Fair Allocations of a Renewable Resource.
Abstract
In an economy with finitely many agents, one renewable resource and an infinite horizon, it is shown that there is exactly one maximal allocation corresponding to given limiting shares of consumption and this allocation converges monotonically. Therefore, if there is no discounting, at most one fair maximal program exists - that which gives an equal amount to each individual in the limit. In this allocation, envy is always finite. However, only in special cases is it envy-free. This is in contrast to the case of finite economies where envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations may not exist, or if they exist may not be unique. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 1977
- Accession Number
- ADA057953
Entities
People
- Joel Sobel
Organizations
- University of California, Berkeley