Crisis Dynamics and Strategic Decision
Abstract
Although timing and dynamic variables are generally acknowledged as essential aspects of crisis analysis, they are not explicitly included in current crisis models, which remain static in nature. The present report revises the classical model of deterrence, which is the basis of many models currently in use, to incorporate dynamic variables previously excluded from the analysis. This revised model of deterrence, incorporating dynamic elements, is then utilized to develop a basic computer program and related graphics display designed to summarize the status of the relationship between a pair of nations and the potential for conflict. The model developed in the present research revises the classical approach in several important respects. First, the nations involved are no longer dichotomized as a potential aggressor and deterrer. Rather, each party is characterized as viewing the other as a potential aggressor. Thus the analysis is no longer restricted to a one-sided optimization problem, but can be considered as a game-theoretic situation. This revised model is then utilized in an interactive computer program which monitors the changes in several of the critical variables in the decision calculus of each nation in the analysis and its national command authority over time.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 1977
- Accession Number
- ADA049056
Entities
People
- Abraham R. Wagner
- Jeffrey T. Richelson
- Lee E. Dutter