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MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND INFLUENCE: SOME OBSERVATIONS. (U)  
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# MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND INFLUENCE: SOME OBSERVATIONS



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**MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND INFLUENCE:  
SOME OBSERVATIONS**

by

**Michael J. Francis**

**20 July 1977**

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### FOREWORD

This memorandum was presented at the Military Policy Symposium sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute and held at the US Army War College in early 1977. Under the general theme "Inter-American Security and the United States," a broad range of issues affecting US relations in the Latin American region were addressed. This memorandum considers the relationship between US military aid to Latin America and influence.

The Military Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a forum for the timely dissemination of analytical papers such as those presented at the 1977 Military Policy Symposium.

This memorandum is being published as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. The data and opinions presented are those of the author and in no way imply the endorsement of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

*DeWitt C. Smith, Jr.*

DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.  
Major General, USA  
Commandant

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#### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. MICHAEL J. FRANCIS is Professor of Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. He is the author of *The Allende Victory: An Analysis of the 1970 Chilean Presidential Election* (1973) and *The Limits of Hegemony: U.S. Relations with Argentina and Chile During World War II* (forthcoming). He also has done numerous articles dealing with US foreign policy toward Latin America and the domestic politics of Chile.

## **MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND INFLUENCE: SOME OBSERVATIONS**

This discussion attempts to start bringing some order to the thinking about how developed countries use military assistance to influence weaker states. The subject is discussed in terms of the standard international relations literature on influence and the writings on militarism in Latin America. It is written at a time of eroding US hegemony over Latin America.<sup>1</sup> The consideration of this particular topic stems from an interest in a broader subject: how powerful countries influence the behavior of weaker states.

### **BACKGROUND**

It may be helpful to begin by establishing (1) that when nations give economic and military assistance one of the goals is the gaining of influence over other states and (2) that the influencing of Latin American countries has been a goal of the US military aid program.<sup>2</sup>

In order to create a supporting constituency for economic and military assistance, the rationales of national defense, altruism, and economic benefits are so often mentioned that one tends to overlook the influence justification. Yet scholars of international relations have generally pointed out that the attempt to gain influence by providing economic and military aid is a normal activity for powerful countries.<sup>3</sup>

The most serious attempt by a student of international relations to discuss the foreign aid question from a theoretical perspective is George Liska's classic *The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy*.<sup>4</sup> He argues that "foreign aid today and will remain for some time an instrument of political power and policy."<sup>5</sup> "If power is the core of politics, control is the proximate object and manifestation of both."<sup>6</sup> In promoting its short-range and long-range security interests, "the United States is anxious not only to retain control over its foreign aid policy but also to influence the political behavior and international alignment of the recipient."<sup>7</sup>

Foreign aid is meant to influence the international behavior of the recipient. The donor may seek this objective by means of different forms of control. He may apply direct control; its most literal modes are explicit and enforceable conditions, and it is impractical with regard to countries that resist international commitments. Or the donor may seek only indirect control over international behavior; he attempts then to influence the domestic political system of the recipient in his favor. The donor's intervention within the structure of group power in the recipient country can itself be relatively direct—when he causes foreign aid to be channeled, earmarked, and allocated so as to strengthen the position of a particularly favored group, of an actual or desired coalition of groups, or of the regime in power...<sup>8</sup>

The dilemma for the United States as a donor is not to decide for or against intervention in principle. Instead, the policy-maker is continually confronted with the quandary of whether, when, and how to intervene in concrete conditions so as to advance American interests, in ways that are acceptable to the actual or alternative recipient regime and compatible with the interests of the aided countries themselves...<sup>9</sup>

In the specific case of military aid to Latin America, the beginning of the modern program in 1938 was motivated by Washington's desire to gain influence. There had been a tradition in Latin America of European military advisers and, since Germany enjoyed the reputation of having an outstanding military tradition, its advisers were often sought by Latin American governments. Fearing that these advisers had been successful in dampening Latin American enthusiasm for the Allied cause in World War I and worried that the German and Italian advisers in the 1930's had the potential of influencing the Latin American military establishments in a pro-Axis direction,<sup>10</sup> in January of 1938 the Department of State reversed its position of not making a serious effort in the military advisor field. At that time the US Army had only 6 military attaches assigned among the 20 states of Latin America.<sup>11</sup>

The first was a political policy designed to avoid "anything that might be construed as an intrusion in Latin American military affairs" which even extended to discouraging private munition sales by American manufacturers. The second was a military policy of limiting the US defense effort to protection of the continental United States and its outlying territories.

During World War II there was substantial interaction between US military men and Latin American officers, except for the case of Argentina. Brazil and Mexico actually furnished men for the Allied war effort. A postwar attempt to provide military aid to Latin America with the goal of standardizing arms within the hemisphere was justified in terms of giving the Latins more responsibility for the area's defense against outside attack, thereby freeing US troops to fight elsewhere if war came. In 1946 and 1947 the measure failed to be passed by the Congress although it was reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee both years.

It was the Korean War which opened up the post-World War II flow of military assistance. The convenient rationalization for the \$40 million authorization in the 1951 Mutual Security Act was that the Inter-American Defense Board was in the process of preparing a plan for cooperation against aggression from abroad. Despite frustrations in the administration of the program, between 1952 and 1957 there were few changes in the program's rationales although the idea of its helping to obtain cooperation on political matters began to be mentioned in terms of creating a good atmosphere for hemispheric relations.<sup>12</sup>

Between 1957 and 1960 there was a tide of criticism which forced some changes in the program and its public justifications. The most controversial new idea was quietly slipped in by Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy in 1958 when he said that "the program for Latin America is . . . a very modest program and is primarily for the purpose of the maintenance of internal security and also a very modest preparation for defense against any incursion from offshore."<sup>13</sup> But after 1956 the training portion of the program began to be justified in terms of exposing the Latin American officers to their US counterparts and thereby giving the Latins an understanding of the proper role of the military as a force obedient to civilian government. Even such critics as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accepted this as a laudable goal. The 1960 Committee Report on the Mutual Security Act exempted military training from spending restrictions because it felt

that such training has useful political as well as military results. Particularly

for junior and middle grade officers, a course in one of the US service schools provides a beneficial exposure to American institutions and results in better understanding of American attitudes and politics.<sup>14</sup>

During its short life, this emphasis on professionalism as an anecdote to military involvement in *Latin American politics* had great popularity as a justification for the training program. But when it became obvious that the least professional militaries were not necessarily the most likely to intervene and that, in fact, the opposite may be true,<sup>15</sup> that line of reasoning was abandoned.

As for justifying military assistance in terms of the influence it gave Washington, it was Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who gave it the greatest emphasis. In a 1965 statement (which represents his standard testimony to the Congress) he praised the high return on investment for training and reminded the congressmen that those military officers being trained were "the coming leaders of their nations. It is beyond price to the United States to make friends with such men."<sup>16</sup> He also stated that this form of aid gave the United States a lever to help control the possibly extravagant expenditures of the Latin American military by influencing their military planning.<sup>17</sup> The former Commander in Chief of the Southern Command testified in 1965 that the "amenability" of the Latin American officers "to suggestions from American forces can be very important in the future."<sup>18</sup>

The most recent hearings for military assistance have also emphasized the influence gained through such programs.<sup>19</sup> Lt. General H. M. Fish argued before a congressional committee against the banning of US military advisors in Latin America because "it would greatly reduce United States influence on significant elements of host governments . . ."<sup>20</sup> The MAAG's were said to "enhance professional relations which extend US influence and encourage military cooperation."<sup>21</sup> Aid to Venezuela was justified on the grounds that it helped "preserve a dialog with their military."<sup>22</sup> *Help for Argentina* was said to be needed in order to allow the United States "to influence the course of events by maintaining this contact with Argentina rather than not doing it."<sup>23</sup> As for El Salvador, "we want to maintain [a] favorable military-to-military relationship as leverage to encourage restoration of normal relations with Honduras."<sup>24</sup> Credits for military sales to Ecuador were made in 1974, according to testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, "in an effort to reestablish a meaningful military relationship with that country's military leadership

and to help in refurbishing Ecuador's military services which had been traditionally supplied from US sources."<sup>25</sup>

The other current major justifications for the aid program are that it helps relieve the defense burden of the United States through coordinated planning for certain contingencies and the long-controversial internal security rationale. Although this paper does not consider the internal security question *per se*, obviously by selectively propping up governments one is influencing governmental policy. That Washington helps the government of Bolivia with its internal security needs (and not Cuba) promotes the continuation of the policies of the Bolivian junta as opposed to whatever might come if the United States withdrew its assistance (assuming that this aid for internal security was crucial to the government's remaining in power, which may or may not be true). But this paper is not concerned with exploring that question either in terms of practicality, efficiency, or morality.

What accounts for the multiple and changing rationales for the military assistance program?

David Baldwin observes in his *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy, 1943-1967* that the justifications may be quite deceptive and that the objectives of an aid program may not be those used to sell the program to the American public via the US Congress.<sup>26</sup> Without going into detail on the question, it is my position that the search for influence that is seemingly inherent in the role of a great power has been the prime stimulus for the continuation of the military assistance program to Latin America. And most of those officials at the highest level realize the primacy of the influence motivation but believe that the Congress needs a more concrete set of explanations. But this has been a dysfunctional situation in terms of allowing for any public accountability for the program. The Congress ends up studying and debating the peripheral justifications but when these come under attack, the program's directors can ignore this because it is not the "real" justification under attack.

Also helping to explain the changing rationales is the fact that the program has naturally developed the momentum of powerful bureaucratic interests in the US government. On the Latin American side, the military establishments clearly like the program enough to pressure their governments to participate.<sup>27</sup> Also they will be willing to manipulate the fears of the United States in order to insure the

continuation of the program. Just as the Brazilian Navy was said to suddenly begin spotting unidentified submarines in its territorial waters (submarines it could not locate due to its antiquated equipment) around appropriation time in the Brazilian legislature, Washington's policies can also be shaped by its fears—in this case the fear of outside influence generally and communism in particular. The Latin American militaries know this and surely would play on US anxieties if an end or drastic curtailment were threatened in the program.

#### A FRAMEWORK FOR INFLUENCE

Against this background, we should now address the central question: *How can one begin to analyze when aid is influential and when it is not?* This is an uncharted area and this discussion does little more than suggest some directions for possible study or conceptualization. It goes over some parts of the vast literature on Latin American militarism and politics with an eye to what this suggests about military assistance as a channel of influence. Four topics are considered: the military as an institution, Latin American political systems, types of aid, and the issues which might be influenced.

*Militaries as Institutions.* As those who teach Latin American politics can testify, almost every generalization about the area (including this one) has some exceptions. And it is the continual problem of those who study Latin American militaries that each country's military establishment has its own unique history.<sup>28</sup> Leadership, historical development, ideological influences, rivalries between branches of the services, and role in society vary widely among the Latin American military establishments. Even rough attempts to categorize are soon annihilated by events.<sup>29</sup> This discussion offers three generalizations regarding Latin American military institutions which channel and mold the possible influence of the US program.

- The first is that communism has little appeal to the professional Latin American military man. This results from two factors. One is the innate conservatism (sometimes mistaken for being apolitical) found in most military men.<sup>30</sup> Secondly is the experience of Cuba where the existing military establishment was decimated after Castro's takeover—an action widely noted among the military leadership in other Latin American countries. This is not to argue that there have not been leftist military men (Luís Carlos Prestes in Brazil or Marmaduke Grove in Chile) but only to emphasize the rather commonplace

observation as to the basic anticommunism of the Latin American military establishments.

This characteristic can be seen in a different light, however, when one reviews the history of the US aid program. It will be recalled that the military advisor program was resurrected in 1938 in order to offset the influence of military advisors from Germany and Italy. These advisors, as purveyors of the ideas of fascism or corporatism, undoubtedly had an influence and their ideology had a definite appeal to some Latin American military leaders such as General José Felix Uriburu in Argentina. But the point here is that the same justification cannot be applied to the situation since 1960. The competitor for influence is no longer corporatism—it is communism, an ideology with a singular lack of appeal to Latin American military leaders. While the United States may have had to convince them of the seriousness of the cold war at some points, it was never necessary to persuade them that communism was not a suitable ideology for their own societies. The worry that the Russians will gain ideological influence with the Latin American militaries through sales programs seems dubious.

- The second generalization is that the Latin American militaries perceive themselves as having serious outside threats. Anyone who has lived in a Latin American country for any length of time has seen headlines that the neighboring country is planning some military mischief. This function of protecting the country against external aggression is the central justification for the modern professional military.

The significance of this in terms of influence is that the most basic current goal of our aid program to Latin America has been the promotion of international security, in other words, developing the ability to put down domestic discontent by the use of force. Even when they recognize that there is an internal threat, this is a role which is unnatural for the professionalized military in comparison to the more natural inclination toward external defense.

So while not denying the obvious fact that the military will participate in internal security programs, it will have a tendency to use weapons for external defense despite the wishes of the United States. The influence of Washington in this area is severely bounded and it must be recognized that any weaponry or tactics given to a Latin American military establishment will, to some extent, be seen by that institution in terms of how they promote external defense and this tendency may well be increasing with the growth of professionalism in

those militaries. Once given, it becomes almost impossible to control the uses to which weapons and training are put. Thus it is clear that expenditures intended specifically for internal security must also be understood in terms of what they do for a country's external defense capability and hence on the perception neighboring countries have of the balance of military power.

• The final generalization is that the Latin American military establishments are in the process of *formulating nationalistic ideologies* which link development and defense. One sees the clearest examples of this in Peru and Brazil where relatively articulate ideologies resulted from the fact that

the military institutions came to see existing social and economic structures as security threats because these structures were either so inefficient or so unjust that they created the conditions for, and gave legitimacy to, revolutionary protest. In both countries, the officer corps believed that these conditions were ultimately a threat to the military institution itself. . . . The result was that military policy became much more closely linked to political policy than it had been in the past. For in both military establishments the conviction was spreading that the existing political institutions were incapable of implementing the social and economic policies which the officer corps now thought necessary to *military security*.<sup>31</sup>

Besides the obvious cases of Peru and Brazil, other countries such as Bolivia seem to be moving in this general ideological direction.

Unless offsetting factors develop, ideologies linking development and defense will spread—although taking on unique features in each country. The implication of this ideology for US influence is that these ideas can potentially provide a road map or direction for the actions of the military establishments. To the extent that this is true, it will further limit US influence. An organization with a poorly defined mission or without a perception of the relationship between its priorities is obviously more open to suggestions from the outside (influence from the United States for example) or to pressure than is a group with a clearer perception of its role.

This phenomenon has been reflected in the evolution of American academic opinion. For example, Irving Louis Horowitz writing in the 1960's tended to see the Latin American militaries as outposts of US capitalism which the military assistance programs kept in line.<sup>32</sup> But writing in the mid-1970's he declared:

From the point of view of military equipment, the United States input into

the area has been sufficient to maintain a major role in the armed forces of the hemisphere, but not to change the structure of the relationship between North America and Latin America—certainly not enough to tilt those relationships so they would become more favorable to United States interests over and against national interests.<sup>33</sup>

So in discussing the Latin American militaries as institutions it is suggested that, to the extent one can generalize about such diverse groups, they have a strong anticommunism which hardly needs fanning by the United States, that internal security is basically an uncomfortable role, and that the emerging ideological systems such as one sees in Brazil and Peru have the potential of limiting US influence rather severely in many cases.

*Latin American Political Systems.* Besides the institutional nature of the military varying widely from country to country, its position in the society also differs greatly. However, it is clear that in all Latin American countries the military establishment is a political actor.<sup>34</sup> As José Miguens puts it, "the military sector is not isolated but is part of the total system of the society; not only does it have permanent transactions with the other subsystems but any change in one of the subsystems will modify the others and the functioning of the whole society."<sup>35</sup>

So in order to begin to evaluate the amount of influence over a country one can gain via military relationships, it is necessary to first know the role of that particular military establishment in the politics of the country. It seems logical that the likelihood of influence would be greatest if the military had complete control of the government and the other power contenders were weak. The ideal, in terms of maximizing influence, would seem to be something like the Nicaraguan situation when a 1946 West Point graduate ran the country and the potential opposition was divided and brittle. On the other hand, the influence would be least if the military were completely out of politics, had only an unimportant defense function, and used little of the country's resources.

But even such seemingly obvious generalizations present difficulties. For example, does the presence of an Anastasio Somoza, Jr. and the uncertainty of what follows his possible fall from power in a country with little practice in democracy give the United States the tremendous influence one assumes? There may be a "he may be an SOB but he's our SOB" or an "only game in town" phenomenon which gives the leader in such a case significant bargaining leverage to resist influence. It

is such imponderables which render attempts to quantify civil-military relationships and the political behavior of Latin American militaries almost useless except to the extent they point out that our assumptions are not supported by empirical evidence.<sup>36</sup>

This intuitive inference that under most conditions influence is greatest with dictatorships headed by military men and the least with stable democracies points to the potential tension between the desire to develop influence and the expressed hope for democracy in Latin America. Democracy may, in fact, tend to erode influence.

It also seems fair to suggest that, other things being equal, the more stable a government, the more it will be able to resist initiatives from Washington. An unstable government, whether a tottering dictatorship or a faltering democracy, presumably would be most willing to follow the advice of the United States either in return for material support, public support of the particular government, or for military aid that might placate a restless faction in the armed forces. But, here again, one finds an inherent contradiction between the expressed desire for stability and the desire for influence.

There is another aspect to this question of civil-military relations and the provision of military assistance and that is the common assertion that providing the military with training and weapons *per se* encourages it to make coups.<sup>37</sup> Although it does not seem unlikely that professionalism could lead to increased political activity and hence to coups, it is an empirically untestable proposition due to the large number of variables involved and the small number of cases. But perhaps a less controversial assertion is clear: training and weapons have an impact on the military establishment. And in altering its power, this obviously alters the balance of political contenders in a Latin American country—a factor which needs to be considered in discussing providing aid in hopes of obtaining influence. One might even arm and train a military in an effort to gain influence but find that the military eventually felt itself strong enough to “shop around” for its armaments and professional advice.

Two further caveats need to be filed in this discussion of the problem of understanding the role of the military in a particular political system as necessary for predicting its openness to persuasion. The first is the warning that we are discussing a culture which has a number of differences from that of the United States. What seems logical to the North American, may not seem so logical to a Latin American and vice versa. So subtle attempts to manipulate can easily

misfire when actions by the United States take on a completely different light in the eyes of a Latin American.

The second is the reminder that recipient and donor of any particular assistance are, by the very nature of their differing situations, bound to see the act in a different perspective. Klaus Knorr sums up the situation quite well from the recipient side:

The familiar official rationale is that additional resources are needed for national economic development or for national security, whether threatened internationally or internally . . . But while the rhetoric no doubt often reflects genuine concerns felt by recipient governments, other reasons for getting foreign aid are operating as well. It may be taken for granted that in poor and wealthy states the actual top priority of governments is usually to stay in office, and to do so as comfortably as circumstances permit; and getting control over foreign resources can help in many ways . . . The symbolic act of commitment by the donor state may be treasured for its implications for international security. Or aid from one donor may be appreciated as a means to balancing the leverage achieved by another. Or the elites in the recipient state see foreign aid as a source of additional income for themselves. The actual motivations are apt to be multiple, and official reasons for seeking or taking foreign aid will not necessarily coincide with the actually operating objectives of the governments concerned.<sup>38</sup>

*Type of Program.* Influence will also vary according to the type of program—training, sales, advisory, or whatever. Congressional witnesses often comment that the greatest return on the military assistance dollar is in the training area. The standard McNamara quote was:

Probably the greatest return on our military assistance investment comes from the training of selected officers and key specialists at our military schools and training centers in the United States and overseas. These students are handpicked by their countries to become instructors when they return home. They are the coming leaders, the men who will have the know-how and impart it to their forces. I need not dwell upon the value of having in positions of leadership men who have first-hand knowledge of how Americans do things and how they think. It is beyond price to us to make friends of such men.<sup>39</sup>

It will be remembered that one of the early justifications for the training program was that it was going to inculcate a respect for democratic principles and the concept of a subordinate role for the military. While that claim seems dead, it does appear that the training program has given the Latin American military men a respect for the United States.<sup>40</sup> The problem remains, however, as to how this evasive

warm feeling toward the United States translates into impact on policy. Although such ties will be overridden by other influences or situations within the Latin American militaries, one can construct scenarios in which such a friendly predisposition might help Washington to influence a Latin American government. And friendships between US military advisors and Latin American officers can be a source of intelligence. The construction of these scenarios, their probability, the value of the intelligence, and the cost involved are key to any thorough evaluation of the military assistance training program.

Influence, of course, can come from programs other than training. For example, in the India/Pakistan, Honduras/El Salvador, and Greece/Turkey disputes, it has been claimed that the control of replacement parts and ammunition gave the United States the leverage to de-escalate the conflict. One supposes that the more dependent a military is on supplies from another country, the greater the potential for influence by the supplier. Although in the cases of Guatemala<sup>41</sup> and Peru,<sup>42</sup> there are observations that the militaries find this dependency irritating. It seems logical to assume that similar tensions exist in other Latin American countries.

Military sales have been claimed to provide influence and the possible loss of this channel was criticized when administration witnesses protested congressional limits on the sales program. After the limitations seemed to lead to increased sales by third countries such as France and Germany, the Congress moved away from such restrictions. The liberals apparently halted their opposition because such restrictions were paternalistic and destructive of "mature" relationships and this line was echoed by witnesses before congressional committees.<sup>43</sup> It seems ironic to suggest that a relationship involves disproportionate influence and is not paternalistic. It also may be that at least some of the increased sales by France and Germany resulted from a desire of the Latin Americans to lessen their reliance on the United States.

*Issues.* So if some of the programs can indeed create a friendly feeling between, at the least, the Latin American military establishments and the United States, the question still remains—*influence over what? And what kind of influence?*

For purposes of discussion, potential issues over which influence might be exercised can be divided into three general categories: (1) those involving the distribution of resources within the country (political-economic); (2) foreign policy issues; and, (3) purely military matters (assuming one can draw a line between these and political issues).

Political-economic issues are the central pivots around which governments and social systems revolve. Distribution-of-wealth, who-gets-what issues are so key to any political system that they are the most difficult for the outsider to influence. As for US interests in these questions, the protection of markets and the interests of the multinationals seem the most obvious. But the multinationals and the general question of markets is inexorably linked to the country's development strategy. Given the current Latin American love/hate relationship with foreign investment, one suspects that efforts to protect investments against strict regulation are difficult short of a situation where a military establishment is desperate to curry favor with the United States. Protecting markets and sources of supply may be somewhat easier since, besides the local elite benefiting from any existing status quo, it is the multinationals which are currently being seen as the potentially harmful foreign influences.<sup>44</sup>

It is in the foreign policy area that the United States has been most open in seeking to influence policies. Votes in international bodies and alliances against communism have been prime goals in Washington. Realizing that foreign policy support is a kind of minimum price one pays for the hegemony of another country,<sup>45</sup> the Latin American states have been generally willing to follow US initiatives<sup>46</sup> but sometimes ready to threaten cooperation in order to increase their level of assistance.<sup>47</sup>

However, can military assistance influence this? Obviously the anti-Communist propensities of the Latin American militaries mean that to the extent they have control over foreign policy, there will be cooperation on some issues but this is not necessarily the result of the military aid relationship. One sees a difficult situation beginning to confront the United States as the internationally popular North/South issues<sup>48</sup> have been integrated into both the Brazilian and Peruvian military ideologies. So events such as Brazil's supporting the United Nations' condemnation of Zionism begin to happen.

It is influence over military matters that the strongest power is claimed to result from the aid program.<sup>49</sup> Often the military assistance program is said to assist in holding down military expenditures for modern hardware<sup>50</sup> and in helping to create a counterinsurgency ability.<sup>51</sup> From the outside it is difficult to judge such claims. Despite the critics of the aid programs, the percentages of Latin American GNP's going to support the military is comparatively low (although the outside threat is not so great). But it seems reasonable to think that, to

the extent that military matters can be defined within a professional sense, US highly professional officers would be in a position to offer welcomed advice and assistance.

#### CONCLUSION

The conclusion is bland and unexceptionable: The potential for influence via the military assistance channel varies in each case according to the military's institutional nature, its role in the political system, the type of aid provided, and the nature of the issue. One could carry this framework further by introducing more of the international relations literature on bargaining.<sup>52</sup> For example, it is easier to convince a country to initiate an action than to undo a decision already made. And it is easier to apply pressure if it can be kept confidential because once it reaches the level of a public issue, nationalism can be purposefully or inadvertently whipped up. But to continue reasoning into the labyrinth of international bargaining behavior with a framework which is already stretched rather far does not seem potentially productive.

#### COUNTERINFLUENCE

The discussion has skipped lightly over a parallel topic which needs to be briefly noted at the close of this paper. It should be recognized that setting up relationships which allow for US influence over Latin America contain the seeds of relationships which allow the influence or manipulation to flow in the other direction. This must be understood in any evaluation of the program's effectiveness.

If advice can flow in one direction, it can also go the other way. Relationships involve commitments. One suspects that many of the US military officers who have served in Latin America have come to see Latin American problems from the perspective of the Latin American military. They have developed "localitis"—the phenomenon of perceiving US interests in terms of a particular country or region in which the individual has served.<sup>53</sup> Thus they return and become bureaucratic lobbyists for the programs in which they have been involved. The guerrilla threat or the possibility of an external attack on Latin American country "X" becomes a real worry.

This is not to criticize the phenomenon. It seems inevitable and in one sense demonstrates that the US official has developed an empathy

for the group with which he has worked. But such reverse relationships do represent a cost in the sense that a pressure group for the continuation of the relationship develops. And the Latin American military officials who are closely tied to the assistance program will obviously manipulate these relationships in order to insure the continuation of the military assistance structure.

#### ENDNOTES

1. Abraham Lowenthal, "The United States and Latin America: Ending the Hegemonic Presumption," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 55, No. 1, October 1976.
2. For reasons of convenience, grants, sales, and training are normally lumped together as military aid or assistance in this discussion.
3. Besides Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVI, No. 2, June 1962, introductory international relations textbooks usually make this point. For example, John Spanier, *Games Nations Play: Analyzing International Politics*, New York: Praeger, 2nd ed., 1975, p. 451; Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, *International Relations*, Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 2nd ed., 1957, p. 173; Vernon Van Dyke, *International Politics*, New York: Appleton - Century and Crofts, 3rd ed., 1972, p. 434; W. W. Kulski, *International Politics in a Revolutionary Age*, New York: J. B. Lippincott, 2nd ed., 1968, pp. 343, 347; Ivo D. Duchacek, *Nations and Men*, Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 3rd ed., 1975, p. 447-8; and Charles Kindleberger, *Power and Money*, New York: Basic Books, 1970, p. 133.
4. George Liska, *The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
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20. US House, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1976*, p. 230.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 270.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 272.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 349.

26. Liska, p. 243-247.

27. For example, it seems clear that Chilean President Salvador Allende's support of the Chilean military's comparatively large military assistance request was more to placate that group than stemming from any desire to help equip or modernize the Chilean services.

28. Good reviews of the literature on Latin American militarism are Richard Rankin, "The Expanding Institutional Concerns of the Latin American Military Establishments: A Review Article," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. IX, No. 1, Spring 1974; and Lyle McAlister, "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. II, No. 1, Fall 1966. Some detailed case studies of particular Latin American militaries are beginning to appear with Robert Potash, *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945*, Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1969; Nunn, *The Military in Chilean History*, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976; and Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971, being the best so far.

29. E.g., Theodore Wyckoff, "The Military in Latin American Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. XIII, No. 2, September 1960.

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31. Luigi Einaudi and Stepan, *Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil*, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1971, p. 123. Also see Thomas G. Sanders, "Development and Security are Linked by a Relationship of Mutual Causality," *American Universities Field Staff Reports*, East Coast South America Series 15 on Brazil, and Charles D. Corbett, "Military Institutional Development and Sociopolitical Change: The Bolivian Case," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. XIV, No. 4, November 1972 on Bolivia.

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44. Michael T. Klare, "Arms and Power: The Political Economy of U.S. Weapons Sales to Latin America," *NACLA's Latin America and Empire Report*, Vol. IX, No. 2, March 1975.
45. Norman A. Bailey, *Latin America in World Politics*, New York: Walker and Company, 1967, p. 4-5.
46. The vintage example of this was when, prior to the 1942 Rio Conference, the Cuban Ambassador to Washington assured the Department of State in advance that the Cuban delegation could be considered, according to the words of one department official, "an extension of the United States delegation" and it "would be very glad to introduce any resolutions which the United States delegation felt might better come from some other country." US National Archives, Department of State files, 710.CONULTATION (3)/261, memo, December 23, 1941.
47. The case of Haiti at Punta del Este in 1962 is the most obvious although some other situations, not all dealing with foreign policy, are discussed in Francis, "La ayuda economica de Estados Unidos a America Latina como instrumento de control político," *Foro Internacional*, Vol. XII, No. 4, April-June 1972.
48. Seymour Brown, *New Forces in World Politics*, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974, Chapter 5.
49. House, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1976*, p. 79; House, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1977*, p. 719-20.

50. House, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1972*, p. 218; US House, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1973*, 93rd Cong., 2nd Session, 1972, p. 751.

51. House, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1974*, p. 1277.

52. E.g., Fred C. Ikle, *How Nations Negotiate*, New York: Harper and Row, 1964; Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games and Debates*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960; and William D. Coplin, *Introduction to International Politics: A Theoretical Overview*, Chicago: Markham, 2nd ed., 1974, Chapter 10.

53. For a discussion of this question and some general foreign policy bureaucracy problems, all of which have implications for those involved in the military bureaucracy, see Sheldon Appleton, "Systemic Bias in U.S. Foreign Affairs Reporting: A Critique and a Proposal," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 1972.

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