


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US ARMY INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES



STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT

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SOVIET MILITARY INTENTIONS
IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

GARMISCH, GERMANY

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**/ SOVIET MILITARY INTENTIONS IN THE
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC**

LTC ROBERT B. ROSENKRANZ
June 1977

FOREWORD

This research project represents fulfillment of a student requirement for successful completion of the overseas phase of training of the Department of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (Russian).

Only unclassified sources are used in producing the research paper. The opinions, value judgments and conclusions expressed are those of the author and in no way reflect official policy of the United States Government; Department of Defense; Department of the Army; Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence; or the United States Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies.

Interested readers are invited to send their comments to the Commander of the Institute.



ROLAND LAJOIE
LTC, MI
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SUMMARY

The author traces the history of political and military relations between the USSR and the German Democratic Republic since WW II and analyzes current open sources, both Communist and Western, to determine trends in Soviet policy in the GDR. By placing recent indicators in a historical context he concludes that political and military progress in the GDR, and within the Warsaw Pact, make likely an agreement by the Soviet Union to reduce its military presence in East Germany. The conclusions are qualified by limiting the scope to regional considerations.

I. INTRODUCTION

It is somewhat suprising that the most formidable element of the Soviet military threat facing Western Europe receives limited attention in open sources. The Warsaw Pact's largest element, The Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), is usually treated in passing in unclassified analyses of the Warsaw Pact and only infrequently receives a sophisticated political strategic evaluation by Western specialists. The scarcity of open source material, a common condition accruing to things military in the Soviet Bloc, undoubtedly contributes to this situation. It is not unusual to find Western critics evaluating each other's analyses using the same sources and arguing from the same set of general assumptions, with only slightly varying conclusions, which are most often exclusive of any basic reevaluation of premises. The most rewarding studies on USSR-GDR relations address political, economic, and social subjects. A brighter focus on the political - military factors influencing Soviet relations in East Germany is necessary. The handful of legitimate experts now publishing unclassified works in the field proceed virtually unchallenged, an intellectually hazardous condition.

This brief study does not throw down the gauntlet to messrs. Erickson, Wolfe, and Mackintosh. On the contrary, perhaps the modesty of its achievements will exhort those more qualified.

The scope here is limited to considering forces deployed in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the political and military factors which affect them. In treating the USSR and its relationships with the GDR an attempt will be made to draw some informed conclusions concerning Soviet military intentions in the GDR. The military force of 20 Soviet Divisions and supporting elements located in the GDR provides the Raison D'etre for this study, but the locus of discussion points is traced primarily from a political rather than military perspective. A detailed examination of the military forces themselves is not included, nor is an evaluation of tactical employment options, avenues of attack, and the like. A basic assumption underlying this paper is that the Warsaw Pact and its military elements are political instruments in the Clausewitzian sense. In effect, conclusions about military intentions are drawn from an essentially political analysis. There is something to be gained from enriching the mix in military analyses. In particular, after surveying the traditional numerical

comparisons of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces the addition of political considerations seems appropriate for a balanced view.

The discussion which follows encompasses both description and prediction. Hopefully the latter will issue logically from an analysis of the factors described. The structure of the discussion includes: A sketch of the political and military history of USSR-GDR relations. A discussion of nonmilitary factors pertinent to the study, an analysis of selected military factors in addition to the GSFG, for example the East German Army, Soviet military doctrine, and MBFR, and finally a section on current trends. This last, covering the period 1973 to the present, is intended to assess current sources and put the trends noted in a historical context to support the conclusions reached.

A note on sources. The majority of the sources used leading up to "current trends" are Western, the concluding sources are balanced between Western and Communist. For general background on East Europe, Warsaw Pact, and Soviet foreign and military policy there are numerous reputable studies available. Sources for the specific focus of this study are rare, as mentioned. In fact, the library on Soviet-East German relations is quite imbalanced and incomplete. No classified data have been used.

II. POLITICAL BACKGROUND.

The objectives of the Soviet Union immediately after the war in Europe can be catalogued as follows: Deny a resurgence of a German threat by exerting influence in Central Europe; install regimes in East Europe which would be willing to cooperate and collaborate with Moscow; exploit East Europe economically; deny East Europe to the Western allies; and, as a future goal, establish a base for the expansion of socialism.¹ A key factor in Soviet East European policy was, and remains today, "The German Problem". The focus on Germany is understandable in light of the impact Germany has had on the Soviet Union since 1914, a negative impact to be sure. Stalin was determined at all costs to prevent a resurgence of German militarism, revanchism, and Nazism, popular Soviet animadversions, even today. In any case, the strategic importance of Germany dictates its primacy in Soviet post-war considerations in Europe.

A look at recent German history and Soviet policy toward Germany will help identify some major issues pertinent to this study.

A. Political Relations 1945-61.

1. West Germany. With Germany's unconditional surrender in 1945 the four occupying powers, the US, USSR, Great Britain, and France, assumed responsibility for the fate of the conquered area. The Potsdam Agreement recognized

special Soviet interests and concerns and agreed to the Soviet annexation of Northern East Prussia. Pending a final peace treaty the territories east of the Oder-Neisse rivers and Danzig remained under Polish administration. Extensive relocation of German populations from the newly acquired Polish areas to the Soviet zone of Germany was ordered. In addition to four zones of allied occupation, a joint four-power Kommandatura was established in Berlin. Allied intentions were to develop a common policy on Germany and treat the country as an economic entity. Allied plans proved abortive due to a divergence of national policies, especially between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. A major goal of the Allies was to root out all vestiges of Nazism and its sources of power, and this was to be accomplished by decentralization, denazification, punishment of war criminals, dismantling of war industries and imposed reparations. However, in the western zones the occupying powers found their major energies devoted to coping with the chaos and despair of a war-ravaged country. The US and UK acting jointly set about rebuilding the German economy and encouraging the development of responsible German political and administrative units. The Soviet Union remained intransigent in negotiations with the Western Allies over a Post War settlement which would guarantee a united, disarmed, economically

stable and democratic Germany. By 1948 the Western Allies had established the nucleus of a West German Government and this brought relations with the Soviets to a crisis in the form of the Berlin blockade. The blockade lasted until May 1949 but was unsuccessful due to allied determination and the airlift. In this period the US and UK pressed ahead with Marshall Plan aid while granting increased local autonomy to the West Germans. The Allied military governments were replaced by the Allied High Commission and in 1949 Konrad Adenauer became the first postwar Chancellor.

Pending a German peace treaty, the West Germans took the position that the Oder-Neisse territories remained legally German and that neither the USSR nor the East Germans held legitimate authority on German territory. The West Germans supported a united Germany with a Democratic Federal Government. Adenauer's Government based its foreign policy on integration into the Western Alliance and its economic policy on integration into the European Community. In 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was granted the Status of a sovereign state and joined NATO over the strenuous objections of the Communists, who protested a rearmed West Germany. The Soviet Union offered the FRG a normalization of diplomatic relations in 1955, however, due to unresolved differences over German reunification, contacts were confined to cultural and trade affairs. The USSR was formally excepted from Adenauer's Hallstein Doctrine,

named for his Secretary of State, which disallowed diplomatic relations between the FRG and any country which recognized the GDR. The FRG's economic power gave this doctrine teeth. In 1957 the FRG by the treaty of Rome joined the European economic community (EEC). By 1961 the West German economy was booming and the FRG was one of the strongest industrial states in the world. In the same time frame the West German Armed Forces had been welded into a respectable fighting machine with a standing army, navy, and air force under NATO Command.²

2. East Germany. The Soviet approach to occupation differed radically from that of the Western Allies. Reparations and security were dominant Russian concerns. The German population received little sympathy from an occupation force whose country had so recently been devastated by Naziism. Marshal Zhukov administrated the occupation and presided over extensive purges of residual Nazi elements and the virtual rape of German industry and transportation. Entire factories and railroads were dismantled and moved to the Soviet Union and the East German economic infrastructure was completely revamped. Large farms were expropriated and redistributed, and all private capital holdings were seized. Key industries were nationalized and the professional civil service was abolished. Politically the German Communist Party (KPD) was preeminent under the careful tutelage and protection

of Russian authorities. In 1946 the KPD became the Socialist Unity Party (SED) while assimilating the East German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Otto Grotewohl and Wilhelm Piek were made joint party chairmen. The SED exerted the dominant political influence in East Germany, with other political organizations serving as minions and subsidiaries. In October 1949 the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was proclaimed an independent German state, following the formation of the FRG in September 1949. A constitution was promulgated the same year and it posited a single German citizenship. In 1950 the GDR jointed the Council for mutual and economic assistance (CMEA or COMECON). Soviet reparation demands were curtailed in 1950 and ended in 1954. The East German economy was oriented to meet the demands of the Soviet Union, which made reparations somewhat counterproductive. In 1950 East Germany officially recognized the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's Eastern frontier. In 1952 at the SED's second Congress the party proclaimed its intent to lead East Germany on the path to Socialism. Walter Ulbricht moved from General Secretary to First Secretary of the Party's Central Committee shortly thereafter, in a successful consolidation of his power and influence.

In the 1950s "Socialization" in East Germany was closely patterned on the Soviet model and moved forward

relentlessly (a slight pause occurred during the Kremlin's "Transition Period" 1953-54) within a Stalinist mold imposed by Ulbricht and the SED. The revamping of the social structure and consolidation of all aspects of the economy under party aegis were unpopular acts among the more skilled and educated segments of the populace, as evidenced by their mass exodus to the West across the open frontiers. In 1952 the border dividing Germany was closed by the GDR, except for Berlin. In 1955 the GDR signed the Warsaw Treaty and joined the Warsaw Pact the next year. By 1958 Ulbricht stood unopposed as party leader and in 1960, when President Wilhelm Pieck died, the office of President was abolished and Ulbricht became Chairman of the New Council of State. That same year he swiftly and brutally collectivized agriculture.

Several factors contributed to the GDR's lack of progress politically, economically, and psychologically in the 1950s: Soviet economic exploitation, reparations, a top-heavy communist bureaucracy, party in fighting, and a massive migration of skilled workers.³ In August 1961 the East Germans, with Soviet encouragement, moved to curtail the drain on their population resources by constructing the Berlin Wall. The initial phase of development of the GDR had ended.

3. The Soviet Union and Germany. Soviet Policy toward Germany has never varied from its basic tenet of

self interest. It is doubtful whether the fear and hatred engendered by the great patriotic war has ever been eradicated from the collective psyche of the present Soviet leadership. These feelings only intensify the application of fundamental Soviet principles.

In the period 1945-1955 the Soviet Government paid lip service to the concept of German reunification and may have considered it a practical policy, but only with a Germany under the political control of the Soviet Union.⁴ Once it became clear that the West would not accept reunification on the Kremlin's terms, the Soviets resigned themselves to a second best option of a divided Germany without a permanent solution. Some benefits accrued from this situation. The Soviets could harass and intimidate the allies over the security and viability of West Berlin, isolated deep within East Germany. They retained significant leverage over the East Germans, who lacked international status, fretted over the Soviet commitment and never lost sight of the ubiquitous Soviet occupation forces. And, a divided Germany guaranteed a dependable buffer state between East and West, while eliminating the threat of a united, armed Germany.

In 1948 the Soviets blockaded West Berlin in reaction to the Western Policy of granting West Germany increased autonomy. In 1949 the Soviets reacted to the formation of the FRG with the formation of the GDR. In

1955 the Soviets reacted to the Western grant of full sovereignty and military status in NATO to West Germany with the grant of limited sovereignty to East Germany,⁵ and the incorporation of the GDR into the Warsaw Pact. In each case the Soviets were manipulating relations with their satellite in response to larger Soviet foreign policy concerns in Europe. The fact could hardly have been lost on the East Germans that their fate was directly tied to what the Kremlin perceived as its interests in the "solution" to the German problem.

Until 1955 Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty presupposed an all-German Government, with a strong suggestion, at least in Western interpretations, that the Soviets intended to dominate the political process of reunification. In 1952 the Soviets' proposed peace treaty was rejected by the allies as an attempt at preventing West German inclusion into a Western Alliance and legitimizing defacto boundaries. The allies continued to insist on free all-German elections with no preconditions on future German relations. In 1952 East Germany was an artificial construct, an expendable commodity, if German reunification on Moscow's terms could be achieved. Events of 16-17 June 1953 probably altered that view. Extensive worker unrest in East Berlin was quickly suppressed by Soviet troops, but the Kremlins negotiating position was weakened. It seemed unlikely that the Western Powers would now compromise on the questions of free elections and free associations for all of Germany.

East German domestic problems required that the Soviets continue to supply strong props to the regime.

In 1954 a new Soviet Government represented by Molotov met with the allies in Berlin to offer a slightly modified treaty proposal which reflected continued Soviet mistrust of a free, united Germany. It was rejected. The USSR-GDR treaty of 1955 and the Kremlin's position on a disarmed Germany, which was presented at the Geneva conference in the Fall of 1955, acted to perpetuate the divided status of Germany. The Soviets stood to gain regardless of the allied response to the Kremlin's peace treaty initiatives. If accepted, the possibility of Soviet hegemony over all of Germany lay open. If rejected, the rearming and Western integration of the FRG might be delayed temporarily, and the Soviets gained a propaganda ploy of sorts in branding the West as obstructionist and unwilling to chance the democratic process.

Walter Ulbricht was developing into a valuable Soviet ally during the turbulent early years of the GDR. He demonstrated his political acumen in overcoming widespread student unrest in 1956 and in eliminating all his political opposition by 1958. He had a knack for reading the political barometer in the Kremlin and the typical result of his machinations was to strengthen Moscow's commitment to the GDR. East Germany became a dependable anchor for Soviet policy in East Europe in large measure due to the Kremlin's confidence in Ulbricht.

The period 1956-58 witnessed a basic alteration to Moscow's treatment of the question of reunification. In 1956 the brutal Soviet suppression of the revolt in Hungary changed popular Western opinion that Khrushchev might tolerate a neutralized Germany in Central Europe. The Suez Canal crisis and unilateral reductions of the Soviet armed forces enabled the Kremlin to maintain a diplomatic momentum despite its brutalization of Hungary, but few governments harbored any illusions about Soviet intentions. By 1957 the Soviet Union viewed with growing apprehension the growth of NATO's and West Germany's military power and even endorsed the Rapacki Plan, offered by the Polish Foreign Minister for which it was named.⁶ The allies rejected the concept of an atom-free zone in Central Europe prior to a solution of the political problem of Germany. A major Soviet concern at this time was that the West Germans might gain control of nuclear weapons. By 1958 the Soviet approach to reunification had been completely reoriented. Henceforth negotiations were to include representation from the two German States with a view toward federation rather than a unification presided over by the Big Four. This was in line with the GDR's position.

The constant drain of GDR manpower through West Berlin produced a diplomatic crisis in 1958 when the Soviet Union threatened to sign a separate peace with the GDR and transfer Soviet responsibilities in Berlin to East Germany. The threat of a separate treaty was an oft-used tactic of

Khrushchev's foreign policy, repeated again during the Berlin crisis of 1961-62. The Soviets, under heavy Western pressure, did not abrogate their Potsdam responsibilities in Berlin, a move which most certainly would have seriously menaced world peace,⁷ with a belligerent GDR astride the life lines to the encircled city. At the Paris summit in 1960, and the Vienna summit of 1961, the Russians maintained their barrage of demands and proposals for a German peace treaty, a "free" Berlin, and recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the German frontier.

Kremlin policy in the period 1955-61 stressed recognition of its East German client, with pressure on the West to prevent the growth of West German Power. The possibility of a nuclear-armed West Germany and the prospects of a renewal of German revanchism legitimately alarmed the Kremlin leadership.

B. Political Relations 1961-73

1. West Germany. The West Germans have been closely attuned to the Western Powers in dealing with the German problem, for obvious reasons. Without allied, essentially American, military guarantees West Germany could readily fall prey to Soviet intimidation and domination. Basic to West German policy through the early years was a conviction that German reunification was possible if NATO power and influence prevailed over that of the Soviet's. That conviction has waned, and although the West Germans do not consider

the division of Germany a settled question, the postwar boundary realignments which ceded territory to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR have been accorded de jure recognition by virtue of other agreements short of a final peace treaty.⁸ The question of who represents all the German people was in dispute until the 1972 FRG-GDR treaty, with the FRG claiming sole representation as the only freely elected German Government.⁹ Even today, in 1977, the claim lays dormant, not relinquished.

With the replacement of the Grand Old Man of West German politics, Konrad Adenauer, in the Fall of 1963, West German policy toward the East softened somewhat. This accorded with Khrushchev's attempted demarche toward West Germany, which was thwarted by his removal in 1964. Germany's flexibility toward East Europe under Ludwig Erhard created new challenges for the Soviet Union. The Kremlin was determined to control East European approaches to the FRG without foreclosing on its own options with regard to detente. Strenuous GDR opposition to FRG overtures in Eastern Europe, and violent Soviet opposition to NATO's multilateral force (MLF) plan, served to immobilize the Soviet Bloc in 1965-66. As an example, a planned exchange of political debates between East and West Germany in 1966 was cancelled, probably with the Kremlin's connivance in Ulbricht's decision. Erhard's CDU/FDP coalition collapsed in 1966 to be replaced by the Kiesinger-Brandt (CDU/SPD) "Grand Coalition." This signaled a definite alteration in

West German policy and the real beginning of Bonn's Ostpolitik. The Hallstein Doctrine was modified to accommodate expanded contacts with the East Europeans, and the Romanians became the first Warsaw Pact member to establish formal diplomatic relations with the FRG. A Warsaw Pact crisis was precipitated by GDR and Polish opposition to FRG entree to Eastern Europe. Ulbricht in particular was becoming hysterical with Bonn's Ostpolitik and continued GDR diplomatic isolation. The Karlovy Vary conference of European Communist Parties in April 1967 attempted unsuccessfully to bring some unity to the Soviet Bloc's response to Ostpolitik. By 1968 West Germany had extensive economic arrangements with the East Europeans, including the GDR, which enjoys a special trade advantage as an "Associate" member of the Common Market. The division of Germany is not officially recognized by the EEC, so the GDR is treated as a quasi-member.¹⁰ Bonn's eastern policies which had the effect of increasing the GDR's diplomatic tribulations, pushed the GDR toward a greater dependence on the USSR.

The Soviets made some tentative approaches to the FRG in 1967 and 1965 regarding a renunciation of force agreement (Gewaltverzicht), but the usual Soviet preconditions of recognition of the GDR, recognition of defacto borders, and renunciation of nuclear weapons hindered progress. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 paralyzed

Ostpolitik but only temporarily. In 1969 Willy Brandt's new "small coalition" (SPD/FDP) gave the hint of a promise to recognize the political status-quo in East Germany.¹¹ The Soviet Union appeared more conciliatory toward Bonn than did the obdurate Ulbricht. To the Kremlin this was a different Ostpolitik than that of 1966-68 in that it recognized Soviet primacy in Eastern Europe. Additionally, the Soviet Union could now feel more secure having put the fear of retribution in the hearts of her satellites. However, a more vigorously assertive GDR was intent on inhibiting Soviet initiatives which ran counter to the interests of East Germany. Brandt made clear in 1968 what preconditions he expected the Soviets to insist on for normalization of relations with the Bloc.¹² Despite strenuous opposition by the GDR, Bonn signed agreements with Moscow and Warsaw in 1970 which recognized the postwar borders. Once Ulbricht had been removed in 1971, the Allies and Moscow completed the Four Power Berlin Agreement guaranteeing access to Berlin, and in the same year serious negotiations began between the two Germanies. The Berlin accord signaled a retreat from Soviet concessions to the GDR made in 1955 concerning control of Berlin access routes, and the increased tempo of East - West agreements suggested that Ulbricht had been removed as an obstacle to progress. A series of inter-German agreements regulating relations between the two states culminated in a basic treaty between

East and West Germany, which was ratified in June 1973. It was an historic milestone and constituted a remarkable political achievement, despite its limitations. Brandt's critics labeled the treaty a sellout, politically motivated and granting East Germany recognition as a sovereign state. On the contrary, it represented a retreat from the GDR's insistence on full recognition, heretofore a Sine Qua Non in Ulbricht's demands. Moscow's interests clearly seem to have influenced East German acquiescence on this point. Additionally, the treaty recognized the responsibility of the Four Powers in Berlin, a sore point with the GDR. In 1973 the FRG signed a treaty on mutual relations with Czechoslovakia similar to the Moscow and Warsaw treaties of 1970.

2. East Germany. Under Walter Ulbricht East Germany's policy toward West Germany closely followed that of the Soviet Union, but sometimes more stridently and inflexibly than the Kremlin would have preferred. In the 1950's the GDR claimed to be the only legitimate government in Germany and sole representative of the German people. By 1962 unification was no longer a professed goal, except under greatly changed circumstances, whereby the FRG would be assimilated into the East German political system. In fact, Ulbricht was moving in the other direction, toward a separate East German identity with a citizenry of distinctly East German Nationality. The East Germans were strenuously seeking to end their

diplomatic solitude and achieve international recognition as a sovereign entity.

In 1964 the GDR signed a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation with the USSR which underscored Soviet recognition of a separate German state and guaranteed East German borders. The initial efforts of the FRG in 1966-68 to approach the East Europeans were effectively countered by the GDR and Poland, who feared a resurgence of German revanchism. Ulbricht was also a strong influence on the Kremlin in its final decision to squelch the Prague Spring. The GDR sensed a threat to its domestic authority in political liberalization by its neighbor, a type of political theory of infection. By 1969 the Ulbricht regime was in a secure and more confident posture vis-a-vis the remainder of the Soviet Bloc and was on the road to increased international recognition. A chastened Czechoslovakia and a cautious Romania seemed ready to heed the call to brotherhood by Moscow and Pankow Hardliners. In this context Moscow moved to a more active response to Ostpolitik, and Bonn further eased its application of the Hallstein Doctrine.

There were conflicting lines in Pankow's Foreign Policy. Politically it was Ulbricht's avowed intention to achieve international recognition while strictly limiting the exposure of his people to the decadent influences of the West. Economically he was determined to make East

Germany an independent industrial power, but he needed close ties with the Soviet Union, and, to a lesser degree, with the FRG to do this. The bottom line in hard choices was political survival, however, not diplomatic or economic success, a system of priorities familiar to Communists.

After construction of the Berlin Wall the drain on East Germany's pool of skilled workers was reduced drastically and the economic situation stabilized. Ulbricht dismissed the unrealistic goal of catching up with the FRG and in 1963 formulated a new economic system (NES) of Planning and management. He incorporated advanced Western methods into the rigid, SED dominated economy and, in a period of relative political tranquility, the new measures engendered a great leap forward. Parallel measures incorporating flexibility, modernization, worker incentives, and decentralization were applied in revising the state and party structures. Additionally the SED made some conciliatory gestures toward its suspicious and hostile population.¹³ To keep things in perspective, however, the general environment under Ulbricht remained tyrannical and totalitarian.

The East German leadership has striven over the years to maximize its utility to the Kremlin in a trade off for Soviet support. Despite this, policies have not always run parallel, particularly when the Kremlin has perceived larger Soviet concerns at stake. Conversely

there have been times when Pankow viewed its own vital interests in jeopardy and took initiatives to deflect Moscow from its course. A major divergence occurred in 1964 with Khrushchev's attempts at demarche with the FRG. This was the climax to earlier disagreements between Ulbricht and Khrushchev, for example the Kremlin's retreat from the Berlin crisis in 1962¹⁴ and Pankow's endorsement of Red Chinese charges in 1963 that the Kremlin was selling out the GDR. The Soviet East German Treaty of 1964 was evidently intended to allay Pankow's concerns. Ulbricht, a master politician, may well have been an actor in the Soviet Politburo's maneuvers leading to Khrushchev's ouster.¹⁵

A second divergence was generated by Bonn's initiative toward Eastern Europe in 1966. Confronted with a concerted West German drive at rapprochement, Ulbricht took the lead in thwarting such a move, which he viewed as a direct threat to GDR viability. He enunciated the "Ulbricht Doctrine" - No relations with the FRG prior to FRG recognition of the GDR.¹⁶ Moscow was initially ambivalent on the question of Ostpolitik, but when Romania established diplomatic relations with West Germany, the steam rising from East Berlin caused a response by the Kremlin. The Soviets were mainly concerned with the maintenance of cohesion and discipline within the Bloc. East Germany quickly concluded bilateral agreements with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria

which insured no further agreements with Bonn prior to FRG recognition of the GDR. The East Germans, in their initial set of treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, formed the so-called "Northern Triangle" in the strategically critical Central Region.

As mentioned, Ulbricht's forceful insistence on Soviet action in Czechoslovakia was probably influential in the Kremlin's decision to invade in 1968. Immediately following the intervention Ulbricht demonstrated a new assertiveness and self-confidence in his political pronouncements. He felt the East Germans had secured a more prominent role in the Socialist community and a decisive voice in Bloc affairs. This put Ulbricht in conflict with the Kremlin, whose concerns with detente transcended the national aspirations of one bloc member. East Germany came into direct confrontation with Moscow by provoking a crisis in Berlin over the convocation of a presidential election assembly in the western sector. The Kremlin's annoyance with Ulbricht was apparent. The Soviets were undertaking a conciliatory approach to Brandt's Ostpolitik, which promised border recognition,¹⁷ and they intended to conclude a treaty despite Ulbricht's objections. Ulbricht launched a verbal barrage against Brandt's views on "One German Nation" and rejected out of hand any rapprochement between the two Germanies, short of total West German capitulation. This was seriously out of line with Soviet intentions and Ulbricht was forced to

permit meetings at Erfurt and Kassel in 1970 between Brandt and Willy Stoph, chairman of the GDR's council of ministers. These meetings only highlighted the gulf between Ulbricht and Brandt. With the conclusion of the Soviet-FRG treaty, East Berlin was pressured by Moscow to reinitiate negotiations with the FRG, but continuing East German intransigence served to undercut Soviet East-West diplomacy. There is little doubt that the Kremlin played a major role in easing Ulbricht from power in 1971. (Ulbricht was allowed to stay on in a figure head position until his death in 1974). Shortly thereafter, with a more complaisant Erich Honecker at the helm of the SED, the historic Four Power Berlin agreement was signed. Here the interests of the GDR were clearly subordinated to these of the Great Powers, and East Germany was stripped of any authority to impede access to Berlin. Pankow was deprived of a fundamental bargaining chip, leverage over Berlin access, and experienced a diminution of influence in the Eastern Bloc. The FRG-GDR accords in 1971-72,¹⁸ culminating in the basic treaty at the end of 1972, represent concessions by both sides, but represent a marked retreat from the Ulbricht line. The treaties present a challenge to GDR insularity, particularly with regard to East-West travel, and gave impetus to the GDR's policy of abgrenzung. Initiated by Ulbricht, and expanded upon by Honecker, abgrenzung is the policy of encouraging East German nationalism, an attempt by the SED

to emphasize and distinguish East German separateness from West Germany and from certain aspects of German history. The doctrine of a separate East German Nation has been enshrined and heavily propagated to counter the viruses of revisionism and convergence.

It is doubtful whether even a shrilly orchestrated policy of abgrenzung concerns the Kremlin, since it serves Soviet ideological purposes and does not really inhibit either Soviet or GDR economic ties with the West. The continued East German insistence on a "free" West Berlin does create some discord, since this is an area of possible super power confrontation. A "free" West Berlin would also deprive the Kremlin of useful leverage over both East and West Germany.

An expansion of FRG-GDR economic ties is possible, particularly in light of the special status the GDR already enjoys as a shadow member of the common market, to the extent of several hundreds of millions of dollars annually,¹⁹ and this could be a future source of friction between the GDR and USSR. There are ongoing negotiations between East and West Germany in diverse fields, and these contacts could ripen into fullfledged ties if the East German leadership overcomes its feelings of insecurity and inferiority. The Soviets would then be in the ironic situation of trying to stem the momentum of a process they forced on the East Germans.

With the advent of Erich Honecker East Germany has moved closer than ever to the Soviet Union. Politically, economically, ideologically, and militarily the GDR is Moscow's most dependable ally. Ulbricht had opposed Soviet policies which threatened the GDR's vital interests in legitimacy and stability, adroitly at first, but with an increasingly heavy hand in his last years as First Secretary. He even dared to offer the GDR as a paradigm of the advanced socialist model, an affront to Moscow. The GDR lacked the power base to exercise the autonomy Ulbricht desired. The succession of Honecker reversed the trend. The pattern since 1971 is one of intensive, even obsessive, imitation of the Soviet model in every field -- economics, diplomacy, military affairs, politics -- a slavish adherence to Soviet policy, and a push for total integration with Soviet instrumentalities and agencies.

3. The Soviet Union and East Germany. The relationship between the Soviet Union and the GDR has been variously characterized as patron-client, senior partner - junior partner, and super power-satellite. Whatever the label, the nature and essence of the relationship which prevails involves grossly disproportionate powers mutually benefiting one another. Some basic tenets of this marriage of convenience reveal constraints imposed on both parties: first, that Soviet global and domestic

interests must be served; second, that Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe must be preserved; and third, that the viability of a dependable, communist GDR is essential. The achievement of one goal may tend to jeopardize another. In such cases the Soviets worry about themselves.

Under Brezhnev concerns with cohesion have dominated the Kremlin's policy in Europe, often at the expense of the satellites. From the Kremlin's point of view, in a period of detente, Bloc discipline must be at its tightest to preclude ideological slippage.²⁰ The rapid shifts and adventures of Khrushchev's era do not sit well with the present leadership.

In 1963-64 Khrushchev's moves toward West Germany evinced charges of a sellout of the GDR by Brezhnev and Suslov, indicating a degree of sensitivity among Kremlin hands to the remonstrances of the GDR. In 1966 a Warsaw Pact crisis arose from acrimonious back room disagreements among pact members, primarily between Ulbricht and Ceaucescu of Romania, concerning relations with the FRG. The Soviet Union was forced to soft pedal proposals for a revised Warsaw Pact system and a new Pan-European security system due to disunity among its allies. In fact, the Soviets probably missed an excellent opportunity in 1966 to spark new initiatives on East West relations and exploit the currents alive on both sides of the Iron Curtain to revise and realign standing arrangements. It

was vintage Soviet that priority was given over to disciplining the Bloc and maintaining a facade of unity. It was apparent that the German problem and concerns with solidarity in the strategic northern tier were pre-eminent. The chance to entice Bonn from her Western allies by dealing in substance foundered on Moscow's inflexibility. It is difficult to overstate the fervor with which Pankow and, to a lesser degree, Warsaw opposed Kiesinger's Ostpolitik in 1967-68. The East Germans and Poles felt that the intrusion of the West Germans into the Pact area threatened their special relations with the Soviets, and perhaps equally significant, both countries harbored a sincere dislike and fear of West Germany, for different reasons. The so-called "Ulbricht Doctrine" set the GDR apart in terms of hysterical hostility, but all except Romania fell in line with Moscow's defensive, reactive policy toward Ostpolitik. A flurry of bilateral mutual assistance treaties²⁰ served to underwrite the multilateral Warsaw Pact military relations and to present an image of Warsaw Pact solidarity. Serious disalignments within the Warsaw Pact in the 1964-68 period culminated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The differentiation of interests was illustrated by the varying responses to Ostpolitik. The key lay in the German question. Ulbricht was determined to achieve dejure recognition and considered the status quo in an atmosphere of detente and Ostpolitik a threat to the SED's survival. Moscow had the choice of a flexible

stance toward the FRG, to which accrued economic benefits for the Soviets and East Europeans, and possibly the winning away from the NATO fold of a critical alliance member, or an inflexible rigidity to accommodate Ulbricht and Gomulka and defend the pact against the perils of Western penetration. Moscow opted for the latter. Ulbricht's hard line approach, applied in Prague in August 1968, did not prevent the Kremlin from finally moving on the question of Ostpolitik. On the contrary, once the sheep were penned, negotiations went forward apace, following a reasonable period of mourning by the West.

The Soviets have linked cohesion to coexistence, and integration to detente, ²¹ and the GDR is the primary model for the success of the policy. The thrust toward integration of the GDR with the USSR is almost transnational in character since the removal of Ulbricht. The one-sided nature of the exchange is dictated by the enormous disparities in size, power, and influence between the two countries and also by the mind set of 25 years of imitation by the GDR. The East German elite is ever conscious of that fact that it needs Moscow more than Moscow needs it. It has been suggested that Soviet proletarian internationalism is a surrogate concept demanding allegiance from an East German population deprived of national legitimacy. The thought is plausible and can be compared to the function of Pan Europeanism for

the West Germans right after the war. The collateral policy of abgrenzung is framed against a primary allegiance to the Soviet Union. A basic purpose of encouraging closer ties, GDR to USSR, is to insure Soviet support and guarantee a Soviet perception of self interest in such support.

Between 1969-71 the Kremlin struggled with an increasingly difficult Ulbricht who opposed Soviet objectives in detente. With the removal of Ulbricht the sweeping accords of 1971-73 were achieved and, in the opinion of some, an historic period of normalization and the waning of the German question began.²²

The remarkable convergence in GDR-USSR relations can be inferred from Honecker's suggestion in 1972 that the GDR become a Soviet republic.²³ Ironically, by such unseemly obsequiousness, Honecker may carve himself more room for maneuver by convincing Moscow of his absolute dependability. His goals parallel those of Ulbricht's, to maximize the Soviet commitment to the GDR and exert the greatest possible leverage on the Kremlin's German policies. His approach, however, denotes a new phase in Soviet-GDR relations.

C. Nonmilitary Factors Affecting Soviet-East German Relations. Certain specific factors are dealt with below as influencing substantially the manner in which the USSR perceives or acts toward its German client.

1. Propaganda and the SED. The SED directs the ideological campaign in the GDR, as it directs everything else, with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as the Guiding Light. For the doctrinaire East Germans it is even a case of being more Catholic than the Pope. The road to socialism, only briefly interrupted during the change of Kremlin leadership in 1954-56, has been vociferously abetted by an ardent call to the precepts of Marxism-Leninism. Institutionalized, daily interchange at all levels between the SED and CPSU has been a reality for years,²³ and so there is little doubt about the extent of Soviet influence. A dark and little understood feature of GDR-USSR relations is the connection between their respective organs of state security. There is an apparent interlock between the Soviet KGB and the GDR's State Security Service (SSD) which not only serves the interests of the SED hierarchy, but also provides the Kremlin a local network for continuous, dependable surveillance and control throughout the GDR.

2. Economics. The GDR is the strongest member of Comecon except for the Soviets, and East Germany's economic power has played an important role in expanding its political clout, both within the Bloc and with the West. The NES introduced by Ulbricht in the early sixties recognized economic realities at the expense of Marxist propaganda and exploited the historical German traits of efficiency and industriousness. This is not to say that

the concept of central planning was abandoned, but rather modified within the framework of Communist authoritarianism. The fate of ideological revisionists, versus that of the economic young Turks, attests to the differentiation applied by party leaders in adapting to change.²⁴ The GDR's economy is inextricably immeshed economically, scientifically, and technically with that of the Soviet Union, for which it produces machinery, machine tools, precision instruments and electronics, chemicals and petrochemical products, ships, and consumer goods. The Soviet Union provides the GDR with raw materials, primarily crude oil, cotton, iron ore, timber, iron, steel, and other metals. To a degree the integration of the GDR into Comecon threatens the special relationship with the USSR through pressures for standardization and removal of special trading rights. The Soviet Union's interests in Comecon integration probably transcend the parochial concerns of the GDR, the partner which stands to lose more in any surrender of economic autonomy. In fact the situation was made more complex with the recent energy crisis and worldwide recession which impaired the GDR's economic advantages in trade with the USSR. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union remains the GDR's most important trading partner, and the GDR is the USSR's most important Comecon trading partner, in a mutually beneficial economic relationship.²⁵

The GDR probably is less concerned than other members of Comecon about a loss of autonomy at the behest of the Soviet Union. Among East European countries the GDR is a major economic power in terms of industrial production, modern techniques, and trading strength, particularly since Czechoslovakia's "problems" of 1968. This has had an ideological-political spillover effect on the other two partners in the Northern tier, but in the Bloc as a whole the GDR's influence is dwarfed by the Soviet Union.²⁶

The GDR has kept pace with the FRG in percentage growth in recent years, but trails substantially in overall economic output on a scale of roughly ten to one.²⁷ The effect on the GDR population of the affluent neighbor to the West cannot be precisely measured, but with private consumption of the average East German only 60 percent of his West German counterpart, the effect is certainly of some concern to the GDR's leadership. The economic impact of the FRG on the GDR's economic health is in dispute. The special benefits the GDR derives as an informal member of the EEC is variously estimated as 10 percent of the GDR's trade portfolio, one third of the GDR's trade with the FRG, and one percent of the GDR's GNP.²⁸ No one disputes the fact, however, that sizable advantages accrue to the GDR in its trade with the FRG.

3. The GDR Constitutions. A glance at the evolution of the present GDR constitution makes manifest what political events attest to, that the Soviet Union looms ever larger in the institutions of the GDR. In 1949 the first constitution emphasized antifascism and democratic reform. A new constitution in 1968 labeled the GDR a "Socialist State of the German Nation" and emphasized the leading role of the SED under Socialism. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the GDR in 1974 the constitution was altered again. This time the concepts of a unified Germany and a democratic Germany were dropped altogether. The position of the GDR as an inseparable part of the Socialist family of nations was made precise and the special relationship with the Soviet Union was made explicit. "The German Democratic Republic is allied forever and irrevocably with the Union of Soviet Republics." 29

4. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Helsinki accords have their genesis in the German problem and their effect is felt directly in East Germany and the USSR. In 1954 when negotiations were underway to grant West Germany sovereignty and incorporate her into NATO the Soviets suggested a European security conference with the ultimate goals of keeping West Germany out of NATO, fostering European disarmament, and removing the American presence from Europe. 30

In 1958 the Poles, very apprehensive over the possible

acquisition of nuclear weapons by West Germany, proposed the Rapacki Plan. The West rejected the initiatives of 1954 and 1958 and the question of a European security conference did not surface again until the mid-sixties. A Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Bucharest in 1966 offered a specific proposal on peace and security in Europe which, although ignored by the West at the time, was to lead to the Helsinki conference in 1972-73. The exercise of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Czechoslovakia set back the case for a security conference, since the Western Powers felt it might lead to an acquiescence in Soviet hegemony in East Europe, an acknowledgement for which the time was hardly right. But other forces operated to continue the momentum for an agreement: interests in detente, the burgeoning American commitment in Southeast Asia, Ostpolitik, Soviet problems on the Ussuri River, and domestic pressures within the Soviet European satellites. The shock of Czechoslovakia had united NATO behind the FRG and pushed the Kremlin into a more conciliatory posture. NATO had proposed a European conference on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in June 1968. President Nixon extracted from Moscow in 1972 an agreement that both CSCE and MBFR negotiations would be initiated, separately but concurrently.³¹

A dialogue between NATO and the Warsaw Pact continued from 1966 until the beginning of the Helsinki conference

concerning the Agenda and substantive matters. The 1966 Bucharest declaration proposed the liquidation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the removal of all foreign troops from other countries' territories, indigenous force reductions in both Germanies, a nuclear free zone, and a bar to control of nuclear weapons by West Germany. The pact also offered the ritual denunciation of Neo-Naziism, revanchism, and militarism as practiced by the FRG, and demanded ratification of the Oder-Neisse line and dejure recognition of the GDR. By 1972, after six years of exchanges and communiques the two sides had revised and realigned their positions. NATO had offered separate CSCE and MBFR conferences with emphasis on separating the problem of force reduction from those concerning politics, economics, and scientific-cultural ties. The WTO offered a vague seven point agenda which included border questions, applications of force, interstate contacts, and disarmament.³²

The final treaty dealt with areas important to the Soviets -- ratification of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe by affirming the territorial and political status quo, and removal of some East-West trade and technology barriers; and areas important to the West -- freedom of movement, cultural exchanges, tourist access, and media freedoms.³³ The German problem was ameliorated more by bilateral treaties in 1970-73 than by CSCE, and its further abatement rests more with the two Germanies than with a multi lateral

agreement, but the impact of Helsinki will be felt. The impact of "Basket Three" is felt in the GDR today.

5. Psychology. Although it will be imprecise, some estimate of the effect of recent history on the leadership in the Soviet Union should be essayed. Travelers in the USSR and readers of Soviet popular literature cannot avoid the impression that the influences of the Great Fatherland War are not dead. There exists to this day a veritable deluge of material on the war and its perpetrators, and the lessons of the war are the meat and potatoes on which the current Soviet military is fed. The Soviet national press rarely fails a daily offering on some aspect of WWII -- its heroes, its villains, its lessons. Soviet television, cinema, and radio dwell on the war, literature and art are dominated by WWII related subjects, and there are probably few museums or galleries in the RSFSR which do not have WWII displays. The most sincere invective and heartfelt calumny of which a Soviet is capable in political matters contain terms such as Nazi, Fascist, and revanchist. A reasoned argument would point out that WWII was the last Soviet military adventure and as such would traditionally be the source of a nation's current military instruction, and this may be the case. But no such rationalization can adequately illuminate the psychology contained in the blanket of WWII material which covers the Soviet Union thirty years after the fact. No

discussion of the development of Soviet-German relations in the postwar period can omit the suspicion that underlying the patina of official Soviet rhetoric is a substrata of pathological hatred and jingo racism. The present Soviet leaders, military and civilian, participated in the war, many as heroes, and witnessed the brutalization and devastation of their homeland by the Nazi virus. The years of degradation, cruelty and slaughter have probably left an indelible mark, even on a desensitized Communist cadre inured to the Stalin band of leadership. The subtle distinctions made by party propaganda between "new" East Germans and old Prussian militarists ring somewhat hollow. The obsession of Soviet foreign policy since WWII with avoiding an unfriendly, united, and armed Germany makes clear what one of the "gut" issues is in the Kremlin. In this context it is instructive to compare the bombast concerning the brotherhood of East Germans and Soviets (BRATSKII NARODI) with actual Soviet policy in the GDR.³⁴

III. THE MILITARY ASPECT OF SOVIET POLICY IN EAST GERMANY

A. The Warsaw Pact (WTO). The origins of the Warsaw Pact have already been alluded to. The Soviets and East Europeans feared an armed West Germany participating in NATO. When Soviet efforts to block FRG entry into the West European Union (and eventually NATO) failed in 1954 the Russians moved ahead with plans to form the WTO at the same time accusing West Germany of militarism and revanchism, a propaganda line strenuously pursued by Ulbricht. The bland text of the treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance agreed to in Warsaw in 1955 does not depict the true state of Soviet domination of the Pact. The treaty allows for dissolution should an all-European security arrangement be arrived at, but that clause has never achieved significance, particularly since the Berlin crisis of 1962. Of the six East European states which initially signed the treaty, Albania withdrew following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Albania had been an inactive member since 1962) and Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania remain as members. The GDR formally joined in 1956.

The most contentious point among Western analysts studying the Warsaw Pact concerns the purposes it serves. The answers arrived at are derived for the most part from events and deduction, since Soviet propaganda is hardly

conclusive, and is often at odds with reality as regards intentions. In its first five years the Pact seemed to be mostly a paper organization both politically and militarily, with a web of bilateral defense treaties and Soviet military forces providing the authentic base for East European defense. Prior to the conclusion of the Soviet-East German defense treaty of March 1957 the East Germans' fledgling high command was not even permitted into the joint command, an indication of the special status of East Germany. At the time both Soviet and East German spokesmen emphasized the transitory nature of East German membership pending the reunification of Germany. Conversely, the suspension of active participation in the Pact until the 1957 treaty legally granted some autonomy to East Germany emphasized the sovereignty of the GDR, a reflection of the dichotomy in Soviet perceptions of the GDR. The Soviets also concluded defense treaties in 1956-57 with Poland, Romania, and Hungary, and the four satellite treaties provided the legal basis for the stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. A USSR-Czech treaty authorizing the stationing of Soviet troops was signed in October 1968, after the August invasion. The Soviet-Romanian status-of-forces agreement lapsed in 1958 when Soviet troops left Romania.³⁵

Some analysts posit that the Warsaw Pact was intended to legitimize the Presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe,

but the bilateral treaties afforded the same thing.³⁶ If the Pact was intended to integrate East European armed forces into a unified command, little of that was accomplished prior to 1961. No joint exercises were held, no major decisions were made by the Joint Command, few meetings were held, and not much in the way of force integration was accomplished, except for the improvement of joint air defense arrangements.³⁷ Concerning East European armies, their subjugation to Soviet domination had been completed prior to 1955. In the immediate postwar years the Communists gained control of the Security and Police apparatuses in East Europe, and from 1949-53 undertook to rebuild the national armies in the Soviet image. Soviet organization, weapons and equipment, training and doctrine were imposed, and the Soviet military high command controlled the process. There were extensive purges of disloyal or incompetent national elements, along with an intensive campaign of political indoctrination. Many senior officers of the East European armed forces were schooled in the Soviet Union. By 1953 around 1,500,000 soldiers, 65-80 divisions, were available in the satellite countries, although their comparative combat efficiency was quite uneven. (About half were combat effective).³⁸ The upgrading of East European armies was not complete by 1955 and, in reality, Soviet forces carried the burden of any military undertaking which might be called for.

The use of the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of local political control is another task often referred to. Again the question arises as to whether the Pact mechanism was necessary considering the large Soviet forces already in place in Eastern Europe. The crushing of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 with Soviet troops did not contribute to the image of the Pact as a cooperative Socialist alliance, and although provisions of the treaty were used as a pretext, the Pact organization played no part in the suppression. In fact, the only bilateral treaty which actually permits unilateral Soviet intervention is the Soviet-GDR treaty, an indication the Soviets lacked legal justification in Hungary no matter which treaty they cited. Robin Remington suggests that two views of the Warsaw Pact existed in the Kremlin initially: Khrushchev's concept of the Pact as a political instrument for dealing with the West, particularly on the German question, and Molotov's image of the Pact as a vehicle for Socialist consolidation and military defense. Molotov lost the political battle, but subsequent events forced an evolution toward his point of view.³⁹

Mention should be made of the structure of the WTO, about which information is scarce. There is a Political Consultative Committee (PCC), which is supposed to meet twice a year but actually has an erratic history of meetings, a standing commission, and a joint secretariat. On the military side there is a joint command and a joint staff. The

The Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff are always Soviet, with the Ministers of Defense of member states as Deputy Commanders-in-Chief in charge of their home forces. The force structure includes Soviet land, sea, and air forces stationed in Eastern Europe and elements of East European national forces. As an exception, all the armed forces of the GDR are subordinate to the WTO. In the event of war, national and Soviet forces in Eastern Europe come under the Joint Command of the Warsaw Pact, but in actuality probably under Soviet Command. It appears as though most East European forces with the exception of the East Germans remain under nominal control of their respective Ministers of Defense in peacetime, although some elements are permanently assigned to the Joint Armed Forces. The exact command structure is a well kept secret.

Khrushchev's pressures on Berlin from 1958 to 1961 culminated in a crisis in 1961 when the allies initiated a major military buildup in response to Soviet demands that the Western Powers abandon West Berlin. The Soviets countered with an upgrading of Warsaw Pact readiness, including for the first time, the conduct of large scale military maneuvers. The crisis petered out in 1962, but the emphasis on improving the WTO's military posture continued. The threat of a nuclearized West Germany via NATO's MLF led to Khrushchev's flirtation with Bonn in 1963-64, but also to

an attempt at shoring up cohesion in the Pact and smoothing relations with Walter Ulbricht. Additionally Khrushchev planned an extensive nuclearization of Pact theater forces as a counter to NATO's nuclear capabilities. Actually, except for a limited number of tactical delivery systems in Eastern Europe, the bulk of the Soviet Nuclear threat against Europe was contained in medium range bombers and 700 ballistic missiles in Western Russia. The nuclear delivery systems in Eastern Europe were distributed among both Soviet and satellite forces, but the Soviets maintain custody of all nuclear munitions. The spectre of a nuclear capable West Germany was the basis for Soviet warnings which accompanied the buildup, but the nuclear might of U.S. Forces in Europe was the real threat to which the Soviets reacted.⁴⁰ Concomitant with a change in emphasis from massed conventional forces to massed fire power came a substantial reduction in Soviet ground forces worldwide in the period 1955-64. The three-phased reductions programmed by Khrushchev amounted to a reduction of 2.7 million men, down to 3 million by 1964. The thinning of Soviet troops in Europe, however, amounted to only 90,000 by Soviet testimony, and with the buildup in Hungary in 1956 and in East Germany in 1961, there may not have been a net loss. The overall total remained about 500,000 men. By 1964 there were 26 Soviet Divisions in Eastern Europe, with approximately 60 East European Divisions, plus 60 Soviet divisions as backup in Western Russia.

Security forces and border guards constitute a large additional para-military force in Eastern Europe, but they are usually omitted from estimates of Warsaw Pact strength. Although considerable effort was being exerted by 1964 to integrate satellite forces into the Warsaw Pact structure, their effectiveness and reliability were debatable.

Between 1964 and 1966 the new Kremlin leadership under Brezhnev altered Khrushchev's foreign policy approach to West Germany but did not substantially alter his policy towards the Warsaw Pact. In 1966 the Bucharest Declaration resuscitated the concepts of a Pan-European Security Conference and the joint dissolution of NATO and the WTO, and sought the united backing of Pact members on policy toward the West. The Romanians made unity impossible, but, nonetheless, the Pact was, by this time, serving an important function as a channel for communication and coordination among members.⁴¹ The Socialist community, less than cohesive under the stresses of Ostpolitik and East European nationalism, offered the Kremlin a difficult challenge. Brezhnev tried three approaches to bring matters under tighter control: multilateral orchestration through the Warsaw Pact, bilateral inducements of individual states, and preferential treatment by region -- special consideration to the strategically significant northern tier. As an example of the latter, the Kremlin maintained a conservative line and Ulbricht and Gomulka were able to

persuade the Soviets not to respond favorably to the blandishments of the grand coalition of Kissinger, at least for the time being. Soviet plans for upgrading the Warsaw Pact coordination machinery and improving East European economic ties failed, in large measure due to the maverick Romanians, an indication that the multi-lateral approach was less than successful. As a buttress to Pankow's counter policy of "West Politik" all Pact members except Romania signed bilateral friendship treaties with East Germany in 1967, and the Soviet Union then updated all its East European defense treaties, again with the exception of Romania.⁴² The replacement of Grechko with Yakubovsky as Warsaw Pact command-in-chief renewed discussion within the Pact concerning revision of the Alliance policy whereby Soviets dominate every level of the Pact structure. The Romanian suggestion of rotation of the command position among all member predictably got nowhere.

Events in Czechoslovakia leading up to the Warsaw Pact invasion in August 1968 highlighted diversity within the alliance. Ulbricht was adamant about dealing with Dubcek's revisionism in Prague, while at the other end of the spectrum Romania offered Czechoslovakia tacit support. The Soviets temporized initially, but spring brought threats of Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Czechoslovakia and a military buildup on the Czech borders. Best estimates are that the invasion consisted of 22 Soviet

divisions, plus 3-5 other Warsaw Pact divisions from East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, with 400-700 tactical aircraft and 250 transport aircraft. It appears that 10 of the 26 Soviet divisions stationed in East Europe were used (8 from East Germany, 2 from Hungary), 11 from Western Russia, plus an airborne division from the Soviet Union for a net increment from outside Eastern Europe of approximately 200,000 men. Satellite forces consisted of 2-4 Polish divisions, elements of 2-3 East German divisions, and minor elements from Hungary and Bulgaria. The status-of-Forces Agreement imposed on the Czechs following the invasion left approximately 5 Soviet divisions garrisoned in Czechoslovakia.

Hapless Soviet attempts to justify the invasion as a response to West Germany's impending invasion of East Europe finally gave way to the "Brezhnev Doctrine" which disallows anti-Socialist degeneration and is a perverted restatement of proletarian internationalism. The primacy of Soviet military power insures that unalloyed sovereignty accrues only to the strongest member of the Socialist Commonwealth. The implications of the invasion cut two ways vis-a-vis East Germany. The Soviets demonstrated their determination to maintain a strong hold on Eastern Europe and thereby insure a dependable forward deployment. They were willing to follow Ulbricht's hard line since it served their political and strategic interests. However, the Kremlin made manifest its order of priorities, first

of which was Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and Soviet security, at the expense, if need be, of the Eastern satellites. Germany's strategic significance and past history made it unlikely that either sentiment or concern with national sovereignty would inhibit Soviet policy in East Germany. The lessons of Czechoslovakia were not lost on any East European.

As noted earlier, the Prague "interruption" was soon followed by renewed Soviet overtures to the West and increased receptivity to Ostpolitik by a domesticated Warsaw Pact membership. The Brandt Government signed the non-Proliferation treaty in 1969 and a Warsaw Pact summit meeting late the same year again advanced proposals for a European security conference. The strangest opposition to negotiations with West Germany came from Pankow, but Ulbricht was coerced into permitting the unsuccessful meetings with FRG representatives at Erfurt and Kassel. The East Germans continued to insist on de jure recognition and an independent Berlin but the Bonn-Moscow agreement in August 1970, and the Bonn-Warsaw agreement in November 1970 ignored both demands. Ulbricht strongly resented continuing diplomatic isolation and the Warsaw Pact meeting in December 1970 did not assuage his feelings. The Four-Power Agreement on Berlin went forward as Ulbricht was ceremoniously removed.

Pressures on Moscow following the Czech invasion led to a revised military command structure in the Warsaw Pact. The Defense Ministers were removed from the Political Consultative Committees to form a new Committee of Defense Ministers, leaving party first secretaries, chairmen of Councils of Ministers, and Foreign Ministers on the PCC. Deputy Ministers of Defense of member States became the Deputy Commanders-in-Chief of the Joint Forces. This change had the effect of upgrading the importance of the national decision-making authority by moving the Defense Ministers out from under the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and into an advisory council to the PCC. A second innovation established the military council, chaired by the Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief, but containing high ranking non-Soviet officers who apparently provide the Satellites a greater influence in military policy than before. The Joint Staff was made permanent, whereas prior to 1969 it seemed to function on an Ad Hoc basis. It now has responsibility for training, joint exercises, and standardization of weapons and equipment. There are rumors that it also has formed a separate body to coordinate the use of military technology. The joint command oversees military operations and gives policy guidance to the Joint Staff, which then directs training and implements policies. The Joint Staff also directs

the Soviet military liaison missions attached to each Ministry of Defense for coordination, liaison, and supervision.

The question of what function the Pact Headquarters would perform in wartime is not settled. In 1956 in Hungary and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia command passed to a Soviet Headquarters. Now, with a revised structure and a permanent headquarters in Lvov in the Ukraine, things may have changed, but the command and staff still have no operations, signal, transportation, or supply services sufficient to support wartime operations, and the Soviets provide all logistics, command and control and air defense. The organizational changes have probably accomplished their purpose, to enhance the feeling of participation by the East Europeans and to broaden the channels of communication. The member states now have a greater say in the disposition of their national forces, a permanent headquarters suggests the WTO might retain control in wartime rather than reverting to a Soviet headquarters,⁴⁴ and the member states have input to policy decisions. However, the chances are quite good that the WTO will be supplanted by the Soviet high command should hostilities commence, since the military realities have not altered substantially.

Political consultations among Pact members through the Pact mechanism were frequently quite intense in the

period 1969-1973. The great changes wrought by Ostpolitik and detente necessitated increased coordination, and the Warsaw Pact was the primary vehicle used by the Kremlin to implement its European policies. The restraint shown in Poland in 1970, the control of the GDR in 1970-1972, the finalization of the Berlin, Oder-Neisse, and German partition questions to the Kremlin's satisfaction, and the move toward CSCE attest to the utility of the Warsaw Pact mechanism in implementing and coordinating Soviet foreign policy in recent years.

The size and composition of forces presently in the Warsaw Pact are reflected in accompanying charts.⁴⁵ There has not been a significant change in the size of the Pact ground forces since 1968, when approximately five Soviet divisions were added in Czechoslovakia.⁴⁶ Even during the buildup on the Sino-Soviet border in the late sixties no appreciable changes in European troop strengths were noted. The sizable withdrawal of troops from East Germany in 1967, extensively reported in the Western Press, proved to be illusory. Equally illusory is a belief that a static end strength means no change in force effectiveness. The 31 Soviet divisions and 53 satellite divisions in East Europe have improved appreciably in the last decade in training, equipment and weapons. Although there are varying degrees of readiness in the East European armies, all Soviet divisions deployed

in the Warsaw Pact are Category I. The accession to the WTO of modern tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery weapons, missiles, engineering equipment, CBR equipment, high performance and support aircraft, air defense missiles, and advanced electronic equipment, and the extensive standardization of weapons, have upgraded the combat effectiveness of the WTO without an increase in numbers of forces. As an example, the 20 Soviet divisions in East Germany are now equal to 25 Soviet divisions of 1965 caliber in terms of firepower and assault capability.⁴⁸ The pattern in the Brezhnev years has been one of continuous, and more recently explosive, growth in the conventional capabilities of Warsaw Pact forces, particularly the Soviet element. Additionally Khrushchev's emphasis on firepower and nuclear strike capability has not been discarded, which is to say, a dual track military buildup has been underway in East Europe for ten years in both the conventional and nuclear sectors. The distribution of forces in Eastern Europe indicates the regions considered most critical by the Soviets either politically or tactically.

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>NATIONAL DIVISIONS (Approx)</u>	<u>SOVIET DIVISIONS (Approx)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
East Germany	6	20	26
Poland	15	2	17
Czechoslovakia	10	5	15
Hungary	5	4	9
Romania	9	0	9
Bulgaria	8	0	8
	<u>53</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>84</u>

The Soviet forces are deployed in four groups as follows: Group of Soviet forces Germany (GSFG) consists of five army headquarters, 20 divisions (10 tank, 10 motor rifle) with 370,000 men and the 16th air army with 900 first line combat aircraft; northern group of forces in Poland has 2-3 division equivalent, 30,000 men and two air divisions; central group of forces in Czechoslovakia has 5-6 divisions, between 60,000 and 70,000 men and two air divisions; southern group forces in Hungary has four divisions (two tank and two motor rifle), 40,000 to 50,000 men, and one or two air divisions. The four groups total 575,000 men, 15 tank divisions, 16 motor rifle divisions, and organic tactical air support. Immediate reinforcement is available from three western military districts in the Soviet Union, the Baltic, Trans-Carpathian, and Belorussian military districts, for an additional eight armies with 340,000 men and 6800 tanks. East Germany maintains six divisions (2 tank, 4 motor rifle), 300 interceptors and a light navy. Poland has 15 divisions (5 tank 8 motor rifle, one airborne, one amphibious), 3800 tanks, 750 combat aircraft and a

sizable navy. Czechoslovakia has 10 divisions (5 tank, 5 motor rifle) and 500 combat aircraft. The totals in the northern tier are 56-58 divisions with 16,000 tanks and 2900 aircraft, of which 48 divisions are first echelon combat ready. The emphasis on modernization among non-Soviet forces has focused on the northern tier, to include, for the first time, combat aircraft with an offensive capability. The southern tier has received second priority. The Hungarian Army has 6 divisions with 90,000 men and 1500 tanks. Bulgaria nominally has 8 motor rifle divisions, half of them combat ready, and two tank division equivalents unassembled, plus a small airforce and navy. Romanian forces are not well integrated into the Pact and consist of 2 tank divisions, 7 motor rifle divisions, an Alpine brigade, and an airborne brigade.⁴⁸

A little known factor in the Status-of-Forces agreements between the Soviets and their East European hosts concerns the costs of maintaining Soviet troops on foreign soil. The East Germans paid war reparations and also for the presence of Soviet troops until the mid-fifties, but on a diminishing scale. The Soviets received troop support funds of \$900 million in 1949, reduced the figure to \$350 million by 1957, and reportedly lifted the obligation completely in 1959. It is assumed that the status-of-forces agreements signed with Poland and Hungary in 1957 also lifted their burden. Little is known about the Czech situation except for a support

requirement noted in the published sections of the 1968 agreement. The Romanians, who have had no Soviet troops stationed on their soil since 1958, complained in 1966 about the support burden, which suggests that the Pact shares costs on a prorata basis. Since the Soviets also complain occasionally about the heavy costs, the troop support question may be a continuing point of contention among Pact members.⁴⁹

The arms budgets of the East Europeans have tended upward ever since 1967 when the Soviets made a substantial increase in their arms budget and embarked on a program of Warsaw Pact modernization. The Germans have made the greatest increases in their military outlays, particularly in the period 1967-71 when their arms budget doubled.⁵⁰ As of 1970 the GDR, which ranked fifth in size of armed forces per 1000 population among Warsaw Pact states, had the highest level of military expenditures as a percentage of GNP, except for the USSR.⁵¹ One analyst concludes that after Czechoslovakia the Soviets relaxed their coercive approach sufficiently so that Pact members began to set their own levels of economic contribution to the Warsaw Pact based on their own perceptions of security needs and their ability to pay. Increasing rates of expenditures have generally paralleled increases in national income. The effect has been a surprising stability and continuity in the level of expenditures, except for East Germany, which overspent when the reins were loosened.

He concludes that the budget evidence reflects increased cohesion and common perceptions among those sharing the alliance burden,⁵² although evidence from East Germany might also reflect a touch of paranoia.

To return to the contentious question of what importance the Soviet Union attaches to the Warsaw Pact, opinions cover the spectrum. The Pact serves a military function by guaranteeing the forward defense of the USSR, the so-called buffer zone concept. If the Soviets are thinking more in terms of offense, as they seem to be lately, East Europe contains strategically vital terrain, with the northern tier forming a salient pointed at the heart of Western Europe. The degree of importance attributed to the East European armed forces is problematical, and the evidence is conflicting. The East European armies are being modernized and integrated to a greater degree into the Pact structure, but there is no way to know how much of this is politically motivated window dressing.

The Pact may serve a control function by legitimizing a Soviet military presence disposed to insure satellite subservience. This was obviously true in 1956 and 1968, but may be less true today. It can be argued that troops in place in an alliance structure can better accomplish a police role in the satellite states than could Soviet divisions rushed from western Russia, but indeed sizable reinforcements from the Soviet Union were used in

1968 anyway. The function described by Robin Remington seems to have grown in importance in the seventies, that of the Pact as a forum for communications and the exchange of views. Malcolm Mackintosh views the Pact as "an administrative headquarters through which to harness the resources of Eastern Europe to the job of protecting Soviet security and supporting Soviet foreign policy."⁵³ How do the East Europeans perceive the Warsaw Pact? There is no unity of views. It effectively provides a nuclear umbrella and a formidable defense against NATO. It is a source of legitimacy and prestige to the less popular regimes. It provides the satellite armed forces with modern weapons and is a channel for expressing East European views. Nevertheless, it is not an alliance of equals, and, with the exception of the East Germans and Bulgarians, there is probably growing resentment of Soviet domination.

From the vantage point of the Warsaw Pact high command the alliance is a fraternal gathering of equals, held together by the exercise of Leninist teachings and principles, with communists as the "cementing force."⁵⁴

B. The Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG). History, politics, and strategy have combined to make East Germany the linchpin of Soviet policy in Europe. Since the end of WW II sizable Soviet troop dispositions have been maintained in East Germany in support of Soviet policy. In the immediate postwar period Soviet forces provided for

the forward deployment of Soviet power, guaranteed the division of Europe, and insured the subjugation of defeated Germany. In the period of consolidation and Stalinization between 1945 and 1953 the Soviet military dominated events in East Germany, built and penetrated the East German Army, and provided a "secure environment" for the establishment of Communist Party control. Large domestic internal security forces augmented the effort. The establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955-56 provided a unified structure into which the GSFG was incorporated. The GSFG has been, and is today the cutting edge of Soviet forces in Europe and receives top priority in weapons, equipment, and personnel.⁵⁵ It would serve as the spearhead of any offensive action in central Europe and would bear the brunt of an allied attack in the central sector. Several things indicate the importance the Soviets place on the GDR as strategic terrain: the rapid rate of modernization within the GSFG, the extensive stockpiling of military supplies and the permanent POL pipelines in East Germany, the hardening of aircraft shelters, and the frequency of military exercises in the GDR.

The status-of-forces agreement signed with the GDR in 1957 differs in an important respect from basing agreement with other satellites. In the GDR the Soviets

can take unilateral military action if, in the Soviet view, security is threatened, a legal incorporation of the Brezhnev doctrine.⁵⁶

The modernization of GSFG in the Khrushchev era emphasized improved combat capabilities and preparations for nuclear war, with stress on firepower and mobility. The ground forces received tactical and air defense missiles, T-62 tanks, antitank missiles, and new river crossing equipment. The tactical air army received MIG-21 and SU-7 tactical aircraft and a new light bomber.⁵⁷

In its only combat action approximately 8 divisions of GSFG participated, without opposition, in the Czech intervention of 1968 and performed quite well in terms of command and control and deployment capabilities.

Standardization and modernization continued forward in the post-invasion period with GSFG remaining number one in priority. The GSFG has 5 armies (3 tank and 2 motor rifle), with 20 divisions, 370000 men, 7000 tanks, and 3000 infantry fighting vehicles. (Over one third are BMP's), The sixteenth air army has 133 helicopters, 900 combat aircraft and 60,000 personnel. The GSFG's disposition of forces is depicted on a map in the appendix.⁵⁸

By Soviet testimony the close coordination of the East German Army with the GSFG approaches unit integration. For example, the Seventh East German Panzer division is "bonded" with the Soviet guards tank army, and the ninth

East German Panzer Division operates with Soviet Strike Forces.⁵⁹ However, beyond tactical integration, which serves Soviet interests, the existence of a communist brotherhood melding Soviet soldier to German soldier is problematical.⁶⁰

The attribution of a political role to the GSFG introduces some complexities, since the East German regimes under both Ulbricht and Honecker have eagerly sought the continued presence of a huge number of Soviet troops. The GSFG plays a legitimizing role for the oft times unpopular communist regime and tends to guarantee the Soviet commitment to the vital interests of the GDR. The East Germans have never been enthusiastic about force reduction negotiations and nuclear free zone proposals, since both threatened Soviet troop withdrawals. Until the treaties of the early seventies the GSFG played an important political role for the GDR in propping up Ulbricht's claims to separate sovereignty, and in intimidating his own population. It is also a visible counterweight to FRG and NATO forces in West Germany. From the Kremlin's point of view the degree to which the GSFG serves a police function is probably diminishing. Since the Berlin riots of 1953 the GSFG has become the USSR's most dependable European ally. Even if trouble threatened, it is doubtful if 20 divisions would be necessary to restore order. And it should be noted that these divisions are tailored and trained for a strictly combat role.

Considering the political realities, the GSFG may be thought of by the Kremlin as a potential police force for Poland and Czechoslovakia more than for the GDR. Using the GSFG on a fictitious field exercise to police the northern tier is less conspicuous than a deployment from the rear.

The familiar arguments attributed to the Soviet for maintaining the military status quo in East Germany should be mentioned: the GSFG provides a political trump card around Berlin, large Soviet forces deter Western adventurism, nuclear war requires great numbers of readily available reinforcements, and the corollary to flexible response - conventional war with massed armor is a realistic option. A quite popular and convincing view is that the sheer weight of inertia keeps the GSFG unchanged, with a conservative Soviet military establishment diligently safeguarding its interests against encroachment by a Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy unsure of the risks attendant to reduction. Thomas Wolfe offers several reasons why troop reduction proposals given lip service in the past might be more attractive now. Troop reduction could give validity to Soviet propaganda, particularly in the present context of Western disarray, it would save money, it would allow greater flexibility in addressing the China conflict, geographically it would favor the Soviet Union, which is in closer proximity to the central region than NATO's strongest member, and lastly,

the treaties the USSR has with the East Europeans would maintain the machinery necessary to reassert the status quo ante.⁶¹

C. The East German National People's Army (NVA)⁶²

The Yalta and Potsdam agreements forbade a German military force, but the Soviet military administration in East Germany started building one almost immediately in the form of a paramilitary people's police, adding shortly thereafter, a frontier police. Both came under the newly formed German Interior Ministry. In 1948 the People's Police became the Garrisoned People's Police (KVP), about 60,000 uniformed personnel under strict communist control. Many ex-soldiers and POW's belonged to the KVP. Between 1948 and 1953 fledgling naval and air police units also were formed, and all three services were trained, equipped, armed, and indoctrinated by the Soviets. By 1953 the KVP had 7 divisions and 100,000 men. All police were under the control of the Minister of Interior, Willie Stoph. In 1956 the KVP became the national people's army. A Ministry of National Defense was created and Willie Stoph was named Defense Minister. The army, navy, and air police became the army, navy, and air forces totalling 120,000 men. The Interior Ministry retained a number of internal security forces, including the border police, but the border police transferred to the Defense Ministry in 1961. Soviet indoctrination was intensive in the early years of the KVP. Many officer cadre were trained in the Soviet Union, and Soviet

officers supervised police activities at all levels. Soviet dissatisfaction with the performance of some units during the 1953 Berlin uprising led to a purge of over 10,000 East German police personnel.

When the GDR joined the Warsaw Pact, all its military forces came under the Joint Warsaw Pact Command, the only satellite armed forces in that category. In 1961 the border troops also came under Pact control. In 1960 Colonel-General Heinz Hoffman became Minister of Defense, and a National Defense Council was created, chaired by Party and State leader Walter Ulbricht. At the time of construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 the NVA and the border troops were both used to seal the Berlin frontier. The East German Army was not popular with the East Germans despite a long German military tradition and despite the use of traditional German uniforms and customs by the NVA, so universal conscription was initiated by the armed forces in 1962. By 1962 over 30,000 members of the NVA and the border guard had defected to the West. The closing of the frontier slowed the flow to a trickle. In 1962 the NVA took over the Soviet Garrison in East Berlin, a political move which was undercut by the 1971 Four-Power agreement.

The Soviets have set about building a modern, reliable East German Army, and with considerable success. The East German forces were given nuclear delivery systems in the mid-sixties, although the nuclear warheads remain in

Soviet custody.⁶³ Today the NVA has 105,000 men in 2 tank divisions and 4 motor rifle divisions and a total of 1700 tanks. The Navy has 16,000 men and a small surface fleet, the air force 36,000 men and 441 combat aircraft. Reserves total 405,000 men. The East German armed forces are the most modern of the satellite armies and are directly modeled on their Soviet equivalents in organization, tactics, and training.

97% of the German officer corps belongs to the SED⁶⁴ and, according to Dale Herspring, the Party exercises absolute and complete control over the armed forces. He further maintains that the German Officer Corps is a highly trained, very dependable elite which is imbued with communist ideology.⁶⁵ The contention that the East German military elite, although politically aware and active, is completely subservient to political direction from the Party is consistent with historical German experience. An other point to be made is that the East German army pressured for, and obtained in 1961, a revamped party apparatus within the armed forces which accommodated the demands of a modern, technical, and professional force. The political officers henceforth were trained as professionals rather than as propaganda hacks, and they gained acceptance by the officer corps on their merit. In fact the Party then had to guard against assimilation and too great a consensus of interests to insure that the political officers' control function was

not compromised.⁶⁶ A. Ross Johnson sees another implication in the professionalization of the East German military establishment, beyond the duality of military proficiency and political reliability claimed by Herspring. He foresees the growing pride and self awareness of the military elite as a source of tension and dissention between the NVA and the East German political leadership, and between the East German military elite and its Soviet military mentors. On the one hand, there is evidence that the long term effort by the Soviets to insure a reliable East German military force has been successful. The German officer corps derives from the working class, is Soviet trained, armed, and equipped, functions as a part of a Soviet military alliance, and has a special stake in maintaining close relations with the Soviets. Moscow has continued close support for the training and equipping of the East Germans and has recognized their growing professionalism. On the other hand, Johnson questions whether Soviet concessions to the sensitivities of the East European are merely palliatives. Several facts argue against an equalization of status among Pact members, viz: the Soviet's obsession with secrecy, a jealous concern with super power prerogatives, well documented Soviet arrogance toward her own allies, the priority given to Middle East clients (over the East Europeans) for modern military hardware, Soviet suspicions about

East European loyalties, and the secondary role usually given the East Europeans in Warsaw Pact military operations.⁶⁷ The Germans must sense these factors to one degree or another, but they are a distinctly special case and do not present the Soviets with as many problems as the other satellites. Johnson offers four examples of disharmony in Eastern Europe, but in only one case do the Germans share the concerns of their neighbors, and that is in the realm of a guaranteed Soviet nuclear umbrella in the event of conflict in Europe. The arms negotiations have caused both East and West Europeans to be apprehensive about super power deals. But the East Germans have not complained about Soviet domination of Warsaw Pact planning, nor about Warsaw Pact cost sharing and "offset" payments for Soviet troops in East Europe. On the sensitive issue of Pact military support for the Soviets in the Far East, support not provided for by the Warsaw treaty but requested by Moscow of the East Europeans since 1970, only the East Germans have agreed to a commitment. The Soviet - GDR Treaty of 1975 extends the GDR's commitment worldwide.⁶⁸ It is probably safe to assume that the East German military is professionally closer to the Soviets than any other East European army. General Hoffman has even commanded joint pact military maneuvers on several occasions. And he stated in 1972 that plans

were in progress to extend Soviet - East German military integration down to unit level,⁶⁹ certainly convincing evidence of the direction of change.

D. Deployments and Military Doctrine in the GDR.

Both politics and geography make the European central region critical to the Soviets. The present distribution of Soviet troops points up the emphasis. 27 of 31 divisions are located in the northern tier. A mix of factors determines their exact dispositions and it would be difficult, if not fruitless, to discriminate among these factors to determine why the units are where they are now. It would be particularly challenging to determine Soviet thinking on how much of the force structure is dedicated to combat and police roles and what percentage of the present deployment is negotiable without degrading what the Soviets perceive as the Pact's vital functions.⁷⁰ Beyond comparing the NATO forces to the WTO, one is left with pure speculation. Despite the fact that certain traditional tasks of the Warsaw Pact forces have obviously been modified, deleted, or amplified with time, the total manpower and force distribution in the WTO have not changed significantly except in Czechoslovakia. The size of the GSFG has not changed since WWII except for minor adjustments in 1955, 1956, 1958, 1962, 1964, and 1968. As mentioned earlier modernization has changed the nature of the force radically, but not its size. It is probably

not unreasonable to assume that, as with American troops in the FRG, the number and distribution of Soviet troops in Europe result primarily from chance, inertia, and past events, and politics inhibits adjustments. Contingency planning may envision redeployment if hostilities threaten, with present dispositions as givens rather than as derivatives of scenario requirements.

The forward disposition of the GSFG accords well with Soviet doctrine and makes the Soviet redeployment problem much less than that of NATO. On the defense the forward deployment provides a substantial buffer for the Soviet homeland and maximizes air defense effectiveness. On the offense the GDR is a perfect spring board for thrusts into the West European heartland.

In the Khrushchev era great emphasis was placed on nuclear strikes and rapid exploitation, at some expense to support and staying power. Under Brezhnev the Soviets achieved strategic nuclear parity, built up their conventional forces in Europe, and are in the process of beefing up the Warsaw Pact's theater nuclear forces. The basic offensive doctrine has not changed: swift, powerful breakthrough operations with armor heavy forces using massive firepower to smash enemy defenses and permit deep penetrations into his rear. The Soviets consider nuclear conflict in Europe in the event of hostilities to be very likely, and may even consider nuclear preemption if NATO's use of nuclear weapons seems imminent. Because the Soviets

consider all of Europe and contiguous areas to be one theater, the nuclear weapons in Western Russia would most likely be employed to support a tactical nuclear war. With the growth of the Soviets' strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals the Soviets seem more confident that a strategic exchange could be deterred, even if the theater war escalated. The GSFG is well equipped and prepared for nuclear conflict. It is completely mobile in armored fighting vehicles, well trained in CBR procedures, and possesses the latest Soviet models of nuclear capable missiles, aircraft, and artillery. Great stress is placed on the opening bombardment of an attack, and all systems would be employed to deliver conventional, and probably nuclear fires in order to crush, shock and disperse the defenders. Much attention has been given lately to the GSFG's supposed capability to employ the basic Soviet tenet of surprise and leap to the attack from a standing start in less than 48 hours.⁷¹ This capability is untested and must be critically examined in light of the Soviet obsession with initially having a heavy preponderance of forces. A standing start permits little concentration of units. The Soviet forces have a high density of air defense and antitank weapons and expect to push forward after the initial breakthrough with rapid rates of advance, up to 60 miles per day, knocking out enemy armor and maintaining control of the skies. Air superiority

will permit the use of the transport aircraft and helicopters available to the GSFG, as well as the use of on-call airborne forces.

Soviet doctrine accommodates conventional warfare in Central Europe, and the relentless buildup in the conventional capabilities of GSFG in the last ten years attests to it. However the conventional emphasis should not distract from the basic tenets of Soviet doctrine. Large modern conventional forces are needed to fight the land battle, but a nuclear attack to achieve in-depth massive destruction is still a dominant Soviet concept. Theater nuclear weapons are still a fundamental instrument for destroying NATO's nuclear capabilities, command and control, and ground formations, for isolating the battlefield, and for breaching the main line of defense.⁷² The GSFG, more than any other Soviet force, is highly integrated with the most modern conventional and tactical nuclear weapons and the pick of Soviet military manpower so as to serve as the cutting edge of any Soviet attack plan in Europe. GSFG has been tailored to fit the doctrine it must implement. The training of GSFG units emphasizes surprise, deception, speed, massed armor, nuclear exchanges, and deep penetrations supported by massed firepower. GSFG has always had first priority on men and equipment and continues to receive it. The obvious implication is that the same priority would apply in the event of hostilities. The NVA would then be integrated into the Soviet fronts formed along the

East German border, probably a three division German army per front in the South and Center sectors. All fronts would be under Soviet control.⁷³ This employment is an exception to the standard employment of East European troops as second echelon and support elements. Increasing reliability and effectiveness must play a large part in the decision to integrate East German forces into the Soviet fronts. Since the inclusion of the NVA into the Soviet first echelon has only evolved with the improvement of NVA capabilities, it is interesting to speculate on the effect this has had on Soviet estimates of the size of forces needed in GSFG.

Another area of speculation relates to the effect of the build up of Soviet theater nuclear weapons on the role of the GSFG. Despite the continuing importance of conventional striking power, at some point the sheer weight of nuclear strike capability should decrease the need for massive number of troops in the forward positions.

The Soviet propensity for a redundant capability and the evolution of Soviet doctrine mesh well with the capabilities of the military forces in East Germany. The GSFG seems eminently suited for implementing current Soviet doctrine.

E. Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR). By 1971 the Soviet Union and its allies had offered 44 proposals for negotiations on European security and force

reduction, an indication of the level of interest in the subject. In 1952 Stalin suggested a neutralized, disarmed, and unified Germany. In 1955 and 1956 Khrushchev made various proposals aimed at preventing West Germany's entry into NATO, and subsequently recommended a negotiated arms reduction plan and nuclear disarmament. Proposals for troop reductions, nonaggression treaties, nuclear free zones, and total disarmament continued throughout Khrushchev's tenure. A small non-negotiated troop reduction did take place in Europe on both sides in 1964. Under Brezhnev a different pattern evolved. In 1966 the Soviets recommended a European security conference and repeated this proposal at Karlovy Vary in 1967. The proposal was again reviewed when the storm over Czechoslovakia subsided. The Kremlin avoided mutual force reduction talks in the late sixties out of reluctance to give the impression it was aiding the American effort in Vietnam, and also because it felt the reductions would occur unilaterally anyway due to American domestic pressures. It was not until 1970 that the Soviets shifted to a more receptive line based on NATO's insistence that issues like Berlin and MBFR must be dealt with prior to a European security conference. The WTO meeting in Budapest in June 1970 offered the first hint that the Soviets would discuss the question of foreign troop reductions. Again in 1971 at the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress, and in Tbilisi,

Brezhnev repeated this view. The Warsaw Pact meeting in Prague in 1972 outlined a recommendation directed mainly at guidelines for CSCE.

Several factors influenced the Soviet shift on MBFR: the effects of Ostpolitik, problems with China, the achievement of strategic parity with the United States and the initiatives associated with this new power relationship, interests in advancing detente, and the loosening of ties between the NATO allies which provided an opportunity to be exploited.⁷⁴ The Soviet seem more sophisticated and subtle in an era of detente in pursuing their strategic and political aims in Europe. In part this is an adjustment to the changes in Western policy and in part a result of new confidence which derives from great power status and increased military power.

The Soviets acceded to Western demands that MBFR talks must accompany CSCE, and both multilateral negotiations began in 1973. The Russians had indicated a willingness to negotiate the dissolution of both NATO and the WTO in favor of a pan European security arrangement, but since Soviet emphasis on existing borders and the finality of WWII territorial adjustments has never abated, Soviet sincerity on this point is in doubt. The Soviet Union has never accepted the Western use of the word "BALANCED", and in fact rejected its incorporation into the title of the talks. The Western view that since the theater balance favors the Soviets, the Warsaw Pact should proportionately reduce

more is not acceptable to the Russians, who consider the present disparities stabilizing and arrived at due to the historical evolution of forces. The Soviets tabled the first proposal in November 1973, a plan for a three-stage reduction of men and equipment of all alliance forces on both sides totalling about 15 percent. NATO's counter proposal envisioned an asymmetrical reduction, initially of only Soviet and U.S. forces, down to a common manpower ceiling of about 700,000 in the NATO guidelines area (NGA - the Central Region of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg.) NATO was concerned with Soviet armor preponderance in the Central Region and also with the close proximity of the Soviet Union as compared to the distance of withdrawal for U.S. forces. The Soviets objected to the exclusion of nuclear delivery units and the Bundeswehr and considered the unequal percentages an attempt to exploit the Socialist alliance. Soviet emphasis on nuclear weapons and the West German army and lack of emphasis on U.S. troop reductions identify real Soviet concerns - the ability of American forward based systems to deliver nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, and the possible emergence of a European or West German nuclear force if the Americans withdraw. On the NATO side the proposals suggest a willingness to present obviously unattractive options to the Soviets, a reflection of the environment from which the initial MBFR initiatives

emerged. In the late sixties NATO feared the Mansfield clique in the United States would force unilateral NATO reductions, and so the MBFR proposals were made to defuse the issue.

On the Soviet/WTO side several factors argue in favor of reductions. Politically the NATO reductions could have a destabilizing effect on the Western alliance and could reduce American influence in Europe. Economically the Soviets could save money and manpower, while the relaxation of the atmosphere would foster Soviet trade relationships in Europe. As mentioned, geography favors the Russians in mutual withdrawals. Legally the matrix of Soviet-East European treaties insures Soviet access to Eastern Europe, while the Americans depend almost exclusively on the NATO alliance arrangements. And finally, reductions may permit the Soviets to concentrate more on the China threat.⁷⁵ The root question is, how do the Soviets leaders perceive the role of its massive forces in the Central Region? Will a reduction of military power adversely affect the Kremlin's ability to retain its hegemony in East Europe and project its influence into Western Europe? Although a question for kremlinologists past history indicates that the political leadership can sell to the Soviet military leaders a phased reduction which does not alter the present imbalances.⁷⁶

In December 1975 NATO amended its proposal to include a Western reduction of 1000 tactical nuclear warheads, 54 F-4 aircraft, 36 Pershing missiles, and 29,000 U.S. troops in exchange for 68,000 Soviet troops and 1700 medium tanks. NATO also agreed to include air-forces in the reductions. The WTO restated its insistence on national totals and symmetrical reductions. In February 1976 the WTO put forth a proposal for equal percentage cuts, initially only by the US and USSR, with a freeze on national force ceilings. NATO rejected equal percentage reductions. In June 1976 the WTO finally released its first strength data on WTO forces with figures below the NATO estimates.⁷⁷ In November 1976 the Bucharest conference communique proposed an agreement reducing first use of nuclear weapons. NATO rejected the proposal.

The East Germans have varied little from Soviet guidance on arms control, even when it seemed in their interests to do so. Particularly prior to the diplomatic breakthrough of the 1970-73 period, Pankow's diplomatic isolation and dependence on the Soviet Union caused East German policy makers some agonies. Failure to follow the Soviet lead might jeopardize the GDR-USSR relationship, but acquiescence might threaten the GDR's vital interests. The Soviet arms policies usually carried the day in Pankow.

Since the early fifties the East Germans have made many arms control proposals, but with little variation among them. A popular item since 1954 was a mutual renunciation of force agreement with the FRG, however,

when Brandt offered to sign such an agreement in 1967. Ulbricht recanted demanding prior recognition of the GDR. The East Germans were also interested in mutual reductions of arms and arms expenditures by the FRG and GDR. There have been several such proposals, ranging from Gradual Reductions to total disarmament, offered by the GDR since the late 1950's. Presumably any agreement reached prior to 1973 would have been in bilateral negotiations, where again the issue of formal recognition would have surfaced. The most popular measure, adamantly pursued by Ulbricht, was for an agreement with the FRG renouncing the use of nuclear weapons. In this the Soviet Union strongly concurred. The East Germans have repeatedly proposed that both Germanies renounce nuclear weapons and have offered the idea in various forums. Two considerations may have been at work here. The GDR sincerely fears an FRG with nuclear arms, but also recognized the propaganda value of offering peace proposals in its campaign for international recognition. The catalog of arms proposals mentioned thus far supports East Germany's national interests and also is compatible with the Kremlin's policy of limiting the West German military threat. In multilateral MBFR negotiations,⁷⁸ however, the interests of the Soviet Union do not necessarily coincide with those of the GDR. Reductions in the NGA will reduce the Soviet presence in the GDR and may enhance the FRG's military advantage over the

GDR. Nevertheless, the GDR has not publically demonstrated any disharmony with the objectives or proposals of the WTO since the talks in Vienna were convened.

IV. TRENDS.

The purpose of this section is to examine current GDR-USSR relations in order to determine political and military trends. The preceding discussions of political and military relations were intended to put current opinions in a comprehensible context.

A. Political Trends - Western Sources. There are few specialists in the field of Soviet - East German relations and even fewer acknowledged experts. The following is a representative sampling of current opinion from the pick of the experts.

There is some divergence of opinion about future directions, but a general consensus that the complex of agreements reached in the period 1970-73 (the Bonn-Moscow and Bonn-Warsaw accords, Four-Power Agreement, and Fundamental Treaty) marked an historical turning point in European affairs. The postwar German problem has been the single greatest challenge to the normalization of relations in Central Europe. The accords which were reached ushered in a new era.

As a result of the diplomatic breakthroughs of the early seventies the status of the GDR as international pariah ended. The GDR has been recognized by virtually

the entire international community, including the United States in September 1974, and in September 1973 both Germanies were admitted to the United Nations. On 1 August 1975 the 35 participants to CSCE signed the Helsinki Agreement, in the view of some the final acceptance by the West of the legitimacy of the borders of Eastern Europe.

In Wolfgang Klaiber's opinion⁷⁹ the Soviet Union's motives in seeking the West German treaties were to entice the FRG from NATO, improve trade relations, and validate the WWII borders. Only the last served the interests of the GDR, and Ulbricht feared that the tradeoff jeopardized East German political interests. In removing Ulbricht as an impediment to negotiations the Soviet Union sought a replacement who would satisfy at least three requirements, to maintain the SED's leading role, to support Soviet foreign policy, and to support the WTO and COMECON. Although a hardliner was preferred, liberalization within the required constraints was acceptable. Liberalization under new leadership might, however, court trouble from certain sectors of potential dissidence within East German society: the intelligentsia, youth, trade unions, and party revisionists.

Melvin Croan⁸⁰ details the nature of the Ulbricht years to highlight the essential dichotomy in East Germany's conduct of affairs. At times the tactically agile Ulbricht

toed the Moscow line with unswearing fealty, and at other times he was unyielding in defense of East German vital interests. This split increased toward the end of his reign. As a Stalinist dictator his rule was absolute, but his new economic system yielded an "Economic Miracle" which produced the highest standard of living in the Communist world and an industrial power among the top ten in the world. The key to economic success was rationalization and modernization by a managerial - technocratic elite that in true German tradition exercised mobility and flexibility without demanding liberalization. The society remained in a cultural straight jacket, with no allowance for intellectual heterodoxy. (The fates of Stefan Heym, Robert Havemann, Wolf Biermann, and Christa Wolf bear witness.) Croan sees the present strategy of the GDR under Honecker as one of maintaining the dual track inherited from Ulbricht. Diplomatic successes and relative stability under a heavy influx of visitors from West Germany have heightened East German confidence to continue contacts with the West. However, Honecker does not have the political strength nor the desire to stray far from the Soviet fold, and in that sense the pursuit of East German national interests has faltered. If the Soviets dictate to lessening of contacts with West Germany, Honecker will comply.

Henry Krisch⁸¹ perceptively assesses Erich Honecker's foreign policy and concludes that the penetration of the GDR by Soviet influence has gone so far as to threaten the national sovereignty of the GDR. Honecker himself has encouraged a special brand of nationalism which makes a distinction between German "nationality" tied to historical German culture and a GDR "nation" which owes its allegiance to the Socialist Community, or the USSR. Honecker has abandoned Ulbricht's pretensions of offering a developed German socialist model for the bloc, a provocative effort in the Kremlin's view, and has coupled servility to the Soviet Union with an attempt at demarcation or decoupling from West German influence. The policy of abgrenzung is Honecker's less than successful method of insulating the GDR ideologically from the effects of closer ties with the FRG and includes an insistence on the unchallenged finality of the division of Germany. The close economic ties between the GDR and FRG and the massive special visit programs brought about by the agreements from 1971 to 1975 severely limit Honecker's efforts. In 1975 3.5 million West Germans visited the East, while 600,000 mostly elderly and retired East Germans went West. Honecker is still dependent on the USSR to protect the GDR's stability and legitimacy while he works at his special brand of nation building. The

Soviets, however, demonstrate an unlimited capacity for exploiting the GDR for their own interests. Economically there is a close interdependence. For example, the Soviets in 1974 took 31 percent of the GDR's exports and the GDR took 23 percent of the Soviet Union's exports. There is also a thick web of agreements and joint industrial projects between the two countries and an ever-increasing degree of political ideological cooperation exhibited in GDR institutions, legislation and political practices, all patterned on the Soviet model. The GDR is an ardent supporter of the WTO and COMECON, and is eagerly pursuing integration, and even assimilation, by the Soviet Union. In 1974 a prominent East German approvingly remarked, "there is no sector of work or of daily life that is not shaped in part by the fraternal relations to the Soviet Union." Kirsch mentions the importance of the NVA to the GDR as one of the trappings of sovereignty and as an access channel to the WTO, and stresses its absolute subjugation to Soviet control. There are problems on the horizon for Honecker. He has effectively entrenched his regime at the expense of his opponents, such as Willie Stoph, and has revised the history of the Ulbricht era in good communist fashion, while moderating the strict controls of his predecessor. Unfortunately for Honecker, the relaxation and an economic downturn occurred together. The increase in raw material and fuel prices and a growing dollar debt against Western accounts have impaired living standards, and the proximity

to the glittering West German economy raises fears of domestic turmoil. Another constant source of vexation to the Honecker regime is Berlin, and the 1971 Four-Power Agreement is a prime example of Soviet disdain for East German sensitivities when larger interests are at stake. The Soviets insist on Four-Power control not only to maintain a lever on the West but to foreclose on the possibility of overly warm GDR-FRG relations. The GDR has overcome the challenge of unification with the signing of the final act in Helsinki, but not the challenge of the FRG occupying half of East Germany's capital city. Several incidents in the last two years indicate that Berlin will continue to be a source of tensions. Traffic disruptions, violent objections to the establishment of FRG environmental and antitrust offices in West Berlin, and periodic threats to the corridors have served as signals for shifts in Soviet foreign policy in other areas. The GDR acts at Moscow's bidding in Berlin, in the long run to the benefit of the West, since the Soviet Union's strategic interests dictate a more moderate tone. In any case, the problem has not been solved in Berlin, only regulated.

John M. Starrels⁸² describes East Germany's foreign policy as a unique combination of transnational integration with the Soviet Union and expanded western and third world contacts. On questions of military security the GDR is extremely conservative and sensitive to its exposed position as the jump off point for an attack or as the

target for an invasion, depending on the scenario. It supports CSCE, MBFR and SALT, but in terms of a Soviet puppet. The GDR has moved to establish a regional sphere of influence in the northern tier, but under Honecker, in an understated way that does not threaten Soviet supremacy. Relations with Bonn present East Germany its greatest challenge. Between 1971 and 1976 approximately 15 million West Germans visited the East, and the GDR has recently taken various administrative steps to stem the flow and reduce personal contacts. However, economically the interchange increases steadily, particularly in light of the GDR's special EEC status which supports ten percent of East Germany's trade portfolio. Starrels emphasizes the threat Berlin presents to the GDR's security, but only in terms of an infectious political virus. The GDR is apparently embarked on a new strategy of peaceful engagement with the West, in part due to a new regime and new self confidence, but also because of Soviet encouragement. Domestically the integration with the Soviet Union moves ahead rapidly, while the SED offers up an image of statehood which is, at the least, confusing. It is possible however, that despite the dominating presence of the Soviets and alluring proximity of the West Germans the rather passive East German population is developing a type of national pride. The startling successes in international athletic competition may reflect this, and certainly nurture it.

J. F. Brown⁸³ depicts the GDR as having transitioned from a weak and precarious satellite to a stable, powerful ally of the Soviet Union. Ulbricht's assertiveness in defense of GDR interests was only tolerated until it conflicted with Soviet interests in detente. His paranoia toward Ostpolitik resulted in his removal in favor of a more compliant leadership. Brown envisions a more two-sided exchange in effect today between Pankow and Moscow and points out that East Germany is the Soviets' greatest success story. It has a developed economy which supports the Soviet Union, occupies a key strategic position, and is a barrier to Polish ambitions. However, it is still without a solid national basis and is susceptible to cultural and ideological encroachment from the FRG. Ultimately, the Soviet Union remains the arbiter of the GDR's fate.

A series of reports⁸⁴ began appearing in the Western press in November 1976 which indicates that the potential unrest predicted by Wolfgang Klaiber and Henry Krisch is now a reality in the GDR. Dissident intellectuals are at the forefront of a wave of political resistance and protest which has resulted in a sharp crackdown by the government. One source of restiveness is the government's resistance to the flood of emigration applications brought on by publication of the text of the Helsinki accords, which East Germany signed. The SED is somewhat perplexed at the reaction of its affluent and usually quiescent

population, and the current hardline approach may be as much for Moscow's benefit as for domestic purposes. Several popular heroes of the counter elite (Wolf Biermann, expelled from the GDR, Jordan Fuchs and Robert Havemann, both recently arrested) have been focal points of the unrest, which may mean the current of resistance does not run deep into the mass of workers. Nevertheless, Honecker and his Soviet masters may be restudying some of the side effects of detente in the GDR in light of recent events.

Two examples of American domestic controversy reveal the problems implicit in viewing Communist relations through Western eyes. The American press has emphasized the human rights aspects of the Helsinki Agreement and has sharply attacked the so-called "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine" ⁸⁵ for the organic congeniality it imputes to Soviet suzerainty in Eastern Europe. Conversely, the Soviets and East Germans have heralded the Helsinki accords as according a final measure of legitimacy to the division of Europe and are perplexed that anyone would question Sonnenfeldt's recognition of a defacto condition. In fact, the East German Government is surprised that its own people view the Helsinki Agreement as they do. Neither the Soviets nor the East Germans anticipated the "divisive" reaction which has occurred.

B. Political Trends - Communist Sources

The Communist press does not point out problems between the Soviets and East Germans directly, but even inter alia suggestions of disagreement are lacking from recent pronouncements.

In the summer of 1974 a series of articles appeared in Pravda and Izvestia attacking FRG provocations in West Berlin and taking the opportunity to emphasize the consonance of views between the GDR and USSR with respect to Berlin.⁸⁶ The Soviets attacked the idea that previous agreements justified FRG political activities in Berlin and accused West Germany of reviving the cold war.

A key address by Leonid Brezhnev⁸⁷ at the GDR's 25th Anniversary celebration in Berlin made the usual point but at length and with great force. The GDR and USSR have forged a fraternal alliance and the GDR recognized the importance of sustaining this alliance by following the Soviet lead. The SED rescued East Germany from the monstrous evil of German imperialism and fascism and now promotes socialist peace in central Europe. Economic and political ties have cemented solidarity and sealed the bonds which unite the GDR and USSR. The GDR must never lose sight of who her true friends are. Honecker responded in kind and professed a readiness to draw ever closer in every way to political unity with the Soviet Union. The distinction drawn by Honecker between historical Germans and socialism's new German man accords more with ideology than experience.

On 7 October 1975 the GDR and USSR signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid. The negotiations were reported at length in the Soviet press.⁸⁸

Emphasis was placed on the open-ended commitment of the GDR to support the USSR militarily, and there were the usual references to solidarity.

On 18 May 1976 Erich Honecker addressed the ninth Party Congress of the SED and made two main points: that the German problem was settled (a point with which the FRG quickly took issue), and that the "indestructible alliance" with the Soviet Union insured absolute faithfulness to the Soviet line.⁸⁹ M.A. Suslov also addressed the Congress. Brezhnev's absence can be attributed to concern for his health, rather than a snub of his most devoted ally. Suslov praised the new German man, who has rejected his heritage of fascism and imperialism. The paean to the Socialist superman rang rather hollow in Berlin.

A survey of recent articles in International Affairs a Soviet Journal prepared for foreign consumption, reveals quite clearly the current propaganda line as regards the GDR. A lengthy article by Hermann Axen⁹⁰ of the SED politburo proceeds ad nauseum to detail the great debt the GDR owes to the USSR for its birth and development and to encourage an ever closer cohesion and integration within the Socialist Community. A Soviet review of an East German book on international relations⁹¹ praises the authors' heavy

emphasis on Socialist integration and a coordinated Socialist foreign policy. Going beyond the unity and cohesion litany, the book outlines the GDR's growing interaction with the West and the third world, a reflection of increased East German confidence. Another book review, of the second book in a jointly published series on USSR-GDR relations,⁹² offers a solid documentary of events in the early years of the GDR, from a Communist viewpoint. The USSR is accorded a primary role as benevolent protector of its recent adversary. In another article⁹³ the Soviets use the occasion of the 1975 USSR-GDR treaty to highlight the achievements of the GDR under the tutelage of its Soviet mentor. The GDR is described as, "a reliable outpost of peace and Socialism in Central Europe."

Oscar Fischer of the SED Central Committee provided a lengthy piece⁹⁴ on the development of the GDR and the debt owed to the USSR for the GDR's success. Nothing new is added to the neverending praise of Socialist brotherhood and USSR-GDR fraternity. A third Soviet Book Review,⁹⁵ this time of a history of the GDR which was written by the Soviets, makes clear whom the Soviets think is responsible for erecting a Socialist showcase on the ashes of Naziism. In a far-ranging analysis of CSCE⁹⁶ the Soviets point out the finality of European borders, something they are prone to do, and emphasize the forceful way they intend to insure peace in Central Europe, also something they are prone to do. A. Ivanov provides a comprehensive analysis of GDR

development, primarily economic development, in commenting on the SED's 9th Congress.⁹⁷ It is a very laudatory appraisal of the GDR which gives ample space to the Soviet contribution, but focuses on facts and figures in outlining the Republic's accomplishments. Two articles which appeared recently also provide facts and figures on GDR and COMECON economic achievements.⁹⁸ In contrast to the GDR's lead in industrial production among East European satellites, the East Germans are only in the middle of the pack in the production of consumer goods.

Mention should be made of a recent pattern disclosed by press announcements of meetings between Honecker and Brezhnev. Since 1974 they have met regularly in the Spring and the Fall every year, except for the Spring of 1976, when Suslov represented Brezhnev at the 9th Party Congress. Although a minor point, it is an indicator of the regularity with which Honecker receives guidance from the Kremlin.

C. Discussion of Political Trends.

Soviet sources have, in the last two years, underlined three areas in their treatment of the GDR: the noteworthy economic achievements of the East Germans, the growing brotherhood of the two nations and their armed forces, and the abuses of the provisions of the Four-Power Agreement by the FRG. The East German press has closely followed the Soviet lead. Western analysts have highlighted the undying fealty paid by Honecker to Moscow and the advent

of Pankow's West Politik, in concert with Soviet detente initiatives. The bizarre spectacle of Erich Honecker courting Soviet assimilation and East German nationalism simultaneously is of some fascination to observers. In fact, Honecker is given too little credit in comparison with Walter Ulbricht. His tactics are at variance, but his goals are the same, a powerful, sovereign East Germany protected by big brother to the east. Transnationalism is not a likely result of GDR-USSR integration, although the Soviet Union has shown a remarkable facility at incorporating disparate regions into its orbit. The lack of contiguous borders is a fact not lost on Honecker. The Soviet-East German relationship is driven by a matrix of conflicting forces. The dominant factor was, and remains, Soviet Power and Soviet national interests as perceived by the Kremlin and supported by projections of its power. Specifically the Kremlin insists on internal stability under Communist Party direction, and support for Soviet policy within East Europe and toward the West. The East German leadership shares Moscow's goal of domestic tranquility under SED domination but feels threatened by the allure and economic power of the Federal Republic, particularly in Berlin. Great advances have been made diplomatically since 1971, but concomitant with recognition has come the increased penetration of Western influence. Honecker's strategy reflects an irreconcilable schizophrenia. He is pressing for integration

and imitation of the Soviet model, exhorting the East German nation to a measure of national pride, and moving our of necessity to expand GDR ties with the West. The necessity arises from trends in COMECON under Soviet impetus and from a recognition of East German economic interests. The bottom line is domestic reliability, a point underscored by Soviet sensitivities in Berlin. To date the trends are for a harder domestic line by Honecker and continued wooing of Soviet support to guarantee stability while continuing economic initiatives with the West. It seems likely that the Soviets will sacrifice Basket Three of Helsinki in the process. Nothing so far suggests that Moscow questions Honecker's ability or willingness to walk the tightrope in meeting Soviet demands.

D. Military Trends - Western Sources.

Western sources have already been cited extensively in Section III, above. Some recent commentary should be added, however. There is virtual unanimity among serious observers that the Warsaw Pact now possesses a quantitative edge over NATO in the Central Region in every category except nuclear warheads. With minor variations most studies agree that the WTO has a dominant lead in combat power. The current debate centers on how the Soviet Union and her allies might employ that power.

Current Western references for assessing Warsaw Pact combat power in central Europe, and East-German/GSFG capabilities in the GDR include the following:

1. George S. brown, US Military Posture for FY 1976 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1975);
2. James R. Schlesinger, Defense Posture Statement (Washington DC: USGPO, 1976);
3. John M. Collins and John Steven Chwat, The U.S. / Soviet Military Balance (Washington DC: USGPO, 1976);
4. Air Force Magazine, The Military Balance 1976/77, December 76;
5. Air Force Magazine, Soviet Aerospace Almanac 1977; March 77;
6. The Military Balance 1976-77 (London: IISS, 1976);
7. Robert Lucas Fischer, Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces (London: IISS, 1976);
8. "The Security of the FRG and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces," White Paper 1975/1976 (Bonn, Germany: Press and Information Office, 20 Jan 76); and two recent studies, one by LTG James Hollingsworth, and another done by U.S. Senators Nunn and Bartlett for the US Congress. Both of the latter are controversial and both attack NATO's unpreparedness for the Warsaw Pact threat.⁹⁹ The studies listed supra discuss both nuclear and conventional capabilities with varying degrees of emphasis. The most impressive imbalances noted by analysts are in conventional capabilities. John Erickson has written two articles recently¹⁰⁰ which reinforce the alarming testimony concerning the growth of Soviet combat strength in Central Europe.

An article on Soviet compliance with Basket One of the Helsinki Agreement¹⁰¹ points out that the so-called "Military Detente" pursued by the Kremlin is reflected in (unenthusiastic) compliance by the WTO with military exercise notification procedures. A great amount of attention has been paid to the replacements for General Shtemenko, WTO chief of staff until his death on 23 April 1976, and for Marshal Yakubovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the WTO until his death on 30 Nov 76. The selection of the very competent Colonel General Gribkov and the brilliant and politically savvy General Kulikov for the respective posts indicates a continuing high priority for the WTO.¹⁰² The six month delay in appointing Gribkov led to speculation that some pact members again questioned the tradition of exclusively Soviet appointments to high pact positions. An article on standization in the WTO makes the politically salient point that the GDR is only allowed to produce small arms and that its great potential as an arms producer is intentionally not exploited. The same author in another article, attempts to distinguish the roles originally intended for the GSFG: 12-14 divisions for combat and 3-5 divisions for internal GDR security, but this is a questionable hypothesis. He concludes that the present Soviet forces in the GDR possess far more striking power than the earlier versions of the same divisions and thereby provide

the Soviets with an overpowering offensive punch.¹⁰³ Awareness of NATO's declining credibility has elicited a spate of articles on NATO's mistaken perceptions of the Warsaw Pact. One by John H. Morse is representative.¹⁰⁴ He takes NATO to task for ignoring the no-warning attack and nuclear attack scenarios. It is apparently the case that discussions of no-warning attacks are avoided for troop morale purposes, and of nuclear exchanges in deference to West German sensitivities. It should be noted that although East Germany habitually decries NATO's capability to inflict nuclear devastation on both Germanies, no mention is ever made of the build up of Soviet theater nuclear weapons, nor of their provocative nature. Western analyses of Soviet theater doctrine have already been mentioned. Only recently have scholars paid much attention to the subject. Harriet Scott's annotations of Sokolovsky's Military Strategy, 3rd Edition, Adelphi Papers Number 89 and 109,¹⁰⁵ Joseph D. Douglass's The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive, and the US Air Force's translation of the Soviet Military Thought Series are the best sources on current doctrine. All reflect a Soviet emphasis on surprise attack and nuclear employment in central Europe. Mention might also be made of Leon Gouré's The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy and John Erickson's Soviet Military Power.¹⁰⁶

A scan of Western press stories on the GSFG and NVA

over the last twenty years reveals some interesting trends. The initial years of the GSFG were marked by an emphasis in the Western press on the importance of Soviet troops to East German stability, and on the imperial domination of the German scene by the Soviet military. An article in 1965 said that Soviet soldiers are forbidden to mix with the population and would be punished if they did.¹⁰⁷ A series of reports of impending Soviet troop withdrawals appeared in the mid-sixties and included testimony on Ulbricht's strenuous objections to any reduction. By the 1970's press coverage in the West had switched emphasis completely to pointing out the close brotherhood of the GSFG and NVA forces and the growing power of both armies. In 1976 the East German Deputy Defense Minister was quoted as saying, "There is not a single land unit of the national people's army that does not have close contact with the corresponding unit of Soviet forces in Germany."¹⁰⁸

Reporting on the Warsaw Pact has undergone an evolution in only three years. In 1974 an analyst observed that although the WTO was founded to check West German revanchism, "Today, however, Bonn is no longer regarded as a potential enemy," and the Warsaw Pact is only an extension of Soviet foreign policy.¹⁰⁹ By 1976 the headlines threatened devastation at the hands of an offensive minded WTO, ready to attack at any moment and, "Within 48 hours of the start of the attack, the Warsaw Pact forces

would have crossed the Rhine."¹¹⁰ Another article quoted Shtemenko as claiming the prime purpose of the WTO was to suppress counterrevolution in Communist countries, a confusing and inconsistent remark. An East European was quoted at the Communist Party Conference in Berlin in July 1976 as follows, "The enthusiasm of these speeches regarding Moscow's leadership was in direct proportion to the number of Soviet troops stationed on the soil of each speaker,"¹¹¹ a remark more cynical than accurate. The WTO summit meeting in Bucharest in November 1976 received a great deal of press coverage. It was to be a test of Moscow's ability to keep an increasingly independent membership in line in preparation for the Belgrade CSCE Conference in June 1977. The meeting was a qualified success for Brezhnev. The summit communique calls for nuclear disarmament and military detente, and makes several specific proposals for MBFR. These include a total ban on nuclear testing, withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of other states, and the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the WTO. Two new proposals call for a mutual pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons and a ban on expansion of either defense alliance, a ploy aimed at preventing Spain's admission to NATO. The communique urges expansion of "Basket Two" cooperation, indirectly attacks U.S. emphasis on "Basket Three" of the Helsinki accords, and then moves on to encourage intra-alliance WTO cooperation. The PCC established two new WTO

organs, a committee of foreign ministers and a united secretariat, to improve the mechanism of Pact cooperation. This is apparently another effort by the Soviets to enhance at least the illusion of satellite participation, and also to advance East European integration. Overall the conference had a tone more political than military, which is a continuing trend. The upsurge of demands among East European populations, as for example in the GDR, for compliance with the humanitarian elements of the Helsinki Agreement, will test the Kremlin's resolve to maintain a cooperative facade.

A final comment on the Western press concerns coverage of the East German military. In February 1977 the Americans and British reported extensively on an East German mobilization, ostensibly triggered by widespread unrest among the population.¹¹² The West German press reported the same mobilization as a routine exercise, and it was correct.¹¹³ The discrepancy points up a consistent inability of the American press, in particular, to properly assess events in East Germany. News stories about East Germany have frequently been distorted by wishful thinking and lack of comprehension during the past twenty-five years, whereas the West Germans seem finely tuned to realities across the border. In this regard the West Germans offer some revealing data. In their opinion there is no doubt that, when called upon, the NVA will fight against the GDR.

Secondly, the ^WEst German Army has been in a redeployment process from East to West for the last two years in order to adopt a better offensive posture toward the West. And finally, although the NVA and GSFG do not like each other, they have great confidence in each other's military abilities.¹¹⁴

E. Military Trends - Communist Sources.

The twentieth Anniversary of the Warsaw Pact engendered several commemorative volumes from the Moscow presses. The Soviet Foreign Ministry published a collection of documents and materials covering the formal activities of the Warsaw Pact from 1955-1975¹¹⁵ which is useful as reference material, but not very representative of political realities. The declarations and communiques are drawn mostly from the open Soviet press. The cumulative effect of a sequential listing of pronouncements covering twenty years is to point up how modestly actual events have influenced Warsaw Pact propaganda. Three books, published about the same time, provide detailed coverage of the history of the Warsaw Pact and member armies, with the exception of Soviet forces. They also describe the East European armed forces today. Origin of the Peoples' Armies of Member-Countries of the Warsaw Pact¹¹⁶ has a chapter devoted to a detailed explanation of the creation of the NVA. It lays great stress on the Socialist orientation of the training and indoctrination of the East German armed forces and their close brotherhood with

Soviet Forces. A second volume,¹¹⁷ issued by the Defense Ministry, repeats the theme with even greater intensity, portraying the friendship and brotherhood of Soviet and East German military as indivisible. The most informative and detailed book on the Warsaw Pact which the Russians have published recently is Battle Alliance of Fraternal Peoples and Armies.¹¹⁸ The authors display considerable ingenuity in substantiating the antifascist nature and heritage of the GDR armed forces. Emphasis is placed on the total control of the army by the Party. At Battle Station,¹¹⁹ a book dedicated to the GSFG, also puts noticeable stress on the close working relationship between the Soviet and East German armies and the absolute socialist reliability of the GSFG's German brothers-in-arms. One final book will be mentioned, a tome on European security and cooperation published by the Soviet Foreign Ministry after the convening of CSCE.¹²⁰ One of its central themes concerns the rejection of the Western concept of "Balance of Power" in Europe in favor of "Peaceful Coexistence." In Marxian terms this amounts to acquiescence in Soviet extensions of power and influence short of war, and acceptance of the status quo in East Europe. In regard to military doctrine and strategy in Europe, the Western sources cited earlier draw, for the most part, from the recent Soviet texts on the subject by Sokolovsky, Sidorenko, Savkin, and Grechko,¹²¹ and the material will not be

rehashed here. Critics sometimes question the validity of using open sources to assess Soviet doctrine and strategy. The best counter argument is the fact of the armies in the field, their weapons, equipment and training, and the actions of the Soviet Government, which have adhered quite closely to the doctrine and strategy in the basic texts.

A selection of recent articles in Kommunist Vooruzhenykh Sil on the NVA and GSFG gives a flavor to Soviet and East German military opinion about military affairs in East Germany. An article by a senior East German political officer describes the goals of Socialist competition in the army -- ideological indoctrination, military skill, discipline, and encouragement toward sports and culture. Pride of place goes to political reliability.¹²² An excellent rendition of the standard line is provided by a Soviet Colonel describing socialist internationalism as practiced by the East Germans.¹²³ Honecker's convoluted nationalism, which mixes historical German/ antifascism and socialist internationalism, is outlined, and internationalism is made identical with Soviet brotherhood. The main objective of the NVA, according to Defense Minister Hoffman, is to become as one with the GSFG, eternal friends and brothers-in-arms, tied one to the other by common goals, a common class, and a common ideology. Integration with the Soviets in the military sector is to be extended

to all sectors, and to both socialist alliances, the WTO and COMECON. A series of articles by Admiral Ferner, Deputy Defense Minister and Commander of the main Political Directorate of the NVA, offers additional insights to East German political military thought.¹²⁴ On the occasion of the NVA's eighteenth anniversary Admiral Ferner depicts NATO as a threat to Socialism and the Soviet armed forces as brother soldiers to the NVA, ever ready to defend against the threat. The brotherhood of the two armies is the guiding principle of the SED's military policy. To commemorate the thirtieth birthday of the defeat of Hitler Ferner recounts the glorious achievements of the Soviet armed forces in liberating East Germany, and tasks the NVA to draw ever closer to its saviors. The twentieth anniversary of the NVA is marked by Ferner with lavish praise for the great progress made in two decades of building a socialist army. The East German armed forces are communist and from the working classes in overwhelming numbers. He notes the new GDR-USSR Pact as a signal of ever closer ties between the two countries. Some short clippings from the Military News section tell us a bit about the GSFG.¹²⁵ There are special "brotherhood rooms" set aside in officers' clubs and other places throughout both the GSFG and NVA for Soviets and East Germans to meet and fraternize. The Soviets and East Germans produced a formal plan in 1974 for the increased integration and cooperation of the NVA and GSFG at all levels. The

officers of the NVA and GSFG hold joint political indoctrination seminars on a regular basis, in addition to their respective national programs of indoctrination.

The Soviet Military Herald also carries relevant articles on military affairs in the GDR. The East Germany military attache wrote a brief piece lauding the close and constant friendship of the NVA and Soviet forces on the eighteenth anniversary of the East German army.¹²⁶ An interview with the commander of the East German rocket forces elicits both military and political responses, a rarity. The general considers the tactical task primary and recognizes the decisive role played by GSFG in helping his forces accomplish their missions. The ties with GSFG are fundamental and complete, but apparently contacts with other military forces in the WTO are rare.¹²⁷ Marshal Yakobovsky's article on the occasion of the Warsaw Pact's twentieth anniversary traces the development of the Pact from the close comradeship and common hatred of Nazis experienced by East Europeans during WWII. Here there is no mention of the East Germans. In the present day the Pact has achieved new levels of effectiveness and close cooperation, with all members sharing equal responsibility. He describes the organization, mentions the major combined exercises, and details some examples of improved fighting capabilities. For example, the NVA's motor rifle regiments have 40% more firepower than seventeen years ago. The

levels of education and Party membership are also up among the soldiers of the Pact armies, brothers-in-class, brothers-in-arms.¹²⁸ General Ivanovsky gives an interesting and detailed history of the GSFG since the defeat of fascist Germany, citing the usual facts and figures to herald the splendid achievements of the force he commands. His catalog of previous commanders, with accompanying pictures, seems contrived to elicit some immodest comparisons.¹²⁹ Admiral Ferner appears again, with an article similar to those he wrote for KVS. By his testimony brotherhood and solidarity between the GDR and the GSFG--and even with the Baltic fleet--have achieved new heights in 1976 due to shared goals, a common purpose, and relentless indoctrination. Ferner leaves little to the imagination.¹³⁰ A final article by Colonel-General Kessler, Deputy Defense Minister of the GDR, strikes the same cords, but with more finesse. He quotes Honecker and Brezhnev, is appropriately appreciative for Soviet largesse, and cites the symbiotic relationship of GSFG with the NVA. Brothers-in-arms they prepare with single-minded determination for the "Triumph of Peace and Socialism."¹³¹

The Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Bucharest 25-26 November 76 provided an excellent opportunity for Kremlin watchers to measure the pulse of the alliance via the Communist press. On the surface all seemed well. Brezhnev had fared well at shoring up the apparent weaknesses in

the structure. However, problems with the recalcitrant Romanians and serious and persistent economic problems in the East Bloc remain to be dealt with. One consistently bright spot for the Kremlin shone throughout. The most devoted and powerful Soviet ally in the alliance, if the signs and signals do not deceive, is the German Democratic Republic.¹³²

F. Discussion of Military Trends, and Summary.

Some sense can be made from the bits and pieces which a survey of current commentary unearths by retaining an historical perspective. Soviet foreign relations constitute a study in self interest, and Soviet military policy in the GDR has, since its inception, been set in a political context, so the tendency, to this point, to separate the political and military has produced a somewhat artificial dichotomy. A similar tendency at separation in most source material relating to Soviet military and political relations with the GDR encourages such an approach. Actually the Communists are less naive than Westerners in this regard. Woven into the ritualistic obeisance to Marxism-Leninism which pervades Soviet and East German commentary is a clear-eyed understanding of political goals and military methods. The concluding discussion attempts to synthesize the political and military arguments drawn thus far.

Two facts stand out from a review of current sources. The combat strengths of the WTO, GSFG and NVA have taken a quantum jump in less than ten years in comparison with NATO with no appreciable increase in manpower, and the cooperation and coordination of the NVA with the GSFG have also reached new heights. These new realities have threatened the NATO posture in the central region, bolstered Soviet and East German confidence and prestige, and provided new flexibility to Soviet doctrine and strategy in Europe. The doctrine of an explosive breakthrough with massive firepower and a deep mobile exploitation remains unchanged. The build up of both conventional and nuclear might provides a dual combat option and also leaves room for negotiated symmetrical reductions which retain the Soviet advantage.

The GDR is pursuing military and economic policies completely in line with Soviet desires and has become a vital ally as a result. East Germany has always been considered important terrain politically and strategically, but the GDR has not always been important to the Soviets as a separate powerful state. East Germany's new found legitimacy, close integration with the Soviet Union, and developing capacity to deal with the FRG have reduced the importance of the huge GSFG presence. This fact taken in conjunction with the changed military equation vis-a-vis NATO forces in West Germany increases the likelihood of

movement at the MBFR negotiations. There are some imponderables, which were mentioned earlier. To what degree is the present force structure a result of inertia on the part of a conservative military leadership, and how far will that leadership bend? The assessment of Soviet military influence on the political leadership involves an inexact science.¹³³ It is probably safe to say, however, that the politicians could prevail upon the Generals if the military asymmetries are retained in an agreement to reduce forces. A second grey area concerns the degree of success of the SED's program of nationalism and the potential for unrest within a traditionally dormant and passive East German population. Honecker's success here will probably depend on the economy, a sector where the Soviets can help by controlling the escalation of raw material prices. And finally, the effects of racism on decisions of the Soviet leadership cannot be measured. The intense and pervasive thirty-year propaganda campaign against Nazism makes a distinction between old German Nazis and new German Socialists which is often lost on the public, and might also mean little to the Soviet gerontocracy which fought the war. Much of the Russian population probably likes the American enemy more than its East German ally.¹³⁴ But since the Kremlin leaders have never appeared particularly sentimental on questions of national interest, feelings of enmity toward former

enemies are probably successfully sublimated.

The WTO has developed into an important mechanism for the Soviets to implement policy in Eastern Europe, and although it is presented as a temporary alliance which the Soviets are willing to negotiate away, all indicators point the other way.

An area of speculation is the extent to which Honecker might influence a Soviet decision to negotiate a reduction of forces in the GDR. It should first be pointed out that since the military forces in the GDR are very evidently of political importance to the Soviets, it is unlikely they would be reduced unilaterally. Secondly, although MBFR is a multilateral negotiation in which the GDR and other satellites participate, the Soviets make all the decisions. With this in mind, Honecker may approach Brezhnev with the salient arguments that GSFG in its present strength is necessary to insure a non-threatening FRG, an intimidated West Berlin, and a quiescent East German population. The Soviet response would most likely be that the FRG does not present a threatening posture, but rather offers inviting economic opportunities and that twenty divisions are not necessary to threaten West Berliners or East Germans. In the final analysis, as demonstrated for many years, Soviet foreign policy objectives will preempt parochial East German concerns.

By way of summary, if one cuts through the chaff, trends are discernible, and for the most part up beat from the communist standpoint. East Germany is a dependable, economically powerful ally closely integrated with the Soviet Union. The East Germans continue to express and demonstrate their undying loyalty to the USSR. Two areas of possible trouble in the GDR-Soviet relationship are domestic unrest in East Germany and the continuing irritant of West Berlin. Few clouds are on the military horizon for the military behemoth in East Germany, which seems to have outgrown its potential tasks and provides an ideal chip in a political poker game. Two unlikely eventualities would alter the scene, a substantial upgrading of NATO's military capabilities, or a nuclear-armed West Germany.

V. CONCLUSIONS.

1. In a calculation of Soviet willingness to reduce the size of its military forces in East Germany, the indications, based on an assessment of Soviet - GDR relations, are favorable. This conclusion is qualified by the exclusion of the strategic concerns of the Soviet Union and omission of other Soviet-satellite relations in East Europe.

2. Soviet perceptions of the FRG's threat to Soviet hegemony in East Europe will significantly affect the Kremlin's attitude toward a reduction of forces in the central region. East German economic and military power,

and the extent to which the SED controls its population are critical determinants in Soviet evaluations of the West German threat.

3. The trends in Soviet-GDR relations indicate growing confidence by the Kremlin in the GDR's political and military reliability, and a depreciation of the GSFG's role as policeman.

4. The growth in GSFG and NVA combat power, both conventional and nuclear, lessens Soviet dependence on massive ground forces in the GDR. However, Soviet doctrine, which requires a huge preponderance for offensive breakthrough, has not changed. What constitutes "massive" is indeterminate.

5. Since the GSFG is a political factor in Soviet foreign policy in Europe, it is very unlikely that a change in its structure would occur unilaterally, but rather through the multilateral forum of MBFR.

6. The WTO is an important factor in Soviet policy in East Europe today. Negotiations to reduce forces in the GDR and the WTO will not be in the context of alliance dissolution. Such proposals by the USSR are likely to be offered only so long as NATO's rejection seems assured.

VI. A COMMENT ON METHODOLOGY.

This paper has attempted to outline the political and military history of Soviet-East German relations, point out recent trends which are indicated by a survey of current Soviet and Western sources, and reach some tentative conclusions by placing these trends in their historical context. A focus limited to Soviet forces in East Germany introduces several complications. The first complication is the relationship of the GSFG to its environment. The GSFG is often accorded a passing reference, an uncritical acknowledgement of its dominant presence in East Germany, in lieu of a detailed examination of its local situation. The reasons for this treatment probably relate to the uniqueness of the GSFG as compared to other Soviet forces in East Europe, viz: Soviet forces in East Germany are insulated from the populace, but interact with the NVA; The Soviets' presence is highly valued by the SED leadership; Soviet forces are legally, and in reality, unrestrained in their military activities; GSFG sits astride the country which perpetrated the great fatherland war; and the size of the GSFG absolutely dwarfs the national military establishment.¹³⁵ These factors in their effect render the GSFG an autonomous entity, a separate military domain, a huge fighting machine conveniently located for military

and political purposes in the GDR. In this sense the GSFG can be dealt with as a discrete quantity of military power with the complications of environment factored out of the analysis. The resulting model is more amenable to the methodology used here.

A second complication is the role GSFG plays in Soviet strategic considerations. The strategic balance and Soviet global strategy have purposely not been dealt with. They constitute a large separate subject. The elimination of the strategic factor limits the conclusions reached, but should not invalidate those which are properly qualified. A restricted, regional context offers the advantage of a sharpened focus and tends to illuminate the problem at hand.

A third complexity involves the differentiation of USSR-GDR relations from other Soviet relationships in the Warsaw Pact. A complex interplay of forces has been simplified for the purpose of analysis. Soviet policies toward other members of the Pact involve a dimension not addressed^d adhere, but one which must be included in a more comprehensive treatment of Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe.

FOOTNOTES

1. Zbigniew Brezezinski, The Soviet Bloc, United and Conflict, revised. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp 4-5
2. Encyclopedia Britannica, (Chicago: William Benton, 1964), pp 336-359.
3. Peter Christian Ludz, The German Democratic Republic from the Sixties to the Seventies (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, 1970), pp 4-8
4. Milovan Djilas (Conversations with Stalin (NY: Harcourt, Brace & World 1962), pp 114 and 153). Quotes Stalin as follows: Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system... it cannot be otherwise," and "We shall turn Eastern Germany into our own State."
5. East Germany was given full sovereignty over its domestic and foreign policies, except in all-German questions and matters affecting the rights and duties of the big four under the Potsdam Agreement. Wolfgang Klaiber, East German Politics in the Decade Ahead (Arlington, VA: IDA, 1970), p 13.
6. The Soviets were unhappy with Gomulka's initiatives but agreed to endorse the plan. See Brezezinski, op c.t chapters 12-14.
7. The Western Allies reiterated their determination to maintain their prerogatives in Berlin and advised the Kremlin that the Soviet Union would be held responsible for any breach of the Potsdam Agreement. Actually, the East Germans were more obnoxious than the Soviets in Berlin. See Robert B. Evans, The Soviet Approach toward European Security 1945-1962 (Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 1975), p 29.
8. The FRG is a signatory to bilateral agreements with the countries which occupy the ceded lands, and also to the CSCE Agreement at Helsinki.
9. Klaiber, East German Politics in the Decade Ahead, p 27.
10. The GDR is, in effect, a member of the EEC and is exempt from the restrictions, tariffs, and quotas imposed on nonmembers. Dejure recognition would probably change the GDR's status and hurt the East German economy.

11. Willy Brandt spoke of "Two German States in one Nation", a defacto recognition of sorts. Melvin Croan, Integration and Self-Assertion. The Relationship Between East Germany and the Soviet Union (unpublished paper, 1975), p 56.
12. Thomas F. Healy, 1971 Four-Power Berlin Agreement - Increased or Decreased Tension in the 1970's? (Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 1972), p 11. The preconditions were: a) Recognition of the GDR, b) Recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, c) Renunciation of Atomic Weapons, d) Recognition of Berlin as a separate political entity.
13. Wdz, OP.cit pp 6-8.
14. Khrushchev Recinded his ultimatum to the West despite Ulbricht's agitation for a separate peace treaty.
15. Klaiber, East German Politics in the Decade Ahead, p 22.
16. Croan, Integration and Self Assertion, p 52.
17. Brandt's formula for this was, "Two German States in one nation."
18. e.g. The Postal and Telecommunications Agreement of 30 Sept 71, The Traffic Treaty of May 72.
19. Croan, Integration and Self-Assertion, p 76.
IBID, p 82
20. The Czech-USSR Treaty was Signed in 1963, GDR-USSR Treaty in 1964, Polish-USSR Treaty in 1965, Bulgarian USSR Treaty in 1967, and Hungary-USSR Treaty in 1967. Romania's Treaty with the USSR expired in 1968 and was automatically extended 5 years. Fritz Ermath, International Security and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in East Europe 1964-1968 (Santa Monica: Rand Copr. 1969), pp 51-52.
21. Croan, Integration and Self-Assertion, p 84.
22. Henry Krisch, "The Winning of the 'German Question'; Problems of Communism, Sep-Oct 1976, pp 87-92.
23. John M. Starrels and Anita M. Mallinckrodt, Politics in the German Democratic Republic (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp 293-344.

24. See Ludz, op cit, pp 41-51 for a discussion of the nurturing of the Young Turks; pp 52-57 for a discussion of the Mistrust of Revisionists such as Georg Lukacs, Ernst Bloch, Robert Havemann, and Wolfgang Harich.
25. Ludz, op cit, pp 66-78; Henry Krisch, "The German Democratic Republic in the mid-70's, "Current History" March 1976, pp 119 ff.
26. Ludz, op cit pp 72-78.
27. Michael Kerin, "The GDR's Economic Miracle, "Problems of Communism, Jan-Feb 76, p 89. The USSR is increasing its trade with the GDR each year. In 1974 it accounted for 31% of East Germany's foreign trade. See Krisch in Current History, Mar 76.
28. Kerin, p 91.
29. Starrels and Mallinckrodt, op cit, pp 252-55 and pp 379-84.
30. Wolfgang Klaiber, et al, Era of Negotiations: European Security and Force Reduction. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1973), p 12.
31. Klaiber, et al, pp 9-23.
32. The 1970 Bonn-Moscow and Bon--Warsaw Treaties and the 1971 Berlin Record contributed substantially to the removal of various preconditions for negotiations with the notable exception of GDR recognition, which the Bonn-Pankow Treaty of 1972 pushed to the back burner. It should be remembered that American stress on MBFR at this time was generally influenced by Strong Congressional pressures for unilateral force reductions. Kleiber, et al, pp 25-36.
33. The Helsinki final act was signed by 35 nations on 1 August 75. Section one involves security (frontiers, prior warning of major military exercises), section two economic, technological and environmental cooperation, section three humanitarian cooperation, and section four provides for a follow-up conference in Belgrade on 15 Jun 77. The sections are commonly referred to as "baskets."
34. Much here regarding Soviet paranoia and psychosis is speculation supported in part by the Author's observations See also: Hedrick Smith, The Russians (N.Y.: Quadrangle, 1976), pp 318-319.

35. Information on the Warsaw Pact was gathered from: Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971); Ken Booth, The Military Instrument in Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1972 (London: RUSI, 1973); Thomas W. Wolfe, The Role of the Warsaw Pact in Soviet Policy (Santa Monica: Rand Corp, 1973); Lawrence T. Caldwell, "The Warsaw Pact: Direction of change," Problems of Communism, Sep-Oct 1975, pp 1-19; Friedrich Wiener, "The Armies of the Warsaw Pact Nations" (Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Pubs, 1976), pp 11-18; The Military Balance (London: IISS, 1976); I. Yakubovsky "Bastion Mira i Bezopastnosti Narodov" (Bastion of Peace and Security of the People), Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal (Military History Journal), March 1971, pp 20-31.
36. The Warsaw Treaty did legitimize the move of Soviet troops from Austria back into Hungary and Romania, a move necessitated by the Soviet-Austrian Treaty of 1955.
37. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p 148.
38. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp 42-44, p 149.
39. Remington, pp 23-27.
40. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp 144-156.
41. Remington, p 8.
42. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp 350-51.
43. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp 468-471.
44. The other side of the coin is that with a more autonomous and permanent WTO structure national control of non-Soviet forces may actually decrease.
45. Data drawn from: Malcom Mackintosh "The Warsaw Pact today", Survival, May-June 1974, pp 122-126; Lawrence T. Caldwell, "The Warsaw Pact: Direction of Change," Problems of Communism, Sep-Oct 1975, pp 1-19; David Holloway, "The Warsaw Pact in the Era of Negotiation," Survival, Nov-Dec 1972, pp 275-279; and Sergei Shtemenko, "A Brotherhood Born in Battle: A New Type of Military Alliance," Za Rubezhom (Abroad), 7 May 1976 (in Survival Jul-Aug 1976, pp 168-170).
46. John Erickson claims that "The manpower level in groups of Soviet forces abroad has increased by some 100,000 over the past five years..." but does not specify how much

he believes GSFG has increased, nor does he support his figures. He implies that new and added weapons and the addition of a tank battalion to the motorized rifle division and a motorized rifle company to the tank regiment account for the increase. However other adjustments may account for commensurate decreases, e.g. one-for-one replacement of four-man T62 tank crews with three-man T-72 tank crews and the replacement of towed Howitzer sections with the smaller self-propelled Howitzer crews. Until Erickson delineates the increases and supports his figures, his claims, which counter previously published data, will be viewed skeptically. See: "Trends in the Soviet Combined-arms concept," Strategic Review, Winter 1977, pp 38-53.

47. John Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities", Current History, October 1976, p 128; Peter Vigor and C.N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Threat to Europe", RUSI, March 1975, pp 69-75.
48. John Erickson, "The Warsaw Pact," The Soviet War Machine (London: Salamander, 1976), pp 232-244. A point made by Mr. Erickson with regard to troop strength bears repeating. Internal security troops substantially augment the forces available to the East Europeans, viz: Poland - 80,000; East Germany - 100,000; Czechoslovakia - 25,000; Hungary - 20,000; Bulgaria - 22,000; Romania - 45,000.
49. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp 485-86.
50. Harvey Starr, The Warsaw Pact After Czechoslovakia: A Collective Goods Analysis, Unpublished Paper, 1973.
51. Henry Krisch, Convergence and Divergence in Soviet-GDR Relations: Recent Trends and Their Implications, University of Connecticut Colloquium, 10 Sep 74.
52. IBID.
53. Mackintosh, "The Warsaw Pact Today," p 126.
54. Shtemenko, op cit, p 168.
55. Commanders of the Soviet Occupation Forces (1945-1949) and GSFG (1949-1977) have done well careerwise; an indication of the selection criteria for the job:

1945-46	Zhukov
1946-49	Sokolovsky
1949-53	Shuikov
1953-57	Grechko
1957-60	Zaxharov
1960-61	Yakubovsky
1961-62	Konev
1962-65	Yakubovsky
1965-69	Koshevoy
1969-71	Kulikov
1971-72	Kurotkin
1972-77	Ivanovsky

56. TASS, 12 March 57, from RFE News Service.
57. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp 176-178.
58. John Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities", Current History, Oct 76, p 98; John Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe," RUSI, Mar 75, p 6; John Erickson, "The Warsaw Pact", The Soviet War Machine (London: Salamander, 1976), p 238.
59. Erickson, RUSI, Mar 75, p 66.
60. A recent Soviet book is a paeon to the cordial relations between the GSFG and its hosts. See Na Boyevom Postu (At Battle Station), Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1975, pp 289-294.
61. Thomas W. Wolfe, The Soviet Union's Strategic and Military Stakes in the GDR (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp, 1971), pp 15-19.
62. The most detailed English language source for the history of the NVA is Thomas M. Forster, The East German Army (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1967), pp 15-33. Forster is very biased. See also: Eugene K. Keefe, et al, The Area Handbook for East Germany, (DA PAM 550-155), Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1972, pp 279-298; Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp 145-46.
63. East Germany paraded its tactical missiles for the first time in its fifteenth anniversary, in Oct 64. Thomas W. Wolfe, "The Evolving Nature of the Warsaw Pact" (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp, 1965), p 37.
64. Shtemenko, op cit, p 170.
65. Dale Roy Herspring, East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology 1949-1972 (NY: Praeger, 1973).

66. Dale R. Herspring, "The CPU and the Military", Problems of Communism, Mar-Apr 76, pp 71-75.
67. A. Ross Johnson, Has East Central Europe Become a Liability to the USSR? The Military Aspect (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp. 1975); A. Ross Johnson, The Military in Eastern Europe -- Loyalty to WHOM? (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Cop. 1975).
68. Henry Krisch, "The GDR in the Mid 1970's" Current History, Mar 76, p 122.
69. Croan, Integration and Self Assertion, p 99.
70. "Indeed, in Moscow's concept of security in Europe the strategic advantages of a forward military position are so intimately linked with the need to preserve the Soviet Union's hegemonical hold upon one half of the continent and to extend its political influence over the other half that it would seem difficult to define where one interest leaves off and the other begins." Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Attitudes toward MBFR and the USSR's military Presence in Europe (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp 1972), p 2.
71. Arnaud de Bouchgrave, "Nightmare for NATO", News Week, 7 Feb 77, p 36; Michael Getler, "Crack in German Forces a Key to NATO strength" The Washington Post, 24 Feb 77; Robert Lucas Fischer, Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces (Adelphi Paper No.127) (London: IISS, 1976), p 16; John H. Morse, "Questionable NATO Assumptions", Strategic Review, Winter 77; White Paper 1975/76 (Bonn, Germany: Press and Information Office, 1976); "Surprise Attack Could make Nuclear Weapons useless," London Times, 15 Mar 76.
72. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1976); Travor Cliff, Military Technology and the European Balance (Adelphi Paper No.89) (London: IISS, 1972), 28-35, Stephen Cansy, The Alliance and Europe: Part IV: Military Doctrine and Technology (Adelphi Paper No.109) (London: IISS, 1975); P.H. Vigor and C.N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Threat to Europe," RUSI March 1975, pp 69-75.
73. From discussions with members of the Bundeswehr. These views are supported by deployments observed in WTO field exercises.

74. Wolfe, Soviet Attitudes Toward MBFR, pp 1-13.
75. IBID, pp 13-16.
76. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Europe (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. 1974), pp 37-42; Thomas W. Wolfe, Military Power and Soviet Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 1975), pp 46-49; Bruce Clarke Jr, Fact Sheet: MBFR (unpublished memorandum, Nov 76); Lothar Ruehl, "The Negotiations on Force Reductions in Central Europe", NATO Review, Oct 76 (in CNSE No. 177, 25 Jan 77).
77. "Mutual Force Reuctions", Air Force Magazine, Dec 76, p 106.
78. Ostensibly Multilateral, but Dominated on the Warsaw Pact side by the USSR.
79. Wolfgang Klaiber, East German Politics in the Decade Ahead (Arlington, VA: IDA, 1970), pp 31-47.
80. Melvin Croan, "East Germany", The Communist States in Disarray 1965-1971 (MINN: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, eds., pp 73-94; Melvin Croan, Integration and self-assertion: The Relationship between East Germany and Soviet Union (unpublished paper, 1975), pp 114-120.
81. Henry Krisch, Convergence and Divergence in Soviet-GDR Relations: Recent Trends and Their Implications (unpublished paper, 1974); Henry Krisch "The German Democratic Republic in the mid-70s, "Current History, March 1976, pp 119 ff; Henry Krisch, "The Waning of the German Question", Problems of Communism, Sep-Oct 76, pp 87-92.
82. John M. Starrels and Anita M. Mallinckrodt, Politics in the German Democratic Republic (N.Y.: Praeger, 1978), pp 362-386.
83. T.F. Brown, Relations between the Soviet Union and its East Allies: A Survey (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 1975), pp 68-75.
84. "East German Intellectuals Protest Biermann Expulsion in Open Letter", Stars and Stripes, 22 Nov 76 "East German Atticks Sanctions on Writers", Stars and Stripes,

- 24 Nov 76; "Crackdown in the Showcase", Time, 6 Dec 76; "Rumblings in East Germany", The New Leader, 3 Jan 77; "East Germans: Daring to Dissent", Stars and Stripes, 26 Nov 76; "Crackdown in East Germany", Stars and Stripes, 15 Jan 77.
85. "United States National Security Policy vis-a-vis Eastern Europe", Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, 94th Congress, Washington D.C.: USGPO, 12 Apr 76.
 86. Izvestia, 7 Jul 74, p 2; Pravda, 20 Jul 74, p. 5; Pravda, 1 Aug 74, p. 5; Pravda, 3 Sep 74, p. 4.
 87. Pravda and Izvestia, 7 Oct 74.
 88. Pravda, 7 Oct and 14 Oct 1975; Izvestia, 7 Oct, 8 Oct, and 14 Oct 1975.
 89. Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, RL 263/76, 25 May 76.
 90. Hermann Axen, "A Quarter of a Century of the Socialist GDR", International Affairs, Nov 74, pp 3-13.
 91. "Review - GDR's Foreign Policy and International Relations" International Affairs, Feb 75, pp 103-106.
 92. "Review - USSR - GDR Relations 1949-1955", International Affairs, 1 Nov 75, pp 107-110.
 93. "USSR - GDR Fraternal Alliance," International Affairs, Dec 75, pp 65-68.
 94. Oscar Fischer, "Along the Common Course Toward Peace and Security", International Affairs, Apr 76, pp 12-19.
 95. "Review - History of the GDR 1949-1973", International Affairs, May 76, pp 116-119.
 96. V. Yaroslavtsev, "Basis of European Security", International Affairs, May 76, pp 13-20.
 97. A Ivanov, "The GDR's Attainments in Social Development", International Affairs, Sep 76, pp 81-89.
 98. "GDR: SUPG's Economic and Social Policy", International Affairs, Nov 76, pp 136-137; "Cooperation of the CMEA Countries in the Production of Consumer Goods", International Affairs, Jan 77, pp 129-130.

99. Sam Nunn and Dewey F. Bartlett, "NATO and the New Soviet Threat", Congressional Record, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Vol 123, No. 13, 25 Jan 77. Michael Gettler, in a series written for the Washington Post (24 Feb 77) quotes British Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton Chairman of NATO's Military Committee on the recent spate of criticism against NATO's preparedness: "I disagree with Nunn, Hollings Worth, retired U.S. Air Force Major General George Keegan, and Belgian Gen. Robert Close," Says Hill-Norton, "Because they have all taken the worst case scenerio." Getler also quotes the Bundeswehr's Deputy Chief of Staff Wolfgang von Attenburg who observes that, "The Soviets still have 60 to 70 percent more troops than needed for defense in Central Europe". General Keegan stated recently (Russ could neutralize NATO Forces within a day, Gen Keegan warns", Stars and Stripes, 3 Apr 77), that all of NATO's territory could be occupied by the Russians in 36 hours.
100. John Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe," RUSI, Mar 75, pp 65-69; "Soviet Military Capabilities" Current History, Oct 76, pp 97 ff.
101. F. Stephen Larrabee, "Soviet Implementation - The Helsinki Agreement: The Military Dimension", Radio Liberty Research Report, RL 1/77, 1 Jan 77.
102. Krasnaia Zvezda, 13 Oct 76, Radio Liberty Research Report, RL 442/76, 14 Oct 76; Radio Svoboda 11/77, 11 Jan 77.
103. Arthur Volz, "Standardization in the Armies of the Warsaw Pact", Radio Liberty Research Report, RL 306/76, 14 Jun 76, "Soviet Military Strength in Historical Perspective," Radio Liberty Research Report, RL 485/76, 1 Dec 76.
104. John H. Morse, "Questionable NATO Assumptions", Strategic Review, winter 1977. (In CNSE No. 179, 1 Feb 77).
105. Steven Canby, The Alliance and Europe: Part IV: Military Doctrine and Technology (Adelphi Paper No.109) (London: IISS, 1975).
106. L. Goure, F.D. Kohler, and M. L. Harvey, The Role of Nuclear Force in Current Soviet Strategy (Coral Gables, Fla: CAIS, 1974), John Erickson; Soviet Military Power (London: RUSI, 1971).

107. Christian Science Monitor, 1 Mar 65.
108. Paul Wohl, "East Germans Cement Soviet Bloc Unity", Christian Science Monitor, 24 Nvo 76.
109. Paul Wohl, "Warsaw Pact Shifts -- Intone and Purpose", Christian Science Monitor, 17 May 74.
110. "Surprise Attack could make nuclear weapons useless", London Times, 15 Mar 76.
111. Malcolm W. Browne, "Red Deviation is Still Related to Proximity of Red Army", International Herald Tribune, 14 Jul 76.
112. "East Germany Reported to Alert its Armed Forces, Fearing Unrest", Baltimore Sun, 3 Feb 77; "East Bloc Unrest Believed Cause of E. German callup", Stars and Stripes, 13 Feb 77.
113. "DDR Modernizing its Mobilization System", Bonn, Germany, Wire Service, 10 Feb 77. The West Germans took the same data used by American experts and added in understanding of the situation to reach opposite conclusions. Often times analyses of the military situation in the GDR pay homage to facts and figures at the expense of political evaluation. It might be fair to say that quantification is the Western ideology most closely approximating the Eastern obsession with Leninist Principles.
114. From discussions with representatives of the Bundeswehr.
115. Organizatzia Varshavskava Dogovora 1955-1975 (Organization of the Warsaw Pact 1955-1975) Moskva: Izdalelstvo Politichiskoy Literaturii, 1975.
116. Zarojdenia Narodnikh Armii Strain-Uchastnitz Varshavskava Dogovora (Origin of the Peoples' Armies of Member-Countries of the Warsaw Pact). Moskva: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1975, pp 336-369.
117. Boyevoy Soyuz Bratskikh Armii (Battle Union of Brother Armies), Moskva: Izdatelstvo Ministerstvo Oborony, 1974 pp 97-128.
118. Boyevoya Sotrudjestvo Bratskikh Narodnikh Armii (Battle Alliance of Fraternal Peoples and Armies), Moskva: Izdatelstvo Ministerstvo Oborony, 1975, pp 186-192.

119. Na Boyevom Postu (At Battle Station), Moskva: Voenizdat, 1975, pp 289-294.
120. Evropa: Bezopastnost' i Sotrudnichestvo (Europe: Security and Cooperation), Moskva: Izdatelstvo Mejdunarodniye Otnoshenia, 1974.
121. V.D. Sokolovsky, Voyennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy), Moskva: Voyennizdat, 1968; A.A. Sidorkenko, Nastupleniye (The Offensive), Moskva: Voenizdat, 1970; V. Savkin, Osnovnoyye Printsipy Operativnogo Iskusstva, Taktiki (Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics), Moskva: Voenizdat, 1972, A.A. Grechko, Vooruzhennyye Sily Sovetskogo Gosudarstva (The Armed Forces of the Soviet State), Moskva: Voenizdat, 1974.
122. Bruner, Kommunist Vooruzhyonikh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces - Hereafter KVS), No.5, March 1973, pp 76-80.
123. Grigorkin, KVS, No. 16, Aug 73, pp 80-84.
124. Admiral Feruer, KVS, No. 5, Mar 74, pp 77-80, No. 9 May 75, pp 62-66; No.4, Feb 76, pp 84-88.
125. KVS, No.8 Apr 74, p 95; No.10, May 74, p 94; No.2, Jan 75, p. 95; No. 2 Jan 77, pp 92-93.
126. General Feucht, Voennii Vestnik (Military Herald), No.3 1974, pp 106-108.
127. General Borman, Voennii Vestnik, No. 2, 1975, pp 118-121.
128. Marshal Yakubovsky, Voennii Vestnik, No. 5, 1975, pp 7-11.
129. General Ivanovsky, Voennii Vestnik, No.6, 1975, pp 8-14.
130. General Kessler, Voennii Vestnik, No. 2, 1976, pp 70-73.
131. General Kessler, Voennii Vestnik, No. 3, 1976, pp 113-116.
132. Krasnaia Zvezda (Red Star) 26, 27 and 28 Nov 1976.
133. See Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Military: Influence on Foreign Policy", and William E. Odom "The Party Connection", both in Problems of Communism, Sep-Oct 73, pp 1-26.
134. Several Soviet citizens stated as much to the author during a recent trip to the Soviet Union.

135. "There is One Russian Soldier for Every 34 Native (East) Germans in a State the Size of Ohio." Hubert J. Erb, "Soviets Strengthening Massive Forces in East Germany", Stars and Stripes, 29 Jan 74.

VIII. APPENDIX - CHARTS and MAPS

- A. "WTO Military Command Structure", from: A Ross Johnson, Has East Central Europe Become a Liability to the USSR? The Military Aspects.
(Santa Monika, CA: RAND Corp, 1975), p 16.
- B. "Selected Comparative Data on Soviet and East European Military Capabilities, 1962-1975," IBID, p. 13.
- C. "Warsaw Pact Structure", from: J.I.H. Owens, Editor, Warsaw Pact Infantry and its Weapons (London: Brassey's Pub Ltd, 1976), p 5.
- D. "NATO/Warsaw Pact Forces Located in Europe", from: The Soviet War Machine (London: Salamander, 1976), p 236.
- E. "Soviet Forces in East Germany" IBID, p 238- and "Order of Battle GSFG", from: John Erickson, "Trends in the Soviet Combined Arms Concept", Strategic Review, winter 1977, p 47.
- F. "German Democratic Republic", from: The Military Balance 1966-1977 (London: IISS, 1976), pp 12-13.
- G. "Warsaw Pact - NATO Quantitative Comparisons", Thomas W. Wolfe, Military Power and Soviet Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp 1975), p 64.
- H. "NATO vs. Warsaw Pact in the Central Region", from: Air Force Magazine, December 1976, p. 105.
- I. "Ground Force Manpower" and "Manpower in Major Combat Units: Division-Equivalents Times Manpower", from Robert Lucas Fischer, Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces (Adelphi Paper no. 127) (London: IISS, 1976), p.7 and p. 11.
- J. "Mobilization and Reinforcement", IBID, p 4.
- K. "Military Expenditure and Manpower," IBID, p.4.
- L. "Selected Data on East European Military Expenditures", from: A Ross Johnson, Has East Central Europe Become a Liability to the USSR? The Military Aspect, p.14.
- M. "Percentage of Increases in Defense," from: Harvey Starr, The Warsaw Pact After Czechoslovakia: A Collective Goods Analysis (unpublished paper, 1973).




Fig. 1 — WTO military command structure

TABLE 1

Selected Comparative Data on Soviet and East European Military Capabilities, 1962-1975

Country	Population	Total Regular Forces	Combat Aircraft	Internal Security and Border Troops	Total Military Forces	Number of Soviet Divisions ^a	
						Tank	Total
Bulgaria							
1962	7,629,254	120,000	---	40,000	160,000	--	0
1967	8,400,000	154,000	250	20,000	174,000	--	0
1975	8,760,000	152,000	253	20,000	172,000	--	0
Czechoslovakia							
1962	13,581,186	185,000	---	35,000	220,000	--	0
1967	14,500,000	225,000	600	40,000	265,000	--	0
1975	14,570,000	200,000	458	20,000	220,000	2	5
German Democratic Republic							
1962	17,280,000	85,000	---	60,000	145,000	10	20
1967	17,200,000	127,000	300	70,000	197,000	10	20
1975	16,990,000	143,000	330	80,000	233,000	10	20
Hungary							
1962	9,977,870	80,500	---	35,000	115,500	--	4
1967	10,300,000	102,000	140	35,000	137,000	2	4
1975	10,790,000	105,000	108	20,000	125,000	2	4
Poland							
1962	29,527,000	257,000	---	45,000 ^b	302,000	--	2
1967	32,000,000	270,000	820	45,000 ^b	315,000	1	2
1975	33,580,000	293,000	785	80,000 ^b	373,000	1	2
Rumania							
1962	18,366,000	222,000	---	60,000	282,000	--	--
1967	19,500,000	173,000	240	50,000	223,000	--	--
1975	21,460,000	171,000	254	45,000	216,000	--	--
Grand Total Military Forces							
1962							26
1967							26
1975							31

^a A Soviet division roughly equals 9000 men.

^b Includes armored brigades of territorial army.

Note: All 1962 population data are from 1960.

Source: *The Military Balance*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1960, 1967-1968, 1973-1974.

Table 1. WARSAW PACT STRUCTURE

Member State	Army Strength	Reserves	Operational Formations	Estimated Infantry Element	Military Service
<i>Bulgaria</i>	120,000	250,000	8 motorised rifle divs 5 tank bdes	36,000 2,500	24 months' conscription
<i>Czechoslovakia</i>	155,000	300,000	5 tank divs 5 motorised rifle divs 1 airborne bde	25,000 2,500 1,400	24 months' conscription
<i>German Democratic Republic</i>	100,000	200,000	2 tank divs 4 motorised rifle divs	25,000 20,000	18 months' conscription
<i>Hungary</i>	90,000	150,000	1 tank div 5 motorised rifle divs	2,500 23,000	24 months' conscription
<i>Poland</i>	220,000	500,000	5 tank divs 8 motorised rifle divs 1 airborne div 1 amphibious ash div	2,500 40,000 4,100 3,000	24 months' conscription
<i>Rumania</i>	141,000	400,000	2 tank divs 8 motorised rifle divs 2 mountain bdes 1 airborne regt	5,000 40,000 5,000 1,500	18 months' conscription
<i>USSR</i>	1,800,000	2,000,000	59 tank divs 110 motorised rifle divs 1 airborne divs	125,000 500,000 32,000	24 months' conscription
Summary					
Total Warsaw Pact numerical strength:				2,628,500	
Infantry strength:				904,000	
Percentage infantry:				34	

Mechanisation and technological development since World War I is reflected in the proportion of infantry then and now. In 1917 approximately 70 per cent of the 15.5 million men mobilised by Imperial Russia were infantry.

NATO/WARSAW PACT FORCES LOCATED IN EUROPE

In a general war situation, Warsaw Pact forces committed against Nato might be allocated as follows:

Soviet Forces in the Leningrad Military District against Norway.

Soviet Ground and Naval and Air Forces from the Baltic Military District plus Polish and East German airborne and amphibious forces against Denmark, the northern coast of West Germany and Holland.

Soviet Ground and Air Forces from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) and the Soviet Northern Group of Forces (NGF) in Poland, and from the Moscow and Belorussian Military Districts, plus Ground Force elements of the East German and Polish armies, against North Germany (Hanover and the Ruhr); and (together with Czech army units and elements of the Soviet Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia (CGF) and Soviet troops from the Kiev Military District) against Central Germany (Frankfurt).

Soviet forces from GSFG, CGF and SGF (Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Hungary) plus elements of the East German, Czech and Hungarian Armies, and troops of the Kiev and Carpathian Military Districts, against Southern Germany (Stuttgart-Munich), Austria and Italy.

Against Southern Europe and Turkey Soviet troops of the Odessa and Caucasian Military Districts and elements of the Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian armies.


This would give a comparison of strengths as follows (Nato forces in parenthesis):

Warsaw Pact divisions 140-150(45) tanks 27,000 (10-11,000) artillery pieces 8-9,000 (6,000) men (under arms now) 1,240,000 (1,200,000).

Although the manpower under arms is approximately equal, the Warsaw Pact capacity for very rapid mobilisation would give them a 3-1 superiority in fighting troops after three weeks of mobilisation. Nato could only close the gap after a further month had elapsed.

To what extent the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies can be relied upon depends, of course, on the political situation in which conflict occurs. The startling improvement in the quality and quantity of equipment with which the USSR has equipped the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries since 1970 would seem to indicate that these countries are increasingly being considered by the USSR as quite reliable allies. The German and Bulgarian Armies have particularly benefitted from this trend. The Poles, Czechs and Hungarian armies in addition use good quality domestically produced equipment. Only the Romanian army has failed to show a marked improvement since 1970. Presumably, due to Romania being the least controllable regime politically and having the least important position strategically, her army is accorded the lowest priority of resupply by the USSR.

It should be borne in mind that to ensure internal security in both peace and war, all Eastern European countries have very large forces under the control of their Ministries of the Interior or State Security organisations. These forces are, to all intents and purposes, military; being equipped with small warships, combat aircraft and armoured vehicles. To quote an example: A Polish conscript might find himself called up to do not two years national service in the army, but three years in the Border Troops of the Territorial Defence Force. Poland has 80,000 such troops, Romania 45,000, East Germany 80-100,000, Hungary 20,000, Czechoslovakia 25,000 and Bulgaria 22,000. The USSR has in addition almost half a million such troops, many of whom would be used to ensure the stability of Eastern Europe in the event of war. In addition, all Eastern European countries have TA-style militia forces involving a very large percentage of their adult male populations.



Map of Germany showing the locations of Soviet 1st Army divisions in 1945.

Legend:

- T TANK DIVISION
- X MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION

Scale:

- 0 to 80 MILES
- 0 to 120 KILOMETRES

Key Locations and Divisions:

- Hamburg:** 1410
- Berlin:** 201, 1710, 1510, 2010, 116
- Frankfurt:** 116
- Leipzig:** 2010
- Dresden:** 116



ORDER OF BATTLE GSFG

(This Order of Battle compilation was originally prepared for a study day of the Royal Corps of Transport, Scottish Command, and has been currently updated.)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Population: 17,230,000.
Military service: 18 months.
Total regular forces: 157,000, incl 92,000 conscripts.
Estimated GNP 1975: \$43.7 bn.
Defence expenditure 1976: 10,233 m Ostmarks (\$2,729 m).
\$1 = 3.8 Ostmarks.

Army: 105,000, incl 67,000 conscripts.
2 tank divisions.
4 motor rifle divisions.
1 *Scud* brigade.
2 artillery regiments.
2 AA artillery regiments.
2 anti-tank battalions.
1 airborne battalion.

About 2,400 T-54/-55, T-62, 600 T-34 med tks; about 115 PT-76 lt tks; BROM scout cars; BMP, BTR-60P/-60P/-152 APC; 76mm, 335 122mm, 108 130mm, 85 152mm guns/how; 120mm mor; 110 122mm, 140mm, 240mm RL; 24 *FROG-7*, 12 *Scud B* SSM; 57mm, 85mm, 100mm ATK guns; 82mm RCL; *Sagger*, *Snapper* ATGW; 14.5mm, 23mm SP, 57mm and 100mm AA guns; SA-7 SAM.

Reserves: 350,000.

Navy: 16,000, incl 10,000 conscripts.
3 *Riga*-class escorts.
4 SO-1- and 14 *Hai*-class submarine chasers.
12 *Osa*-class FPBG with *Styx* SSM.
50 MTB (15 *Shersten*-, 35 20-ton *Illis*-class).
25 patrol craft (18 *Kondor*-class ex-mine-sweepers).
3 *Krake*-class ocean, 34 *Kondor*-class medium minesweepers.

6 *Robbe*-class, 12 *Labo*-class landing craft.
1 helicopter squadron with 13 Mi-4.

Reserves: 25,000.

Air Force: 36,000, incl 15,000 conscripts;
441 combat aircraft.
3 FGA sqns with 36 MiG-17.
18 fighter sqns with 310 MiG-21/-21UTI.
2 fighter/training wings with 45 L-29, 50 MiG-21.
2 tpt sqns with 34 Il-14, Tu-124, and Tu-134.
75 Mi-1, Mi-2, Mi-4, Mi-8 hel.
20 MiG-15, L-29, Yak trainers.
5 AD regts: 120 57mm and 100mm AA guns.
144 SA-2 at some 24 SAM sites.
2 parachute battalions.

Reserves: 30,000.

Para-Military Forces: 69,000, 47,000 border guards, 22,000 security troops, 350,000 Workers' Militia.

Table 4

WARSAW PACT-NATO QUANTITATIVE COMPARISONS*

	Overall European Theater		Central Region	
	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>	<u>NATO</u>
Troops (combat & direct support) ^a	1,150,000 (485,000 Soviet)	1,113,000 (190,000 U.S.)	800,000 (430,000 Soviet)	600,000 (190,000 U.S.)
Divisions (incl. Div. equivalents)				
armored			26 (14 Soviet)	(2 1/3 U.S.)
mechanized			30 (13 Soviet)	11 (2 U.S.)
other			2	2
Total	78 (31 Soviet)	59 (4 1/3 U.S.)	58 (27 Soviet)	21 (4 1/3 U.S.)
Main Battle Tanks (in op. service) ^b	17,600 7,500 Soviet	8,600 (1,350 U.S.)	13,800 (6,850 Soviet)	6,000 (1,350 U.S.)
Artil. Pieces			5,000	1,800
Anti-tank Wpns. ^c				(# favor NATO)
Tact. aircraft	3,600 (1,500 Soviet)	2,800 (300 U.S.) ^d	2,770 (1,250 Sov.)	1,720 (230 U.S.) ^d
Combat Helicop.		(# favor U.S.) ^e		(# favor U.S.) ^e
Tac. Nuc. Wpns.	3,500	7,000	(Approx. same as overall)	(Approx. same as overall)

^aGround forces only. About 50,000 air personnel for U.S. and slightly more for USSR in Europe.

^bAdditionally, Soviets reportedly have about 1,000 stockpiled tanks in Europe, while NATO has about 4,000 (of which about 1,300 are U.S.).

^cNumbers not available. Said to be growing in NATO's favor. See *Military Balance 1973-1974*, p. 90.

^dThere are about 500 U.S. tactical aircraft in Europe, but those based in Britain & with 16th Air Force in Spain not shown.

^eU.S. has 5:1 margin overall in combat helicopters. Ratio in Europe not available.

* Sources for this Table include: *Military Balance 1973-1974*, pp. 87-95; Trevor Cliffe, *Military Technology and the European Balance*, Adelphi Paper No. 89, IISS, London, 1972, pp. 26-29; Colonel Delbert M. Fowler, "How Many Divisions? A NATO-Warsaw Pact Assessment," *Military Review*, November 1972, pp. 80-87; Moorer, *U.S. Military Posture for FY 1974*, p. 56, and for FY 1975, pp. 58-66; Denis Greenhill, "The Future Security of Western Europe," *International Affairs*, London, January 1974, p. 5.

NATO	Manpower		Equipment		Warsaw Pact	Manpower		Equipment	
	Ground	Air	Tanks	Aircraft		Ground	Air	Tanks	Aircraft
United States	189	41	2,500	260	Soviet Union	455	60	7,900	1,300
Britain	55	9	650	130	Czechoslovakia	135	45	2,900	450
Canada	3	2	30	50	East Germany	105	36	1,700	400
Belgium	64	20	325	140	Poland	204	63	3,200	850
Germany	345	117	2,400	580					
Netherlands	78	21	525	160					
	734	210	6,430	1,320					
France	58		325						
Totals	792	210	6,755	1,320	Totals	899	204	15,700	3,000

APPENDIX H.

Table 2: Ground Force Manpower (000)^a

NATO		Warsaw Pact	
Belgium	64	Czechoslovakia	135
Britain	55	East Germany	105
Canada	3	Poland	204
Denmark	22	Soviet Union	455
France	58		
Luxembourg	—		
Netherlands	78		
United States	189		
West Germany	345		
In Berlin:			
Britain	3		
France	2		
United States	4		
Total	823	Total	899

Ratio Pact/NATO = 1.09 : 1

^a Data derived from *The Military Balance 1976-1977*, op. cit. in note 23, p. 104. Forces in Berlin were evidently omitted; they have been added as shown under the

respective national sections. Danish forces were not shown on p. 104, but the figure given here was derived from the country entry on p. 21.

Table 5: Manpower in Major Combat Units: Division-Equivalents Times Manpower (10,000)

NATO ^a		Warsaw Pact ^b	
Belgium	$1\frac{1}{2} \times 1.5 = 2.5$	Czechoslovakia	$8 \times 1.0 = 8.0$
Britain ^c	$2 \times 1.9 = 3.8$		$1 \times 0.3 = 0.3$
	$\frac{1}{2} \times 1.0 = 0.3$	East Germany	$6 \times 1.0 = 6.0$
Canada	$\frac{1}{2} \times 1.0 = 0.3$	Poland	$11 \times 1.0 = 11.0$
Denmark	$1\frac{1}{2} \times 1.0 = 1.7$		$2 \times 0.7 = 1.4$
France ^d	$2 \times 1.6 = 3.2$	Soviet Union	$27 \times 1.1 = 29.7$
	$1 \times 0.2 = 0.2$		
Luxembourg	—		
Netherlands	$2 \times 1.5 = 3.0$		
United States	$4 \times 1.6 = 6.4$		
	$6 \times \frac{1}{2} = 2.0$		
West Germany	$12 \times 1.5 = 18.0$		
Total	41.4	Total	56.4

^a Belgium and the Netherlands are assumed to be similar to West Germany. Denmark is weighted by 1.0, since substantial numbers of reserve personnel in the brigade establishment are excluded. Full American divisions are weighted by 1.6. The *Reforger* brigade, the Berlin brigade, two Nunn brigades and the two armoured cavalry regiments are weighted by $\frac{1}{2}$; they have 3,000-4,000 men each. The two French divisions are weighted at 1.6 (*The Military Balance, 1975-1976*, p. vii); the French Berlin force is 2,000 men (*The Military Balance, 1976-1977*, p. 22). The three British divisions (each about 12,500 men) are counted as two division-equivalents (at 19,000 men

each). British forces in Berlin have 3,000 men (*ibid.*, p. 19). Luxembourg has 500 men.

^b Soviet divisional strength is averaged at 11,000 men. Czech and Polish cadre divisions are omitted. The two special-purpose Polish divisions (one airborne, one amphibious) are assumed to be similar to Soviet airborne divisions (*ibid.*, p. vii). Others are assumed to average 10,000 men each.

^c Britain and France are reorganizing their forces into more but smaller divisions; the total number of combat personnel should remain about the same or increase slightly. See *The Military Balance 1976-1977*, pp. 18 and 21.

Table 7: Mobilization and Reinforcement (divisional manpower in 10,000s)^a

	M	+7	+14	+21	+28	+35
NATO^b						
Belgium	2.5	2.5	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
Britain ^c	4.1	4.5	5.9	6.6	6.6	6.6
Canada	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Denmark ^d	1.7	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
France ^e	3.4	8.2	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2
Luxembourg	—	—	—	—	—	—
Netherlands	3.0	3.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
United States/ ^f	8.4	9.0	12.2	14.9	15.8	18.6
West Germany ^g	18.0	18.5	21.0	21.0	21.0	21.0
Total	41.4	48.0	58.9	62.3	63.2	66.0
Warsaw Pact						
Czechoslovakia	8.3	8.3	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.3
East Germany	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
Poland	12.4	12.4	14.4	14.4	14.4	14.4
Soviet Union	29.7	39.6	62.7	62.7	62.7	62.7
Total	56.4	66.3	93.4	93.4	93.4	93.4

^a NATO M-day is not the same as Pact M-day but lags behind it. Both Pact and NATO M-day strengths are of limited relevance, since both sides would have to end peacetime routine and move to combat positions.

^b Companies, battalions and brigades for home defence (except six West German home defence groups) omitted.

^c Active and TAVR units equivalent to five large infantry brigades arrive between M+5 and M+21. Other active and TAVR units in Britain are withheld for home defence and for Norway.

^d Danish brigades are assumed to be rounded out by M+7. Danish regional battalions and home defence forces are not counted.

^e French territorial forces are assumed withheld.

^f 24 division-equivalents between M+7 and M+21, plus 1/11 division per day from M+5 onwards, plus a Marine division on M+30.

^g One home defence group with assumed availability on M+7, five more by M+14.

Table 8: Mobilization and Reinforcement with Degradation Factor^a
(divisional manpower in 10,000s)

	M	+7	+14	+21	+28	+35
NATO	See Table 7. Only about 75,000 men of the forces shown at M+35 are in reserve units in peacetime. All active units are assumed to be ready.					
Warsaw Pact						
Czechoslovakia	8.3	8.3	9.4	9.5	9.7	9.8
East Germany	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
Poland	12.4	12.4	13.5	13.6	13.8	13.9
Soviet Union ^b	29.7	39.6	56.5	58.0	59.6	61.0
Total	56.4	66.3	85.4	87.1	89.1	90.7

^a See p. 21 for the assumption about degradation in combat capability; the manpower of affected units is multiplied by this factor.

^b Divisions are assumed to arrive in category order (Category I first, etc.).

Table 1: Military Expenditure and Manpower*

	Military expenditures ^b 1975 (\$ billion) 1975	Active armed forces 1976 (000) ^c
NATO	2.0	88
Belgium	11.1	344
Britain	3.0	78
Canada	0.9	35
Denmark	14.0	513
France	1.4	200
Greece	4.7	352
Italy	—	1
Luxembourg	3.0	112
Netherlands	0.9	39
Norway	1.1	60
Portugal	2.2	460
Turkey	89.0	2,087
United States	16.1	495
West Germany	—	—
Total	\$149.4	4,864
Warsaw Pact	0.5	164
Bulgaria	1.7	180
Czechoslovakia	2.6	157
East Germany	0.5	100
Hungary	2.0	290
Poland	0.8	181
Romania	124.0	3,650 ^d
Soviet Union	—	—
Total	\$132.1^e	4,722

* Data from *The Military Balance 1976-1977*, op. cit. in note 19, pp. 78-81. See also *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1965-1974* (Washington DC: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976), hereafter cited as *World Military Expenditures*; Central Intelligence Agency, *A Dollar Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1965-1975* (Washington DC: CIA, SR 76-10053, February 1977), hereafter cited as *A Dollar Comparison*; and Joint Economic Committee, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China - 1976* (Washington DC: USJEC, 1976), hereafter cited as *Allocation of Resources*. The CIA includes expenditures on paramilitary forces in its estimate of 1975. With 3-5 per cent real programme growth, the 1976 figure might be \$140-150 billion 1976 dollar. For estimates in roubles, see CIA, *Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Roubles, 1950-1975* (SR 76-10121U, May 1976). This shows an increase in the American estimate of Soviet defence costs in roubles, though not a re-estimate of Soviet forces and programmes (beyond normal changes reflected in the February 1976 dollar estimates).

^b For estimates of change over time see *The Military Balance 1975-1976*, p. 76, and *World Military Expenditures*, p. 46. For discussion of the methodological problems of estimating Soviet defence expenditures, see *The*

Military Balance 1976-1977, pp. 109-10, *World Military Expenditures*, pp. 8-11, and *Allocation of Resources*. For commentaries on the CIA dollar and rouble methodologies, see Andrew Marshall, 'Estimating Soviet Defence Spending', *Survival*, March-April 1976 and W. T. Lee, 'Soviet Defense Expenditures', in William Schneider and Francis Hoebler (eds), *Arms, Men & Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1977* (New York: Crane Russak, 1976) - though Lee's criticisms were drafted before the new CIA rouble estimate appeared.

^c Instead of making a judgment about the availability of some of the forces listed here on both sides, I have included all current signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact.

^d The United States now estimates that there are 4.4 million Soviet military personnel, plus about 400,000 border guards and internal security forces. *Allocation of Resources*, p. 17, 25, 58; *A Dollar Comparison*, p. 4; *FY 1977 Defense Report*, pp. 3-113. The difference from *The Military Balance* estimate of 3,650,000 (plus 'some 750,000 uniformed civilians') is more apparent than real. The American figure includes a higher re-estimate of Soviet military manpower in the Soviet central support structure. However, the Soviet Union relies on military personnel for support functions that might otherwise be performed by civilians. The increase in the American

TABLE 2
Selected Data on East European Military Expenditures

East European Country	Direct Defense Expenditures			Military R&D			As Percent of National Income	Total Military (including Regular and Internal Security (in thousands of men
	As Percent of National Income	As Percent of National Product	As Percent of State Budget	Personnel Costs (in local currency millions)	Operating, Maintenance, and Procurement Total ^a (in local currency millions)	Estimated Total (in local currency millions)		
Bulgaria:								
1962	5	5.8	6	81	177	258		160
1967	3.1	3.0	6.1	115	153	247		174
1972	3.5		6	137	259	394		169
Percentage Changes								
1962-1967				12	26	-4		9
1967-1972				15	96	58		-3
Czechoslovakia:								
1962	4.8	4.7	6.7	2,074	6,168	8,242	1,259	220
1967	4.5	5.7	6.9	2,710	7,446	10,156	2,083	265
1972	3.8	5.7	6.1	3,128	10,041	13,169	2,575	225
Percentage Changes								
1962-1967				31	21	23	65	20
1967-1972				15	34	35	24	-15
German Democratic Republic ^c :								
1962	3.6	3.9	5	472	2,228	2,700	135	145
1967	3.9	3.7	5	717	2,883	3,600	180	197
1972	5.2	6.3	7.6	858	5,379	6,237	311	210
Percentage Changes								
1962-1967				52	29	33	33	36
1967-1972				20	87	73	73	7
Hungary:								
1962	3.2	2.5	5.9	1,573	3,340	4,913		116
1967	2.7	2.6	5.2	2,004	3,429	5,433		137
1972	2.9	3.6	4.1	2,294	7,136	9,430		130
Percentage Changes								
1962-1967				27	3	11		18
1967-1972				14	108	74		-5
Poland ^d :								
1962	4.3	3.9	7.4	4,099	14,279	18,378	248	302
1967	4.4	5.4	8.2	5,016	21,392	26,408	412	320
1972	4.2		8.9	6,619	32,841	39,460	1,034	353
Percentage Changes								
1962-1967				23	50	44	66	6
1967-1972				32	53	49	151	10
Rumania:								
1962	3.2	2.9	5.4	1,457	2,467	3,924		282
1967	2.6	3.1	4.1	1,617	3,529	5,146		223
1972	2.5	2.7	5.3	1,937	5,773	7,710		210
Percentage Changes								
1962-1967				11	43	31		-21
1967-1972				20	64	50		-6

^aTotal equals personnel plus operating, maintenance, and procurement costs.

^bData recalculated to exclude nonmilitary security costs.

^cData since 1968 recalculated to exclude nonmilitary security costs.

^dRobert T. Hinaman and Nancy M. Kling, "Military spending in Eastern Europe," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, p. 345, assert that internal security expenditures are not included in the defense budget. If this indeed be the case, the Polish numbers must be increased accordingly.

Note: This table assumes (1) that official defense expenditures are a meaningful category embracing all direct military expenditures, except for military research and development costs; (2) and that for a specialized purpose, such as the tracking of relative changes in defense expenditures, an index of defense expenditures in local currencies as a proportion of national income (net material product) according to official East European data is more useful than an index constructed from Western dollar estimates of defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product.

Sources: Percent of national income, percent of State budget, total defense expenditures, all from official data; percent of gross national product, and totals of military strength, from *The Military Balance*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1960, 1967-1968, 1973-1974; personnel costs, procurement, operations and maintenance, plus estimated R&D, from Thad P. Alton (and others), *Estimates of Military Expenditures in Eastern Europe*, ACDA/L-207, March 1973-1974.

Table 4

Percentage of Increases in Defense

Expenditures: WTO 1967-1971

	Percentage Increases From 1967 to 1968	Percentage Increases From 1968 to 1969	Percentage Increases From 1969 to 1970	Percentage Increases From 1970 to 1971	Avg. Yearly Increase	Aggregate Percentage Increase 1967 to 1971
Bulgaria	1.3	2.6	19.2	12.85	9.0	43.6
Czechoslovakia	5.9	2.5	11.9	6.5	6.7	29.3
E. Germany	61.3	9.2	6.3	6.7	20.9	100.0
Hungary	18.2	23.5	11.8	6.5	15.0	75.2
Poland	10.1	9.8	10.5	5.9	9.1	41.6
Rumania	4.0	4.2	30.7	6.4	11.3	50.1
U.S.S.R.	15.5	-1.1	37.0	0.0	12.9	56.7

Average Yearly
Increase for all
members except
Soviet Union =
12.0

Aggregate Average
Percentage Increase
for all members
except Soviet Union=
56.6