On Coalition Formation in Simple Games: A Mathematical Analysis of Caplow's and Gamson's Theories.

Abstract

This paper proposes a theory of coalition formation in simple games. The process of coalition formation is modeled as an abstract game. Two solutions of abstract games, the core and the dynamic solution, are used as the predictions of our model. Two classical theories of coalitions in sociology due to Caplow and Gamson are reformulated in a more general and mathematical setting. These theories are then analyzed using the techniques of our theory.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Nov 01, 1977
Accession Number
ADA049491

Entities

People

  • Prakash P. Shenoy

Organizations

  • University of Wisconsin–Madison

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  • Energy and Power Technologies

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  • Applied Mathematics
  • Behavioral Sciences
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  • Cooperative Games
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