A Dynamic Theory of Contractual Incentives.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to construct a simple model of the information, incentive, and decision aspects of financial incentive system and to offer insights into the problem of a high-level government unit that wishes to encourage lower-level units and private contractors to behave in consonance with its financial and non-financial objectives.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Feb 01, 1978
Accession Number
ADA052822

Entities

People

  • Paul R. Kleindorfer
  • Robert W. Blanning

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Acquisition
  • Business Administration
  • Congress
  • Contractors
  • Contracts
  • Cost Overruns
  • Costs
  • Department Of Defense
  • Fixed Price Contracts
  • Governments
  • Incentive Contracts
  • Information Processing
  • Probability
  • Probability Distributions
  • Random Variables
  • United States
  • United States Government

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Economics
  • Systems Analysis and Design