The Executive Power to Make War: The Power to Deceive.
Abstract
The Constitution is clear on the subject of war powers: Congress, a body representative of the people, was to be trusted with the powers. Capable of deliberation, the Congress would be less likely to commit the nation to a hasty, unwise course of action than the executive, and so it was in most instances until 1940. In this past quarter century, Presidentially initiated hostilities based on 'precedent' and 'inherent powers' resulted in interventions in Korea, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and Cambodia. The author maintains that centralization of the war power in the Executive has increased the stature and prominence of deception, leading to the rule of man rather than the rule of law. A decision arrived at by a single man often does not receive the benefit of opposing views and is often arrived at in secrecy; this is especially true of a decision to arm and commit the nation to war. In the absence of an external threat, the Executive, to accomplish policy which it considers to be in the national interest, has in the past quarter century committed the nation to armed hostilities knowing well the adverse reaction the decision would receive had it been aired in public.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1975
- Accession Number
- ADA054753
Entities
People
- Francis Paul Butler
Organizations
- University of Utah