The Bargaining Set and Nonstandard Analysis.

Abstract

An elementary proof of the equivalence of the Bargaining Set and the Core is given for nonstandard infinite economic games based on a new definition of the Bargaining Set that retains the spirit of the original definition and which is appropriate to the large economy nonatomic model of Aumann and the nonstandard model of Brown-Robinson. As a corollary a generalization of the result obtained by Lloyd Shapley is derived concerning the convergence of the Bargaining Set to the Core in sequences of replicated economic games. In particular, attention is not restricted to replicated sequences, concave utilities are not assumed, and the restriction of the Bargaining Set to pareto optimal payoff configurations is dropped.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 01, 1978
Accession Number
ADA057424

Entities

People

  • John Geanakoplos

Organizations

  • Harvard University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Commerce
  • Construction
  • Corporations
  • Economic Models
  • Economic Systems
  • Economics
  • Game Theory
  • Market Economy
  • Mathematical Models
  • Mathematics
  • Measure Theory
  • Models
  • Numbers
  • Operations Research
  • Real Numbers
  • Standards
  • Theorems

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Mathematical Modeling and Probability Theory.