
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VOLUME I



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June 1978

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This study determined the feasibility of consolidating real property maintenance activities (RPMA) for selected instl in the NCR. It considered feasibility with regard to geographic, functional, and economic factors. It applied the continuing objective of DOD policy and guidance which is to ensure that RPMA at military instl is consolidated where such action is cost effective and does not result in mission impairment. The study showed several approaches to consolidation to be feasible though hardly equal. One alternative was recommended as superior. It offered the best prospect for space and dollar savings and improved RPMA performance and was least risky.

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
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Army Installations

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1	Commander, Harry Diamond Laboratories
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1	Fort McNair
1	Fort Myer
1	Cameron Station
1	Arlington Hall Station
1	Vint Hill Farms Station
1	Walter Reed Army Medical Center
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CONTENTS

Section		Page
	DISTRIBUTION LIST	ii
	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
	CONTENTS	v
	ABSTRACT	vii
	SUMMARY	viii
I	INTRODUCTION	
	Purpose	1
	Background	1
	Assumptions	2
	Study Scope	4
II	CURRENT METHOD OF OPERATION	
	Installations	5
	CMO Differences	7
III	STUDY PROCEDURES	
	Reduction of Major Alternatives	7
	Development	10
IV	RECOMMENDED RPMA CONSOLIDATION CONCEPT AND SAMPLE APPLICATION	
	Concept and Application	12
	Dominant Considerations	12
	Strengths	12
	Other Considerations	17
	Weaknesses	17
V	INSTALLATION, MACOM, AND DA COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT	
	Other Viewpoints	18

Figure

1	Candidates for RPMA Consolidation	6
2	Study Procedure	8
3	Alternatives by Shop and Management Concepts	9
4	Total FY 77 Spaces & Annual Costs of RPMA Alternatives	11
5	Recommended RPMA Consolidated Organization	13
6	Installation/NCR-RPMA Relationships	15

Page

ANNEX A--STUDY REQUEST A-1

ANNEX E--SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION, MACOM, AND DA COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT OF MAY 1978 E-1

APPENDIX E-1--COMPLETE INSTALLATION, MACOM, AND DA COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT OF MAY 1978 E-1-1

VOLUME II

ANNEX B--CURRENT METHOD OF RPMA OPERATION

APPENDIX B-1--CURRENT ORGANIZATION CHARTS

APPENDIX B-2--SUPPORT PROVIDED TO CURRENT FE ORGANIZATIONS

APPENDIX B-3--COST FACTOR FOR RPMA PERSONNEL

ANNEX C--STUDY PROCEDURE AND ANALYSIS TRAIL

APPENDIX C-1--CONCEPTUAL CONSOLIDATION ALTERNATIVES

APPENDIX C-2--DEVELOPMENT OF RECOMMENDED CONSOLIDATED RPMA ORGANIZATION

ANNEX D--ONE-TIME COSTS AND SAVINGS

ANNEX F--BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABSTRACT

This OSD-directed study determined the feasibility of consolidating real maintenance activities (RPMA) for selected installations in the National Capital Region. Installations considered for RPMA consolidation were Fort Belvoir, Vint Hill Farms, Arlington Hall Station, Fort Myer, Fort McNair, Cameron Station, Harry Diamond Laboratories, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, and Defense Mapping Agency-Topographic Center. It considered feasibility with regard to geographic, functional, and economic factors. It applied the continuing objective of DOD policy and guidance which is to ensure that RPMA at military installations is consolidated where such action is cost effective and does not result in mission impairment. The study showed several approaches to consolidation to be feasible though hardly equal. One alternative was recommended as superior. It offered the best prospect for space and dollar savings and improved RPMA performance and was least risky.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this OSD-directed study was to determine the feasibility of consolidating real property maintenance activities (RPMA) for Fort Belvoir, Vint Hill,[1/] Arlington Hall, Fort Myer, Fort McNair, Cameron Station, Harry Diamond Laboratories, Walter Reed Medical Center, and Defense Mapping Agency-Topographic Center. As requested, feasibility with regard to geographic, functional, and economic factors was considered. The study applied the continuing objective of DOD policy and guidance to the effect that RPMA at military installations in a given geographic area will be consolidated where such action is cost effective and does not result in mission impairment.

Army and DMATC RPMA consolidation in the National Capital Region (NCR) is feasible. Although there is no known exact counterpart of the nine installations and their RPMA requirements elsewhere, diverse successful RPMA and RPMA-like examples abound in government, industrial, and private practice. Their experience shows that there are many geographically, functionally, and economically feasible solutions (ranging from no to heavy consolidation) to most RPMA problems despite the undeniable uniqueness of each. Admittedly, not all "feasible" solutions to a problem are equal, and certainly not all are desirable. But this study's finding that consolidation of Army and DMATC RPMA in the NCR is feasible should come as no surprise.

This study shows several approaches to consolidation (differing in kind and degree) to be feasible though hardly equal. From among the many feasible alternatives, one is recommended as a superior RPMA consolidation concept and is considered to offer the best prospects for spaces and dollar savings, to lead to improved RPMA performance, and to be liable to the fewest risks. As a test and illustration of the recommended concept, a sample organization was developed against FY 77 data, the most recent, most representative data available. That trial application of the concept is discussed in this paper to demonstrate the consolidation principles and the likelihood of real though modest savings. It is not suggested that the exact distribution and number of spaces for the FY 77 example need be the best for another year. By application of the same concept and principles, a consolidation implementation team would have to develop a new organization similar to the FY 77 example but necessarily adjusted for

---

1/ Vint Hill Farms Station and Harry Diamond Laboratories are in addition to the seven installations specified in the 4 April 1977 request of ASD(I&L). OSD and DA study requests are included at Annex A.

changing workloads and made consistent with other actions occurring in the meantime. Such other actions might be the closure of one or more of the installations and a realignment or consolidation of other BASOPS activities.

The procedures by which conceivable alternatives were reduced to six feasible major concepts, these compared to select the best, and finally the best concept refined to produce the recommended one are described very briefly in Section III of the Main Paper and at greater length in Annex C and its appendixes.

The recommended approach to be followed if consolidation is undertaken is best described as a major consolidation with only limited physical centralization. Most RPMA spaces remain at the installations. Each commander keeps a small staff engineer section (outside the consolidated RPMA organization), thereby retaining control over RPMA funding levels and their application; the local commander still holds the purse strings under a revolving fund system. The day-to-day execution of RPMA is to be performed by the same decentralized labor force distribution as today but as part of the consolidated RPMA organization. The RPMA-performing force left at an installation is to operate under a station manager (recommended at the same grade as the current FE) who reports to the director of the consolidated RPMA organization. That director in turn reports to MDW. The centralized part of the consolidated RPMA organization brings together engineering, management, and administrative functions and includes some functions (supply and procurement, maintenance and service equipment maintenance) currently available but not everywhere dedicated to RPMA. The relation among installation commanders, staff engineers, station managers, and the NCR-RPMA director is sketched in Figure 1 for the recommended concept. The staff engineer plans, programs, and budgets; he (or she) also initiates and accepts projects. The installation commander retains family housing management as well as fire prevention and protection. The NCR-RPMA consolidated organization concept is outlined in Figure 2. Application of that concept to FY 77 conditions is highlighted in Figure 5 of the Main Paper; there all elements are shown with spaces corresponding to FY 77 conditions.

The first concern in devising a recommended concept for RPMA consolidation was to preserve performance (effectiveness) at reduced cost, if possible. Application of the recommended concept to FY 77 conditions yielded a net reduction of about 7 percent in both spaces and annual cost. These sample "savings" are detailed in the Main Paper and Annex C and its appendixes. The complete audit trail of the way in which the historical FY 77 experience was rebuilt as though the recommended organization existed then appears in Appendix C-2. That trail, though much less than an implementation plan, can certainly serve as an advanced sketch if implementation is begun.

INSTALLATION/NCR-RPMA RELATIONSHIPS




Figure 1

RECOMMENDED RPMA CONSOLIDATED ORGANIZATION




Figure 2

The studied installations and their parent MACOMs have taken exception to many of the general and specific points developed in this study. All their comments are reproduced exactly as received in Annex E. There the comments are also categorized and accepted or disputed by the authors of this study. The urgency with which the study was completed evidently led to unfortunate misunderstandings. A point too often missed is that the scope and resolution of a feasibility study are more limited than those of implementation planning and execution.

ARMY AND DMATC RPMA CONSOLIDATION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. This study had a twofold purpose:

a. Investigate the feasibility of consolidating real property maintenance activities (RPMA) for Fort Belvoir, Vint Hill Farms Station (VHFS), Arlington Hall Station (AHS), Fort Myer, Fort McNair, Cameron Station, Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), and Defense Mapping Agency Topographic Center (DMATC) considering geographic, functional, and economic factors; and, if consolidation is feasible,

b. Recommend a practical and effective consolidation concept to provide RPMA services to the Army (and DMATC) in the National Capital Region (NCR).

2. Background.

a. A continuing objective of Department of Defense (DOD) policy and guidance is to consolidate RPMA geographically at military installations where such action is cost effective and does not result in mission impairment. An Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) (ASD(I&L)) memorandum of 4 April 1977 directed the military services to study "consolidation by service" for RPMA organizations in the NCR through the formation of "three lead service complexes." A broader Army-directed 1977 study of total Base Operations (BASOPS) realignment in the NCR gave some consideration to an "Army Lead Service

Complex" for RPMA. That study did not include a comprehensive cost/benefit analysis for RPMA consolidation and, thus, was considered unresponsive by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics and Financial Management) (ASA(I,L&FM)).

b. The OASA(I,L&FM) directed the Chief of Engineers (COE), through the Director of the Army Staff to conduct a new study of RPMA in the NCR. The COE, in turn, directed the Engineer Studies Center (ESC) to perform the study under sponsorship of the Director of Facilities Engineering (D/FE).

c. By now some historical precedent has been accumulated on military consolidations. There are revealing experiences of the San Antonio RPMA implementation, Navy Public Works Centers, a Northern Oahu consolidation, and a study of the Fort Bragg/Pope Air Force Base complex.

3. Assumptions. Although RPMA organizations and workloads often undergo changes, time and data restrictions forced this study to apply a rather static view--a historical snapshot as its best achievable description of current RPMA. It was assumed that the basic question of the feasibility of consolidation would not have different answers in successive years. The principles applicable to 1 year's workload are applicable to another year's. Provided that workloads are roughly similar, application of the same principles will produce the same conceptual organization although the numbers of people occupying the elements of that organization may differ from 1 year to the next.

a. FY 77 workload data were accepted as characteristic of current and future requirements and activity. Although the opening of a new hospital at WRAMC was scheduled for FY 78, and although that act alone would roughly double medical facilities at WRAMC, that increase was considered in keeping with the character of WRAMC and its similarities and differences relative to the other installations considered. Across all installations the FY 77 split between in-house and contract RPMA was assumed representative.

b. Early FY 78 RPMA organizations were considered to correspond to the FY 77 workload data and to be the starting point for any move to consolidation. More recent and pending changes to RPMA organizations were ignored.

c. No breakthroughs in the technology for performing RPMA tasks were assumed despite changing attitudes toward energy consumption and despite the knowledge that new facilities include some novel equipment that may require new techniques or new schedules.

d. It was assumed that major Army command (MACOM) engineer sections (apart from the Military District of Washington (MDW)) would remain unchanged for any consolidation requirements considered. The assumption is sound for a large MACOM like US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). But, any consolidation involving WRAMC and DMATC would almost certainly lead to some adjustment to the staffing of their

parent MACOMs--Health Services Command (HSC) and DMATC. WRAMC and DMATC account for relatively large fractions of the total RPMA responsibility of their parent MACOMs.

4. Study Scope.

a. In considering different kinds and degrees of RPMA consolidation, this study addressed the following specific tasks.

(1) Determine the economic advisability of consolidating RPMA direct labor functions in the NCR.

(2) Determine the economic advisability of consolidating RPMA overhead (engineering, administration, and management) functions in the NCR.

(3) Determine the economic advisability of consolidating RPMA direct and overhead functions within geographic subdivisions of the NCR.

(4) Structure a recommended organization of the consolidation of RPMA in the NCR if one or more alternatives is feasible.

b. This study did not consider a non-Army parent for NCR-RPMA; nor does it include an implementation plan. Therefore, the study does not:

(1) Identify real estate and facilities for the recommended NCR-RPMA.

(2) Estimate the time required for implementation. (Experience indicates, however, that implementation would exceed 18 months.)

(3) Include an environmental impact statement.

(4) Address specific requirements associated with obtaining approval or initiating changes in RPMA funding.

c. The rest of this Main Paper comments briefly on the current method of operation (CMO) (see Annex B and its appendixes for a more detailed description), gives a bare sketch of the study procedure (the procedure and its application are treated fully in Annex C and its appendixes), and presents a recommended consolidated RPMA organization and its features (see Appendix C-2 for the development of the recommendation).

II. CURRENT METHOD OF OPERATION

5. Installations. The nine installations considered in this study as listed in paragraph 1 span six parent commands. DMATC is the only non-Army agency considered. The Army MDW does, however, maintain the property book for DMATC real property assets. Figure 1 shows the locations of the nine primary installations and the relatively small stations that are satellited on the primary installations for RPMA support. The installations vary in their size and other characteristics. Selected physical characteristics are summarized in Figure B-1 of Annex B. Annex B gives

CANDIDATES FOR RPMA CONSOLIDATION




Figure 1

a fuller treatment of the CMO, including organization charts of the current RPMA for each installation.

6. CMO Differences. There are some current differences in the organizational makeup and conduct of RPMA among the installations. For instance, the Facility Engineers (FEs) at Fort Belvoir, MDW, DMATC, HDL, and Arlington Hall receive maintenance and service (M&S) equipment support from another BASOPS element, while Vint Hill and WRAMC have M&S equipment organic to their FE organizations. Supply varies similarly. At the direct labor (pipe twister) level, the differences are a function of organizational size and installation mission. For instance, size of workload is the major reason Vint Hill does not have a separate organizational element for entomology; Fort Belvoir does have such an element. The influence of mission is apparent in WRAMC's requirement for a hospital support division.

III. STUDY PROCEDURES

7. Reduction of Major Alternatives. Figure 2 traces, in barest outline, the procedure followed in this study (see Annex C for details). At the beginning, a nearly infinite number of RPMA alternatives was imagined. After applying the criteria of feasibility, the study team quickly reduced these to just six major conceptual alternatives including the CMO. These six concepts are simply the practical ways shown in Figure 3 for combining the three most obvious separate approaches for



STUDY PROCEDURE
NEAR-INFINITY OF ALTERNATIVES
6 MAJOR FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVES
BEST OF THE 6
FINE-TUNED BEST
RECOMMENDATION

Figure 2

ALTERNATIVES BY SHOP AND MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS

Shop Functions \ Management Functions	Retained at Installation	Consolidated by Geographic Area	Consolidated by Region
Retained at Installation	Alternative 1	Alternative 2	Alternative 5
Consolidated by Geographic Area	a/	Alternative 3	Alternative 4
Consolidated by Region	a/	a/	Alternative 6

a/ Not practical.

Figure 3

shop and management functions: no change, grouping by area, and grouping over the entire region. All six major concepts were then applied comparably to high resolution for FY 77 conditions. FY 77 alternative structures were generated in accord with guidelines and rules expressed in AR 420-10[1/] and DA Pam 570-551 (FE Staffing Guide).[2/] Data provided by the nine installations for FY 77 provided the starting point for applying each conceptual alternative. The resulting spaces and annual costs are shown for each alternative in Figure 4. Alternative 1, the standardized result for CMO, possesses the most spaces and highest annual cost.

8. Development. The Alternative 5 concept and its application to FY 77 conditions were then refined and adjusted from the FE Staffing Guide standard to account better for geographic dispersion and the multiplicity of customers. The refined concept, immodestly dubbed the "best of the best," became the study's recommended concept. The refinements to Alternative 5 are detailed in Appendix C-2. (Alternative 4 applied to FY 77 is slightly less than Alternative 5 in annual cost; but the subarea centralization of shop functions seemed more liable to impairment of installation missions. No effort was made to refine the Alternative 4 concept and reapply it since the small cost advantage

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1/ DA, HQ, AR 420-10, General Provisions, Organizations, Functions, and Personnel.

2/ DA, HQ, DA Pam 570-551, Staffing Guide for US Army Garrisons.

TOTAL FY77 SPACES & ANNUAL COSTS OF RPMA ALTERNATIVES




Figure 4

resulted from MDW not being given a separate staff engineering office under Alternative 4. Alternative 5 would have yielded the lowest annual costs for FY 77 had both alternatives been given the same staff engineer approach.)

IV. RECOMMENDED RPMA CONSOLIDATION CONCEPT AND SAMPLE APPLICATION

9. Concept and Application. The recommended concept organization is as shown in Figure 2 of the Summary. Here, Figure 5 shows the total organization of RPMA resulting from application of the recommended concept to FY 77 conditions. Figure 5 includes the staff (not part of the consolidated organization) who would have provided Civilian Personnel Office (CPO), Adjutant General (AG), pay and travel, and Management Information Systems Office (MISO) support from MDW and who would have occupied the installations' staff engineer elements.

10. Dominant Considerations. Driving considerations in developing the recommended RPMA concept were to:

a. Provide capability for equal or better service than under the CMO.


b. Preserve the installation commanders' prerogatives and control over RPMA.

c. Economize.

11. Strengths. Main strengths of the recommended concept are:

a. NCR-RPMA responsiveness directly to command and RPMA needs is assured.

RECOMMENDED RPMA CONSOLIDATED ORGANIZATION
(SPACES BASED ON FY 77 DATA)



*THE SPACES AND ANNUAL COSTS DO NOT INCLUDE HOUSING MANAGEMENT OR FIRE PREVENTION AND PROTECTION BECAUSE THESE WERE NOT EVEN CONSIDERED FOR CONSOLIDATION/CENTRALIZATION.

Figure 5

(1) The original total number of nonsupervisory direct labor spaces is preserved at each installation. RPMA direct labor functions, except entomology, remain decentralized among the installations.

(2) Each installation is provided an engineer staff through which the installation commander can exercise planning and funding control. Figure 6 shows the relationship of the staff engineer to the installation command and the consolidated organization.

(3) A station manager is designated for each installation. Station managers are responsible for the service provided their installation customers. Station managers are recommended at the same grade as current FEs.

(4) Engineering, management, and administration for RPMA execution is centralized.

(5) Installation-unique functions (i.e., hospital support at WRAMC and Fort Belvoir) remain exactly the same as in current organizations.

(6) Installation production control functions (work reception, estimating, scheduling, and materials coordination) are decentralized to each installation with a strong central management backup for support and coordination.

(7) Dedicated NCR-RPMA procurement, supply, and M&S equipment maintenance are provided.

INSTALLATION/NCR-RPMA RELATIONSHIPS




Figure 6

(8) Spaces are included to account for the multiplicity of customers and geographic dispersion--factors not addressed in the standard staffing guide approach.

b. A revolving fund is recommended as the most appropriate method of funding the NCR-RPMA because it:

(1) Allows installation commanders to retain control over the level and application of funds.

(2) Is fully compatible with the Army's command management system and philosophy.

(3) Brings together about 50 NCR-RPMA customers. (The estimate of customers is based on current Interservice Support Agreements (ISSAs).)

(4) Gives visibility to all costs and charges for both NCR-RPMA managers and customers.

(5) Fosters uniform treatment of customers.

c. The recommended concept applied to FY 77 conditions would have provided significant savings in both spaces and annual cost.

(1) A realizable reduction of 113 spaces is estimated (7 percent of an original 1,610 RPMA and RPMA-related spaces).3/ The savings are drawn from current FE and other BASOPS staffs.

(2) Largely as a consequence of space reductions, a realizable annual savings of $2,030,000 is estimated (6.7 percent of an original $30,239,000).3/

3/ The baseline spaces and annual costs do not include housing management or fire prevention and protection staffs inasmuch as these were not even considered for consolidation/centralization.

(3) One-time costs tend to be minimized because only part of the current structure is centralized.

12. Other Considerations. In addition to identifiable cost savings, DOD consolidation guidelines refer to economies of scale that can be realized by consolidating RPMA supply procurement, contracts, and utilities. The study team briefly searched for potential savings in this area but found savings unlikely because:

a. The Government Services Administration (GSA) presently purchases supplies in bulk. Installations utilize the GSA system when economical.

b. The study team compared unit price contracts for similar type work. Unit prices did not vary by total size of contract. Factors such as overall market demand appear to have greater impact.

c. Point utility connections for utilities are prohibited because of the wide dispersion of candidate installations.

13. Weaknesses. The recommended NCR-RPMA does have some weaknesses.

a. The reduction in other BASOPS spaces tends to reduce the flexibility of the BASOPS labor pool. Some spaces are lost outright. Others become dedicated to RPMA within the centralized part of the RPMA consolidation.

b. Some installation commanders feel threatened with crippling loss of control. If feeling is believing, consolidation will meet strong objections. However, as the strengths listed above (and described

more fully in Appendix C-2) should show, commanders are left with what should be powerful, sufficient controls even though some of their accustomed persuasions have been relaxed.

V. INSTALLATION, MACOM, AND DA COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT

14. Other Viewpoints. The studied installations and their parent MACOMs have taken exception to many of the general and specific points developed in this study. (The authors of the study sympathize most with the frequent pleas for hard, projected data. By default, FY 77 data were collected as the best and hardest available. The study directives allowed no one the luxury of growing old waiting for harder data to materialize.) All comments are reproduced exactly as received in Annex E. Annex E also contains a summary categorization of the comments along with replies by the study's authors. Some comments are accepted, but many are openly disputed.

LAST PAGE OF MAIN PAPER

ANNEX A

STUDY REQUESTS

ANNEX A

STUDY REQUESTS

	Page
Memorandum for ASA(I&L), ASN(I&L), and ASAF(I&L), subject: "Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Military Installations in the Washington, D.C. Area," 4 April 1977	A-2
Memorandum for Engineer Studies Center, subject: "Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D.C. Area," 19 January 1978	A-4
Memorandum for the Chief of Engineers, subject: "Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Military Installations in the Washington, D.C. Area," 30 November 1977	A-12

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

IN
INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS

APR 4 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&L)
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (I&L)
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (I&L)

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Military Installations in the Washington, D. C. Area

A continuing objective of Department of Defense (DoD) policy and guidance is that real property maintenance activities functions at military installations in a given geographic area will be consolidated where such action is cost effective and does not result in mission impairment.

The Survey Report of 2 July 1969 for consolidation of RPMA at military installations in the Washington, D. C. area was reviewed for feasibility of a "single manager" concept. The "single manager" concept does not appear to be attainable for the total area because of the size and complexity of the resultant operation. The most cost effective approach to consolidation of RPMA in this area appears to be to "consolidate by Service."

Accordingly, it is requested that the Washington, D. C. area be studied for "consolidation by Service" into the following RPMA organizations:

Army Lead Service Complex: Fort Myer, Arlington, VA; Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, VA; Fort McNair, Washington, D. C.; Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA; Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D. C.; Defense Mapping Agency, Topographic Center, Washington, D. C.; and Fort Belvoir, Fort Belvoir, VA.

Navy Lead Service Complex: Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.; Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D. C.; Naval Observatory, Washington, D. C.; Naval Security Station, Washington, D. C.; Naval Communication Station, Washington, D. C.; National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD; Naval Ship Research and Development

Center, Bethesda, MD; Naval Ordnance and Harry Diamond Laboratories, White Oak, MD; Marine Corps HQ Battalion, Arlington, VA; and Marine Corps Barracks, Washington, D. C.

Air Force Lead Service Complex: Andrews Air Force Base, Camp Springs, MD; and Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D. C.

The implementation study should take about six months. Following the implementation study phase, a report will be forwarded by 7 November 1977 to the ASD(I&L) for determination recommending whether the single manager organization for that particular complex will be implemented or what other specific consolidation action will be taken. The impact of consolidation of RPMA functions on other support areas such as procurement, supply, data automation, and others must be analyzed and considered in the total benefit/cost ratios to be realized. It is anticipated that implementation of the plan would be accomplished within a year after approval. Prior to the announcement of any consolidation, a review will be made by the ASD(I&L).

In the interest of achieving economies and efficiencies, you are requested to initiate the above actions as quickly as possible. Cooperation among the Services and this office to insure smooth implementation of this mutual program effort will be greatly appreciated.

DALE R. BABIONE
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Logistics)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: DAEN-FEZ-B

19 JAN 1978

MEMORANDUM THRU DEPUTY CHIEF OF ENGINEERS

FOR ENGINEER STUDIES CENTER

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D. C. Area

1. References:

a. ASD(I&L) Memo, 4 April 1977, Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Military Installations in the Washington, D.C. Area.

b. "Department of Defense (DOD) Guidelines for Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) Surveys at Military Installations," 1 June 1972.

c. CERL Technical Report C-73, "Consolidation of RPMA at Fayetteville, N.C., Volume IV: General Procedures for Conducting RPMA Consolidation Studies," June 1977.

d. MDW Study, "MDW Base Realignment Study," 30 June 1977.

2. Purpose. To request the Engineer Studies Center (ESC) to conduct a comprehensive cost/benefits analysis of the possible alternatives for the proposed consolidation of RPMA functions and responsibilities at specified Army installations in the Washington, D.C. area, as directed by reference 1 a. The proposed consolidation alternatives will be compared with the current method of operation to determine the economic feasibility of consolidation. Support for this study effort will be provided by the Directorate of Facilities Engineering and the major commands and installations involved.

3. Background:

a. A continuing objective of Department of Defense (DOD) policy and guidance is that real property maintenance activities at military installations in a given geographic area will be consolidated where such action is cost effective and does not result in mission impairment. Reference 1 a. directed the services to study "consolidation by service" for RPMA organizations in the Washington, D.C. area through the formation of three lead service complexes.

DAEN-FEZ-B 19 JAN 1978

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D. C. Area

The study of the Army Lead Service Complex was included in a broader Army-directed study of total BASOPS consolidation in the Washington, D.C. area. This study (reference 1 d.) was done by MDW and resulted in an Army decision that total BASOPS consolidation was not feasible. The study did not include a comprehensive cost/benefits analysis for RPMA consolidation and thus did not provide sufficient data to respond to reference 1 a. For the Army to satisfy the original OASD request, a new, extensive round of data collection and analysis and consideration of RPMA consolidation alternatives is required.

b. RPMA consolidations have been studied for a number of geographic areas. Useful precedents have been published for Northern Oahu, HI; San Antonio, TX; and Fayetteville, N.C. Although the cost analyses and implementation plans produced for these proposals cut across services, the questions asked, data collected, and methods applied are relevant to consideration of an Army Lead Service Complex for the Washington, D.C. area. In particular, reference 1 c. provides a general template for conducting RPMA consolidation studies. The method described therein, complies with the DOD guidelines outlined in reference 1 b.

4. Scope:

a. The requested analysis must entail great breadth and depth. The physical dispersion, variety of functional responsibilities, varying missions and processes, different supervisory structures, seasonal effects, and current base FE and FE support areas interface of the installations specified, demands the accumulation of a vast data base for analysis. Descriptive data must accurately reflect the commonalties and differences among installations in order to provide a sound basis for the evaluation of alternatives. Using FY 1977 data, the analysis team is to review the current methods of operation, determine the levels of workload effort accomplished, and examine cost data related to accomplishing real property maintenance at the specified installations. Consideration must be given to the space, equipment, and vehicle requirements of current and alternative RPMA approaches. The team must also analyze the costs and levels of work effort attributable to RPMA-related support functions such as comptroller, communications, civilian personnel, management information systems, adjutant general/administration, supply, procurement, and transportation.

b. Study tasks, phasing, and milestones are outlined at Incl 1. A minimum of two IPRs (week of 20 March and week of 8 May) will be held during the study period. Other informal meetings will be held as required.

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D. C. Area

5. The following major commands and installations will be included in the study effort:

a. MDW - Ft Myer, Ft McNair, and Cameron Station

b. TRADOC - Ft Belvoir

c. DARCOM - Harry Diamond Labs

d. INSCOM - Arlington Hall Station and Vint Hill Farms Station

e. HSC - Walter Reed AMC

f. DMA - Defense Mapping Agency, Topographic Center (now Topographic and Hydrographic Center)

6. Alternatives:

a. The original OASD Memo (reference 1 a.) defines a single set of installations. Two installations have been added to that set. It is intended that the analysis of consolidation consider different subsets of those installations. For example, a best possible consolidation may leave one or more installations unconsolidated.

b. It is intended that, even for a fixed set of installations, different approaches to consolidation be analyzed. For example, from a few to many RPMA functions may be consolidated. Also, what outwardly might appear to be a sihgle approach to consolidation, may involve consideration of a number of funding alternatives.

7. Data requirements and collection:

a. Reference 1 c. defines data requirements for a type cost/benefits analysis of RPMA consolidation. Subject to minor modification, the requirements outlined therein are appropriate for this analysis. Copies of reference 1 c. will be provided to installation POCs.

b. In general terms, required data will include:

(1) Summary descriptions of installations' facilities, occupants, and customers.

(2) Month-by-month characterization of FY 1977 RPMA workloads by RPMA functions to include budgetary cost data to support program execution. FY 1977 is to serve as a baseline year; anything exceptional about FY 1977 and any projected differences should be noted. Detailed data requirements will include the need to express workloads in terms consistent with FE Staffing Guide procedures.

(3) Extent to which RPMA workloads are performed by RPMA staff, troop projects, self-help, and contracting-out.

(4) Current RPMA organization. Organizational diagrams, manpower authorizations, and on-board strengths by skill. (Any changes to TDAs now in process should be reported with estimate of likely outcome.)

(5) Current space, equipment, and vehicle requirements of RPMA.

(6) Current and projected ISSAs.

(7) RPMA dependence on other installation and off-installation support. Quantitative expression necessary, but qualitative expression of any unusual support is better than nothing.

(8) Special mission considerations.

c. The above data requirements are representative only. In accordance with the project task schedule at Incl 1, the Engineer Studies Center (ESC) will develop, not later than 25 January 1978, the specific data requirements to include formats for collecting the data. Given the complexity of the problem and the likelihood that new issues may be raised, supplementary data requirements may be issued later. Every effort should be made to keep supplementary requests to a minimum. The ESC and the FE Directorate staff will check data for completeness and consistency; if necessary, they will contact installation POCs directly for clarification, completion, or correction of data. ESC will perform normal data validation functions.

d. It is in the interest of all installations to provide data that accurately describe their requirements and activities. Installations will be encouraged to provide any additional information necessary to record special problems and considerations. Such additional submissions should be as concise as possible.

8. Facilities Engineering Directorate Support:

a. The Directorate will task the major commands to provide the detailed data required in the formats developed by ESC.

DAEN-FEZ-B 19 JAN 1978

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D. C. Area

b. Data will be submitted directly to ESC. The Directorate will assist ESC in checking/editing the submissions and contacting the installations for clarification, completion, or correction of data.

c. In order that part of the evaluation of RPMA alternatives may be based on application of FE Staffing Guide principles, the Directorate will designate a staffing guide expert to provide assistance to the study team.

d. The Directorate will be responsible for all coordination and staffing of the report. ESC's role is to be limited to technical accomplishment, incorporation of comments, and assistance in preparing briefings.

9. Points of Contact:

a. Directorate of Facilities Engineering - Mr. Edward T. Watling, Chief, Resources Management Division (DAEN-FER), phone 693-0523

b. Engineer Studies Center (ESC) - Mr. Bruce Dunn, phone 227-2315

c. Major Commands and Installations have been requested to provide a POC in the grade of 05/GS-13 or above not later than 23 January 1978. An initial meeting with POCs will be held at 1000 hours, 25 January 1978, in Room 1G 041, Forrestal Building, to discuss detailed data collection requirements.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS:



1 Incl
as


EDWIN P. GEESEY
Colonel, Corps of Engineers
Acting Director of Facilities Engineering

COST BENEFITS ANALYSIS—TASKS AND SCHEDULE

Task		PARTICIPATION ESC	DAEN-FE	INST
1.	Inform installations of need for participation, give preview of data requirements, and request identification of POCs.		X	
2	Develop preliminary evaluation criteria.	X		
3	Define detailed data requirements, subject to later expansion.	X	X	
4	Issue detailed data requirements to installations.		X	
5	Prepare data for submission to ESC.			X
6	Check/edit submitted data.	X	X	
7	From submitted data, develop descriptions of current workloads, methods, and costs of operation. Prepare draft on current (FY 77 baseline) RPMA.	X		
8	Define candidate sets of installations for RPMA consolidation.	X	X	
9	Define alternative approaches to RPMA consolidation: physical, organizational, and funding alternatives.	X	X	
10.	Structure alternative approaches for alternative sets of installations.	X	X	

Task		PARTICIPATION ESC	DAEN-FE	INST
11	Develop refined evaluation criteria.	X		
12	Obtain additional data neçessary for evaluation of alternatives.	X	X	X
13	Analyze/evaluate/cost alternatives.	X		
14	Coordinate with installations on any seeming anomalies.	X		X
15	Develop conclusions.	X		
16	Staff draft report to MACOM/Installations and DA staff. Obtain AAA review.		X	X
17	Analyze comments, prepare final report with recommendations.	X		
18	In-process review (IPR).	X	X	X

COST BENEFITS ANALYSIS--SCHEDULE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

30 NOV 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS

ATTN DAEN-FEP

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Military Installations in the Washington, D. C. Area

In accordance with discussions between our respective offices, DAS and OSD, it is agreed that materials prepared by MDW in connection with an overall MDW realignment study do not satisfy the requirement of the OSD memorandum of 4 April 1977, subject as above. It is understood that your office has been tasked by DAS to prepare a study report for consolidation of RPMA activities in MDW by 31 January 1978.

Points which were not covered in the realignment study but which should be considered in the RPMA study report are as follows:

1. Address all activities for which Army was assigned lead service responsibilities by the 4 April 1977 OSD memorandum. For example, Walter Reed Army Medical Center and Defense Mapping Agency were omitted from the earlier study.

2. Assure that the study comprehensively considers geographic, functional and economic factors. The earlier study made only a superficial analysis of RPMA.

3. Approach the study in a positive manner which gives equitable consideration to consolidation possibilities. Experience gained in previous successful RPMA consolidation actions should be utilized and given due consideration in the final recommendations.

A copy of the interim reply to ASD(MRA&L) is attached.

BY DIRECTION OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(INSTALLATIONS, LOGISTICS AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT):

Paul W. Johnson
Deputy for Installations and Housing
OASA(IL&FM)

Incl
a/s

CF: DAS

LAST PAGE OF ANNEX A

ANNEX E

SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION, MACOM, AND DA COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT OF MAY 1978

ANNEX E

SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION, MACOM, AND DA COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT OF MAY 1978

This annex categorizes and summarizes installation, MACOM, and DA comments on the May 1978 draft version of this report. The summarized comments and the ESC responses are presented in matrix format in Figure E-1. The original comments as received are reproduced as Appendix E-1 to this annex.

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES

Subject	Ft Belvoir	TRADOC	WRAMC	HSC	DMATC	DMA
Challenges to Veracity, Accuracy, and Logic	•"Lacks backup doc." •"Oversimplified." •"Incomplete justification." •"Impact on other BASOPS efficiencies recognized but not fully rationalized."	•Same as Ft Belvoir.	•"Savings grossly overstated and additional costs understated and ignored." •"Savings of BASOPS manpower by removal of FE is extremely suspect." •San Antonio RPMA used as example, not yet implemented. •Marginal estimated savings and decrease in responsiveness to instl cdrs do not appear to warrant further consideration of proposal. •Recommend hold in abeyance until SARPMA evidence is in.		•DMATC information ignored or not properly interpreted. Most important defect is lack of logic or rationale for projected savings. •Savings appear from reduction of support to FE (Compt, CPO, etc.) and from changes in staffing standards. •Recommend study be redone with hard data and clear assumptions and other alternatives. •Did not explain how exhibit unit will be supported.	•Comd concern about feasibility of DMATC being included in consolidation not addressed in study. •Because of consolidation elsewhere, feasibility is assumed; thus, ESC went beyond basic guidance. •Did not show impact on security, labor work force, engr scheduling, programing, and visibility of work force. •ESC's reliance on the FE Staffing Guide is very dangerous for small installations. •In small "close-knit" organizations, service orders are often used in place of IJOs; thus our historical data are suspect. •No rationale how savings are derived. Gross errors in support area.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES—Continued

Subject	Ft Belvoir	TRADOC	WRAMC	HSC	DMATC	DMA
Challenges to Veracity, Accuracy, and Logic--continued						• 2d MDW procurement office out of phase with study. • Study should be done over using DOD Instruction 7041.3, "Economic Analysis and Program Evaluation for Resources Management." • Recommend DMA not concur that consolidation is feasible. Study is inaccurate and incomplete and should not be used as basis for decision. Final study should be coordinated prior to release to OASD(MRA&L).

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES—Continued

Subject	HDL	ERADCOM	DARCOM	INSCOM Arl Hall & Vint Hill	MDW	DACA
Challenges to Veracity, Accuracy, and Logic	•Staff engr manpower needs underestimated. If in error here, may be also in other areas. If so, could be more detrimental to HDL mission than apparent. Due to Army's serious current manpower constraints, it may take years to overcome any underestimation.	•Reorganization based on assumption current organizations are adequately staffed when they appear to be understaffed. Cannot concur that reorganization can save 100 spaces and also improve responsiveness. Responsiveness more likely to decrease. •Concur with comments of HDL commander.	•Concur with HDL and ERADCOM. •Report assumes manpower savings without specifics to mission impairments. •Better definition and identification of total RPMA workload requirements may help determine the most effective method of realignment of present staffing in a consolidation effort.	•113 space savings overly optimistic in light of already understaffed BASOPS. •Not convinced consolidation will provide equal or better service. Strong reservations because of impact on command mission. •Savings are overly optimistic and neglect analysis of costs resulting from consolidation. •Potential for improvement from pooled expertise may not materialize.	•Doubt whether any spaces can be saved. •Stronger arguments needed to keep procurement in MDW in light of Army actions to reduce procurement actions in NCR. Two procurement activities in MDW are inefficient. Conclusion: Apprehensive about consolidation of RPMA and resulting organization's ability to do the job. •Bigness is not always a virtue; the proposed organization is a greater management challenge and a ready-made target for resource cuts. Must be careful not to create expectations which cannot be met.	•Concur conceptually with proposal to consolidate RPMA in NCR. •Savings of 113 are not regarded with confidence. •Recommend more detailed cost benefit analysis be conducted before final recommendation.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Challenges to Veracity, Accuracy, and Logic	•Concur with thrust of major conclusions and recommendations. •Identifies theoretical savings. No one should assume will be realized in practice. •No issue taken with methodology. •Evidence of other consolidations is that increase in spaces may result. •Need realism in projected savings because of danger of Army suffering cuts and manpower based on optimistic projections.	•No basis on which to comment.	The level of resolution in the study is appropriate and sufficient to demonstrate the feasibility of consolidation and to determine the best consolidation concept within the constraints of geography, functions, and economics. The level of resolution is also sufficient to make a decision whether or not to proceed to an implementation study and plan. The study is conceptual and does not contain sufficient detail or accuracy for a final implementation decision or determination of savings. The consolidation and management concepts described are sound and can serve as a guide for the implementation study. The accuracy of the FE manpower allocations and savings reported in the study are dependent upon the accuracy of the reported workload data, the size of the current direct labor force, and the manpower standards in the DA Staffing Guide for Army Garrisons. Each step of ESC's method is explained and the results can be reproduced by anyone skilled in using the FE Staffing Guide and workload data. The staffing process has identified some numerical errors and omissions which have been corrected for final report and should improve the clarity and auditability of the study. The findings were based on workload data submitted by the installations. No one has revised or offered to revise submitted workloads. Concern was expressed that use of the FE Staffing Guide is dangerous and may cause an overstatement of savings. It is the Army-approved basis for manpower staffing determinations and is the only tool available short of on-site manpower surveys which would be too costly and time consuming for a feasibility study of this type. On-site manpower surveys should be and usually are made during the implementation study phase. In response to those statements impinging upon the veracity of the report and briefings and to those which imply even valleity to disregard substantive information, we suggest that they are the unintentioned result of the obviously threatening atmosphere engendered by a consolidation study and a deep concern to protect the best interests of the Army and DOD. The fact that some respondents' unsolicited pleas for special consideration were not acknowledged by agreement does not mean they were not carefully considered. Throughout the study, efforts were made to keep the study open and involved installations informed through POC meetings and informal

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Challenges to Veracity, Accuracy, and Logic--continued			conversations. All requests for special briefings and meetings were honored. At the appropriate time in the study, before any manpower figures were involved, the installations were asked to review the consolidation alternatives to be tested in the study and to suggest any additional ones they believed pertinent. Without exception, no one suggested any further alternatives be tested and, in fact, stated that they preferred the status quo. In short, innuendos regarding the study's objectivity and veracity are false.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	Ft Belvoir	TRADOC	WRAMC	HSC	DMATC	DMA
Omitted Topics	•Travel and coordination for mgt and engr." •Study ignores or oversimplifies uniqueness and complexity.	•Same as Ft Belvoir.		*Did not address how projects will be prioritized against projects of other installations.*		

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	HDL	ERADCOM	DARCOM	INSCOM Arl Hall & Vint Hill	MDW	DACA
Omitted Topics	•Study did not address satellite installations and associated travel times. •The "shakedown" with contractors required with the continuing relocation of HDL HQ and ERADCOM to the new facility requires continuity of on-site personnel. •Study did not address scheduling of recurring maintenance of installed equipment. Should use Navy system.			•AHS RPMA spaces are Program 3 (PE 381011), part of Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) under control of NSA. •Vint Hill is outside NCR--40 to 50 miles from Metro center. Report should include analysis of impact of excluding Vint Hill. •Did not address setting priorities among installations. AHS will lack visibility compared to historic Ft McNair. •Did not address travel of central management and engineering to installations. •Did not address costs and loss of efficiency of personnel turmoil of implementation. •Consolidation may negatively affect quality of work and labor relations.	•Stationing, space requirements, and costs for centralized part of consolidated organization should be addressed. Space available in NCR is critical.	

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES—Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Omitted Topics	•Recent RPMA study reported FE Staffing Guide is inadequate and needs revision, which supports our concern for overestimated savings.		Admittedly, some topics were not addressed in the study. Those not addressed were considered outside the range of topics necessary to a determination of feasibility. If undertaken, the implementation study will have to address additional topics as well as some of the same topics in greater detail. Project Priorities. The study envisions each installation commander/staff engineer setting priorities for projects at his own installation. Relative project priorities between installations would be negotiated with the NCR-RPMA. The NCR-RPMA has a large enough capability to handle all high-priority projects for all installations. It also has the added flexibility to rapidly apply a larger than normal force at any single installation in the case of emergencies. Theoretically, the entire in-house, contract, and temporary-hire capabilities of the NCR-RPMA would have to be exceeded before conflicts in priority occur. Realistically, depletion of the NCR-RPMA capability will not occur. Development of annual work plans by staff engineers in coordination with the NCR-RPMA should reveal most conflicts, permitting their resolution in advance of their expected execution. The major restraint to project execution and completion will be an installation's inability to fund the project. Lack of funds is also a current restraint. IFS. The study envisions the use of IFS for workload planning, scheduling, reporting, etc. IFS is now in use only at MDW installations and is compatible with consolidation concepts. Other installations are scheduled to implement IFS. The added manpower for converting and operating the system at these installations did not appear in the FY 77 baseline data. It should be determined and added to the baseline during the implementation phase. It would have to be accounted for as additional workload at these installations whether or not any consolidation actions are taken. BMAR. BMAR reduction was not specifically addressed. The FY 77 BMAR effort prior to consolidation is assumed to continue after consolidation at the same level. The specific location of the central NCR-RPMA headquarters within the NCR was not addressed. However, as shown in Annex D, the number of people actually moving is small and should not be difficult to accommodate.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES—Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Omitted Topics—continued			Construction Inspection Travel Cost. The FE Staffing Guide standard for construction inspection allowed 12 positions (2 supervisory, 10 nonsupervisory) for the combined workload of the installations in the NCR (currently 25 inspectors are on board). Travel time for these inspectors should be minimal by scheduling and grouping their work so that they can report directly to an installation each day. Dedicating one or two inspectors to the larger installations is warranted to further their familiarization with the peculiarities of the installations. Central management allows the flexibility to shift the work force as workload varies among the installations. Since there is an overall reduction in the number of inspectors, there should be less problem with the availability of government vehicles for their use. Engineers' Travel. The FE Staffing Guide allowed 53 positions (1 supervisory, 52 nonsupervisory) for engineering services for the combined workload reported by the installations in the NCR (currently 74--4 supervisory, 70 nonsupervisory). The combined reported workload is 7,139 IJOs with a slightly skewed distribution as to size of the job. Allowing two 1-hour trips for the larger jobs (40 percent) and one 1-hour trip for the smaller jobs (60 percent), approximately 5 man-years of effort can be expected for travel. Five positions should be added to this function in the recommended NCR-RPMA to compensate for travel. Since there is a reduction in the total number of positions in this function of 13, the requirement for government vehicles should be somewhat less.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	Ft Belvoir	TRADOC	WRAMC	HSC	DMATC	DMA
Accuracy and Adequacy of Manpower	•Staff engr inadequate (want 17 people, not 8--list tasks but do not show workload). •Entomology manpower too low--11 recorded for Ft Belvoir (currently have 5 direct labor spaces).		•Staff engr inadequate--need 10 people, not 5, allocated. Omitted engineering coordination with tenants. •4 people now in Master Plan alone. •Only 3 positions can be identified in other BASOPS *support of FE, not* 10 as claimed. FE support is spread among many jobs in a support area like CPO.	•Did not address who validates BMAR and who controls BMAR funds. •Did not address IFS. •Did not state actual location of central mgt office. •Staff engr grade will eventually be downgraded to less *than current* FE's grade due to reduction in personnel supervised. •12 personnel for engr procurement not enough.	•132 spaces allocated to DMATC. Station mgr inadequate. Present (not FY 77) auth 137 (128 FTP + 9 TPT); also usually have 20 temp plus 20-25 students 16 hours/week (315). 132 can't do job unless consolidated organization uses *temps*. •3 CPO support taken should only be 2. No savings for comptroller because of added work interface with AIF. •The current level of support to FE will be same after consolidation, only at different location.	•Study shows savings of 94 out of 323 nonshop spaces (almost 30 percent) with no rationale. •DMA now has a shortage in both shop and nonshop manpower. •Justify savings in procurement by reducing 30.5 man-years to 12 thru fragmenting function. Same work order accountability is required. DMA buys special photo space items which are not subset of Ft Belvoir. •Work coordinating is understaffed. Need 6 (current) instead of 2. •DMATC current manpower is incorrect; should be 127, not 157 as in study. Did not recognize overtime, temporary overstrength, or 20 to 25 stay-in-school (SIS) students (16 hrs per week). •EEO of 1 space inadequate; should be 3 spaces.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	HDL	ERADCOM	DARCOM	INSCOM Arl Hall & Vint Hill	MDW	DACA
Accuracy and Adequacy of Manpower	•Staff engineer manpower needs are underestimated (lists tasks but not workload). Wants 7 people instead of 2. •One environmental and energy engineer (not shown in data submittal) was not identified with staff engineer. •Only two production control people allowed for functions now done by six people.			•Staff engineer has insufficient manpower for residual responsibilities.	•Require 20 added spaces for IFS system operation and management.	

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Accuracy and Adequacy of Manpower	•Staff engineer appears understaffed. •Workload estimates may be understated. •Manpower to support IFS not sufficient.		In FY 77, overall onboard manpower level was approximately 75 percent of recognized manpower requirements and is indicative of current Army manpower constraints. Realistically, these constraints are likely to continue at the current level or worsen. Unless some management or business process improvements are made, the current level of RPMA service, whether adequate or not, associated with existing manpower constraints can be expected to continue. In order to make a fair feasibility comparison between current and consolidated alternatives, it was necessary to treat each with some staffing rules and standards. The existing level of manpower constraints was also applied to the recommended consolidated organization so that at least an equal level of service can reasonably be expected. The basic FE Staffing Guide organization structure was adopted to meet the special needs of a consolidated operation. These modifications were made only where dictated by good management practice. In each case, the level of manpower allocated was based upon reported workload adjusted to the level of current constraints. Six installations challenged the manpower allocated to the residual staff engineer functions as too little. The manpower allocations to the staff engineer were made by applying FE Staffing Guide standards to reported workload. At the larger installations an additional person was allowed in recognition of increased coordination of workloads with tenants. At each installation the manpower allotted to the staff engineer is greater than those currently identified to the reported workload. Although some installations submitted lists of the tasks to be performed by the staff engineers, none are supported by either historical or projected workload information. In the case of HDL, the list includes a duplication of a number of tasks which were included in the consolidated organization's mission. A list of tasks is not the same as workload and is not alone sufficient for manpower allocations. The manpower required for the staff engineer should be resolved by an on-site manpower survey during the implementation study. In the surveys, the installations should have the opportunity to demonstrate in detail the workload history associated with these tasks.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Accuracy and Adequacy of Manpower--continued			Some of the claims for staff engineer manpower requirements cited in the comments do not fit with earlier reported information or with FE Staffing Guide standards for the current organization. For example, WRAMC states four people are currently in master planning. They originally reported two people and the FE Staffing Guide standard applied to their workload allows two people. HDL states six persons are now required for production control (work reception, scheduling, estimating, and inspection) at their installation. Based on their reported workload (4,350 service orders, 379 IJOs consuming 16,268 direct man-hours--or 43 hours per IJO), the FE Staffing Guide standard allows one person for work reception and scheduling and zero persons for estimating the 379 IJOs--a total of one for both functions. In the consolidation, their local production control unit was allowed the minimum of two persons with material coordination as a combined duty. WRAMC support to the FE was estimated based on averages derived from support provided to FE at other installations because no data were forthcoming from WRAMC after repeated requests. The actual support should be determined by an impartial on-site manpower survey during the implementation study phase. Similarly, DMATC support to FE was estimated with average factors and should ultimately be resolved by an impartial manpower survey. (There has not been one since 1972.) It is difficult to understand why interface with AIF or any revolving fund should have significant impact on the DMATC Comptroller. They stand primarily in the role of a customer paying a bill, usually quarterly. DMATC manpower was rechecked. The 132 spaces allocated to DMATC are the result of the manpower and workload reported. They reported 154 man-years for FY 77--17 supervisory, 118 FTP nonsupervisory, 11.25 temp, and 9.5 SIS, which equals 153.75. Adjustments for changes since the base year should be made by manpower surveys in the implementation study phase.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Accuracy and Adequacy of Manpower--continued			The 12 personnel allocated to procurement were based on 75 percent of FE Staffing Guide recognized strength for the workload projected. The result was compared to available information for the San Antonio RPMA and other consolidations and appeared in the proper range. No one has offered an alternative projection of workload with which to make an adjustment. The EEO space allocated to the NCR-RPMA was considered as a liaison position with the MDW EEO office and installation commanders. The EEO could require strengthening.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES—Continued

Subject	Ft Belvoir	TRADOC	WRAMC	HSC	DMATC	DMA
Omitted Costs	•Additional cost of management and engineer travel time, AUVs.		•One-time relocation costs and cost for extra vehicles for added travel. •WRAMC would save only $60,000, not $200,000 in study. (No explanation of how derived.) •Recommend hold in abeyance until complete cost analysis including relocation charges, equipment, and transportation.			
Command and Control Problems	•Current FE responsibilities split between staff engr (cmd and control) and station mgr (execution and support). •All FE functions (house mgt, fire prot and pvnt, master planning, and real property and environment) should go to consolidated organization--NCR-RPMA. (Implication--turn over installation to MDW; all occupants as tenants.) •Recommend fire, house mgt, real property, and environment included in NCR-RPMA.	•Same as Ft Belvoir.				

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	HDL	ERADCOM	DARCOM	INSCOM Arl Hall & Vint Hill	MDW	DACA
Omitted Costs						
Command and Control Problems	•With consolidation, HDL commander would have little or no control over manpower available. •An NCR-RPMA manpower cut would affect HDL projects. •In consolidated FE, there could be priority conflicts between HDL projects for mission requirements and those of other installations.	•Consolidated organization departs from conventional, industrial, and military management practices of placing supporting activities under control of responsible executive.		•Divides RPMA responsibility to detriment of installation commander's prerogative and reduces level of FE not in keeping with COE's program to enhance image.		

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Omitted Costs			See ESC response for Omitted Topics.
Command and Control Problems			Consolidated organization does not place supporting activities under the control of responsible commander as is conventional military and industrial practice. It is very difficult to ascertain what is conventional military practice in this regard because in practice, military support arrangements vary greatly; e.g., Navy Public Works Centers, cross-service support agreements, contracted support, GSA support, etc. Even a wide range of arrangements are in common practice in industry. The confusion seems to stem from the meaning of "control." It is commonly thought control requires a direct boss-subordinate relationship, but other types of control--policy, persuasion, instituted procedures, and financial--are also in effective daily use in the military. In the proposed consolidation concept, the installation commander is asked to replace the use of boss-subordinate control with policy, procedural, and financial controls--what might be called customer's controls. The FE's level of prestige is not reduced in the consolidation. It is increased. The Director of the NCR-RPMA, the FE, is now the head of an FE organization serving the combined installations equal to a Ft Bliss or Ft Knox. He has nine middle managers working for him as station managers dedicated to serving a specific set of customers. The staff engineers serve as special staff to the installation commanders to provide a broad range of engineering advice. A consolidated RPMA organization will require the close cooperation of the customer installations to help them justify their manpower requirements and forestall mission-impairing manpower cuts. Current FE functions were split between the consolidated organization and the residual staff engineer on two bases. First, those functions which were not strictly RPMA functions were left with the installation--housing management, fire protection and prevention, master planning, real property, and environmental and energy program administration. Secondly, planning, programing, and budgeting were left with the staff engineer to provide the installation commanders financial control over the RPMA services he receives. No doubt other splits of responsibilities are feasible and even more desirable. For example, all installations could be turned over to MDW with all others as tenants. MDW could provide all BASOPS support for tenants or only special

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Command and Control Problems--continued			subsets of support--facility and industrial operations for instance. Facility engineering support could be pipelined to the CE through an FE division added to the corps' current district/division structure. Studies in process are looking at these questions, all of which were beyond the scope and schedule of the study. It should be noted that the basic consolidation concept--central management/decentralized execution--would remain valid for all of the aforementioned alternatives. However, with differing parent command relationship, the internal structure of the NCR-RPMA and staff engineer functions would change.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	Ft Belvoir	TRADOC	WRAMC	HSC	DMATC	DMA
Organizational Alignments	•"Pest control should not be centralized because of volume of unscheduled work." •Contract inspection should be stationed at installation even if reporting centrally. •Recommend: "review and clarify."		•"Hospital support division requires close support."	•Family housing and fire protection remain installation responsibility; therefore, WRAMC needs procurement, maintenance, and alteration expertise for family housing and BOQ. This work is done by same people who do work for FE.	•Special support group should be shown under utilities, not buildings and grounds.	

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	HDL	ERADCOM	DARCOM	INSCOM Arl Hall & Vint Hill	MDW	DACA
Organizational Alignments				•Station manager likely to lose grade because of reduction of functions.	•Fully endorse providing both station manager and staff engineer at each facility but since dual hatting is a logical alternative, study should formally address the virtues of dual hatting officers. •Concerned about dollar and manpower control split because it reduces resources of responsible commander. •Total resources should be given to responsible manager to clearly fix responsibility.	•MDW has procurement and supply and should be able to absorb engineer procurement and supply.

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SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Organizational Alignments			Pest control should not be centralized because of volume of unscheduled work. Only 2.5 percent of the pest control work was reported as nonrecurring work by the installations. Viewed by installation, only Ft Belvoir had any significant nonrecurring pest control workload--6 percent. Contract inspection should be stationed at installation even if managed centrally. Agree; see discussion under Omitted Topics and Costs. Hospital support requires close support. Agreed; the consolidated organization should have dedicated hospital expertise in engineering and planning services to support both WRAMC and the Ft Belvoir hospital as well as the smaller medical facilities at installations. Family housing and fire protection remain an installation responsibility but all RPMA-type support for them should be provided by the consolidated organization. Thus, no duplication of engineering or direct labor skills is needed by the installations. Station manager may be reduced in grade because of reduction in functions. During the implementation phase manpower surveys, a grade reduction may result. ESC recommends that they should not be reduced in grade. MDW procurement and supply should be able to absorb engineer procurement and supply. A dedicated engineer supply and procurement arrangement is very strongly recommended. There is clearly more responsive support at those installations which have dedicated engineer supply. As a minimum, all engineer supply and procurement operations should be concentrated in dedicated organizational elements of the central procurement and supply and colocated with the engineers even if they continue to be administratively attached to a central supply and procurement group. As stated in the study, dedicated supply, procurement, and equipment maintenance working in close coordination with production controllers is the main management tool for assuring responsive service. It is the means to getting the men, materials, and equipment to the right place at the right time so that the job can be started and completed as promised. A large measure of RPMA customer dissatisfaction stems from excuses for supply and equipment delays.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Organizational Alignments--continued			Separation of staff engineer and station management function. ESC strongly recommends against dual hatting in this instance because of the built-in conflicts between the two roles. The station manager's job is to execute the RPMA work at the installation--to assure responsive, quality work to his customers--installation commander and tenants. The staff engineer's job is to advise the installation commander on planning, programing and budget matters. It is his job to order work and assure that the commander's legal and regulatory obligations are met and that he receives a quality product from the RPMA at the right price. In a sense, he is the commander's interface with the NCR-RPMA whose relationship is basically that of a contractor. Since staff engineers represent commanders in six major command channels, dual hatting would require the station manager/staff engineer to divide his allegiance between major commands along the lines of his advisor-execution roles.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	Ft Belvoir	TRADOC	WRAMC	HSC	DMATC	DMA
Funding Method	•Advantages of AIF not clearly delineated. "OMA and ISSAs better understood by user." •Recommend: OMA funding unless overriding advantage of AIF shown.	•Same as Ft Belvoir. •Use of AIF for FE not compatible with present Army AIF philosophy because AIF is only for products, not for services. •Recommend: Reconsider AIF.	•"Increases overhead cost up to 25 percent."	•No financial trail will lead to inequitable resource allocations. AIF overhead will increase cost to tenants with no provision for their increased budgets for services now covered in hosts' BASOPS. Thus, tenants with other fund channels are penalized.		

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	HDL	ERADCOM	DARCOM	INSCOM Arl Hall & Vint Hill	MDW	DACA
Funding Method				•Did not fully address disadvantages to customer from proportionate allocation of overhead costs. •Reimbursement to AIF likely to be more expensive to the comd. How does DA offset this? What checks are imposed to control overhead expansion to customers who have no say in overhead charged them?	•AIF would require MDW to establish two separate accounting systems. •Cost visibility can be achieved with current OMA system.	•DODD 7410.4 prohibits AIF for function pertaining to daily military facility operations simply for centralization, reimbursability, cost accounting visibility. •Recommend review funding alternatives.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Funding Method			A revolving fund (similar to AIF) provides a means of providing visibility for expenditures and places the primary responsibility for controlling those expenditures on the party who is consuming the service. Other funding arrangements such as direct funding of a host command providing support to tenants separate the responsibility for controlling expenditures from the party who consumes the service. The consumer tends toward an attitude that he is provided free goods and services. This tends to lead to situations where budgeted services and goods are depleted before planned. To counter this tendency, the providing agency unilaterally imposes controls. Applied to the consolidation, this means that installation commanders could lose control of RPMA. The revolving fund concept is suggested to preserve command prerogatives. The fact that revolving funds are not well understood by some is offset by the fact that they are well understood by others. Those using and understanding it have not expressed concern. Conversion to a revolving fund does tend to make currently hidden overhead cost more visible to RPMA customers. It appears that RPMA costs have increased. Actually, they do not. Some portions of RPMA overhead costs are currently hidden in other fund categories of the customer's budget. These also will require adjustments. In short, a customer such as WRAMC is now fully paying for all RPMA overhead although it may not be labeled as such. Among the reasons for suggesting the AIF Model for the revolving fund is that it has a fully developed set of rules and reviews for controlling overhead cost growth. Any revolving fund or system of reimbursements that accomplishes the same goals with the same safeguards will serve the study intent.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES—Continued

Subject	Ft Belvoir	TRADOC	WRAMC	HSC	DMATC	DMA
Special Considerations	• "Unique because Ft Belvoir is largest installation (bigger than MDW) and complex (30 tenants). Warrants special attention." • Recommend: "Exclusion of Ft Belvoir because of size and uniqueness."	• Same as Ft Belvoir. • Recommend Ft Belvoir be excluded.	• "Unique organization with unique facility problems. Study fails to recognize life and death implications of WRAMC tertiary medical care. • Absolute assurance of prompt emergency engineering reaction under direct control of Cdr, WRAMC is a non-negotiable requirement."	• Support WRAMC comments. • Any alternatives other than status quo reduces commander's control of FE personnel and decreases FE responsiveness.	• "DMATC unique...no comparable organization in DOD because of special mapping equipment and security."	• "DMATC is unique organization; there is no comparable organization in DOD. Uniqueness is reflected in requirements for FE and interfaces with other elements. DMA photo labs and production space are not similar to any space elsewhere in NCR."

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	HDL	ERADCOM	DARCOM	INSCOM Arl Hall & Vint Hill	MDW	DACA
Special Considerations	•HDL has unique immediate requirements to support R&D labs, one of a kind equipment systems, and facilities for technical mission. •Personnel need intimated and detailed knowledge of facility. •Recommend HDL be exempted from consolidation because of time sensitivity of FE responses for R&D lab mission projects. •Consolidation would be detrimental to mission.		•Close support of R&D mission is critical. Planning, programing, budgeting, and performance evaluation should remain with HDL. Supervision and management of day-to-day operations should also remain with HDL. •Recommend HDL should not be consolidated.	•INSCOM is making DA-directed Base Realignment Study with VHFS, AHS, and Ft Meade as candidates. Decision expected early fall. •Recommend AHS and VHFS be deleted from implementation of consolidated RPMA.		

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Special Considerations			All of the involved installations, except MDW, requested to be excluded from the consolidation for various reasons. Four installations sought to be excluded from the study because of their uniqueness: Ft Belvoir because it is large and complex; WRAMC because of special hospital support; HDL because of special laboratory support; and, DMA because of special mapping equipment and security. In recognition of these special needs, all identifiable specialized support elements--WRAMC's Hospital Support Division and DMATC's Techical Support Branch--were left at installstions with the same work force and mission, although they are transferred to the consolidated organization. Objectively, standing back to gain perspective of these claims of uniqueness, ESC observed that the Ft Belvoir FE successfully supports both a hospital and a large research and development complex without undue difficulty. Arlington Hall has security requirements similar to DMATC but does not consider them a bar to consolidation as long as the consolidated organization's personnel are properly cleared. Some portion of the engineering and inspection staffs of the consolidated organization will require special clearances. Not emphasized are the greater areas of commonality--custodial, guards, grounds, painting, production control, administration, etc.--among these installations. It is not difficult to imagine a single Army installation equal to the size of the installations in this study with a large number of tenants with equal diverse unique missions being served by a single FE organization. For example, to put the size of the combined NCR Army installations in perspective: in acreage, they are slightly bigger than Ft Meade; smaller than West Point or Schofield Barracks; about 20 percent the size of Aberdeen Proving Grounds; less than half the size of Redstone Arsenal; and, less than 7 percent the size of Ft Hood. In square feet of buildings: they are slightly smaller than Ft Hood; double Redstone Arsenal; about the same as Ft Bragg, Ft Bliss, Ft Benning, and Ft Knox. Maximum travel one-way distances in the NCR are slightly more than Ft Hood and less than Ft Bliss. Each of these forts supports a large hospital.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	Ft Belvoir	TRADOC	WRAMC	HSC	DMATC	DMA
Data Baseline Considerations	•Recommend: Savings recalculation using FY 79 projected data prior to final implementation decision including realizable BASOPS.		•Use of FY 77 data (333 spaces) creates apprehension as to quality and quantity of support to new hospital. WRAMC is expanding to nearly double occupied area. Recognized strength has already increased to 376 spaces. •Recommend hold in abeyance until savings based on FY 79 projected spaces.			

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	HDL	ERADCOM	DARCOM	INSCOM Arl Hall & Vint Hill	MDW	DACA
Data Baseline Considerations	•HDL manpower is currently insufficient. HDL has increasing workload with additions to population and equipment since baseline year FY 77. How will additions be handled?					

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Data Baseline Considerations			FY 77, the latest complete year, manpower and workload information was used in this study. The manpower allocations and savings expressed in this study are based on this baseline. Future increases or decreases in workload from this baseline will result in changes to the manpower allocations. These changes would occur independently of consolidation. Thus, the consolidation savings based on the FY 77 workload are a relative measure for future years. Considering the difficulty in securing accurate, recent historical data, the suggestion that projected data would provide a more realistic baseline is hardly convincing. However, adjustments for imminent changes in workload should be made during the implementation study and planning phase.

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	Ft Belvoir	TRADOC	WRAMC	HSC	DMATC	DMA
Scope		•Why wasn't Ft Meade included in study?				
Security					•The prime area of concern...DMATC's stringent security requirement and special security clearances. Scarcity of special access billets will not allow NCR-RPMA engineer and inspector access.	

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	HDL	ERADCOM	DARCOM	INSCOM Arl Hall & Vint Hill	MDW	DACA
Scope						
Security						

(Figure E-1 Continued on Next Page)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ESC RESPONSES--Continued

Subject	DACS	OACSI	ESC Response
Scope			Concerning Ft Meade, ESC was directed as to which installations were to be considered for consolidation.
Security			Across all nine installations, DMATC was the only installation which raised a question concerning security--claiming it to be a prime area of concern. DMATC claimed scarcity of SI billets will not allow NCR-RPMA engineers and inspectors access. Arlington Hall Station is the only other installation within the study known to have SI billets and, yet, did not list it as a problem. DMATC claims 93 SI billets while Arlington Hall Station claimed 89 SI billets. An analysis comparing the two organizations with staffing levels they presently have with what they would have after consolidation shows 14 realized SI billets which can be applied to the NCR-RPMA HQ--more than adequate for engineering and inspection.

Figure E-1

APPENDIX E-1

COMPLETE INSTALLATION, MACOM, AND DA
COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT OF MAY 1978

Correspondence to DAEN-FER	Page
Letter from US Army Engineer Center, subject: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, DC Area," 13 June 1978	E-1-3
Letter from US Army Training and Doctrine Command, subject: same, 13 June 1978	E-1-8
1st Indorsement from Walter Reed Army Medical Center, subject: same, 13 June 1978	E-1-10
1st Indorsement from US Army Health Services Command, subject: same, 14 June 1978	E-1-13
Letter from Defense Mapping Agency, Topographic Center, subject: same, 13 June 1978	E-1-19
Letter from Defense Mapping Agency, subject: same, 15 June 1978	E-1-23
Letter from Harry Diamond Laboratories, subject: same, 13 June 1978	E-1-35
1st Indorsement from US Army Electronics Research and Development Command, subject: same, 13 June 1978	E-1-48
1st Indorsement from US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, subject: same, 14 June 1978	E-1-49
Letter from US Army Intelligence and Security Command, subject: same, 14 June 1978	E-1-50
Letter from US Army Military District of Washington, subject: same, 13 June 1978	E-1-54

Correspondence to DAEN-FER--Continued	Page
Comment 2 from Comptroller, Army, Operation and Maintenance, subject: same, 13 June 1978	E-1-57
Comment 2 from Army Staff, Management Directorate, subject: same, 13 June 1978	E-1-58
Comment 2 from Army Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, subject: same, 13 June 1978	E-1-59

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY ENGINEER CENTER AND FORT BELVOIR
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060

ATZA-FE

13 JUN 1978

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D. C. Area

HQDA (DAEN-FER)
WASH DC 20314

1. Reference is made to your letter, DAEN-FER-P, 24 May 78, subject as above.

2. In accordance with paragraph 2. of referenced letter, Fort Belvoir comments on the proposed RPMA consolidation are given below.

a. General: From an early acceptance of the feasibility of RPMA consolidation in the NCR (not questioned), the study rapidly moves to a recommended plan of consolidation with major savings, primarily in manpower. This appears to be an oversimplification and adequate backup documentation in the report is lacking, making any detailed review of the study findings most difficult. Consideration of the time and effort required for travel and coordination of the consolidated elements appears inadequate. The recommended plan has split traditional DFAE missions between the command/staff engineer and the consolidated organization/station manager with little rationale. In other areas, overconsolidation appears to have taken place. And finally, AIF funding is proposed with incomplete justification provided.

b. Savings: The recommendation to consolidate is based almost entirely on recommended manpower savings. Throughout the study period these personnel savings have continued to decline. It is felt that most of these savings are not realizable. For example, the number of personnel allocated to the Staff Engineer at Fort Belvoir is insufficient. See Inclosure 1. Other installations can be expected to make the same claim. Some of the savings in personnel come from BASOPS areas other than RPMA. While this may be expected, considering workload reduction and hopeful efficiencies in overhead consolidation, it is felt that all these savings will not be realizable. The report recognizes the loss of efficiencies in these remaining BASOPS areas (reference paragraph 14.a., Section IV), however, no further discussion of this weakness is set forth. Consideration of the extensive travel time and coordination

required is not apparent. An additional real cost which has not been calculated is travel, including vehicle purchase, maintenance and operation. If the availability of AUV's at Fort Belvoir is typical of MDW, transportation of the consolidated overhead personnel will be a major problem. This situation is not expected to improve. See attached TRADOC DCSLOG Bulletin #74-4 (Incl 2).

c. Command and control: The recommendation splits normal DFAE missions and requires excessive interface between the staff engineer (command/control) and the station manager (execution/support). If it is determined that consolidation will be effected to include Fort Belvoir, then it should include the normal DFAE functions of Fire Protection, Housing Management, Master Planning and Real Property, and Environment. All these areas are closely interrelated in daily operations with the DFAE mission and are already under the DFAE throughout most of the Army. They should be under the same chain of command in this consolidation.

d. Overcentralization: In some areas overcentralization has been recommended. As an example, consolidation of entomology direct labor is not appropriate for Fort Belvoir. There is a current recognized requirement for 11 entomology personnel with daily requirements on post. Since much of the work is not subject to advanced scheduling, sending the workforce from some location off the installation would be inefficient from the standpoint of response time, manpower and transportation. One area requiring same day response to eliminate down time is spraying of vacant family housing quarters. Other unscheduled, quick response actions result from calls for control of suspected rabid animals, bee or wasp problems, and roach infestations. Contract inspection is another area that should be reviewed. As a minimum, inspectors should be stationed at Fort Belvoir even if they report to a central office.

e. AIF Funding: The advantages of AIF type funding over OMA are not clearly delineated. OMA funding with the use of ISSA's provides the same general advantages and is better understood by those using it. Experience at Fort Belvoir, where 30 tenant organizations/agencies operate in this manner, confirms the simplicity of this funding method.

f. Uniqueness of Fort Belvoir: Fort Belvoir is unique among the installations studied in several areas. It is the largest installation in the study. In several important aspects its operation exceeds that of the three combined MDW installations. An example of this is the output from engineering services, an element which is proposed to be consolidated (reference Figure C-1-4). The uniqueness of Fort Belvoir's need to constantly coordinate the RPMA support of 30 plus tenant activities must be carefully studied. This size and complexity of operations warrants special consideration. The current study does not address these factors in adequate detail or ignores them entirely.

ATZA-FE 13 JUN 1978

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D. C. Area

3. The following recommendations are made:

a. Prior to any final decision on implementation, personnel savings be recalculated using FY 79 projected authorizations with full investigation and detailed listing of realizable BASOPS reductions.

b. Fire Protection, Housing Management (less Housing assignment policy), Master Planning, Real Property and Environment be included in the consolidated missions.

c. Operations in such areas as entomology and contract inspection be reviewed and clarified in view of our stated concern of overconsolidation of mission and location.

d. OMA funding be used for the consolidation unless overriding advantages of AIF funding can be shown.

e. Fort Belvoir, because of its size and uniqueness, be excluded from the proposed consolidation of RPMA activities.

C. W. Guth

2 Incl
as

C. W. GUTH
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

FORT BELVOIR

STAFF ENGINEER PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

Staff Engr	1
Budget	5*
Master Plan	1
Real Prop	2
Space Management	1
Resources Mgmt/Operations Planning	3
Clerk Typist	1
RPMA Work inspection & acceptance	2
Utilities Consv. Officer	1
	17**

*Buying services from MDW AIF will double paperwork for each reimbursable customer.

**As compared to eight spaces recognized by the study group.

Incl 1

EXCERPT FROM TRADOC DCSLOG BULLETIN #78-4, DATED 25 APR 78

13. FISCAL YEAR 79 ADMINISTRATIVE USE VEHICLE (AUV) ACQUISITION. Informal coordination with TARCOM indicates that FY 79 AUV procurement will be severely reduced in certain vehicle types. Specifically, it is feared that the total US Army buy may be zero sedans, less than 50 pickups, less than 500 carryalls and approximately 300 panel trucks. TRADOC alone has requirements for 502 sedans, 556 pickups, 201 carryalls, and 139 panel trucks. If the TARCOM information holds true, it is obvious that TRADOC will receive far less than our requirements. Such a shortfall, in conjunction with the reduced procurement already experienced in FY 77 and 78, requires even more intensive management of AUV assets. The first step in this process begins with retaining overage but not over mileage vehicles until they attain the requisite mileage. When these vehicles become excess due to receipt of new procurement, they will be transferred within TRADOC to meet requirements elsewhere. TRADOC message, ATLG-TS-ATM, subject: Disposition of Overage/Over Mileage AUV, dated 031546 May 77, covers this situation and the procedures to be followed. Transportation Motor Pool Customers should be advised of the possible shortfall in the procurement of new vehicles during FY 79.

Incl 2

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651

ATEN-RM-IE

13 JUN 1978

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, DC Area

HQDA (DAEN-FER)
WASH DC 20314

1. Reference letter, DAEN-FER-P, HQDA, 24 May 1978, subject as above.

2. As requested by reference, comments on subject study report are submitted herewith.

3. While the report alludes to possible savings in overhead functions at Fort Belvoir, it does not address the full impact from a cost effective standpoint. Nor does the report address the adverse impact of consolidation on mission accomplishment. The study report starts with the premise of an early acceptance of the feasibility of the National Capital Region (NCR)-RPMA consolidation and then moves rapidly through a recommended plan of consolidation with major savings projected in manpower. This is an oversimplification, and adequate backup documentation is lacking in the report making a detail review of study findings most difficult.

4. Consideration of time and effort required for travel and coordination of constituted elements is inadequate. The study report recommends the split of traditional FE responsibilities between installation commander/staff engineer and the MDW consolidated organization/station manager with limited supporting rationale for doing this. After a thorough review of the study report, it is not feasible to include Fort Belvoir in the Washington RPMA consolidation.

5. Review of the installation description on page B-4 and other pertinent information in the draft report reveals that staffing and work load requirements of Fort Belvoir exceed that of MDW's current organization, which further substantiates the exemption of Fort Belvoir from the consolidation. In addition, the fragmentation of Engineer functions (i.e., Fire Protection and Family Housing not being included in the consolidation) will further degrade mission accomplishment and supervision of these important functions.

13 JUN 1978

ATEN-RM-IE

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, DC Area

6. The study report recommends using the Army Industrial Fund (AIF) as the appropriate method of funding the NCR-RPMA consolidation with inadequate justification for doing this. AIF funding is questionable. It is not compatible with the Army's present industrial funding philosophy; e.g., industrial funding is appropriate where an item is produced or replaced for a customer and all costs associated with that item are eventually passed on to the customer. RPMA does not involve an item; it is a service.

7. A question arises as to why a major Army installation, like Fort Meade, was not included in this study? Its proximity to the various installations in the NCR-RPMA Study is approximately the same as Fort Belvoir.

8. It is recommended that Fort Belvoir be exempted from this consolidation, and another look be taken at using the Army Industrial Fund as a method for funding NCR-RPMA.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CLAUDE L. ROBERTS, JR.
Colonel, CE
Engineer

HSWS-E (24 May 78) 1st Ind 13 JUN 1978
SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D.C. Area

DA, HQ, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C. 20012

TO: HQDA (DAEN-FER), Washington, D.C. 20314

1. In addition to a review of the proposed report on Army and DMATC RPMA Consolidated Report dated May 78, information furnished at the briefings at the Forrestal building on 6 Jun 78 and at Walter Reed Army Medical Center on 8 Jun 78 were considered.

2. The Study savings in personnel spaces is grossly overstated and additional costs, that will accrue have been either ignored or understated.

a. The WRAMC Staff Engineer Office would have to be staffed at a minimum of ten people (versus the five shown) to be able to perform the duties left at WRAMC. Other duties not enumerated would be engineering guidance and coordination of Family Housing and tenant organizations as for example, the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. These are unique organizations with truly unique facilities problems. It should be noted that WRAMC presently has four spaces totally involved in Master Planning alone. Neither this Command or any other Command can afford to underman this critical area of future development. Other commands will certainly find their recommended allocation for staff/engineering insufficient.

b. The utilization of the 1977 engineer manpower authorization of 333 spaces in the study creates some apprehension as to the quantity and quality of engineer support that will be realized for the new medical facility. WRAMC is presently expanding and occupying a medical facility that effectively doubles the occupied area of this installation. Recognized spaces have increased to 376 with probable future increases as necessary. The Hospital Support Division is manned for simple operations and minor maintenance only. The impact of not recognizing the close support necessary from other Facilities Engineers would be devastating.

c. The saving of BASOPS manpower spaces by removal of the DFAE from WRAMC assignment is extremely suspect. Rather than an economy of ten (10) manpower authorizations, as proposed in the study, it has been determined that only three positions can be identified as totally or primarily dedicated to facility engineer support. For example, in the CPO area, the Facilities Engineer support is spread across seven functional areas with supporting personnel assigned other activities as well as Facilities Engineer, yet, each supporting personnel specialist spends less than 50% in Facilities Engineer Support. The resultant is no CPO space savings. Analogies exist in P&C and Resources Management.

HSWS-E 13 JUN 1978

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D.C. Area

3. Since the actual relocation of personnel to specific installations was not part of the study, it is difficult to perceive how, or if, this additional cost was identified. In addition, although manpower adjustment was made for travel time, no costs were identified for additional vehicles needed as well as operating and maintenance costs of these vehicles.

4. The statement was repeatedly made that the consolidation of RPMA concept works. The San Antonio Consolidation was used as an example. A fast query developed the fact that the consolidation has not yet been implemented and that potential users are apprehensive of the quality and responsiveness of the services to be rendered. Based on the study, the net savings to WRAMC would be about $200,000; however, WRAMC calculates savings of only $60,000 assuming that the same RPMA services are provided at no additional cost. Further, it has developed that cost to the users will be significantly increased under the AIF concept (as much as 25% overhead charge).

5. The failure of the study to recognize the life and death implications in the WRAMC mission of tertiary medical care is frightening. Absolute assurance of prompt emergency engineering reaction under the direct control of the Commander, WRAMC, is a non-negotiable requirement. Implementation of the split Facilities Engineering responsibility as envisioned by the study will critically involve delays as jurisdictional disputes arise and will require negotiations between MDW and WRAMC.

6. Consolidation is usually undertaken to maximize economy while decentralization is used to maximize efficiency. If this action is taken based upon the incomplete study, it would appear that we lose both, i.e., give up efficiency for no demonstrable economy. The marginal estimated savings in personnel and dollars coupled with the decrease in responsiveness to the needs of the installation commander do not appear to warrant any further consideration of this proposal.

7. It is recommended that the review and decision on the project plan be held in abeyance until:

a. A realistic personnel savings can be identified based upon FY 79 projected spaces.

HSWS-E 13 JUN 1978

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D.C. Area

b. A complete costing of the proposed changes be made including relocation charges as well as equipment and transportation charges.

c. Data can be obtained and considered on cost and customer satisfaction for the San Antonio Consolidation.

George A. Baker

GEORGE A. BAKER, MD
Major General, MC
Commanding

HSLO-F (24 May 78) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in Washington, DC Area

DA, HQ, US Army Health Services Command, Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234 14 JUN 1978

TO: HQDA(DAEN-FER-P) WASH DC 20314

1. Non concur.

2. Headquarters, US Army Health Services Command supports the position taken by MG Baker, Walter Reed Army Medical Center Commanding General, in his 24 March 1978 letter concerning consolidation of RPMA at army installations in the Washington, DC, area (Incl 2). His position is that the most desirable RPMA configuration for WRAMC is the existing one and given a choice as to various arrangements, the status quo remains his first choice. The medical mission at WRAMC is one of medical research, medical education and tertiary medical care activities, and the mission demands great responsiveness from the installation DFAE. Any alternative other than the status quo reduces the Commander's control of DFAE personnel and a corresponding decrease in DFAE responsiveness.

3. Additional comments from review of the draft report follow:

a. Financial Management:

(1) Tenant Viewpoint: The US Army Engineer Studies Center (ESC) study does not include a financial trail to accommodate the consolidation, and therefore it will lead to inequities in resource distribution. The Industrial Funding concept provides for full cost reimbursement to the Servicing Activity by its customers. The current tenant/host relationships provide that the host furnishes BASOPS support to the tenant where both are funded by OMA except for certain mission unique requirements. Under the proposal of Industrial Funding, tenants on a post will be paying more for mission unique requirements as the servicing RPMA distributes their overhead costs per project order, etc. No provision has been made to accommodate these increased costs to a tenant as a result of this proposed reorganization. Example: HSC, BAMC and AHS must now pay a 25 percent overhead charge based on the design and construction estimate of medical unique projects undertaken by the San Antonio RPMA. This 25 percent overhead charge is being absorbed by these

tenants as no provisions were made to resolve this financial inequity during the reorganization planning. Tenants financed by different command channels, from the host installation, are thus financially penalized by the reorganization. Either the proposed "savings" are overstated or the host installation has gained in this reorganization by not having to provide the tenant with services the RPMA is now responsible for (or did not fully transfer all resources to savings or RPMA). As long as this financial inequity exists, tenants will resist such consolidations.

(2) Installation Viewpoint: The ESC study does not include a financial trail to accommodate the consolidation, and therefore it could lead to inequities in resource distribution. A cost analysis should be performed as to what WRAMC is paying now for real property maintenance and what it would cost under the reorganized Industrial Funding rules and regulations. Is a flat overhead rate by the RPMA appropriate or would it cost WRAMC more or less funds. A flat overhead rate may or may not be an appropriate method of cost distribution. The dollar impact (+ or -) must be assessed in order to prepare command responses or command budgets. This same cost analysis would have to be made at Fitzsimons Army Medical Center and Fort Detrick in the future if they become involved in RPMA study.

(3) The basic theoretical premise of the study is that savings will occur when similar functions are organizationally centralized. In organizational concepts, centralization is to maximize economy while decentralization maximizes efficiency, and there is a trade-off when changing from one organizational structure to another or gradations between the two extremes. A key point in the management-decision process is to determine which functions operate best under centralization, decentralizaton or gradations in between. There is a cost involved in sacrificing effectiveness to economy which is rarely quantified and considered a trade-off in consolidation studies.


b. The study did not address how projects from one installation will be prioritized against another installation's projects. This might affect the responsiveness to WRAMC medical mission.

c. The study did not address which MACOM will validate BMAR and have responsibility for fund control in reducing BMAR projects.

AD-A056 619 ARMY ENGINEER STUDIES CENTER WASHINGTON DC F/G 5/1
ARMY AND DMATC RPMA CONSOLIDATION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGIO--ETC(U)
JUN 78 G E COOPER, B DUNN, J R KIRKPATRICK

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HSLO-F (24 May 78) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in Washington, DC Area

d. The study did not address the Integrated Facilities System.

e. The study did not mention where the actual location of the "centralized management office" would be.

f. The removal of personnel and functions (but not the responsibility) from the direct control of the Facilities Engineer will eventually lead to a downgrading of the position for the Military Director and his Civilian Deputy. Lower graded personnel generally means less qualified and experienced staff representation and an inability to deal effectively with higher graded staff counterparts.

g. The study proposes 12 personnel (one supervisor and 11 others) to accomplish the procurement function for the NCR-RPMA consolidation. This number is considered completely inadequate to provide quality support to all customers on a timely basis. It would be necessary to staff a complete Procurement Office with attendant record keeping, reports and functions required of such an office. An understaffed office will degrade the responsiveness essential to effective hospital administration.

h. The study provides that Family Housing and Fire Protection remain the responsibility of each installation. Therefore, WRAMC must retain expertise in the procurement of repair, maintenance and alteration of Family Housing, including BOQ. This involves some of the same personnel who accomplish procurement of similar services for the DFAE, since no distinction is made procurement-wise between the two customers.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. W. Ransone

J. W. RANSONE
Colonel, MC
Acting Chief of Staff

1 Incl
wd Incl 1
Added 1 incl
2. as

CF: wo/incl
Cdr, WRAMC, ATTN: HSWS-E

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF:
DAEN-FER-P

S-13 Jun 78

24 May 1978

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D. C. Area

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. This letter transmits the draft report "Army and DMATC RPMA Consolidation in the National Capital Region" to you for comments.

2. Request your comments be forwarded to DAEN-FER NLT 13 June 1978.

3. You are invited to a briefing on the subject by personnel from the Army Engineer Studies Center to be held at 1000 on 6 June 1978, Rm 6-A-092, Forrestal Building, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D. C.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS:

Edward T. Watling

1 Incl
as

EDWARD T. WATLING
Chief, Resources Management Division
Directorate of Facilities Engineering

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CDR DMATC, ATTN: Facilities Engineering
CDR HQERADCOM, ATTN: DRDEL-CS
CDR Vint Hill Farms, ATTN: IAV-FE

31.5.4

-E

24 MAR 1978

OJECT: Review of RPMA Consolidation Alternatives

Engineer Study Center
6500 Brooks Lane
WASH DC 20315

1. References:

a. Study "Purpose of IPR" Engineer Study Center (ESC), undated.

b. Wiring diagrams, ESC, undated.

c. Questionnaire, ESC, undated.

2. In accordance with the oral request of the ESC Study Group on the Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) during the meeting of 16 March 1978 at the Forrestal Building, the following information is furnished.

3. Although realizing that cost effective use of resources in the Washington, D.C. region is a valid concept, there is insufficient information available to me to make a viable study. Therefore, this letter will basically address the impact of the alternatives on Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC).

4. The Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) is, primarily, an installation which is devoted to medical research, medical education, and tertiary medical care activities. Consequently, RPMA services for WRAMC must be extremely well planned, managed, and executed. It is particularly important that these services be rendered with great responsiveness, often to correct life/health-threatening situations (involving large patient and experimental animal populations) or to remedy conditions which jeopardize on-going teaching and research programs. A considerable portion of the RPMA workload consists of highly specialized maintenance, construction, modification and alteration services, the timely provision of which is critical to WRAMC's mission effectiveness. Therefore, to assure provision of highest quality RPMA services in a timely manner, it is imperative that the WRAMC Commander retain control over the manpower, equipment and dollar resources required for RPMA planning, management, engineering, and execution.

5. The desired alternative for WRAMC is #1. Status Quo Alternative #2 is the next best and #3 is our third choice. Alternatives #4, #5, #6 and #7 are absolutely unacceptable to WRAMC.

Encl 2

29.3.4

HSC INFO COPY

SUBJECT: Review of RPMA Consolidaton Alternatives 24 MAR 72

The reasons for placing #1, #2 and #3 in the decending order of preference is due to the degree of dilution of our mission of supporting the medical center. The Facilities Engineering operations focus on the primary mission of WRAMC, which is patient care. Over the years, the engineering operations and organization have been thoroughly studied and tailored to carry out this mission. Foremost in the minds of the engineers is providing the necessary, and often critical, environment for medical care, teaching and research. Support to the Harry Diamond Laboratories and to the Defense Mapping Agency Topographic Center would have to be viewed as secondary in importance. This could result in customer dissatisfaction.

7. Alternatives #4, #5, #6 and #7 are unfeasible at this installation. Main objection is that the WRAMC Commander would not have immediate control and response of the engineers. The very nature of the mission of WRAMC requires immediate reaction to the needs of patient care, medical research and health care education.

8. Because of widespread installations and traffic problems, area or regional shops appear to be inefficient. Travel time would significantly decrease the amount of work hours available to these shops and could decrease their effort by 25%. WRAMC is a medical facility with the lives of service members and their dependents at stake. WRAMC must furnish the best facilities and care available to these patients. The medical staff must have immediate engineer response capability in actual maintenance and facilities planning. There is already a built in delay for design and approvals for minor construction of over $75,000. It is my contention that the delay would be increased for all projects and would be extended to minor construction under $75,000. Further, it is WRAMC's contention that as a Medical Major Command it would not be a proper function to command a Regional Facilities Engineer Organization. Conversely, because of the life and death implications of our mission, WRAMC is unwilling to be satellited on another Regional Installation or Command with the resulting layers of bureaucracy. As the number of alternatives become higher they become more objectionable since as the shops become more and more centralized, the Commander's control of the DFAE personnel is progressively reduced. There can be no doubt that in that type of organization the necessary sense of urgency, often instilled by the operating Commander, is lost. There are presently 12 major construction projects of $54,000,000 planned at WRAMC during the next five years. Based on experience obtained from construction of the New Medical Treatment Facility, there can be no doubt in my mind that a professional engineering inspection capability must be immediately available and responsible to the Commander if quality facilities are to be received. As previously stated, I desire that the present arrangement be maintained.

GEORGE I. BAKER, MD
Major General, MC
Commanding

DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY
TOPOGRAPHIC CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:
DMATC-FEO(28000)

13 JUN 1978

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D. C. Area

TO: Chief of Engineers
Department of the Army
ATTN: DAEN-FER
Washington, D. C. 20305

1. Reference DAEN-FER-P letter, 24 May 1978, subject as above.

2. As the draft study was developed, this Headquarters believes that certain information about the Defense Mapping Agency Topographic Center (DMATC) was not considered or properly interpreted. As you are aware, DMATC is a unique organization, and except within this Agency, there is no comparable organization within the Department of Defense. This uniqueness is reflected in the requirements for facility engineering support and the interface between the facility engineer and the other elements of the Center. DMATC agrees with the stated contention, "The first concern in constructing a cost effective recommendation was to preserve performance (effectiveness) at reduced cost." Our concerns along these lines relative to draft report "Army and DMATC RPMA Consolidation in the National Capital Region" are serious and pervasive.

3. The prime area of concern is the requirement for special billets to permit engineering personnel access to highly classified operational facilities. Because of stringent security requirements, most of the DMATC facilities have controlled access throughout, with considerable space requiring special security clearances. The competition for the limited number of special compartment billets is such that the probability of a consolidated engineering center obtaining more billets than now exist within the DMATC facility engineer is very poor. One of the purported advantages of a consolidated facility engineer organization is the ability to fully utilize engineers in the various disciplines and an improved inspection of contracts by specialization of inspectors. Currently, the same small staff of engineers and engineer technicians does the programming, designing and inspection at DMATC. DMA does not believe that additional special access billets would be available to permit specialization. Hence, a small cadre of engineers would, by necessity, have to do the same functions now accomplished without either manpower savings or increased use of specialized staff. Will the construction inspection staff be increased with inspectors with SAA clearance and inspectors with the required intimate knowledge of the various buildings which if not present will reflect on response time and effectiveness? In the

151,000 square feet of SAA space, 70,000 square feet has been modified with special environmental controls.

4. The total number of persons, 132, proposed to be assigned to DMATC in the consolidated RPMA organization would probably prove to be totally inadequate. In the present DMATC organization, the Facilities Engineering Office (FEO) is authorized 137 employees (128 FTP and 9 TPT). In addition, however, it is quite normal for FEO to have employed 20 or more temporary employees on over-strength authorization, made possible by the recruiting lag in obtaining technical personnel for the production elements of the Center. In addition, FEO typically employs 20 to 25 stay-in-school (SIS) students for 16 hours each week during the winter months and an equal number of summer student aids full time during the summer months. Most of the stay-in-school students or summer aids are utilized in custodial and grounds-keeping functions. Unless we can be given some assurance that the new consolidated RPMA organization will be equally generous in providing over-strength authorizations and part time or full time student assistant help, the proposed complement of 132 simply will not be able to accomplish the required facilities maintenance work.

5. We are unable to determine how the determination that 3 full time people in the Personnel Office could be eliminated if 132 employees (FEO) were detached and became a part of the consolidated RPMA organization. The proposed ratio of Personnel Office employees to total personnel served in the HTC Center is approximately 1 to 72. Based on this ratio, 132 employees engaged in facilities maintenance work would require less than two full man years of support from the Personnel Office.

6. The technical support function has been erroneously put under Buildings & Grounds Division in the installation activities chart of alternative 5, figure C-2-11. Its proper position should be under the Utilities Division.

7. Under this proposed consolidation, how could support be provided for the exhibit unit for this Agency which is not an RPMA function?

8. The most important defect in the study is the lack of logic or rationale concerning the projected savings. For example:

a. There is no superior aspect of the proposed organization that will provide savings compared to present operations. The savings claimed seem to be derived from adjustments to work staffing standards and reductions in the support staff (personnel, comptroller, etc., workload supporting facilities engineering). The rationale supporting the claimed savings is not fully addressed in the study; it appears that

the savings are not the product of consolidation, but rather, an outgrowth of an assumption that less support will be required through consolidation.

b. It appears that more analysis is required before any determination as to cost effectiveness can be made.

c. Savings claimed in the Comptroller's Office may not exist due to the continued need for interface with the industrial fund, major-equipment procurement, and installation resource allocation.

d. There seems to be an assumption that current levels of support to facilities engineering will not be required under consolidation. For example, those DMATC resources applied to personnel servicing of facilities engineering are claimed as a saving. Yet, the same personnel servicing functions would still be required in the consolidated organization. Consequently, the same level of resources would have to be allocated to these functions. The point is that there would be a reallocation of support resources from DMATC to the consolidated organization, but not necessarily an overall reduction in those resources.

e. The consolidation may bring some savings in the areas of procurement and supply. However, as the study states, there are standards applicable in these areas; and to expect dramatic improvements over the standards is not realistic. Most of the current organizations have sufficient volume of minor equipment, supplies, and materials to maintain reasonable efficiency. Current systems at DMATC such as use of the Air Force Stock Fund and maximum utilization of government supply sources do not leave substantial room for improvement.

f. Each of the Components considered in the consolidation has unique requirements such as specialized hospital equipment and environment at Walter Reed Army Hospital and specialized mapping equipment, environment, and security at DMATC. This diversity of requirements may substantially diminish savings and hamper services in the elements being supported.

9. It is recommended that the study be redone, utilizing hard data on all elements, addressing the claimed savings in detail and specifically identifying all assumptions that lead to these savings, and analyzing the consolidated organizations' ability to maintain the present level

18 JUN 1978

DMATC-FEO(28000)
SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D. C. Area

of services to the unique and vital installations involved. It should be pointed out that a more complete analysis may require some expansion in the set of feasible alternatives.

John R. Lund

JOHN R. LUND
Colonel, USA
Director

DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY
BUILDING 56, U.S. NAVAL OBSERVATORY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20305

15 JUN 1978

FE

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D.C. Area

TO: Chief of Engineers
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20314

1. References are listed in Enclosure 1.

2. This letter is in response to reference f.

3. By reference a. and reiterated in references b. and c., this Agency advised the Engineer Studies Center (ESC) of some major concerns on the feasibility of the DMA Topographic Center RPMA function being included in a consolidated RPMA activity. At a meeting with ESC (reference d.) we were assured that our concerns would be addressed in the study. Unfortunately, neither the draft study nor the briefing on the study (reference g.) addressed any of our concerns. The tenor of the study was expressed at the briefing to this Agency when the briefer stated that the feasibility of the consolidation required no study so, therefore, ESC went well beyond the basic guidance.

4. As we pointed out earlier in the letters to ESC, reviews of the impact on security, laborer work force, engineer scheduling and programming and visibility of the work force must be addressed. The fact that studies have been completed elsewhere does not by definition make it applicable to the National Capital Region (NCR).

5. The study group used work standards to develop the manning for all elements except the shops. Because of the small size of several of the installations, we believe this approach is very dangerous. There is a strong tendency in a small close-knit organization to get the job done and for expediency charge many things to service orders rather than individual work orders, thus making much of the historical data suspect. The study reflects a savings of 94 FE spaces out of 323 nonshop spaces or nearly a 30 percent savings. Other than referencing a standard there is no rationale on how these savings can be realized. If the historical data are suspect, as we believe these are, then the results of applying the standards are also suspect. DMA has recognized that we have a shortage in both the shop and nonshop work force and cannot believe that other stations are enough overstrength that 94 spaces can be saved.

6. Within the support area, we believe there are some gross errors. The proposal to establish a second acquisition office within MDW is completely out of phase with the study. How is it possible to justify big savings by consolidating RPMA functions and also big savings (from 30.5 man-years to 12 man-years) by further fragmenting the acquisition function by adding a new acquisition element to the NCR. The assumption that there would be tremendous reductions in procurement actions also goes in the face of current programs to support small business. The assumption that incoming supplies will be in large quantities is probably sound, however, consolidation will not reduce the total number of work orders. The supplies used on each work order will still require accountability. It should also be noted that the Facilities Engineer may receive the supplies in his warehouse but the requisitions are handled through base supply. There is, therefore, a workload impact within the supporting supply activity. This Agency also questions the assumption that all facilities are subsets of Fort Belvoir. For example, the DMATC photo labs and production space are not similar to any space elsewhere within the NCR.

7. We also believe that the Study Group misinterpreted the data supplied in support of the Work Coordinating Division at DMATC. This division currently has a staff of six. In the proposed consolidation this staff is reduced to two with backup from the Consolidated RPMA Headquarters. However, that Headquarters only has thirteen in this total area and only three in the estimating section. We are encountering considerable difficulty in doing the work with six and in fact, we augmented this force with personnel from our Component in St. Louis during the early work on the DMA consolidation of production functions. In addition, we have extended from 16 to 24 hours the time limitation on service orders due to our inability to keep up with estimates of individual orders. To do the job with less than a staff of six is, we believe, impossible.

8. All manpower numbers used for DMATC are incorrect. The total Full Time Permanent (FTP) billets assigned to the DMATC Facilities Engineer is 127, not 157, as shown in the study. In addition, the study does not recognize the many overtime hours used within the function, the Temporary Part Time (TPT) employees, the temporary overstrengths, the 20 to 25 Stay-in-School(SIS) students for 16 hours, each week, during the winter months or an equal number of summer aids that are employed full time, during the summer months.

9. For a consolidation of this magnitude and complexity, we feel that a more comprehensive cost/benefit analysis should be included. The analysis should clearly indicate underlying assumptions, investment and recurring costs and be presented so that the cost saving, between the present and proposed operations, can be clearly seen and tracked. In this respect, we recommend using the guidelines provided

in DoD Instruction 7041.3, "Economic Analysis and Program Evaluation for Resource Management," in providing an acceptable and recognizable cost/benefit analysis.

10. The allocation of one authorization to the EEO function appears to be unrealistic. There will be a large percentage of minorities, at the lower end of the pay scale, represented in the proposed work force. Historically, a major portion of our EEO workload has been devoted to this group. Based on our experience, we feel that a minimum of three spaces would be required to effectively carry out this function.

11. We recognize the desire to provide the study to OASD(MRA&L), at an early date. However, the proposal to forward the study with only comments from users on the draft is incomplete staff work and denies us an opportunity to comment on the final study. This approach would require OASD(MRA&L) to review the draft, the final study and the comments provided to the draft, to determine what comments were accepted or rejected. The Final Study should be coordinated prior to release to OASD(MRA&L).

12. In summary, DMA does not concur in the conclusion that consolidation is feasible. The accomplishment of the study in such a short time period is admirable, but reducing the study time so that it preempts adequate analysis and staffing is unacceptable. This Agency believes that the draft study is incomplete, inaccurate and should not be used as a basis for making a decision on consolidating the RPMA functions in the National Capital Region.

R. M. COLLINS
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director

5 Enclosures
1. List of References
2. Reference a.
3. Reference b.
4. Reference c.
5. Reference e.

cc:
DASD(I&H)

REFERENCES

a. Defense Mapping Agency letter, subject: "Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) of Army Installations in the Washington DC Area", dated 27 February 1978. (Enclosure 2).

b. Defense Mapping Agency letter, subject: "Review of RPMA Consolidation", dated 24 March 1978. (Enclosure 3).

c. Engineer Studies Center (ESC) letter, subject: "Review of RPMA Consolidation", dated 3 April 1978. (Enclosure 4).

d. Meeting with Director ESC and members of the study team, with Chief of Staff, Defense Mapping Agency and members of DMA Staff, on 3 April 1978.

e. Defense Mapping Agency letter, subject: "Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) of Army Installations in Washington DC Area", dated 13 April 1978. (Enclosure 5).

f. Your letter, subject: "Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA)of Army Installations in the Washington DC Area", dated 24 May 1978.

g. Briefing on draft consolidation report presented to members of the DMA Staff by the Engineer Studies Center (ESC) on 2 June 1978.

27 February 1978

RETYPED/DP-56/27 Feb 78/hmw
FE Mr. Allen.DP-56/22 Feb 78/dha

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D. C. area

TO: Chief of Engineers
Department of the Army
ATTN: Engineer Studies Group
Washington, D. C. 20305

1. As the subject study is developed, this Headquarters believes that certain information about the Defense Mapping Agency Topographic Center (DMATC) should be considered. As you are aware, DMATC is a unique organization, and except within this Agency, there is no comparable organization within the Department of Defense. This uniqueness is reflected in the requirements for facility engineering support and the interface between the facility engineer and the other elements of the Center.

2. The prime area of concern is the requirement for special billets to permit engineering personnel access to highly classified operational facilities. Because of stringent security requirements, most of the DMATC facilities have controlled access throughout, with considerable space requiring special security clearances. The competition for the limited number of special compartment billets is such that the probability of a consolidated engineering center obtaining more billets than now exist within the DMATC facility engineer is very poor. One of the purported advantages of a consolidated facility engineer organization is the ability to fully utilize engineers in the various disciplines and an improved inspection of contracts by specialization of inspectors. Currently, the same small staff of engineers and engineer technicians does the programming, designing and inspection at DMATC. DMA does not believe that additional special access billets would be available to permit specialization. Hence, a small cadre of engineers would, by necessity, have to do the same functions now accomplished without either manpower savings or increased use of specialized staff. Since the one supervisor in the Engineering Division, the division responsible for planning, designing and inspection, is truly a working supervisor, there are no savings identifiable in the management area which could be realized from consolidation.

3. Another area of concern to DMA is the interface between the production equipment maintenance work force and the facility engineer. There is very limited manning in both of these functional areas. Therefore, there have been many occasions where the actual work accomplished has crossed functional lines. If these craftsmen are working for different organizations, the

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functional lines will have to be clearly drawn. Since the dividing line is not clear, any attempt to truly define it will undoubtedly have an impact on working relationships. In this same functional area, the facilities engineer provides the production equipment maintenance with considerable machine shop support. If the facility engineer reports to a different organization, the loyalty to DMATC will undoubtedly drop as will the willingness to provide support. This is just one of the intangible losses envisioned from consolidation.

4. Still another uniqueness of organization at DMATC is the fact that the common laborer pool is in facilities. Much of their effort is in support of logistics and the production elements. We believe it is logical to place this labor force in facilities, as these are the employees who cut grass or shovel snow. As a separate organization, this interface would be difficult, if not impossible. A reorganization of this labor force dividing it between the facilities engineer and DMATC would be essential, and I believe there would be a substantial loss in effectiveness.

5. It should be noted that DMATC is operating under the Air Force supply system and will be under the Air Force automated procurement system on 1 May. If the facility engineer is operating under the Army system and the remainder of the installation operating under the Air Force system, there are bound to be problems where the facilities engineer and production equipment maintenance interface.

6. The Defense Mapping Agency also operates under a unique cost accounting system that is focused on the mission of DMA and responding to requirements of DoD. Although the facilities engineer could certainly operate on a different system from the rest of the installation, undoubtedly, some of the information that should be analyzed in total could be analyzed only in pieces under two different cost account systems.

7. DMA is also concerned over responsiveness of a consolidated facility engineer. The major portion of the new DMA production equipment comes from R&D programs. Often the actual requirements in power or air conditioning are not known until shortly before the actual equipment arrival date. From an engineering standpoint, this is a tremendous problem and often has an impact on the maintenance and repair program. If the facility engineer is working for a different organization, the loss of being part of the DMATC team could have a real impact on the responsiveness.

8. In summary, the Defense Mapping Agency envisions far more problems than benefits if the Defense Mapping Agency Topographic Center facility engineering support comes from a consolidated center. We therefore urge that DMATC not be included in any consolidation of the facility engineer.

R. M. COLLINS
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director

24 MAR 1978

FE

Mr. Allen/Mr. Hertel/DP-56/23 March 1978/hmw
SUBJECT: Review of RPMA Consolidation

TO: Commander and Director
Engineer Studies Center
6500 Brookes Lane
Washington, D. C. 20315

1. This Agency finds it impossible to provide a constructive review of the comparison of the seven options proposed by the Engineer Studies Center (ESC). Basic items missing from the ESC study include costs and benefits (dollars and manpower) associated with each alternative, including advantages and disadvantages as viewed by the Study Group and their recommendations.

2. In addition, as I advised you in my letter of 27 February, this Agency has some very serious concerns about the ability of a centralized facility engineer function being able to meet our requirements due to problems in security clearances, interface with elements of the Topographic Center and responsiveness to the constant change in mission equipment. I am sure that similar concerns have been expressed by the Walter Reed Army Medical Center and Arlington Hall Station. Without direct knowledge of their problems and the impacts of consolidation on the various missions, it is impossible to recommend the most desirable option.

3. Responses to the eight questions provided at your 16 March meeting cannot be answered without the data described in paragraph 1. It is impossible even to determine if the status quo is the best option.

SIGNED

R. M. COLLINS
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director

ESC 3 April 1978

SUBJECT: Review of RPMA Consolidation

Deputy Director
Defense Mapping Agency
ATTN: FE
Washington, DC 20305

1. References:

a. Letter, Deputy Director, DMA, 27 Feb 78; subject: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, DC Area.

b. Letter, Deputy Director, DMA, 24 Mar 78; subject: Review of RPMA Consolidation.

c. ASD(I&L) memorandum, 4 Apr 77; subject: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Military Installations in the Washington, D.C. Area (Inclosure 1).

2. The comments in reference 1a and 1b regarding the special RPMA requirements at DMAHC are most appreciated. They represent exactly the type of input we need to conduct a thorough and objective study. There does appear, however, to be a misunderstanding regarding our request for a review of RPMA consolidation alternatives. Perhaps a brief description of the background leading to our request will help.

3. A continuing objective of Department of Defense (DOD) policy and guidance is that real property maintenance activities at military installations in a given geographic area will be consolidated where it is cost effective and does not result in mission impairment. In consonance with this objective, OASD(I&L) directed the Army, Navy, and Air Force (reference 1c) to study RPMA consolidation in the National Capital Region (NCR). The Army was directed to study consolidation for seven installations, one of which was the Defense Mapping Agency Topographic Center. Since the initial directive, two more installations (Harry Diamond Laboratories and Vint Hill Farms Station) have been added to the list of candidates for consolidation.

ESC 3 April 1978
SUBJECT: Review of RPMA Consolidation

4. Subsequent to the OASD(I&L) directive, the Office, Chief of Engineers (OCE) was directed to conduct the Army's consolidation study. OCE, in turn, tasked the Engineer Studies Center (ESC) to perform it. In an effort to follow the spirit of the OASD(I&L) directive and DOD guidelines for consolidation studies, OCE and ESC have attempted to accomplish an interactive study involving all potentially affected installations and their parent organizations. Only through such cooperation will the Army be able to fulfill OASD(I&L) expectations for a thorough and objective study. It was intended that the participation of the principals could be achieved through their designated POCs.

5. Since the consolidation study was initiated, ESC has met on three occasions with all POCs to review the study schedule and progress, and request their participation in specific tasks as part-time study group members. The ESC study team members have also met many times with installation POCs singularly to collect the great amount of installation data required.

6. An important part of our study process is the selection of alternative consolidation schemes that can be analyzed in detail. This was shown in our initial study schedule (Inclosure 2). It is essential that each alternative reflect the special requirements of each installation. For example, WRAMC requires a hospital support unit. The strawman alternatives were offered for early POC review in an attempt to utilize the intimate knowledge that each POC has of his installation. A detailed in-depth review of all costs and benefits was not expected. Chiefly, we just wanted to be sure that mission related or other important features were not overlooked. In addition, we wanted to get an overall perspective of the feasibility of the different concepts inherent in the various alternatives. This prompted our request for a relative rating of each alternative. For example, those alternatives with area shops may or may not be feasible as regards DMATC.

7. I hope the above clarifies any misunderstanding that our request for a review of the alternatives may have generated. Hopefully, through the continued close cooperation of all interested parties we will be able to meet OASD(I&L) expectations of a study product.

2 Incl
as

WALTER C. BELL
Colonel, Corps of Engineers
Commander/Director
Engineer Studies Center

17 April 1978

FE

Mr. Allen/DP-56/13 April 1978/hmw

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D.C. Area

TO: Commander and Director
Engineer Studies Center
6500 Brookes Lane
Washington, D. C. 20315

1. References:

a. HQ DMA(FE) letter, subject as above, dated 27 February 1978.

b. HQ DMA(FE) letter, Review of RPMA Consolidation, dated 24 March 1978.

c. ESC letter, Review of RPMA Consolidation, dated 3 April 1978,

2. As indicated by references 1.a. and 1.b., this Agency has some real concerns as to the practicability of Consolidating the Topographic Center's Real Property Maintenance Activity with other activities in the Washington area. In reviewing the six alternatives, the following comments are provided:

a. As indicated in reference 1.a., the consolidation of engineering and inspection would, we believe, create some real problems with respect to security billets. The competition for special security billets is such that additional billets are probably not available, and without additional billets, we do not believe the consolidated functions could perform satisfactorily. Although we do provide access for uncleared contractors to accomplish construction, this is normally on non-duty hours and by special arrangement. This type arrangement for engineers doing design is not practical as we depend on them not only to accomplish the design, but also to identify the space that is necessary for the construction. In addition, we use the inspectors as "watchers" for uncleared workers. The double duty for the inspectors saves placing additional people on overtime. If the inspectors were more nearly aligned by disciplines and crafts, added security billets would be needed. As for engineers, these are not available. The problems with special security billets would apply to all alternatives, except status quo.

b. The removal of the shops from the control of the installation also creates problems. Because of the small size of the installation, the shops are used by both the facilities work force and the equipment maintenance work force. Cross use of these shops under alternatives 2 and 5

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would be cumbersome at best. The moving of the shops as proposed in alternatives 3,4,6 and 7 would create the requirement to enlarge the equipment maintenance shops at the Topographic Center; thus, negating any savings from consolidation.

c. The Topographic Center has a single laborer pool under control of the Facilities Engineer. This labor force does such non-RPMA functions as move furniture and equipment. Under current procedures, the entire force might be moving furniture one day and cutting grass another. If this labor force was split with part working for facilities, and part under control of the Topographic Center, flexibility of work assignments would be lost and full utilization would be difficult. Additionally, with a divided work force, tasks such as moving offices would take excessive time. This division of the labor work force would be necessary under all alternatives, except status quo.

d. From an engineer scheduling and programming standpoint, DMATC offers a unique challenge to the Facility Engineer. Because much of the production equipment comes from the R&D Program, actual requirements for power and air conditioning are often not known until shortly before actual equipment arrival date. The late receipt of this critical design data has a tendency to disrupt all schedules in design and construction. Although major gains in coordination of requirements have been made in recent years, further improvement will be limited. We believe that it is not reasonable to expect the same responsiveness from a consolidated engineer as we now receive. This drop in responsiveness would be for two major reasons. First, the Facility Engineer would be reluctant to change schedules if the change impacted on other customers, and second, not being part of DMA would tend to change the outlook of individuals from being part of the overall production to just having a job to do. The impact on scheduling and programming applies to all alternatives, except status quo.

e. In a highly technical and industrial organization such as DMA, it is difficult to maintain visability for those not directly involved in the mission of the organization. We believe that we are doing an outstanding job of making all personnel aware of the importance of the support function. Although the consolidation of RPMA functions would not reduce the importance, the fact that the employees would now be Army employees, rather than employees of a Defense Agency, would tend to reduce the coverage they would receive within the Agency public information system. Additionally, since these employees would be attached to a location away from their "front office," the normal reaction is to feel you are not part of that organization either. Although it is certainly difficult to measure this impact, we believe it to be a very real influence on productivity in all alternatives, except status quo.

f. In reviewing the impact on DMA of operating under an ISSA or with industrial funding, we see no significant difference. In either case,

we would be dependent upon an outside agency for support, and, in effect, be a customer of the host facility engineer.

3. In summary, the Defense Mapping Agency does not believe that the consolidation of the Facility Engineer function of the Topographic Center under an Army installation is advantageous to either this Agency, or the Department of Defense. We urge that as this study is developed, the option of excluding the Topographic Center be identified and included in the final study.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

ROBERT S. ALLEN
Director
Facilities Engineering Office

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HARRY DIAMOND LABORATORIES
2800 POWDER MILL ROAD
ADELPHI, MD. 20783

19 JUN 1978

DELHD-FA

SUBJECT: ARMY and DMATC RPMA Consolidation in the National Capital Region

THRU: Commanding General
Electronics Research and
Development Command (ERADCOM)
DRDEL-CG
2800 Powder Mill Road
Adelphi, Maryland 20783

THRU: Commanding General
US Army Materiel Development and
Readiness Command (DARCOM)
DRCLDC/DRCIS-EF
5001 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22333

TO: US Army Corps of Engineers
Facilities Engineering Directorate
DAEN-FER-P, Room 1G067, Forrestal Bldg.
Washington, DC 20314

1. This Command non-concurs with the recommendation in the draft report of the Consolidation Study. It is recommended that Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL) be excepted from consolidation, for the following key reasons:

a. The HDL Facilities Engineering Office is responsible for the design, construction, installation, alteration, maintenance, and repair of special-purpose, one-of-a-kind equipment systems and facilities in direct support of the Installation's technical mission. This is not a normal Post-Engineer function. No guidelines other than those we have developed are available for this work.

b. The HDL Facilities Engineering Office is prepared to give immediate response to all research and development laboratory requests for support, enabling researchers to meet their deadlines and avoid mission delays. These requests for support are diverse, and often unique.

DELHD-FA
SUBJECT: ARMY and DMATC RPMA Consolidation in the National Capital Region

c. We consider it highly important that our personnel have an intimate and detailed understanding of the composition and conditions of the existing plant and that they have a similarly intimate and detailed knowledge of the conditions and features required for the activity's mission effort.

d. The draft study does not specifically address itself to our satellite installations.

e. Were the consolidation plan to be implemented as proposed, the HDL Commander would have little or no control over the manpower available to accomplish his mission. A manpower cut within the NCR-RPMA group would adversely affect HDL projects, and therefore its mission completion.

2. I believe that it is essential for the Facilities Engineering Office to be retained intact. Otherwise, mission effectiveness will suffer. I feel strongly that the response of the Facilities Engineering Office to urgent requests for project-oriented requirements cannot be subject to the reaction of another command. This is due in a large part to the time sensitivity of these requirements.

3. We wish to remain exempt from any consolidation effort that would be detrimental to HDL's mission.

4. The Installation Commander's "Staff Engineering Group" has, in my opinion, been underestimated as to the amount of personnel and duties required to support me here at HDL. The reasons are noted in the inclosure. This is an area I can closely evaluate. Consequently, if the Study is in error for the Staff Engineering Group, similar error may have been made in other areas: i.e. (Station Manager Group and NCR-RPMA Organization). If so, it will not provide the results or the intent of this consolidation and could be even more detrimental to HDL's ability to accomplish its assigned mission. I am also of the opinion, that due to the serious manpower constraints the Army is currently under, that any underestimation of manpower requirements made at this time we will be forced to live with for years.

1 Incl.

CLIFTON R. GOODWIN
COL, ADA
Acting Commander

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INTRODUCTION

It should be pointed out that the consolidation study considered only the Headquarters Site at Adelphi. It did not consider the other four sites that constitute HDL, except a small notation on Woodbridge.

HDL consists of

1. The Adelphi Headquarters - 18 buildings on 137 acres of land,
2. Blossom Point, MD, Test Area - 64 small buildings on approximately 1,600 acres of land,
3. Woodbridge, VA, Research FRcility - 13 buildings on 579 acres,
4. Gaithersburg, MD, Research Facility - 13 buildings on 21 acres,
5. Diamond Ordnance Radiation Facility, Forest Glen, MD - 2 buildings, and a building classified as equipment (housing our nuclear reactor), on 1.29 acres. We are in the process of closing this facility.

The workload at those installations must be identified separately because of the excessive travel time involved and the work impact on each of the projected three proposed groups i e (1) NCR-RPMA Directors Staff (2) Installation Commander Staff Engineer and (3) The station manager staff and workers.

The mission of HDL is research, development, engineering, and testing in weapon systems and physical sciences. HDL serves as the Army's Lead Laboratory for fluidics and nuclear weapons effects research and testing.

REASONS WHY PRESENT ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED

We believe that it is important for the present HDL Facilities Engineering Office to continue to function intact primarily because the tasks that need to be done at HDL require the kind of experienced and knowledgeable staff that we now have. Some of the tasks requiring this sort of experience include

1. furthering the HDL mission,
2. continuing the relocation of HDL headquarters,
3. incorporating ERADCOM into HDL space.

Each of these tasks merits individual discussion.

1. Relocation

Harry Diamond Laboratories is currently completing the relocation of its Headquarters to the Adelphi, MD, site. This has been a difficult and complex job. A completely new Army installation, dedicated to research, development, and testing, was conceived, designed, and built in three consecutive years of Congressional incremental funding. There were no other buildings on this site.

The HDL Facilities Engineering Office has the sole responsibility for assuming the operation and maintenance of this new Army installation, which is currently undergoing critical "shakedown" and "punch-list" corrections (corrections required because of contractor errors). New construction includes major modular laboratories housing special-purpose research equipment with special independent temperature - and humidity - controlled environments. The utilities systems use the latest state-of-the-art-design, such as high-temperature (400°F), high-pressure (300 lb), hot water heating systems, redundant electric services, elaborate intrusion-detection systems, and so on.

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• We believe that the current management design, operating, and maintenance personnel of the HDL Facilities Engineering Office must continue to be "on-site" during this critical period of "shakedown" and "punch-list" corrections. This is also highly desirable after this period.

2. Incorporation of ERADCOM

The ERADCOM reorganization has introduced an increased workload to the Facilities Engineering Office. ERADCOM our next higher command (immediately subordinate to DARCOM), will bring 200 to 300 additional people to the existing buildings at HDL. Moving these personnel (mostly attached to ERADCOM Headquarters) into HDL space will have an important effect on the current Facilities staff. A detailed knowledge of the existing buildings is essential to carry out this incorporation efficiently.

3. HDL's Mission and FEO Responsibilities

Maintenance of electric, water, and sewer systems, as well as service to buildings, pavements, and grounds, is common to all installations. However, one of the important missions of the HDL Facilities Engineering Office is the support of the RDT&E work within the laboratories and the maintenance of the special-purpose facilities and equipment related to these.

HDL does not perform any of the functions which are the prime missions of the other Army installations within the National Capital Region: that is, operation and maintenance of housing for troops, families, headquarters and schools, and industrial support services such as commissaries, PX's, laundries, heaters, medical centers, etc. Therefore, the HDL Facilities Engineering Office does not support functions such as these.

Rather, the HDL Facilities Engineering Office has an entirely different orientation. It is prepared to give immediate response to all research and development laboratory requests for support, enabling researchers to meet their deadlines and avoid mission delays. These requests for support are diverse and often unique, requiring complex preparation and readiness. The HDL Facilities Engineering Office must be prepared to meet all these engineering and design requirements at all times, backed up by the Army District Engineer. Also, a special on-going program is being developed for preventative maintenance which it is important to continue uninterrupted.

To summarize, the HDL Facilities Engineering Office is responsible for the design, construction, installation, alteration, maintenance, and repair of special-purpose, one-of-a-kind equipment systems and facilities in direct support of the installation's technical mission. This is not a normal Post Engineer function. No guidelines other than those we have developed are available for this work. Resourcefulness, ingenuity, and experience are required to a high degree in applying theories, practices, and methodology, and in devising solutions to a vast range of unique and complex problems. Therefore, it is clear that the responsibilities of the HDL Facilities Engineering Office are not the usual duties of a Post Engineer.

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• For various reasons, therefore, the functions of the HDL Facilities Engineering office are best accomplished by people experienced and familiar with the various continuing tasks that need to be done.

4. Conclusion

The vast majority of the personnel in the HDL Facilities Engineering Office have been with the project since its inception. These personnel are totally familiar with the new facility, and many dollars have been spent in specialized training for them. After the "shakedown" period, it would not be in the best interests of the installation to eliminate this cadre of HDL oriented and trained management and design personnel. We consider it highly important that our personnel have an intimate and detailed understanding of the composition and conditions of the existing plant and that they have a similarly intimate and detailed knowledge of the conditions and features required for the activity's mission effort.

Any transition period will naturally be difficult and somewhat disruptive. However, the transition between the present management and the proposed consolidation would be further complicated by the kinds of tasks required of the Facilities Engineering Office at HDL. Only part of the responsibilities of the HDL Facilities Engineering Office are routine and easy for newcomers to take over. The relocation and reorganization of HDL and ERADCOM, combined with the necessity to support HDL's technical mission, impose a double burden on the HDL Facilities Engineering Office. The continued presence of experienced management and engineering type personnel at HDL is therefore important to facilitate the reorganization of these laboratories during the present turbulent period and to continue direct support to mission work.

REMARKS IN RESPONSE TO PROPOSED RPMA CONSOLIDATION

The report stresses that the consolidation plan will not result in reducing the number of blue-collar workers. However, additional staffing is needed for identifiable, recurring, day-to-day on-site maintenance workloads. Even now, there is not sufficient staff (blue-collar workers) to fill present and future needs. If there is no intent to increase the number of on-site personnel to match the continuing and increasing workload, then this work would have to be contracted out, where no contracts now exist. Writing and administering these contracts would naturally be included in the responsibilities of the proposed NCR-RPMA Group. This would add workload to specification writers, contract administrators, legal office personnel, procurements office personnel, and contract writers. Are sufficient personnel being allotted to handle this work? Further, beside the personnel mentioned above, there would be a need for local on-site contract inspectors and security escorts.

HDL Operation Under NCR-RPMA Group: Problems

1. Conflicts. Under the proposed consolidation, there could be conflicts between the technical mission requirements of other installations and HDL. If such conflicts arose, there could be problems of priority and of availability of manpower and equipment.

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Preventive Maintenance. The Study does not identify how a schedule for recurring maintenance of installed building equipment will be provided to the station manager, or contracted, because of lack of personnel to accomplish the tasks.

The IFS does not address installed building equipment, i.e., hoods, air condition- equipment, electric equipment, etc. We have checked other Army installations and it seems as though each one has a separate system and does it in a different way or operates on "break down" maintenance.

At HDL we do not yet have an up-and-running system. If the consolidation occurs, the developing of the same kind of Preventive Maintenance Programs for all of the 9 installations under the new NCR-RPMA Group should be developed. It still would be the prerogative of each Commanding Officer to determine how much maintenance he wants to spend in this area. However, all equipment should be inventoried and a common program developed by some branch in the NCR-RPMA group. The Navy has a working computerized program that, in our opinion, should be adopted for this function.

3. Separation of Personnel. It would seem illogical to separate the existing office and shop personnel, two highly trained and experienced groups of people that now work as a unit, equipped to handle all Post Engineer type work, as well as technical mission requirements. Ultimately, mission response time would suffer.

4. Security and Escorts. All personnel working for or at HDL must be cleared for a minimum of secret or be under line-of-sight escort at all times.

5. Difference in work load and manpower between 1977 and when implemented. The study reflects conditions in 1977. We have had considerable changes (increase in space, additional mission work, difference in slots reported in 1977, etc.). How will the study group propose to compensate for this if consolidation in implemented? Also, if after consolidation and something is wrong, requiring more spaces, how will it be accomplished?

6. Level of Manpower Allocated. The Study allots only 75% of the recognized staffing guide allowances. Therefore, if the staffing guide allows for 4 men, you are staffing at 3 men.

7. RIF Actions. The Supervisors and Foremen of the blue collar workers will not necessarily be retained at their current installation because of RIF actions. This highly skilled group of people now trained to supervise the workmen operating and working on the specialized installation equipment will not be properly utilized.

Each installation commander retains responsibility for the following functions:

1. Environment and energy program.

2. Housing management (excluding RPMA direct execution).

3. Fire prevention and protection.

"These three functions were not considered for the consolidation in this study and hence the staffing remains unchanged."

Through a misunderstanding, HDL is shown in Figure C-2-8, Page C-2-27 as having only two (2) persons supporting this area, when in fact there were three (3); one (1) environment and energy (General Engineer) and two (2) Fire Inspectors. Since this report, we have hired a third Fire Inspector which will not be reflected in this report.

In addition to the above personnel, this proposed HDL staff is identified in the report as three (3) positions with the following duties:

1. "Planning programming for appropriated funds (RPMA and MCA) as currently including master planning and annual work planning in cooperation with the consolidated NCR-RPMA organization."

2. "Real Property records (supported by automated IFS reports from consolidated organization."

The next page is our interpretation of what duties we really expect. This cannot be done with a total of three (3) persons.

The following are some of the duties that HDL envisions will be the Staff Engineering Group responsibilities:

1. Working daily in concert with HDL Commander.

    a. Providing HDL Installation engineering expertise for resolution of MSC (ERADCOM) support problems and fulfilling MSC requirements.
    b. Master Planning.
    c. Space Management.
    d. Installation Planning Board Meetings.
    e. Disaster Control.
    f. Civil Defense.
    g. HDL Fire Marshal responsibility.
    h. Inter-Service Support Agreement Management.
    i. Local reporting to HDL Commander.

2. Establishment of work priorities.

3. Work request approvals.

4. Responsibility for approving estimates.

5. Full time building and maintenance inspector for completed work acceptance.

6. Approval of utilities purchases.

7. Preparation of Annual Budget.

8. Monitoring expenditures of appropriations funded projects (Construction).

9. Report Preparation:

    a. Unconstrained Requirements
    b. Command Analysis Utilities
    c. Technical Data
    d. DEIS I & II
    e. Special Projects (O & M Facilities)
    f. Special Projects (MCA Minor)
    g. Military Real Property Inventory
    h. Leased Real Property Review
    i. Response to myriad messages (TWX's) with short deadlines, requiring in-put from entire Facilities Engineering staff at times to accurately comply
    j. Annual Schedule for Capital Equipment
    k. Military Security - Classified Document Review
    l. Other reports not aforementioned.

10. Establishment and Maintenance of Resource Management Plan (RMP).

11. Preparation of Annual Work Plan (AWP).

12. Implementation of Annual Work Plan.

13. Investigative work relating to sophisticated laboratory requests. (M9400 - Mission Support).

14. Managing fund expenditures between HDL and MDW Consolidated RPMA.

15. Initiating, processing and monitoring requisitions of services and/or supplies not coming under purview of MDW - RPMA.

16. Daily administrative functions:

    a. Full time (8 hours each workday) telephone answering service.
    b. Receive, log and process mail.
    c. Prepare and forward outgoing correspondence.
    d. Maintenance of timesheets, and daily suspense items.
    e. Handle requests daily from HDL occupants ranging from information in-put to job work status.
    f. Review of utilities sales contracts.
    g. Review and up-dating of internal procedures.
    h. Belvoir-Woodbridge Family Housing Activities.
    i. Secretarial support to Environmental-Energy, Fire Protection personnel, plus other residual staff personnel.

17. Studies as directed.

In the event of consolidation, the Resident Staff Engineer Office at HDL. should consist of:

1. Resident Facility Engineer GS 13/14: We would suggest that this position be filled by a Civilian Facilities Engineer. Our major command, DARCOM, had previously identified this position at HDL as being best occupied by a civilian who can provide the Commanding Officer with continuous day-to-day Facilities expertise. Military personnel must rotate every three years, so that HDL would lose the benefit of engineers with a knowledge of plant operation, and would continually have to be training new people. Rotating military personnel in this position would create turbulence for the Facilities operation and for HDL. This person must protect his Commander from a public law violation in the Facilities area. He must be a fully trained Facilities Engineer.

2. General Engineer GS 12/13: Handles mostly planning functions, consults with HDL scientist and technicians to determine support needed, develops work requests, requests help from NCR-RPMA Group. Maintains Real Property Records and Installation drawings. Inspects completed work (contract or In-House) for acceptance. Inspects work associated with Standing Orders for compliance with HDL requirements.

   Note: We have found it next to impossible to recruit at less than the GS-12 level to obtain competent engineers.

3. Engineering Technician GS 11/12: Assist General Engineer as required.

4. Budget Analyst GS 11/12: Budget Analyst, in accordance with AR 10-10 and Army Staffing Guide 570-551. Because consolidation would not reduce this person's responsibilities, the position should not be held by a less qualified person.

5. Clerk-Typist GS-5: Clerk typist would operate HDL trouble desk. This function must be included as a Resident Engineer reponsibility. In order to set priorities for Service and to make sure HDL work is being performed by the Station Manager. In addition the Resident Engineer forces can also be made quickly aware of any calls needing their attention.

In the event of complaints from HDL Customers, the complaints should go to the Commanding Officer's Staff Engineering Group for resolution. Some work called into the trouble desk should not be accomplished. All Service Orders (SO) must be approved by the HDL Staff Engineering Group. The HDL Commander should have the prerogative of having his staff engineering group rate the person in this capacity, as this person will be responding to HDL personnel. In the study this slot is assigned to the HDL Station Manager - the slot is recognized as needed for either organization. HDL feels it will best be utilized under HDL control.

6. Production Controller GS-12: The Controller is needed to collect all work orders and to program, coordinate, and schedule priorities for accomplishment of this work. The Controller would:

   (1) Analyze completed work, including contract and Station Manager Workers performance

   (2) Recommend corrective action for improvement of performance, productivity and work methods to the best interest of HDL

   (3) Develops Annaul Work Plan in conjunction with other in-house resident personnel and implements same.

   (4) Implements and secures approval for IJO's, before sending, to the local Station Managers Production Control Group.


   (5) The Controller would see that all HDL Reports are correctly made.

7. Secretary GS 05/06: The Secretary would edit and type official correspondence to higher Commands and to other agencies outside Army channels, concerning military construction, and all other correspondence associated with a facility group. This person would maintain liaison with the installation personnel office concerning personnel matters, perform general office services, operate official mail desk, maintain classified documents, perform record management services, process requests for travel and transportation. This person would operate a WANG typewriter, putting Environmental Impact Assessments on tape, etc. Would directly support the HDL Staff for Environment and Energy programs and Fire Prevention programs.

All of the above personnel would perform other duties such as stated in the HDL statement of work to be accomplished by the HDL Staff Engineering Group.

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES FOR DRAFT REPORT BECAUSE OF ERROR ON OUR PART, OR A MISUNDERSTANDING OF HOW IT WOULD APPEAR IN CHART FORM.

Page B-1-7. Change to read Harry Diamond Laboratories. Delete Roads & Grounds Section.



Page B-4 Land acres at HDL in 1977 were 2,338 acres not 3,030. Square Ft. in 1977 was 637,000. We now have 758,000 - but will be disregarded for this report.

Page B-2-4. Figure B-2-2. We have in-put from the Civilian Personnel Office and Procurement Office that the figures given to us were too high. They wished to adjust these figures down - as you have established averages, this is probably academic.

Page B-2-8. Second line states "WRAMC supports HDL under the terms of a ISSA". It should read "WRAMC supports HDL's nuclear reactor, located at Forest Glen, under the terms of a ISSA".

Page C-2-27. Figure C-2-8. First line "Environment & Energy", HDL has a dedicated Environment & Energy person".

Page C-1-38. Line 8. "HDL receives support from WRAMC under a ISSA Agreement". Change "HDL's Diamond Ordnance Radiation Facility receives support from WRAMC under a ISSA Agreement".

HDL STATION MANAGER

Page C-14 (3) Responsiveness: States "the recommended NCR-RPMA was structured to provide better service to installation commanders than the current method of operation (CMO). It envisions RPMA execution being performed by the same decentralized direct labor force as today under station managers at the same grades as current Facilities Engineers (FE)".

The proposed HDL Station Manager is shown as having 84 slots including himself, Admin. Assistant and we assume it includes two (2) others (work receptionist & estimator). HDL's reported direct labor force and direct support personnel which are HDL Sections 0611, 0612, and 0613 (Woodbridge), and includes the Chief of 061, the work receptionist, 1 storeroom operator, 1 material coordinator, 1 clerk-typist and secretary to support all of the above. Total is 93 persons.

We find it difficult to read the Chart, Figure C-2-4, Page C-2-11, under the station manager, as not all lines are explained.

Example: Elect $\frac{1 \mid 0}{1 \mid 8}$ does this mean there are two (2) elect supervisors and 8 non-supervisors?

What does $\frac{1 \mid 30}{0 \mid 1}$ custodial mean?

...means there will be one supervisor for 30 working men - that ratio is unacceptable for efficient inspected work.

It appears that 1 foreman in the A/C Shop and 1 foreman in the Plumbing Shop has been d...pped - these areas at HDL are very complicated and need foremen. These foremen have been highly trained and are responsibe to the HDL mission. At HDL we work two (2) shifts in some areas requiring more supervision.

Figure C-2-6, Page C-2-21 seems to state that even though HDL has 1 work receptionist, 1 Scheduler analyst, 3 estimators and 1 Real Property man, we will be recognized as having only one (1) person.

Figure C-2-6, Page C-2-22 indicates that there will be two (2) persons allocated to HDL under the station manager to perform the above functions now performed by six (6) people, in addition, the study states that these two (2) persons will also perform material coordination as a combined job and also do facility inspections.

This is RIDICULOUS! The existing three (3) planning estimators (trained in work standards and working only in the estimating area) cannot keep up with the workload now:

DRDEL-CS (13 June 78) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Army and DMATC RPMA Consolidation jn the National Capital Region

Headquarters, US Army Electronics Research and Development Command, 2800 Powder Mill Road, Adelphi, MD 20783 13 JUN 1978

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, ATTN: DRCLDC/DRCIS-EF, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333

TO: US Army Corps of Engineers, Facilities Engineering Directorate, ATTN: DAEN-FER-P, Room 1G067, Forrestal Bldg., Washington, DC 20314

1. The proposed reorganization makes the assumption that all facilities organizations within the national capital region are adequately staffed, then reorganizes them and in consequence "saves" over 100 spaces. Data in the study and briefings presented suggests that most organizations are currently understaffed. For these reasons we cannot concur with the resultant conclusion that the consolidation will improve responsiveness. In fact it appears to decrease.

2. Apart from the above, the consolidated organization departs from conventional industrial and military management practices of placing supporting activities under the control of the responsible executive thereby delimitating his ability to efficiently accomplish his mission.

3. Concur with the comments of the Commander HDL.

1 Incl
nc

for VICTOR S. UNDERHILL
COL, GS
Chief of Staff

MAS 565

DRCIS-EF (13 Jun 78) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: ARMY and DMATC RPMA Consolidation in the National Capital Region

HQ, USA Materiel Development & Readiness Comd, Alex, VA 22333 27 June 1978

TO: HQDA (DAEN-FER-P) WASH DC 20314

1. This headquarters strongly supports the position of the Commanders, Harry Diamond Laboratories and the US Army Electronics Research and Development Command concerning the subject effort.

2. Rationale for this position is as follows:

a. The consolidation would remove most of the installation commander's control of RPMA without relieving him of responsibility.

b. The R&D activities at HDL require RPMA support by specialists familiar with the facilities not only in the crafts but in design and engineering as well.

c. All of the remote facilities, for which HDL is responsible, were not addressed in the report.

d. The report proposes reductions in staff where staffing is already critically short.

e. Implementation of the consolidation will reduce responsiveness of RPMA forces in support of critical R&D missions.

3. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that HDL RPMA not be consolidated as proposed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
nc

ROBERT L. MOORE
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
ARLINGTON HALL STATION
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22212

IACG

14 JUN 1978

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D.C. Area

Lieutenant General John W. Morris
Chief of Engineers
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20314

1. Reference is made to DAEN-FER-P letter, dated 24 May 1978, subject as above.

2. I have reviewed the draft report "Army and DMATC RPMA Consolidation in the National Capital Region" transmitted by the referenced letter and have listened to the briefing on the report ably and enthusiastically presented by your team from the Engineer Study Center. However, I have strong reservations concerning the consolidation of RPMA in the NCR because of its impact on the mission of this command.

3. I am not convinced that consolidation will provide equal or better service. The recommended organization divides responsibility for RPMA to the detriment of the installation commander's prerogatives and control and reduces the responsibilities of the installation facility engineer to a level not in keeping with the Chief of Engineer's program to enhance the image of the facilities engineer. The estimated resource savings of the consolidation plan are based almost entirely on the overly optimistic saving of 113 spaces, while neglecting analysis of the costs to be incurred as a result of consolidation.

4. This command is the MACOM for two of the candidate installations in the study - Arlington Hall Station (AHS) and Vint Hill Farms Station (VHFS). Prior to implementing the study the following should be considered:

a. The RPMA spaces at AHS are Program 3 (PE 381011) which is a part of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) under the control of the National Security Agency.

IACG 14 JUN 1978
SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, D.C. Area

b. VHFS lies outside of the NCR as defined by the National Capital Planning Commission. Because of the forty to fifty mile distance from metropolitan Washington and the resulting built-in time delays, the report should have included an economic analysis to determine the cost differences between including and excluding VHFS from the consolidated organization.

c. This headquarters is now conducting a DA directed base realignment study with a decision expected early this fall. Candidate location sites are AHS, VHFS and Fort Meade, or a combination involving perhaps all three.

d. Further comments are provided in detail at Inclosure 1.

6. Based on the above, strong consideration should be given to deleting AHS and VHFS from the implementation of the consolidation of RPMA in the NCR.

1 Incl
as

WILLIAM T. ROLYA
Major General, USA
Commanding

Supplementary Comments
to
Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA)
at Army Installations in the Washington, D. C. Area

1. The report does not examine the determination of priorities between installations for support from the consolidated organization. Small installations such as AHS and VHFS do not and will not have the visibility of a national historic site such as Fort McNair and the likelihood of support degradation therefore exists.

2. The recommended consolidation leaves the installation commander with a majority of the current facility engineer's administrative and management workload including the functions of planning, programming and budgeting, master planning and annual work planning, reports, real property records, energy and environmental programs, housing management, and fire prevention and protection (the last three were not considered for consolidation in the study). What the current facility engineer performs backed up by a full staff, the study recommends the installation commander perform with a staff engineer plus two people (plus the housing management and fire prevention and protection staffs). The study, instead of separating out from the current organization the spaces and fractions of spaces performing these functions, should have analyzed the workload and recommended sufficient staff. A three-man staff is not sufficient to carry out effectively the installation commander's responsibilities.

3. The report recommends that the station manager retain the same grade as the current facility engineer but does not explain how. From full managerial responsibility for the installation facilities engineering organization, the station manager has been recommended by the report to be reduced to supervising an administrative assistant, the utilities division and the buildings and grounds division. The report does not even recommend he be allowed to supervise the functions of work reception, estimating, scheduling, and material coordination. The two (2) personnel at AHS and three (3) at VHFS recommended to perform these functions are recommended to work directly for the production manager at the central headquarters not for the station manager. The reduction of the station manager's responsibilities appears to be a reversal of the Chief of Engineer's program to enhance the image of the facility engineer. A future manpower review may direct that this space be reduced in grade.

4. The report cites as an advantage of consolidation that a centralized staff will provide a pool of highly qualified personnel. It may provide the potential, but the potential is often not realized when implementation occurs. At AHS and VHFS, the INSCOM has a known dedicated staff that are

Incl 1

.eared for access to INSCOM facilities (and also those of DARCOM and DIA) and have supported INSCOM operations worldwide. INSCOM does not support the conclusion that change from a known quantity to an unknown quantity in a remote headquarters results in an improvement in service. The report also does not address the costs for travel between the centralized staff and the direct labor force for administration and coordination. In the matter of engineering and design for RPMA the familiarity with the work force and the facilities and the daily interaction between the engineering staff and the work force enhance effectiveness and efficiency. Centralization can result in degradation of effectiveness and efficiency. The study also does not address the costs and loss of efficiency resulting from the personnel turmoil which will occur when the consolidation is implemented.

5. The report cites as an advantage of consolidation, that the centralized organization will have the flexibility to transfer direct labor from installation to installation on a day-to-day basis if required for high priority projects. It has been noted that the consolidation in the San Antonio area resulted in the authority to require the employees to be able to commute to any installation in the area with no travel pay as a condition of being hired. The report does not address the cost in loss of employee morale and effectiveness that would occur if this policy were effected in the NCR. Many of the employees at AHS and VHFS have worked many years at these installations and built up a loyalty and dedication to their work. In the area of labor relations and quality of work performed, consolidation may be a minus.

6. The report recommends the industrially funded concept for the consolidated organization, but does not address the disadvantages of that method. Under this concept, the customer is not only charged with direct costs of services provided, but also a proportionate ratio of overhead costs. This headquarters is concerned about the funding impact on this command under such an arrangement. Foreseen is an inflationary trend whereby reimbursement to an industrially funded activity will be more expensive to the command than current funding arrangements. How does DA plan to identify such increases to insure that command funding programs are proportionally increased? A further question to be answered concerns what checks will be imposed on the consolidated organization to prevent expansion of overhead at the expense of the customers who have no say in the overhead charged to them.

7. The 113 realizable spaces to be reduced in the National Capital Region is an overly optimistic estimate in view of the minimal staffs recognized at the installations (staff engineer, production control, and station manager) and the already under-staffed BASOPS organizations. A full review of manpower figures is required prior to implementation.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
FORT LESLEY J. McNAIR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

13 JUN 1978

ANEN

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, DC Area

HQDA(DAEN-FER-P)
WASH DC 20314

1. Reference the draft report "Army and DMATC RPMA Consolidation in the National Capital Region."

2. The study recommendation would significantly increase the overall responsibilities of the Commander, MDW. And while the consolidated RPMA organization is intended to stand alone as a subordinate activity in MDW, it will be heavily dependent for support on the entire MDW staff. The time allocated for command comment was insufficient for the command and staff to adequately analyze the report. Based on a cursory review and from the viewpoint of the gaining command, the following concerns and comments are provided:

a. Resources. My major concern is the resource management scheme. Separating control of manpower and dollars, as shown in the study recommendation, raises questions on how effectively the responsible commander can in fact discharge these responsibilities. There are two options in accomplishing real property maintenance, doing the work in-house or using the funds to contract out. The responsible commander must have control of the choice of these options. I strongly believe that total resources should be given to the responsible commander who would be held accountable. This permits better management and clearly fixes responsibility.

b. Industrial Funding. I find the proposal to use an Army Industrial Fund objectionable. It would require MDW to establish additional and separate accounting systems, and to establish, change, and justify rates. Establishing an industrial fund is not resource efficient for MDW; there are no offsetting benefits.

13 JUN 1978

ANEN

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) at Army Installations in the Washington, DC Area

The current MDW RPMA organization services installation-like activities such as the National Defense University (NDU) and Defense Logistics Agency (DIA) wherein the BASOPS P2 account serves as the carrier and is reimbursed by tenants. Cost visibility can be achieved with the current OMA system.

c. Staffing. The major shortfall in recommended staffing appears to be for managing and operating the automated Integrated Facilities System (IFS). Experience has shown that staffing estimates for IFS are grossly understated in terms of the real manpower requirements. An additional 20 spaces as a minimum are required.

d. Personnel Savings. There is serious doubt that any space savings would result from the proposed consolidation, certainly not as many as the 113 identified as "realizable savings." A more detailed evaluation of proposed staffing is more likely to increase than decrease total manpower requirements, such as recognizing a need for additional IFS personnel. Also, since the augmentation spaces coming to MDW for support activities cannot be validated, the actual requirement may be greater. Anticipated space cuts in the current FE organizations and BASOPS staffs prior to implementation will reduce the manpower pool from which the new organization will be staffed. There are only two ways to compensate for these reductions--reduce the savings or lower the organizational requirements. Consequently, the study should not depend on manpower reductions as a rationale for acceptance. Unless this doubt is given sufficient emphasis in the study, approval may be the basis for mandating space cuts at some future point.

e. Procurement. To have two procurement activities in a small command like MDW is neither efficient nor good management. In view of ongoing actions at the Secretary of the Army level to reduce the number of procurement activities in the NCR, this study must make a compelling case if procurement capability is to stay in MDW. The procurement arguments should be reworked prior to completion of the final report.

f. Dual hatting. Providing both a station manager and a staff engineer at each facility is highly desirable and has my full support. The principal virtue of providing the installation with an engineer staff officer lies in his

contribution to priority setting and responsiveness. However, since dual-hatting these responsibilities in a single officer is a logical alternative, the study should formally address it as such. In doing so, it is expected that sufficient support for the two officer system will be provided to preclude a quick space savings by dual hatting.

g. Physical Space Requirements. The stationing, space allocation and associated costs for the centralized part of the consolidated organization needs to be addressed in the study. Space availability is a critical issue in the NCR. We cannot have effective centralized management if the component parts of that structure are dispersed all over the NCR.

3. Because of the significant impact on the NCR organization, manpower and dollars, recommend the study be reviewed by concerned members of the DA Staff, specifically, the Comptroller and DCSOPS.

4. Aside from the preceding specific comments, as the Commander, MDW, I am apprehensive concerning the concept of consolidating RPMA and the resultant organization's ability to both do the job and do it well. Its success will rest mainly on the management capabilities at mid level, and that level already has been decremented in quality and numbers. Bigness is not always a virtue and by being large the proposed organization is a greater management challenge and a ready made target for resource cuts. The demands on our facilities engineer organization and the amount of real property needing maintenance continue to grow as well as the pressure to reduce the resources to meet these requirements. We must be wary that we don't create a larger undercapitalized organization having greater expectations but a lesser ability to accomplish the real property mission.

KENNETH E. DOHLEMAN
Major General, USA
Commanding

DACA-OMB

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) of Army Installations in the Washington, DC Area

TO DAEN FROM DACA-OM DATE 13 JUN 1978 CMT 2

MAJ Wright/54525

1. Concur conceptually with the proposal to consolidate maintenance and repair of real property (MRRP) activities within the National Capital Region. The following comments are forwarded for consideration.

a. OSD is circulating a draft DODD 7410.4 (Regulations Governing Industrial Fund Operations) which specifically prohibits industrially funding of those "functions that pertain to daily operations of military installations . . .". The draft further states that, "Centralization, reimbursability and need for improved cost accounting will not be, in and of themselves, sufficient reasons for industrially funding an activity or function." Recommend, therefore, that alternative methods of financing be examined prior to study finalization.

b. The requirement for a separate Material and Service Acquisition organization is not understood. Procurement and supply functions and organizations currently exist within MDW which should be able to absorb the consolidated MRRP facility's requirements without a substantial increase in overhead.

c. Dollar savings are predicated on "a theoretical reduction of 150 spaces . . ." which are refined to a "realizable savings" estimate for 113. Considering the short time frame permitted for the study which necessitated numerous disclaimers and caveats, these savings are not regarded with confidence.

2. Consolidation, on the basis of the conclusion of the draft study, appears feasible. However, if savings do not materialize, there seems to be little justification for consolidation and resulting increased costs could be a source of considerable embarrassment to the Army. Recommend that a more detailed cost-benefit analysis be conducted to validate personnel savings before a final recommendation is made for consolidation.

FOR THE COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY:

1 Incl
nc

[redacted]
Brigadier General, GS
Director of Operation
and Maintenance, Army

W. W. WRIGHT
Major, GS

DACS-DMA(12 June 1978)
SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) of Army Installations in the Washington, DC Area

TO DAEN-FER-P FROM DACS-DMA DATE 13 JUN 1978 CMT 2
LTC Johnson/eb/76321

1. Subject report has been reviewed and this office concurs with the thrust of the major conclusions and recommendations of the study. There is one specific comment and that concerns the potential savings identified in the study that might result from consolidation. Detailed comment on this issue follows in paragraph 2.

2. a. The study identifies a "theoretical reduction of 150 spaces" and "theoretical annual savings of $2,663,000." However, these figures are then reduced to 113 spaces and $2,030,000 because "no one should assume that the full potential for savings would be realized in practice." The study then further qualifies this estimate by stating that these realizable gains are "large enough that careful implementation should not run much risk of overrunning current levels at worst." To make matters worse, there are indications that other consolidations have in fact resulted in an increase in personnel space requirements rather than savings.

b. Inasmuch as the decision to implement the consolidation will be based primarily on economic issues, an overly optimistic estimate of potential savings could lead to the selection of an alternative that, although feasible, could in fact result in greater cost to the Army. The fact that the Army has in the past, suffered cuts in dollars and manpower based on projected savings identified in feasibility studies demands realism in the identification of potential savings.

c. Issue is not taken with the methodology of the study. However, workload estimates may have been understated. The staff engineer section appears to be understaffed considering the breadth of its responsibilities. Adequate consideration may not have been given to the manpower requirements to support IFS. Furthermore, the recent RPMA study reported that FE staffing guides are inadequate and need revision. These are some of the concerns that support our recommendation that projected savings be reviewed for possible overstatement.

Incl wd

J. Woodall

JACK D. WOODALL
Colonel, GS
Chief, Army Management Division
Management Directorate

(DAMI-RMA) 24 May 78
SUBJECT: Consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) of Army Installations in the Washington, DC Area

TO: DAEN-FER-P FROM DAMI-RMA DATE 13 Jun 78 CMT 2
MAJ Dahlin/mlm/71862


OACSI has reviewed the draft report and has no basis on which to comment on its recommendations.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

1 Incl
wd

JAMES D. STANTON
LTC, GS
Chief, Personnel and Services Division

LAST PAGE OF APPENDIX E-1


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78