A Measure of Strategic Stability Based on Two-Strike Nuclear Exchange Models.

Abstract

This paper presents a quantification of the notion of strategic stability as it pertains to changes in US and Soviet nuclear postures. Based on the use of two-strike strategic exchange models, this approach can be used to measure the degree to which proposed posture changes are stabilizing or destabilizing. The categories 'predominantly stabilizing' and 'predominantly destabilizing' are introduced to describe changes which, in sequence, produce respectively stabilizing and destabilizing results. (Author)

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Feb 01, 1978
Accession Number
ADA051937

Entities

People

  • Jeffrey H. Grotte

Organizations

  • Institute for Defense Analyses

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Algorithms
  • Civil Defense
  • Department Of Defense
  • Deterrence
  • Differential Equations
  • Far Infrared Radiation
  • First Strike Capability
  • Force Structure
  • Nonlinear Programming
  • Strategic Weapons
  • Ussr

Readers

  • Regression Analysis.
  • Strategic Security Studies