Military Chiefs and Presidential Policy: the Problem of Dissent.

Abstract

This paper analyses the conflicts between the demands of bureaucratic loyalty, professional integrity, and constitutional principles of civil control that arise when senior military officers are faced with the dilemma of opposing presidential defense policies. At issue is the question of whether or not intensive bureaucratization of the American military since 1947 has undermined the officer corps' traditional sense of professional independence and political neutrality.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1975
Accession Number
ADA053544

Entities

People

  • William L. Sammon

Organizations

  • University of Chicago

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Congress
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Employment
  • Governments
  • Military Budgets
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • National Governments
  • National Politics
  • National Security
  • Personnel Management
  • Political Systems
  • Public Administration
  • Public Policy
  • Sociopolitics
  • Warfare

Fields of Study

  • Political science

Readers

  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Systems Analysis and Design