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
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


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THESIS

THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS
IN RECRUITING AND SUSTAINING
THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

by

Stephen G. Foti

March 1978

Thesis Advisor:

J. W. Creighton

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The concepts of enlistment standards, factors influencing enlistment, and incentives enhancing enlistment are also discussed. This report concludes with recommendations concerning proposed changes to ensure the viability of the recruiting effort in sustaining the All-Volunteer Force concept.

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The Importance of Socio-Economic Factors in Recruiting
and Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force

by

Stephen G. Foti
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1972

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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March 1978

Author

Stephen G. Foti

Approved by

J. W. Croyleton

Thesis Advisor

James K. Curran

Co-Advisor

[Signature]
Chairman, Department of Administrative Sciences

[Signature]
Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the importance of socio-economic factors in recruiting and sustaining the All-Volunteer Force. It reviews previous research which explored the inherent factors of the recruiting effort in attaining enlistment standards. It considers the problem areas and goals of attracting and recruiting sufficient numbers of qualified enlisted personnel to fulfill the manning level requirements needed to satisfy military operations and missions. In addition, a brief history of military manpower procurement from a draft environment to the transition of volunteerism is included.

The concepts of enlistment standards, factors influencing enlistment, and incentives enhancing enlistment are also discussed. This report concludes with recommendations concerning proposed changes to ensure the viability of the recruiting effort in sustaining the All-Volunteer Force concept.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION -----	8
	A. PROBLEM -----	9
	B. PURPOSE -----	14
	C. SCOPE -----	14
II.	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND -----	16
III.	ENLISTMENT STANDARDS -----	24
	A. BACKGROUND -----	27
	B. ASVAB TESTING -----	30
	1. Content -----	32
	2. Scoring -----	33
	3. Reliability -----	33
	C. QUALITY -----	34
	D. QUANTITY -----	42
	E. REPRESENTATION -----	45
	1. Female -----	45
	2. Racial -----	47
IV.	FACTORS INFLUENCING ENLISTMENT -----	50
	A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS -----	50
	B. ATTITUDES TOWARDS MILITARY SERVICE -----	51
	1. Fate Control -----	52
	C. TECHNICAL TRAINING -----	53
	1. Education -----	55
	D. MILITARY PAY -----	56
	1. Unemployment Rates -----	59

V.	ENHANCING ENLISTMENT THROUGH THE USE OF INCENTIVES	-62
A.	ATTITUDES TOWARDS MILITARY SERVICE	-----63
1.	Fate Control	-----67
B.	EDUCATION AND TRAINING	-----70
1.	Cooperative Education	-----71
C.	MILITARY PAY	-----75
1.	Occupational Bonus	-----79
2.	Performance Pay	-----80
VI.	CONCLUSION	-----82
VII.	RECOMMENDATIONS	-----85
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	-----91
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	-----97
	FORM DD 1473	----- 2

I. INTRODUCTION

The advent of the All-Volunteer Force was a major and fundamental change that affected all aspects of the way the Armed Forces must now procure personnel. The military services are now operating in a no-draft environment for the first time since World War II. This unique situation has had the effect of placing the burden of recruiting entirely on the services to attain proper manning level requirements.

On July 1, 1973, induction authority officially expired and at the end of Fiscal Year 1975 the last conscripted soldier had completed his required service (Schlesinger, 1974). The decision to end peacetime conscription in the United States and to rely instead entirely on volunteers to meet the manpower needs of the Armed Forces must be considered as one of the most crucial and controversial defense policies undertaken in recent years.

President Richard M. Nixon, in announcing his decision to proceed with the All-Volunteer Force, acknowledged the national controversy surrounding the issue of discontinuing the draft (Marmion, 1971). Nevertheless, the military departments were called upon to begin planning for sustaining sustaining their manpower requirements on a volunteer basis and a special commission was formed to study the problem and to develop "... a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving towards an All-Volunteer Force." (President's Commission, 1970, p. 211).

A. PROBLEM

One of the major effects of the draft was to remove the military from forces of the recruiting marketplace. In a draft environment, the military could afford to be dominated by traditions that often ran counter to the general thrust of changes in the civilian environment. The draft ensured an adequate supply of manpower. The removal of the draft compels the military to compete directly with civilian industry for qualified personnel. The Armed Forces must now be responsive to changes in the civilian environment and must focus on making enlistment competitively attractive in order to attract sufficient numbers of qualified personnel at a cost the American public is willing to bear.

During the draft, there was no apparent need to improve the supply of manpower accessions into the services. However, with the advent of the All-Volunteer Force there were many adjustments that needed to be made in the recruiting process in order to monitor the factors that influence service age individuals to choose military service rather than alternative civilian pursuits.

The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force supports the importance of the recruiting effort in maintaining the quality of an All-Volunteer Force.

"... The Commission recognizes the importance of recruiting and retaining qualified individuals. Improvements, combined with an intensive recruiting effort, should enable the military to maintain a high quality force." (p. 18).

However, the recruiting establishment in the past has been a small, comparatively stable body accustomed to performing traditional duties in traditional ways. The unchanging nature of recruiting was described in this way:

"Traditional recruiting methods with some exceptions, have not significantly changed over the past 100 years. Appeals popular in the 19th century are still in use today." (Broadening the Recruiting Market, 1972, p. 1).

There is general agreement that the difficulties for sustaining the All-Volunteer Force will increase after 1980 and become more severe after 1985 because of the sharp decline in the population of military age males and forecasted increases in private sector competition for employable youth.

Furthermore, the future recruiting situation may be less bright. In a statement before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Professor King stated that:

"The All-Volunteer Force has been operating under a combination of circumstances which could not reasonably be expected to ever be more favorable." (Senate Hearing, 1977, p. 7).

This previous statement directly relates to the absence of a draft-guaranteed supply of qualified personnel into the military service. As a result, further analysis is deemed essential concerning certain issues of major importance and their potential consequences.

The following issues are linked with the recruiting process and the ability to sustain the All-Volunteer Force concept in the United States.

1. A 40% force level decline from the peak of the Vietnam War significantly reduced recruiting requirements, while a relatively stable force level is now expected to be maintained for marginal national security.

2. The prime recruiting targets exist in the 17- and 18-year-old male population. However, this population will continue to steadily decline into the early 1990's as much as 25% from 2.15 million to 1.6 million.

3. Record unemployment levels, especially among the teenage group now estimated at 19% and among blacks at 36.9% are expected to considerably improve due to a 50% decrease in unemployment forecast for 1982.

4. The substantial pay increases in real military recruit pay relative to real civilian pay for comparable jobs of 193% to 11% will see greater parity or be reversed in the future (Senate Hearing, 1977, p. 7).

5. The future supply of military manpower becoming more speculative and subject to seasonal variations.

6. The principal qualitative procurement objectives of the services to maintain or improve upon the pre-All Volunteer Force standards.

7. The traditional and largely self-imposed limitations on potential recruits in relation to women and black representation.

8. The supply of volunteers will tend to distribute itself inefficiently among and within the Services (Morgan and Roseen, 1974).

These factors portend a very grave recruiting problem for the military in the near future. With a smaller source of supply, the services will need to attract one of every four males instead of the previously projected six to reach recruiting goals. Blinkin points out that:

"While it should remain possible to meet the quantitative requirements, the quality of manpower will surely suffer. However, difficulties may develop even before this supply problem is encountered. As the economy continues to recover, the number of male high school graduates drawn to the military is likely to reach disturbingly low levels." (Senate Hearing, 1977, p. 18).

The aforementioned problem appears to spiral at a much greater rate when Professor Morris Janowitz discusses the concept of "postwar erosion of Nationalism." In essence, this feature relates to societal attitudes concerning the validity of the mass armed force and the effectiveness of our military institutions during the Vietnam War (New Yorker, 1975, Vol. I, p. 59). This evolution of anti-military sentiment makes it considerably more difficult and subsequently places greater emphasis and importance on recruiting qualified individuals interested in military service. As a result, a smaller force was determined to be sustained primarily by the prevailing socio-economic pressures that emerged during this period.

At no other time in our history has a peacetime military had to cope with so many changes in the way it deals with its most important resource, people. The process of change, which

began in the 1960's, is likely to accelerate in the near future as new policies and procedures are instituted.

Already there have been fundamental changes within the military. Paramount among these changes are the elimination of the draft, the reduction in defense personnel and budgets, and the increasing costs of personnel in relation to the recruitment function. In addition, a declining civilian manpower pool, and new attitudes towards the military in Congress and among the general population in the wake of the Vietnam War have created a new environment in which the military must now operate. The American military have already begun to adapt to changes in the personnel environment, but more change is required. The challenge for the armed forces is to maintain a broad-based organization that can attract young people (Cooper and Rostker, 1974).

In a managerial sense, the elimination of the draft was a major shock. The draft had set up many internal behavioral and organizational responses that subsequently needed to be altered in a zero draft atmosphere. As a result, the need for analyzing the socio-economic factors which affect military enlistments of non-prior service eligible youths directly bear upon the recruiting situation.

Research into the area of recruiting the All-Volunteer Force indicate that certain socio economic factors prevail and that the servcies need to adopt changes in the accession and procurement process if they wish to remain a viable

All-Volunteer Force. It becomes evident that the recruiting process has and will become more important and vital for the success of the All-Volunteer Force to be realized.

B. PURPOSE

Therefore, the purpose of this thesis will be to investigate the importance of socio-economic factors in recruiting and sustaining the All-Volunteer Force concept.

C. SCOPE

This thesis is primarily based on a comprehensive literature review of government publications, technical reports, research papers, Department of Defense official documents, books, magazine articles, and various unpublished papers.

The bibliography of this thesis has been expanded to include as many references as possible pertaining to the subject of the transition of the United States Armed Forces from a draft environment to one of all volunteers.

The U. S. Defense Manpower Commission in its report dated April 19, 1976, states:

"The prospects for sustaining DOD annual requirements for new enlisted manpower from 1976 through 1985 will be affected by the dominant demographic, economic, and social conditions prevailing during the next decade." (Defense Manpower Commission, 1976, p. 386).

At this time, the recruiting effort is principally concerned with the enlistment aged population in attaining qualitative, quantitative, and representational factors of armed forces enlistment standards. In addition, the attitudes of

youth towards military service, educational and training opportunities, and military compensations and benefits are vital in recruiting an all-volunteer force.

It is pertinent to discuss the methods of averting potential recruiting shortfalls by altering enlistment standards, occupational selection standards, potential supply of women accessions, military compensation, training programs, and increasing the degree of fate control and self-determination.

Accordingly, these changes can increase the size of the applicant pool by inducing additional men and women to seek enlistment who would not apply otherwise.

The format of this thesis pursues these essential elements so that one can logically understand the concepts and underlying influences in procuring potential candidates into the military service.

Therefore, Chapter Two primarily relates the historical background of the draft through the transition of volunteerism. Chapter Three deals with enlistment standards and the aspects of quality, quantity, and the representational mix. Chapter Four reviews certain socio-economic factors which influence enlistment, while Chapter Five explores incentives enhancing enlistment into the military service. Finally, the conclusion focuses on the socio-economic factors that directly bear upon recruiting practices and procedures. Additionally, it emphasizes the need for larger advertising budgets and expanded recruiter forces that provide an effective and more flexible mechanism towards attracting youth into the military.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter presents a detailed history of conscription particularly in the United States. It primarily focuses on the emergence of conscription as a solution to the problem of military manpower procurement until the inception of the All Volunteer Armed Force.

The word conscription is basically a derivative of the Latin expression "conscribes milites" (to enroll soldiers). Conscription is one of two methods of securing manpower to be trained and formed into a national soldiery. The other method is recruitment. In military history, a sharp distinction can not be made between recruitment and conscription. Where conscription has existed, volunteering has been permitted to anticipate conscription.

Wars in Europe from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries were primarily fought by professional armies. However, the draft was relied upon during great national crises. The first modern conscription law was adopted by France during the French Revolution. In 1793, voluntary military service produced only one-third the number of men considered necessary for defense of the new democracy. As a result, Napoleon led an army primarily manned by conscription. Accordingly, most major European nations adopted this practice of conscription during the nineteenth century (Carleton, Jan. - June 68).

In the "New World," the Colonialist fought as necessary to protect his interests and well being. The militia concept

stemmed from this feature. This meant that every able-bodied person should be armed and ready to fight when the occasion demanded such action. In Jamestown from 1607 until 1775, when the American Revolution began, conscription of one type or another was promulgated in a number of laws and ordinances. In the Revolutionary War voluntary enlistments failed to supply the needed manpower. Various types of bounties were adopted as inducements to enlistment. These included large sums of money, clothing and 100 acres of land. In 1777, Massachusetts and Virginia resorted to conscription. By February, 1778, only about two-thirds of the authorized Continental Army had been recruited and General Washington recommended to the Continental Congress that the necessary men be obtained by universal conscription throughout the colonies (Little, 1969).

After the American Revolution, a militia law was passed by Congress requiring all free males between the ages of 18 and 45 to participate in military training. However, no officers nor equipment were provided and only four days of training were required. Therefore, the law had little impact upon the nation and in 1903 it was repealed. Voluntary enlistment was again inadequate in the War of 1812.

Conscription was used in a limited manner in this country until the Civil War. The Confederate States instituted conscription in 1862. The northern states adopted a conscription registration law on March 3, 1863. Serious problems were encountered in the north primarily due to the administration

of the system. The law was selectively enforced, being applied only to areas where volunteering had lagged. In addition, there were many exemptions in the Union system whereby an individual could avoid service if he could provide a substitute or would pay the government three hundred dollars to purchase "freedom." This first drawing of names in 1863 was accompanied by riots. Within a few months, ninety-eight registrars were murdered by mobs and severe property damage occurred. As a result, troops had to be withdrawn from the front to put down the draft riots in New York City.

After the Civil War, the United States had no draft and did not reinstitute the system until after entry into World War I. The Selective Service Act was prepared and presented to Congress the day after war was declared in April, 1917. The Selective Service Act of 1917, in contrast with the 1863 law, was carefully drawn in light of the previous experience. Exemptions were allowed only for married men and men in essential work categories. Nevertheless, a bitter six-week debate ensued in which the bill was alleged as being unconstitutional. In May of 1917 the act was passed by Congress. The law was enforced uniformly and without discrimination. The draft order number was determined by chance and administration of it was controlled by local and state boards. As a result, 24 million Americans between the ages of 17 and 45 were registered for the draft and more than 2.8 million men were selected and inducted into the service. This compares with

1.6 million men who volunteered, many when their compulsory induction seemed imminent. This law was so successful that it required only three minor revisions during its period of applicability (Lockmiller, 1955). The draft was again eliminated at the conclusion of the war.

However, planning for future emergencies began in 1926, when the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee convened. The Committee proposed "An Act to provide for the common defense by increasing the personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States and providing for its training" which called for the registration of all males between the ages of 21 and 35.

In response to the war in Europe, the Congress passed the first peacetime draft law in the history of the United States in 1940. Mandatory registration of all males between the ages of 21 and 35 was required and drafted men were to serve a period of one year. On August 18, 1941, Congress extended the period of service to 18 months. America's entrance into World War II extended the length of service for the duration of the war plus six months. Registration was broadened to include men between the ages of 18 and 60. During the period of emergency from November 1940 to October 31, 1946, there had been nearly 22 million registrants between the ages of 18 and 37 with more than 10 million men inducted into military service.

On June 25, 1946, Congress extended conscriptive service to July 1, 1947. At that time, Congress passed a law which

provided for the retention of a nucleus of Selective Service personnel for protection against national emergencies. Thus, the United States depended solely upon enlistments for maintaining the posture of the services. The United States was without conscription, however, for only one year. Although the draft ended and a general demilitarization was initiated, Americans soon realized that military preparedness was a necessity in a shrinking world, where a surprise attack was an ever-increasing possibility.

Although an attempt was made to man the Armed Forces with volunteers during this period, it was considered a failure in force quality as well as total numbers. The failure is not surprising in view of the attitudes regarding military service which existed in the Nation at the conclusion of a great and costly war.

For four years President Truman tried unsuccessfully to have Congress pass a Universal Military Training Act which would provide one year of training to all American men. This issue always fostered bitter debate, but the Cold War crisis forced the Congress to enact the Selective Service Act on June 24, 1948.

The 1948 Act provided for a period of service of 21 months. All men between the ages of 18 and 26 were required to register. The law provided that high school students could continue their study, if their work was satisfactory, until graduation, or until they reached the age of 20, whichever was first. Youths

in the 18-year-old category were allowed to enlist for one year (limit of 161,000 per year) and avoid the draft by joining the reserves for six years. College and University students could have induction postponed until the end of the academic year. Each month the draft call was calculated to yield the number of men required to sustain the military forces at the levels authorized by Congress. The authorized level was 2,000,882 men, but subsequent budget cuts forced successive reductions in authorized military strength.

After January 1949 the Armed Forces were able to attain the required manpower level and draft calls were cancelled, but registration and classifications continued. The value of this continuation of registration and classification paid off when inductions were forced to resume within 60 days after the Korean hostilities began.

The Selective Service Act of 1948 was succeeded by the Universal Military Training and Service Act of June 30, 1951. This Act increased the sources of manpower available for induction by restricting certain deferments and extending the service period from 21 to 24 months. The Universal Military Training and Service Act was extended in June 1955 until July, 1959. A further extension until July 1, 1967, was granted by Public Law 88-2.

In March 1969, President Nixon appointed the Gates Commission to develop a comprehensive plan to eliminate the draft. The chairman was Thomas S. Gates who had once been Secretary

of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration. As an independent public advisory body with its own staff of 16 members, the Gates Commission examined all aspects of the All-Volunteer Force issue from a fresh and unbiased perspective. In November 1969, the President reduced the period of prime draft vulnerability from seven years to one year and established draft selection by lottery. In February 1970, after a year of intensive study, the commission concluded that:

"We unanimously believe that the nation's interest will be better served by an All-Volunteer Force, supported by an effective standby draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts; that steps should be taken promptly to move in this direction; and, that the first indispensable step is to remove the present inequity in the pay of men serving their first term in the Armed Forces." (Report of Pres. Comm., 1970, p. 8).

The commission's comprehensive report was a significant contribution to the public's understanding of a complex defense issue and to foster broad acceptance of the All-Volunteer Force concept. There was a consensus in the conclusions of the Gates Commission regarding the feasibility of the AVF and the principal steps needed to end reliance on the draft. The commission recommended:

1. Substantial pay increases for junior enlisted personnel.
2. Selected pay increases for junior enlisted personnel.
3. Selected pay incentives for specialists.
4. A greatly expanded recruiting program.

(Report of Pres. Comm., P. 10).

Thus, in October 1970, the Secretary of Defense directed the military to move toward an All-Volunteer Force with 1 July 1973 set as the target date for achievement. In January 1971, the President proposed that induction authority be extended to 30 June 1973, due to the Vietnam War. In September 1971, the Congress, after lengthy debate, extended the President's induction authority to 1 July and passed legislation on pay and benefits for an AVF. In October 1972, the Secretary of Defense reported that DOD was within reach of achieving an AVF of 2.3 million active duty and 1 million Reserves. As a result, by January 1973, draft calls under the Selective Service System ended, and on 1 July 1973 the President's power to conscript young men had expired. Thus, America became the first major world power to rely entirely on "volunteerism" to man a military "force in being" of over two million for its defense and projection of aims, goals, and foreign policy.

III. ENLISTMENT STANDARDS

This chapter presents the enlistment standards to be used as the goals of this nation and of the Department of Defense to build a credible All Volunteer Force (AVF). The creation of that credible force is based on a number of critical factors. The first of several major factors is that adequate numbers of citizens must volunteer for military service to properly man a large standing Armed Force. The second is that these volunteers must possess the desired qualitative factors necessary for the maintenance of a credible force that is capable of decisive military action in support of national security objectives. The third is that these volunteers attain a proper balance of male, female and racial representation. These factors must necessarily be viewed in the present fiscal environment in which The Armed Services plan and program its combat forces.

Adjustments in procurement programs have been made throughout the Armed Services in order to meet its annual enlisted recruiting goals from a quantity standpoint with seemingly no sacrifice of quality in the process. These are a variety of reasons for this success. Obviously, increased financial incentives for enlistees, lower procurement objectives, and increased emphasis on enlisting women are key factors.

Partial success to date is related intimately with the reasons given by young men and women enlisting in the service.

Studies show that people enlist to learn a skill that will be useful to them in civilian life, to continue their education, to test their abilities and define their interests, to find adventure, challenge and maturity, and to serve their country (Bowers and Bachman, 1974, p. 21).

Rising unemployment and an uncertain economy have helped recruiting goals set by all of the Services. A sagging economy represents an opportunity to be a great deal more selective in accepting men and women for enlistment.

Although there have been major organizational, manpower and program changes, and even changes in the image of recruiters in the eye of the public over the years, the recruiting mission has essentially remained the same. However, many people, military and civilian, have no appreciation or understanding of the complexity of the recruiting business and the role of the recruiter and the formidable task he performs. Simply, the mission of the Recruiting System is to recruit and select qualified personnel from the civilian community to satisfy the manpower needs and objectives of the Armed Forces. As a result, the study is limited to an analysis of the system for recruiting non-prior-service enlisted personnel only.

While many studies have been accomplished on the general subject of recruiting in an all volunteer environment, they were written prior to or during the transition period. Accordingly, these studies only address the basic issue of

whether the military could continue to procure manpower without the draft and do not directly deal with the factors mentioned earlier.

Therefore, for purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that the economic conditions in the United States will improve to the point where the youth of America are once again in demand for employment by both the military and civilian communities. David Cortright expresses the impact of current economic conditions. ". . . The deepest economic slump and highest rate of unemployment since the Great Depression have caused a surge of new enlistees and have neatly 'solved' the problem of the all-volunteer force." (Military Establishment, June 1975, p. 43).

It is assumed that the all-volunteer force policy will continue and that a return to stable economic conditions and better employment opportunities will not warrant reinstatement of conscription.

It is assumed that military pay, benefits and educational opportunities will continue at the present high comparative level with civilian occupations. The importance of educational incentives as an ingredient critical to the success of high quality all-volunteer force was summarized by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Education) Dr. M. Richard Rose:

"Educational and training incentives more strongly attract high school graduates and those with higher school grades than do financial incentives.

"Educational and training opportunities attract equally from all races those individuals with

higher educational levels as well as higher academic performance. These incentives hold no racial bias.

"Educational and training opportunities are primary incentives to re-enlistment and correlate highly with career satisfaction." (Statistical Review, 1974, p. 10).

Rose states that ". . . The educational and training incentives operate optimally only when such major irritants as low pay are removed." (p. 11) It is assumed that the political situation of the United States will continue to demand a mix of highly competent tactical and strategic forces capable of successful operations in all spectrums of warfare.

A. BACKGROUND

The military services have been administering some sort of aptitude testing for many years. Screening of enlistees and inductees for minimum mental ability was first introduced into the armed services in August 1942. Existent literacy standards were waived to permit men who possessed sufficient intelligence to assimilate military training the opportunity to serve even though some were illiterate.

"Screening tests during W.W. II were used to select men on the basis of very low mental standards, i.e., those who did not possess sufficient literacy or mental ability to absorb the most elementary training. However, this experience emphasized the value of screening on the basis of mental ability -- a practice which continued after the war when higher mental standards could be applied." (Uhlener, 1952, p. 3).

Aptitude testing was still very "primitive" during the Second World War.

Following World War II, personnel testing programs were given the necessary attention. Each branch of the service developed its own battery of tests to determine minimum mental suitability. "It was realized early that much waste in cost of transportation and processing of enlistment applicants could be avoided if those who were likely to be disqualified for mental reasons could be detected and rejected at the local recruiting stations before being sent to Central Examining Stations." (Uhlener, p. 7). This was not the case as far as aptitude testing was concerned. Although considerable advancement has been made in developing the tests, they were not administered until after the recruit had been sent to the Central Examining Stations. This resulted in a high rejection rate due to little or no vocational aptitude.

Armed Forces Qualification Tests (AFQT) were developed in 1949 by a joint subcommittee composed of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The main objective of this subcommittee was to develop a screening instrument which could be used by all three services to determine acceptance or rejection of enlistees and inductees. The mental category status of each person was defined in terms of his score on the AFQT.

Nancy Guinn, of the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, related that due to increased demands placed on new recruits and because of technological advances in all spheres of military operations, it has become necessary to attract and enlist individuals who possess marginal mental ability. An important

relationship of the availability and demand of manpower under differing situations can be explained in the following way:

"During periods of reduced international military involvement, increased selectivity is feasible because the drain on national manpower resources is not excessive. However, with the occurrence of war or national emergency, the requirement for military manpower becomes highly demanding. The Selective Service Law requires that the services accept any registrant who achieves a percentile score of 10 or higher on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, regardless of educational level or aptitude test scores." (Guinn, 1970, p. 2).

In addition, by 1965. . . "the increases in selectivity for enlistment had introduced such high mental standards that the Armed Forces were deferring substantial numbers of personnel in the available manpower pool. The majority of these individuals, classified as Category IV on the basis of an AFQT score, between the 10th and 30th percentiles, were being rejected because they failed to qualify on supplementary tests or did not possess the necessary educational prerequisites." (Guinn, 1970, p. 1).

In October 1966, in response to a request made by President Johnson, the Department of Defense lowered mental standards for accepting men into military service. This effort was named "Project 100,000" after its goal to recruit 100,000 men, who previously would have been rejected because of failure to meet minimum mental standards or, in some instances, physical standards. The purpose of Project 100,000 was to give to a broader segment of the Nation's youth the opportunity to serve in the country's defense and, at the same time, to improve

their competence and prepare them for a more productive life upon return to civilian status. Project 100,000 was terminated in 1972.

B. ASVAB TESTING

The concept behind the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) actually dates back to 1958. This test is used to determine mental and aptitude qualifications which are vital to enlistment eligibility. It was then that the Armed Services first started testing high school students for vocational aptitude. It proved to be a very valuable recruiting tool, because it provided the recruiters with a list of prospective enlistees who have a measurable vocational aptitude.

"The program was very successful. So successful, in fact, that the other services joined by initiating their own programs and soon there was a lively competition among recruiters to place their service's tests in a given school. This competition became detrimental to the total recruiting program and the schools could not and would not allocate the time necessary to administer the test for each service. In addition, school administrators in some schools were turned anti-test, anti-military, and anti-recruiting by some unscrupulous acts and conduct." (Procedures Manual, 1974, p. 1-1,2).

This action prompted the Assistant Secretary for Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to direct the military departments to explore the feasibility of developing a common aptitude battery. In 1966, a group of experts from the Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences, the Navy Personnel and Training Research Laboratory, and the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory developed a prototype test. (Procedures Manual, p. 1-3).

Tests were developed to serve as both an instrument for counseling high school students by school administrators and as a military recruitment aid that would: (1) establish mental qualifications for enlistment and induction; (2) permit selection of enlistment aptitudes for particular occupational or training systems; and (3) provide classification and assignment information. With the exception of Coding Speed, test items contained on the first form of the ASVAB were selected from an item pool consisting of all items contained in the different tests of the armed forces.

"Because of differences among the services in acceptance standards, training programs and job requirements, a test with known degree of validity in one service might have reduced validity if applied in another service. Hence, it was necessary to require high correlation among counterpart tests if they were to be considered to be equally effective in predicting success in training and on the job. The scores on all the tests were correlated with each other and statistical adjustments made to provide stability and generalizability to the base mobilization population." (Bayroff, 1970, p. 4).

ASVAB was introduced into the national high school environment in 1968 by joint service regulation which established responsibilities for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Inter-service Recruiting Committees were formed to ". . . plan, coordinate and maintain the relationship between local recruiting and schools for testing purposes." (Bayroff, p. 3). This was intended to mold the testing of all the services into a united front; however, the services acted independently and skirted DOD directives. This resulted in a revised directive in 1972 which designated the Secretary of the Air Force as the executive agent with overall responsibility for the school

testing program. The Armed Forces Vocational Testing Group, with headquarters at Randolph AFB, was formed and tasked to develop plans, policy, and procedures to implement, coordinate, and manage the ASVAB program. (A.F. Vocational Testing Program, 1974, p. 2).

1. ASVAB Content

ASVAB consists of nine tests designed to measure aptitude in five separate vocational-technical areas.

General-Technical -- describes the student's ability for occupations requiring academic ability. The composite is composed of verbal and mathematical components of the battery.

Clerical -- describes the student's ability relevant to clerical and administrative occupations. The composite is composed of the battery components concerned with verbal ability and clerical speed and accuracy.

Electronics -- describes student's ability relevant to electrical and electronic occupations. The composite consists of tests dealing with electrical information and with understanding of mechanical principles.

General Mechanics -- describes student's ability in terms of those capabilities relevant to a variety of mechanical and trade jobs. The composite consists of tests assessing shop information and spatial ability.

Motor Mechanics -- describes the student's ability relevant to engine repair and other related jobs. It is composed of measures of automotive information and understanding of mechanical principles. (Counselor Manual, 1974, p. 17).

Individual tests consist of twenty-five questions except Coding Speed, which has 100. All tests are timed. Actual testing time is one hour and 52 minutes.

2. ASVAB Scoring

The Armed Forces use the results of the nine tests and compute aptitude composites slightly different than the previously stated five vocational-technical areas which are reported to the high school counselors and testees. The four aptitude composites are: Mechanical, Administrative, General and Electronics.

"The Mechanical composite (M) depends upon the scores of the subtests Tool Knowledge, Mechanical Comprehension, Shop Information and Automotive Information. The Administrative composite (A) depends upon the scores of the subtests Coding Speed and Word Knowledge and Arithmetic Reasoning, Space Perception, and Electronics Info." (Procedures Manual, p. 6-2).

Generally, the Armed Forces will accept mental Category I and II applicants without high school diplomas, but applicants scoring in Category III or IV must possess a diploma. Also, very few mental Category IV people are allowed to enlist. Furthermore, all General Education Development Certificates must be state-certified.

3. ASVAB Reliability

The reliability of a test is an index of the consistency with which it measures (i.e., the extent to which repeated administration of the test will repeat the same results). Measurement errors may be introduced by such things as the length of the test. "A test may be too short and so give an inadequate sampling of the attribute being measured. It may be so long that the test-taker becomes bored and begins to answer to random." (Strauss, 1972, p. 426).

Among the techniques used to determine test reliability is checking to see if slightly different versions of a test given to the same people at different times, or the same test given to matched samples of people, give the same approximate results. The reliability of ASVAB was determined by use of an internal consistency index computed through use of the Kuder-Richardear Formula 20 and through correlation with an alternate form of the test.

C. QUALITY

People must be recruited in the quality necessary to successfully fulfill the mission of the Armed Forces. However, there are no permanent solutions in determining manpower needs. As Defense requirements, technology, and budgetary constraints change, so will needs and the ways of meeting them (Falk, 1966, p. 124). Accordingly, DOD planners and programmers must be attuned to a myriad of internal and external factors which could impact on recruiting.

"Mental test standards are established by law and military policy as a means of determining acceptability of potential enlistees and inductees. The purpose of such standards is to screen out those who cannot profit from military training and who might be actual liabilities to the Services." (Uhlener, 1952, p. 1).

Quality recruiting is and must continue to be the goal of the United States Armed Forces. The supply of qualified people limits success of meeting National objectives just as sharply as does the supply of money or materials.

The Armed Forces measure quality through the use of several criteria such as moral, physical and mental standards. Since the advent of the AVF, however, there has been a tendency to expand the general meaning of quality to include other factors such as social, economic, and racial representativeness of the Armed Forces. Indeed, the issue of representativeness has been argued for years by professional scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and others, but it did not become a major item of professional or academic interest as long as conscription remained in effect. The peacetime draft, in all probability, did provide a reasonably balanced cross-section of American youth for military service. Additionally, the selectivity of conscription enabled the services to maintain a reasonably high level of quality as measured by aptitude and educational achievement. However, termination of the draft raised serious questions about the availability and extent of quality in an AVF. For example, during the first meeting of a newly organized Senate Sub-Committee on Manpower and Personnel, its Chairman, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, stated that the issue of quality in the AVF:

". . . does not simply go to the question of IQ, or the educational level of the new soldiers. Quality includes the whole spectrum of questions on the representativeness, the motivation, and the patriotism, as well as the skill of our armed force personnel." (OASD, M&RA, Dec. 1974).

Most of the issues raised by Senator Nunn are complex and proper evaluation would require extensive testing and substantial analysis.

In examining the quality of enlistees, one should logically first try and determine a suitable military concept or definition of quality and a satisfactory means of measurement. Extensive research on the subject suggests that it is an ambiguous term at best and that no fully satisfactory measure exists. However, people are not hesitant to discuss the issue. For instance, Assistant Secretary of Defense, William K. Brehm, in writing on the quality of recruits stated:

"Quality is a complex concept. Its many facets include physical capacity, moral behavior, trainability, intelligence, and most importantly--motivation and discipline. The services try to measure all of these things before an individual is signed up, to predict whether or not he will be successful. At present, some 31 percent of the males in the military age group are ineligible for service." (COMM. DIGEST, 1974, p. 2).

More often than not, however, quality is referred to strictly in terms of education level, mental category and aptitude. There are many illustrations as to what constitutes quality, but perhaps none quite as straight forward as conveyed in a status report released by the Directorate of Personnel Plans in February 1974. The report stated "two yardsticks most frequently used to assess the quality of enlistees are standardized test scores and level of education, whether or not the enlistees have completed high school." (Transition of AVF, 1974, p. 16).

Bliven states:

"In 1964, when the recruits were both volunteers and draftees, the percentage of high school graduates was sixty-eight. In 1975, the overall percentage was seventy-two." (New Yorker, 1975, Vol. I, p. 56).

When recession began, the military's qualification standards were fairly high. However, they have been getting higher. Volunteers are not accepted until they have satisfactorily taken the ASVAB. This was not the process taken during the draft years. As a result, average scores are higher than ever before because the services are becoming more selective.

Accordingly, mental category, education and aptitude are critical enlistment criteria affecting recruiting procedures. Education is easy enough to understand, but it should prove helpful to explain mental qualification and job aptitude. Obviously, the degree of aptitude and educational achievement found in the AVF are quantifiable and easily compared to earlier periods of the draft.

Until fairly recently, the Armed Services used the Armed Forces Qualification test to determine mental group designation and skill aptitude. The AFQT basically measured arithmetic reasoning, word and tool knowledge, and pattern analysis. The Armed Services now use the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery to measure these results.

Based on these test scores, examinees are divided into groupings according to mental qualifications. The mental group category terminology common throughout the Department of Defense is shown in the following table.

Table 1

<u>Mental Category</u>	<u>Percentile Score</u>
I	93 to 100
II	65 to 92
III	31 to 64
IV	10 to 30
V	9 and below

Categories I and II are considered to be above average, Category III average, and Categories IV and V below average. Category V personnel are exempt from military service by law.

As stated earlier, the end of the draft required the Armed Forces to revitalize its recruiting effort. Quality standards were fairly rigid in 1973. However, this was basically attributed to the smaller procurement objectives of the services.

In brief, the following enlistment eligibility criteria were iterated:

a. Mental Category I and II personnel may be high school graduates or non-high school graduates.

b. Mental Category III and IV personnel must be high school graduates.

c. All enlistees, regardless of category or level of education must achieve at least:

(1) The minimum qualifying aptitude score for the specialty in which enlisting, and

(2) A minimum score of forty-five in the area measuring general aptitude, and

(3) A minimum composite aptitude score of 170.

The latter point represents a significant change and it applies to both male and female applicants. Certainly the recruiters' job will become much more difficult as a result of these changes and ultimately the key to success in the recruiting effort.

During the transition phase and the first two years of the AVF, measured aptitude changed significantly, but not for the better. The trends indicate decreases in the above and below average categories, as shown in the following table.

Table 2

AFQT COMPARISONS: TRANSITION PHASE AND AVF

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>Percent Change</u>
I	5.3	2.1	60.4 decrease
II	28.3	23.1	18.4 decrease
III	41.7	58.9	41.2 increase
IV	24.1	16.1	33.3 decrease

(OASD, M&RA, DEC. 1974).

One could argue from these figures that overall quality is becoming more average, but comparison of the AVF with previous conscript force indicates that a better quality mix was obtained during the draft.

A greater disparity would be obvious except for the inclusion of females in the CY74 figures. By law, female entrants

must possess a high school education and attain aptitude scores in Categories I - III. Since they presently are estimated to account for 8.9 percent of all enlisted accessions, inclusion of their scores raised the 1974 percentages to some extent and distorts the quality comparison. Moreover, the higher entrance requirements for females accounts for part of the Category IV improvement. Although the decrease in Category IV accessions is quite impressive, it also becomes an undesirable aspect. The Department of Defense possesses the viewpoint that:

". . . the learning capacity of new entries is adequate in meeting job requirements when the proportion of Mental Group IV personnel does not exceed about 22 percent. Conversely, when the overall proportions of Mental Group IV personnel drops below 15 percent, there is a tendency toward many people underchallenged by their job assignment." (SASC, FY 1975, p. 1481).

Notwithstanding this phenomenon, the AVF clearly is obtaining less above average and more average recruits for the Army at precisely the time when technological requirements demand more quality. Moreover, the complexity of weapon systems for battlefield use is growing at such a rate that soon the Army will require the degree of technological expertise in its combat arms elements that formerly was required only by the more technically oriented services. Technological demands, therefore, will exacerbate the existing quantitative and qualitative dilemma of ground combat forces.

The downward trend in quality takes on added significance when related to the quantitative factor. It is reasonable to

assume, for example, that the services, recruiting during a period when unemployment is extraordinarily high, will take the most qualified who apply. Under more normal economic conditions, however, it will be virtually impossible for the services to maintain current aptitude levels. To illustrate the enormity of the problem, the Brookings Institution has calculated that even if Category IV accessions increase to 15 percent, the services must recruit two out of every five (or 40 percent) of every qualified and available male in Category I-III before he reaches age 23 (Blinkin, 1973). Since the services currently are recruiting only seven percent in Category IV, the present accessions in Categories I-III must exceed, by a substantial amount, 40 percent of the national availability. This situation highlights the relationship between supply and the quality of volunteers.

When the Army recruited only 86.9 percent of its NPS male accessions during June-December 1973, 20.8 percent were in Category IV. Quality was so uncertain during those first months of the AVF that Congress attached a rider to the Defense Appropriation Act for FY 1974.

In essence, certain military members would be honorably discharged, if they failed to achieve performance standards or adapt to Army life. By mid-1974 the Army found it necessary to discharge approximately 1,000 enlistees per month under the program, which amounted to about 7.3 percent of total monthly accessions. Additionally, the Army discovered that average

monthly loss rates for non-high school graduates were 2.7 times greater than those with degrees and that Category IV personnel failed at a rate 1.8 times greater than Category I-III accessions. (OASD, DEC. 1974).

Thus, during the first 18 months of the AVF (January 1973 to June 1974) the Army adjusted quality standards as necessary to avoid enormous recruiting shortfalls. When recruiting problems faded as the national economic slump began in mid-1974, the quality problems faded also. What remains to be seen is the ability to recruit adequate numbers, at a generally acceptable level of quality, when the economy returns to normal.

At present, the U. S. experiment with an AVF has been in progress for approximately five years, and evidence to date has raised some important questions about the quality and quantity for the force in the long term. It is quite evident that the Armed Services find it difficult to recruit when nationwide unemployment remains below approximately 5.0 percent.

D. QUANTITY

The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, the Gates Commission, considered the feasibility of obtaining various voluntary force levels that ranged from 2.0 million to 3.0 million military personnel. It concluded that active duty force levels within this range were possible if certain improvements were made in military pay, conditions of military service life, and recruiting capability. However, despite implementation

of these recommendations, the Commission's optimistic estimates have not fully materialized.

Although the Gates Commission did not suggest a specific military manpower force level, a careful reading of the report indicates that a tentative objective was a volunteer force level between 2.25 and 2.5 million. Indeed, a force level within this range subsequently was recommended by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird when he requested, in February 1972, a force level at just under 2.4 million for FY 1973. (Annual Def. Dept. Report, FY 1973, p. 55). The force was not obtained and a series of reductions in force level requests began. The shortfall at the end of FY 1973 was approximately 144,000 (Manpower Statistics, 1974, p. 22), whereupon the Secretary of Defense lowered the manpower request to 2.33 million for FY 1974 (Annual Def. Dept. Report FY 1974, p. 95). Despite the reduction in the total force objective, a further shortfall of 59,000 occurred, for a combined shortage of over 200,000 for FY 1973 and FY 1974. Only a modest reduction in total force objectives was set for FY 1975 force levels, and recruitment has been sufficient to stabilize the force at approximately 2.1 million. The following Table demonstrates this downward trend in active duty manpower levels under the transition to the AVF concept.

Table 3

DOD ACTIVE DUTY FORCE

<u>FY</u>	<u>Stated Objective</u>	<u>FY End Strength</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>
1973	2,396,517	2,252,810	143,707
1974	2,233,000	2,162,000	71,000
1975	2,152,000	2,129,000	23,000

(Annual Defense Department Reports; DOD Selected Manpower Statistics)

As can be seen from the previous Table, the decrease from FY 1973 to FY 1975 was 12.3 percent. Moreover, the FY 1974 request of 2.233 million was described as a ". . . base line force--the minimum force that the President and Secretary of Defense consider necessary to carry out national security objectives." (SASC, 1973). Yet a 5.9 percent reduction of that minimum force occurred between FY 1974 and FY 1977.

Within DOD, this downward quantitative trend has had a most serious impact on the U. S. Army. In FY 1973 the Army established a force objective of 841,000, but ended the year with slightly less than 801,000. In the following year the requirement was lowered to 804,000, but Army strength fell to 783,000, its lowest strength since 1950. Since then the strength has stabilized at about 785,000 (Manpower Statistics, FY 1973, p. 22).

This pronounced difference between stated force objectives and actual force levels reflects, in large measure, the Army's inability to recruit the quantity and quality mix of personnel under a voluntary program. Moreover, some significant recruiting

trends are evident which suggest that the shortfalls would have been much greater except for a heavy reliance on females, prior servicemen, blacks, and the fortuitous circumstance of high national unemployment. Indeed, it appears that the latter factor may be merely postponing the possible demise of the AVF, while reliance on females could be considered by some an innovation of questionable long-term value.

E. REPRESENTATION

1. Female

A major doctrinal question exists about the role of females in the Armed Forces, particularly because of their rapidly increasing rate of representation. Few would deny the ability of many females to serve in most military capacities, and indeed their contributions during World War II, both in military service and industry, is proof enough. However, the desirability of large numbers of females in the Armed Forces as a matter of policy clearly is another matter.

The services must recognize that in many respects females constitute an extremely valuable resource for supplying personnel to a shrinking manpower pool. However, they should not be overly utilized by what is perhaps the largest organizational segment of American society, the Armed Forces. If a majority of females join the Armed Forces to acquire skills and training for later use in civilian life, then one could logically support high female accession rates. Yet such

reasoning is diametrically opposed to the concept of limited personnel turnover in an AVF, which of necessity must be kept low to justify the high financial cost of a volunteer force. On the other hand, if female reenlistment rates are maintained at levels comparable to those of males, then other problems will become manifest.

The Army has conducted one study which concluded that between 20 and 35 percent of Army positions could be filled by females. Therefore, it may not be unrealistic to assume that the Army would accept such levels of female representation if threatened with severe personnel shortages. In this event, the viability of the Army's combat potential might be seriously weakened.

One should not conclude that these increases in female representation are the direct result of the currently fashionable emphasis on sexual equality. Rather, the emphasis on females reflects a pragmatic approach to overcome the problem of male recruitment. The Army, for example, originally planned a slight increase in the number of females during a five-year period from about 21,000 in FY 1973 to 24,000 by FY 1978. Nevertheless,

". . . because of shortfalls in male recruiting, increased skills opened to women and success in female recruiting, the Army revised (its) enlisted women end strength goal to over 25,000 in FY 1974 and over 50,000 by the end of FY 1978." (Manpower Req., 1975, p. XII-3).

Indeed, at the end of FY 1974 the Director of the Women's Army Corps, Brigadier General M. E. Clarke, stated emphatically that, "the Army would not have met its recruitment

goals for that year without the increased recruitment of females." (Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 25, 1974). The willingness to exploit this resource has continued unabated. During the first six months of FY 1975, the Army had recruited 126 percent of its goal of NPS females (OASD, M&RA, 1975). Indications are that the figure would be higher except for the shortage of uniforms for female recruits and lack of adequate billeting arrangements at training bases.

In order to absorb and effectively utilize the large influx of females, the Army, along with the other services, has made significant changes in a vast number of occupational skills. The traditional roles of utilization in positions such as medical and clerical have been expanded to such a degree that 93 percent of the Army's enlisted Military Occupational Skills (MOSs) are now open to qualified female applicants. Only combat related and otherwise hazardous positions are restricted to males. Moreover, female officers are no longer restricted to the command of female units and are eligible to command any unit except combat or combat support (Man. Req. 1975, p. XII 3-5).

2. Racial

Less spectacular, but nonetheless significant, has been the increased representation of Blacks in the Army since the emergence of the AVF. Considerable research on the racial mix of an AVF was conducted by the Gates Commission which predicted that the racial composition of the Armed Forces would ". . . not be fundamentally changed by ending conscription." (Pres. Comm.

1970, p. 15). Moreover, the Commission concluded that Black representation in the Army enlisted ranks, which stood at 12.8 percent in 1969, would not increase beyond 18.8 percent, and that not until 1980. (p. 141-7). By 1974, however, the percentage had increased to 22 percent and showed every indication of going higher. Black enlistment rates had climbed to 30 percent during 1974 and Blacks were reenlisting at a rate of 52.2 percent as opposed to 30.9 percent for Caucasians. (OASD, M&RA, March 11, 1975). Since Blacks represented approximately 11.0 percent of the general population in the 17-44 age group, the 22 percent figure for the Army became a matter of concern, and steps were taken by the Secretary of the Army to slow down the Black enlistment rate (N. Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1974). As a result, the percentage of Black enlistees in the Army dramatically declined.

The successful efforts by the Army to reduce Black enlistments starting in mid-1974 has coincided with a general increase in overall male NPS enlistments, which also began in mid-1974 and has continued to date. In part, the increases probably have resulted from several initiatives by the Army, such as enhancing the quality and size of its recruiting force and capitalizing on the educational and training ambitions of many young people.

In theory, an all-volunteer force is more competent, with less turnover in lower ranks and a higher percentage of reenlistments. Accordingly, these factors would relieve some

pressure from the recruiting process. However, the services also needed to consider the shift towards a younger force, thus dictating higher accession demands than previously projected. As a result, the following chapter will address the factors which ultimately influence an individual to enlist in the Military Service.

IV. FACTORS INFLUENCING ENLISTMENT

This chapter presents certain socio-economic factors that are prevalent in influencing an individual to enlist in the All Volunteer Force. These socio-economic factors will include the attitudes and perceptions of youth towards military service, the aspects of technical training and education, and the financial incentives such as military pay.

A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS

Several studies in this area concluded that certain socio-economic factors have an effect on enlistment rates. A 1972 study by the Department of the Navy, for example, indicated that there was a positive correlation between enlistment rates and national levels of income (Gelke and Cook, 1972, p. 63). Uscher in his Enlistment Propensity Model indicated that there was also a positive correlation between enlistment rates and unemployment rates (Uscher, 1974, p. 9). Additionally, the Hause and Fisher study identified the average income for the 17 to 21 age group as a significant factor affecting enlistments (Hause and Fisher, 1968, p. 13).

Many of these pre-1973 studies indicated that many men were motivated to enlist by the prospect of being drafted into the Army (Eckhardt, 1973, p. 2). The Muldrow survey and the Hause and Fisher studies were conducted during the draft era. However, these findings may still be valid today. A review of the salient factors enumerated by these reports can possibly determine the effects of the present no-draft atmosphere.

Therefore, the determination of these and other socio-economic factors may provide a substantially better method of properly assessing the enlistment potential of individuals willing to enlist in the Armed Forces. Accordingly, these factors may provide new insights for affecting enlistment rates.

B. ATTITUDES TOWARDS MILITARY SERVICE

It has been a guiding assumption in past research that general perceptions about the military services will influence an individual's attitude about enlistment.

For instance, in a survey entitled "Values, Preferences and perceptions concerning military service," conducted by the Institute of Social Research at the University of Michigan, there was found to be a positive correlation between pro-military sentiment and the enlistment potential into the military service. In addition, the perception of favorable job opportunities in the service and the military work role are particularly strong predictors of pro-enlistment views. Other strong predictors are the feelings of high level military influence over national policy, perceptions that military leaders are quite competent, a tendency to support past actions in Vietnam, strong opposition to amnesty for those who refused to serve in Vietnam, and support for the idea that servicemen should obey orders without question (Bachman, 1973, p. 17-26).

Among first-term enlisted men, the factors previously mentioned relate not only to feelings, but also to plans of

reenlistment. This lends a further note of reality that general attitudes about the military services and their mission have a bearing on enlistment behaviors.

In a study, "Impact of an All Volunteer Force upon the Navy," the change in the volunteer rate was considered as the draft lottery system was abolished and the all-volunteer concept emerged. It was pointed out that young men in the draft lottery judged their chances of being drafted as: certain to be drafted, uncertain, or certain not to be drafted depending on their lottery number. This concept of "Perceived Draft Vulnerability" significantly affected the young men's attitudes toward enlistment. The study indicated that enlistments tended to decrease as draft vulnerability decreased (Gelke & Cook, 1972, p. 46).

This type of behavior becomes increasingly important in an all volunteer force environment. Without reliance on the draft as an inducement towards military enlistment, recruiting goals are more difficult to attain.

The effect of shifts in the attitudes of young men and women regarding military service is subject to quantification, but major changes could profoundly alter the prospects for sustaining manpower requirements. Therefore, perceptions and attitudes towards military service can have an enormous impact and considerable effect upon recruiting young people.

1. Fate Control

Further research into the area of attitudes is exemplified in a two-part study entitled, "A Study of Experimental

Incentives as an influence on enlistment intention." In general, the most attractive items in both iterations emphasize the importance of both perceived "fate control" and "traditional incentives" as significant factors influencing potential enlistment and career motivation. It was pointed out that the interest in equitable traditional incentives has not waned, but they are not enough by themselves. A degree of self-determination is expected as well. The study showed that:

"Today's youth seems to place a high value upon playing an active role in determining the shape of his present and future activities and life style. His view of the satisfactions offered by life in military service are strongly conditioned by what he has seen and learned, and came to expect in civilian life. He appears less inclined than his predecessors to passive acceptance of arbitrary constraints upon his personal life." (Frey, et.al., 1974, p. 52).

Accordingly, most incentives seem to be geared towards encouraging the potential enlistee to believe that he would not be completely under the control of the service and that he would be able to retain personal control over important aspects of his life. The motivational theme was also a common element in previous research (Glickman, et.al., 1973). In addition, this outcome is consistent in showing that the desire for self-determination and fate control are very important influences on enlistment and career motivation.

C. TECHNICAL TRAINING

A powerful incentive for enlistment in the Armed Forces in the availability of various training programs, which

effectively enable the potential recruit to trade three to four years of his life for the acquisition of a marketable skill that may serve him for a lifetime in civilian society. Given the increased technological demands of both civilian industry and the Armed Forces, it is probable that use of skill acquisition as an enlistment ploy by the services will continue indefinitely.

Exemplifying the research done on the personal factors influencing enlistment is a 1969 U. S. Navy Recruitment Survey by T. W. Muldrow. His purpose was to determine the motivational factors and their relative strength of influence on the decision to enlist in the Navy in 1969. Through the use of a structured questionnaire administered to enlistees prior to their transfer to "basic" training, it was concluded that:

"The opportunity to obtain technical training and the desire to travel were most important personal reasons influencing more than 80% of the enlistees." (Muldrow, 1969, p. iii).

The Armed Forces, as an organization offering employment, is viewed as part of a whole set of employers that exist in an individual's perceptual field, all of whom are interrelated in terms of degree of skill and occupational transferability. It would seem that the increasing value that young men assign to self-actualization and meaningful control over their vocational and personal life has not been accompanied by a devaluation of vocational satisfactions. These concerns continue to be important. In addition, it adds information as to specific incentives

underlying this dimension which can be used to address the linkage of military and civilian careers and how they impact on enlistment motivation.

There have been recent developments to provide apprenticeship credits for military training and experience in specific occupations. In this way, full apprenticeship qualifications can be attained while an individual is on active duty. This aspect should help all segments of society.

Not all military training, however, has civilian convertibility and, as one might expect, not all potential recruits are technically oriented. The services, in order to capitalize on this non-technical element in the civilian market of military enlistment age individuals, offer a number of methods whereby military personnel can accomplish formal education during a period of active duty with the services paying up to 75 percent of the tuition cost. In addition, after discharge, formal education and technical training can be continued through various programs.

1. Education

The Defense Manpower Commission stated:

"Military service is an ever-changing and important profession. For a profession to be viable, the people involved must have the opportunity to train in the duties of the profession and to develop professionally. The need for educational opportunities is particularly important for the military profession, because history has demonstrated the value of peacetime professional education of the military when emergencies arise." (Defense Manpower Comm., 1976, p. 220).

A great deal of pressure has been placed on the services to increase the quality of enlisted accessions under the All-Volunteer Force program. One approach is to stress the opportunity for personal development through education.

As a result, the services have expanded educational programs within budgetary constraints. Recruiters often publicize these programs so that potential candidates will be influenced towards enlistment into the military service. The Armed Forces has long recognized that training and education are powerful inducements in meeting recruiting goals. To rapidly expand education programs to meet the needs of an All-Volunteer Force, and to ensure qualified personnel were available to help members select appropriate courses of instruction, guidance and counseling positions were established.

These programs have been well received by military members and have improved the overall education level of the Armed Forces enlisted structure. They are also a positive factor in attracting good people into the Armed Forces.

D. MILITARY PAY

Military pay is a very important aspect of the viability of recruiting an All-Volunteer Force. It is logical to expect men and women to volunteer for military service if the Armed Forces offer them a decent living wage as defined by the Department of Labor at any given point in time.

The Defense Manpower Commission reached the conclusion that:

"To pay personnel too little is inefficient, for even if enough personnel could be obtained, they probably would not be of the desired quality, and training and turnover costs would increase." (Def. Man. Comm., 1976. p. 280).

It is a known fact that the Armed Forces pay will never be extravagant, but it was the first-term enlisted personnel who had previously suffered the most severe pay inadequacy. Between 1948 and 1970, salaries of first-term soldiers increased only about one-third as much as those of career soldiers. As a result, the average annual pay for a military man during his first two years' service was just over half that which a man of comparable age and education could expect to earn in the civilian labor market. In order to draw competent people to the Armed Forces this major disparity between military and civilian pay had to be overcome.

The most significant events in this area will be covered to provide a background in the legislation which has been important in enhancing the military enlistment potential of sustaining an All-Volunteer Force concept.

In December 1967, after years of having military pay lag behind civilian pay, Congress passed Public Law 90-207, which provides a link between military pay and pay raises granted to Federal General Schedule (GS) employees. This law insures that a military pay keeps pace with the pay of civilian counterparts.

During the period of the draft, pay philosophy seemed to be one of significantly underpaying servicemen in the first

two years of service. This was possibly due to considering that period as service one was obligated to give one's country. In a report to Congress, the Comptroller General stated:

"Before 1971 the role of military compensation was to retain and motivate careerists because the draft insured meeting first-term requirements. Between 1952 and the passage of Military Selective Service Act (Public Law 92-129) in 1971, military pay levels of first-term enlisted personnel were well below those of comparable civilians. Many of the increases during this period raised only the pay of the careerists. Several special pays and bonuses were enacted to insure continued service of personnel with critical skills." (GAO Report, 1973, p. 64).

Thus to eliminate its dependence on the draft, yet still meet its overall manpower requirements, the Army in 1970 was faced with quadrupling its level of volunteer enlistments. Increasing the pay of first term soldiers could not in itself achieve this necessary four-fold increase. However, it was a prerequisite if changes within the Army were to be effective in attracting young Americans to voluntary service.

In November of 1971, Public Law 92-129 provided major pay increases for service members in the first two years of service. These increases averaged 91% for enlisted personnel. (GAO Report, 1973). This represented a dramatic change in pay philosophy. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Kelly, in a speech in December 1971 had the following to say about that raise:

"There is no basis for demanding that military people subsidize the rest of the Nation by providing their labor at rates far below those which they could receive in other occupations . . .

It is enough that we ask them to risk their lives for us, without imposing a financial tax at the same time." (Commanders Digest, 1972, p. 3).

These two public laws have brought military pay up to a comparable level with pay in the private sector and have made a great contribution to the All-Volunteer Force concept.

In addition, the military pay bill submitted to Congress in 1972 took an important step toward rectifying the pay inadequacies of the first-term enlisted man. For example, the initial scale provided for what was roughly a doubling of the pay for the new military recruit. Smaller increases were provided for those in higher grades and with longer terms of service. In addition, the new bill provided for a significant increase for many military members in their basic quarters allowance.

Since the initial request submitted to Congress, five additional pay increases have been received by the Armed Forces. The significant raises have been directed toward base pay; however, increases have been realized in subsistence and housing allowance as well. These actions by Congress have helped make the Armed Forces competitive with the private sector of our society toward attracting the quantity and quality volunteers needed for the Services.

1. Unemployment Rate

Unemployment rate is another factor to be considered in the overall socio-economic makeup under consideration. It is felt that an increase in the unemployment rate would increase

the attractiveness of enlistment as an alternative to unemployment. Uscher supports this statement in his Enlistment Propensity model.

A study conducted by Hause and Fisher developed a theory of the supply of first-term military manpower, and examined the differentials in alternative civilian earnings and tastes for military service of potential first-term enlistees by mental ability. By the use of regression analysis, they were able to estimate the effect of military and civilian earnings, employment opportunities, and the draft on enlistment rates.

"Enlistment rates based on the total male population age 17 to 20 appear to be significantly associated with the relative military earnings and induction rates. Enlistment rates based on male population age 18 and 19 not enrolled in school appear to be significantly associated with the unemployment rate and the induction rate." (Hause and Fisher, 1968, p. xii).

Combining the above time series estimates with estimates based on a cross-section sample, Hause and Fisher concluded:

"These estimates suggest that, in the absence of a draft, a one percent increase in relative military earnings would increase enlistment rates around .75 percent, and a one percent increase in unemployment rates would increase enlistment rates around .20 percent; the actual effects of these conditions may differ from these point estimates by amounts of 50 to 100 percent." (Hause and Fisher, 1960, p. xii).

It has been suggested that the recruiting effort in an all volunteer environment will become increasingly explicit as additional information is obtained. However, it is apparent

that individuals contemplating military service wish to retain considerable control over their vocational and personal lives and are interested in the traditional incentives of money, opportunity for advancement and good working conditions (Korman, 1973).

Therefore, in order to properly analyze these factors it would be appropriate to explore incentives which will enhance enlistment into the All-Volunteer Force. Accordingly, the following chapter will address these particular areas of enhancing enlistment.

V. ENHANCING ENLISTMENT THROUGH THE USE OF INCENTIVES

The Armed Forces need to develop better techniques to foster the appeal of military enlistment by competent personnel. The choice of a strategy by which to influence enlistment motivation into the services has assumed increasing importance in the All-Volunteer Force setting. However, despite this urgent need the optimum strategy is not immediately apparent. As a result, this chapter presents a discussion of various incentives which enhance different types of individuals to enlist in military service.

The logic of incentives as a change mechanism starts with the simple paradigm that if you offer people the opportunity to gain specific objects or objectives which they value, they will change their behavior in order to realize these values and then adjust their behavior in order to maintain these values. They are crucial in both the design and utilization of incentive change methods (Frey et. al., 1974).

The All-Volunteer Force setting deals with a great diversity of individuals with a wide variety of needs and motives. This clearly presents a problem in attempting to use any single incentive strategy effectively. An underlying assumption is that the incentives which are being manipulated actually represent appreciable values and constitute a source of attraction to the involved target population. As a result, value assumptions attached to these employed incentives are particularly crucial.

In this respect, under the conditions of an All-Volunteer Force program, the success of the program depends on the incentives offered by the services and the perception of these incentives by society. The incentives offered must align with what is wanted by today's youth in order to induce this segment of manpower into military service.

Military managers must locate and develop new intangible incentives. These would provide a better psychological climate that offer the service member a larger measure of fate control over their lives and selection of a chosen vocational skill, training or education while in the service. In addition, serious consideration must be given to further cultivate the traditional incentives, such as pay and bonuses.

A. ATTITUDES TOWARDS MILITARY SERVICE

A survey conducted for the Department of Defense by Gilbert Youth Research, Inc., provided insights into the motivations and predispositions of contemporary American civilian youth toward the military (Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service, April 1972).

The survey was considered a vehicle to continuously monitor the beliefs and attitudes of youth. The survey also permitted the assessment of attitude changes toward the military possibly resulting from the reactions of youth toward new programs and events within the Service. Such surveys are considered useful to the Department of Defense because they provide a unique

perspective from which to evaluate policy and plan optimum recruitment.

In recent years the United States Armed Forces were faced with the task of recovering from the problems of the Vietnam Era coupled with the transition to the All-Volunteer Force. The twin pressures of wide-ranging commitments and continuous budget constraints have made it increasingly difficult to provide the satisfying incentives expected by Armed Forces personnel. Accordingly, certain aspects of service life discourages many fine young Americans from joining the Armed Services.

The Nixon Administration in its first move to try and improve service morale and alleviate societal pressures of the draft following the Vietnam War appointed the Gates Commission. The recommendations of the Commission given specific directions towards an All-Volunteer Force was obvious. Hence, the only task for the Commission was to justify the transition and provide incentive methods to attract young men to a military career. The main incentive recommended by the commission was increased pay. This when implemented provided initial incentives, increased morale of the soldiers, and satisfied those members of society who supported the All-Volunteer concept.

The Commission's report had little effect in raising the low social attitude felt towards the services. Society still maintained its low opinion of the forces, and once this attitude became generally accepted, a descending spiral seemed to take hold. The lower the value placed on the military by the

public, the fewer good men are attracted to the forces. The few good men in the forces, the more derogatory the opinion of society about the military (Rosser, 1972).

The efforts of the Gates Commission at least attempted to raise the morale of the soldiers, and this must have had some effect in lowering the dissent from within the Armed Forces.

As a result, a number of programs have been implemented in an attempt to adjust to the social environment. A concerted effort has been made by all the services to try and improve the general conditions under which service personnel serve.

Unattractive living conditions, inadequate and impersonal post services, and an atmosphere which seems to dilute the dignity of the individual, serve to deter many fine people who otherwise might choose to become soldiers.

To attract the adequate quantity and quality of military men, the services had to provide attractive living conditions for its members. These living conditions must afford a sense of personal dignity and a standard of living comparable to today's young people which are available through other careers.

Actions relative to the area of family housing were designed to improve the quality and availability of family housing for married soldiers, regardless of rank. Family housing conditions on many Army posts were inadequate. Particularly for young Army men, an increasing number of whom have wives and small children, housing facilities were especially sparse. Thus,

there remained an urgent requirement for new quarters construction and for the renovation and maintenance of currently occupied old houses.

Beginning in 1973, additional measures were developed to expedite improvements in the condition of family housing. Another program provided mobile homes located in attractive on-post trailer parks at a rate of 5,000 units per year to a total of 30,000 units.

Through the years, the military has endeavored to develop a progressively more attractive Post environment. Modern Post Exchanges and Commissaries are being built and are adopting new measures of management and increased inventories. The list of measures which were undertaken was extensive. Education Center services were expanded, shuttle bus schedules increased, and motel facilities leased for interim guest house accommodations. In addition, gymnasiums were rehabilitated and re-equipped, outdoor recreational areas expanded, and administrative processing activities consolidated to streamline the business of reporting into and out of installations.

In many instances where an installation is some distance from the nearest sizable town, the service member on his off-duty time and his family are dependent on the services provided by the Post. Whether isolated or not, military installation represents the member's special community, and its quality is a reflection of how the service cares for its people. This

program is continuing and being upgraded on most installations to provide the necessary care for today's service members.

1. Fate Control

In the past, enlistment into the Armed Services always connotated a controlled environment. Individuals perceived their fate as ultimately and very unavoidably controlled upon enlisting in the service. At that time, the services took for granted that the exigencies of military service left little room for modification of past organizational practices to alter the image in terms of more flexible decision-making, initiative-taking and individual participation. However, serious consideration has been given to organizational changes that provide a suitable psychological atmosphere that offers members a larger measure of personal fate control in their vocational life.

The military forces in order to be successful in regaining both the soldier's and society's confidence were required to institute a coordinated systems approach to these critical problems at the highest DOD level. In addition, evidence of successful programs are also available at various command levels.

Major efforts were undertaken to lower dissent from within the services. At the same time, these policy changes considerably enhanced the enlistment aged youth's perceptions towards military service. The following examples are major revisions at the DOD level to formerly existing doctrine.

a. In May, 1970, the Army announced that appearance regulations would be revised to allow slightly longer hair.

b. In April, 1970, a new emphasis on personnel problems in the Navy was attempted with the surprise appointment of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, as Chief of Naval Operations. Zumwalt was promoted over thirty-three other Admirals (Cortright, 1975). Zumwalt, through a series of highly publicized personal messages announced the relaxation of uniform regulations, approval of beer in the barracks, the opening of hard rock clubs, liberalized leave policies, and a ban on all forms of unnecessary harrassments.

c. In the fall of 1970, the Army instituted a controversial "Amnesty" program, whereby soldiers with drug problems were encouraged to enter a rehabilitation program, with the promise that no punitive action would be taken against participants.

d. In December, 1970, Army Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland, followed the Navy with directives eliminating morning reveille, easing pass restrictions, Saturday inspections, and legalizing beer in mess halls. In addition, soldiers were allowed to purchase materials to decorate their living quarters, thus fostering some further degree of individuality and self-determination.

The most far-reaching new policies attempted to introduce a measure of enlisted men's participation into personnel policies. In addition, the services'treatment of its people

had to be based upon the recognition that the great majority of them are responsible and can be relied upon to perform well because they know their leaders have placed trust and confidence in them.

The thrust of military policy has now been aimed at the mainstream of the services, the great majority of men and women who are worthy of and can carry the responsibility of mutual trust.

The first steps towards building a broader attitude of mutual trust, thereby increasing an individual's fate control was to eliminate routine sign-in and sign-out procedures, the discontinuance of bedchecks, and the removal of many unnecessary formations.

The decision to allow commanders to test the practicality of allowing soldiers to have beer available for purchase from vending machines in their barracks was another policy aimed at demonstrating trust and treating our soldiers as mature, responsible individuals. Although wrongly interpreted by some as an act of permissiveness, the new policy simply recognized that the dayroom in the barracks is the single soldier's living room.

Restrictions regarding travel while on pass have also been eliminated, partly in recognition of today's rapid means of transportation and partly in keeping with the approach that a soldier should be treated as a responsible adult.

The intent and consequence of these policy changes was not to accept unreliability or carelessness in the behavior of today's military men. The standards of performance demanded of soldiers have not been compromised. Accordingly, what has changed is the expectation that the AVF as an institution manifests toward its soldiers. The AVF today seeks a discipline which grows from within each member, a self-discipline developed by regarding each member as dependable. These intangible incentives inspire and promote self-discipline. These features also provide the AVF with a durable source of strength to attract qualified personnel into military service.

B. EDUCATION AND TRAINING

The importance placed on educational and training benefits has had a great effect upon enlisting qualified personnel into the military services.

In a research report entitled "Trends in Enlistment Motivation," these factors were again evident of the values youth placed on these areas of interest. During the period April, 1971, to April, 1972, a questionnaire was administered to all male enlistees at twenty-five Armed Forces entrance and examination stations. The total sample consisted of 26,853 voluntary accessions to the enlisted force. The first twelve questions requested respondents to rank each of twelve reasons that may have influenced them to join the services on a scale of either strong influence, some influence, or no influence.

The results showed, approximately 65% of the total sample, that the most frequently endorsed reason attributable for enlistment was to learn a trade or skill valuable in civilian life (Fisher and Harford, 1973).

Accordingly, education can also be an important method that can be more fully utilized by the services to enhance enlistment of competent individuals to join the military. These specific aspects of vocational training can be coupled with a formal educational program so that the recruiter possesses more flexibility in enlisting the best available talent sought by the services.

1. Cooperative Education

It is conceivable that the first term enlistee may be given a wide range of options concerning a two-year or four-year educational program. The problem will be to develop one which will attract that group of quality individuals interested in a civilian education program and at the same time keep costs down to an acceptable figure to the military services. The most attractive to the prospective recruit would be a fully-funded program. However, this would be more costly from the military viewpoint than military training. As a result, a partially-funded program could be developed to meet cost effectiveness criteria and still be very attractive to this group of individuals who might otherwise may not have been interested in joining the service.

However, if a cooperative education program were made available to select high quality mental Category I and II personnel, then it should prove to be very favorable in a relative cost comparison. In other words, if a cooperative education program could increase the total number of enlistments, and, more importantly, the number of quality (Category I and II) enlistments, the civilian training costs would not have to exactly match the cost of training conducted by the military establishment in order to be cost effective. Although not completely necessary, it would be less costly if the soldier was assigned to the closest military installation for active duty. However, the soldier could be required to pay for his own travel, thereby alleviating the military of additional expenses.

The prospects of additional enlistments has a very definite value and the increased quality has an intangible value. Both factors should be used to offset the increased cost of civilian training in relation to military training.

There is a good indication that the military would look favorably towards a program which produced better educated soldiers. With that in mind, an option could be developed which would provide military job qualification training in lieu of Advanced Individual Training. The two-year vocational training colleges are very suitable for this purpose. This could be further enhanced if colleges developed special courses oriented towards a specific military job skill.

Under this proposed program, the recruiter would be required to seek young men or women meeting the quality standards (Category I and II) for the program and also the other requirements for the same MOS. Ideally, recent high school graduates would enlist, attend basic training, and then attend the civilian college.

Due to the fact that participants in this program would be restricted to High School Graduate Category I and II, it is envisioned they would encounter little or no difficulty in meeting the military job requirements.

Another promising aspect to this approach would be to tie the enlistment option to a reserve commitment while the individual is in college. In this way, the individual would have a part-time job in a reserve organization. During this educational period, they would also be able to take advantage of this opportunity to learn the military portion of their future jobs. Of course, the reserve unit should be located near the college for the sake of convenience and expediency.

In order to properly develop this program into a viable enlistment incentive, it should be well planned and managed throughout the higher echelons of the Department of Defense. A pertinent and definitive sales approach should be developed in the field by recruiters while necessary coordination with colleges is carried out by the higher levels of DOD management. In addition, administrative details between the reserve components and the active service could be accomplished rather

easily. This enlistment option can also be developed to entice combat arms and other critical specialty ratings into longer enlistments necessary for the adequate operation of the services. Ancillary programs could also benefit by this option if developed prior to total involvement. An example of this would be the increased emphasis that could be placed on the high school Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) Testing Program. High school teachers and counselors could be influenced by seeing the testing program as a scholarship test, if proper merchandising techniques were used. With proper publicity, this program could increase not only the quality of enlistments, but also the total annual recruiting production of the recruiting commands.

There are, no doubt, other alternatives which would increase enlistments. Attacking the problem at the other end of the quality spectrum is usually discussed and favored by some. By lowering either the mental or physical qualification requirements, an immediate surge of enlistments becomes available. However, this also has cost implications. Lower quality enlistees have always resulted in a higher rate of early discharges. The increased cost of wasted training, as well as pay, for a program which reduces entry standards should be compared with the increased training costs of a cooperative education enlistment option before any decision is made to lower the enlistment standards.

Today, there is a need to increase the awareness in young men and women of the patriotic aspects of serving one's country. This program would lend itself to just such an advertising campaign.

C. PAY

It has been a widely accepted postulate since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force concept that raises in military compensation offer the most direct means for increasing the numbers of young men who apply for enlistment.

An important assumption underlying the incentive intervention approach is that "more is better." This concept mainly encompasses the belief that when greater societal value is attached to particular incentives, these incentives are construed to be more effective. The manpower projections developed by the Gates Commission determined this to be true. The commission's report estimated that a 10% increase in basic military pay would result in 12.5% increase in the enlistment rate, while a 40% pay raise would result in a 49% increase in the number of voluntary enlistees (President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, 1970).

Additional studies conducted in the area of military enlistment behavior and pay have rendered similar results. For instance, a comprehensive study entitled "An Econometric Analysis of Volunteer Enlistments by Service and Cost Effectiveness Comparison of Service Incentive Programs" was conducted

for the Defense Manpower Commission for the period 1958 through midyear 1974. The study indicated that basic pay increases can be used effectively to increase accessions. The study suggests that a 10% increase in basic pay could yield as much as a 14% increase in enlistment, while a 40% increase could yield a 56% increase in enlistments (Grissmer et. al., 1974).

The study supports the Gates Commission finding that basic pay increases or decreases can significantly influence voluntary enlistments. Furthermore, assuming the same relationship between basic pay increases and enlistment behavior will pertain to the target population in 1985, an increase of 17% in basic pay alone will be needed to eliminate the projected 19,000 male shortfall (Defense Manpower Commission, 1976).

In general, this basic pay increase is a comparatively costly response to a pending shortfall in qualified recruits. However, further research information suggests that no single action excepting a pay increase would be sufficient by itself to close the gap between projected supply and demand. Accordingly, specific cost and cost-effectiveness estimates concerning alternate methods of recruiting strategies have been considered (Defense Manpower Commission Staff Studies, 1975). Therefore, great care and discretion must be utilized in determining the precise amount of a basic pay increase coupled with other strategies that will be required to sustain the All-Volunteer Force.

The Gates Commission recommended pay raise was large and pay for military recruits increased 193% above inflation between 1964 and 1973. As stated earlier, however, their recommendation could have had an adverse effect if not handled properly because of two money misconceptions (Towell, 1977). Firstly, managers perceive money as a prime motivator because they themselves are highly achievement-oriented and attach special significance to monetary rewards. Military men and top executives tend to be achievement-oriented and because they themselves are particularly interested in some concrete measure that will reflect how well they have done, it is easy and natural for them that the same will apply for all (McClelland, 1967).

Secondly, managers have a tendency to keep coming back to money as a means of motivating people because at the practical level it is one thing that can be easily manipulated.

In the process of developing incentives to enhance enlistment another study investigated the endorsement of a set of single incentives presented in the Gilbert Youth Survey. The conclusion was that "more may well be slightly better." This was based on the results that 24% of the sample endorsed a \$3,000 bonus as a likely enlistment inducement versus a 21% endorsement of a \$1,000 bonus (Fisher and Rigg, 1974). However, the larger bonus included the proviso of enlisting in some skill that is in short supply. This portends a different context from the simple bonus because it also implies that the potential recruit is considered an above average enlistee

qualified to fill a critical skill category. Another factor to be considered is that the enlistee would receive valuable training while in the service.

A number of enlightening facts are presented in another extensive research program into incentives within the Navy. The purpose of the research was to administer a set of experimental incentives to ascertain their potential worth for inducing enlistment into the Navy. The random sample was composed of male youth ranging in ages 16 - 22 years. One of the approaches to test if "more is better" was to check whether increases in the absolute magnitude of single incentives would enhance the attractiveness of the Navy.

Differences in the value of an enlistment bonus were presented since enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses have a long history of popularity and use. Thus, the attractiveness of a \$1,000 enlistment bonus was compared to a \$3,000 enlistment bonus for the same length of engagement period. Surprisingly, in this study, the \$1,000 bonus was marginally more attractive than the \$3,000 bonus. The results tentatively suggested that the "more is sometimes worse." (Frey et. al., 1974).

Although one may first feel that the results are contrary to common sense a number of psychological theories provide possible explanations. First, the initial implication is that a serious credibility gap may have been created. Thus, increasing the absolute magnitude of certain incentives may lead to the conclusion that the Navy is so unattractive that

it must resort to bribes to ensure enlistment. Second, these increased incentives may be perceived as grossly manipulative. This would easily lead to feelings of resentment, negative effect, and reactance against the manipulator. In fact, if a person does indeed feel that his freedom of choice is threatened, he would be less likely to enlist than without the prospect of such incentives (Frey et. al., 1974).

1. Occupational Bonus

The most promising incentives reflect the same dimensions that are considered to be important in civilian jobs. The Navy is currently using re-enlistment bonuses, but not bonuses for enlistment. The Army and Marine Corps are giving bonuses for enlistment in the combat arms.

Pride and professionalism are at the heart of attracting men to the combat arms. The job of the combat arms soldier, even in peacetime is especially demanding. The Army proposed and Congress approved a \$3,000 enlistment bonus for soldiers volunteering for the Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Engineer and Signal branches. The Army initially gave a \$1,500 bonus, increased to \$2,500 in 1974, but never gave the full \$3,000 Congress-approved bonus. These pay measures did not indulge military men nor were they an attempt to "buy" combat soldiers. Rather, they offer solid and credible recognition of the special role of certain soldiers and serve as the basis around which a heightened sense of purpose and morale can be built.

In addition, a service member may qualify for proficiency pay. Enlisted proficiency pay is granted to categories of personnel on the basis of the occupational specialties in which they are engaged. The needs of the service dictate which groups are to be granted this bonus. However, another type of pay incentive may also be considered feasible to induce additional enlistments into the service.

2. Performance Pay

Explicit recognition of individual performance of unusual qualities is generally considered to be a desirable element in most wage and salary plans. The commitment to this aspect of the work ethic still appears to be strong among young people. However, no provision for individualized reward for quality performance is found in our military services.

One procedure by which a performance pay system might be introduced is to mate it with Pro-pay. It can be presumed that budgetary considerations will enter into determination of the feasibility of inaugurating performance pay. Therefore, part of the budgetary allowance now assigned to Pro-pay might be reallocated to performance pay. This is, the number of ratings and people eligible for Pro-pay could be cut back to free funds for performance pay. It should also be pointed out that it would be possible to implement performance pay on a selective basis rather than across the board. An attractive feature of the performance pay concept is that it does not entail guarantees to individual recruits.

The concepts mentioned in this chapter are primarily based upon the attitudes of civilian youth. The ability to induce this group to enlist in military service through the use of incentives directly bear upon the recruiting situation.

VI. CONCLUSION

The United States All-Volunteer Armed Force must maintain adequate manpower levels comparable with national security and foreign policy missions through effective recruiting programs. During the presentation of this thesis, many socio-economic factors are discussed that can influence the prospects for recruiting adequate numbers of qualified personnel into the all-volunteer force for the future.

The Defense Manpower Commission concluded that the viability of sustaining the All-Volunteer Force concept is primarily dependent upon the economic situation. Their findings were based upon two assumptions:

"The current relative attractiveness of service pay, other benefits and conditions of service will not be eroded over the next decade; and second, that the public attitude toward the Services and enlistments will not deteriorate."
(Defense Manpower Comm., 1976, p. 417).

The Services have demonstrated considerable flexibility in defining mental and educational standards in past years. Variations in enlistment standards have traditionally been used as a means for adjusting to varying conditions of accessions supply and demand. The same flexibility will enhance the prospects for recruiting qualified individuals interested in military service.

It appears that potential candidates for enlistment into the military want both traditional incentives and an increased opportunity for self-control. However, it should be noted that these factors may be different for those of different socio-economic backgrounds. For example, with decreasing socio-economic status, the significance of tangible incentives becomes stronger; while the items reflecting aspiration for fate control become stronger with increasing socio-economic status. The fact that there are variations in the manner that persons of different socio-economic groupings respond to incentives reinforces the view that varied incentives and appeals should be developed by the services and directed at different target populations of potential enlistees in order to maximize the recruiting effort. Furthermore, incentives need to be selected on the basis of their appropriateness and attractiveness for specific populations to utilize their potential for influencing enlistment decisions.

These findings indicate that a viable strategy for the competitive appeal of the services under all-volunteer conditions emphasize recruiting. In addition, serious consideration must be given to organizational changes that provide a psychological climate that offer potential candidates a greater degree of personal fate control in their vocational life as well as financial benefits. However, the differences in incentives for different groups of potential enlistees should not obscure the incentives common to the total target population.

Therefore, it would be in the best interests of the services to design specific appeals channeled through various media aimed at different segments of today's American youth. In addition, recruiters should be trained to fully employ this information with greater diagnostic insight.

A competent recruiting program is essential in effecting a viable All-Volunteer Force at a reasonable cost. This factor becomes increasingly important and appropriate when considering the opinion of Senator Nunn, when he stated:

"In the face of unparalleled quantitative and qualitative expansion of Soviet forces, the United States can no longer continue down the road of steady contractions in its force levels and decreasing proportions of the defense budget allocated to weapons systems in order to meet the ever-rising costs of military manpower." (Senate Hearing, 1977, p. 2).

These are the problems that confront policy makers and are now considered the most crucial aspects in sustaining the All-Volunteer Force. It is essential that steps be taken to initiate appropriate actions and certain changes in the recruitment of qualified individuals into the military service.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Under the All-Volunteer Force concept, the key to success is the ability to sustain the required quality and quantity of accessions into military service. Accordingly, with the unnecessary deterrents eliminated and positive rewards strengthened, the Armed Forces has become an increasingly attractive opportunity for young volunteers.

It has become imperative that the services heighten the appeal of youth towards military service in an All-Volunteer Force environment. As a result, the services must devise a comprehensive, systematic method of attracting the quality and quantity of volunteers its mission requires. A modernized accession system should be developed which exercises a powerful advertising and recruiting capability. This program can be utilized to disseminate information concerning military service, training and educational opportunities, benefits, and an adjustable array of options for service entry. These can be accomplished through a strong and active force of impressive person-to-person recruiting.

The Defense Manpower Commission conducted a study which estimated the effect of intensified recruiting activities accompanied by basic pay increases.

The efforts included the expansion of recruiting staffs, greater advertising, and other actions designed to increase the effectiveness of Service recruiting efforts. The study

results suggest that accelerated recruiting efforts served to increase the supply of accessions by stating:

"If the Services fail to intensify recruiting efforts in dealing with a shortfall in the future, the effect of any contemplated pay increase on accessions supply could be diminished. Conversely, if the competitiveness of military compensation is permitted to decline in the future, the resulting decline in accession rates will likely be compounded if Service recruiting activities are constrained simultaneously." (Defense Manpower Comm., 1976, p. 410).

Therefore, greater emphasis must be placed upon advertising through recruiting. This feature can increase the awareness of the military as an employment option, improve understanding, interest, and attitudes among youth in order to attract this target population towards military service.

Advertising generates an interest for many persons to seek additional information from one of the several services. Many potential enlistees contact a local recruiter or call the services' toll-free telephone numbers to request additional information.

The favorable effect of a better advertised Armed Force must be complemented by an expanded and improved recruiter force. During the draft years, the Selective Service system had provided for the bulk of military manpower needs. The effort to move away from reliance upon the draft has raised the recruiting effort to a position of paramount importance.

Recruiting procedures and techniques have changed significantly during the AVF years. Recruiters no longer merely process walk-in traffic of people who decided to enlist in lieu of induction. In order to enlist a young man or woman into military service, recruiters must now seek out, contract and convince a large number of potential candidates in the value of military service. Without the pressure of the draft, many of these individuals have no interest in military service. Thus, the recruiter is of greatest value in reinforcing interest and personally influencing preference through use of incentives in order to secure a commitment from the individual.

In addition, a determined effort has been undertaken to expand the size of the recruiting command while elevating its quality. Recruiter training was made more comprehensive, and higher standards have been applied in the selection of recruiter personnel.

Recruiting programs have reached a point in development that acquire potential enlistees into the service in a no-draft environment. However, with a manpower personnel shortage forecasted for the future, it becomes increasingly important to consider further changes in programs, operations and policies.

The complementary efforts of advertising and a strengthened recruiter force are effective if they also present a variety of attractive options for military service, carefully designed

to fill the military's general and specific manpower needs. A continuing development of appropriate methods of entry is a very fundamental component in an effective system of attracting new entrants in the needed quantity and quality. Within the constraints of reasonable consistency, the Armed Forces must maintain flexibility in its presentation of options for entry while adapting alternatives to changing needs.

A method of attracting volunteers to enlist is to emphasize and offer several options. Some of the most significant options are to allow a volunteer the freedom of choice to select a particular location of service, military occupational specialty, delayed entry or unit of service thereby fostering the sense of fate control. For example, these options prove very attractive in ensuring service in Europe or Hawaii, perceived job satisfaction, and a degree of self-determination.

These options can be focused on any area temporarily undersubscribed as a flexible means of attracting potential recruits to particular job areas and geographical locations. These options can also be changed when the supply of volunteers attain the required levels to meet the needs of the services. In addition, this flexible approach can prove to be very advantageous towards keeping hard-to-fill skills open and attractive to volunteers.

There are additional methods that can possibly increase the likelihood of youths becoming attracted to enlisting in military service. For instance, a career behavior information

system can be developed to increase the amount of information available to potential recruits in order to reduce ambiguities associated with selecting an occupation in the service and to increase the appeal of the military for those persons not interested in enlistment.

The establishment of an enlistment counseling program within the recruiting system can provide a potential applicant with a means of examining occupational options with a professional counselor. This program could increase the manpower pool of potential recruits and enhance the attractiveness of choices within the services.

The expansion of the recruiting program can publicize educational and training opportunities throughout the military environment. These recruiting efforts can be targeted towards new populations previously not given a great deal of attention. However, enlistment incentives have different appeals for different segments of society and need to be fully evaluated to determine their effectiveness. Therefore, further experimental evaluation should be undertaken to examine the traditional tangible incentives and those that increase the individual's sense of fate control. This proposal would increase the cost of the AVF, but might prove to be an overall cost savings to the government and taxpayers in the long run.

In addition, there should be an increased emphasis placed upon the integrity of the recruiter. This program can create

better attitudes, more trust, confidence, and foster a more effective recruiting tool among youths towards enlisting in the armed services. This feature may result in many prospective recruits not becoming disenchanted with military service and convey these feelings in the form of negative feedback to other prospective recruits among friends and relatives.

In summary, the Armed Forces recruiting system should be updated to meet the demands and needs of potential candidates interested in enlistment. This process should attract quality personnel to the recruiting commands. It should also place the necessary emphasis on advertising and recruiting, thereby improving the attitude of youths toward the services' image. Ultimately, it should provide flexibility to the enlistee concerning numerous options of entry, military training, and increased sense of fate control.

It is important that when considering the recommended proposals offered in this chapter that one does not lose sight of the fact that the Armed Forces have a vital mission and that any adopted changes must not impinge upon operational effectiveness.

The military can proceed with former methods, but without change there must be doubt as to whether it can properly develop an effective military force compatible with the rest of American society.

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
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