On Coalition Formation: A Game-Theoretical Approach.

Abstract

This paper deals with the question of coalition formation in n-person cooperative games. Two abstract game models of coalition formation are proposed. The core and the dynamic solution of these abstract games are then studied. These models assume that there is a rule governing the allocation of payoffs to each player in each coalition structure called a payoff solution concept. The predictions of these models are characterized for the special case of games with side payments using various payoff solution concepts such as the individually rational payoffs, the core, the Shapley value and the bargaining set M sub 1 superscript (i). Some modifications of these models are also discussed.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Nov 01, 1977
Accession Number
ADA049384

Entities

People

  • Prakash P. Shenoy

Organizations

  • University of Wisconsin–Madison

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Abstracts
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Bargaining
  • Computer Programming
  • Contracts
  • Cooperative Games
  • Game Theory
  • Mathematical Programming
  • Mathematics
  • Military Research
  • North Carolina
  • Numbers
  • Operations Research
  • Real Numbers
  • Theorems
  • Transitions
  • United States

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Mathematical Modeling and Probability Theory.