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**MANAGING THE BALANCE: EXECUTIVE—LEGISLATIVE
ROLES IN FOREIGN POLICY**

by

Colonel Rudolph B. DeFrance

15 May 1978

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FOREWORD

This memorandum considers the fragmentation of the foreign policy process within the executive and legislative branches. Since the Constitution does not delegate specific responsibilities for the conduct of foreign affairs, the author points out that the President, his cabinet and the legislature gradually have derived their foreign affairs powers. He reviews proposals that have been made to streamline the foreign policy process and concludes that, although the reorganization would require functional realignment cutting across present organizations, it would give the Government increased effectiveness in the formulation of foreign policy.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

COLONEL RUDOLPH B. DeFRANCE is the Director of the National Security Seminar, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations. Following his graduation from Pennsylvania State University in 1974, where he earned a master's degree in public administration, he was assigned to the Strategic Studies Institute until mid-1977. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy and of the US Army War College. Colonel DeFrance's Army service includes troop duty with cavalry and aviation units, and he commanded an air cavalry squadron in Vietnam. He also has had staff assignments in personnel at Department of the Army and in intelligence at Department of Defense.

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MANAGING THE BALANCE: EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE ROLES IN FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy formulation in the United States is a complicated process involving numerous and varied government organizations. The fragmentation of the foreign policy process among the executive and legislative bodies and the myriad of offices within each body that are involved lead to frustrations for both critics and friends of the process. Moreover, the delicate world balance of power is influenced by our foreign policy decisions. The process of foreign policymaking is critical to managing the balance of power in the world because decisions derived from the process interact with policies of other countries and hence either pave the way for smooth relations or cause frictions which may eventually lead to war or at least to diplomatic rupture.

As the process of foreign policymaking has developed during the past 200 years, compartmentalization of functional areas has tended to separate domestic affairs organizationally from foreign affairs. At the highest government level within the executive office of the President, for example, the Domestic and National Security Councils are separate, independent offices. Fragmentation of the foreign policy efforts also has resulted because of constitutional directives, and omissions or silence. Anyone who has studied US Government knows that authority

is divided among the executive, legislative and judicial branches, but the responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs is not comprehensively addressed in the Constitution. The President has the power to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors, for example, and Congress is provided the constitutional power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and to declare war, but there are no specified limits to such authority. Laws are passed by Congress, carried out and enforced by the executive branch, and adjudicated by the courts. With regard to the separation of powers in foreign relations matters, Louis Henkin, author of *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*, said, "As they have evolved, the foreign relations powers appear not so much 'separated' as fissured, along jagged lines indifferent to classical categories of governmental power."¹ This irregular development of power has led to claims of usurpation, vacillation and compromise.

EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP

Over the years since the founding fathers argued out our Constitution, the President has emerged as the paramount authority in foreign affairs. Those who developed the Constitution, of course, could not foresee how changed the relationship of the United States would become with the rest of the world. Fortunately, the constitutional authority for foreign affairs was not specific, so that over the past two centuries the separation of power was shaped as the United States became more involved in the changing world. The power of the President in foreign affairs quickly took precedence over that of Congress. This concept was enunciated on several early occasions notably by John Marshall, the great Chief Justice, whose 1820 statement in the House of Representatives was later invoked by the Supreme Court. "The President is sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."²

As Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, the President exerts influence over the status of US military forces at least in part, and as his role in foreign affairs has strengthened, so has the status of the military departments grown in foreign affairs. The framers of the Constitution were adamant that the President would be the civilian commander of the armed forces and that Congress would decide upon a declaration of war. Thus, the military leaders in uniform command only in the execution of policy made by their civilian superiors. Presidents have derived additional foreign policy authority through their responsibility

as Commander in Chief gained from so-called war powers to exercise control over the conduct of war. This presidential authority was limited in 1973 when Congress passed the War Powers Resolution. In fact, the resolution is not very restrictive. It merely requires the President to inform the Congress within 48 hours after committing US military forces into combat. If the Congress has not sanctioned his action in 60 days, then the US commitment must be terminated within an additional 30 days. Indeed, if the next war were to be a short intense war, as many responsible military and civilian professionals believe, it may be over before the Congress must act. Still, the act puts Congress on record as being determined that they will have a greater influence in foreign affairs.

The Department of State has been designated by the President as the primary agency to conduct foreign policy. In recent times, "President Kennedy formally proclaimed the primacy of the (State) Department in Washington and of the ambassador in the field, naming the Secretary the 'agent of coordination in all our major policies toward other nations'."³ This policy was supported both by President Nixon and President Ford through their endorsement of the forceful leadership of Dr. Kissinger, initially the National Security Advisor, who became Secretary of State. However, the Department of State has not had the necessary authority to accomplish assigned missions. While it is commonly accepted that the Secretary of State is the senior Cabinet official, in fact, his influence in foreign affairs may only equal that of other Cabinet officials and in some instances his influence with the President may be subordinate to that of the National Security Advisor. The National Security Council coordinates foreign policy matters of the various departments and often has the final comment to the President on foreign policy alternatives prior to his final decision. While the National Security Council is closer, physically and influentially, to the President, the Department of State has the central position with regard to foreign policy matters.

Under the direction of the President and the National Security Council and in coordination with other agencies of the government, the Department of Defense is responsible for the military aspects of national security for the United States. Forty years ago, when the United States was not highly involved in nor so concerned over the affairs of the rest of the world, the military departments, and especially the military professionals (those in uniform), restricted themselves to military affairs. Foreign affairs and military matters were essentially

independent fields. Today, however, that has changed. Because of the mission, size and geographical distribution of the Department of Defense, it exercises more influence in foreign policy security matters than ever before. In numbers of persons dedicated to political-military affairs, the Defense Department outnumbers the State Department. Compared to the Politico-Military Bureau of the Department of State, Defense maintains five staffs—one in each service, one serving the joint chiefs, and one in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Especially since World War II, however, national security has extensively intertwined political and military factors, as well as other variables. In some instances, the military balance is the driving force in foreign policy formulation causing some to question whether the military influence is excessive in foreign policy matters. During and following World War II, the military professional was drawn into the foreign policy system by the necessity to administer armies of occupation and the military assistance programs to foreign governments, in some cases with greater involvement than that of diplomats from American embassies. Political boundaries, such as the seventeenth and thirty-eighth parallels, were created which became the military frontiers of the United States. The Soviet Union's military potential and advancing technology became the dominant challenges that motivated US foreign security policy. The threat of the spread of communism stimulated US diplomatic efforts to provide aid to certain countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, regardless of the fact that normally aid would not have been granted because they were ruled by dictatorial governments. Initially, for example, our involvement in Vietnam was undertaken in the form of assistance to the French to help combat the spread of communism. To administer and coordinate growing military responsibilities in foreign policy matters, the Defense Department developed a principal organizational unit, the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, dealing not only with military assistance, but with treaties, collective security, negotiations for overseas military facilities, and other politico-military problems.

The loss of the Vietnam War following the loss of US popular support for the war effort, and the loss of confidence by the US people in the credibility of the federal government because of Watergate have contributed to what very well may prove to be a reversal in the influence of the professional military in foreign policy formulation. The apparent concern of the US people is to avoid involvement in any war

similar to that of Vietnam. As a result, domestic affairs such as social welfare, urban renewal, and education are vying for influence in the decisionmaking process. Among others, Adam Yarmolinsky foresees continuing, though declining, influence of the military in foreign policymaking.

The chances are that, while military professionals and Pentagon civilians will be less prominent and less influential than in the last three decades, they will continue to have a voice in formulating options and a hand in writing some of the cables and memoranda that form the stuff of foreign policy.

THE CONGRESS

Congress wants a greater say in foreign policy matters, a fact emphasized by the 1973 War Powers Act. Additionally, Congress' desire for greater responsibility in foreign policy was emphasized in Senator Mike Mansfield's comments on the report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. Mansfield, a member of the commission, said:

Perhaps most remarkable is the almost total absence—until one reaches the concluding chapters—of any consideration of the role of the Congress in foreign policy. . . . The entire thrust of the Commission report goes toward enshrining the preeminence of the executive branch in the conduct of foreign policy.⁵

Several members of Congress freely admit that the Legislature has been remiss previously in executing its responsibilities toward foreign policy and historically has yielded leadership to the executive branch. However, in light of the executive-legislative rift during and since the Vietnam War, because of the assertions of executive privilege, and by frustration on the part of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in failing to gain desired information from the President, Congress now seeks a greater balance between the executive and legislative branches.

EVOLVING WORLD BALANCE

During the 1970's, significant events have occurred that have altered the balance of power in the world and have influenced the balance of the US executive-legislative equation. These systemic changes in world balance of power transcend the foreign affairs of the United States and

permeate most domestic policies as well. As a result of the new world influences on governmental matters of the United States, organizational change may be necessary to deal more efficiently and effectively with foreign policy. Several of the changes that place demands on reorganizing to improve the foreign policy process have been emphasized in current literature. Analysis of the more significant catalysts contributes to the justification for change in the foreign policymaking apparatus of the United States.

The United States is increasingly more dependent on other nations of the world for natural resources, energy, monetary and trade relations, and security. In turn, other countries rely on the United States for similar assistance. Table 1 shows the degree to which US trade with the rest of the world has escalated in the past 10 years. In no instance have our exports or imports increased less than 300 percent.

One giant adversary, the Soviet Union, competes with the United States for dominant political influence throughout the world. The Soviet Union's deep-rooted conflict with the People's Republic of China (PRC) has not abated since the death of Mao. Normalization of Sino-Soviet relations would reduce tension and would release Soviet assets for the central front. The PRC realizes that its own advantage is served to the extent that the Soviet Union is preoccupied with the West, especially in Central Europe.

As distinct from conflict of interests with the Soviet Union, and even with China, the United States has enjoyed an era of essential cooperation with the Western-oriented world, primarily Europe and Japan, and to a lesser extent, with developing countries. The United States can no longer afford to stand alone as the leader of the free world against communism. The post-World War II efforts to rebuild Europe and Japan are substantially complete. Those two powers now are better able to contribute to security assistance instead of being dependent on the United States for assistance.

Europe and Japan jointly share a greater percentage of global Gross National Product than does the United States. In 1955 the US GNP was 36 percent of the world GNP. The European Community plus Japan held 19 percent of the world GNP or just over half that of the United States. In 1975 the US share of the world GNP had been reduced to 23 percent while the share of the combined GNP of the European Community and Japan exceeded that of the United States by 5 percent, with 28 percent of the world GNP.⁶

The United States should not provide for her security alone, but

US FOREIGN TRADE PERCENT INCREASE 1965-1975¹
(in billions of US dollars)

	US Exports to—	US Imports from—
Total	401% (26.7 B.-107.2 B.)	449% (21.4 B.-96.1 B.)
Canada	382% (5.76 B.-21.8 B.)	530% (4.9 B.-21.7 B.)
Japan	355% (2.7 B.-9.6 B.)	470% (2.4 B.-11.3 B.)
European Community	318% (7.2 B.-22.9 B.)	338% (4.9 B.-16.6 B.)
OPEC Countries	771% (1.4 B.-10.8 B.)	1005% (1.7 B.-17.1 B.)
Less Developed Countries (-OPEC)	375% (7.6 B.-28.5 B.)	403% (5.5 B.-22.2 B.)
Communist Countries ²	1590% (.14 B.-2.236 B.)	640% (.1374 B.-882 B.)

1. Council on International Economic Policy. Office of the President. *International Economic Report of the President*, March 1976, table 28-33.

2. Eastern Europe, USSR, China.

Table 1.

should work together with the Western-oriented world toward an interdependent network of defenses. To be determined is the share of common security to be borne by each country. To that end, within NATO and beyond there is no longer a choice of whether or not the United States should standardize weapons systems. The trend of interdependence points only in one direction. Interdependence for security dictates standardization. The sooner the United States moves out confidently in that direction, the greater our security will be. The US military influence in foreign policy formulation, for example, could take a position of leadership in this regard, working toward strengthening the NATO alliance through standardization. The converse could easily weaken European security. In fact, the stability of our relations with our adversaries could be more secure in the near future than with our allies. As early as 1973, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who became President Carter's National Security Advisor in 1977, said:

We could find a situation a decade from now in which our relations with either the Soviets or the Chinese, assuming there is no reversal in that relationship, are more stable, more predictable, and less pregnant with hostility than our relations with either the Europeans or the Japanese.⁷

NATURAL RESOURCES

A major factor that is causing changes in the executive-legislative balance in foreign policy formulation is the increased reliance by the United States on the import of foreign raw materials. The growing concern over natural resources cannot be limited to either domestic or foreign relations, but clearly cuts across both. The United States is moving from a more resource-independent economy to a more resource-dependent economy more rapidly than predicted as recently as five years ago. The energy crisis and the oil embargo of 1973 opened the eyes, albeit slightly and temporarily, of Americans to the fact that the United States cannot guarantee itself unlimited supplies of cheap energy. The severely cold winter of 1977 reinforced Americans' recently revised perception that energy resources are limited and the United States must compete with other nations for those resources. The political conflict becomes readily apparent for the United States when it balances traditional moral support for Israel with the need for petroleum resources from other Middle East, largely Arab, nations. The conflict is magnified when it is understood that Western Europe and Japan, our strongest allies, depend on Middle East oil more than does

the United States. While energy consumption was reduced in all the major industrial Western-oriented nations in 1975, dependence upon OPEC for petroleum remained dynamic. Thirty-seven percent of the oil for domestic consumption in the United States was imported, 78 percent of the imports from OPEC. Japan, which is virtually entirely dependent upon crude imports, received 90 percent of its total consumption from OPEC member states. Western Europe, too, is still heavily dependent on the OPEC countries for oil. Ninety-four percent of French crude imports and 84 percent of Great Britain's imports in 1975 were from OPEC countries.⁸ The future requirements for petroleum imports appear to be even more grim.

Compared to the United States, Europe imported twice as much oil in 1975, and even though Europe continues to develop its North Sea potential as rapidly as practical, it will have to import even more by 1985. And by that time, Japan's oil imports are likely to be two-thirds larger than in 1975. Together, the needs of Europe and Japan for imported oil are expected to be well over twice as large as those of the United States.⁹

THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE

The people of the United States elect the entire Federal Legislature but only the President and Vice President in the executive branch, and they are elected indirectly through the electoral college. Yet, it is the executive branch that has historically been the leader in foreign policymaking and implementation. With the exposure of corruption in both executive and legislative branches, as Watergate demonstrated, the people, perhaps more apathetic previously in governmental processes and elections are now more acutely aware of their responsibilities, and have the right, through their votes in the future, to influence the directions of government in foreign policy formulation. Times have changed since the early post-World War II era when the foreign policymakers essentially had the support of the American public. Allison and Szanton, co-authors of the book *Remaking Foreign Policy*, help explain why foreign policy formulation of national security matters is different today.

... in 1950 the issues that dominated the foreign policy agenda were perceived as threats affecting all Americans equally. In contrast, issues like food, energy, inflation, and oceans now divide farmers and consumers, labor and management, (and) East and West coast fishing industries.¹⁰

The impact of pluralistic special interest groups on foreign policy

matters has resulted in increased concern and involvement by members of Congress. It is not a matter of whether or not the military threat to the United States has diminished or whether detente is unsuccessful. Factors other than the threat most recently have increasingly influenced foreign policy matters to the degree that now the influence of the Department of Defense and Department of State must be balanced by other agencies with disparate interests such as Commerce, Labor, HEW, and Treasury. The public attitude tends away from advocating the United States as the policeman of the world. The desires of the people today are to improve the lot of our society. Resources for domestic matters such as health, education, and urbanization are in increasing competition with resources for our strong defense. Since congressmen are elected, and are responsive to their constituencies, the public influences foreign policy matters. Although the utility of military force by the United States will continue to be balanced by the desire not to permit the Soviet Union to upset the balance of mutual destruction, economic requirements and environmental dangers will demand consideration in formulating foreign policy.

There recently have been several proposals for reorganization of the executive branch to improve foreign policy formulation. One of the two that will be discussed here was proposed jointly by Graham Allison, Professor of Politics at Harvard, and Peter Szanton, former president of The New York City RAND Institute. The other proposal was made by retired General Maxwell Taylor. Both recommended reorganizations that would terminate the National Security Council and place greater responsibilities with the President's Cabinet.

First, there must be an organizational system that provides greater coordination between the executive departments. The day-to-day activities of the individual departments should remain decentralized at department level, but the decision of which issues should be raised from the departmental level to centralized, more coordinated efforts should be decided by the President. Central coordination should not be mandated to one of the Cabinet members, e.g., Secretary of State. He is one among equals and does not have the authority or manpower capability to coordinate foreign policy aspects of all issues with all Cabinet departments. However, the Cabinet heads could be given greater say in recommendations to the President and should be given greater opportunity to be counselors to the President.

Allison and Szanton recommend replacing the National Security Council (NSC) with an Executive Committee of the Cabinet (Ex Cab)

consisting of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, HEW, and the Secretary of a new Cabinet office, which would combine Commerce and Labor. All major policy issues that include foreign, domestic and economic concerns would be reviewed and resolved by this committee for recommendation to the President. Other Cabinet officers and agency heads could be asked to join the discussion of those issues that concerned them. In addition, Allison and Szanton would combine the staffs of the NSC, Domestic Council and Economic Policy Board into one staff servicing the Ex Cab. The principal advantage of the Ex Cab is that it could improve the integration of policy recommendations to the President. It would be less unwieldy than including the entire Cabinet in all meetings and would widen the circle of advisers to the President, by placing Cabinet officers more in touch with each other as well as with the President.¹¹

General Taylor's proposal is somewhat similar. He suggests eliminating the NSC and replacing it with a National Policy Council (NPC) which would have an expanded role and membership. In addition to the President, Vice President and Secretaries of State and Defense, the NPC would include the Secretaries of Treasury and HEW, plus an economic representative with rank equal to a Cabinet head, *nominated by the President and approved by the Senate*. Within the NPC there would be four subordinate panels chaired by four Cabinet heads. One panel, chaired by the Secretary of State, would specialize in military-foreign-intelligence matters. A second panel, chaired by the economic representative, would be concerned with matters such as inflation, unemployment and energy. The third panel, chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, would be involved in money supply and expenditures; the fourth panel, chaired by the Secretary of HEW, would address primarily health, education, and urbanization matters.¹² The advantage of General Taylor's proposal, similar to the proposal by Allison and Szanton, would be to permit broader discussion and a larger forum for recommending policy alternatives to the President.

Congress needs to be able to check better on what foreign policies the executive branch is promulgating to prevent fragmentation of the congressional foreign policy review effort. To this end Allison and Szanton propose a biennial statement from the President to Congress of US foreign policy objectives. Each house of Congress should create an Interdependence Committee to review the executive report and respond to the executive branch.

General Taylor is not so optimistic about congressional

reorganization. He says, "It is most unlikely that Congress would be willing to adjust its own committee organizations to dovetail with panels of the National Policy Council . . ."13 From the results of the Senate reorganization efforts of 1976 and 1977, it appears that General Taylor is correct concerning Congress' reticence to reorganize for better foreign policy assessment. The Senate Rules Committee proposed reducing the number of Senate committees from 31 to 15 and limiting the number of committees on which a senator could serve to 7, freeing senators to become more familiar with their responsibilities. The unseating of several chairmen of committees by new liberal senators in early 1977 and the ability of the new senators to vote for the reorganization before being assigned to committees gave the reorganization a good chance of passing. Intensive lobbying and constituent interest caused the final reorganization to be confined to reduction of the number of committees from 31 to 26 and reduced the number of committees a senator could serve on to 11.14 The House also has made organizational changes to improve its capability to influence foreign policy. Most noticeably the House created a committee on international relations eliminating the committee on foreign affairs and in early 1977 structured the subcommittees primarily along geographical lines as opposed to functional subcommittees.

CONCLUSION

Reorganization of the foreign policy mechanisms of the US Government could enhance our foreign policy process in several ways. First the reorganization at the executive level could permit greater participation in foreign policy formulation by departments that presently have little or no say, but which also are affected by foreign policy decisions. Although wider participation may slow down the process, and compromise to a greater extent foreign policy recommendations, those handicaps would be offset by the knowledge that each agency with an interest in any aspect of a foreign policy matter would be heard sufficiently prior to making a final decision. The broadening of involvement in foreign policy formulation plus the knowledge by the public of the more diverse ability to influence foreign policy matters will increase public support and therefore the credibility of foreign policy decisions. Members of Congress, dependent upon their constituents for survival, will be more willing to condone foreign policy

matters if the public is willing to accept them, especially knowing that all interested agencies of the government had the opportunity to influence the outcome of foreign policy determinations.

The proposals for reorganization require significant changes in management thought. The executive branch historically has been organized to deal with either domestic policy or foreign policy. The reorganization requires a functional cross cut of the jurisdictions of vertical organizations by an executive hierarchy at the Presidential level. With regard to Congress, it will in fact play a larger role in foreign affairs because of the increasing intertwining of domestic and foreign matters. Congressional staffs are growing to cope with the executive bureaucracy, but Congress is still incapable organizationally of reviewing and checking adequately executive initiatives. In addition, the demands of confidentiality often weigh less heavily upon members of Congress than upon employees of the Executive Branch, despite the attempts of many on Capitol Hill to improve the situation.

In dealing with foreign governments oftentimes keeping secrets generally is one of the elements of mutual trust, and results in mutual understanding that is essential to US security. Only when confidentiality is used for unethical or personal advantage is it wrong. Congress and the people of the United States should understand the difference and be educated to encourage and condone the former and abhor the latter. Whenever Congress has convinced the executive branch that it respects the privilege of secrecy, then greater understanding and mutual communication will permit Congress to check more easily the ethics of those persons responsible for foreign policy secrets and prevent negligence and wrongdoing through lack of confidentiality.

The growing interdependence of the United States and other countries of the world with respect to military threats, resources, law of the sea, environmental matters, trade and monetary matters and other challenges indicates that the available resources of the United States will be increasingly sought after by others. In matters of foreign policy, the Department of Defense will see a large number of interested agencies contributing to the formulation of foreign policy positions. The strengthening of the President's Cabinet as counselors to him, coupled with a greater ability of the Congress to review the foreign policies of the executive branch, to include mutual respect and understanding, will reduce the future influence of the military professional in foreign policy formulation.

ENDNOTES

1. Louis Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*, p. 32.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
3. Peter Szanton and Graham Allison, *Remaking Foreign Policy—The Organizational Connection*, p. 121.
4. Adam Yarmolinsky, *The Military Establishment, Its Impacts on American Society*, p. 131.
5. *Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy*, p. 229.
6. Council on International Economic Policy, Office of the President, *International Economic Report of the President*, table 2, p. 137. (European Community includes those countries who are members of the European Economic Community today.)
7. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The International Community in the Next Two Decades," Murphy Commission Report, Appendix A: "Foreign Policy for the Future," app. Vol 1, p. 12.
8. Council on International Economic Policy, Office of the President, *International Economic Report of the President*, pp. 13-16.
9. John G. Winger and Carolyn A. Nielson, *Energy Report from the Energy Economics Division of the Chase Manhattan Bank*, New York, September 1976.
10. Szanton and Allison, p. 57.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
12. Maxwell D. Taylor, *Precarious Security*, pp. 113-114.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
14. "How Senate's Reorganization Plan Was Scaled Down," *The New York Times*, February 10, 1977, p. 1.

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The fragmentation of the foreign policy process among the executive and leg- islative branches has been derived over the past 200 years with the executive branch playing the dominant role. Since WW II the military has held increasing influence in foreign policy matters. Recently Congress has expressed concern and interest in their role in foreign policy formulation and several proposals have been made to reorganize government to improve foreign policy formulation. The reorganization would require functional realignment cutting across present organizations but would give the Federal Government increased effectiveness in		15e. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	

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