On Solutions of Non-Cooperative Games: An Axiomatic Approach.
Abstract
This paper studies solutions of strict non-cooperative games that are played just once. The players are not allowed to communicate with each other. The main ingredient of our theory is the concept of rationalizing a set of strategies for each player of a game. An axiom based on this concept is stated that every solution of a non-cooperative game is required to satisfy. Strong Nash solvability is shown to be a sufficient condition for the rationalizing set to exist, but it is not necessary. Also, Nash solvability is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of the rationalizing set of a game. For a game with no solution (in our sense), a player is assumed to recourse to a standard of behavior. Some standards of behavior are examined and discussed.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 1978
- Accession Number
- ADA060662
Entities
People
- Prakash P. Shenoy
Organizations
- University of Wisconsin–Madison