct. One may well ask why a national actor would maintain his beliefs when it is "clear" that events are proving him wrong, and may be endangering the nation. It is because the reality in which the actor operates is self-constructed and may not match the reality which events are revealing. Thus a national actor can be caught in a never-ending logic loop: it is difficult

for events to change an actor's beliefs because his perception of events is selected by those beliefs.[16] Jervis summarized well the dangers of dysfunctional images:

> Not being aware of the inevitable influence of beliefs upon perception often has unfortunate consequences. If a decision-maker thinks that an event yields self-evident and unambiguous inferences when in fact these inferences are drawn because of his pre-existing views, he will grow too confident of his views and will prematurely exclude alternatives because he will conclude that the event provides independent support for his beliefs.[17]

C. IMAGES OF ARABS AND THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR

The 1973 Middle East war surprised most Arab-Israeli watchers, especially in Israel and the United States. Even after Egypt began the canal crossing, the U.S. Government assured itself that there would be no war -- that Egypt would not attack. How could two of the best intelligence agencies in the world be so wrong in their analyses? Why were those who did realize what was going to happen overruled or ignored by superiors?

Much hindsight has been applied to answering these questions and others. Israel convened the Agranat Commission of Inquiry to examine the responsibility of the military and civilian authorities for the failure to anticipate the war and for lapses in the initial conduct of the war. Within the U.S. Government, assessments also took place. In answering the question of how the U.S. failed to properly interpret information that was at hand, one might

point to a functional failure or perhaps a systemic defect in the structure of the intelligence community. However, another factor must be recognized as the principal "reason" for the pre-war intelligence failure, and the western world's surprise at the initial successes of the Arab armies, who only six years earlier were, in their own view, humiliated on the same battlefield. This factor was the American and Israeli image of the Arabs.

John Amos, in his study, The October War: A Study in the Politics of Escalation, points to an Israeli-held image of the Arabs that was ". . . the basic political assumption of Isra'ili policy vis-a-vis bordering Arab states: the assessment that Arab efforts at military cooperation will be limited and piecemeal at best. . ."[18] This image was that the Arabs were factionated, that they could not get along on little matters, let alone something as important and difficult as a coordinated attack on Israel. Remembering the circular logic of images, one can point to the events of the 1967 war and the Arab disunity over the Palestinian-Jordanian civil war in 1970 (to name only two recent cases), to find the source of the image. This image (along with other "unreal" images) was strong enough that it acted as a perceptual defense or cognitive screen and suppressed or filtered out messages that could not be reconciled with the images. An example of this process occurred as American and Israeli intelligence officers tried to explain the sudden departure from Egypt and Syria of the Russian civilian advisors and their families two days before the war began. Former Secretary of State Kissinger ". . . acknowledged that the American government missed the meaning of the evacuation . . . Because the government was certain that the Arabs were too weak to contemplate starting a war."[19] Secretary Kissinger stated:

> the explanation we gave to this information

> was absurd: it was that a crisis broke out between Egypt and Syria on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, and that the Soviets decided to transfer their men because of this crisis.[20]

Thus two images of the Arabs (that they are facticnated and weak militarily) had a dysfunctional effect on the Israeli and American perceptions of reality in October 1973. That their misperception caused "unfortunate consequences" for both understates the impact of the war. Not only were the military perspectives altered, but both Israeli and Arab societies were affected, and truly, the Middle East should no longer be viewed in the pre-1973 war terms.

III. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION

A. METHODOLOGY

To achieve the objectives stated in the introduction, the general procedure known as content analysis was used. The material for analysis was taken from the New York Times during the period 1967 to 1975 inclusive. The Times was selected for two reasons. First, it is a "prestige" publication. As described by Ithiel deSola Pool, "The Times (of New York) has long been regarded as the American prestige paper. . . "[21] Bernard Cohen agrees: "There can be no question that the New York Times is of prime importance. . ."[22] Second, the Times provides the most detailed and comprehensive coverage of the Middle East news available to the American public. The Times reports the small as well as the big stories involving Arab nations and people, and with a circulation of about a million copies daily, the Times, more than any other single news source, is able to present an image of the Arabs to the American public. It is inferred that this presented image is representative of the image of Arabs actually held by Americans.

The data analyzed included signed and unsigned editorials, wire-agency stories and any other stories or articles about Arab nations or people. The actual number of news sources came to eight including, in descending frequency: (1) New York Times Special, (2) Reuters, (3) Associated Press (AP), (4) Editorials, (5) United Press International (UPI), (6) Others (those articles with no

source indicated), (7) Agence France Presse (AFP) and (8) Times London (TL). The Arab nations include Libya, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen, South Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman. Qatar was theoretically included, but no data was collected on that state. Additonal data was collected for the Palestinians and Arabs in general. These nations and peoples are called "Referrents."

The sample consisted of every 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th and 30th days of each month. This sample size (648 issues over the nine-year period), ". . . reduces the universe of relevant data to manageable proportions [barely] without introducing biases which preclude valid generalization from the sample back to the universe."[23]

The coding procedure was to first place the article in either a favorable, unfavorable or neutral image category. If the article was favorable or unfavorable, it was then coded as to the single dominant theme it presented. The possible theme categories into which an article was placed were developed from the data as it was analyzed. This insured that the theme categories were: (1) exhaustive -- all relevant items in the sample were capable of being placed in a category, (2) independent -- assignment of any case to a category did not affect the classification of other data and (3) mutually exclusive -- no case was placed in more than one category.[24] Appendix A is a copy of the code sheet used in its final form.

A total of 2,401 articles (cases) were collected and coded. Because of the large number of cases, a computer was used to tabulate and analyze data. The program used for the analysis was the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Although there are dimensional and format limitations with SPSS that are inconvenient, generally it is

an adequate system, and totally necessary when handling this much data.

A validation test was run on the first 448 codings. People were selected at random and asked to code two cases, one of which was the same for everyone. The results were a 78% agreement on the image category (favorable, neutral, unfavorable) designated by the author and a 62% agreement on the theme designated. Based on these results, the research methodology and design are valid and the codings are reliable to the point someone else could repeat the project and the results would not be significantly altered.

At this point a brief discussion of a bias in the reportage of the New York Times is called for. It has been noted by some that the Times is pro-Israeli (as opposed to unbiased or pro-Arab) on the issues in the Middle East and is therefore a poor choice for this study. To determine the extent of such a bias a comparison of the "editorial" source and all other sources was made covering the entire nine-year period. The results of the analysis show that for all other sources the image category ratings were: Favorable -- 13.0%, Neutral -- 36.0% and Unfavorable -- 51.0%. For the editorial sources, the image category ratings were: Favorable --17.1%, Neutral --20.3% and Unfavorable -- 62.6%. The editorial ratings were 4.1% higher in favorable images and 11.6% higher in unfavorable images. If this shows an editorial bias, its effect on this study is mitigated by the fact that editorial sources accounted for only 123 out of 2,401 cases -- or 5.1%. In any case, the bias would not affect the ability to note trends in the images and themes over the nine-year period.

B. ORGANIZATION

The paper is subsequently divided into chapters by referrents. Chapter 4 presents the aggregate results of the entire study, that is: The American Image of the Arabs. Chapters 5 through 11 discuss the image categories and themes for Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Libya, respectively. Chapter 12 does the same for a group of national referrents that have been combined because of their infrequent (≤1.5%) occurrence. This group includes: Yemen, South Yemen, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman and Bahrain. American images of the Palestinians are presented in Chapter 13. Because not all readers will have interests in all countries, a synopsis of the findings in chapters 5 through 13 is presented at the beginning of each. The final chapter deals with the fourth objective of the paper -- drawing conclusions from the data and determining what significance the study might have for future policy formulation.

The notes and bibliography sections deal only with sources used and cited in the first three chapters and the conclusion and follow normal style dictates. All other material is from the New York Times and will be cited in the text with a shortened title, as shown in the example below.

> . . . it was reported that if Lebanon herself received air-defense help from the Arab nations, that aid would be extended to the [refugee] camps. ("Lebanon Asks Arab Aid . . .," 25 Jun. 74, p. 3, c. 1.)

IV. AMERICAN IMAGES OF ARABS

There were a total of 2,401 cases counted in the nine-year period. The frequencies per referrent varied from 679 for Egypt to zero for Qatar. Figure 1 shows the frequencies for each referrent. The referrent "Arabs" requires explanation. If a news article included more than one of the referrents, so that it was impossible to place it clearly in a single file, or if no national referrent was mentioned, then it was counted in the "Arabs" file. As one can see, this accounts for a large number of cases (652 or 27.2%). These cases are included in the aggregate data in this chapter and are not counted in any other chapter.

Figure 2 shows the case count for each year of the study. Ranging from a high of 419 in 1974 to a low of 189 in 1971, the cases by year do not necessarily reflect the major events that transpired. For instance, the war years, 1967 and 1973, are two of the lowest in number of cases. The peace efforts of 1974 and the War of Attrition, the Palestinian -- Jordanian war and President Nasser's death in 1970, account for the high case totals in those two years.

A. CATEGORIES

The American image of Arabs has been generally unfavorable. The table below summarizes the image category ratings.

****

Arab Image Categories (Percentage)

	Favorable	Neutral	Unfavorable
Study Total	13.2	35.2	51.6
1967 Total	12.7	16.7	70.6
1975 Total	16.8	35.9	47.3

****

One can see that although the favorable ratings did not increase significantly during the period, the neutral rating doubled from the first to the last years, and the unfavorable rating fell dramatically. Figure 3 shows the aggregate category ratings by year, and although there are bad years as far as the rating is concerned, the trend to a less unfavorable, if not more favorable, image is unmistakable. Figure 4 shows the aggregate image ratings for each referrent. The chapters that follow will discuss those ratings in more detail.

B. THEMES

To better understand the components of the unfavorable image Americans have of the Arabs, the image has been disaggregated into specific themes. Figure 5 shows the themes that make up the favorable (101 to 112) and unfavorable (301 to 312) images (code 0 is neutral). Of the 24 themes discovered, the ten most frequent are unfavorable. The first five of these will be discussed in detail as will the three most frequent favorable themes. Figure 6 shows the themes as they occurred in each year.

1. Arabs Are or Support Terrorists (Code 304)

This was the most frequently occurring theme, and it describes two characteristics. Those Arabs who are terrorists are primarily the Palestinians (see Chapter XIII), but those who support terrorists make a much larger group. Only Saudi Arabia, of the major national referrents, received no such themes. A particularly strong Times editorial denounced this support:

> Palestine commando groups and the Arab states supporting them have repeatedly asserted that there are no limits to their warfare against Israel. The Arab world has applauded as heros the murderers and criminals who have attacked Israel and Israel-bound planes at European airports and in flight. ("Action Against . . .," 25 Feb. 70, p. 46, c. 1.)

In the aftermath of the Munich killings, the United States took action which brought the terrorist theme to include those Arabs living in the U.S.:

> The Nixon Administration, acting on a promise by the President to protect Israeli citizens in the United States from terrorist attacks, has begun a major effort to identify Arabs residing in this country who are suspected of planning terrorism and to screen travelers from Arab nations more carefully. ("U.S. Checks . . .," 5 Oct. 72, p. 1, c. 7.)

One of the types of "support" that Arab states gave to terrorists was that of a haven to which they could come after committing their acts. In early 1974, two separate incidents; one in which the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) attacked the Shell Oil refinery in Singapore, and another in which members of the Japanese Red Army seized the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait, saw the guerrillas given refuge by South Yemen:

> Nine guerrillas who flew to Southern Yemen after terrorist actions in Singapore and Kuwait have been given freedom to leave the country when they wish and were awaiting instructions from their commands . . . ("9 Guerrillas . . .," 10 Feb. 74, p. 7, c. 1.)

2. Arabs Are Factionated and Disunited (Code 303)

Much of the disunity that was found among the Arabs had

to do with the Palestinians. Following the Rabbat Conference in January 1970, Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, an Egyptian journalist and Nasser-confidant conceded that:

> the conference of 14 Arab countries and the Palestinian commandos had ended in such "confusing ambiguity" that it was still impossible to determine . . . whether it had been a total failure or a limited success.
>
> The inability of the diverse Arab countries to achieve unity Mr. Heykal said, was damaging to the Arabs "in the face of our enemies and in the eyes of our friends." ("Cairo Editor . . .," 10 Jan. 70, p. 8, c. 3.)

Early in 1972, when the Arabs attempted to put some of the blame on Moscow for the stalemate in Middle East peace efforts, the Soviet bloc countries responded pointedly:

> Eastern European sources . . . said that blaming others for their failures had been a main reason for Arab weakness. They referred to persistent Arab disunity and expressed the belief that Arabs were suffering from a lack of leadership. ("Arabs Criticize . . .," 30 Jan. 72, p. 2, c. 3.)

As President Sadat made it clear, early in 1975, that he favored some type of settlement with Israel in the Sinai, he became the object of pressures designed to prevent such an accord. In March, the P.L.O. sent a delegation to see Mr. Sadat about a possible Sinai accord:

> Mr. Sadat angrily refused to receive the delegation, saying that Palestinian -- Egyptian relations, but not Egyptian foreign policy, was an apt subject for discussion between his Government and the Palestine Liberation Organization.
>
> The Syrians and the Palestinians, who were the most outspoken after Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi, in expressing their distrust of the Egyptians, did not fear that Mr. Sadat would accept nonbelligerency, but that he would go too far in making concessions short of that. ("Mr. Sadat . . .," 30 Mar. 75, Sec. 4, p. 4, c. 4.)

Arab disunity was also suggested by the frequent disagreements within O.P.E.C. over the price of oil:

> A ministerial conference of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries moved today toward what was expected to be a modest price increase for oil, but conflicts developed, chiefly between Saudi Arabia and the militant members, over the size of the increase. ("Saudis and OPEC . . .," 25 Sep. 75, p. 65, c. 4.)

3. Arabs Are Militant and Belligerent (Code 301)

One aspect of this theme was that it became associated not just with the Arab nation-states, but also with Islam. In the example below, the true meaning of "Jihad" -- to strive -- was lost to the view of the Muslim as a religious

fanatic:

> "Jihad" -- holy war -- against Israel was the watch-word here again last week. Bearded Islamic scholars from more than a score of Moslem nations decreed that "sacrifice of blood and treasure in "Jihad" had become the duty of the faithful all over the world." ("Arabs Talk . . .," 20 Oct. 68, Sec. 4, p. 6, c. 1.)

As the 1970 War of Attrition heated up, the Arabs made it clear that they were ready to continue the fight:

> The five Arab "confrontation countries" vowed today to fight on for the recovery of lands captured by Israel, thus implicitly rejecting endeavors by major powers to restore the 1967 cease-fire between the United Arab Republic and Israel. ("5 Arab . . .," 10 Feb. 70, p. 1, c. 1.)

At the 1974 Rabbat Conference, Yasir Arafat's comments were clear, if more muted:

> Today is the turning point in the history of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. I vow to continue the struggle until we meet in Jerusalem with the same smiling faces we see here tonight. ("Arabs Agree . . .," 30 Oct. 74, p. 1, c. 1.)

4. Arabs Are Anti-U.S. or Pro-Soviet (Code 307)

The United States' support for Israel was the main cause of the anti-U.S. character of this theme:

> . . . the United States of America is adopting a new hostile attitude against the Arab nation and unveiling its real links with Zionism and with the Israeli expansionist plan.
>
> The United States support and consolidation for the purpose of expansion and continued aggression come at a time when Israel has violated the whole of Palestine . . . ("Text of . . .," 10 Feb. 70, p. 3, c. 1.)

President Nasser was particularly irritated by the United States over the years. Mr. Heykal described Nasser as:

> . . . being deeply suspicious of Washington's policies, from his rise to power in 1952 until his death . . . the Egyptian leader considered himself to be the victim of "double dealing," "political blackmail" and "threats" by what he viewed as often conflicting positions of the White House, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Department and the influence of private United States oil interests. ("Nasser's Ire . . .," 30 Aug. 71, p. 10, c. 4.)

Despite the impasse that developed between Egypt and the Soviet Union, Israel, for one, was not ready to say that the

Moscow and Cairo rift was irrevocable. They pointed to the long-term character of Soviet aid to the Arabs:

> Israel reckons that the Russians are a poor people with a rich government which is allowed to act as the U.S. State Department and Pentagon might act if not controlled by Congress. One result is that Moscow has invested $21 billion in the Middle East since 1955, only $6 billion of which went to nonmilitary projects. ("Bleak View . . .," 20 Oct. 74, Sec. 4, p. 5, c. 5.)

5. Arab Governments Are Defective (Code 305)

The repressive measures taken by Iraq in 1969 (see Chapter IX) in dealing with its Jewish population was generalized to include the Arab world:

> Beyond the immediate issue of the threat to Jewish citizens in Iraq and some other Arab nations the current hysteria in Iraq is symptomatic of a fundamental political instability that is indemic throughout much of the Arab world. Wherever such domestic instability exists, the problems of peace and security for neighboring states are inevitably complicated. ("Lessons From . . .," 30 Jan. 69, p. 34, c. 1.)

The 1970 war in Jordan with the Palestinians was a mixed-bag for the Israelis. While pleased to see the Palestinian defeat, there was:

> some concern in Israel . . . that recent turmoil in Jordan could spread to Lebanon and lead to a weakening of the already limited control that Arab governments exercise over Palestinian guerrillas. ("Israelis Concerned," 15 Jun. 70, p. 13, c. 1.)

Israel's prediction was proved correct as the fragile political system in Lebanon was buffeted by the activities of the Palestinians and the government's inability to deal with them:

> A leading editor, Edward Saab, brooded darkly: "At the point where we are in this civil war that is bloodying the country, and with the confusion of interests and ideologies, the Lebanese are condemned to eliminate each other without this massacre being translated into a clear-cut victory or defeat." ("Lebanon's Violence . . .," 15 Sep 75, p. 1, c. 2.)

6. Arabs Are Realistic and Moderate (Code 108)

Not all Arab plans to recover their lost territories were based exclusively on military options:

> . . . the Egyptians . . . concluded that the backing of world opinion was essential if the Arabs were to recover their occupied territories, whether by diplomacy or war. ("Arabs Exploit . . .," 20 Jul. 69, Sec. 4, p.

4, c. 4.)

Although the dominant Syrian theme in 1974 was its militant and belligerent attitude toward Israel (see Chapter VII) and a possible peace settlement, a more positive theme was also found:

> Since the coup in 1971, President Hafez al-Assad, the 45-year-old former air force commander, has succeeded in consclidating political power. He is a nationalist and was the first Syrian leader to suggest that moderation and realism in policy against Israel might be better than unrelenting hostility. ("Assad's Gift . . .," 10 Mar. 74, Sec. 4, p. 2, c. 3.)

During the Sinai negotiations in 1975, it was the Israelis who sometimes were portrayed as uncooperative in the face of a moderate Arab stance:

> Now, however, when the Arab world seems ready at last to accept an independent Jewish political state in the Middle East, the Israelis are not responding positively to this extended hand. ("Israel's Inflexible . . .," 15 May 75, p. 43, c. 1.)

7. Arabs Are United, In Agreement (Code 105)

One of the recurrent internal Iraqi problems was the on-again, off-again Kurdish rebellion. In March of 1970 it

appeared to be off-again:

> The [cabinet] appointments fulfilled pledges made in a March 11 declaration by the Iraqi Government that recognized the autonomy of the Kurdish people within an Iraqi state and that has apparently ended the eight and one-half year war with the Kurds. ("5 Kurds Appointed . . .," 30 Mar. 70, p. 5, c. 1.)

The Arab League, in deciding to provide financial assistance to Lebanon in July of 1974, expressed the unity of the Arab countries:

> Mr. Riad [Secretary of the Arab League] said that the council reaffirmed the solidarity of the Arab countries with Lebanon and their commitment to the defense of Lebanese territory as well as their support for what the Palestinians claim as national rights. ("Arab League . . .," 5 Jul. 74, p. 3, c. 1.)

Arabs recognized the harmful effect that their disunity and factionalism had on achieving their political goals. King Faisal exerted himself to promote Arab unity:

> President Assad told King Faisal that their talks would strengthen Arab solidarity, which he called "the only way to get what we want -- liberation of the occupied lands and restoration of usurped Palestinian rights. ("King Faisal . . .," 15 Jan. 75, p. 3, c. 1.)

8. Arabs Are Willing to Negotiate (Code 102)

After almost a year of the War of Attrition, the world saw signs that Egypt, after Nasser's death, was interested in dealing with Israel other than on the battlefield:

> Officials also interpret various actions by the new Egyptian leadership under President Anwar al-Sadat as indications that Cairo is eager to pursue negotiations with the Israelis rather than slide back into renewed fighting along the Suez Canal. ("U.S. Officials . . .," 20 Nov. 70, p. 7, c. 1.)

Three years and another full-scale war were to pass before the hopes engendered by a new Egyptian regime were to be realized. On 27 October 1973, Arab and Israeli commanders met in the Sinai to discuss details of the cease-fire and logistical relief to Egypt's encircled III Corps. The face-to-face meeting was seen as significant:

> For the first time in seventeen years, responsible representatives from Israel and Egypt have met face to face in formal negotiations . . .
>
> Arabs and Israelis are at last making a start toward the kind of negotiations ordered by the United Nations Security Council. ("Start Talking," 30 Oct. 73, p. 42, c. 2.)

The other major combatant in the war, Syria, was slow to follow the Egyptian example in being willing to negotiate

anything with Israel. Though the hope was dim, Secretary of State Kissinger picked up any indication of Syrian willingness to negotiate:

> He [Kissinger] is said to believe that Mr. Hafez al-Assad of Syria might have given the Egyptian and Saudi envoys some new assurances of Syria's willingness to begin disengagement talks and to release the names of the Israeli prisoners. ("Kissinger Agrees . . .," 15 Feb. 74, p. 3, c. 4.)

C. SUMMARY

Although the majority of the aggregate image ratings were unfavorable, the trend over the period has been an improved American image of the Arabs. Though the most frequent themes were unfavorable, the trend has been a significant decline in the relative frequency of the unfavorable themes. The militant, belligerent theme declined from 16.2% of the 1967 cases, to only 2.3% of the 1975 cases. The anti-U.S. or pro-Soviet theme declined from 4.4% of the 1967 cases to only 2.0% in 1975. Other unfavorable themes whose relative frequencies declined were: are or support terrorists, defective government, unyielding or uncompromising, defective military, inhumane, rash or unrealistic and bad character. Those favorable themes that increased in relative frequency were: effective military, progressive, want peace, united and in agreement, anti-terrorist, realistic or moderate, anti-Soviet and good character.

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
LIBYA	620.	64	2.7	2.7	2.7
IRAQ	645.	88	3.7	3.7	6.3
EGYPT	651.	679	28.3	28.3	34.6
SYRIA	652.	174	7.2	7.2	41.9
LEBANON	660.	144	6.0	6.0	47.9
JORDAN	663.	194	8.1	8.1	55.9
SAUDI ARABIA	670.	79	3.3	3.3	59.2
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	675.	10	0.4	0.4	59.6
YEMEN	678.	22	0.9	0.9	60.6
S. YEMEN	681.	36	1.5	1.5	62.1
KUWAIT	690.	26	1.1	1.1	63.1
BAHRAIN	695.	3	0.1	0.1	63.3
PALESTINIANS	697.	225	9.4	9.4	72.6
OMAN	698.	5	0.2	0.2	72.8
ARABS	699.	652	27.2	27.2	100.0
	TOTAL	2401	100.0	100.0	

Figure 1 - AGGREGATE -- FREQUENCIES BY REFERRENT

YEAR



VALID CASES 2401 MISSING CASES 0

Figure 2 - AGGREGATE -- FREQUENCIES BY YEAR

CROSSTABULATION OF CATEGORY BY YEAR

PAGE 1 OF 1

CATEGORY	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
1. FAVORABLE		26	29	33	44	32	15	35	48	51	317
		8.2	9.1	10.4	13.9	10.1	4.7	11.0	15.1	16.1	13.2
		12.7	12.4	14.1	10.8	16.9	6.0	16.6	11.5	16.8	
		1.1	1.2	1.4	1.8	1.3	0.8	1.5	2.0	2.1	
2. NEUTRAL		34	92	89	137	65	64	46	210	109	846
		4.0	10.9	10.5	16.2	7.7	7.6	5.4	24.8	12.9	35.2
		16.7	39.3	38.0	33.7	34.4	32.0	21.8	50.1	35.9	
		1.4	3.8	3.7	5.7	2.7	2.7	1.9	8.7	4.5	
3. UNFAVORABLE		144	113	112	225	92	117	130	161	144	1238
		11.6	9.1	9.0	18.2	7.4	5.5	10.5	13.0	11.6	51.6
		70.6	48.3	47.9	55.4	48.7	58.5	61.6	38.4	47.4	
		6.0	4.7	4.7	9.4	3.8	4.9	5.4	6.7	6.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		204	234	234	406	189	200	211	419	304	2401
		8.5	9.7	9.7	16.9	7.9	8.3	8.8	17.5	12.7	100.0

Figure 3 - AGGREGATE -- CATEGORIES BY YEAR

REFERREN	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	CATEGORY 1. FAVORABLE	2. NEUTRAL	3. UNFAVORABLE	ROW TOTAL
LIBYA	620.	5	24	35	64
		7.8	37.5	54.7	2.7
		1.6	2.8	2.8	
		0.2	1.0	1.5	
IRAQ	645.	10	20	58	88
		11.4	22.7	65.9	3.7
		3.2	2.4	4.7	
		0.4	0.8	2.4	
EGYPT	651.	117	280	282	679
		17.2	41.2	41.5	28.3
		36.9	33.1	22.8	
		4.9	11.7	11.7	
SYRIA	652.	19	63	92	174
		10.9	36.2	52.9	7.2
		6.0	7.4	7.4	
		0.8	2.6	3.8	
LEBANON	660.	16	41	87	144
		11.1	28.5	60.4	6.0
		5.0	4.8	7.0	
		0.7	1.7	3.6	
JORDAN	663.	55	83	56	194
		28.4	42.8	28.9	8.1
		17.4	9.8	4.5	
		2.3	3.5	2.3	
SAUDI ARABIA	670.	17	41	21	79
		21.5	51.9	26.6	3.3
		5.4	4.8	1.7	
		0.7	1.7	0.9	
	COLUMN TOTAL	317	846	1238	2401
		13.2	35.2	51.6	100.0

(CONTINUED)

Figure 4 - AGGREGATE -- REFERRENT BY CATEGORY

REFERREN	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	CATEGORY FAVORABLE 1.	NEUTRAL 2.	UNFAVORABLE 3.	ROW TOTAL
UNITED ARAB EMIR	675.	2	5	3	10
		20.0	50.0	30.0	0.4
		0.6	0.6	0.2	
		0.1	0.2	0.1	
YEMEN	678.	3	4	15	22
		13.6	18.2	68.2	0.9
		0.9	0.5	1.2	
		0.1	0.2	0.6	
S. YEMEN	681.	2	6	28	36
		5.6	16.7	77.8	1.5
		0.6	0.7	2.3	
		0.1	0.2	1.2	
KUWAIT	690.	1	18	7	26
		3.8	69.2	26.9	1.1
		0.3	2.1	0.6	
		0.0	0.7	0.3	
BAHRAIN	695.	0	2	1	3
		0.0	66.7	33.3	0.1
		0.0	0.2	0.1	
		0.0	0.1	0.0	
PALESTINIANS	697.	11	39	175	225
		4.9	17.3	77.8	9.4
		3.5	4.6	14.1	
		0.5	1.6	7.3	
OMAN	698.	2	0	3	5
		40.0	0.0	60.0	0.2
		0.6	0.0	0.2	
		0.1	0.0	0.1	
ARABS	699.	57	220	375	652
		8.7	33.7	57.5	27.2
		18.0	26.0	30.3	
		2.4	9.2	15.6	
	COLUMN TOTAL	317	846	1238	2401
		13.2	35.2	51.6	100.0

THEME

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
	0.	846	35.2	35.2	35.2
EFFECTIVE MILITARY	101.	28	1.2	1.2	36.4
WILLING TO NEGOTIATE	102.	36	1.5	1.5	37.9
PROGRESSIVE	103.	35	1.5	1.5	39.4
WANT PEACE	104.	32	1.3	1.3	40.7
UNITED; IN AGREEMENT	105.	39	1.6	1.6	42.3
PRO-U.S.	106.	27	1.1	1.1	43.4
ANTI-TERRORIST	107.	33	1.4	1.4	44.8
REALISTIC; MODERATE	108.	50	2.1	2.1	46.9
CARE FOR HERITAGE	109.	10	0.4	0.4	47.3
ANTI-SOVIET--COMM	110.	12	0.5	0.5	47.8
HUMANITARIAN	111.	5	0.2	0.2	48.0
GOOD CHARACTER	112.	10	0.4	0.4	48.4
MILITANT;BELLIGERENT	301.	186	7.7	7.7	56.2
OIL, ECON BLACKMAIL	302.	85	3.5	3.5	59.7
FACTIONATED	303.	190	7.9	7.9	67.6
ARE, SUPP TERRORISTS	304.	272	11.3	11.3	79.0
DEFECTIVE GOV'T	305.	95	4.0	4.0	82.9
UNYIELDING, UNCOOP	306.	62	2.6	2.6	85.5
ANTIUS, PROSOV	307.	117	4.9	4.9	90.4
DEFECTIVE MILITARY	308.	53	2.2	2.2	92.6
INHUMANE	309.	16	0.7	0.7	93.3
RASH, UNREALISTIC	310.	23	1.0	1.0	94.2
UNRELIABLE,BELLICOSE	311.	71	3.0	3.0	97.2
BAD CHARACTER	312.	68	2.8	2.8	100.0
	TOTAL	2401	100.0	100.0	

Figure 5 - AGGREGATE -- FREQUENCIES BY THEME



* C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N O F *
THEME BY YEAR
* PAGE 1 CF 4

THEME	COUNT / RCW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	YEAR 67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	RCW TOTAL
C.		34	92	89	137	65	64	46	210	109	846
		4.0	10.9	10.5	16.2	7.7	7.6	5.4	24.8	12.9	35.2
		16.7	39.3	38.0	33.7	34.4	32.0	21.8	50.1	35.9	
		1.4	3.8	3.7	5.7	2.7	2.7	1.9	8.7	4.5	
101. EFFECTIVE MILITIA		0	1	6	6	0	0	11	2	2	28
		0.0	3.6	21.4	21.4	0.0	0.0	39.3	7.1	7.1	1.2
		0.0	0.4	2.6	1.5	0.0	0.0	5.2	0.5	0.7	
		0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.1	
102. WILLING TO NEGOT		5	3	4	5	3	1	5	7	3	36
		13.9	8.3	11.1	13.9	8.3	2.8	13.9	19.4	8.3	1.5
		2.5	1.3	1.7	1.2	1.6	0.5	2.4	1.7	1.0	
		0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.1	
103. PROGRESSIVE		2	5	2	3	5	2	5	2	9	35
		5.7	14.3	5.7	8.6	14.3	5.7	14.3	5.7	25.7	1.5
		1.0	2.1	0.9	0.7	2.6	1.0	2.4	0.5	3.0	
		0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4	
104. WANT PEACE		3	5	3	3	6	2	2	2	6	32
		9.4	15.6	9.4	9.4	18.8	6.3	6.3	6.3	18.8	1.3
		1.5	2.1	1.3	0.7	3.2	1.0	0.9	0.5	2.0	
		0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	
105. UNITED; IN AGREE		3	2	3	10	5	1	1	5	9	39
		7.7	5.1	7.7	25.6	12.8	2.6	2.6	12.8	23.1	1.6
		1.5	0.9	1.3	2.5	2.6	0.5	0.5	1.2	3.0	
		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.4	
106. PRO-U.S.		3	2	1	1	1	0	2	17	0	27
		11.1	7.4	3.7	3.7	3.7	0.0	7.4	63.0	0.0	1.1
		1.5	0.9	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.9	4.1	0.0	
		0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.7	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		204	234	234	406	189	200	211	419	304	2401
		8.5	9.7	9.7	16.9	7.9	8.3	8.8	17.5	12.7	100.0

(CONTINUED)

Figure 6 - AGGREGATE -- THEMES BY YEAR

THEME	YEAR	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
107. ANTI-TERRORIST	COUNT	0	0	3	10	6	4	6	2	2	33
	ROW PCT	0.0	0.0	9.1	30.3	18.2	12.1	18.2	6.1	6.1	1.4
	COL PCT	0.0	0.0	1.3	2.5	3.2	2.0	2.8	0.5	0.7	
	TOT PCT	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	
108. REALISTIC; MODER	COUNT	5	6	10	4	3	2	0	7	13	50
	ROW PCT	10.0	12.0	20.0	8.0	6.0	4.0	0.0	14.0	26.0	2.1
	COL PCT	2.5	2.6	4.3	1.0	1.6	1.0	0.0	1.7	4.3	
	TOT PCT	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.5	
109. CARE FOR HERITAG	COUNT	2	1	1	1	2	0	0	2	1	10
	ROW PCT	20.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	10.0	0.4
	COL PCT	1.0	0.4	0.4	0.2	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.3	
	TOT PCT	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	
110. ANTI-SOVIET--COM	COUNT	0	2	0	0	1	5	0	1	3	12
	ROW PCT	.0.0	16.7	0.0	0.0	8.3	41.7	0.0	8.3	25.0	0.5
	COL PCT	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.5	2.5	0.0	0.2	1.0	
	TOT PCT	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	
111. HUMANITARIAN	COUNT	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	5
	ROW PCT	40.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	20.0	0.2
	COL PCT	1.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.3	
	TOT PCT	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
112. GOOD CHARACTER	COUNT	1	1	0	1	0	2	2	1	2	10
	ROW PCT	10.0	10.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	20.0	20.0	10.0	20.0	0.4
	COL PCT	0.5	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.0	1.0	0.9	0.2	0.7	
	TOT PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	
301. MILITANT;BELLIGE	COUNT	33	25	22	36	17	8	16	22	7	186
	ROW PCT	17.7	13.4	11.8	19.4	9.1	4.3	8.6	11.8	3.8	7.7
	COL PCT	16.2	10.7	9.4	8.9	9.0	4.0	7.6	5.3	2.3	
	TOT PCT	1.4	1.0	0.9	1.5	0.7	0.3	0.7	0.9	0.3	
COLUMN TOTAL		204	234	234	406	189	200	211	419	304	2401
		8.5	9.7	9.7	16.9	7.9	8.3	8.8	17.5	12.7	100.0

(CONTINUED)

CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR

THEME	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
302. OIL, ECON BLACKM		2	1	0	2	8	6	31	25	10	85
		2.4	1.2	0.0	2.4	9.4	7.1	36.5	29.4	11.8	3.5
		1.0	0.4	0.0	0.5	4.2	3.0	14.7	6.0	3.3	
		0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.2	1.3	1.0	0.4	
303. FACTIONATED		18	17	12	27	19	22	11	21	43	190
		9.5	8.9	6.3	14.2	10.0	11.6	5.8	11.1	22.6	7.9
		8.8	7.3	5.1	6.7	10.1	11.0	5.2	5.0	14.1	
		0.7	0.7	0.5	1.1	0.8	0.9	0.5	0.9	1.8	
304. ARE, SUPP TERROR		20	26	26	50	12	42	29	46	21	272
		7.4	9.6	9.6	18.4	4.4	15.4	10.7	16.9	7.7	11.3
		5.8	11.1	11.1	12.3	6.3	21.0	13.7	11.0	6.9	
		0.8	1.1	1.1	2.1	0.5	1.7	1.2	1.9	0.5	
305. DEFECTIVE GOVT		16	8	19	12	2	4	15	3	16	95
		16.8	8.4	20.0	12.6	2.1	4.2	15.8	3.2	16.8	4.0
		7.8	3.4	8.1	3.0	1.1	2.0	7.1	0.7	5.3	
		0.7	0.3	0.8	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.1	0.7	
306. UNYIELDING, UNCC		14	10	2	12	3	1	3	5	12	62
		22.6	16.1	3.2	19.4	4.8	1.6	4.8	8.1	19.4	2.6
		6.9	4.3	0.9	3.0	1.6	0.5	1.4	1.2	3.9	
		0.6	0.4	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.5	
307. ANTILS, PROSOV		9	9	7	32	17	15	2	20	6	117
		7.7	7.7	6.0	27.4	14.5	12.8	1.7	17.1	5.1	4.9
		4.4	3.8	3.0	7.9	9.0	7.5	0.9	4.8	2.0	
		0.4	0.4	0.3	1.3	0.7	0.6	0.1	0.8	0.2	
308. DEFECTIVE MILITA		11	6	6	10	1	4	8	3	4	53
		20.8	11.3	11.3	18.9	1.9	7.5	15.1	5.7	7.5	2.2
		5.4	2.6	2.6	2.5	0.5	2.0	3.8	0.7	1.3	
		0.5	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	
COLUMN TOTAL		204	234	234	406	189	200	211	419	304	2401
		8.5	9.7	9.7	16.9	7.9	8.3	8.8	17.5	12.7	100.0

(CONTINUED)

CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR

THEME	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
309. INHUMANE		3	0	4	2	0	2	2	2	1	16
		18.8	0.0	25.0	12.5	0.0	12.5	12.5	12.5	6.3	0.7
		1.5	0.0	1.7	0.5	0.0	1.0	0.9	0.5	0.3	
		0.1	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	
310. RASH, UNREALISTI		3	3	4	5	1	1	4	1	1	23
		13.0	13.0	17.4	21.7	4.3	4.3	17.4	4.3	4.3	1.0
		1.5	1.3	1.7	1.2	0.5	0.5	1.9	0.2	0.3	
		0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	
311. UNRELIABLE, BELLI		5	2	6	27	8	5	5	4	9	71
		7.0	2.8	8.5	38.0	11.3	7.0	7.0	5.6	12.7	3.0
		2.5	0.9	2.6	6.7	4.2	2.5	2.4	1.0	3.0	
		0.2	0.1	0.2	1.1	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	
312. BAD CHARACTER		10	6	4	10	4	7	4	9	14	68
		14.7	8.8	5.9	14.7	5.9	10.3	5.9	13.2	20.6	2.8
		4.9	2.6	1.7	2.5	2.1	3.5	1.9	2.1	4.6	
		0.4	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.6	
COLUMN TOTAL		204	234	234	406	189	200	211	419	304	2401
		8.5	9.7	9.7	16.9	7.9	8.3	8.8	17.5	12.7	100.0

V. EGYPT

SYNOPSIS

There can be little doubt about the importance of Egypt in the Middle East, from 1967 to 1975. Over this period, Egypt accounted for 679 of 2,401 cases, or 28.3%. The next most frequent referrent was the Palestinians with 9.4%. Egypt had more cases than any other referrent every year of the study except for 1974, when Syria was the most frequently encountered referrent. The distribution of cases by year is shown in Figure 7. The exceptionally high case count (149) in 1970 can be accounted for by three significant events: (1) the "War of Attrition" conducted by Egypt and Israel across the Suez Canal, (2) an increase in Soviet-Egyptian interactions which led in 1971 to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and (3) the death of President Nasser, and the Sadat Government taking power.

The image ratings for Egypt were: (1) favorable 17.2%, (2) neutral 41.2% and (3) unfavorable 41.5%, the third best rating for a major national referrent. The five most frequent themes were: (1) militant and belligerent (11.0%), (2) anti-U.S. or pro-Soviet (8.4%), (3) unreliable and bellicose (5.0%), (4) unyielding and uncooperative (3.7%) and (5) defective military (3.5%).

Although the dominant themes presented an unfavorable image of Egypt, there was a definite break between the post-67 war years (1967 through 1972) and the post-73 war years (1973 through 1975). Figure 8 depicts the changes that occurred between the two periods. Although it cannot

be said that Americans have a favorable image of Egyptians over the entire period, the trend has clearly been in that direction, as shown by the ratings for 1974 and 1975.

A. IMAGE CATEGORIES

The Egyptian image categories moved from the most unfavorable rating in 1967 to a situation in 1975 in which Egypt had the highest favorable rating of any other referrent. The table below shows the ratings and compares them to the aggregate figures.

****

Egypt Image Categories (Percentage)

	Favorable	Neutral	Unfavorable
Egypt Total	17.2	41.2	41.5
Study Total	13.2	35.2	51.6
Egypt 1967	13.7	19.2	67.1
Egypt 1975	26.3	55.3	18.4

****

A crosstabulation of the image categories by year is shown in Figure 9.

B. THEMES

Egypt had at least one case in all but one of the 24 themes that were found. Although Egypt's image is "better" than the image of the Arabs as a whole, the five most frequent themes encountered were in the unfavorable image category. Each of these five themes will be discussed and examples given, in descending frequency. Figure 10 shows a crosstabulation of the themes as they occurred in each year.

1. Egyptians Are Militant and Belligerent

This was the most frequent theme, occurring in 11.0% of the cases. It was the highest in 1967 (24.7%), but had decreased to zero in 1975. In 1967, these cases were a result of the Egyptian activities in the Sinai prior to the war actually beginning. The very volatile move of requesting the removal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), ending a stay that began after the 1956 Suez War, portrayed Egyptian belligerence:

> . . . there was a series of incidents Wednesday as Egyptian forces moved in on the United Nations troops.
>
> Mr. Thant's report revealed that Egyptian gunners dropped two shells between two outposts of the Emergency Force yesterday to reinforce a warning to move out. ("U.N. Troop . . .," 20 May 67, p. 1., c. 3.)

The closing, a few days later, of the Straits of Tiran

by Egypt also cast them in the role of the militant:

> The United States has officially but privately warned the United Arab Republic that it considers the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba an "act of aggression" and will oppose it by all possible means. ("U.S. Warns . . .," 25 May 67, p. 1, c. 5.)

In 1970, the image of a belligerent Egypt was again presented, centering primarily on the War of Attrition across the Suez Canal. President Nasser, buoyed by shipments of modern weapons from the Soviet Union, had, ". . . repeatedly talked of forcibly taking back lost territories, at some future date." ("They Fight . . .," 25 Jan. 70, Sec. 4, p. 4, c. 1.)

While the October 1973 war helped change some images of the Arabs in general and Egypt in particular (as will be seen momentarily), it did not help Egypt's image as a belligerent. In July 1973, one of President Sadat's advisers upon his return from a visit to the Soviet Union, told newsmen that:

> . . . the Soviet Union was determined to strengthen the Egyptian and Arab capability to confront the Zionist occupation, which is backed by imperialism, until this aggression is liquidated and the aspirations of the Palestinian people are recognized. ("Moscow and Cairo . . .," 15 Jul. 73, p. 9, c. 1.)

During the 1973 fighting, Egypt's good military performance was detracted from by the effect of the

belligerent image. Senator Henry Jackson, in pushing for military aid to Israel contended that:

> Egyptian aggression must not be rewarded by diplomatic maneuvers that will enable Israel's enemies, who decided when the war would start, to decide also when the war will end. ("Jackson Bids . . .," 15 Oct. p. 21, c. 1.)

Although this militant or belligerent theme was the most frequent Egyptian theme throughout the study, it nearly ceased to occur after the 1973 war. In 1974 there were but two occurrences of the theme, and in 1975 there were none.

2. Egyptians Are Anti-U.S. or Pro-Soviet

This theme occurred in 8.4% of the Egyptian cases, with 71.9% of those concentrated in the years 1970 through 1972. President Nasser made use of his dependence on the Soviets in trying to influence the United States to cut aid to Israel. Early in 1970 Nasser warned, "We depend to a great extent on the Soviet Union . . . If the United States gives 50 Phantoms to the Israelis, where do we go? We have to go to the Soviet Union . . ." ("Nasser . . .," 5 Feb. 70, p. 15, c. 1.)

Some of the themes were clearly more anti-U.S. than they were pro-Soviet:

> A further intensification of Arab anger against the United States has been evoked by President Nixon's statement yesterday on the Middle East.

A favorite cartoon in the Arab newspapers features President Nixon with a Dayan-type eye patch. ("Cairo Decries . . .," 20 Feb. 70, p. 1, c. 7.)

The Soviet supply of military equipment also created a pro-Soviet image of the Egyptians. In March, 1970, the Soviets conducted an extensive military airlift to Cairo with Soviet aircraft landing or taking off at a rate of seven an hour. ("Israeli Jets . . .," 25 Mar. 70, p. 1, c. 2.) During the War of Attrition in 1970, ". . . Soviet pilots flying combat formations over central Egypt for defense against raids by the Israeli air force," ("President Orders . . .," 30 Apr. 70, p. 1, c. 4.) also created a pro-Soviet image of the Egyptians. Further promoting this image were reports that ". . . Soviet forces were manning SAM-3 missile installations . . . in central Egypt." ("Dayan . . .," 10 May 70, p. 13, c. 1.)

Even the change of leadership in Egypt after the death of President Nasser did not dispel the anti-U.S. image of the Egyptians. Referred to as "Egypt's Interim Leader," President Sadat was described as ". . . a bitter foe of Israel and one of the most outspoken critics of the United States." ("Egypt's . . .," 30 Sep. 70, p. 16, c. 6.)

The Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in May 1971 raised even more concern about Egypt's pro-Moscow leanings. A Times editorial decried the treaty commenting that it went ". . . far enough toward cementing the ties between the two states to raise questions whether Egypt may be on the way to becoming another Soviet satelite." ("The USSR . . .," 30 May 71, Sec. 4, p. 12, c. 1.)

One should note that the occurrence of the anti-U.S. or pro-Soviet theme dropped off markedly after 1972. Most interesting is that it did not occur at all in 1973, the year of the war. Allowing for some pro-Soviet link, nonetheless, in 1973, the Egypt-U.S.S.R. break which surfaced in early 1972, reduced the occurrences of the theme to five and two in 1974 and 1975 respectively. A causal relationship can be implied between this decrease in the pro-Soviet view of Egypt and the decrease in Egyptian militance and belligerence from 1974 to 1975.

3. Egyptians Are Unreliable and Bellicose

This theme should be expanded to include images that Egyptians distort the truth, violate agreements, are propagandists, exaggerate, are imaginative, cannot keep secrets and use threatening rhetoric. The theme is concentrated in 1970 and 1971 and was found in 5.0% of the Egyptian cases.

A distinctly bellicose image is portrayed in an editorial that appeared in mid-1970 as the United States was trying to arrange a cease-fire in the War of Attrition:

> But Israel's reluctance to accept any truce that might enable the Egyptians to build up their defensive and offensive forces on the West bank of the Suez Canal is understandable in view of the persisting boastful belligerence of President Nasser and his Arab friends. Unlike the Israelis, the Egyptian leader has so far responded publicly to the American proposals only with more fire-eating rhetoric. ("'Jokers' . . .," 30 Jun. 70, p.

40, c. 2.)

Once a truce was arranged, the view of Egyptian unreliability emerged because the United States first suspected and then confirmed that Egypt had violated the truce agreement by moving SAM-2 missile batteries closer to the Canal:

> Yesterday, the State Department announced that the United States had confirmed evidence of the deployment of anti-aircraft missiles in the standstill zone, which extends for 32 miles on each side of the canal. ("Cairo Terms . . .," 5 Sep. 70, p. 1, c. 6.)

As peace negotiations picked-up in January, 1971, prior to the expiration of the Suez truce, Israel used the image that Egyptians cannot keep secrets as a lever in the talks:

> Premier Golda Meir and Foreign Minister Abba Eban reportedly took the lead in urging that United Arab Republic polemics and breaches of diplomatic secrecy not be used as a pretext for halting the discussions . . . ("Israel to Stay . . .," 25 Jan. 71, p. 13, c. 3.)

The "Rogers' Plan," in early 1971, was impeded by the Israelis' perception of the Egyptians as unreliable when it came to keeping agreements:

> Israelis still remember their bitter experience of last August, when a loosely

worded cease-fire and military standstill arrangement drawn up by the United States was violated, within hours of coming into force by the Soviet-Egyptian missile build-up on the canal's western bank. ("Israelis Said . . .," 30 Apr. 71, p. 2, c. 4.)

4. Egyptians Are Unyielding and Uncooperative

Occurring in 3.7% of the Egyptian cases, this theme was most frequent, expectedly, following fighting and during the various attempts at negotiated cease-fires and disengagements in 1968, 1970 and 1975. In 1975, it was the most frequent unfavorable theme.

Early in 1968, peace talks, under the aegis of United Nations Secretary General Gunnar Jarring, were repeatedly stalled by Egypt's unwillingness to negotiate with Israel:

> The United Nations' envoy [Jarring] . . . has been told by the Egyptian Government that it "categorically" refuses to send representatives to Cyprus for contacts with Israel at any time "in the present and in the future." ("New Hitch . . .," 10 Mar. 68, Sec. 4, p. 4, c. 1.)

The Israelis, using this image of intransigence, put the onus for the peace talk failures on the Arabs:

> The prevailing view among Israeli leaders is that while the mission [Jarring's peace mission] serves a purpose, there is little

> likelihood of any real achievements while the United Arab Republic refuses to negotiate with them. ("Eban Said . . .," 15 Nov. 68, p. 15, c. 1.)

Prior to the 1970 cease-fire across the Suez, Egypt's hard stand fostered the uncooperative image:

> Mr. Nasser took an unyielding position against making any territorial concessions to Israel, and even dismissed a suggestion of a limited cease-fire during Jewish and Moslem religious holidays. ("Nasser . . .," 15 Feb. 70, p. 1, c. 5.)

In 1975, as Secretary Kissinger was "shuttling" to bring about the Sinai disengagement, it was the Israelis who drew much of the criticism about being unyielding. Angrily, they pointed the finger at Egypt:

> "It's a stab in the back," a senior Israeli official said . . . "We are being blamed for the breakdown when in fact it was Egypt who refused to alter its opening position in the talks."
>
> "The Knesset holds the Government of Egypt responsible for the suspension of negotiations for an interim agreement." ("Bitter Israelis . . .," 25 Mar. 75, p. 1, c. 6.)

In mid-1975 this unfavorable image was further reinforced when President Sadat turned down abruptly an Israeli proposal for a compromise in the Sinai:

> Although the nature of the Egyptian reply was secret, it was reliably reported that the Egyptians had not budged from their refusal to make a formal declaration of non-belligerency at this time. ("Cairo Gives . . .," 25 Jun. 75. p. 14, c. 2.)

5. Egypt's Military is Defective

The 1967 war saw repeated occurrences of this theme, which acccunts for 3.5% of all Egyptian cases. The opposite theme -- effective military -- did not occur in 1967. The 1973 war changed the world's perception of Egypt's military capability. The effective military theme occurred more frequently than did the defective military theme in 1973.

The 1967 debacle caused the image of an incapable and corrupt Egyptian military to receive world-wide attention:

> A Belgrade radio correspondent reported today that the United Arab Republic lost the war with Israel because its officers were more concerned with tennis and ice cream than with fighting the Israelis. ("Yugoslav . . .," 25 Jun. 67, p. 20, c. 1.)

The 1967 defeat had its effect on the Egyptian self-image as well as on that of the rest of the world:

> "The world's gone crazy," says one Egyptian sergeant in a popular tale. "Every 10 years or so we are loaded on trucks and

> driven hundreds of miles into the desert. Then suddenly the convoy comes to a halt and we are ordered to walk back to base as fast as we can." ("Luster . . .," 5 Aug. 67, p. 2, c. 4.)

Another characteristic of the same theme was that when Egypt's military was not being routed by the Israelis they were back home plotting the overthrow of the government:

> Former Vice President Abdel Hakim Amer, who was dismissed as deputy supreme commander of the United Arab Republic's armed forces after the defeat by Israel in June, may be court-martialed for attempting to stage a military comeback. ("Amer . . .," 5 Sep. 67, p. 15, c. 1.)

During the 1969 and 1970 fighting across the Suez Canal, Egypt's military scored some successes. However, these were overshadowed by Israeli operations that not only were successful to the point of being spectacular, but embarassingly pointed up Egypt's limited military capabilities:

> At this moment typewriters must be clacking away in half the film studios of the Western make believe world as writers reconstruct the latest thriller pulled off by the Israeli James Bonds, who snatched a seven ton radar station from an Egyptian coastal position on the Gulf of Suez and, with the help of powerful helicopters, made it disappear. ("The Suez Snatch," 5 Jan. 70, p.

36, c. 1.)

Before Soviet pilots began flying a protective "umbrella" around Cairo in early 1970, Israeli fighters had what amounted to unopposed access to the capitol and pointed to the ineffectiveness of Egypt's air force:

> The Israeli planes had the skies to themselves. No Egyptian fighters appeared . . . to challenge them.
>
> The Egyptians have numerical superiority over the Israelis in jet fighters, but they sorely lack sufficiently trained pilots. ("Seat in Cairo . . .," 25 Jan. 70, Sec. 4, p. 4, c. 4.)

YEAR



VALID CASES 679 MISSING CASES 0

Figure 7 - EGYPT -- FREQUENCY BY YEAR

YEAR		CATEGORY: FAVORABLE 1.	NEUTRAL 2.	UNFAVORABLE 3.	ROW TOTAL
1967 TO 1972	1.	72	184	240	496
		14.5	37.1	48.4	73.0
		61.5	65.7	85.1	
		10.6	27.1	35.3	
1973 TO 1975	2.	45	96	42	183
		24.6	52.5	23.0	27.0
		38.5	34.3	14.9	
		6.6	14.1	6.2	
	COLUMN TOTAL	117	280	282	679
		17.2	41.2	41.5	100.0

Figure 8 - EGYPT -- IMAGES BY PERIOD

Figure 9 - EGYPT -- IMAGES BY YEAR

CROSSTABULATION OF CATEGORY BY YEAR

PAGE 1 OF 1

CATEGORY	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
1. FAVORABLE	COUNT	10	15	13	11	14	9	10	15	20	117
	ROW PCT	8.5	12.8	11.1	9.4	12.0	7.7	8.5	12.8	17.1	17.2
	COL PCT	13.7	19.5	19.1	7.4	16.9	19.6	25.0	22.4	26.3	
	TOT PCT	1.5	2.2	1.9	1.6	2.1	1.3	1.5	2.2	2.9	
2. NEUTRAL	COUNT	14	27	32	60	36	15	13	41	42	280
	ROW PCT	5.0	9.6	11.4	21.4	12.9	5.4	4.6	14.6	15.0	41.2
	COL PCT	19.2	35.1	47.1	40.3	43.4	32.6	32.5	61.2	55.3	
	TOT PCT	2.1	4.0	4.7	8.8	5.3	2.2	1.9	6.0	6.2	
3. UNFAVORABLE	COUNT	49	35	23	78	33	22	17	11	14	282
	ROW PCT	17.4	12.4	8.2	27.7	11.7	7.8	6.0	3.9	5.0	41.5
	COL PCT	67.1	45.5	33.8	52.3	39.8	47.8	42.5	16.4	18.4	
	TOT PCT	7.2	5.2	3.4	11.5	4.9	3.2	2.5	1.6	2.1	
COLUMN TOTAL		73	77	68	149	83	46	40	67	76	679
		10.8	11.3	10.0	21.9	12.2	6.8	5.9	9.9	11.2	100.0

Figure 10 - EGYPT -- THEMES BY YEAR

CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR

THEME	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
0.		14	27	32	60	36	15	13	41	42	280
		5.0	9.6	11.4	21.4	12.9	5.4	4.6	14.6	15.0	41.2
		19.2	35.1	47.1	40.3	43.4	32.6	32.5	61.2	55.3	
		2.1	4.0	4.7	8.8	5.3	2.2	1.9	6.0	6.2	
101. EFFECTIVE MILITA		0	1	6	1	0	0	4	0	0	12
		0.0	8.3	50.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	1.8
		0.0	1.3	8.8	0.7	0.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.1	0.9	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	
102. WILLING TO NEGOT		1	2	1	3	3	0	5	2	3	20
		5.0	10.0	5.0	15.0	15.0	0.0	25.0	10.0	15.0	2.9
		1.4	2.6	1.5	2.0	3.6	0.0	12.5	3.0	3.9	
		0.1	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.7	0.3	0.4	
103. PROGRESSIVE		1	3	0	2	3	1	0	1	3	14
		7.1	21.4	0.0	14.3	21.4	7.1	0.0	7.1	21.4	2.1
		1.4	3.9	0.0	1.3	3.6	2.2	0.0	1.5	3.9	
		0.1	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.4	
104. WANT PEACE		1	4	1	1	6	1	0	1	6	21
		4.8	19.0	4.8	4.8	28.6	4.8	0.0	4.8	28.6	3.1
		1.4	5.2	1.5	0.7	7.2	2.2	0.0	1.5	7.9	
		0.1	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.9	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.9	
105. UNITED; IN AGREE		1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	3
		33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.4
		1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	
		0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	
106. PRO-U.S.		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	10
		10.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	80.0	0.0	1.5
		1.4	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.9	0.0	
		0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		73	77	68	149	83	46	40	67	76	679
		10.8	11.3	10.0	21.9	12.2	6.8	5.9	9.9	11.2	100.0

(CONTINUED)

THEME	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
107. ANTI-TERRORIST		0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
		0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	2.5	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	
108. REALISTIC; MODER		4	2	5	2	1	1	0	1	4	20
		20.0	10.0	25.0	10.0	5.0	5.0	0.0	5.0	20.0	2.9
		5.5	2.6	7.4	1.3	1.2	2.2	0.0	1.5	5.3	
		0.6	0.3	0.7	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.6	
109. CARE FOR HERITAG		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
		50.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
		1.4	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
110. ANTI-SOVIET--COM		0	1	0	0	0	4	0	1	3	9
		0.0	11.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	44.4	0.0	11.1	33.3	1.3
		0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.7	0.0	1.5	3.9	
		0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.4	
111. HUMANITARIAN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	
112. GOOD CHARACTER		0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	3
		0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	
301. MILITANT;BELLIGE		18	10	13	11	11	2	8	2	0	75
		24.0	13.3	17.3	14.7	14.7	2.7	10.7	2.7	0.0	11.0
		24.7	13.0	19.1	7.4	13.3	4.3	20.0	3.0	0.0	
		2.7	1.5	1.9	1.6	1.6	0.3	1.2	0.3	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		73	77	68	149	83	46	40	67	76	679
		10.8	11.3	10.0	21.9	12.2	6.8	5.9	9.9	11.2	100.0

(CONTINUED)

* CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR *

THEME	YEAR	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
303. FACTIONATED	COUNT	0	2	0	1	2	6	0	1	1	13
	ROW PCT	0.0	15.4	0.0	7.7	15.4	46.2	0.0	7.7	7.7	1.9
	COL PCT	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.7	2.4	13.0	0.0	1.5	1.3	
	TOT PCT	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.9	0.0	0.1	0.1	
304. ARE, SUPP TERROR	COUNT	1	3	1	3	1	1	0	0	0	10
	ROW PCT	10.0	30.0	10.0	30.0	10.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
	COL PCT	1.4	3.9	1.5	2.0	1.2	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	TOT PCT	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	
305. DEFECTIVE GOV'T	COUNT	5	5	0	1	1	0	4	1	1	18
	ROW PCT	27.8	27.8	0.0	5.6	5.6	0.0	22.2	5.6	5.6	2.7
	COL PCT	6.8	6.5	0.0	0.7	1.2	0.0	10.0	1.5	1.3	
	TOT PCT	0.7	0.7	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.6	0.1	0.1	
306. UNYIELDING, UNCO	COUNT	4	7	0	6	2	0	0	1	5	25
	ROW PCT	16.0	28.0	0.0	24.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	20.0	3.7
	COL PCT	5.5	9.1	0.0	4.0	2.4	0.0	0.0	1.5	6.6	
	TOT PCT	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.9	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.7	
307. ANTILS, PROSOV	COUNT	4	2	3	24	10	7	0	5	2	57
	ROW PCT	7.0	3.5	5.3	42.1	17.5	12.3	0.0	8.8	3.5	8.4
	COL PCT	5.5	2.6	4.4	16.1	12.0	15.2	0.0	7.5	2.6	
	TOT PCT	0.6	0.3	0.4	3.5	1.5	1.0	0.0	0.7	0.3	
308. DEFECTIVE MILITA	COUNT	5	4	2	8	0	1	3	0	1	24
	ROW PCT	20.8	16.7	8.3	33.3	0.0	4.2	12.5	0.0	4.2	3.5
	COL PCT	6.8	5.2	2.9	5.4	0.0	2.2	7.5	0.0	1.3	
	TOT PCT	0.7	0.6	0.3	1.2	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.1	
309. INHUMANE	COUNT	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
	ROW PCT	75.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
	COL PCT	4.1	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	TOT PCT	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		73	77	68	149	83	46	40	67	76	679
		10.8	11.3	10.0	21.9	12.2	6.8	5.9	9.9	11.2	100.0

(CONTINUED)

CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR

THEME	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
310. RASH, UNREALISTI		1	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	0	8
		12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	25.0	0.0	0.0	1.2
		1.4	1.3	1.5	0.7	1.2	2.2	5.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	
311. UNRELIABLE, BELLI		2	0	2	19	5	3	0	1	2	34
		5.9	0.0	5.9	55.9	14.7	8.8	0.0	2.9	5.9	5.0
		2.7	0.0	2.9	12.8	6.0	6.5	0.0	1.5	2.6	
		0.3	0.0	0.3	2.8	0.7	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.3	
312. BAD CHARACTER		6	1	0	4	0	1	0	0	2	14
		42.9	7.1	0.0	28.6	0.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	14.3	2.1
		8.2	1.3	0.0	2.7	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	2.6	
		0.9	0.1	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	
COLUMN TOTAL		73	77	68	149	83	46	40	67	76	679
		10.8	11.3	10.0	21.9	12.2	6.8	5.9	9.9	11.2	100.0

VI. JORDAN

SYNOPSIS

Jordan was the third most frequent referrent in the study, with 194 cases accounting for 8.1% of the total. Over half of these cases occurred in the years 1968 and 1970. In both of those years, Jordan was involved with the Palestinians, but in opposite situations, as explained below. The distribution of Jordans's cases in each year is shown in Figure 11.

The image ratings for Jordan were: (1) favorable 28.4%, (2) neutral 42.8% and (3) unfavorable 28.9%, the best rating of the major national referrents. Jordan's unfavorable image ratings were concentrated in the 1967-1970 period. Over the last five years of the study, the unfavorable ratings declined to zero. Figure 12 compares the image category ratings for the two periods.

The five most frequent themes were (1) are or support terrorists (9.3%), (2) anti-terrorist -- extremist (8.2%), (3) factionated and disunited (6.7%), (4) want peace (5.2%) and (5) militant and belligerent (4.6%). The factional and disunited theme at least partially explains the fact that the other four most frequent themes were paired opposites.

A. IMAGE CATEGORIES

Americans have a better image of Jordan than they do of

any other major Arab referrent. The category breakdown for the entire period is shown in the table below with aggregate figures for comparison.

****

Jordan Image Categories (Percentage)

	Favorable	Neutral	Unfavorable
Jordan Total	28.4	42.8	28.9
Study Total	13.2	35.2	51.6
Jordan 1967	25.9	29.6	44.4
Jordan 1975	33.3	67.7	0.0

****

Jordan's favorable rating was the highest in the study, and its unfavorable rating was, next to Saudi Arabia, the lowest. Figure 13 shows the trends over the period. At all times, Jordan's image ratings were better than the aggregate.

B. THEMES

The dominant themes found in Jordan's cases tell the story of the Hashemite Kingdom's see-saw position in the Arab world. Two of the five most frequent themes are

favorable, and the first two are opposites. Each of these themes will be discussed separately. Figure 14 shows the themes as they occurred by year.

1. Jordanians Are or Support Terrorists

In 1968, commando groups, operating from Jordan and laying mines in Israeli-held territory, took their toll on Israeli farmers. In August, the Israeli Air Force struck at what were called a "terrorist command center and training camp" near Amman. Israel was quick to point out that it held Jordan responsible for the commando's ability to operate:

> General Bar-Lev described today's action as a "substantial and unexpected blow to the terrorist organizations," and added: "I hope this will help the authorities in Jordan to finally realize that violations of the cease-fire will bring unpleasant consequences." ("Israeli Jets . . .," 5 Aug. 68, p. 1, c. 1.)

In November of 1968, Jordan and the commando groups worked out a formal agreement which seemed to confirm Jordan in the terrorist camp:

> The seven-point agreement disclosed last week between the Jordanian Government and commando groups operating from Jordan is regarded by students of Arab politics as a tentative step toward the creation of what some have called "the commando state." ("Jordan Pact . . .," 25 Nov. 68, p. 4, c. 3.)

Early in 1970 King Hussein was beginning to change his view of supporting the commando operations, feeling that they posed a threat to his own control. Nevertheless, in February of that year, Hussein was still trying to project the image that he supported the guerrilla movement's activities:

> Brushing aside a suggestion that he had been obliged to back down by the growing power of the commando movement, King Hussein declared, "The power of the commandos is our power, and our power is their power." ("Hussein Explains . . ., 15 Feb. 70, p. 19, c. 1.)

In April of 1970, King Hussein reorganized his Government. The timing and new assignments solidified further the image that Jordan supported the guerrilla movement:

> Two Jordanian Army Officers known to be on good terms with Palestinian guerrillas were appointed to key posts in Cabinet and military changes announced in Amman tonight. ("Jordanian Generals . . .," 20 Apr. 70, p. 9, c. 1.)

Only weeks before the outbreak of fighting between the commandos and the King's troops, Israel was still using the image of Jordanian support for the commandos to justify their military actions:

> Announcing the attacks, the [Israeli]

spokesman said that the targets "were those of the Jordanian Army, which assists terrorists and makes it possible for them to act against Israeli civilian settlements. ("Israelis Resume . . .," 15 Aug. 70, p. 1, c. 8.)

2. Jordan Is Anti-Terrorist/Extremist

This theme was undetected until late 1969 and then emerged as a dominant theme in 1970 and 1971. As tensions built up between the commando groups and Jordan in the summer of 1970, King Hussein began signalling his concern about the effect the commando operations were having on the country:

> King Hussein of Jordan, in a television speech tonight, warned Arab commandos that "we shall deal with any attempt to undermine our national unity with whatever means are necessary." ("Hussein Cautions . . .," 30 Aug. 70, p. 5, c. 1.)

As "Black September" dawned in Jordan, King Hussein, under intense pressure from his military, unleashed his armed forces to bring the commandos under control. The Palestinians and regular Jordanian forces fought viciously throughout the country. The King's forces were held at bey at Dawson Field, North of Amman, by a spectacular multi-hijacking by the P.F.L.P. It was, however, Jordanian forces which ultimately freed the last of the hostages from a downtown hotel where the commandos had hidden them. The drama of looking for the hostages drew world concern and supported the image of King Hussein as an opponent of

terrorism and extremism:

> Diplomatic sources said the western ccuntries want to know if talks with the guerrillas would weaken the King's position on the recurrent fighting with the commandos. ("West Seeks . . .," 20 Sep. 70, p. 21, c. 1.)

By the end of the month the King's armed forces had, with much difficulty, "defeated" the Palestinians and further promoted the anti-terrorism theme as well as the favorable image of a competent military.:

> As seen from here, the King of Jordan not only survived his seven-day war against militant Palestinian guerrillas, he also prevailed. He was able to expel them from his capital and to inflict heavy punishment on the Syrians who had tried to help carve out a guerrilla sanctuary in northern Jordan. ("The First Round . . .," 25 Sep. 70, p. 14, c. 5.)

In the summer of 1971, King Hussein again moved against the commandos:

> Jordan announced today that her troops had been battling Palestinian commandos in the northern hills since yesterday in an attempt to push them away from inhabited areas. ("Jordan Acknowledges . . .," 15 Jul. 71, p. 7, c. 3.)

By the end of July, Jordan claimed to have totally

defeated the commandos. Premier Mustafa Tal, who was assassinated by members of Black September at a Cairo Arab League meeting on 28 November 1971, claimed that:

> the commandos had lost all their bases in Jordan and that "subversive" commando groups such as the left-wing Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine would not be allowed to operate from Jordan from now on. ("2,300 Guerrillas . . .," 20 Jul. 71, p. 1, c. 6.)

The image of Jordan as being anti-terrorist and extremist has a high potential for dysfunctionalism. If one too blithely perceives Jordan's actions in 1970 and 1971 as meaning a lack of support for the Palestinian "cause," unexpected results are sure to occur. Although Hussein earned for himself epithets such as the "Hashemite Harlot" and the "Dwarf King" for his prosecution of the Palestinians, he at no time has disavowed their cause. Despite the image that was created, Hussein's actions were more motivated by internal pressures than any desire to "exterminate" the Palestinian commandos.

3. Jordan Is Factionated and Disunited

With the two most dominant themes being opposites, it is not surprising that factionalism and disunity would occur frequently in the Jordanian cases. This theme was found almost exclusively (10 of 13 occurrences) in 1970 and was the dominant theme in that year.

The battle between the commandos and the King's army reflected more than just the surface dichotomies in Jordan:

> The point is that the soldier was a Bedouin of the east bank of the Jordan River and the fedayeen were Palestinians of the west bank. This made their scuffle a microcosm of the basic conflict that divides Jordanian society. ("Old Enmities . . .," 5 Jul. 70, p. 14, c. 3.)

Although the King's forces were "victorious" in their battle with the commandos, not all members of Hussein's military favored such strong actions:

> The resignation of Brigadier Daoud [Premier of Jordan's military government] came amid evidence of increasing pressure by the conferrence of Arab leaders on King Hussein and the guerrillas for a cease-fire and a settlement of their conflict. ("Letter . . ., 25 Sep. 70, p. 14, c. 3.)

Even after the civil war had ended, and what remained of the commandos were being relocated from Amman, the disunity engendered by the fighting continued to surface:

> Some Arabs said that a "madman" had fired a rocket at the house of Habes al-Majali, who was regarded as the strongman in the military government that fought Jordan's nine-day civil war . . . ("Blast Near . . .," 5 Oct. 70, p. 3, c. 5.)

4. Jordan Wants Peace

The theme that Jordan wants peace was the most consistent of the Jordanian themes, occurring in seven out of the nine years analyzed. King Hussein created a favorable image of himself and his country by emphasizing his desire for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict:

> King Hussein has chosen a poet-diplomat, Abdel Monem Rifai, to head his Government in an apparent effort . . . to underscore his hopes for a peaceful Middle East settlement. ("New Cabinet . . .," 25 Mar. 69, p. 20, c. 2.)

King Hussein's hopes for peace were often mentioned in conjuction with re-opening Jerusalem, and helped promote the theme of wanting peace in the Middle East:

> In the context of peace, Jerusalem could become an open city -- a meeting place for the three great religions of the world. ("Hussein Urges . . .," 30 Mar. 72, p. 1, c. 2.)

Hussein repeatedly stated that he was willing to negotiate with Israel in order to obtain a peaceful settlement:

> King Hussein of Jordan said today that the chances for a lasting peace in the Middle East

had risen considerably in recent months and he called upon Israel to take up his offer to begin negotiations with Jordan through the United States. "I believe there could be a real peace in the area . . ." ("Hussein Sees . . .," 15 Mar. 74, p. 9, c. 1.)

5. Jordan is Militant and Belligerent

This theme almost exlusively occurred during the 1967 war and the period of rapprochement Jordan had with the Palestinians in 1968, in which it was (along with supporting terrorism) the most frequent theme. As preparations were made by the Arabs prior to the 1967 war, Jordan made the appropriate sounds and movements to indicate that it was ready for war:

> The Government has given permission for Iraqi and Saudi Arabian forces to enter Jordan . . . general mobilization in Jordan had been completed and all military units were deployed according to plan. ("Jordan Will . . .," 25 Mar. 67, p. 17, c. 2.)

In 1968, there were frequent clashes between Israel and Jordan. The unfavorable image that was presented owed primarily to the dominance of the belligerent theme. Israel used every opportunity to emphasize this unfavorable image:

According to Israeli military spokesmen, the Jordanians poured artillery shells into settlements along the west bank of the river south of the Sea of Galilee. ("Israel and Jordan . . .," 5 Jun. 68, p. 1, c. 2.)

YEAR

CODE

```
 67.  ***************  (     27)
 68.  **************************  (     50)
 69.  **********  (
 70.  ***************************  (     51)
 71.  ******  (     10)
 72.  ********  (     14)
 73.  *******  (     11)
 74.  *******  (     11)
 75.  ***  (      3)
      I.........I.........I.........I.........I.........I
      0        20        40        60        80        100
      FREQUENCY
```

VALID CASES 194 MISSING CASES 0

Figure 11 - JORDAN -- FREQUENCY BY YEAR

YEAR		CATEGORY 1. FAVORABLE	2. NEUTRAL	3. UNFAVORABLE	ROW TOTAL
1967 TO 1970	1.	34	61	50	145
		23.4	42.1	34.5	74.7
		61.8	73.5	89.3	
		17.5	31.4	25.8	
1971 TO 1975	2.	21	22	6	49
		42.9	44.9	12.2	25.3
		38.2	26.5	10.7	
		10.8	11.3	3.1	
COLUMN TOTAL		55	83	56	194
		28.4	42.8	28.9	100.0

Figure 12 - JORDAN -- IMAGES BY PERIOD

CROSSTABULATION OF CATEGORY BY YEAR

PAGE 1 OF

CATEGORY	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
FAVORABLE	1.	7 12.7 25.9 3.6	7 12.7 14.0 3.6	3 5.5 17.6 1.5	17 30.9 33.3 8.8	5 9.1 50.0 2.6	6 10.9 42.9 3.1	7 12.7 63.6 3.6	2 3.6 18.2 1.0	1 1.8 33.3 0.5	55 28.4
NEUTRAL	2.	8 5.6 29.6 4.1	30 36.1 60.0 15.5	10 12.0 58.8 5.2	13 15.7 25.5 6.7	3 3.6 30.0 1.5	6 7.2 42.9 3.1	3 3.6 27.3 1.5	8 5.6 72.7 4.1	2 2.4 66.7 1.0	83 42.8
UNFAVORABLE	3.	12 21.4 44.4 6.2	13 23.2 26.0 6.7	4 7.1 23.5 2.1	21 37.5 41.2 10.8	2 3.6 20.0 1.0	2 3.6 14.3 1.0	1 1.8 9.1 0.5	1 1.8 9.1 0.5	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	56 28.9
COLUMN TOTAL		27 13.9	50 25.8	17 8.8	51 26.3	10 5.2	14 7.2	11 5.7	11 5.7	3 1.5	194 100.0

Figure 13 - JORDAN -- IMAGES BY YEAR



* C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N O F *
THEME BY YEAR
* PAGE 1 CF 3

THEME	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	YEAR 67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
0.		8	30	10	13	3	6	3	8	2	83
		9.6	36.1	12.0	15.7	3.6	7.2	3.6	9.6	2.4	42.6
		29.6	60.0	58.8	25.5	30.0	42.9	27.3	72.7	66.7	
		4.1	15.5	5.2	6.7	1.5	3.1	1.5	4.1	1.0	
101. EFFECTIVE MILITIA		0	0	0	5	0	0	1	0	1	7
		0.0	0.0	0.0	71.4	0.0	0.0	14.3	0.0	14.3	3.6
		0.0	0.0	0.0	9.8	0.0	0.0	9.1	0.0	33.3	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.5	
102. WILLING TO NEGOT		2	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	6
		33.3	16.7	0.0	16.7	0.0	16.7	0.0	16.7	0.0	3.1
		7.4	2.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	7.1	0.0	9.1	0.0	
		1.0	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.0	
103. PROGRESSIVE		0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	4
		0.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	2.1
		0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.1	18.2	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	1.0	0.0	0.0	
104. WANT PEACE		2	1	2	2	0	1	1	1	0	10
		20.0	10.0	20.0	20.0	0.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	0.0	5.2
		7.4	2.0	11.8	3.9	0.0	7.1	9.1	9.1	0.0	
		1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.0	
106. PRO-U.S.		0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
		0.0	50.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
		0.0	2.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
107. ANTI-TERRORIST		0	0	1	7	4	2	2	0	0	16
		0.0	0.0	6.3	43.8	25.0	12.5	12.5	0.0	0.0	8.2
		0.0	0.0	5.9	13.7	40.0	14.3	18.2	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.5	3.6	2.1	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		27	50	17	51	10	14	11	11	3	194
		13.9	25.8	8.8	26.3	5.2	7.2	5.7	5.7	1.5	100.0

(CONTINUED)

Figure 14 - JORDAN -- THEMES BY YEAR

THEME	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
108. REALISTIC; MODER		1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
		33.3	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
		3.7	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	
109. CARE FOR HERITAG		1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	3
		33.3	0.0	0.0	33.3	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
		3.7	0.0	0.0	2.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
110. ANTI-SOVIET--COM		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
		0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
		0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
111. HUMANITARIAN		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
		50.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
		3.7	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
112. CODE CHARACTER		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	
301. MILITANT;BELLICE		2	5	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	9
		22.2	55.6	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.0	11.1	0.0	0.0	4.6
		7.4	10.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	5.1	0.0	0.0	
		1.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	
303. FACTIONATED		2	0	0	10	0	0	0	1	0	13
		15.4	0.0	0.0	76.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.7	0.0	6.7
		7.4	0.0	0.0	19.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1	0.0	
		1.0	0.0	0.0	5.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		27	50	17	51	10	14	11	11	3	194
		13.9	25.8	8.8	26.3	5.2	7.2	5.7	5.7	1.5	100.0

(CONTINUED)

THEME	YEAR 67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
304. ARE, SUPP TERROR	3	5	3	7	0	0	0	0	0	18
	16.7	27.8	16.7	38.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.3
	11.1	10.0	17.6	13.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	1.5	2.6	1.5	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
305. EFFECTIVE GOVT	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	4
	0.0	0.0	25.0	50.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1
	0.0	0.0	5.9	3.9	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	0.0	0.0	0.5	1.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
306. UNYIELDING, UNCO	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
	3.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
307. ANTILS, PROSOV	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3
	33.3	33.3	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
	3.7	2.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
308. DEFECTIVE MILITA	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	4
	25.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1
	3.7	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
310. RASH, UNREALISTI	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
	33.3	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
	3.7	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	0.5	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
311. UNRELIABLE, BELLI	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
	3.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	27	50	17	51	10	14	11	11	3	194
	13.9	25.8	8.8	26.3	5.2	7.2	5.7	5.7	1.5	100.0

VII. SYRIA

SYNOPSIS

Syria accounted for 7.2% (174 out of 2,401) of all cases in the study. Syria was the most frequent referrent in 1974, due to its role in the Middle East peace negotiations that followed the October 1973 war. The distribution of cases by year for Syria is shown in Figure 15.

The image ratings for Syria were: (1) favorable 10.9%, (2) neutral 36.2% and (3) unfavorable 52.9%. This rating, while not the worst, has been constant over the period, showing no improvement.

The five most frequent themes were all unfavorable: (1) militant and belligerent (12.6%), (2) are or support terrorists (9.8%), (3) unyielding and uncooperative (6.9%), (4) anti-U.S. or pro-Soviet (5.2%) and (5) defective military (4.0%).

Syrian belligerence, support for the Palestinian guerrillas, intransigence in negotiating positions and strong alliance with the Soviet Union have created a strongly unfavorable image that has persisted throughout the period. The most frequent favorable theme -- 'Syrians are realistic or moderate -- occurred only six times. While the role that Syria played in the last stages of Lebanon's civil war may have helped to improve this image, it would not have been a significant improvement and was not measured as it was beyond the period of this study.

A. IMAGE CATEGORIES

Americans do not have a favorable image of the Syrians. The majority of Syria's cases were unfavorable and its rating overall was below the aggregate ratings. The image category summary is shown in the table below.

****

Syrian Image Categories (Percentage)

	Favorable	Neutral	Unfavorable
Syria Total	10.9	36.2	52.9
Study Total	13.2	35.2	51.6
Syria 1967	0.0	17.4	82.6
Syria 1975	0.0	16.7	83.3

****

As opposed to the Egyptian and Jordanian cases, Syria's image category ratings did not improve over the period. Although there were years which were better than others, Americans had just as bad an image of Syria in 1975 as they did in 1967. Figure 16 shows the image categories by year.

B. THEMES

Each of Syria's five most frequent themes was unfavorable, and will be discussed in turn. Figure 17 is a crosstabulation showing all themes by year.

1. Syrians Are Militant and Belligerent

Concentrated (90+%) in 1967, 1970, and 1974, this was the most frequent Syrian theme, accounting for 12.6% of all its cases. In May 1967, the Syrians were very open about their preparations for war, creating a belligerent image:

> In recent weeks, it is said, the Syrians have massed about 30,000 men along the frontier [Golan]. If war erupts on the Egyptian border, Syria has promised to join in . . . ("On One Side . . ," 30 May 67, p. 3, c. 4.)

The image of belligerence on Syria's part was reinforced by its disregard for cease-fires and its attacks on civilian villages:

> Israeli armored and infantry forces smashed deep into Syria today after the Syrians, according to Israel, had broken the cease-fire on the northern front and shelled 16 settlements along the 48 mile frontier. ("Forces of Israel . . .," 10 Jun. 67, p. 1, c. 6.)

Although Syrian forces were not directly involved in the War of Attrition in 1970, their military operations kept Israel on its toes and also pointed to Syria's militant stance. In late January, a lone Syrian MIG-21 penetrated Israeli air space, broke the sound barrier over Haifa, breaking windows, and returned to Syria without firing a shot:

> The enemy incursion was the first of its kind since the Arab -- Israeli war of June, 1967. It appeared intended to provide Israeli military chiefs with the lesson they have been trying to teach Arab capitals: that they are vulnerable. ("Syrian MIG-21 . . .," 30 Jan. 70, p. 1, c. 2.)

While the emphasis was placed on a disengagement between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai after the October war, the Syrians in early 1974 were citing Israeli intransigence on the Golan Heights issue as justification for their militant actions:

> Militants in the Syrian leadership have cited Israeli determination to retain the Golan Heights as their argument against agreeing to a disengagement agreement.
>
> A sizeable number of hard liners in the military-dominated leadership . . . favor another battlefield assault against Israel. ("Top Arabs . . .," 10 Feb. 74, p. 16, c. 4.)

Strong talk was followed by strong action as Syria began

an intense and regular shelling of Israeli positions on the Golan:

> . . . President Hafez al-Assad is anxious to demonstrate to the rest of the Arab world Syria's militancy, especially at a time when he is seeking the support of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other states for his hard line stand on a full Israeli withdrawal. ("In Golan . . .," 20 Feb. 74, p. 8, c. 3.)

Although the Syrian operations were not dramatically successful, they served the purpose of reminding Syrians as well as Israel that Syria was ready for a battle at any time and further supported the belligerent image:

> The gunfire along the front . . . is meant mainly to keep the Israelis in a tense state of alertness and to prevent Syrians from getting any impression that their army has allowed a stalemate to settle over the cease-fire lines. ("Harrassment Seen . . .," 15 Mar. 74, p. 8, c. 2.)

2. Syrians Are or Support Terrorists

This theme was predominantly found in the years 1967, 1972 and 1973. Accounting for 9.8% of all Syrian cases, it was the dominant theme in 1973. Support for commando operations was uniform throughout the period. There were only two Syrian cases in which the anti-terrorist theme occurred.

Early in 1967, Syria made clear its support for the guerrilla operations:

> The Damascus Radio . . . pledged continued backing for infiltrators who have sabotaged Israeli border settlements. ("Israel Impatient . . .," 5 Feb. 67, p. 28, c. 1.)

As the June war approached, border crossings from Syria increased in number and boldness:

> Border terrorists infiltrated five miles into Israel last night and set off an explosive charge as a military vehicle was passing the main highway north of the Sea of Galilee.
>
> Military observers said it was one of the most daring acts in two years of border terrorism. An Israeli spokesman said the terrorists had apparently come from Syria. ("Terrorists Strike . . .," 10 May 67, p. 6, c. 3.)

As guerrilla activity continued from Syria, Israel conducted retalliatory raids pointing to Syrian support for the commandos:

> . . . the planes had attacked "concentrations of terrorists" north of Dera . . . The raid was described as a response to increased guerrilla activity from Syria. ("Israeli Jets . . .," 25 Jan. 72, p. 10, c. 1.)

> . . . a senior officer on the Israeli General Staff warned that Syria could expect more strikes unless she prevented the fedayeen, or Palestinian guerrillas from initiating raids from Syrian territory. ("Israeli Jets . . .," 10 Nov. 72, p. 1, c. 5.)

By 1973 the guerrilla organization as-Saiqa (thunderbolt) had been publicly connected with the Syrian Government:

> A guerrilla wearing the uniform of As Saiqa, a Palestinian resistance group based in Syria and supported by the government there, said near the border yesterday that there now were several thousand guerrillas in the border area . . . ("Guerrilla Forces . . .," 10 May 73, p. 1, c. 1.)

If Israeli retalliation had an effect on Syria's support for the guerrillas, it was not the one intended:

> Lieut. Gen. Hafez al-Assad, the President of Syria, today repeated his determination to support Palestinian guerrillas and to provide them with sanctuary in spite of Israeli threats and reprisals. ("Continued Guerrilla . . .," 10 Jun. 73, p. 8, c. 1.)

3. Syrians Are Unyielding and Uncooperative

This theme occurred most frequently during the last three years of the study and is primarily due to the hard-line attitude Syria took in the post-73 war disengagement and peace negotiations. The theme acccunted for 6.9% of all Syrian cases.

In December, 1973, plans were made to hold a Geneva conference to discuss a possible Middle East settlement. Syria made its view of the idea known:

> Syria has also been invited to participate in the conference but a government statement issued in Damascus yesterday said it would not attend on the gound that the conference was designed to "serve Israeli interests." ("Mideast Parley . . .," 20 Dec. 73, p. 16, c. 4.)

Syrian unwillingness to negotiate any kind of agreement with Israel was maintained despite the heavy internal problems the inflexible position helped to create:

> A heavy burden of refugees from wars against Israel is straining Syria, among the most intransigent of the Arab countries, as the military dominated leadership hesitates and debates whether to take a first step to peace with Israel through a separation of their forces. ("Refugee Burden . . .," 15 Feb. 74, p. 3, c. 2.)

As Secretary Kissinger prepared for negotiations between Israel and Syria, the Arab nation was again characterized as unyielding in its view toward Israel:

> Since 1948, the Syrians, often characterized as enigmatic, have been the most militant of the Arab countries in refusing to acknowledge the existence or Israel.
>
> . . . there has been a strong attitude in the military-dominated leadership against all compromises . . . ("Syrians and Israelis . . .," 25 Feb. 74, p. 6, c. 1.)

A year later, as the shuttle diplomacy of Mr. Kissinger had produced few results on the Syrian front, that country again signalled its uncooperative attitude:

> It was reported a few days ago that the Syrians, apparently believing they had nothing to gain from Israel comparable to what Egypt could expect, had sent officials to Arab countries urging an end to the step-by-step diplomacy. ("Kissinger Ends . . .," 20 Feb. 75, p. 3, c. 1.)

Later in 1975, Syria seemed to close the door on any hopes for a Golan settlement similar to the Sinai accord:

> Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria said today that Damascus rejected negotiations on Golan.
>
> "Reports about bilateral or multilateral

> talks are not true," he told newsmen. "We have asked no one for such talks and we will never ask. We do not agree to hold talks on Golan." ("Syria Bars . . .," 25 Sep. 75, p. 7, c. 1.)

4. Syria Is Anti-U.S. or Pro-Soviet

This theme occurred predominantly in 1972 and 1974 and accounted for 5.2% of the Syrian cases. Close Soviet ties in 1972 and 1974 were the sources of the perceptions.

An arms deal in May of 1972 between Syria and the Soviet Union, suggested Syrian dependence.

> . . . the new military agreements strengthen Syrian-Soviet relations and would be expected to make Damascus more dependent on Soviet assistance. ("Soviet Sign . . .," 15 May 72, p. 2, c. 4.)

Later that year, it became clear that the Soviets were providing more than just equipment to the Syrians:

> There have been unofficial reports that the Soviet SAM-3's have been recently added to Syria's arsenal. They also pictured a stiffening of Syria's air defenses, which have been bolstered recently by Soviet arms and advisers. ("Damascus Describes . . .," 10 Nov. 72, p. 8, c. 3.)

After the October 1973 war and during the peace negotiating that followed, Moscow expressed its support for the Arabs in general but made special referrence to Syria:

> Moscow not only affirmed solidarity with the Arab states but pledged steadfast willingness to "render assistance to reinforcing Syria's defense capability." ("French Say . . .," 15 Mar. 74, p. 8, c. 4.)

5. Syria's Military is Defective

Accounting for 4.0% of the Syrian cases, this theme occurred almost exclusively in 1967 and 1973. In each of those years there were three cases in which the theme was dominant. There was only one occurrence of the effective military theme in those years.

The defective military theme included such characteristics as being corrupt and plotting against the government as well as battlefield ineptitude. In the aftermath of the 1967 war, Syria, while using a planned coup attempt by some military officers as an excuse for attacking the United States, pointed up an unfavorable image of their military:

> Two Syrian Army officers pleaded guilty today of having planned to overthrow the Syrian government and declared that the United States was the "chief architect of the plot . . ." ("2 Syrians . . .," 25 Jun. 67, p. 16, c. 3.)

The plotting military characteristic of the defective theme was repeated in Syria in 1973:

> The Syrian secret police have executed 42 army officers following an abortive attempt in July to assassinate President Hafez al-Assad.
>
> Syrian informants said that about 60 officers had disappeared after having been arrested by the secret police, headed by President Assad's brother, Col. Rifat al-Assad. ("Executions in Syria . . .," 30 Aug. 73, p. 11, c. 1.)

YEAR



VALID CASES 174 MISSING CASES 0

Figure 15 - SYRIA -- FREQUENCY BY YEAR

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

Figure 16 - SYRIA -- IMAGES BY YEAR

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Figure 17 - SYRIA -- THEMES BY YEAR

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CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR

THEME	YEAR	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
306. UNYIELDING, UNCO	COUNT	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	4	12
	ROW PCT	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.7	25.0	33.3	6.9
	COL PCT	13.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	4.1	33.3	
	TOT PCT	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	1.7	2.3	
307. ANTIUS, PROSIV	COUNT	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	2	0	9
	ROW PCT	11.1	11.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	55.6	0.0	22.2	0.0	5.2
	COL PCT	4.3	16.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	31.3	0.0	2.7	0.0	
	TOT PCT	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	0.0	1.1	0.0	
308. DEFECTIVE MILITA	COUNT	3	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	7
	ROW PCT	42.9	0.0	0.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	42.9	0.0	0.0	4.0
	COL PCT	13.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	15.0	0.0	0.0	
	TOT PCT	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	
309. IRONSIDE	COUNT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	5
	ROW PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	40.0	40.0	20.0	2.9
	COL PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	2.7	8.3	
	TOT PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	1.1	0.6	
311. UNFELIABLE, BELLI	COUNT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	6
	ROW PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	50.0	16.7	3.4
	COL PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	4.1	8.3	
	TOT PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	1.7	0.6	
312. BAD CHARACTER	COUNT	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	3
	ROW PCT	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	33.3	1.7
	COL PCT	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3	0.0	0.0	8.3	
	TOT PCT	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.6	
COLUMN TOTAL		23	6	9	10	5	16	20	73	12	174
		13.2	3.4	5.2	5.7	2.9	9.2	11.5	42.0	6.9	100.0

VIII. LEBANON

SYNOPSIS

Lebanon's 144 cases accounted for 6% of the study total. Forty of these cases (27.8%) occurred in 1975, related, of course, to the civil war that had broken out. Figure 18 shows the cases by year for Lebanon.

The image ratings for Lebanon were: (1) favorable 11.1%, (2) neutral 28.5% and (3) unfavorable 60.4%. The trend over the period was toward a more unfavorable image, and the Lebanon ratings were more unfavorable than the aggregate results.

The five most frequent themes included one favcrable theme: (1) are or support terrorists (20.1%), (2) factionated and disunited (17.4%), (3) defective government (16.0%), (4) anti-terrorist/extremist (4.2%) and (5) defective military (2.8%).

Although there was a favorable theme in the five most frequent, the dominance of the first three was so complete (53.5% of all Lebanon cases), that the image of Lebanon remains strongly unfavorable. The confessional political system of Lebanon has simply been unable to handle the pressures that the combination of Palestinians, the normal Middle East primordial bifurcations and external interference has presented.

A. IMAGE CATEGORIES

The American image of Lebanon is not a good one. Lebanon had the second highest unfavorable rating of the major national actors and the third lowest favorable rating. The Lebanon ratings were poorer than the aggregate ratings as shown in the table below.

****

Lebanon Image Categories (Percentage)

	Favorable	Neutral	Unfavorable
Lebanon Total	11.1	28.5	60.4
Study Total	13.2	35.2	51.6
Lebanon 1967[1]	0.0	0.0	100.0
Lebanon 1975	7.5	15.0	77.5

[1]one case only

****

Figure 19 crosstabulates the image categories by year.

B. THEMES

Of the five most frequent themes found in the Lebanon file, one is favorable, two are paired opposites and, as in the case of Jordan, the factionated and disunited theme is present to provide some explanation. Figure 20 depicts all the themes as they occurred by year. Only the three most frequent will be discussed in detail.

1. Lebanese Are or Support Terrorists

This theme accounts for 20.1% of all the Lebanon cases and dominates the years 1970, 1972 and 1974, in which it was the most frequent theme. As the 1970 wave of hijackings began, Lebanon showed its support for the perpetrator of an earlier seizure by freeing the French hijacker of a U.S. jet on $8 bail:

> Belon was greeted by young Lebanese girls carrying flowers when he emerged from the magistrate's office. They said that the flowers were in appreciation of his feeling for the Arab cause. ("Beirut Frees . . .," 15 Jan. 70, p. 15, c. 3.)

Later in 1970, Israel conducted a particularly destructive retaliatory raid into Lebanon and was condemned by the United Nations Security Council for its actions. Israel cited the Lebanese support for the guerrilla's activities in defending the raid:

> Yoseh Tekoah, Israel's [U.N.] representative declared that Israel had been "forced to act in self-defense" and said the raid had been directed "solely at the concentrations of terrorism in southeast Lebanon." He said terrorists there had been firing on Israeli towns and villages and causing civilian casualties. ("U.N. Council . . .," 20 May 70, p. 5, c. 1.)

In 1972, the guerrilla activity from Lebanon increased, as did the frequency of Israel's retaliation. Israel made it clear that it placed the responsibility for the commando actions on Lebanon. Said Lieut. Gen. Elazar, Israeli Chief of Staff:

> This terrorist activity around the villages and from bases located within them is liable to bring disaster upon the villages of south Lebanon. It is our hope that the Lebanese authorities and their army will understand the seriousness of the matter and do their very best to prevent such a grave development. ("Israel Raids . . .," 15 Jan. 72, p. 12, c. 1.)

As if in a belated reply the Lebanese Government stated their position. "Premier Saeb Salaam said emphatically today that Lebanon would not clamp down on the Palestinian guerrillas." ("Beirut is . . .," 25 Jun. 72, p. 14, c. 4.) Later that year Salaam met with Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. After the meeting Salaam left no doubt about Lebanon's position. "Our relations with our Palestinian brothers emanate from mutual comprehension and oneness of

spirit." ("Commandos Say . . .," 25 Sep. 72, p. 7, c. 1.)

On 14 May 1974, Palestinian guerrillas, operating from Lebanon, seized an Israeli school in the village of Maalot near the Lebanese border. Taking 90 school children hostage, the guerrillas demanded the release of imprisoned Arab guerrillas. Israeli forces attacked the commandos, killing them, but not before some of the students had been killed. Israel retaliated swiftly by air, land and sea:

> Israeli naval boats . . . attacked what Israel said were Palestinian guerrilla bases on the south coast of Lebanon in a continuing series of punitive measures that followed the shooting on Wednesday of students at Maalot. ("Israelis Report . . .," 20 May 74, p. 3, c. 5.)

2. Lebanon Is Factionated and Disunited

This theme occurred predominantly, and expectedly, in 1975 and accounted for 45% of all Lebanon's cases in that year. In the wake of Israeli retaliatory raids for Lebanon's support of guerrilla operations, Lebanon sought help from its Arab neighbors. It would have been difficult for the other Arab nations to render assistance, had they wanted to because of the division of interests in Lebanon:

> Lebanon has called for an urgent meeting of the Arab League Defense Council next Tuesday to consider Israeli raids into southern Lebanon, but Lebanese political forces are divided over what form of help should be sought. ("Lebanon Calls . . .," 30

Jan. 75, p. 2, c. 4.)

As the fighting between what was at first described as the left and right in Lebanon heated up, Rashid Karami, a perenniel Lebanese political actor, was appointed Premier, for the second time, with the task of ending the fighting between the two factions:

> The basis of Mr. Karami's problem is a stand-off between the conservative Phalangist party, which claims to speak for the country's large Maronite Christian population, and an important left-of-center leader, Kamal Jumblatt, of the Moslem Druze sect. ("Shooting Flares . . .," 25 Jun. 75, p. 14, c. 1.)

The source of the deep split in Lebanese society is rooted in centuries of history, but this most recent outburst arose from Muslim desire to amend the confessional political system which had been established in 1943:

> . . . the left has been demanding secularization of Lebanon's political life, where top positions are strictly allocated according to religious affiliation, as well as greater opportunity for impoverished groups, which tend to be Moslem.
>
> On the right, the Phalangists are the most militant defenders of the status quo and of the leading role assigned to the Maronite Christian community in a political compact reached in 1943. ("Syrians Seek . . .," 20 Sep. 75, p. 3, c. 5.)

All efforts at ending the fighting seemed doomed in the fall of 1975. An embattled Karami began an appeal for help from Syria -- the beginning of the end for the Muslim left and Palestinian coalition:

> Christian and Moslem gunmen battled through the day here yesterday as Premier Rashid Karami sought help in neighboring Syria to end the six month Lebanese crisis. ("Lebanese Premier . . .," 10 Oct. 75, p. 1, c. 1.)

3. Lebanon Has a Defective Government

Occurring in 16% of the Lebanon cases, this theme was found most frequently in 1969 and 1975. It was the dominant theme in 1969, and it includes characteristics such as unstable and incapable in Lebanon's case.

Civil unrest early in 1969 over Lebanon's inability to prevent Israeli retaliatory raids, universal conscription and restriction on commando organizations put pressure on the always fragile Lebanese Government. By April of that year, rioting threatened to force the collapse of Premier Karami's coalition:

> He presented his resignation after speeches by two former premiers, Abdullah Yaffi and Saab Salaam, whose constituencies are in the center of the riot area in Beirut. ("Lebanon Premier . . .," 25 Apr. 69, p. 1, c. 4.)

The defective government theme is tied to the factionated and disunited theme, because of the religious split within the government. As established in 1943, the President is to be a Christian and the Premier a Sunni Muslim. That the religious factions were on opposite sides of the Palestinian question disabled the government.:

> The Lebanese crisis arose from a conflict between President Charles Helou and Premier Rashid Karami over the government's restraints over Palestinian guerrillas wishing to attack Israel from Lebanese territory. ("Dayan Defends . . .," 30 Apr. 69, p. 4, c. 5.)

In the spring of 1975, the Government of Lebanon seemed incapable of maintaining even rudimentary control over the fighting in the country, which further accentuated the split between the two religious groups:

> After the cease-fire in the fighting this week, indecisive action by the Government's security forces against trouble-makers in the country's diverse political factions stirred demands in the press and in economic groups for a new cabinet to replace the badly divided Government of Premier Solh.
>
> A persistent problem in Lebanon is an inability to form a strong government because of intense rivalries among political leaders representing the different religious, ethnic and economic interests in the country, roughly half Moslem and half Christian. ("Lebanese Shaken . . .," 20 Apr. 75, p. 5, c. 1.)

The instability in Beirut caused ripple effects throughout the Arab world and threatened the peace that had just seemed to settle on the region. A Times editorial spoke of the implications:

> If the Arabs cannot maintain order among themselves in Beirut, one of the most advanced of Arab countries, instability in Lebanon can only strengthen the hawks in Jerusalem who counsel against trusting any Arab government's word and against taking risks in the effort to secure Arab-Israeli peace. ("The Tremors . . .," 5 Jul. 75, p. 16, c. 1.)



VALID CASES 144 MISSING CASES 0

Figure 18 - LEBANON -- FREQUENCY BY YEAR

Figure 19 - LEBANON -- IMAGES BY YEAR

Figure 20 - LEBANON -- THEMES BY YEAR

CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR PAGE 1 OF 2

THEME	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
0.		0	7	6	5	0	4	5	8	6	41
		0.0	17.1	14.6	12.2	0.0	9.8	12.2	19.5	14.6	28.5
		0.0	63.6	28.6	26.3	0.0	26.7	35.7	40.0	15.0	
		0.0	4.9	4.2	3.5	0.0	2.8	3.5	5.6	4.2	
102. WILLING TO NEGOT		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
		0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7
		0.0	0.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
104. WANT PEACE		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.7
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	
105. UNITED; IN AGREE		0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	4
		0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	2.8
		0.0	0.0	9.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	
		0.0	0.0	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	
107. ANTI-TERRORIST		0	0	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	6
		0.0	0.0	16.7	33.3	16.7	0.0	16.7	16.7	0.0	4.2
		0.0	0.0	4.8	10.5	33.3	0.0	7.1	5.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.7	1.4	0.7	0.0	0.7	0.7	0.0	
108. REALISTIC; MODER		0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
		0.0	66.7	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1
		0.0	18.2	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	1.4	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
112. GOOD CHARACTER		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.7
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	
COLUMN TOTAL		1	11	21	19	3	15	14	20	40	144
		0.7	7.6	14.6	13.2	2.1	10.4	9.7	13.9	27.8	100.0

(CONTINUED)

CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR

THEME	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
301. MILITANT;BELLIGE		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	50.0	1.4
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.1	0.0	2.5	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.7	
303. FACTIONATED		0	1	1	2	0	1	0	2	18	25
		0.0	4.0	4.0	8.0	0.0	4.0	0.0	8.0	72.0	17.4
		0.0	9.1	4.8	10.5	0.0	6.7	0.0	10.0	45.0	
		0.0	0.7	0.7	1.4	0.0	0.7	0.0	1.4	12.5	
304. ARE, SUPP TERROR		0	0	2	8	2	9	0	6	2	29
		0.0	0.0	6.9	27.6	6.9	31.0	0.0	20.7	6.9	20.1
		0.0	0.0	9.5	42.1	66.7	60.0	0.0	30.0	5.0	
		0.0	0.0	1.4	5.6	1.4	6.3	0.0	4.2	1.4	
305. DEFECTIVE GOV'T		0	1	7	1	0	1	3	1	9	23
		0.0	4.3	30.4	4.3	0.0	4.3	13.0	4.3	39.1	16.0
		0.0	9.1	33.3	5.3	0.0	6.7	21.4	5.0	22.5	
		0.0	0.7	4.9	0.7	0.0	0.7	2.1	0.7	6.3	
307. ANTIUS, PROSTV		1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	3
		33.3	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	2.1
		100.0	0.0	0.0	5.3	0.0	0.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	
		0.7	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	
308. DEFECTIVE MILITA		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	4
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	50.0	25.0	2.8
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.1	10.0	2.5	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	1.4	0.7	
312. BAD CHARACTER		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.7
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		1	11	21	19	3	15	14	20	40	144
		0.7	7.6	14.6	13.2	2.1	10.4	9.7	13.9	27.8	100.0

IX. IRAQ

SYNOPSIS

The 88 cases in which Iraq was the referrent accounted for 3.7% of all cases. Nineteen of these cases (21.6%) occurred in 1969 when Iraq had some acute internal stability problems. Figure 21 shows the frequency of the Iraq cases by year.

The image ratings for Iraq were: (1) favorable 11.1%, (2) neutral 22.7% and (3) unfavorable 65.9%. Iraq's unfavorable rating is the highest of the national referrents, and the ratings were more unfavorable than the aggregate results.

The five most frequent themes were all unfavorable and included: (1) defective government (21.6%), (2) anti-U.S. or pro-Soviet (13.6%), (3) militant and belligerent (9.1%), (4) unreliable and bellicose (4.5%) and (5) oil/economic blackmailers (3.4%).

The highly unfavorable image category rating Iraq received is mitigated by only ten favorable cases in the nine-year period, with no more than two favorable cases in any year. The dominance of the defective government theme combined with the consistency of the anti-U.S. or pro-Soviet and the militant and belligerent theme, make for a durable unfavorable image of Iraq.

A. IMAGE CATEGORIES

American images of Iraq are the most unfavorable of all major national referrents. Iraq's unfavorable rating was the highest of the national referrents and it's favcrable rating was third lowest. A summary of Iraq's image category ratings is shown in the table below.

****

Iraq Image Categories (Percentage)

	Favorable	Neutral	Unfavorable
Iraq Total	11.4	22.7	65.9
Study Total	13.2	35.2	51.6
Iraq 1967	0.0	0.0	100.0
Iraq 1975	9.1	27.3	63.6

****

Figure 22 is a crosstabulation of the image category ratings by year.

B. THEMES

The most frequent themes in Iraq's cases are unfavorable. In Iraq, however, these unfavorable themes are more evenly distributed over the nine years than was the case with the previous referrents. Figure 23 is a crosstabulation of the Iraqi themes by year. Only the three most frequent themes will be discussed in detail.

1. Iraq Has a Defective Government

This theme includes characteristics such as unstable, incapable, radical, corrupt, repressive and extremist. It was the dominant theme in 1969 and 1973.

In January, 1969, the Government arrested a group of Iraqi citizens on espionage charges. They were later executed. The group included at least four Iraqi Jews. The United States protested this repressive and extreme action at the United Nations:

> The Government of the United States recognizes the legal right of any Government to bring to trial and administer justice to any of its citizens. However, the manner in which these executions and the trials that proceeded them were conducted scarcely conforms to normally accepted standards of respect for human dignity or to the obligation in this regard that the United Nations Charter imposes upon all members. ("Hangings by . . .," 30 Jan. 69, p. 1, c. 1.)

Some observers felt that the many arrests and trials were "circuses" provided by a shakey Iraqi Government to divert the attention of the people from their more basic problems:

> The current wave of arrests and show trials in Iraq is interpreted by qualified Western specialists here as an outgrowth of the extreme instability and insecurity of Iraq's left-wing Baathist regime. ("Hangings View . . .," 30 Jan. 69, p. 3, c. 1.)

Another characteristic of the defective government theme which was evidenced in the Iraqi cases was that of instability. Coups and attempted coups were not uncommon:

> Iraq's former chief of public security had planned in a coup Saturday to seize or assassinate President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Vice-President Saddam Hussein with the goal of taking power in Baghdad . . . ("Delaying of . . .," 5 Jul. 73, p. 5, c. 1.)

The crackdown which occurred as a result of the above-cited coup attempt went beyond the trial and execution of the 13 people who were accused of taking part in it:

> President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr of Iraq, in a move seen as further evidence of the power struggle involving an attempted coupt two weeks ago, has ammended the country's provisional constitution to give himself full

powers.

> General Bakr, a 61-year-old former infantry officer, becomes head of state, Premier and Commander in Chief of the armed forces.
>
> He has power to appoint or dismiss every official from the vice president down. ("President Bakr . . .," 15 Jul. 73, p. 14, c. 1.)

2. Iraq Is Anti-U.S. or Pro-Soviet

Accounting for 13.6% of Iraq's cases, this theme is evenly distributed over the entire period, reflecting the consistently close Iraqi-U.S.S.R. relations. It was the most frequent theme in 1972.

In April, 1972, the announcement of a 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iraq, made official what had been in existence for years. President al-Bakr, ". . . hailed the Soviet Union as a 'true friend of the Arabs.'" ("Soviet and Iraq . . .," 10 Apr. 72, p. 3, c. 1.)

Iraq also lashed out at the United States for its support of Israel:

> . . . he [Iraqi Foreign Minister] asserted that "the United States is still acting irresponsibly and contrary to its alledged intentions by providing the Zionist usurpers with enormous amounts of arms and huge sums of money in addition to political support in all fields . . ." ("Iraq Asks . . .," 10 Oct. 74,

p. 6, c. 1.)

Early in 1975, the Beirut paper, An Nahar, announced that Iraq and the Soviet Union had concluded the biggest arms deal ever between the two countries. The only details reported by An Nahar were that "Moscow had agreed to supply Iraq with advanced artillery of all calibers." ("Iraq Executes . . .," 20 Jan. 75, p. 12, c. 3.)

3. Iraq Is Militant and Belligerent

As with the anti-U.S. or pro-Soviet theme, this theme is also distributed evenly throughout the study. In the fall and winter of 1968 the Iraqis, operating in Jordan, were regularly shelling Israeli settlements across the Jordan River:

> By mid-October the Iraqis were shelling two or three Israeli settlements as part of regular Jordanian attacks, the Israelis said, but last week began operating on their own.
>
> On Monday night Iraqi 122mm guns opened up on Israeli settlements . . . ("Iraqi Positions . . .," 5 Dec. 68, p. 1, c. 8.)

In June, 1970, President al-Bakr submitted a plan to the heads of the so-called confrontation states at a June meeting in Libya:

> The Iraqi radio reported that the plan would have set the time for an Arab offensive against Israel, and its purpose would have been to conquer not only the Arab territory

> that Israel occupied in the 1967 war but also Israel herself. (untitled, 10 Aug. 70, p. 3, c. 2.)

Iraq did not direct all its belligerence at Israel. There was an on-again, off-again border feud with Iran that was on-again in early 1975:

> An attack by Iraqi forces on Iranian frontier posts has been repelled . . .
>
> The past month has seen an intensification of a propaganda campaign Iraq has been waging against Iran. ("Iran Says . . .," 10 Feb. 75, p. 4, c. 7.)

YEAR

CODE

```
 67.  ********** (      4)
 68.  ******************** (      8)
 69.  ************************************************** (     19)
 70.  ***************************** (     11)
 71.  ************* (      5)
 72.  ************************** (     10)
 73.  ***************************** (     11)
 74.  ********************** (      9)
 75.  ***************************** (     11)
      I.........I.........I.........I.........I.........I
      0         4         8        12        16        20
      FREQUENCY
```

VALID CASES 88 MISSING CASES 0

Figure 21 - IRAQ -- FREQUENCY BY YEAR

Figure 22 - IRAQ -- IMAGES BY YEAR

CROSSTABULATION OF CATEGORY BY YEAR

CATEGORY	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
1. FAVORABLE		0	2	2	2	2	0	1	0	1	10
		0.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	10.0	11.4
		0.0	25.0	10.5	18.2	40.0	0.0	9.1	0.0	9.1	
		0.0	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	0.0	1.1	0.0	1.1	
2. NEUTRAL		0	1	3	5	0	5	2	1	3	20
		0.0	5.0	15.0	25.0	0.0	25.0	10.0	5.0	15.0	22.7
		0.0	12.5	15.8	45.5	0.0	50.0	18.2	11.1	27.3	
		0.0	1.1	3.4	5.7	0.0	5.7	2.3	1.1	3.4	
3. UNFAVORABLE		4	5	14	4	3	5	8	8	7	58
		6.9	8.6	24.1	6.9	5.2	8.6	13.8	13.8	12.1	65.9
		100.0	62.5	73.7	36.4	60.0	50.0	72.7	88.9	63.6	
		4.5	5.7	15.9	4.5	3.4	5.7	9.1	9.1	8.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		4	8	19	11	5	10	11	9	11	88
		4.5	9.1	21.6	12.5	5.7	11.4	12.5	10.2	12.5	100.0

Figure 23 - IRAQ -- THEMES BY YEAR

* CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR * PAGE 1 OF 3

THEME	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
C.		0	1	3	5	0	5	2	1	3	20
		0.0	5.0	15.0	25.0	0.0	25.0	10.0	5.0	15.0	22.7
		0.0	12.5	15.8	45.5	0.0	50.0	18.2	11.1	27.3	
		0.0	1.1	3.4	5.7	0.0	5.7	2.3	1.1	3.4	
102. WILLING TO NEGOT		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
		0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
		0.0	0.0	5.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
103. PROGRESSIVE		0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
105. UNITED; IN AGREE		0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
		0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3
		0.0	0.0	0.0	18.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
106. PRO-U.S.		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	
108. REALISTIC; MODER		0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
		0.0	33.3	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	3.4
		0.0	12.5	5.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	
		0.0	1.1	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	
109. CARE FOR HERITAG		0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		4	8	19	11	5	10	11	9	11	88
		4.5	9.1	21.6	12.5	5.7	11.4	12.5	10.2	12.5	100.0

(CONTINUED)

THEME	YEAR	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
112. GOOD CHARACTER	COUNT	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	ROW PCT	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
	COL PCT	0.0	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	TOT PCT	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
301. MILITANT;BELLIGE	COUNT	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	2	1	8
	ROW PCT	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	0.0	0.0	12.5	25.0	12.5	9.1
	COL PCT	25.0	12.5	5.3	9.1	0.0	0.0	9.1	22.2	9.1	
	TOT PCT	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.0	0.0	1.1	2.3	1.1	
302. OIL, ECON BLACKM	COUNT	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
	ROW PCT	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4
	COL PCT	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	TOT PCT	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	
303. FACTIONATED	COUNT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
	ROW PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	3.4
	COL PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	
	TOT PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	
304. ARE, SUPP TERROR	COUNT	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
	ROW PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	2.3
	COL PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	0.0	0.0	9.1	0.0	0.0	
	TOT PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	
305. DEFECTIVE GOVT	COUNT	0	1	9	2	0	0	5	1	1	19
	ROW PCT	0.0	5.3	47.4	10.5	0.0	0.0	26.3	5.3	5.3	21.6
	COL PCT	0.0	12.5	47.4	18.2	0.0	0.0	45.5	11.1	9.1	
	TOT PCT	0.0	1.1	10.2	2.3	0.0	0.0	5.7	1.1	1.1	
306. UNYIELDING, UNCO	COUNT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	ROW PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	1.1
	COL PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	
	TOT PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	
COLUMN TOTAL		4	8	19	11	5	10	11	9	11	88
		4.5	9.1	21.6	12.5	5.7	11.4	12.5	10.2	12.5	100.0

(CONTINUED)

* C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N O F *
THEME BY YEAR
* PAGE 3 CF 3

THEME / YEAR	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
307. ANTILS, PROSOV	1 8.3 25.0 1.1	1 8.3 12.5 1.1	1 8.3 5.3 1.1	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	2 16.7 40.0 2.3	3 25.0 30.0 3.4	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	2 16.7 22.2 2.3	2 16.7 18.2 2.3	12 13.6
308. INHUMANE	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	2 66.7 10.5 2.3	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	1 33.3 10.0 1.1	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	3 3.4
311. UNRELIABLE, BELLI	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	1 25.0 12.5 1.1	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	1 25.0 20.0 1.1	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	2 50.0 18.2 2.3	4 4.5
312. BAD CHARACTER	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	1 33.3 12.5 1.1	1 33.3 5.3 1.1	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	1 33.3 9.1 1.1	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	3 3.4
COLUMN TOTAL	4 4.5	8 9.1	19 21.6	11 12.5	5 5.7	10 11.4	11 12.5	9 10.2	11 12.5	88 100.0

X. SAUDI ARABIA

SYNOPSIS

Saudi Arabia's low case count (79 for 3.3% of the total) belies the important role that this country has played in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia's emergence as a dominant force began in late 1973 and continued through the remainder of the period studied. The years 1973 through 1975 account for almost 85% of the Saudi case total. In those three years Saudi Arabia was the third most frequently encountered national referrent. Figure 24 shows the Saudi cases by year.

The image ratings for Saudi Arabia were: (1) favorable 21.5%, (2) neutral 51.9% and (3) unfavorable 26.6%. These ratings place Saudi Arabia as one of the two most favorably regarded Arab states.

The five most frequent themes were: (1) oil/economic blackmailer (19.0%), (2) progressive, reforming, modernizing (10.1%), (3) pro-U.S. (5.1%), (4) realistic, moderate (5.1%) and (5) unreliable, bellicose (2.5%).

It is clear that the oil embargo has had an adverse impact on the American image of Saudi Arabia. It overshadows those favorable images that no other Arab actor generated. Yet, it would seem impossible to separate the bad from the good without taking away the good. Many of Saudi Arabia's actions that created the favorable impressions are so inextricably linked to its oil wealth, that without it, Saudi Arabia would be unable to influence

its more militant Arab neighbors.

Here again, there is a potential for dysfunction. The pro-U.S. image is nebulous. Not rooted in ideolcgical similarities, it seems to be based on a rather cool, systematic appraisal of economic reality. An awareness of this possible dysfunction on the part of the United States will prevent the "unexpected results" that might accrue from a less "real" interpretation.

A. IMAGE CATEGORIES

Next to Jordan, Americans have a better image of Saudi Arabia than they do of any other major national Arab actor. Saudi Arabia has the second highest favorable rating and the lowest unfavorable rating of the national referrents. The table below summarizes the Saudi image category ratings. Figure 25 crosstabulates the image category ratings by year.

****

Saudi Arabia Image Categories (Percentage)

	Favorable	Neutral	Unfavorable
Saudi Arabia Total	21.5	51.9	26.6
Study Total	13.2	35.2	51.6
Saudi Arabia 1967[1]	100.0	0.0	0.0
Saudi Arabia 1975	40.0	45.0	15.0

[1] one case only

****

B. THEMES

Three of the four most frequent themes for Saudi Arabia are favorable. However, the most frequent theme, that of oil/economic blackmail, so dominates, that it mitigates the favorable image of the other three. All four of these themes are concentrated in the 1973 to 1975 period. Figure 26 shows the Saudi Arabian themes by year.

1. Saudi Arabia Is an Oil Blackmailer

Although the oil embargo did not begin until after the 1973 war, Saudi Arabia had specifically linked continued

U.S. oil to a political settlement in the Middle East earlier that year:

> Saudi Arabia's Minister of Petroleum has told Secretary of State William P. Rogers that his country would find it difficult to increase oil production if the United States did not help to bring about a political settlement in the Middle East satisfactory to Arab states . . . ("Oil for U.S. . . .," 20 Apr. 73, p. 7, c. 1.)

When the embargo was imposed, the Saudis left no doubt as to what they wanted to restore the flow:

> . . . Mr. Kissinger was told by King Faisal and other Saudi officials that oil production cuts imposed since Oct. 17 would not be relaxed until there was a physical withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab land occupied during the 1967 war.
>
> The political calculations of the Arabs were that the outbreak of war, involving the Soviet Union in support of Egypt and Syria, and the crisis produced in industrial countries by oil production cutbacks would generate enough alarm in western countries to put pressure on Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab lands. ("Kissinger Fails . . .," 10 Nov. 73, p. 1, c. 1.)

As consumer nations proposed various strategies to counter the oil embargo, Saudi Arabia warned that any such actions would result in further reductions in production:

> Sheik al-Yamani also said that if the oil-buying nations established a collective purchasing organization the result would be less Arab oil at higher prices. ("Saudi Says . . .," 10 May 74, p. 53, c. 1.)

By mid-1974, O.P.E.C. as a whole, rather than just Saudi Arabia, was playing a more noticeable role in the embargo. An editorial reminded Americans of the Saudi responsibility:

> Whether the Saudis have or have not done enough to bring down oil prices -- it must be remembered that they master-minded the original oil embargo that opened the way to quadrupling of the world price . . . ("Parrying . . .," 20 Jun. 74, p. 38, c. 1.)

2. Saudi Arabia Is Progressive

This theme accounted for 10.1% of all the Saudi cases and occurred predominantly in 1975. It is interesting to note that it was after a full year of revenue from the higher oil prices, that this emerged as an important theme.

Following the assassination of King Faisal, Khalid instituted some reforms that created favorable images in the United States:

> Highly placed sources said that a decree had been prepared to create a legislative assembly for the first time in Saudi Arabia.
> The move . . . was being prepared by King

Faisal before his death, and is regarded as a way of modernizing governmental organization. ("Saudi King . . .," 30 Mar. 75, p. 9, c. 1.)

The Saudis were not people to sit on their money. Their plans were impressive:

> If the plan is carried out, 8,500 miles of highway will be built, 200,000 housing units constructed and 2,000 miles of electricity lines will take power to all large towns. Education will be expanded so that the present primary school enrollment of 600,000 will rise to a million. University roles will rise from 12,000 to 31,200. ("Saudis Plan . . .," 25 May 75, Sec. 4, p. 4, c. 3.)

3. Saudi Arabia Is Pro-U.S.

Saudi Arabia is the only major Arab referrent in which this theme is in the most frequent group. It accounts for 5.1% of the Saudi cases (the next highest percentage is 1.5% for Egypt). However, there are still only four occurrences over the entire period, and three of those were in 1974.

Once the Saudis had initiated the oil embargo, they tried to insure that price hikes did not (by their definition, at least) go beyond what the market could bear. Their efforts at holding down prices created the image of concern for the interests of the United States:

> . . . on the major issues of the embargo and oil prices decided here [Vienna], Saudi Arabia

> virtually imposed conditions that were closely in line with American desires. ("Saudis Said . . .," 20 Mar. 74, p. 26, c. 1.)

During the negotiations between Syria, Israel and Secretary Kissinger, attempting to secure a disengagement on the Syrian front, Saudi Arabia lent strong support:

> Secretary of State Kissinger flew to the Egyptian capital tonight after receiving a strong endorsement from Saudi Arabia for his efforts to bring about a troop separation agreement between Syria and Israel. ("Kissinger Wins . . .," 10 May 74, p. 9, c. 1.)

4. Saudi Arabia Is Realistic, Moderate

This theme also occurred in 5.1% of the Saudi cases. It appeared exclusively in 1974 and 1975.

Mixed with the pro-U.S. theme, one characteristic of this theme had to do with the Saudi role in moderating other O.P.E.C. nations' stands on oil prices:

> Sheik Yamani said King Faisal of Saudi Arabia would send personal letters to six Persian Gulf oil-producing countries in an effort to persuade them to cut oil prices. ("Saudis Say . . .," 30 Jan. 74, p. 14, c. 7.)

Again, Sheik Yamani:

We don't want to repeat what happened in Tehran at the end of 1973.

We think that was wrong, and if there is any increase in oil prices it has to be a small portion, step by step, very gradual, which could be absorbed by your [U.S.] economy. ("Zaki Sees . . .," 10 Jun. 75, p. 54, c. 7.)

YEAR

CODE

67. ** (1)

68. **** (3)

69. ** (1)

70. *** (2)

71. ***** (4)

72. ** (1)

73. ********** (14)

74. ********** (33)

75. ********** (20)

0 10 20 30 40 50

FREQUENCY

VALID CASES 79 MISSING CASES 0

Figure 24 - SAUDI ARABIA -- FREQUENCY BY YEAR

CROSSTABULATION OF CATEGORY BY YEAR

PAGE 1 OF

CATEGORY		YEAR 67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
FAVORABLE	1.	4	0	0	0	1	0	1	6	8	17
		5.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.9	0.0	5.9	35.3	47.1	21.3
		100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	7.1	18.2	40.0	
		1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	1.3	7.6	10.1	
NEUTRAL	2.	0	2	0	2	3	0	4	21	5	41
		0.0	4.9	0.0	4.9	7.3	0.0	9.8	51.2	12.2	51.3
		0.0	66.7	0.0	100.0	75.0	0.0	28.6	63.6	45.0	
		0.0	2.5	0.0	2.5	3.8	0.0	5.1	26.6	11.4	
UNFAVORABLE	3.	0	1	1	0	0	1	9	6	3	21
		0.0	4.8	4.8	0.0	0.0	4.8	42.9	28.6	14.3	26.3
		0.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	64.3	18.2	15.0	
		0.0	1.3	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3	11.4	7.6	3.8	
COLUMN TOTAL		1	3	1	2	4	1	14	33	20	79
		1.3	3.8	1.3	2.5	5.1	1.3	17.7	41.8	25.3	100.0

Figure 25 - SAUDI ARABIA -- IMAGES BY YEAR

CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR

THEME	CCUNT / RCW PCT / CCL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	RCW TOTAL
C.		0	2	0	2	3	0	4	21	9	41
		0.0	4.9	0.0	4.9	7.3	C.0	9.8	51.2	22.0	51.9
		0.0	66.7	0.0	100.0	75.0	C.0	28.6	63.6	45.0	
		C.0	2.5	0.0	2.5	3.8	C.0	5.1	26.6	11.4	
101. EFFECTIVE MILITIA		C	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	C.0	0.0	C.0	100.0	1.3
		0.0	C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	C.0	0.0	C.0	5.0	
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	C.0	C.0	C.0	1.3	
103. PROGRESSIVE		1	0	0	0	0	C	1	1	5	8
		12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.5	12.5	62.5	10.1
		100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	C.C	7.1	3.0	25.0	
		1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	C.0	1.3	1.3	6.3	
106. PRO-U.S.		C	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	4
		C.C	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	C.0	0.0	75.0	0.0	5.1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	C.0	0.0	9.1	0.0	
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	C.0	C.0	3.8	0.0	
108. REALISTIC; MODER		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	4
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	C.0	0.0	50.0	50.0	5.1
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	C.0	0.0	6.1	10.0	
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	C.0	0.0	2.5	2.5	
302. CIL; ECON BLACKM		0	0	0	0	0	1	7	6	1	15
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.7	46.7	40.0	6.7	19.0
		C.C	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	50.0	18.2	5.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	8.9	7.6	1.3	
305. DEFECTIVE GOVT		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
		C.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	C.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	2.5
		C.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	C.0	C.0	0.0	5.0	
		0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	C.C	0.0	0.0	1.3	
COLUMN TOTAL		1	3	1	2	4	1	14	33	20	79
		1.3	3.8	1.3	2.5	5.1	1.3	17.7	41.8	25.3	100.0

(CONTINUED)

Figure 26 - SAUDI ARABIA -- THEMES BY YEAR

CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR

THEME	YEAR	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
308. DEFECTIVE MILITA	COUNT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	ROW PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	1.3
	COL PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	
	TOT PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	
311. UNRELIABLE,BELLI	COUNT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
	ROW PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	2.5
	COL PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	
	TOT PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	0.0	0.0	
312. BAD CHARACTER	COUNT	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	ROW PCT	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3
	COL PCT	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	TOT PCT	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		1	3	1	2	4	1	14	33	20	79
		1.3	3.8	1.3	2.5	5.1	1.3	17.7	41.8	25.3	100.0

XI. LIBYA

SYNOPSIS

Libya accounted for only 2.7% of all cases. These occurred predominantly in 1969 and 1970 after the Qaddaffi regime had taken power, and in 1973. Figure 27 shows the Libyan case frequency by year.

The image ratings for Libya were: (1) favorable 7.8%, (2) neutral 37.5% and (3) unfavorable 54.7%. Libya had the lowest favorable rating of all major national actors in the study.

The five most frequent themes were: (1) oil/economic blackmail (15.6%), (2) militant and belligerent (7.8%), (3) are or support terrorists (6.3%), (4) defective government (6.3%) and (5) anti-U.S., pro-Soviet (4.7%).

While other national actors such as Jordan and Egypt improved the images they presented to Americans, Libya reversed the process. The demise of the Idris monarchy marked the beginning of a down-swing in American images of Libya. Middle East watchers would do well to keep the Libyan example in mind when thinking of Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the importance of the monarchy in those two countries who have been closest to the west and the United States. Figure 28 compares the image ratings for the pre and post-Qaddaffi periods in Libya.

A. IMAGE CATEGORIES

In additon to having the lowest favorable rating of all major national actors, Libya's unfavorable rating was the third highest. As noted in the synopsis, the turning point in Libya's image ratings occurred in 1969, with subsequent ratings being consistently unfavorable. A crosstabulation of the image ratings by year appears at Figure 29. They are summarized in the table below.

****

Libyan Image Categories (Percentage)

	Favorable	Neutral	Unfavorable
Libya Total	7.8	37.5	54.7
Study Total	13.2	35.2	51.6
Libya 1967[1]	0.0	100.0	0.0
Libya 1975	20.0	0.0	80.0

[1] one case only

****

B. THEMES

The four most frequent themes, discussed below, are unfavorable and account for 36% of the Libyan total. A theme by year crosstabulation is at Figure 30.

1. Libya Is an Oil/Economic Blackmailer

After Colonel Qaddaffi gained power in Libya in September 1969, he began to apply pressure to the western oil firms which were operating in Libya:

> Western oil companies waited anxiously today for the Libyan Government's decision on the companies' offer of a substantial increase in tax and royalty payments.
>
> The Government had warned of "drastic action" unless the companies accept Government demands by tomorrow. ("West's Oilmen . . .," 10 Mar. 71, p. 11, c. 1.)

Libya did not hesitate to translate its words into action when it found an opportunity:

> Libya has said that the nationalization of the assets of the British Petroleum Company and the fund withdrawal were retaliations for alleged British "collusion" with Iran in the latter's occupation last week of three islands in the Persian Gulf. ("Libyan Premier . . .," 10 Dec. 71, p. 7, c. 1.)

Prior to the October 1973 war and the Saudi Arabian sponsored oil embargo that followed, Libya made it known that U. S. support for Israel would be costly:

> . . . Libya nationalized the entire operation of the independent oilman, Nelson Bunker Hunt, . . . without compensation on the grounds that the United States supported Israel.
>
> The Libyans have let it be known that they are more than willing to sell their oil directly to Europe and Japan, bypassing the American companies. ("Oilmen Set . . .," 5 Sep. 73, p. 51, c. 1.)

Once the embargo had begun, Libya joined in with no reservations:

> Libya fired a double-barrel blast of her "oil weapon" yesterday by ordering a cutoff of all shipments of crude oil and petroleum products to the United States and almost doubling prices for other importers. ("Cutoff in Oil . . .," 20 Oct. 73, p. 1, c. 1.)

2. Libya Is Militant and Belligerent

Qaddaffi's Nasser-style Revolutionary Council was not long in sounding a militant note in demanding the evacuation of Wheelus Air Force Base near Tripoli:

> The leader of the ruling Revolutionary

> Council says Libya will go to war if "colonial states" do not agree to a complete withdrawal of forces from the country. ("Libyan Leader . . .," 5 Nov. 69, p. 5, c. 6.)

A proposed merger of Libya and Egypt was thwarted, in part, by Libyan belligerence over Israel:

> Unlike Egypt's proclaimed "total confrontation" with Israel while at the same time pursuing diplomatic solutions, Colonel Qaddafi rejects all measures short of war. ("Qaddafi Concedes . . .," 30 Jun. 73, p. 3, c. 1.)

One of Colonel Qaddaffi's goals has been to spread the Muslim faith. The Libyans manage to sound belligerent even in this endeavor:

> While there exists no known incidents in drives for conversions, Libyan leader Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, has promised to help Moslem rebels fighting central governments dominated by Christians . . . ("Libya is . . .," 5 Oct. 75, p. 18, c. 4.)

3. Libyans Are or Support Terrorists

On 30 October 1972, Palestinians hijacked a Lufthansa airliner in Beirut and flew it first to Yugoslavia. They were able to secure the release of the surviving Black September guerrillas from the Olympic games tragedy:

> the hijackers and the three released Munich killers took refuge in Libya . . .
>
> . . . Libya provides the training and financing for much of the guerrilla movement. ("The Timing . . .," 5 Nov. 72, Sec. 4, p. 3, c. 3.)

When unable to render some form of physical support for the commando's, Libya provided moral support:

> But he [Qaddaffi] praised the guerrilla attack on the Israeli town of Qiryat Shemona last Thursday. "This operation is long overdue . . ." ("Libya's Premier . . .," 15 Apr. 74, p. 10, c. 4.)

4. Libya Has a Defective Government

When the United States announced that despite the change in government in Libya, it was going ahead with plans to sell F-5's to Libya, there were many objections. Senator Adlai Stevenson described the Qaddaffi regime as ". . . militaristic, communist, belligerent, radical and hostile to the United States." ("Stevenson Criticizes . . .," 20 Mar. 70, p. 3, c. 6.)

Though not overtly oppressive by Iraqi standards, the xenophobic character of the Qaddaffi regime was clear to the Americans that lived in Libya:

> It has never been a gaudy place like Beirut, but the austere puritanism of the young ruling

officers has depressed foreigners even more.

Prohibition has been decreed. Casinos and some theaters and restaurants have been closed. Foreign-language signs at the airport and in the city have been removed and only Arabic is to be seen. The old Italian community has been expelled. ("Strict Government . . .," 10 Nov. 70, p. 2. c. 3.)

YEAR



VALID CASES 64 MISSING CASES 0

Figure 27 - LIBYA -- FREQUENCY BY YEAR

YEAR	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	CATEGORY 1. FAVORABLE	2. NEUTRAL	3. UNFAVORABLE	ROW TOTAL
1967 TO 1969	1.	2	10	4	16
		12.5	62.5	25.0	25.0
		40.0	41.7	11.4	
		3.1	15.6	6.3	
1970 TO 1975	2.	3	14	31	48
		6.3	29.2	64.6	75.0
		60.0	58.3	88.6	
		4.7	21.9	48.4	
	COLUMN TOTAL	5	24	35	64
		7.8	37.5	54.7	100.0

Figure 28 - LIBYA -- IMAGES BY PERIOD



CROSSTABULATION OF CATEGORY BY YEAR PAGE 1 OF

CATEGORY		YEAR 67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
1. FAVORABLE	COUNT	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	5
	ROW PCT	0.0	20.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	20.0	7.8
	COL PCT	0.0	33.3	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.4	0.0	20.0	
	TOT PCT	0.0	1.6	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.0	1.6	
2. NEUTRAL	COUNT	1	2	7	4	2	1	5	2	0	24
	ROW PCT	4.2	8.3	29.2	16.7	8.3	4.2	20.8	8.3	0.0	37.5
	COL PCT	100.0	66.7	58.3	36.4	33.3	20.0	38.5	25.0	0.0	
	TOT PCT	1.6	3.1	10.9	6.3	3.1	1.6	7.8	3.1	0.0	
3. UNFAVORABLE	COUNT	0	0	4	7	4	4	6	6	4	35
	ROW PCT	0.0	0.0	11.4	20.0	11.4	11.4	17.1	17.1	11.4	54.7
	COL PCT	0.0	0.0	33.3	63.6	66.7	80.0	46.2	75.0	80.0	
	TOT PCT	0.0	0.0	6.3	10.9	6.3	6.3	9.4	9.4	6.3	
COLUMN TOTAL		1	3	12	11	6	5	13	8	5	64
		1.6	4.7	18.8	17.2	9.4	7.8	20.3	12.5	7.8	100.0

Figure 29 - LIBYA -- IMAGES BY YEAR

Figure 30 - LIBYA -- THEMES BY YEAR

CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR

THEME	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
0.		1	2	7	4	2	1	5	2	0	24
		4.2	8.3	29.2	16.7	8.3	4.2	20.8	8.3	0.0	37.5
		100.0	66.7	58.3	36.4	33.3	20.0	38.5	25.0	0.0	
		1.6	3.1	10.9	6.3	3.1	1.6	7.8	3.1	0.0	
102. PROGRESSIVE		0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
		0.0	33.3	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	4.7
		0.0	33.3	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	
		0.0	1.6	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	
107. ANTI-TERRORIST		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	1.6
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.7	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	
111. HUMANITARIAN		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	1.6
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.7	0.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	
301. MILITANT;BELLIGE		0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	5
		0.0	0.0	20.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	7.8
		0.0	0.0	8.3	9.1	0.0	0.0	7.7	12.5	20.0	
		0.0	0.0	1.6	1.6	0.0	0.0	1.6	1.6	1.6	
302. OIL, ECON BLACKM		0	0	0	0	4	2	3	0	1	10
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	40.0	20.0	30.0	0.0	10.0	15.6
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	66.7	40.0	23.1	0.0	20.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3	3.1	4.7	0.0	1.6	
304. ARE, SUPP TERRCR		0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	4
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	25.0	50.0	0.0	6.3
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	7.7	25.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	1.6	3.1	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		1	3	12	11	6	5	13	8	5	64
		1.6	4.7	18.8	17.2	9.4	7.8	20.3	12.5	7.8	100.0

(CONTINUED)

* C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N O F *
THEME BY YEAR
* PAGE 2 OF 2

THEME / YEAR	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
305. DEFECTIVE GOV'T	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	4
	0.0	0.0	0.0	75.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	6.3
	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.3	0.0	0.0	7.7	0.0	0.0	
	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.7	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	
307. ANTILS, PRESOV	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	3
	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	4.7
	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	
	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.0	
308. DEFECTIVE MILITA	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
	0.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	4.7
	0.0	0.0	16.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	
	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	
311. UNRELIABLE, BELLI	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	3
	0.0	0.0	33.3	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	4.7
	0.0	0.0	8.3	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	
	0.0	0.0	1.6	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	
312. BAD CHARACTER	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	3
	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	33.3	0.0	33.3	0.0	4.7
	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	0.0	20.0	0.0	12.5	0.0	
	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.0	1.6	0.0	1.6	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	1	3	12	11	6	5	13	8	5	64
	1.6	4.7	18.8	17.2	9.4	7.8	20.3	12.5	7.8	100.0

XII. OTHER ARAB NATIONS

SYNOPSIS

This group includes in descending frequency: South Yemen, Kuwait, Yemen, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Oman and Bahrain. Together they account for 4.2% of the study total. The frequencies per year for each are shown in Figure 31. The 1967 and 1968 occurrences were dominated by Yemen and South Yemen, whose unfavorable ratings were 68.2% and 77.8% respectively. The more recent occurrences came predominantly from Kuwait which had emerged as a giant in the world of finance. The U.A.E., Oman and Bahrain accounted for only 18 cases between them. The dominant themes for the group are associated with the Yemens. They were: (1) defective governemnts (13.7%), (2) factionated and disunited (12.7%) and (3) are or support terrorists (8.8%).

A. IMAGE CATEGORIES

Aggregate figures for this group mean very little, since the frequencies range from a high of 36 to a low of three. Figure 32 provides a breakdown of the images for each referrent over the period. The highly unfavorable ratings of Yemen and South Yemen stem from a concentration of cases in 1967 and 1968. Civil wars and insurgencies in these countries during that time were the sources of the poor ratings. For both countries about 80% of their total cases occurred during those two years.

Kuwait, on the other hand, had only three cases in the first six years of the study. In the post-1973 war atmosphere of Arab economic prowess, Kuwait emerged as a financial power. Most of Kuwait's cases were found in the financial section of the Times. Although a majority (69.2%) of Kuwait's cases were neutral, the oil blackmail theme was its most frequent unfavorable theme.

Very little of significance can be said about the U.A.E. and Bahrain. Oman was characterized primarily as having a defective government because of its problems with the Dhofar rebel activity.

B. THEMES

The three most frequent themes were unfavorable, apply primarily to Yemen and South Yemen and account for over 35% of all the cases in the group. Figure 33 is a crosstabulation of the themes as they occurred by year.

1. Defective Government

The complexion of the war between the republicans and royalists in Yemen, with overt Egyptian military support for the republicans and Saudi logistical support for the royalists, changed after Egypt withdrew most of her forces following the Six Day War of 1967:

> the latest withdrawals would -- if confirmed -- suggest a far more severe cutback, leaving the wobbly Yemeni republicans increasingly vulnerable to overthrow by the Yemeni royalists . . . ("U.A.R. Said . . .," 30 Jun. 67, p. 5, c. 1.)

As the republicans attempted to consolidate their position, measures were adopted which created unfavorable images of the Yemeni Government:

> Mohsen el-Aini, the new Premier of Yemen, declared last night that his government would not accept or permit consultation with the country's royalist family and would not allow the republican system of government to be put to a vote. ("Yemen's Premier . . .," 10 Nov. 67, p. 9, c. 1.)

Although the republican regime managed to hold on to its control of the Government, they were less capable of maintaining order:

> Royalist tribesmen fired bazooka shells in Sana today . . . Sana appeared to be in no imminent danger of falling to the royalists but it was nearly impossible to travel beyond the city because of the guerrillas. ("Royalists Fire . . .," 15 Dec. 67, p. 5, c. 6.)

2. Factionated and Disunited

In South Yemen, the battle was between the new Government (S. Yemen acnieved independence from Britain in November, 1969) of Qahtan al-Shabi and the tribal leaders and sultanates al-Shabi's National Liberation Front party was trying to eliminate. Yemeni royalists supported the tribal forces in South Yemen:

> Prince Hassan Bin Yahya, the Deputy Premier in the regime of the royalist held areas of Yemen, said here today that the battle for Beihan could be the beginning of a widespread tribal uprising against the National Liberation Front regime in Southern Yemen. ("Royalists Expect . . .," 20 Feb. 68, p. 9, c. 1.)

In Yemen, the royalist and republican factions insured that an unfavorable image was maintained by their battle for political control:

> In its sixth year, the war between the republicans who overthrew Imam Mohammed al-Badr, and the royalists who seek to restore him to his thrown, is entering a new phase. Although narrowed militarily to a struggle for the capital, it is broadening in the sense that it is again involving more countries in the Middle East and beyond. ("Royalists in Yemen . . .," 15 Mar. 68, p. 10, c. 1.)

As it was called in 1968, Muscat and Oman alsc had

internal problems with the Dhofar region of the country which, besides wanting to secede from the federation, went out of its way to cause other problems:

> Armed revolution to overthrow the rulers of the Persian Gulf states, one of the richest oil-producing areas of the world, is advocated by a newly formed organization, the National Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf [previously known as the Front for the Liberation of Dhofar]. ("Rebel Group . . .," 10 Dec. 68, p. 6, c. 1.)

3. Are or Support Terrorists

Early in 1967 Great Britain announced that it would quit the Aden Protectorate thus enabling South Yemen's independence. The image of the nationalists was not a good one:

> Jockeying to inherit her [Britain's] power, Arab nationalists are trying to spread chaos with terrorist attacks.
>
> "There will be no end to the bloodshed if the nationalists wishes are not met," one nationalist leader . . . warned last year. ("Now Its's Trouble . . .," 15 Jan. 67, Sec. 4, p. 3, c. 2.)

The Arab nationalists put increasing pressure on the British who sped up the evacuation of non-essential personnel:

The action was interpreted as an indication of how gravely the British authorities regard the crisis here in the wake of the mutiny in the Arab security forces nine days ago and the terrorist control of the commercial quarter known as Crater since then. ("More Britons . . .30 Jun. 67, p. 5, c. 1.)

YEAR



VALID CASES 102 MISSING CASES 0

Figure 31 - OTHER -- FREQUENCY BY YEAR

REFERREN	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	CATEGORY: FAVORABLE 1.	NEUTRAL 2.	UNFAVORABLE 3.	ROW TOTAL
UNITED ARAB EMIR	675.	2	5	3	10
		20.0	50.0	30.0	9.8
		20.0	14.3	5.3	
		2.0	4.9	2.9	
YEMEN	678.	3	4	15	22
		13.6	18.2	68.2	21.6
		30.0	11.4	26.3	
		2.9	3.9	14.7	
S. YEMEN	681.	2	6	28	36
		5.6	16.7	77.8	35.3
		20.0	17.1	49.1	
		2.0	5.9	27.5	
KUWAIT	690.	1	18	7	26
		3.8	69.2	26.9	25.5
		10.0	51.4	12.3	
		1.0	17.6	6.9	
BAHRAIN	695.	0	2	1	3
		0.0	66.7	33.3	2.9
		0.0	5.7	1.8	
		0.0	2.0	1.0	
OMAN	698.	2	0	3	5
		40.0	0.0	60.0	4.9
		20.0	0.0	5.3	
		2.0	0.0	2.9	
	COLUMN TOTAL	10	35	57	102
		9.8	34.3	55.9	100.0

Figure 32 - OTHER -- IMAGES BY REFERRENT

CROSSTABULATION OF

THEME	YEAR									ROW TOTAL
	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	
0.	4	3	1	2	2	5	0	14	4	35
	11.4	8.6	2.9	5.7	5.7	14.3	0.0	40.0	11.4	34.3
	12.5	21.4	16.7	40.0	40.0	62.5	0.0	70.0	66.7	
	3.9	2.9	1.0	2.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	13.7	3.9	
102. WILLING TO NEGOT	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
103. PROGRESSIVE	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3
	0.0	0.0	33.3	33.3	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	2.9
	0.0	0.0	16.7	20.0	0.0	0.0	16.7	0.0	0.0	
	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	
105. UNITED; IN AGREE	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	2.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.7	
	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	
106. PRO-U.S.	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
	0.0	0.0	16.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
107. ANTI-TERRORIST	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
110. ANTI-SOVIET--COM	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	32	14	6	5	5	8	6	20	6	102
	31.4	13.7	5.9	4.9	4.9	7.8	5.9	19.6	5.9	100.0

(CONTINUED)

Figure 33 - OTHER -- THEMES BY YEAR

THEME	YEAR 67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
112. GOOD CHARACTER	1 100.0 3.1 1.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	1 1.0
201. MILITANT;BELLICE	2 100.0 6.3 2.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	2 2.0
302. CIL, ECON BLACKM	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	2 40.0 33.3 2.0	3 60.0 15.0 2.9	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	5 4.9
303. FACTIONATED	3 23.1 5.4 2.9	9 69.2 64.3 8.8	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	1 7.7 20.0 1.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	13 12.7
304. ARE, SUPP TERROR	7 77.8 21.9 6.9	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	1 11.1 16.7 1.0	1 11.1 5.0 1.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	9 8.8
305. DEFECTIVE GOVT	10 71.4 31.3 9.8	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	1 7.1 16.7 1.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	2 14.3 25.0 2.0	1 7.1 16.7 1.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	14 13.7
306. UNYIELDING, UNCC	2 100.0 6.3 2.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	2 2.0
COLUMN TOTAL	32 31.4	14 13.7	6 5.9	5 4.9	5 4.9	8 7.8	6 5.9	20 19.6	6 5.9	102 100.0

(CONTINUED)

CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR

THEME	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
367. ANTILS, PRCSOV		1	1	2	0	1	0	0	1	0	6
		16.7	16.7	33.3	0.0	16.7	0.0	0.0	16.7	0.0	5.9
		3.1	7.1	33.3	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	
		1.0	1.0	2.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	
368. DEFECTIVE MILITA		0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	3
		0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	2.9
		0.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	
		0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	
512. EAC CHARACTER		1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	3
		33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	33.3	2.9
		3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.7	0.0	16.7	
		1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		32	14	6	5	5	8	6	20	6	102
		31.4	13.7	5.9	4.9	4.9	7.8	5.9	19.6	5.9	100.0

XIII. PALESTINIANS

SYNOPSIS

The Palestinians account for 9.4% of the cases in the study and were the second most frequently occurring referrent. Nearly one-half of the cases occurred in 1970 and 1974 due primarily to the Jordanian war and large-scale guerrilla activity. Figure 34 shows the Palestinian case distribution by year. The image category ratings for the Palestinians were the worst of the major actors, with an unfavorable rating of 77.8% and a favorable rating of only 4.9%. The most frequent themes were unfavorable: (1) are or support terrorists (40.9%), (2) militant and belligerent (15.6%), (3) factionated and disunited (5.8%), (4) anti-U.S. or pro-Soviet (4.0%) and (5) unyielding or uncooperative (3.6%).

This highly unfavorable image is one of the factors that obstructs efforts to deal with the Palestinians in the Middle East conflict. The fact that the Palestinians were the second most frequent referrent in the study (and were involved in many more cases which were counted for other actors) demonstrates rather clearly that they are one of, if not the crucial issue that must somehow be resolved in any "final" Middle East settlement. United States recognition of Palestinian claims or official contacts with, for instance, the Palestine Liberation Organization, would produce a hue and cry from the American public. Unless such an action was preceded by something to alter the American image of the Palestinians (P.L.O. recognition of Israel's right to exist, for example), the opposition might be prohibitive, and at

very best would require and extensive and strong set of assurances to the public.

A. IMAGE CATEGORIES

As one might expect, Americans do not have a favorable image of the Palestinians. Their favorable rating is lower than any major national referrent and their unfavorable rating is the hightest. The neutral rating is the lowest in the entire study. The table below summarizes the Palestinian image ratings.

****

Palestinian Image Categories (Percentage)

	Favorable	Neutral	Unfavorable
Palestinian Total	4.9	17.3	77.8
Study Total	13.2	35.2	51.6
Palestinians 1967	0.0	0.0	100.0
Palestinians 1975	7.1	25.0	67.9

****

Figure 35 gives the image cateogry ratings by year. It can be seen that the 1974 and 1975 unfavorable ratings were the lowest of the nine-year period, and that the favorable

rating for those years, however meager, was above the Palestinians' average, hinting at a slight improvement at the end of the study.

B. THEMES

The five most frequent Palestinian themes were unfavorable. The Palestinians had cases in every possible unfavorable theme (defective government and oil blackmailers not being possible for them) and in only five of the twelve possible favorable themes. Figure 36 shows the themes by year for the Palestinians.

1. Palestinians Are Terrorists

This theme accounted for more than 40% of the Palestinian cases, double the next most frequent theme. It was the only theme to occur in each year of the study.

One of the most frequent acts associated with the Palestinians was the hijacking of airliners in order to make some sort of political point or to gain a concession:

> Arab commandos hijacked a Trans World Airlines jet with 113 persons aboard over southern Italy today in what they described as a counter-blow against the sale of Phantom jet fighters to Israel by the United States.

> Sources close to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in Beirut assumed responsibility for the hijacking . . . ("U.S. Jet . . .," 30 Aug. 69, p. 1, c. 19)

Another tactic frequently used by the Palestinians was kidnapping:

> The United States Embassy here [Amman] would not disclose the whereabouts today of Morris Draper, the head of its political section who was seized and later released last night by Palestinian commandos. ("Where Abouts . . .," 10 Jun. 70, p. 15, c. 1.)

Probably the most spectacular hijacking series occurred in September 1970, when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.) seized four airliners and took them to an abandoned R.A.F. airfield north of Amman, holding hundreds as hostages:

> The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Arab guerrilla organization that seized three other airliners and attempted to capture a fourth Sunday, said the VC10 which is 170 feet long and valued at $7-million, had been taken for use as ransom for the return of a 24-year old woman commando Leila Khaled. ("B.O.A.C. Jet . . .," 10 Sep. 70, p. 1, c. 7.)

If the Dawson Field operation just described was the most spectacular, the Munich attack by Black September was

the most devastating. It may well have created an image of the Palestinian which is beyond repair:

> Once again, Arab guerrillas had struck suddenly against their foes, and when the blaze of gunfire ended at the airport outside Munich last Tuesday, 17 lives, 11 of them Israeli athletes, had been snuffed out. ("Another Round . . .," 10 Sep. 72, Sec. 4, p. 1., c. 1.)

If airplanes were not hijacked, they were attacked on the ground, or terminals were attacked. In very few cases were the guerrillas tried and convicted. In the case below the commandos were subsequently released:

> Two Arabs who killed five persons and injured 55 in a grenade attack at the Athens airport last August were sentenced to death today after a one-day trial.
>
> Mr. Arida said that he and his comrade had carried out orders they had received from the Palestinian Black September Organization. ("Greece Sentences . . .," 25 Jan. 74, p. 8, c. 2.)

The Palestinians would offer no respite in their attacks against "enemies," and this applied even to the prominent holy cities during the Easter pilgrimmage. One of the most extreme groups, the P.F.L.P. -- General Command, issued this statement in April, 1974:

> We warn foreign tourists and others who intend visiting the occupied lands that we

shall treat them like enemies.

Following this warning, the Popular Front General Command will accept no responsibility for the lives of anyone on the territory of occupied Palestine apart from Arabs. ("Palestine Guerrilla . . .," 20 Apr. 74, p. 4, c. 3.)

2. Palestinians Are Militant

Early in 1969, Yasir Arafat established himself as the leader of the dominant guerrilla group, Fatah. His remarks made clear the aggressive course of action the commando groups would follow:

> . . . Mr. Arafat promised to intensify the "armed revolution in all parts of our Palestinian territory tc make of it a war of liberation. Armed struggle is the only way . . ." ("Fatah Wins . . .," 5 Feb. 69, p. 5, c. 5.)

The militant Palestinian image was supported by many pictures of the commando and his weapon -- the Kalashnikov rifle. Abu Omar, a leading Fatah spokesman said:

> It's our symbol because we are fighting an armed struggle, and this is our most popular arm -- I think it's pretty neat myself. ("Kalashnikov Rifle . . .," 25 Oct. 70, p. 3, c. 3.)

Despite losing the battle to King Hussein in Jordan in September 1970, Arafat seemed undaunted:

> It is our uncontestable right to bear arms in an attempt to return to our country. Our aim is to liberate our homeland, Palestine, from the Jordan River to the sea. ("The Kalashnikov . . .," 30 Oct. 70, p. 41, c. 1.)

After the 1973 war, talk of peace in the Middle East began to include the Palestinians. Not everyone felt that the militant Palestinians would live at peace with Israel even in their own state. Senator Jacob Javitz:

> . . . a Palestinian state dominated by the Palestine Liberation Organization is a dagger at the heart of Israel and will greatly endanger the peace of the world and would be an affront to human decency. ("Javitz Charges . . .," 20 Oct. 74, p. 56, c. 1.)

3. Palestinians Are Disunited

Though nominally linked under the umbrella of the P.L.O., the various guerrilla groups were frequently at odds with each other. Differences ranged from ideological to operational:

> The challenge to Mr. Arafat, the Fatah chief, came from a commando leader, Abu Yussef al-Khayed, whose followers rejected the decision of the Palestinian commando leadership to withdraw some forces from

Southern Lebanon and reduce guerrilla attacks from there on Israel. ("An Armed . . .," 20 Oct. 72, p. 2, c. 4.)

Talks about peace in the Middle East are looked at differently by various groups within the Palestinian movement. While some would at least talk about peace with Israel, others rejected the concept out of hand:

> Rancor has erupted among leaders of the Palestine guerrilla movement over whether to take part in Arab-Israeli peace talks in Geneva, even though they have not yet been invited. ("Palestinian Guerrilla . . .," 20 Mar. 74, p. 2, c. 4.)

That the P.L.O. had only limited practical authority over the actions of the guerrilla groups was evident:

> The Palestine Liberation Organization said yesterday that it had demanded the release of the United States Army Colonel who was abducted by guerrillas June 29 but that the kidnappers had refused to free him.
>
> . . . Colonel Morgan was in the hands of the Popular Struggle Front and the Popular Front -- General Command, two extremist groups among those opposed to the leadership of Yasser Arafat. ("P.L.O. Reports . . .," 10 Jul. 75, p. 1, c. 4.)

4. Palestinians Are Anti-U.S. or Pro-Soviet

Overt Soviet assistance to the Palestinians was rare. However, in October 1971, Arafat visited Moscow. There the Soviet Union agreed to provide hospital care for those guerrillas who received serious wounds in action against Israel:

> The principal stipulation was that the guerrillas make an effort to end their political feuding and concentrate on resuming terrorist and sabotage attacks on Israel. ("Soviet Plan . . .," 30 Dec. 71, p. 1, c. 7.)

As peace talks continued through 1974, the Palestinians attempted to undermine the American efforts:

> The Palestinian guerrilla organizations have announced stepped up terrorist attacks against Israeli civilian targets to sabotage the American peace initiative that has quieted Israel's military fronts with Egypt and Syria. ("Israel Again . . .," 20 Jun. 74, p. 2, c. 49)

A more official link between Moscow and the Palestinians was forged when in June 1974 Arafat was invited to the Soviet Union. This was the first trip in which Secretary Brezhnev, rather than a friendship group, had asked for Arafat to visit:

> The invitation from Mr. Brezhnev, which Mr. Arafat received last month, is interpreted by the guerrillas as Soviet recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. ("Arafat Off . . .," 30 Jul. 74, p. 5, c. 1.)

5. Palestinians Are Unyielding

This theme was most dominant in 1970. As tensions rose in Jordan, the guerrillas were adamant in their opposition to a peaceful settlement:

> The fedayeen . . . are voicing a view long held by Palestinian leaders when they categorically reject the idea of a peaceful settlement with Israel, saying it would merely put a legal seal on the loss of their homeland. ("Palestinians and . . .," 15 Aug. 70, p. 7, c. 1.)

The P.L.O. attempted to impose its unyielding view on Israel's existence upon all Palestinians:

> Any Palestinian supporting the idea of creation of a Palestinian state on the west-bank territory of Jordan will be regarded as a traitor and tried by a Palestinian revolutionary court, the guerrilla daily, Al Fatah announced today. ("Backers of . . .," 25 Nov. 70, p. 10, c. 3.)

YEAR

```
     CODE
      67.  ***  (      3)
      68.  *****  (      7)
      69.  *************  (     23)
      70.  ********************************  (     59)
      71.  *****  (      8)
      72.  ***************  (     28)
      73.  **********  (     17)
      74.  ***************************  (     52)
      75.  ***************  (     28)
           I.........I.........I.........I.........I.........I
           0        20        40        60        80       100
           FREQUENCY
```

VALID CASES 225 MISSING CASES 0

Figure 34 - PALESTINIANS -- FREQUENCY BY YEAR

* * * *

Figure 36 - PALESTINIANS -- THEMES BY YEAR

CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR

THEME	CCLNT / RCW PCT / CCL PCT / TOT PCT	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
C.		0	0	5	9	1	1	1	15	7	39
		C.0	C.0	12.8	23.1	2.6	2.6	2.6	38.5	17.9	17.3
		0.0	0.0	21.7	15.3	12.5	3.6	5.9	28.8	25.0	
		C.0	0.0	2.2	4.0	0.4	C.4	C.4	6.7	3.1	
102. WILLING TO NEGOT		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
		C.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	C.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.9
		C.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	C.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	C.0	C.0	C.4	0.0	
105. UNITED; IN AGREE		0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	3
		C.0	0.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	C.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	1.3
		C.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	C.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	C.0	0.0	C.4	0.0	
107. ANTI-TERRORIST		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	C.0	C.0	33.3	66.7	1.3
		C.0	C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	7.1	
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	C.0	C.0	C.4	0.9	
108. REALISTIC; MODER		0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
		C.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9
		C.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	C.0	0.0	C.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	C.0	0.0	C.0	0.0	
110. ANTI-SOVIET--COM		0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.5	C.0	0.0	C.0	0.0	
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
201. MILITANT;BELLIGE		C	4	5	15	0	4	0	4	3	35
		0.0	11.4	14.3	42.9	0.0	11.4	0.0	11.4	8.6	15.6
		C.0	57.1	21.7	25.4	0.0	14.3	C.0	7.7	10.7	
		C.0	1.8	2.2	6.7	0.0	1.8	0.0	1.8	1.3	
COLUMN TOTAL		3	7	23	59	8	28	17	52	28	225
		1.3	3.1	10.2	26.2	3.6	12.4	7.6	23.1	12.4	100.0

(CONTINUED)

THEME	COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT / TOT PCT	YEAR 67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
303. FACTIONATED		0	0	2	0	1	3	2	3	2	13
		C.C	C.0	15.4	0.0	7.7	23.1	15.4	23.1	15.4	5.8
		C.0	0.0	8.7	0.0	12.5	10.7	11.8	5.8	7.1	
		C.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.4	1.3	C.9	1.3	0.9	
304. ARE, SLPP TERRCR		2	2	8	15	2	17	13	21	12	92
		2.2	2.2	8.7	16.3	2.2	18.5	14.1	22.8	13.0	40.9
		66.7	28.6	34.8	25.4	25.0	60.7	76.5	40.4	42.9	
		C.9	0.9	3.6	6.7	0.9	7.6	5.8	5.3	5.3	
306. UNYIELDING, UNCO		0	1	1	4	0	1	0	0	1	8
		C.0	12.5	12.5	50.0	0.0	12.5	0.0	C.0	12.5	3.6
		C.0	14.3	4.3	6.8	0.0	3.6	0.0	0.0	3.6	
		C.0	0.4	0.4	1.8	0.0	C.4	0.0	C.0	0.4	
307. ANTILS, PRCSOV		0	0	1	1	2	0	0	4	1	9
		C.0	0.0	11.1	11.1	22.2	C.C	C.0	44.4	11.1	4.0
		C.0	0.0	4.3	1.7	25.0	0.0	0.0	7.7	3.6	
		C.0	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.9	C.C	0.0	1.8	0.4	
308. CEFECTIVE MILITA		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	C.C	100.0	C.0	0.0	0.4
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	C.0	5.9	C.0	0.0	
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	C.C	0.4	0.0	0.0	
309. INHUMANE		0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	3
		C.0	0.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	33.3	C.0	C.0	0.0	1.3
		C.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		C.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	C.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	
310. RASH, UNREALISTI		C	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	4
		0.0	0.0	25.0	75.0	0.0	C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8
		C.0	0.0	4.3	5.1	0.0	C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		C.0	0.0	0.4	1.3	0.0	C.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		3	7	23	59	8	28	17	52	28	225
		1.3	3.1	10.2	26.2	3.6	12.4	7.6	23.1	12.4	100.0

(CONTINUED)

CROSSTABULATION OF THEME BY YEAR

THEME	YEAR	67.	68.	69.	70.	71.	72.	73.	74.	75.	ROW TOTAL
211. UNRELIABLE, BELLI	COUNT	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	5
	ROW PCT	20.0	0.0	0.0	60.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2
	COL PCT	33.3	0.0	0.0	5.1	0.0	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	TOT PCT	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	
212. BAD CHARACTER	COUNT	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	2	0	5
	ROW PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	40.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	2.2
	COL PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	12.5	0.0	0.0	3.8	0.0	
	TOT PCT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		3	7	23	59	8	28	17	52	28	225
		1.3	3.1	10.2	26.2	3.6	12.4	7.6	23.1	12.4	100.0

XIV. CONCLUSIONS

These conclusions are keyed to the objectives as they were outlined in the introduction.

(1) Determine whether the images of Arabs that are created by a comprehensive news medium are favorable, neutral or unfavorable.

As was noted in Chapter IV, the aggregate results show that a majority of the images Americans have of Arabs are unfavorable. Over the entire period, no referrent had a higher favorable rating than it had an unfavorable rating. If the total image rating was quantified as the difference between the favorable and unfavorable percentages, with the lower the score, the more favorable the rating, then the image standings of the major referrents would be as shown below.

****

Image Ratings for Major Referrents

Referrent	Unfavorable	Favorable	Score
Jordan	28.9	28.4	0.5
Saudi Arabia	26.6	21.5	5.1
Egypt	41.5	17.2	24.3

Image Ratings for Major Referrents (cont.)

Referrent	Unfavorable	Favorable	Score
Syria	52.9	10.9	42.0
Libya	54.7	7.8	46.9
Lebanon	60.4	11.1	49.3
Iraq	65.9	11.4	54.5
Palestinians	77.8	4.9	72.9
Aggregate	51.6	13.2	38.4

****

(2) Determine what the favorable and unfavorable images are.

The 24 themes that were identified provide a good deal of insight about how Americans see the Arabs. The domination of the unfavorable themes (the 10 most frequent), however, does not reflect the decline in their frequency and the more frequent occurrence of the favorable themes over the course of the study. Although no attempt was made to statistically weight the themes, it must be said that there was a higher degree of unfavorability created when the Black September killed the Israeli athletes in Munich than when the royalist and republicans fought a battle in Yemen. This becomes more important when one sees that the dominant theme was that Arabs are or support terrorists.

(3) Identify trends as the images change, and as they apply to specific Arab nations or groups of people.

The image trend has been in two parts. There has been a small increase in the percentage of favorable ratings (from 12.7% in 1967 to 16.8% in 1975), and a more dramatic decrease in the unfavorable ratings (from 70.6% in 1967 to 47.4% in 1975). The war years of 1967, 1970 and 1973 are exceptions to the trend, as is 1972, probably due to the high level of Palestinian activity.

Two of the major national referrents made a significant improvement in their images during the period. The turning point for Egypt was the 1973 war. Their military achievements, subsequent willingness to negotiate an interim settlement in the Sinai and movement away from the Soviet Union toward the United States were primarily responsible for Egypt achieving more favorable than unfavorable ratings during the 1973 through 1975 period. In Jordan, it was the 1970 war with the Palestinians that reversed its predominantly unfavorable image. During the period 1971 through 1975, Jordan had a three-to-one favorable image rating.

Libya was the only major referrent to show a significant trend towards a more unfavorable image. With the advent of the Qaddaffi regime in September 1969, the image of Libya took a distinct turn for the worse. Although the Libyan image rating during the Idris period was 2-to-1 unfavorable, under Colonel Qaddaffi it was more than 10-to-1 unfavorable.

Uniformly unfavorable is the best description of the American image of Iraq. The same can also be said for the Palestinians. Although there was an almost imperceptible improvement in the Palestinian image rating, the terrorist theme is so strong that it pervades not only the Palestinian

cases but is the most frequent theme in the entire study.

One Arab state has clearly "emerged" during the period to take a place of leadership and influence in the Arab world. During the first six years of the study, Saudi Arabia accounted for only twelve cases. From 1973 through 1975, however, the total was 67 cases. This emergence is particularly interesting because the Saudis have the second best image rating of the major referrents. During those first six years, there were but three unfavorable Saudi cases. Despite the unfavorable impact the oil embargo had on the image of Saudi Arabia, the favorable ratings also increased during the embargo and post-embargo period.

The trends which were evidenced in the themes were discussed at the end of Chapter IV. A more detailed look will be taken at two of the themes -- effective and defective military. These themes occurred a total of 28 and 53 times, respectively. Such aggregate results do not, however, tell the entire story. Throughout the study, the major combatants were Egypt and Syria. Although there was virtually constant military activity of some sort, the major, unencumbered, full-scale wars were in 1967 and 1973. By disaggregating the military effectiveness themes into the variables of major combatants and the two war years, one gets a different picture of the American image of the military effectiveness of Egypt and Syria. The table below gives the results of this disaggregation.

****

Egypt, Syria Military Effectiveness (Number of Cases)

	Effective	Defective
1967	0	11
1973	11	8

****

Almost immediately after fighting began in 1973, comparisons were made between the "old" and the "new" Arab soldier:

> British military sources, . . . suggested that the counterattack on the bridgeheads was premature, that the Israelis . . . attacked with insufficient forces and air preparation against troops much improved in morale and training from those of six years ago.
>
> Some qualified military sources have suggested that . . . the Syrians have proved tougher than expected. ("Not the Same . . .," 10 Oct. 73, p. 19, c. 7.)

Although the Arabs were unable to translate their initial battlefield successes into a final military victory, the Egyptian and Syrian performance not only altered the military perspectives in the Middle East, but contributed enormously to the political and image gains that the Arabs

made.

(4) Be able to analyze these findings and draw conclusions relative to future policy formulation and analysis.

In the decision-making process, the most valuable tool would be one that reduced uncertainty and increased the ability of the decision-maker to predict the impact of his decisions. The effect of a foreign policy decision made by the United States Government is determined by two variables. First, there is the systemic variable. For instance, what effect would a U.S. decision to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the only representative of the Palestinian people and to deal with that organization on a transgovernmental level, have on other national actors? How would the Soveit Union respond? How would the Arab world respond? How would their responses affect U.S. interests in the region? Statistical analysis of the data collected in this study is of limited value in answering these kinds of questions because the analysis did not get "into" any other nation-states. While there were highly systematic relationships shown between variables such as "referrent" and "theme" or "referrent" and "category," this does not imply any ability to predict Arab behavior since the study dealt only with American images of Arabs. There is, however, an increased ability to predict what the referrent will be if one knows the theme, or category or vice versa. (The Lambda Asymmetric measure of association, for instance, was 0.16899 with the referrent being the dependent variable and the theme being the independent variable. This means that by knowing the theme one can improve his ability to predict the referrent by 16.899%).

The second variable in determining the total impact of a foreign policy decision is the domestic reaction. The

pluralistic bed-rock in which the decision-making process of the United States Government is rooted has taken on a new dynamism of late. For better or worse, the people (usually through their elected representatives) have in the last decade exercised more vigorously their role in the decision-making process in general, with particularly acute attention being given to U.S. foreign policy decisions. Public support, or at least acceptance, of a governmental decision is the legitimizing factor in the total equation. K.E. Boulding put it well:

> The tacit support of the mass . . . is of vital importance to the powerful. The powerful are always under some obligation to represent the mass, even under dictatorial regimes. In democratic societies the aggregate influence of the images of ordinary people is very great; the image of the powerful cannot diverge too greatly from the image of the mass without the powerful losing power.[25]

In most cases this legitimizing support is given as if by default. When it is not, the bureacratic process is affected to some small or large degree and in extreme cases may be stopped altogether (U.S. support to anti-communist forces in Angola, for instance). If decision-makers could know how the American people would react to a decision before it was made, they would better be able to judge what course of action to follow.

It is in this area that this study can make a contribution to future policy formulation. Returning to the hypothetical example of U.S. recognition of the P. L. O., one look at the Palestinian image rating would indicate that such a decision would meet with much resistance. One should

not assume, however, that this means that the decision could not be implemented. What it tells the policy maker is that he must take some measures to try to reduce or mitigate the highly unfavorable image that Americans have of the Palestinians. If this cannot be done, the government must decide either not to take the action or go ahead, regardless, and try to ride out the domestic reaction. Using the techniques developed in this research, the policy maker could monitor the image for any favorable shifts. The reader should also be reminded that there will be a necessary time lag between the presentation of an image and its internalization by the American public, a linkage not explored in this research.

Another case would be a U.S. decision to sell weapons to Egypt. In trying to determine the domestic reaction to a concrete proposal to sell F-5's, for example, one could look at the other Arab countries to which the U.S. has sold weapons. Saudi Arabia and Jordan have the F-5. Their image ratings are the most favorable of all the major national referrents. Recall the considerable debate that occurred prior to those sales being approved. Egypt's image rating is much poorer than those of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Thus, one would conclude that it would be much more difficult to gain domestic acceptance of such a sale to Egypt. The improvement of the American image of Egypt has been noted. The hypothesis this presents, then, is that once continued improvement in the Egyptian image rating reaches the rating of Saudi Arabia or Jordan, the sale of the F-5's would be accepted by the American public and thus Congress. While such an hypothesis cannot yet be tested, continuation of the study and future events will provide the necessary evidence.

Unless one is willing to completely discount the role of the masses in the decision-making process, the images that

the people hold will affect policy. Further, the policy makers, by knowing what these images are can better gauge domestic reaction to a planned action or decision.

A more basic realization should also take place. As bureaucrats and decision-makers attempt to assess the external impact that their foreign policy decisions will have, a sharp awareness of what images they have of the other international actors and how those images affect their perception of reality will go a long way in minimizing the dysfunctional effects of images.

APPENDIX A

CODE SHEET

TYPE: ED AP UPI REUTERS TL AFP SP OTHER

REFFERENT:

TITLE:

DATE:

AUTHOR:

PAGE: COL:

() FAVORABLE

() F-1 effective military

() F-2 willing to negotiate

() F-3 progressive; reforming; modernizing

() F-4 want peace; non-belligerent

() F-5 united; assist each other; agree

() F-6 pro-US; want good relations

() F-7 anti-terrorist/extremist

() F-8 realistic; calm; deliberate; moderate

() F-9 care for heritage

() F-10 anti-communist/Soviet

() F-11 humaniterian

() F-12 good character, e.g., proud, honest, dilligent, trustworthy, capable

() NEUTRAL

EXAMPLES:

() UNFAVORABLE

() U-1 militant; belligerent

() U-2 oil/economic blackmailers; extorters

() U-3 factionated; disunited

() U-4 are/support extremists, terrorists & saboteurs; infiltraters

() U-5 government; unstable, incapable, radical, corrupt, repressive, extremist

() U-6 unwilling to negotiate; unyielding; uncooperative

() U-7 anti-US; pro-communist/ Soviet

() U-8 military; ineffective, corrupt, plot against gov't, cowardly, unreliable

() U-9 inhumane

() U-10 rash; short-sighted; unrealistic; irrational

() U-11 distort truth; violate agreements; propagandists; exaggerate; imaginative; can't keep secrets; use threatening rhetoric

() U-12 bad character, e.g., deceptive, money-grubber, lazy, unclean, unproductive, ruthless, trouble-makers, discriminate, wasteful, over emotional

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