A Comparative Policy-Process Approach to Vietnam Intervention.
Abstract
This thesis provides a comparative policy-process perspective of Vietnam intervention. It is comparative in the sense that the Eisenhower administration's policy process in the 1954 Indochina crisis is used as a basis to compare the Johnson administration's policy making which led to intervention in 1965. The study's analysis centers on the policy processes of the two administrations and how the differences in their policy making contributes to the explanation of the opposite decisions on military intervention. The study's conclusion is that the Johnson policy process was comparatively exclusionary and, as a result, not effective in formulating Vietnam policy. In comparison to the more open Eisenhower policy making, in the Johnson administration dysfunctional policy-making elements are identified in the executive bureaucracy, the role of the President, other policy makers, and Congress. As a result the policy process did not sustain a thorough evaluation of the alternatives and the cost of being an intervenor.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 09, 1978
- Accession Number
- ADA057827
Entities
People
- Charles R. Scribner
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College