Information Conditions, Communication and General Equilibrium,
Abstract
This paper demonstrates that in games in extensive form in general there is a natural heirarchy among equilibrium points with those pure strategy equilibria of games with less information remaining as equilibria when information is increased. It shows that the competitive equilibria of a market game could be interpreted as equilibria which belong to the set of noncooperative equilibria for any level of information in the market. As soon as there is more information than total ignorance (and in general there is) then in general the competitive equilibrium will not be the only noncooperative equilibrium of the market game. When information and communication are taken into account the competitive equilibrium solution is neither the only nor necessarily the most plausible of the noncooperative equilibria of a market game.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 06, 1977
- Accession Number
- ADA054062
Entities
People
- Martin Shubik
- Pradeep Dubey
Organizations
- Yale University