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
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
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


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CRISIS MANAGEMENT: MYTH OR MONSTER

By

Steven Michael Lanoux

June 1978

Thesis Advisor: CDR R. A. McGonigal, USN

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CRISIS MANAGEMENT: MYTH OR MONSTER

by

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Lieutenant
Bachelor of Science

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the
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ABSTRACT

Crisis management is defined to be the expansion of the commitments on an organization beyond the capability of its normal resources to respond adequately to all of them. Crisis commitments are imposed with relatively short notice, with vague prioritization, and without the privilege of reclama by the organization. Under conditions of goal conflict and workday extension, the organization and its environment are statically and dynamically modelled to demonstrate the critical nature of the time element in the management of crises. An in-depth analysis of the supporting situational elements within the Navy is conducted. Emphasis is placed on the structure of the Navy bureaucracy and its effectiveness in the unstable environment which the U. S. military faces. The contribution of bureaucracy to the institutionalization of crisis management as a standard procedure is examined. The sociological norms of individual behavior which are operant in maintaining the crisis management standard are also emphasized. Recommendations for further research and for interim actions to remedy this dysfunctional symptom are proposed.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	7
	A. CRISIS MANAGEMENT.....	7
	B. MYTH OR MONSTER.....	8
II.	BACKGROUND.....	9
	A. UNSPECIFICITY.....	9
	B. PERSPECTIVES.....	11
III.	DEFINITION AND MODELS.....	23
	A. CRISIS MANAGEMENT DEFINED.....	23
	B. MANAGEMENT OF CRISES.....	25
	C. ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL.....	29
	D. DYNAMICS OF THE MODEL.....	36
	E. BUFFER EFFECTS.....	38
IV.	SUPPORTIVE ELEMENTS.....	51
	A. ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE.....	51
	B. NAVY SOCIOLOGICAL NORMS	72
	V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	84
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	93
	DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	98
	LIST OF FIGURES	99

I. INTRODUCTION

A. CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The term "crisis management" has become greatly popularized in recent years and has been used to describe conditions in a wide variety of institutional and organizational settings. These settings range from the micro level of how one handles the personal changes affecting his life (e. g., Passages by Gail Sheehy) to the macro level of how to defuse a nuclear confrontation between the major world powers (e. g., Essence of Decision by Graham Allison). The analyses of these situations has concentrated on the mechanics of managing the crisis, but they have very rarely analyzed crisis management as a symptom of more complex and deeply rooted organizational dysfunctions.

The visibility given to crisis management by the Navy began in October 1976 when the Chief of Naval Operations Master Chief Petty Officer advisory panel identified it as the single greatest contributor to dissatisfaction with life in the military. Unfortunately, the subsequent analysis has fallen prey to a mechanical superficiality also. The investigations and actions of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and of the Commander, United States Naval Surface Forces, Pacific (COMNAVSURFPAC) keyed on relatively short-term, easily resolvable issues which, when viewed from a systemic perspective, were only symptoms of larger problems. That resolution had not, in fact, taken place was indicated by the resurrection of a

slightly different crisis management "monster" by the publication of the article "Get Off My Back, Sir" in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings (August, 1977). Again, both analysis and actions were superficial in nature, but the publicity afforded crisis management in the Navy was even more widespread in this latter case. As an indication of the pervasive nature of crisis management, in his 1978 State of the Union address to Congress and the nation, President Carter tasked us all to eliminate crisis management as a routine way of doing business.

B. MYTH OR MONSTER

After reviewing some of the theoretical and practical background of organizations and conflict resolution, an operational definition of crisis management will be provided. Both the organization and its environment will be modelled in order to demonstrate some of the constructive dynamics which take place under crisis management conditions as well as under normal operating conditions. Time will be viewed as the critical element which produces either crisis or more normal management by the organization. Again, models will be provided to assist in understanding some of the effects on the people and on the organization. The interactive characteristics of the Navy structure and the behavioral norms of the individuals within the Navy are supportive of crisis management as "standard operating procedure". These will be analyzed and related to the definition and the models provided. A prognosis for the future of crisis management in the Navy and recommendations for short and long term corrective actions will be submitted in conclusion.

II. BACKGROUND

A. UNSPECIFICITY

The term crisis management has been bandied about with considerable freedom in recent years. However, a major problem with the many analyses of crisis conditions and the management of them is the nearly total absence of a definition of crisis management. By neglecting to provide a workable, realistic, acceptable definition of the subject of the study, it is left up to the individuals to determine if the actions are appropriate to their own concepts of "crisis management". An approximate definition must be derived contextually by the reader. If an attempt is made to address some of the characteristics of crisis management, one usually winds up with little more than platitudes. The comments in most management texts and articles which address crisis management at all can be "pigeonholed" into one of four categories. These are:

(1) Poor management. "The recurrent crisis is simply a symptom of slovenliness and laziness." (Drucker, 1967, p. 42).

(2) Poor planning. "Too often management feels that its job is to cope with problems as they arise ("crisis management") rather than to anticipate the problems and to take steps to mitigate their impact." (Morrison, 1967, p. 42).

(3) Satisfaction derived from management by crisis. Although caused by "lack of planning, unrealistic time estimates, problem orientation, and the reluctance of subordinates to break bad news", the manager finds the solving of here-and-now problems to be greatly satisfying to the image of a manager as a problem-solver (Mackenzie, 1972, p. 174).

(4) Poor time management. "Managing time also involves anticipating future needs and taking preventive organizational action. . . . If delayed, organizational change frequently takes place in an atmosphere of crisis, adding a major handicap to an already difficult process." (Uyterhoven et. al., 1977, p. 84).

The foregoing attempts to address crisis management are simplistic and superficial. In most cases, crisis management is viewed as an individual characteristic and not as an organizational phenomenon, although some theorists have alluded to complex organization structures as precipitators of confusing and conflicting demands on the subordinates because of too many bosses. The methods suggested to resolve the condition are only partially useful due to their limited scope. If the manager, Navy or civilian, is to be provided with really useful tools to deal with crisis management, the problem must be defined in such a manner that it includes the structure of the organization, the norms of the individuals within that organization, and an awareness of the environment in which the organization must function.

E. PERSPECTIVES

Producing a definition of crisis management can be likened to attempting to contain and gather up all the pieces of a bombshell which has burst in the air: many pieces of varying sizes going off in many different directions at various speeds. Organization theory provides the broad base upon which a definition can be built.

Organization theory enables us to define and to analyze the structure of the units, the systems, and the overall organization under review. There are three components of the organization structure which are of direct concern here: the formal organization, the informal organization and the nonformal organization.

(1) The formal organization. This can be considered as the hierarchy which is normally defined on organization charts and in operating manuals.

"The formal organization is that part of the organization consciously planned to achieve a purpose or a goal. It specifies tasks to be performed in positions or offices. Rules and procedures establish both requirements for admission and departure from positions and the organization and, also, the general behavioral requirements while in the organization. It also provides the means of linking individual performances to objectives through a system of control or coordination. As a division of work is established, the type and the magnitude of the coordination to be provided is influenced. For the organization planner then, the decisions he makes to solve one set of problems creates and determines, in part, another set with which he will have to contend." (Litterer, 1969, p. 71).

A detailed analysis of the characteristics of the Navy formal organization will be deferred until Chapter IV.

(2) The informal organization. This is commonly referred

to as the "shadow" organization that exists within the formal organization. It is characterized by being loosely organized, flexible, ill-defined, as having a very vague membership where the purpose of the interactions are generally unclear, one where the goals are not specified and which is not subject to management control but operates on group norms and conformity, and one with a highly conditional leadership. It exists to "offer the individual satisfaction of the social need, a sense of belonging and identification, knowledge of approved behavior, sympathy, assistance, and an opportunity for influence and creativity" (Hicks and Gullet, 1975). Every formal organization will have an informal organization of some type (Argyris, 1960); it will have varying power and influence, and the effectiveness of the formal organization is frequently determined by the manner and the atmosphere of the interactions between the two.

(3) The nonformal organization. This organization has the same general characteristics as the informal organization, except that the individuals "reach outside their formal structure for vital information and assistance" (Stephens, 1977). The distinction is that the nonformal organization is not constrained to remain within the boundaries as established by the formal structure but may reach across multiple organizations and several hierarchical levels within the various component organizations.

Organization theory also provides us with a much-needed analytic framework within which we can examine the environment of the organizations. Variousy referred to as a "turbulent field" (Emery and Trist 1973), as "unstable" (Burns and Stalker, 1961), today's organizational environments are characterized by an ever increasing complexity of human, technological, regulatory, physical and economic demands. Not only are all these factors changing,

but the rate of change is increasing (Toffler, 1970). The predictability of the environment is decreasing, and the pressures on the organization can become unbearable unless there is some protective mechanism it can use to insulate itself from all of this. Chapter III will provide an analysis of one insulating buffer which may protect the organization to some extent.

Organization theory, finally, enables us to better understand the processes that occur within the various organizations, especially in the area of how decisions are made and how problems are defined. This area provides us with a descriptive model (how it really is) of the organization vice the more general normative model (how it should be). March and Simon (1958) have described these organization processes as:

(1) Dealing with factored problems. The problem is broken down into manageable bits, and any conflict is quasi-resolved by dealing with the bits in a sequential manner. Often the view of the whole is lost.

(2) Satisficing. The first alternative encountered which meets all the minimum criteria is accepted. It may not be the optimum solution for that organization or that situation.

(3) Problemistic search. The search for a solution does not begin until a problem has been identified, and the solution is specific for that problem. There is no motivation to take a larger perspective or to acquire general solutions, nor is there motivation to pursue organizational maintenance until someone declares that a crisis is present.

(4) Uncertainty avoidance. There is a great deal of

uncertainty about the distant future with which managers are generally uncomfortable. This discomfort can be reduced by dealing with the pressing problems of today vice the long-run strategies necessary for the future.

(5) Repertories. The manager has stock programs for handling those types of problems he considers as recurrent. The exact fit of answer to problem is rare, but not as rare as the manager's awareness of this fact.

The several approaches to conflict resolution (interpersonal, intergroup, and international) have all addressed crisis phenomena at their own levels and thus provide essential building blocks for the development of a definition of crisis management. Clinical psychology also includes perspectives of crisis situations which will be useful. These approaches are situational, but the conclusions and dynamics which they present are applicable to a systemic theory.

Studies of interpersonal conflict provide the concept of differentiating between conflict which is confronted and that which is being ignored. Any conflict which is of a major nature to one or more parties and which is not addressed openly will remain as a dysfunctional element in the organizational functioning, albeit one which may be operant below the surface level. The probability of eruption into open hostility (and thus establishing conditions of organizational crisis) is increased with the complexity of the situation at hand, the importance of the situation, and the frequency of interaction among the participants. The point which is repeatedly emphasized is that there are two ways of addressing the conflict: resolution, "such that the original differences or feelings of opposition no longer exist," and control, "whereby the negative consequences of the conflict are decreased, even though the opposing

preferences and antagonisms persist" (Walton, 1968). Resolution is, of course, the much preferred method of addressing conflict, but it is much more difficult for the manager to deal with the feelings of the conflicting individuals in an open and honest manner. It is also possible that the concept of totally resolving any conflict is utopian and invalid.

It should not be inferred from the foregoing that all conflict is undesirable and must be resolved (or at least controlled) as soon as it arises. An organization that attempts to operate in this fashion soon loses its capability to innovate. Several of the benefits of conflict have been pointed out by Mack and Snyder (1957):

(1) "Conflict sets group boundaries by strengthening group cohesiveness and separateness."

(In other words, a group of persons which is in conflict with another group will be drawn closer together, a joining of forces, if you will, and differences between the groups will be emphasized.)

(2) "Conflict reduces tension and permits maintenance of social interaction under stress."

(This means that an open confrontation of conflicting parties will reduce the tension within the group and permit more cooperative functioning of that group.)

(3) "Conflict clarifies objectives."

(By challenging the goals of the group, the various component provisions will be explained and better understood by group members.)

(4) "Conflict results in the establishment of group norms."

(Norms are those unwritten standards of individual behavior which govern the actions of group members. They are required to prevent chaos, and they function to control the nature of conflict within the group.)

(5) "Without conflict, accomodative relations would result in subordination rather than agreement."

(In other words, decisions would not be challenged, and the needs and desires of subordinates would not become known.)

Intergroup conflict studies provide many fascinating cases in the dynamics of today's world, and they contribute an awareness that a failure to recognize and deal with a change in social values will inevitably precipitate crises (Katz, 1967). The nature of the crisis is extremely situational, of course, and may range from an overthrow of the government to relocating the soft drink machines in the workers' lounge. An appropriate intergroup dynamic which must be recognized is that nearly all internal and interpersonal conflict in an organization is subdued when that system is subject to an external crisis or threat (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1971). This can be observed frequently in Navy ships where there is a great deal of internal strife and interdepartmental conflict but which immediately unifies into a coherent and very indignant group front when aspersions are cast upon the capabilities of that ship or her crew by an outsider.

In his studies of international conflict, Katz (1965) has identified forces which can be marshalled to promote conflict as well as those which can be utilized to constrain

the conflict. Although he was dealing with the international scale, these same forces can be reduced to an individual or group level. Those forces in the individual which can be "aroused for his assumption of national roles" are:

"(1) Emotional and behavioral conditioning to national symbols,

"(2) The sense of personal identity as a national,

"(3) Compensatory and defensive identification with militant nationalism,

"(4) Instrumental involvement in the national structure." (p. 423).

These same forces would apply to an individual as a member of the crew of a ship or to a player on a baseball team.

The techniques which Katz has identified for dealing with conflict on an international basis, that is, for "advancing their cause, for living with tensions, or for bringing an end to the conflict" are:

"(1) The use of force, threats, counter-threats, and deterrence,

"(2) Conflict denial,

"(3) Conflict restriction and containment,

"(4) Nonviolence and ideological conversion,

"(5) Bargaining and compromise, and

"(6) Problem-solving and creative integration." (p. 431).

As with the forces to mobilize for international conflicts, these latter quelling forces are also applicable to the individual and group levels.

The subject of international conflict has been addressed

from the perspective of clinical psychology by Babad and Solomon. In considering war as crisis (perhaps the ultimate crisis), they have found that many of the dynamics which they were observing were not limited to the war but were in fact being carried over from and back into the everyday management of organizations. They have observed that during war:

(1) There is, not surprisingly, a disruption of organizational functioning with a high need for improvisation on the part of the leader. There is a high threat level, not only to personal safety and security, but also to the capabilities of the leader as a professional. His response to this latter threat is perceived as having a significant impact on his future career in the service.

(2) There is a tendency of the leader to project a crisis where there is none or to project a worse situation than actually exists. This provides him with the opportunity to solve the crisis and to magnify his worth and his visibility to the higher levels in the hierarchy.

(3) The field commander typically has a nearly overwhelming operational overload, i. e., more to do than he possibly can accomplish. This is compounded by an informational overload, frequently referred to as having too much correct information. (This latter apparent paradox is a result of large quantities of accurate information which has little or no relevance to the tactical or strategic situation. Sorting through these data consumes a great deal of time better spent in other decision areas.)

(4) When placed in a decision situation where his career is perceived as being in jeopardy, the leader resorts to some sort of defensive behavior in order to "save face" and protect his own interests.

(5) Decisions are usually based on unchecked assumptions about subordinates and superiors as well as about environmental and situational elements.

Clinical psychology has provided another insight into the inner workings of organizations by expanding the analysis of crises arising from the major life changes of individuals, such as the death of a spouse. Four distinct stages in the crisis responses of individuals and of organizations have been identified (Caplan, 1964):

(1) An initial rise in tension due to a situation calling for the organism to produce problem-solving responses.

(2) A further rise in tension when the efforts to resolve the situation are ineffective, and a feeling of helplessness begins to set in.

(3) A still further rise in tension accompanied by an emergency mobilization of internal and external resources.

(4) Disorganization or disorientation if the problem is not resolved or avoided.

The development of crises on the organizational level have been observed to be the result of certain "administrative demands":

"(1) Administrative demands for changed employee behavior that employees cannot avoid.

"(2) Demands for changed employee behaviors by administrators who are perceived by employees to be uncaring or distant.

"(3) Demands for changed employee behaviors by administrators who are consistent, persistent, and insistent regarding institution of the changes.

"(4) Administrative demands for changed employee behavior when those demands are not supported by either middle-management personnel or by employee leaders." (Mandell and Zacker, 1977, p. 367).

The Navy's Human Resource Management System provides an example of these administrative demands (as well as the sometimes subtle nature of the crises). Units are scheduled for Human Resource Availabilities (HRAV's) by higher authority. The unit has little or no input to this schedule, nor does it have a choice about whether or not it will have the HRAV (administrative demands 1 and 2). The HRAV requirement is firmly institutionalized at the CINCPACFLT level, as are the principles of management which are presented during the HRAV. These principles and the behaviors which they entail are very different from those encountered in actual practice in the fleet (administrative demands 3 and 4). Accordingly, it is frequently observed that little more than lip-service is actually paid to the Human Resource Management Centers at the upper and middle levels (as will be developed in Chapter IV, these persons "know how one really needs to act" in order to succeed). The lower levels become confused by hearing one thing and having another modelled for them. This creates a crisis of leadership consistency within the unit and usually results in significant organizational stress.

There are, however, administrative actions which can be associated with a satisfactory outcome of the crisis (decreased tensions and increased organizational capability), i. e.,

"(1) Those that promote employee input into the process and the mechanics of the administrative requirements.

"(2) Those that promote employee participation in the discussion of issues raised by the administrative requirements.

"(3) Those that support the development of appropriate internal and external resources for employees to fulfill the administrative requirements.

"(4) Those that have firm requirements that the changes become institutionalized." (Ibid).

These contributions from psychology will be particularly valuable in the understanding of the behavioral norms which influence Navy leaders.

In order to create a satisfactory definition of crisis management, there must be an integration of the above areas: interpersonal conflict, intergroup conflict, international conflict, and psychological analysis of crisis. This will be done in a contextual manner during the model development and the presentation of systemic elements supporting crisis management. It will entail a differentiation between crisis management (an organizational dysfunction) and management of crisis (a managerial skill). It must also be recognized that the structure of the Navy, the norms of individual behavior (those arising from both the formal and the informal organizations), the environment within which Navy leaders operate, and the incidence of crisis management are all intertwined and are mutually supportive. To attempt to change any or all of these in its entirety is not only impractical, but there is a substantial case for such actions being not particularly desirable. However, continuing the status quo is dysfunctional and may prove to be catastrophic in the relatively near future. In view of the decreasing population of service-aged males and the low retention rates currently being experienced, any element which adversely impacts on the management of the Navy and on the individual's confidence in his leaders and in the organization as a whole must be addressed immediately. Action to remedy that situation is essential. If a problem is highlighted and not addressed at its root level shortly thereafter, unfulfilled expectations will increase, and the

degree of dissatisfaction will actually rise. Despite the "problem-solving" approach used too often in the past, the problem will not go away by ignoring it or by denying that it exists.

III. DEFINITION AND MODELS

A. CRISIS MANAGEMENT DEFINED

A crisis situation is created by the short-notice introduction of one or more additional commitments into an organization's already full schedule. It is characterized by vague guidance as to the relative importance of the new commitment in comparison to existing ones, and there is generally no opportunity afforded for the unit to request reconsideration of the imposition. Thus there are four elements to the definition of crisis management:

(1) Additional requirements on an already full schedule. This expands the commitments on the organization beyond the capability of its normal resources to respond adequately to all of them. This expansion may be internal to the organization due to an oversight on its own part, but more typically it is due to the external imposition of an additional commitment. There is also the situation of an internal oversight precipitating a crisis, yet it is usually perceived by the organization as externally imposed because it is the external source (superior) which brings it to the organization's attention.

(2) Short notice. This precludes or reduces the time available for planning as well as for action. Models of the time dimension will be presented later in this chapter.

(3) Vague prioritization. Although there is more to be

done than can reasonably be expected of the organization, that organization receives little assistance in determining what has to be done first. This, of course, opens the door for the well-recognized case of the urgent overriding the important (Drucker, 1967; Mackenzie, 1972), i. e., one in which the organization spends most of its time putting out brush fires while the real business goes unattended. Since priorities must be set by the subordinate level organization, they are usually a function of the perceived power (or the relative seniority in the direct chain-of-command) of the source of the commitment.

(4) No opportunity for reconsideration. The lack of reclama or opportunity for negotiation over its own fate strains the organization's sense of justice since it has had no "day in court". Such negotiation would include not only the new, short-notice commitment but also the overall organizational workloading. It is usually possible to make trade-offs which the subordinate organization would consider equitable without affecting the mission capability of the unit, but the appropriate negotiations seldom take place, however. This element fulfills the second and third administrative action which promotes organizational crisis as set forth by Mandell and Zacker (Chapter II, Section B, page 19).

An organization operating under crisis management conditions would be classified as "head down, tail up". It is an organization which is overburdened, understaffed, operating in a reactive mode, unsure of the importance of the events facing it, and with little or no recourse but to "keep on plugging away". Although this is not a particularly pretty picture, it must be recognized that it is not atypical for Navy units to operate in this manner.

E. MANAGEMENT OF CRISES

Management of crisis is the way in which an organization or, more particularly, the organization's leaders go about resolving the crisis situation as described above. This real-world organizational response to crisis management can be illustrated by reviewing the managerial styles and approaches to crisis of two very different organizations.

The first group to be reviewed has a rather lax managerial style: there is a great deal of freedom for group or individual decisions, leader participation is unstructured and minimized, event sequences are poorly regulated, and information is provided only when requested. This style has been given the appellation "laissez-faire" (Lewin, Lippitt, and White, 1939). Generally, the requirements on the organization are fairly well-known internally, having been emphasized by the leader's oral admonitions. Planning has been rather informal (in Navy parlance, it is referred to as "wheel book" management, i. e., operating out of a notebook which the supervisor carries in his hip pocket). The lack of prioritization in this organization insures that the method of addressing each problem will be a function of the mindframe of the leader. In other words, subordinates do not normally have very many standard procedures upon which they can rely. Each situation must be handled on a contingent basis.

This laissez-faire organization responds to crisis management in a relatively calm manner because reactive management is the standard operating procedure (perhaps the only one). The leader must review the commitments facing the organization and redefine his mental image. Until this is done and the subordinates advised of the revised "plan", everyone in the group must play a "guess a priority" game.

The smooth functioning of the organization at this point depends a great deal on how well the subordinates know the superior and how accurate is their prediction of his new concept of the goals to be realized in the immediate future. The situation is often marked by the overlooking of some element in the overall picture which precipitates another crisis, and so on ad infinitum. Those projects which are of relatively low priority and which are abandoned will generally die (Drucker, 1967).

The Navy has established numerous requirements, however, which make this type of organization an anachronism. The current procedures for formal planning, for review of those plans by seniors in the chain of command, and the more sophisticated management techniques being introduced into the fleet, all of which are increasingly monitored by inspections and "assist" teams, insure that the laissez-faire organization is a dinosaur facing extinction.

The "modern" Navy organization is well aware of the many commitments which it must accommodate. This is a result of an extensive promulgation of schedules and the procedure to be followed in accomplishing most tasks (often in such detail that a daily checklist is provided). Planning is formal: there are official, agenda-run meetings with minutes provided to all attendees, all plans of action which are developed are published and reviewed frequently, and the order of the events is considered to establish the priority. This planning is based on a quantification of the resources with which the organization can work. These resources are dollars, people (converted to manhours), and the time frame between the present and the due date.

This latter organization reacts to crisis management in a more logical, precise, and predictable manner than the former. The reaction is, however, a much more frantic one.

Because the resources were fully defined and quantified, they could be rationally allocated to the various tasks on a prioritized basis until either the resources or the tasks ran out (it is highly unlikely that there would be more resources than tasks in organizations attempting to reduce the work week to sixty hours). The imposition of a new task means that there are no resources with which to address the new commitment. This is an immediate and intuitive conclusion made by the managers of the organization as well as by the workers within it. But intuitive conclusions do not meet those criteria for formal planning under which the unit operates. A revision of the plan of action is made. The new priorities are again a function of the power of the originator of the new commitment because no other criteria have been provided.

The planning itself becomes the source of a new dilemma for the organization: there is a certain minimum of information which must be available in order to conduct a meaningful planning session; collection of this information takes time; the time used to collect the information takes away from the time available for action on the task; action may not commence until until the planning is fairly well completed; the time span has been critically reduced in the first place in order to meet the criteria for crisis management. Accordingly, the unit, although attempting to plan in a reasonable manner, assumes a "flail state" while trying to sort out the problems and the solutions. The extensive adoption of standard procedures has provided categorized, authorized solutions to many problems. Because innovation or non-standard approaches are risky, there may be "force-fitting" of solutions to problems and a marked decrease in effectiveness, efficiency, or both.

This process has been described in detail as the "garbage can model" of organizational behavior (Cohen and

March, 1974) in which an organization is viewed as being composed of four independent streams: problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities. The decision process consists of mixing the four in a garbage can and extracting a combination of possible alternatives. In a Navy context the solutions are highly restricted by standard procedures, the participants are limited, and the choice opportunities are externally determined by senior level scheduling. Only the problems are unlimited. A significant part of the organization's problems originate in the mandate that no task will be permitted to drop out of the load. They have all been accounted for in the planning processes, and they must all be done, including the new task.

The organization, or rather, the leaders have no recourse at this point but to expand the only resource over which they have any control--manhours. The dollars, the numbers of people, and the time frame are all relatively inflexible, but by expansion of the workday, the manhour resource can be expanded within those constraints. The result is increased dissatisfaction--dissatisfaction internally with the longer working hours and the perceived lack of foresight by their leaders, and dissatisfaction externally with the frustration of repeated attempts to plan in an orderly fashion only to have to do it all over again when a new commitment is dropped into the schedule. This increased dissatisfaction is reflected in the decreasing retention rates being experienced by the Navy. The extended workday for the fleet units and the perception of management as not being able to see very far into the future are major contributory elements to retention as a symptom of greater organizational malaise.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL

Perhaps the most widely accepted organizational model is that developed by Leavitt (1965; Leavitt et. al., 1973). It shows the organization as being composed of people, task, structure, and technology in mutual interaction (see Figure 1).




Figure 1 - LEAVITT'S ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL

The particular value of this model is that it reflects the dynamic way in which each element can affect and perhaps even drive the actions of one or more of the other elements. For example, a unit which is critically undermanned may have to reorganize its structure, to make more extensive use of labor-saving technology while avoiding labor-intensive machinery, and may have to redefine its mission (task). A major weakness of this model is that it is only an internal view and is, therefore, simplistic and incomplete. Accordingly, a picture of the environment must be superimposed on the organization.

A complete and yet uncomplicated concept of the environment is provided in the ecological model of the organization (Forbes, 1978). In this model the environment is composed of five interactive forces: economic forces (budgets, materials, and personnel resources), human forces (psychological, social, and political), technical forces (engineering, science, and information processing), regulatory forces (legal, administrative, and moral), and physical forces (geographical, climatic, and spatial influences). A static model of the environment is provided in Figure 2.




Figure 2 - ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES

The various forces in the environment can be hostile or benign, and the character and relative strength of the hostility or friendliness can change rapidly. In considering crisis management, the changes also occur unpredictably.

This model of the organization and its environment, when integrated, shows every element of the organization as being open to direct impact by all of the environmental forces. Although this is true to some extent in real-life organizations, there is an insulating effect provided by the organization itself. The ecological model provides a buffer between the organization and the direct influence of the environment. In this model, time is viewed as a semi-permeable membrane through which the environmental forces penetrate to one or more organizational elements for interaction (see Figure 3).




Figure 3 - THE ECOLOGICAL MODEL

Thus time becomes the critical factor in this model in that it is the determinant of the ability of the organization to prepare for contact with the environment. If the contact is to be hostile, such as an inspection with mission competence at stake (Propulsion Examining Board, nuclear weapons, etc.), expansion of the time factor between establishment of the event and its actual occurrence will reduce the impact on the normal operations of the organization. No-notice inspections (i. e., minimizing the buffer thickness at all points) are often proposed as a means of insuring that high standards of readiness are continually maintained by the fleet. It has also been hypothesized that this would reduce the adverse psychological effects of having a long-term threat hanging over one's head. The merits or faults of these arguments will not be addressed here, but it must be maintained that such procedures would contribute greatly to the institutionalizing of crisis management and would significantly reduce the predictability of the organization's already unstable environment.

If the contact with the environment is to be benign, as for a pre-inspection assist visit, there is an apparent paradox in that either expansion or contraction of the time buffer between initiation and event will have beneficial results. If the buffer is expanded, the organization again has more time to prepare for the event and thus can maximize the benefits to be gained by an assist visit evaluation. On the other hand, decreasing the buffer will give the organization the benefits (deficiency list to work on, definition of needed assets, etc.) sooner and thus permit an earlier start on corrective action. However, imposition of an assist visit on too short a notice may so severely disrupt the organization's schedule that crisis management again results, and full benefit from the visit is precluded.

The criticality of the time dimension will be examined in greater detail in a later section of this chapter.

D. DYNAMICS OF THE MCDEL

The normal operations of an organization can be viewed as major commitments spaced evenly and sequentially on a time continuum. In terms of this model, only one environmental force will interact with the organization at any one time, and that interaction will primarily involve only one organizational element. The other organizational elements will be affected by this interaction, of course, because of the close-linked nature of the elements. The key to normal operations is the predictable and controlled rate of change of the buffer width. As a commitment approaches, the insulating buffer between the organization and the environment grows progressively thinner, and on the due date the thickness at the impacting point is effectively zero.

Under crisis management, however, the orderly functioning of the model deteriorates drastically. Commitments of major significance occur in rapid succession or simultaneously. By definition, many are of a short-notice, urgent nature. The spacing of the events on the time continuum is no longer even or sequential. The rate of change of the buffer thickness is neither predictable nor controllable. Under conditions of simultaneous events, the thickness of the buffer will be equal to zero at multiple points. An additional effect is that the buffer is very thin in areas where there is no direct contact because of the influence of pressing downstream events.

The result is a constructive disequilibrium between the organization and the environment. When one element within

the organization is primarily responsible for interacting with the environment in more than one area, or, when the different organizational elements are interacting with different environmental forces, there is a breakdown of the communication and supportive links between the elements. The lack of clearly defined priorities external to the organization provides the basis for a similar lack of priorities within the organization, and the efforts of the unit become disjointed and ineffective. The different elements may even be pulling in opposite directions. The cohesive and unified nature of the organization breaks down to a greater or lesser extent depending on the significance and degree of simultaneity of the commitments. The organization is prohibited from addressing its problems in a sequential manner (March and Simon, 1958; see Chapter II.B, p. 13), and thus the organizational processes upon which the unit relies for its existence begin to break down.


If the multiple contact points are sufficiently numerous or become so closely spaced that the organization cannot accommodate them all even with greatly expanded manhour resources, the conceptual effect is that the environment collapses in onto the organization and overwhelms it entirely. This is the point where major schedule revisions must occur, and it is typical for a great deal of outside assistance to be provided to the organization to insure its survival. That the source of the accommodating schedule changes and of the external assistance is the same source which precipitated the organization's "crisis" in the first place does not appear to initiate a great deal of introspective questioning by the Navy hierarchy at any level.

E. BUFFER EFFECTS

Time has been presented as the critical factor in establishing the criteria for crisis management. This was referred to earlier in this chapter as the dilemma of planning which faces the modern Navy organization.

In analyzing this dilemma, the first element which should be considered is the relationship of time to information. The accuracy of the information which is needed to take action is a function of the availability of time to collect it (see Figure 4). This is nothing more than common sense--the more time there is, the better the information which can be collected. (Figure 4 shows the relationship as linear. This has been done only to enhance the simplicity of the models; no assumptions about the actual shape of the curve have been or should be made.)


The factors affecting the relationship of time to information include the complexity of the applicable data, internal processing time, where the data are located, how hard it is to locate and obtain, and the security requirements over its handling and processing. It should be noted that the model reflects the fact that there is always some delay time between the initiation of information search and the actual acquisition of the information. It also shows that no matter how much time is available, all applicable information probably cannot be obtained or processed. This can be referred to as an "information gap". It has long been recognized that decision-making must take place under informational uncertainty, but that the uncertainty and the risk can be minimized by more complete information.



- a - Acquisition Delay
- b - Information Gap

Figure 4 - INFORMATION-TIME RELATIONSHIP


The second element contributing to the criticality of time is the relationship of action to time. The ability to act and the effectiveness of the action are functions of the time between initiation and the due date (see Figure 5). This model reflects the normal inability of an organization to take action the very instant that a commitment is generated. However, it can frequently complete the appropriate action before the due date by a marshalling of its resources. This latter ability is the action curve's potential "resource effect". Some action curves are inflexible in that there is a certain amount of time required to perform a task, no matter how extensive the resources. (For example, "baking in" the PA tube on an air search radar cannot be expedited with additional personnel.) Other action curves are very flexible and will have a widely variable "resource effect", one which is proportional to dedicated resources.



- a - Initiation Delay
- b - Resource Effect

Figure 5 - ACTION-TIME RELATIONSHIP

Action and information are, of course, intertwined and mutually dependent. The initiation of action is highly dependent on the availability of a minimum amount of information (see Figure 6). Again the model shows an information gap. This is because all actions can usually be completed without having all the information which exists in the system. Past experiences and "good guessing" enable the unit to fill in the informational gaps.




a - Minimum Information to Act

b - Information Gap

Figure 6 - INFORMATION-ACTION RELATIONSHIP

An integration of action and information with time as the determinant produces a plane of potential effectiveness upon which the organization operates (see Figure 7). The goal is to arrive at the commitment date with all actions effectively completed. These actions are ideally based upon complete information (in both volume and accuracy) collected in the available time period. This model shows how the delay between initiation of the commitment and the commencement of action is actually composed of two elements--the delay in actual acquisition of information (see Figure 4) and the delay between that point and the attainment of the minimum information needed to take action (see Figure 6). The model also includes early completion from the resource effect (see Figure 5) and the typical information gap (see Figure 4) when all actions are completed.

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- a - Information Acquisition Delay
- b - Action Initiation Delay
- c - Resource Effect
- d - Information Gap
- o - Origin
- A - Plane of Potential Effectiveness

Figure 7 - PLANE OF POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS

An operational example of this process is provided by the actions of a ship scheduled for a major fleet exercise. Although the ship may be aware of its participation for six months or a year in advance, the intervening commitments and the decreasing utility of dated information means that very few preparations will be made that far in advance. As the exercise date begins to approach, however, it becomes imperative that the ship begin to get ready (Item a, Figure 4, p. 39). The search for information begins--cognizant officers in the hierarchy are identified; operation orders and tasking messages are gathered. As these data are digested, certain actions are identified for the ship (Item a, Figure 6, p. 43). Fuel, special ammunition and electronic equipment are requisitioned, and stores are loaded. As the underway date draws near, the minutiae of the exercise and more detailed taskings emerge, and the preparations of the ship escalate to high gear. Charts are laid out, publications needed for tactical situations are pre-located at the watchstations where they will be needed, special training procedures are used to insure that the ship will be at the maximum readiness for its programmed involvement in the exercise. Last minute repairs are made where needed. At the appointed hour, the ship is underway with a trained crew, fully operational engineering plant, ready weapons systems, and a full load of fuel and stores. If the ship is designated to escort an aircraft carrier, however, her crew may have little knowledge of the details of an amphibious operation taking place only a few miles distant (Item b, Figure 6, p. 43). Or if the ship is a replenishment ciler, there may be little awareness of the flight schedule of the carrier. Accordingly, it can be visualized that at the commitment date, all appropriate actions were completed, but there is still somewhat of an information deficiency.

As with the other models and concepts, the simplicity

and predictability of this relationship falls apart under crisis management. Under the conditions of multiple, simultaneous commitments, the ability of the organization to devote its attention to a task, to gather information, and to take appropriate actions are split between the competing goals (see Figure 8). This complex model reflects the divided attention which real-life organizations face under crisis management conditions. In order for the organization to address both goals, the resources to be used in taking action and the information-gathering efforts must be split between the goals. As the due date for the simultaneous events presses ever closer, the divisive forces become more emphatic. The small square (Surface A, Figure 8) represents the position of suboptimal equilibrium upon which the organization will have a tendency to settle. While the organization operates over this surface, the flow of information and the actions taken with respect to both goals is balanced. In other words, under conditions of conflicting goals, they have both been accomplished to the maximum extent possible with the resources available.

But, as is obvious from the model, when the due date is reached, the organization still suffers from an information deficiency in both goal areas. In fact, the aggregate information gap is far in excess of the gap under single goal conditions. The adequacies of the actions taken are also less than optimum. (The diagram shows that the actions are approximately fifty percent completed. This assumes a linear, bi-directional axis and is used only for illustration purposes. The scale would have to be logarithmic for greater than fifty percent completion--such an assumption would be quite credible in view of actual fleet performances.) The model also reflects an aggregate action delay effect from trying to do two things at once. The result is that it takes longer to get started on either goal than it normally would.

This model is a bit simplistic in that it reflects simultaneous occurrence and equal priorities. If the priorities are slightly unequal but the accomplishment time frames remain essentially overlapping, the splitting of efforts to gather information and to take action will be weighted by the leader's subjective evaluation of the risk associated with the suboptimal accomplishment of each goal. In other words, the higher priority goal or the one with the greater cost of poor accomplishment will be completed to a more satisfactory level than the one determined to be of lesser importance to the organization (c. f., approach-approach conflict in social psychology, e. g., Brown, 1957).

Within the conceptual framework provided by the ecological model of the organization and its environment and by the models of information and action interactions with reference to time, the structure of the Navy as a contributor to crisis management and the behavioral norms of

Navy personnel will be examined.

IV. SUPPORTIVE ELEMENTS

A. ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

Crisis management is an organizational phenomenon. By that it is meant that this operational mode is so widespread in the Navy that it has become a standard operating procedure. A partial understanding of how such a dysfunctional process can be so extensive and yet tolerated is obtained from the analysis of the structure of the Navy itself.

The Navy is a classic hierarchical bureaucracy. The word "bureaucracy" produces immediate negative and perhaps unfortunate connotations. This is particularly true for the military where the officers like to think of themselves as antithetical to the traditional "bureaucrat". A review of the characteristics of bureaucracy (Weber, 1946), however, indicates the relevance of this organizational definition to the Navy:

(1) The sphere of influence of each individual is clearly defined.

(2) The authority associated with each office or position in the organization is hierarchical, that is, every office is subordinate to some higher office.

(3) The rules for operating the organization are rational and intentional, and there is an orderly system of

files established for maintenance of the organization's history.

(4) Each individual receives thorough training for a new position before he assumes the job.

(5) There is obedience to the position or to rank, but it is not related to the personal relationship with the individual. One is not required to like or to associate with a superior in other than a professional matter.

(6) Promotion is based on seniority within the organization or on particularly noteworthy achievement. The superiors judge the qualifications of the individual for advancement and increased responsibility within the organization.

(7) Individual behavior and discipline are based on the position held within the organization and not on ownership of a part of the operations.

The management system in the bureaucratic organization is equally structured (Burns, 1963):

(1) There is a differentiation of the various functional tasks, i. e., job specialization.

(2) There is an extensive use of advanced technology to improve the processes within the organization. As the means are developed, however, there is a marked tendency to ignore the ends of the concern. This is frequently referred to as a "means-ends inversion".

(3) Success within the organization is highly dependent on recognition of an individual's tasks by his superiors.

(4) Both the rights and the obligations of the individual and of the organization are precisely defined.

(5) Responsibilities within the organization are applied to the various functional positions and not to the individuals themselves.

(6) Control, authority, and communication are hierarchical. This means that information and power are passed vertically, and there is usually no mechanism for the lateral transfer of either one.

(7) The knowledge of the real nature of situations (having the "big picture"), the reconciliation of task assignments and information mismatches, and the assessment of relevance to both task and information is exclusively a function of top management. The higher in the hierarchy, the greater the knowledge and the greater the relevance of the various inputs to that level.

(8) Because of the vertical power and information passing, and because of the superiority of knowledge possessed by the upper levels, nearly all interactions will be vertical. This insures that one of the parties will have more of the valuable commodities of power or information to share with the subordinate. Lateral interactions have a reduced benefit as well as a reduced visibility factor.

(9) The operations of the organization subunits and the behaviors of the individuals within them are governed fairly rigidly by the superiors.

(10) Membership in the organization is conditional upon obedience to the superior and loyalty to the organization.

(11) There is more importance attached to local

knowledge than to general knowledge. This breeds an organization composed of highly specialized "resident experts" with only the highest levels aware of or interested in the overall strategy of the organization.

The institution of bureaucracy in America began to flourish in the late 1800's as the industrial world became able to support larger and larger organizations to accomplish the multiplying tasks facing it. Although the scientific and manufacturing worlds were undergoing rapid and rather drastic changes, the great social movements had not yet begun, nor had technological progress found its way into the everyday lives of the common man. Exploitation of the masses was tolerated, and the government had not yet begun to exert its regulatory might. Thus the environment was relatively calm, and bureaucracy was able to develop unmolested or challenged by other organizational forms. This adaptation of bureaucracy to a benign environment is well recognized.

"Bureaucracy thrives in a highly competitive, undifferentiated and stable environment, such as the climate of its youth, the Industrial Revolution. A pyramidal structure of authority, with power concentrated in the hands of a few with the knowledge and resources to control an entire enterprise was, and is, an eminently suitable social arrangement for routinized tasks." (Bennis, 1965, p. 73).

Or, more simply:

"A mechanistic management system is appropriate to stable conditions." (Burns and Stalker, 1961, p. 119).

In attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of bureaucratic organizations, one must recognize that there are several distinct advantages to this organizational form. One category has come to be called the technical advantages of bureaucracy (Weber, 1946). These are precision, speed,

unambiguity, continuity, and the reduction of material and personnel costs. Other advantages, which would be called non-technical, are the predictability of the bureaucratic organizational response under various conditions, the criteria for success have been defined and can usually be found in writing, and the existence of a widespread, highly refined "corporate knowledge" which usually resides in the informal organization.

These advantages, however, may not be sufficient to enable the bureaucratic organization to operate effectively in today's world. By reviewing briefly the current nature of the environmental forces which impact on the organization (technical, human, regulatory, economic, and physical), it can be determined that the environment is, in fact, far from the stability to which bureaucracy is adapted.

(1) Technical forces. There is nearly an exponential growth in these factors in recent years. The advances are so rapid that the ability to produce state-of-the-art weapons and sensors lags well behind discoveries. The sheer mass of scientific and technological information that has to be digested by today's officer is staggering, yet his very survival may depend on it. In terms of the information-time relationship model (see Figure 4, p. 39), the information search is greatly complicated and made much more time-consuming. This of course impacts on the ability of the unit to act on the information.

(2) Human forces. There are many social variations which impact upon the organization. Some of these within the Navy are the non-economic matters that are becoming increasingly important to the individual, the shift in behavior related to the increased importance of individual values in the place of organizational values, and the miniscule changes in managerial techniques over the decades which causes

increased organizational dissatisfaction (Bowers, 1975).

(3) Regulatory forces. These are continually changing and increasing, both from within and from outside the Navy. The significance of this factor was repeatedly pointed out by the respondents to CDR Mumford's article (Proceedings, August, 1977). Three factors which were considered as overwhelming by Navy unit commanders were the extensive follow-up reporting that was required of them, the add-on instructions which showered upon them and which so confused the issue that required actions were often contradictory, and a feeling of emphasis on the procedures and a discrediting of the effectiveness of the results. In addition, congressional actions are increasingly influencing the management of the Navy and other military forces, and the threat of unionization promises to increase the regulatory forces substantially.

(4) Economic forces. Cuts in military budgets, the increasing share of the budget which must go to support the personnel areas, decreasing material reliability all contribute to the constant state of fiscal fluctuation which must be faced. Additionally, there is an impact from the regular cost-of-living pay raises which do not match those of the civil service or the current rate of inflation: anger and growing dissatisfaction among military personnel.

(5) Physical forces. Bi-annual moves (frequently cross-country), the regular deployments, crowding aboard ships with outdated facilities (not restricted to the fleet, however, since many of the shore facilities are operating out of pre-World War II buildings), and the heat or cold and noise associated with shipboard life make these factors quite unsettling.

In the above brief analysis of the Navy's environment,

it is quite evident that that environment cannot be classified as stable. The conditions are further complicated by the fluctuating world tensions and corresponding Navy commitments which are an integral part of any military organization's existence. The disadvantages of the bureaucratic structure become even more severe when the organization is enmeshed inextricably in an unstable environment. A review of some of these disadvantages is in order.

A common bureaucratic tendency when faced with instability is a firm reliance on the boundaries of responsibility (Burns, 1963). This is marked by the passing of problems to a point in the organization where responsibility is known and accepted, or, barring that, passing the problems to a superior for resolution. The result is nearly always an overloading of the superiors. They are required by the organization to be involved with most decisions and are responsible for almost all coordination. The appropriate level for the decisions or for the coordination may be several levels below that at which the action is finally taken. Such overloading of the superior creates multiple goal conflicts on an individual vice on an organizational level. The model developed in Chapter III (see Figure 8, p. 48) applies here also, and there is a strong tendency for suboptimal accomplishment of the simultaneous requirements.

A second tendency for the bureaucracy is to continue to differentiate in order to meet the needs of the environment as it continually changes. As new needs are generated by the environment, the organization creates a new specialist to handle it. This may involve the creation of whole new groups or staffs within the hierarchy. And, as the specialists multiply, the organization finds that the various elements are no longer or are marginally capable of communicating

with each other, so internal interpreters and intermediaries are created for the purpose of "liason" (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Of course, as stated previously, the responsibility for the relevance of all of this lies with the superior, but it will probably be accepted as a natural outgrowth of his coordination and decision-making duties.

Accompanying the differentiation of the organization and the retreating behind boundaries of job definition is a reduction in organizational lateral communications, an element which is already not a strong point in the bureaucracy. Some of the slack may be picked up by the intermediaries, but unless they receive specific tasking to do so, they usually will not take on this added responsibility. It must be recognized that there is value associated with information: he who has it is accorded greater status and is less dispensable to the organization than one who does not have information. As with any valuable and rare commodity, there is a tendency to hoard this information and to share only as much as is necessary to get by. Accordingly, information-guarding is another element among the causes of poor lateral communications. Information-guarding also severely affects the availability of that information to those parts of the organization which need it to act. Thus the information acquisition delay can be greatly expanded (see Figure 4, p. 39). A final contributory factor is the responsibility of the individual to the superior, with only weak responsibility ties to the organization. Although the informal organization does exert some influence on the individual to share his information, the survival of the individual within the organization rests with his superior, not with his peers. Therefore, the organizational forces supporting lateral communications are weak at best.

Still another tendency of bureaucracies in the

environment of change is evidenced by the decision-making habits of the leaders. Because of their limited exposure to the many refined decision models and management techniques being developed today (some of which are listed below in Chapter V), there is a marked tendency for bureaucratic managers to categorize both their decision-making aids and the problems which they face (see "Repertoires", Chapter II.B, p. 14; March and Simon, 1958). In most cases they do match the categories somewhat so that the selected solution is in the same general area as the problem, but the exact fit may not be right. This also results in a much reduced search for new and better alternative solutions (Merton, 1940).

The individuals within the bureaucracy are subjected to numerous forces which produce a dispersion of their commitment. By virtue of their membership in the organization, they are required to be committed to the organization itself. But this is diluted by the individual's commitment to his superior (both in the form of hero-worship and in the form of having to support the superior in order to survive), by a commitment to himself (especially if his self-image is one of the "comer" in the organization), by a commitment to his work group as an ascendant system within the organization, and finally by a commitment to the informal organization because it meets his social and psychological needs. The end result of this dispersion of commitment is that the organization receives the pauper's share of the individual's concerns.

The final disadvantageous tendency of bureaucracy which is to be considered is the political maneuvering which goes on in the organization. This is operant at several levels. The first is the internal system-vs.-system level. Here the established subgroups in the bureaucracy unite to reject the newer groups and insure that they (the original ones) will

not be replaced. This is summarized in the following:

"When changes are manifested not only by the intrusion of new kinds of task and new kinds of resources, or even by the recruitment of 'new kinds of people', but by clothing them in new institutional forms, they take on the appearance of a threat to the other parts of the existing order, instead of a source of new life. . . . In brief, what happens is that a plan revised in terms of changing the working organization fails to materialize because factors of status and politics play a determining role, and nobody realizes, or rather, admits, that these are real problems to be dealt with. When these factors intervene, as they must, they are regarded as illegitimate if they are recognized at all, and the person who is thought to be advancing (or resisting) claims for increased power or status is condemned as more concerned for himself than for the job." (Burns and Stalker, 1961, p. 192).

In this passage we find also the paradox of the individuals using their "concern for the job" as a front for self-serving behavior which may be dysfunctional from the organization's perspective.

Political maneuvering also takes place at the individual level. This may be rather subtle, but it can be recognized as an outgrowth of the regulations and increased rigidity of behavior of the individuals as they rely on the limits of their responsibilities. The defensibility of the individual's behavior is greatly increased (March and Simon, 1958), even when his legitimate refusal to act causes widespread problems elsewhere. The recent examples of organizational distress caused by employees utilizing "working to the rule" as a coercive technique indicate the potential danger to large organizations. A proliferation of "book men" is a symptom of organizations which are proceeding down this somewhat dangerous path.

This individual rigidity and political behavior becomes a self-sustaining force as pointed out below:

". . . The reduction in personalized relationships . . . facilitates the development of an esprit de corps, i. e., increases the extent to which goals are perceived as shared among members of the group. Such

a sense of commonness of purpose, interests and character increases the propensity of organization members to defend each other against outside pressures. This, in turn, solidifies the tendency toward rigid behavior." (March and Simon, 1958, p. 39).

In other words, any outside pressures will unify the organization in its political maneuvering to defend itself against the perceived threat. At the same time, the individuals will be driven even deeper into their reliance on the strict boundaries of their responsibilities and further reduce the internal cooperation necessary for the organization's survival under unstable environmental conditions.

The above brief description of some of the characteristics of the bureaucratic structure of the Navy will permit an examination of the relationships between that structure and crisis management.

The first characteristic of bureaucratic organizations which is related to crisis management is the tendency of the organization to expand its differentiation in order to respond to uncertainty and new challenges. This creates a cadre of "resident experts" who can deal with external and internal requirements quite efficiently, but the management of a multitude of specialists is extremely demanding of the superior (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The following symptoms appear in a large, differentiating bureaucracy:

--The management of diversified specialists demands a generalist if the organization is to be coordinated and monitored adequately. Such generalists cannot be obtained from within an organization which is producing senior specialists. If an attempt is made to introduce the generalist from an outside organization, the credibility and experiences of the "intruder" will not permit him to function effectively as the manager. The least dysfunctional

path is to promote the most competent specialist.

--The actions of the specialist subgroups tend to be redundant and uncoordinated. Subordinate individuals and organizations become burdened with duplicative or conflicting demands. The senior levels are overloaded by requirements to resolve the conflicts, and they are usually unable to provide additional resources to remedy the problem. The leaders as well as the subordinates become trapped in a routine of suboptimal goal accomplishment.

--Lateral communications between the differentiated elements is weak or non-existent. Attempts at integration are simplistic and frequently fail because there was no prior establishment of common spheres of influence (or clustering of similar accountable paths).

--A corollary to the redundant requirements is an inadequate or non-existent prioritization system. When the unit is forced to prioritize based on what it considers to be an appropriate weighting scheme (as previously mentioned, this is often a function of the seniority or the power of the originating source), the time and resource allocation becomes a risky business with the price of a wrong guess being fairly high.

--The requirements for follow-up are frequently nebulous. The same argument applies to justification for the continued existence of the subgroups. In other words, if a new program or a reporting requirement is initiated, it is very unusual for that program or report sponsor to have to defend its existence on a recurring basis. Even more unusual is for such a program or report to have a "self-destruct" date after which it simply no longer exists. The perpetuation of outdated requirements becomes highly likely, and the probability of these programs and reports actually

being in consonance with the organization's goals is diminished. Certain communities have realized this tendency and have introduced the new concept of "sunset laws", i. e., those which must be repeatedly reapproved by public referendum if they are to remain in effect. This is a relatively recent and not very widespread technique for insuring the current nature of the regulatory forces in the society. Unfortunately, should such a destruct date be included with a new requirement, the subgroup in charge of it frequently becomes so involved in defending its own continued existence that the perspective of the organizational goals is soon lost.

--The location within the organization of the "resident experts" which the system generates is hard to locate and is often unspecified. This greatly increases the time expended to obtain that information which is needed to begin action, and the crisis management issue is further complicated. Associated with this is the inability or unwillingness of the "expert" to take responsibility for his actions or to be quoted as a source of information. This means that more time will pass before a supervisor can be advised of the situation so he can make a decision. And, of course, if authorization for the unit to act must be obtained, this will fall into the same time-delay pattern.

A second characteristic of bureaucratic organizations which relates to crisis management is the proliferation of rules and regulations. This is a function of the bureaucracy's continued specialization and differentiation in that standard procedures are established to fill the vacuum created by the poor lateral communications. These rules and regulations define the extent and the nature of the coordinating relationships within the organization, but they do not insure its effectiveness, nor do they account for the information-guarding which can be found throughout a

bureaucratic organization.

These proliferating rules and regulations have tended of late to specify in increasing detail the level of accomplishment which is expected of the units (a minimum percentage of weekly maintenance actions which must be accomplished, the minimum score which is acceptable on an inspection, etc.). By such specification, it is increasingly possible that the units will be violating the Pareto principle in their task accomplishment (Mackenzie, 1972). This principle states that the first eighty percent of a job is completed in the first twenty percent of the time expended on it. The remaining eighty percent of the time is spent trying, occasionally futilely, to complete the final twenty percent of the job. In a personal message to all commanding officers of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward (CINCPACFLT) recognized this when he warned them to use good judgement when approaching the "flat part of the effectiveness curve". It is probable that the cumulative effect of multiple tasks with specified minimum (but high) levels of accomplishment may be overwhelming to the unit. It is the function of the senior level to insure that this does not happen, but the overloading at that level preempts the attention time required to remedy this situation.

Associated with the formalization of the procedures in the bureaucratic organization and supported by the essentially vertical communication pattern is the multiple filtering effect on the information which is passed through the system.

"The hierarchy . . . operates as an information filter upward, with each level of the hierarchy only passing up to the next such information as is considered relevant. Similarly, on the downward flow of instructions, the higher the level, the more general the instructions." (Boulding, 1963, p. 401).

A characteristic of this information and regulatory flow is that the leaders at the lower operational levels can suffer from exactly the same type of informational overload as that experienced by the higher levels. The nature of the information may be qualitatively very different, but it may be quite similar quantitatively. This is complicated in the Navy by the pressing need for currency in the officer's primary warfare skills, his ability to keep abreast of world events and the ever-improving intelligence outputs, and so forth. The final product is the same: too much correct information. This is identical to the war environment problem noted by Babad and Solomon (see Chapter II.B, p. 18) and is a question of relevancy. The apparent paradox of every level within the organization having too much information and too much direction to do an adequate job may be the challenge of the eighties which faces the Navy.

There is another dynamic which results from the burgeoning rules and regulations in the bureaucracy. This is an establishment of responsibility at a lower level without a concurrent delegation of authority. The insidious nature of this reversal of the "principle of parity of authority and responsibility" (Koontz and O'Donnell, 1968) needs to be recognized. The commanding officer of a ship is totally responsible for maintaining the combat effectiveness of his ship and crew, yet he cannot get that ship underway for training without the permission of several successively senior staffs and commanders. A tactical fighter squadron may desperately need to practice carrier approaches and maneuvers, but if the aircraft carrier is not underway because of a fuel shortage, then the pilots go wanting. Unfortunately, instructions which specify that the "Commanding Officer shall . . ." often do not provide the means for the Commanding Officer to do anything.

A third characteristic of bureaucratic organizations which encourages crisis management is the structural rigidity which is its essence. A part of this is perceptual vice actual, but that can have just as great an influence on organizational dynamics as tangible factors. It must be acknowledged that rigid structures are somewhat discordant in today's society. This has been summarized in the following passage:

"Bureaucracy . . . was an elegant social invention . . . hopelessly out-of-joint with contemporary realities based on . . . a fundamental change in the basic philosophy which underlies managerial behavior, reflected most of all in the following three areas: (a) a new concept of man, based on increased knowledge of his complex and shifting needs, which replaces the oversimplified, innocent push-button concept of man; (b) a new concept of power, based on collaboration and reason, which replaces a model of power based on coercion and fear; and (c) a new concept of organizational values, based on humanistic-democratic ideals, which replaces the depersonalized mechanistic value system of bureaucracy." (Bennis, 1970, p. 114).

This lack of consonance with the "contemporary realities" of Bennis produces dissatisfactions with the nature of the organization itself. The individual may identify with the goals of the organization, but he finds the means of accomplishing them intolerable. There are two primary sources of this dissatisfaction:

"In the first place, there is a growing dissatisfaction with the fragmentation of life in an organization, with the difficulties of being a whole personality and of finding personal satisfactions in relating to others in impersonal role relationships . . . The second major criticism concerns the exploitive character of bureaucratic structures, namely that the rewards of the system, both intrinsic and extrinsic, go disproportionately to the upper hierarchical levels and that the objectives of organizations are distorted toward the immediate interests of the elite and away from desirable social goals of the many." (Katz and Georgopoulos, 1971, p. 130).

These structural-social contradictions and the concordant dissatisfactions are well recognized by Navy

commanders, but the regulatory restrictions on their behavior essentially precludes a capability to do anything about them. These commanders, too, are frustrated by the incongruence, but they are facing the burden of the mission and the unit's commitments. This is often the source of the complaints that "the captain only cares about the job, not the people". In this battle of perspective mismatches, a short-fused additional commitment can become an example of this perceived lack of care for the humans in the organization. The commanding officer is the closest visible representative of the "system", so the individual's hostility becomes transferred to the organization as a whole, and the dissatisfactions are further increased. The end result of this long and involved perceptual chain based on the structural rigidity of the organization is that "crisis management" becomes amplified and distorted out of proportion to its actual impact. But it is the translation of this perceptual distortion into individual behaviors with which the commanding officer must deal. The complexity of managing these behaviors and attitudes while attempting to address a "crisis" commitment can be extremely taxing to the commander, especially in light of the reduced time which is available to him. This latter factor frequently precludes airing the situation and eliminating the unwarranted suspicions in order to get the job done with a unified front.

Among the many conclusions in his report on Navy manpower, Bowers (1975) included the following which support the above relationships:

--The Navy currently has serious problems in the areas of organizational climate and leadership behaviors. These are far below their civilian counterparts, and they are much more distinct in fleet units than in the shore establishment.

--There is a distinct perceived lack of personal independence in the Navy resulting from the bureaucratic structure and from unnecessary intrusion into the lives of the individuals.

--In the attempt to better operate the mission elements and units, the Navy has frequently substituted hardware for human competence. This lack of competence is particularly noted in the management areas.

--The individuals in the Navy, just like the civilians in their organizations, have high needs for participative treatment.

--Ships and shore stations are socio-technical systems. Too often they have been treated as technical systems alone. Consequently, the training and the experience and the concept of dealing with an organization as a social system is relatively poor among Navy leaders.

--There is a definite need to decentralize the Navy organization and flatten the structure. This will promote rewarding independence, lateral communications and cooperation, and it will decrease the dominance of the immediate superior in every move of the subordinate units.

This discord between the Navy organization and the people within it has been recognized at many levels. The Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral James D. Watkins, in an interview with The Washington Post, stated, "The Navy was not prepared for the more qualified, more competent, more mature, more inquisitive, and more demanding young people who started coming into the service in large numbers in 1972" (Washington Post Service, November 16, 1977). Changing the organization and making it more challenging and rewarding for the individuals within it is an extremely

complicated and lengthy process, especially in the face of the inherent inertia in a bureaucracy as large as the Navy. No one would encourage hasty and possibly regrettable change, but the indications are clear that the present conditions cannot be long tolerated.

A final characteristic of bureaucratic organizations which will be treated here is the tendency of tenured individuals (i. e., ~~those~~ with many years of experience within the organization) to retreat into the security of the institution and its traditions when confronted with the nature and the magnitude of the organizational problems which revolve about the structure. This is quite similar to the way in which the lower levels of the hierarchy retreat behind the defined boundaries of their job positions. The result is also usually very similar to that at the lower levels, one of actually magnifying the problem instead of resolving it. The norm is defensive justification of the organization and its actions; receptive examination of the criticism in a problem-solving atmosphere is atypical. An interesting case study in the way in which institutional behavior in a bureaucracy can magnify or create a problem is provided by an investigation into "crisis management" conducted by CINCPACFLT which commenced in October 1976.

CINCPACFLT's original message requested inputs from the various type commanders concerning "avoidable crisis management". At the next level, however, this unusual but not extraordinary request was elevated to crisis proportions for the surface forces. COMNAVSURFPAC requested inputs, consolidated first by the intermediate Squadron commanders and then by the superior Group commanders. This rather routine request for information through traditional channels initiated a frantic effort at the individual unit level. This was because the tasking message, of routine precedence and sent on the 23rd of October, required that the collated

responses be received by COMNAVSURFPAC by the fifth of November. There were no formatting instructions, and guidelines as to specificity of content and desirability of examples were equally vague. Many units and the intermediate commanders spent remarkable quantities of their leadership manhours during this brief period of time in attempting to determine just what was desired, who was in charge of this project, and how to answer the questions in a sufficiently de-politicized manner that it would not come back to haunt them. In terms of the models presented in Chapter III, the information acquisition delay was greatly expanded because the "rules of the game" were unknown. The larger staffs, especially the type commander's, created special internal "task forces" to gather the flood of incoming messages and to handle the "crisis management" crisis on a crash basis (recall the tendency of a bureaucracy to differentiate and specialize in order to meet new challenges). The reports and follow-up actions continued for almost a year. Interestingly enough, the end of all of this was not yet in sight when a new and even more visible (and political) issue started the cycle all over. This was the publication of CDR Mumford's article in the Naval Institute Proceedings in September 1977. In one way this cycle was a bit easier for the staffs than the previous crisis because the task forces were already in existence and were familiar with their patterns of communication and information sources. But the issues were related, and the disturbances to the organization were quite similar.

There were some actions taken in response to these flare-ups of interest in the subject of crisis management, but the adequacy and the appropriateness of these actions are subject to question. The analysis of the replies was based on a simple percentage weighting of the categories into which the symptoms could be relegated. There was no provision for a more sophisticated importance weighting

system to be included or utilized because of the lack of formatting and the open-ended responses. There was no independent appraisal of the situation in the fleet prior to the request or after the study area had been contaminated by the messages. During this time one attempt to scientifically investigate crisis management and the factors which appeared to reduce its impact in some units was in the design phase at the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego. Unfortunately, the project's funding has recently been terminated. Likewise, an independent appraisal of the effectiveness of the actions taken to date has not been conducted. Some reduction in the dominance of short-fuzed requirements has been realized at the fleet level, but commanding officers are still heard to complain about the overburdening and about the degree of flexibility demanded of them.

Problems such as schedule instability, excessive inspections, administrative burdens, short-fuzed requirements, and inadequate resources may be only the symptoms of more significant organizational ills. Until the structure of the Navy comes under critical review and changes are made, we will continue to treat the symptoms while the disease goes on unchecked. Representative of this, our current approaches to retention appear to be emphasizing quotas instead of addressing the ways in which the organization can make Navy life more rewarding, challenging, and congruent with the changing values of the individuals. In this vein, the reduction in the manpower and services of the Human Resource Management Centers, and a perceived reduction in the influence of the Human Resource Subsystem in the Navy may be an even further step in the continued institutionalization of crisis management in the organization.

An additional and interesting sidelight to the

investigations into crisis management and the Mumford article arises out of the information-guarding tendencies of the bureaucratic organization. All messages and correspondence were by means of "personals". This means extremely limited distribution of the contents, and, accordingly, the persons actually gathering the information were often unaware of the reasons for their sometimes outlandish actions. It also meant that the actions taken to alleviate the situation were not publicized. One is led to conjecture that the individuals within the units were aware of the "flail" that was taking place because of the expenditure of manhours at the senior levels and the trouble of maintaining confidentiality within typing or message-processing centers. But one would also conjecture that the lack of publicity would cause additional unrest among those members and that the "grapevine" would be rampant with misinformation. The end result would mean more trouble for the units than if the situation were handled in the open, and it is also possible that the latter treatment might have produced listings of correctible issues that were more than superficial symptoms.

B. NAVY SOCIOLOGICAL NORMS

Probably the most dominant behavioral norm which drives military officers, especially at the more senior levels, is based upon the necessity for maintaining a rapid response capability. It is, in fact, the *raison d'etre* of the military. This was succinctly stated by CINCPACFLT in a personal message to all commanding officers:

"... the hallmark of our Navy resides in its ability to respond promptly to real crises, and that mobility and flexible operations are properly our bread and butter. Our Navy is, and must be, a crisis oriented organization, whose principal command structure is based upon the time-tested, successful

principles of delegation of authority, clear chain of command, narrow span of control, and acceptance of responsibility." (ALPACFLT 01-77).

This awareness of the need for speedy response is permitted to carry over into the daily management of the Navy where it may be totally out of place. As has been pointed out (Drucker, 1967), it is far more important to make an accurate and adequate response than to make a speedy one. One reason for the emphasis on speed is because the crisis response is much more enjoyable for the "hard-charging" naval officer. Under these circumstances he can see immediate progress towards solving his most pressing problems. Such progress, even if it is not on the track to solving the problem in the most efficient and effective manner, is quite rewarding for the officer, so he keeps "stirring the pot". It can also be hypothesized that the energy of the Navy leadership which was directed outwards on the enemy during the many years of Vietnam is now being devoted internally to the Navy as a whole. Accordingly, the crisis mode, so appropriate to a wartime environment and so successful to these officers in the formative years of their careers, is now being applied systematically to solving the problems of the peacetime, rapidly changing Navy. Such "repertoires" of activities are not appropriate to the alteration of a social system as large as the Navy, and they are totally cut of context with the values of the young sailors and officers entering the service.

A second norm of Navy behavior is that of obedience. This is, of course, essential to the functioning of any organization, especially a military one. The degree of authoritarian obedience expected and demanded of Navy personnel is rather extraordinary, however. The standard is calm acceptance of the directives of seniors. This would be wholly justified if the higher levels in the bureaucracy did in fact have more and better information and so were correct

in their demands. Here the withholding of information which characterizes the organization becomes the foundation for the perpetuation of the crisis mode. The higher echelons may have more information, but, because of the information-guarding tendencies in the bureaucracy, the aggregate accuracy is questionable. Not also that the unchecked assumptions about seniors and subordinates which were pointed out by Babad and Solomon (see Chapter II.B, p. 18) are operant in this case. Even if the tasking is questioned, the risks to the commander are very high if he voices his unease. The strongest response which he may be willing to make is to submit a report summarizing the total commitment package which the unit is facing and advising the boss just how tough things are (while the unit complies with the demands in toto). The foregoing should not be construed as encouraging insubordination or mutiny. It is rather an exhortation to negotiate the overall loading of a unit when the burden becomes excessive. This will involve some risk on the part of the commanding officer, and it will necessitate an acceptance of this climate by the seniors in the chains of command. As one commanding officer stated in his response to the Mumford article, ". . . we should continue to afford our seniors the benefit of our opinions whether they want them or not and continue to work for change within the system as our conscience dictates".

A third behavioral norm which affects the Navy is that associated with the "can do" spirit. This is related to the norms of obedience, but it is a bit more complicated. This can-do spirit is associated with the "finest traditions of the Navy", vocabulary which is sure to stir the blood of blue-water sailors, but which often refers to useless or dysfunctional anachronisms. An example of this type of thinking is provided by the response of another commanding officer to the same article by CDR Mumford: "Of course I haven't had everything my way. But I doubt that John Paul

Jones did either." By questioning the can-do spirit of an individual or of an organization, one can imply failure or can challenge competency by extracting confessions of being overburdened. This challenge to competency is a threefold one. First, it challenges the competency of the leader or the commanding officer himself. He is the manager of a complex socio-technical system, but he is the beneficiary of only a minimum of managerial tools. Experience alone may not suffice to carry the unit through the many trials which it will face, but the self-confidence of the commanders and their can-do spirit will keep them in the game. The second challenge is to the competency of the unit. The leader is surrounded and perhaps overwhelmed by the bureaucracy, but he can provide no reasonable alternatives. If he is able to offer any respite to the systemic pressures, it will of necessity be internal to his own organization. Therefore, it will be on a relatively minor scale, and it will probably be ineffective. But by his can-do spirit, the commanding officer will insure that his organization survives in a Navy which is ever increasing in complexity. The end result is nearly always a reversion to task-oriented leadership. The third challenge is to the competency of the Navy as a whole. This results in a highly defensive posture of accepting the Navy as "the best of all possible worlds". Implications of "my Navy" as being poorly managed or with ill-defined goals will stimulate the nationalistic forces in the individual (Katz, 1965; see Chapter II.B, p. 17).

The can-do spirit is, unfortunately, relied upon in the tasking of the operational units. It is known that subordinates will "rise to the challenge" as they always have done in the past. The reason that this is unfortunate is that it entails ever increasing costs because the younger officers and sailors are not willing to accept such a punishing standard of behavior indefinitely. This places the commanding officer in the position of mediator in a battle

of attitudes, something for which he has not been particularly well prepared.

The can-do spirit also has an implication that certain types of officers will undertake voluntary overloads for their units in order to appear as the "shining star" in the boss's otherwise dark sky. He feels that his embodiment of this traditional value will instill a superior level of confidence in him by the senior levels, and his future will thus be enhanced. This type of officer is fast becoming extinct because the "routine" burdens on the various units in the Navy are more than can reasonably be expected. Just getting it all done is enough to gain stardom.

A fourth norm of behavior is one which is highly related to the structure of the Navy. This has been referred to as bureaucratic behavior (Argyris, 1967), and it has several component parts. The first element in the bureaucratic behavior norm is that of competition between the individuals. As has often been observed, the Navy's evaluation system with its forced ranking tends to insure the dominance of competitive behavior. Some competition is desirable, but when it progresses to the point where there is win-lose maneuvering, then it becomes extremely dysfunctional and must be reduced. This element is further complicated by the relatively short tours for military officers, thus reducing the time which is available to the officer during which he must prove himself to his superiors. This can, and often does, produce an enhancement of any polarization effects so that the individual can insure his visibility and ascendancy in the organization. As noted by Babad and Solomon (see Chapter II.B, p. 18), the case is often overstated to bring about just this effect.

A second element in bureaucratic behavior is dependence on the superior. This is a result of the superior being the

source of resolution of polarizations and conflicts, and the superior must set or rearrange the priorities of the subordinates where the risk is too high for the subordinate to accept the responsibility for such actions. Of course, if the subordinate admits his difficulty with the priorities or the conflict, he is taking another type of risk, that which is associated with his can-do spirit and competence. This may become a stressful "Catch-22" for the commanding officer. But the commander must communicate with the superior in order to find out what the latter's desires are, and this contributes to his dependence also. Recall that in the bureaucracy all outputs must be tailored to fit the desires of the superior, since that is the prerogative of his position of increased power and information (see Chapter IV.A, p. 50-52).

A third element to bureaucratic behavior runs somewhat counter to the visibility tendencies of the competitive element, and that is the tendency towards conformity. This element reduces the risk associated with standing out from the crowd. It is a function of individual survival vice that of organizational benefits which may accrue to the star. The seeking of the scarce rewards can be a precarious search, and the individual and organizational costs can be high. By remaining a part of the pack, a relatively safe position is established because of the extensive precedent which is being set by the entire group of peers.

There are several other elements to Argyris' concept of bureaucratic behavior. The identification with organizational successes and the avoidance of any blame or association with failures is a key component. Even if valuable lessons learned can preclude wasted time and effort by the fleet in the future, commanding officers are loath to "put themselves on report" and thus become a potential sacrificial lamb. Bureaucratic behavior is also marked by a

low interpersonal competence on the part of the leaders. They are not used to receiving feedback in a straightforward manner from either superior or from subordinate since it has rarely been done. The leaders tend to be emotionally restrained, since emotionality is viewed as a weakness among "professional naval officers". Bureaucratic leaders also tend to have a very low tolerance for ambiguity. This is especially prevalent among military officers where everything tends to be spelled out in very fine detail.

A last element of bureaucratic behavior is the tolerance for the weaknesses of the organization which arises after years of association with the organization. This is a result of constructive ownership, i. e., no actual financial ownership but an adoption of the organization's values as one's own because of the lengthy association. This tolerance tends to produce somewhat rigid behavior on the part of the leaders. This rigidity becomes most evident when actions of individuals or proposals for the organization transgress the limits of the "traditional" values with which the leaders are most comfortable. The size of the bureaucratic organization and the tolerance of its values by the leaders produces a less innovative system, as stated below:

"... the greater the diversity of the organization (in either its incentive system or its task structure or both), the greater the likelihood that some member will conceive major innovations, the greater the likelihood that some members will propose innovations, and the less likelihood that the organization will adopt the innovations." (Wilson, 1966, p. 245).

Because of the lessened innovation and the tolerance of the system's irritations, the decisions which are made tend to be below their potential for effectiveness. And, when subordinates are working under such a system of tolerance which they view as dysfunctional, their internal commitment to the organization is reduced.

In his studies of the leadership of large organizations, Argyris (1967) has also addressed the issues of the relations between the supervisors and the subordinates. He has found that

"... executives tend to hold three basic values about effective human relationships within organizations. They are:

1. Get the job done. . . .

2. Be rational and logical and communicate clearly. Effectiveness decreases as behavior becomes more emotional. . . .

3. People work best under carefully defined direction, authority and control, governed by appropriate rewards and penalties that emphasize rational behavior and achievement of the objective." (p. 192).

Although these statements are typical of most large organizations in both military and civilian worlds, social scientists discovered as early as the 1920's that they were not the values which produced the greatest productivity or satisfaction on the part of the subordinates. It was in the attempt to permanently change these attitudes that the Human Resource Management System was introduced into the Navy.

Another behavioral norm which needs to be mentioned is that associated with the Navy officer's attitude towards change. As has been pointed out, most approaches to change are at the individual level and do not try to adopt an organizational point of view (Katz and Kahn, 1964). This is a matter of simplicity in that the magnitude is much smaller and more manageable, but the impact on the system is minimal to non-existent. The individual is quite compliant with any attempt to change either the structure or the processes of the organization on the proviso that it will either leave his own secure position in the hierarchy unaffected or with increased power. Otherwise, he will marshal his resources behind maintaining the organization's status quo.

The above mentioned attitudes are operant under conditions of an incremental approach to changing an organization, but under wholesale crisis conditions, there may be intuitive acceptance of the need for change if the very existence of the organization is at stake.

"Many organizations will adopt no major innovation unless there is a crisis -- an extreme change in conditions for which there is no adequate, programmed response. A crisis increases the probability that innovations will be ratified by increasing the cost to any member opposing the ratification. . . . Further, a crisis leads members to devote themselves to organizational interests rather than to task interests; the diversifying influence of the task structure is thereby temporarily set aside." (Wilson, 1966, p. 255).

Note the similarity to the forces which can be marshalled during international conflict (Katz, 1965; see Chapter II, Section B, page 16).

Leadership has received a great deal of visibility in the Navy in recent years, and it too has behavioral norms which are associated with it. The first and the easiest to deal with is the concept of leadership as the Navy's equivalent of the golden fleece--once you've got it, you don't need much else. Every problem seems to be related to a breakdown of effective leadership, but there also seems to be a lack of definitive guidance as to exactly what it is that constitutes effective leadership, or even what is leadership. Most general management texts will define leadership as the ability to influence the behavior of others. Note that this definition is completely devoid of any concept of organizational goals, the common good, etc. Leadership is strictly a personality issue, not an organizational one. It is also situational, that is, it is specific for a particular situation and is not a capability which one person will always have in all cases. In the Navy, there is a distinct tendency to equate leadership to management. In extreme cases, management may be considered

as a subset of leadership with the most important function of the leader being that of accomplishing the task, especially in a crisis (Hersey and Blanchard, 1972). A final attitude towards leadership is based on the Navy tenet that consistency is a virtue of the effective leader. Thus, once a leader has found a style and theory of leadership which works, that style should be set in concrete and used in all conditions and in all organizations. The fallacy of this approach is obvious, yet it is surprising how frequently this belief is applied religiously.

Integrated with the norms on leadership are those associated with management. Basic to these is the conviction that good leaders do not need management training. They already have all of the talents which they need to run an effective organization. Here, as with crisis management and leadership, management in general suffers from a lack of definition. Again referring to most modern texts, management is defined as the ability to accomplish the organization's goals effectively and efficiently. Thus it would appear as though leadership were a special subset of managerial skills, not vice-versa. That they are interrelated cannot be denied, but management would appear to be the more important because of the inclusion of the organizational goals as an inherent characteristic.

One problem with management and managerial training is the relatively nebulous nature of the skills imparted and the extreme difficulty associated with determining satisfactory measures of effectiveness to discover if, in fact, the training has done any good. Accordingly, because the cost-effectiveness and the contribution to combat readiness can be quantified to a much greater degree, the Navy has tended to substitute technology for management on a wholesale scale. And, because of the fixation with being "good leaders", naval officers generally reject the

character of their own management styles (see the section on organization processes, Chapter II, Section B, page 13; March and Simon, 1958).

The last behavioral norm is one which has been mentioned before, and that is the one associated with the reaction to criticism which is evidenced by most naval officers. A one-word description would be "defensive". The organizational rationale for this behavior has been mentioned several times: there is risk associated with changing any procedure which was a success in the past. As stated by Capt. K. G. Schacht, USN (Ret) in the Naval Institute Proceedings (March, 1978, p. 116), "I'm staying with what I know will do the job." Subordinates in the organization, after some experience within it, will quickly recognize the dangers of offering criticism where it is not going to support the beliefs of their superiors, even if criticism is invited. An example of this is provided by the results of CINPACFLT's survey on the amount of agreement with CDR Mumford's article in the Proceedings (September, 1977). The responses were overwhelmingly against CDR Mumford's position (approximately six negative replies were received from the Surface Forces for every one positive reply). Interestingly enough, the letters to Proceedings since publication of the article have been in support of CDR Mumford's statements by a margin of five to one. The difference is that in the original survey the responses were by personal message and the commanding officers were officially accountable for their positions and their statements. To support a position which was highly critical of the higher levels of the Navy would be quite risky for any person in such a position. The Naval Institute provides an unofficial forum for the expression of opinion by naval officers, and thus the risk associated with agreeing with CDR Mumford is much lower. (A similar case can be made for the Proceedings being a forum for all the malcontents in

the Navy, and thus the accuracy of these results is also questionable.) The answer appears to be that the distribution of support and of opposition is distorted in both directions, i. e., the actual conditions in the fleet lie somewhere between the two extremes.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although a great deal of time and effort has been expended in the Pacific Fleet in the last few years attempting to eliminate crisis management, the effectiveness of these efforts has only been minimal. Crisis management remains alive and well as a day-to-day method of doing business. But as has been shown, it is not because of a conscious choice on the part of Navy managers, but rather it is a nearly inevitable result of an overgrown and marginally controllable bureaucracy. For those officers who have chosen to make their living within that bureaucracy, there are certain norms of behavior which they must follow if they are to be successful. In essence, crisis management is firmly institutionalized and will continue to be passed from generation to generation of naval officers unless both structural and behavioral changes are installed and enforced. As with nearly all changes which are to be introduced into large organizations, a positive reward must be tied to the new and desirable behaviors. This means that the fitness reporting system must be tailored to reflect support of any programmed changes. This may be the most difficult part of any planned change effort. If there are no changes to the present organization and to the behavior of the officer corps, it would be predicted that the extensive retention efforts being made will for the most part be ineffective, and both officer and enlisted attrition will remain at an unacceptably high level.

This should not be construed as implying that there has been no progress. There is better stability in units' schedules. Inspections have been combined, thereby reducing

the apparent overall number (in actuality, of course, the units are inspected in just as many areas as before). There has been some reduction of the administrative requirements on the units. And there has been some reallocation of dollars and of human resources to support the fleet's needs.

But it must be recognized that these are only treating the symptoms of larger organizational ills. The flattening of the Navy hierarchy recommended by Bowers (1975) has not been addressed in other than a superficial nature. There has been little attempt to redefine the power structure based on participative management and humanistic values. Those efforts which have been made have been too shallow and without any enforcement capability. These are rapidly becoming organizational imperatives for the Navy.

The managerial tools which are available to fleet commanding officers are inadequate. In today's world of unstable environments and "enlightened" management, the Navy's reliance on its traditions of leadership and followership is somewhat anachronistic. Continuing emphasis on planning and adoption of the long-range viewpoint will provide only a part of the answer. It is highly likely that the wholesale adoption of the "plan of action with milestones" based on the model of nuclear engineering creates a structure of planning which is so rigid that it has no flexibility. This means that such minor irritants as a delay in the delivery of a part needed for repairs or the illness of a key Chief Petty Officer become "crises" because a significant portion of the downstream events were keyed to a delivery date or to one individual's expertise. The frequent observation that so much time is spent in planning that nothing actually gets done is an indicator of such potential.

There are many management tools which are being

developed which can enable the leader of an organization to maximize the efficient and effective use of the time buffer. The techniques and the categories under which they can be grouped have been identified by the Navy Personnel Research and Development Laboratory, San Diego, California (Fehrer et. al., 1978), and are listed below:

- (1) Organization Development Techniques
 - Survey feedback
 - Team building
 - Process consultation
 - Grid organization development
 - Laboratory training
 - Organizational mirror
 - Role analysis
 - Conflict management
- (2) Decision Model Techniques
 - Contingency theory
 - Vroom-Yetton model
 - Cost-benefit analysis
 - Delphi technique
 - Judgement analysis
- (3) Path Analyzing Techniques
 - Incremental analysis
 - Program evaluation and review technique (PERT)
 - Management information systems
 - Keppner-Tregoe problem-solving
- (4) Classical Management Techniques
 - Work sampling
 - Work flow analysis
 - Work simplification
 - Time management
- (5) Enlargement Techniques
 - Job enrichment
 - Job design
- (6) Participative Management Techniques
 - Responsibility accounting
 - Management cybernetics
 - Management by objectives
 - Performance appraisal
 - Behavior modification
 - Reward systems
 - Scanlon plan

Unfortunately, most of these tools are not available to the military manager in the Navy because of a lack of training in their use. Those approaches to problems which were successful in the past for a particular leader tend to become established patterns of behavior (March and Simon,

1958). For this reason, innovative approaches to problems tend to be discouraged despite the opportunity for greater effectiveness at a lower resource cost (Schacht, 1978).

Some assistance can be expected when the broad scale Leadership and Management Training program is fully implemented. There are two cautions which must be accepted in order to give the proper perspective to this program. The first is a caution against over-enthusiasm: the LMT program is superficial to some degree in that it is training, not education. The difference is in the development of the theoretical background and the depth of understanding of the mechanics and interdependencies of the various elements of management. The program can and will increase the repertoires within the Navy managers "bag of tricks", but it cannot insure a better fit of problems and answers. The second caution is centered on an anticipated difficulty in gaining widespread acceptance of this program in the service. It may come as a bitter pill for a senior and highly successful naval officer to be told that he needs and "will have" some training in management and leadership. An indication of this can be gleaned from the problems which are being experienced by the Human Resource Management Centers in getting anything more than lip service from many higher echelons in the fleet. It always seems to be "those guys down there" who need the assistance, and a similar dynamic can be expected with the introduction of the LMT program.

It must therefore be concluded that the organizational dysfunctions are not being addressed on anything more than a superficial and piecemeal basis. This does not mean that those dysfunctions are not recognized, however. It is a commentary on the naval officer's lack of moral courage to do what is needed rather than acquiesce to the political reality of his career needs in a burgeoning bureaucracy. The

disparity in the response to CDR Mumford's article in the message traffic and in the Proceedings reflects this.

It must also be concluded that the analysis of crisis management and its impact on the fleet has been altogether too soft. There is a pressing need for further investigation under rigorous conditions in order to satisfy the high standards of scientific research. Such research should be done by a third party, i. e., one which has no particular stake in the problem or its solution and one which will not be susceptible to political vulnerability. This should minimize the "smokescreening" effect detected in the response to the Mumford article. Such an analysis would have to be instrumented in part in order to develop the quantitative results needed for factor analysis, and it would have to be subjective in part in order to provide the qualitative weighting of the factors. Such a study will enable the Navy to get to the causes of crisis management and actually address the problems, not the symptoms. An essential element to this study would be an in-depth evaluation of successful units in order to determine what factors reduce or minimize the effects of systemic crisis management. This would provide solid pointers for further development of the Leadership and Management Training program, and it could also begin to form the basis for a "profile" which may be highly instrumental in selection for command. Such an analysis of crisis management must receive top priority both in the conduct of the study and in its aftermath. This will of necessity involve an extensive promulgation of the results of the study and a dedication to responsive action. The effects of conducting a study and then not providing the results or taking any action have been mentioned before: the situation can be perceived as being worse than it actually is. A continuance of the status quo carries with it unacceptably high stakes for the Navy and for the free world.


The talents of the Human Resource Management Centers can be brought to bear as an interim assist in correcting this situation. They are beginning to gain some credibility with the fleet, and their job is centered about general, effective management. Although the units have been exposed to many of the techniques listed above which are available through these centers, it is well recognized that the lessons learned during the Availability week are rapidly put aside in favor of the strictly task-oriented behaviors which provide the short-term successes the leaders want. Such utilization of the HRM Centers would entail remanning them back to their authorized levels or even above that. The utilization of these centers on a long-term basis will improve the situation, but it will not correct it per se. In order for this effort to be effective, there must be "leadership by example", another of the finest traditions of the Navy. Every organizational level would be forced to undergo a Human Resource Availability. Competencies at participative management and effective listening would be evaluated, and appropriate guidance would be provided to each level in order to integrate the Navy's command hierarchy into a an effective, "one-language" system. Unless the new behavioral norms are adopted at the top, the lower levels cannot be expected to do anything more than emulate the officers who have made it to the upper reaches.

A method for establishing and maintaining stability among priorities is an imperative. The units have got to have some method of knowing what ranks where, otherwise the the uncertainty and the potential costs of a mistake will remain sufficiently high to make them a very unpleasant place in which to work. Such a prioritization system would have to be very specific and would entail a significant measure of accountability. This means that platitudes are not going to be acceptable, and the priorities, once established, cannot be changed with abandon. Although this

portends to reduce flexibility of the Navy, there are two qualities which can be built in which will minimize this effect. The first characteristic is that the priority system must be designed for negotiation when conflicts occur, which they inevitably will. If the unit is overburdened, either events must be dropped or the resources must be expanded (not just the manhours).

The second quality is a function of the growing fleet levels currently being experienced: provide each unit with "flex-time". This would mean a commitment loading of only eighty or ninety percent instead of the current one hundred plus percent. Thus each unit will have the time to take care of itself and would find the impact of short-notice commitments far less disruptive.

Crisis management has been defined as the short-notice, unprioritized, and unnegotiable expansion of the commitments on an organization beyond the capabilities of its normal resources to respond to them all. These conditions lead to the suboptimal accomplishment of the multiple goals. It has been shown that the bureaucratic structure of the Navy and the behavioral norms of Navy personnel support crisis management. It is the primary conclusion of this study that continuance of the status quo (operation of organizations on the suboptimal plane repeated in Figure 9) cannot be maintained if the Navy hopes to improve retention and to continue as guardian of the free world's sea lanes.



- a-Aggregate Action Delay
- b-Aggregate Information Gap
- c-Goal 1 Action Deficiency
- d-Goal 2 Action Deficiency
- o-Origin
- A-Plane of Suboptimal Equilibrium

Figure 9 - SUBOPTIMAL PLANE

Units must be allowed the freedom to reduce the information gaps and action deficiencies under conditions of simultaneous goals, whether this be by reduction of overall commitment loading or by improved managerial capabilities. The processes of managing the Navy need to be emphasized rather than the ideals of "leadership". This will entail the establishment of pragmatic, specific, attainable sets of goals (i. e., the measures of effectiveness are included in the goal definition) at each level in the organization which integrate the objectives of both superior and subordinate commands. Resources must be managed to those prioritized objectives, and stability of both resources and objectives must be realized. This, together with a simplification of the Navy hierarchy, can reduce the lack of coordination, the duplication, and the frustrations being experienced today.

We have long prided ourselves in the Navy on our ability to respond on a global basis to any type of demand. But it has extended beyond a pride in the ability to respond; it has involved the external image of a proactive world force, one that was always pre-positioned so that it would already be there when it was needed. If this finest of all the traditions is to be maintained, the Navy must restructure itself and must rethink how it wants to do business. The Navy must shift to a proactive stance on its internal management.

"It may now be a fatal flaw if we are indeed into a new epoch with our basic institutions structured to respond to crisis rather than to anticipate what is coming." (Ewald, 1970, p. 24).

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
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LIST OF FIGURES

1.	Leavitt's Organizational Model	30
2.	Environmental Forces	32
3.	The Ecological Model	34
4.	Information-Time Relationship	39
5.	Action-Time Relationship	41
6.	Information-Action Relationship	43
7.	Plane of Potential Effectiveness	45
8.	Simultaneous Events	48
9.	Suboptimal Plane.....	91

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