The Faces of Verification: Strategic Arms Control for the 1980s,
Abstract
Soviet military doctrine incorporates a concept of, and the USSR has sought, strategic superiority--the possession of vastly superior forces coupled with an ability to strike first, thus limiting damage to the USSR. Soviet leaders appear to be structuring their forces not merely to survive and retaliate for any attack, but to exploit--by coercion, for deterrence, or if necessary by war-any opportunity that the acquisition of strategic superiority might present. Verification of Soviet compliance with the agreed terms of a strategic arms limitation agreement is, therefore, an obvious and necessary but not sufficient condition for U.S. confidence that major asymmetries in the strategic balance will not occur. The goal of the United States is to obtain credible assurance that the USSR cannot clandestinely acquire destabilizing strategic capabilities. While there remains any substantial doubt of U.S. capabilities to detect Soviet deceptions, the U.S. will balk at accepting unverifiable Soviet assurances.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1977
- Accession Number
- ADA054187
Entities
People
- Robert Perry
Organizations
- RAND Corporation