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ABSTRACT

THIRD WORLD ARMS TRANSFERS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

by Laurel A. Mayer

This study sequentially examines the Third World arms transfer system, evaluates United States foreign policy objectives associated with its arms transfers, and then analyzes the arms transfer program formulation and implementation processes.

In examining the development of arms transfer patterns and trends, it becomes apparent that significant variations in volume are reflected in various data bases (e.g., while the U.S.-government-furnished data base has the U.S. as the most active supplier of arms to the Third World during the past decade, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data base calculations make the USSR the largest supplier). A substantial portion of these differences appears to be based upon what the data bases are measuring (e.g., SIPRI only counts "major weapons") and currency conversion techniques. Yet, regardless of who is the most active supplier, the major roles of the U.S. and the USSR are confirmed. Additionally, examination of the data revealed: the increasing roles of other arms suppliers; changing patterns of supplier-recipient relationships (including cross-bloc); growing financial burdens; wide variations among states within regions; the growing sophistication of weapons being procured; indigenous and

licensed arms production within the Third World; and growing competition among supplier nations.

Next a rational-strategic perspective was used to evaluate the foreign policy objectives associated with arms transfer programs. In order to clarify "national interests," a list of thirteen specific foreign policy objectives is established. These include strategic (bipolar balance, base rights, allies' self-reliance, regional balances, deterring nuclear spread); economic (balance of payments, need for oil, defense industries, weapons standardization); and political (U.S. influence, deterring Soviet hegemony, human rights, and internal stability). Although most of these objectives do not lend themselves to meaningful quantitative measurement, some meaningful insights were reflected in verbally "box-scoring" the objectives. All the stated objectives have the potential to facilitate positive foreign policy outcomes, but additionally many of the objectives are potentially incompatible with other objectives. In the final analysis, it appears that the specific objectives associated with individual programs must be clearly defined, coordinated, and ultimately used to evaluate specific programs.

Then, from a bureaucratic processes perspective, the formulation and implementation apparatus of U.S. arms sales policy is examined. This complex process involves a large group of government and nongovernment elements with varied responsibilities--including parochial interests.

These interests produce different perspectives and inputs to arms transfer programs, but in the end the major patterns and trends cannot be explained as either organizational "outputs" or bureaucratic "outcomes."

Finally, in the last chapter a series of recommendations is developed based upon the previous analysis. First, as an organizational guideline, the policy and program responsibilities must be more clearly defined--particularly within the State Department. The role of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology in particular must be clarified. As a program guideline, the key appears to be the clear identification of specific objectives against which the program can be managed. Finally, as an overall policy guideline, the United States must formulate policy based upon the pursuit of specific objectives at the least cost to itself and its allies. In summary, the United States must emphasize "management by objectives" with specifically defined lines of responsibility, while simultaneously seeking meaningful multilateral limitations on the spread of armaments--particularly the more advanced sophisticated weapons.

THIRD WORLD ARMS TRANSFERS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the
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in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science

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1977

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Foreign Policy Dilemmas

In this era of growing interdependence, the United States is confronted with some apparent dilemmas in the formulation of arms transfer policy. There is the apparent dilemma associated with advocating strategic arms control and mutual force reductions on the one hand, while increasing conventional arms sales to the Third World. While arms transfers may in some contexts contribute positively to security and stability in the Third World, there is growing concern that such sales support military dictatorships and prevent normal political development. Substantial foreign military sales can have a very positive effect upon U.S. balance of payments; yet there is growing concern that such sales are unacceptably detrimental to the funding of socio-economic improvements in most of the Third World. The government has the power to deny transfer of sophisticated U.S. weapons, but such policy implementations have generally led Third World states to procure such weapons from the USSR, China, and/or European sources.

Within this environment of conflicts and apparent dilemmas, the United States is faced with formulating and

implementing a foreign military sales program. As SALT has demonstrated, military power maximization in itself will not insure security. Yet with recurring disputes among sovereign states and limitations in verification capabilities, there is also a realistic awareness that disarmament by itself will not eliminate rivalries, coercion, and conflicts.

As the recent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) points out:

> Increasing quantities of resources in developing countries are devoted to the procurement of weapons from abroad and nearly all the wars which have taken place over the past twenty-five years have been fought in the poorer parts of the world. The weapons used in these wars have come almost entirely from the industrialized nations of the Northern Hemisphere.[1]

Based upon such trends (SIPRI quotation above), critics of United States military sales policy have asked: "Should We Be the World's Gun Dealer?"[2] Yet behind such headlines there are data which require examination and analysis as to how and where foreign military sales and aid fit into U.S. foreign policy. As Howard Lentner begins his recent book on foreign policy analysis: "The basic condition of international political life is the security dilemma."[3] Conventional arms transfer policy can be viewed

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[1]SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 7.

[2]National Observer (April 10, 1976).

[3]Howard Lentner, Foreign Policy Analysis (Columbus: Merrill, 1974), p. 1.

as a policy dilemma within this broader security dilemma.

Growing Concern

In recent years the sale and trade of modern weapons has been increasingly subjected to government controls, in contrast to the historical existence of Zaharoff, Krupps, and even the contemporaries such as Samuel Cummings of Interarms.[4] There have been some particularly notorious cases of gun running in recent years and loopholes do exist,[5] but ultimately governments do have control--particularly concerning aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles. Whether the controls that exist are adequately applied remains a subject of increasing concern, however.

This growing concern with the proliferation of weapons throughout the Third World has generated substantial intellectual efforts, including those sponsored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): The Arms Trade with the Third World (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1975) and Arms Trade Register (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1975). The former gives a comprehensive survey of contemporary arms trade, while the latter gives comprehensive listing of all major weapons procurements by 97 Third World countries from 1950 to 1974.

There is a growing body of both critical and

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[4]See George Thayer, The War Business (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), passim.

[5]John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, The International Trade in Arms (New York: Praeger, 1972), Chapter III.

supportive literature relative to arms transfers to the Third World. This literature is being generated by diverse sources.[6] Within the government, the Department of State (particularly the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), the Department of Defense (particularly the International Security Affairs/Defense Security Assistance Agency offices), and the Congress (particularly the Committees on Foreign Relations) are all publishing studies and reports about the international arms trade. Research institutions (e.g., The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, and the Rand Corporation) have also published studies concerned with the feasibility of and prospects for conventional arms control. The academic community has also demonstrated significant concern as reflected in journals, conferences, and even the creation of Centers for the Study of Arms Control at many leading American universities.

The large sales of conventional arms to the Middle East and Persian Gulf areas have particularly stimulated extensive attention and debate during the past year. Yet it is a phenomenon that affects all regions of the world.

Theoretical Framework

Although this study is written from a "policy science" (or applied science) orientation,[7] this analysis

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[6]See bibliography for a selected listing of government, academic, and other institutional studies.

[7]See Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 616-42.

need not, and hopefully does not, lose awareness of its theoretical and conceptual foundations. As such, it is important to keep in mind the relationships between theory and practice. Robert Rothstein, in his analysis of foreign policy planning, recalls John Maynard Keynes's contention that "practical men seldom realize how indebted they are to the ideas of 'some scribbler of a few years back.'"[8]

In attempting to formulate an analysis of foreign policy, the political science discipline has not as yet developed the comprehensive universally accepted paradigm or "grand theory." In order to minimize the pitfalls associated with what one analyst has called "joining a camp," or "merely adding explanations on top of each other," or trying to "present still another model,"[9] this study attempts to utilize, associate, and ultimately interrelate concepts from various models.

The concept of "systems theory" provides a framework in which to view the conventional arms trade pattern which now penetrates virtually every region and nation in the nation-state system. The post World War II system has experienced some phenomenal changes (e.g., rapid technological development, the emergence of many newly independent

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[8]Robert L. Rothstein, Planning, Prediction and Policy-making in Foreign Affairs (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1972), pp. 114-15.

[9]Stephan S. Kaplan, "U.S. Arms Transfer to Latin America, 1945-1974," International Studies Quarterly 19 (December 1975): 399-400.

states; etc.) and these changes have affected changing patterns in arms distribution and control. Chapter II of this paper, an overview of the conventional arms transfer system as it has developed in the past twenty-five years, will emphasize patterns and trends. The arms transfer trends are analyzed relative to the changing structures, environments, processes, and patterns of the international system.

Chapter III constructs a hierarchy of foreign policy objectives and goals based primarily upon a "rational-strategic" orientation. Awareness that government policy formulation and implementation generally does not, often cannot, follow a rational-comprehensive, or "root" pattern,[10] does not negate the value in setting up basic objectives for foreign policy. The rational-strategic framework identifies means and ends, and provides a basis for evaluating the importance of and relationships among goals. Within this framework, it is possible to initially assess levels of attainment and possible alternatives.

Any foreign policy analysis that evaluates the attainment of objectives and goals must consider, at least implicitly, the concept of power. The "realist" concept of power as a key variable is best put in perspective by Arnold Wolfers, who includes goals of "self-abnegation" (in

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[10]Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review PS-169 (1959): 78-88.

addition to self-extension); thereby rejecting power maximization as an end in itself.[11] Power becomes a most useful and viable concept when it is expanded beyond the ability to coerce and includes the broad spectrum of abilities to influence. Yet it must be remembered that the ability to influence and affect international phenomena requires a source of power, whether it be economic, psychological, military, or some combination. It also must be kept in mind that no nation, including the United States, or even any regional grouping of nations can be considered omnipotent.[12]

The "bureaucratic-organizational" concepts[13] will be used in Chapter IV as a framework for analyzing the key actors in arms transfer policy formulation and implementation. Devoting an entire chapter to the bureaucratic politics-organizational process analysis must not be considered as in conflict with, or suppression of, the rational-strategic formulation and evaluation of policy. In fact, it is an effort to enrich such an evaluation, showing how bureaucratic and organizational goals can produce "outputs" and "outcomes" that can both facilitate

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[11]Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), Chapter V.

[12]Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 37.

[13]See Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The American Political Science Review 63 (September 1969): 689-728. Also see Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971).

and impede policy formulation and implementation. The purpose of this analysis is not to link any and all policy shortcomings to the phenomenon known as "the bureaucracy," but to identify the key actors, their assets, organizational and individual goals, and assess their impacts.[14]

Hopefully this composite approach, in spite of its potential theoretical shortcomings, will allow this study to emphasize substantive policy over theoretical purity, while remaining cognizant of its conceptual foundations. As such, the goal of this study is to develop a framework for analyzing a particular foreign policy phenomenon, not to substantiate, disprove, or create a new theoretical approach. Still theoretical concepts will be utilized implicitly and explicitly in developing this framework. Ultimately, to the extent that this study is of any value as a policy framework, the theoretical concepts utilized do substantiate their merits.

Cause or Symptom

In any discussion of arms sales, arms control, or defense policy, it is essential to establish the relationship between armaments and conflicts among nation-states.

Raoul Naroll has spoken of "two opposing schools of thought" which he refers to as "the arms-race school" and

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[14]For a criticism of excessive use of the bureaucratic-organizational concepts see Amos Perlmutter, "The Presidential Political Center," World Politics 27 (October 1974): 87-106.

"the deterrence school."[15] Where the deterrence school accentuates the deterring effects military preparations can have upon potential conflict situations, the so-called arms race school tends to argue that arms and military preparations create "circular and self-generating" arms races that tend to make war more likely.

In order to put this arms-conflict relationship into a broader perspective, it should be noted that the "arms race" is but one of at least a dozen major categories of hypotheses that have been advanced by international relations theorists to explain the causes of war.[16] Among the general "causes" proposed are: balance of power, imbalances, the nation-state system, alliance patterns, failures of deterrence, system polarity, internal conflicts, etc.

In addition, various "theories of imperialism," including the "neo-Marxist" or those that Bernard Brodie has called the "Scandal School,"[17] have attributed war to the needs of capitalist countries and their corporations. Brodie notes that long before the special contributions of Karl Marx there was an awareness that "people are disposed

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[15]Raoul Naroll, "Deterrence in History," in Theory and Research on the Causes of War, ed. Pruitt and Synder (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 151-63.

[16]See Richard Rosecrance, International Relations: Peace or War? (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 11.

[17]See Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 280-302.

to view the affairs of the world in terms of their own economic interests as they see and appreciate those interests"; yet the various imperialist theories can be rejected in their single-factor economic analysis and tendency to claim military-industrial conspiracies. Economics is but one of the factors potentially affecting international conflict.[18]

In spite of some of the sensational titles used for studies of the arms industries (e.g., "The War Business," "Making a Killing"),[19] there is a substantial body of social science literature which notes that arms are basically a symptom of interstate political conflict and not a cause. As John Spanier notes: "To attribute wars to arms is to confuse cause and effect."[20] Arms cannot be viewed as an "autonomous process" removed from the political conflict within interstate relations. Or as Arnold Wolfers states it: ". . . the arms competition is not the cause but the result of the conflict."[21] Empirical studies have

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[18]In addition to Brodie, see Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder, eds., Theory and Research on Causes of War (1969), pp. 18-19; and Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973).

[19]George Thayer, The War Business (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969); and Ernie Regehr, Making a Killing: Canada's Arms Industry (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1975).

[20]John Spanier, Games Nations Play (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 242.

[21]Arnold Wolfers, The United States in a Disarmed World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 11.

generally found that some wars have been preceded by arms races, while others have not.[22] Therefore it seems reasonable to view armaments as more of a symptom of conflict than a cause of wars. Yet one can also conclude that arms can and do affect the levels, character, and even timing of wars.

Why Control Conventional Arms

If one concludes, as does Colin Gray, that "arms trading/granting, like arms racing, is neither good nor bad--rather it is both messy and necessary,"[23] a logical following question might be to then ask why attempt to control arms at the conventional level. Gray, in this same article, subsequently answers this question:

> First, although arms races do not cause wars, they do exacerbate tensions, promote distrust and encourage perceptions that make war more likely.
> Second, war (and internal conflict) in and between Third World countries is . . . bad in itself.
> Third, the arms trade is more than "just plain business."[24]

Whether one advocates more restrictions or "less

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[22]Colin S. Gray, "Traffic Control for the Arms Trade?" Foreign Policy, No. 6 (1972): 158. Also see Naroll, "Deterrence in History," p. 163.

[23]Colin S. Gray, "Traffic Control for the Arms Trade?" Foreign Policy, No. 6 (Spring 1972): 154.

[24]Ibid., pp. 162-63. Also see Pruitt and Snyder, Theory and Research on Causes of War, p. 23, who state: "under some circumstances, military preparations in themselves can increase the probability of war," and David V. Edwards, Arms Control in International Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969), p. 39, who states that arms races "must be considered expensive, potentially conducive to war, and certainly corrosive of international confidence . . ."

restrictive" sales of conventional arms to regions of the Third World, there is generally awareness of "the overriding importance of political dimensions."[25] Assuming that arms (like war) is not a good in itself, arms transfers must be viewed as means to affect the desired goals of security, stability, etc. As such, arms transfer (and arms control) policies must be analyzed within the context of how they facilitate policy objectives. It is not just a case of being for or against something. And in no instance can arms, conventional or otherwise, be viewed as just another commodity.

Conversely, one must keep in mind the realities (economic and political) affecting policy formulation. As Wildavsky's study, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, noted: "sensible policy depends as much on knowledge of the world as it is, as on knowledge of the world as it ought to be."[26] Subsequently the recent advice offered by Hedley Bull in discussing arms control seems pertinent: "The problem of world order is not that of how to move beyond the states system, but how to make it work."[27] There

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[25]Luige Einaudi, et al., Arms Transfers to Latin America: Toward A Policy of Mutual Respect (Santa Monica: Rand, 1973), p. 61.

[26]Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1964), p. 180.

[27]Hedley Bull, "Arms Control and World Order," International Security (Summer 1976), 9. Also see Spanier, Games Nations Play, pp. 244-46. For a different perspective see Richard A. Falk, "Arms Control, Global Policy and Global Reform," in Arms, Defense Policy and Arms Control, ed. Long and Rathjens (New York: Norton, 1976), p. 48; or Falk, A Study of Future Worlds (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

is a wide spectrum of alternative methods and procedures available for formulating and implementing arms controls.[28]

The perspectives cited in the above two paragraphs should not be perceived as irreconcilable. Although political policies must be formulated within the art of the possible, this restriction must not be expanded to preclude continuing examinations and evaluations of foreign policy objectives and alternative means of attainment. Keeping in mind the difference between ends and means, arms control policy (along with its colleague, arms transfer policy) must be viewed as a means for enhancing national security and other objectives.[29]

In the first conference report of the University of Pittsburg's Center for Arms Control, Dr. Wesley Posvar, University Chancellor and retired military officer, states: "a post-deterrence system of international security is required, one which puts aside the threat of nuclear annihilation and also preserves our liberties and political values. This is the most challenging dilemma in all human history."[30] Although his statement primarily emphasizes

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[28]See James E. Dougherty, How to Think About Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Crane, Russak, and Co., 1973).

[29]See Walter C. Clemens, The Superpowers and Arms Control (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Co., 1974), p. 112, for his discussion of a "modernist's" approach to arms control.

[30]Wesley W. Posvar, "Arms Control: Today and Tomorrow," Conference Report No. 1 of the Center for Arms Control (University of Pittsburg, November 1975), p. 10.

"nuclear" deterrence, the transfer and control of modern conventional weapons must be analyzed as a component of this dilemma. Conventional arms controls and transfer policies must consider long-term goals as well as short-term solutions.

CHAPTER II

POSTWAR THIRD WORLD ARMS TRANSFERS: AN OVERVIEW

Measuring Arms Transfers

In order to analyze and evaluate the phenomenon of conventional arms transfers, it is initially important that magnitude of the system be understood. Additionally, the significant patterns and trends must be identified, compared, and evaluated.

In measuring and evaluating the magnitude and trends, it is desirable that some valid and reliable quantifiable data base be established. The magnitude of arms transfers (i.e., arms sales and military aid) is a generally quantifiable phenomenon. Monetary values can be calculated and compared, or these same procedures or comparisons can be applied to actual weapons counts--by types, capabilities, or other definable categories. Yet the caveat that arms sales are "more than just plain business" must serve as a caution in the use of both quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Since arms transfers are not just plain business, most buyer (or recipient) and seller (or donor) nations have been generally reluctant to promulgate the details of

weapons transfers--either specific prices, numbers, or even specific transactions. "The USA is still the only country to provide detailed information--or indeed any information at all--on its activities."[1] In addition to transfers generally being covert, "it is virtually impossible to find any official document explaining either the principles of Soviet arms supply policy or the internal machinery responsible for its execution."[2]

Although major weapons transfers (e.g., aircraft, ships) are usually discovered and reported[3] (even if the specific details are lacking), there generally exists no comparable means for discerning the frequency or often even the awareness of the existence of many small weapons transfers. These latter transfers, involving small arms, rockets, and even some missiles, require less obvious logistical support, are easily dispersed and stored, and are generally immune from even the most sophisticated surveillance systems.[4]

Additionally, even when dealing with known

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[1]SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1976 (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1976), p. 137.

[2]SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1975), p. 77.

[3]SIPRI, The Arms Trade Registers (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975), p. 170.

[4]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Verification (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), p. 23. See whole pamphlet for a discussion of weapons verification capabilities.

transfers, there exists significant evaluation, conversion, and comparability problems.[5] By way of example, Congressman Les Aspin, in a recent discussion concerning comparative military spending trends between the U.S. and the USSR, noted: "If the calculations are made in dollars, it turns out that the U.S.S.R. is spending more. If they are made in rubles, it turns out that the United States is spending more."[6] The obvious lesson is that quantitative comparisons must be utilized with cautious awareness of the information gaps and the requirements for some estimates, calculations, and conversion techniques.

In spite of the lack of existence of any universally accepted primary source record of all weapons transfers to the Third World, there still exists an extensive amount of published data on Soviet as well as Western arms transfers. These data, if one remains aware of the caveats cited above, can be used to demonstrate the magnitude and major trends. This study will rely primarily upon the Stockholm

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[5]See SIPRI, The Meaning and Measurement of Military Expenditures (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1972); SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, pp. 173-74. See also Martin C. Needler, "United States Government Figures on Latin American Military Expenditures," Latin American Research Review 8 (1973): 101-103.

[6]Les Aspin and Jack Kemp, How Much Defense Spending is Enough? (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), p. 25. Although Aspin's comment concerned superpower military spending and may have been made partly "tongue-in-cheek," the statement does emphasize the problems of conversions and comparisons, as well as incomplete information.

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data base.[7] Additional U.S. government data bases[8] will be utilized when they significantly add to the analysis. Utilizing those measures, this chapter describes the magnitude, trends, and key variables of the postwar Third World arms trade, identifying the structure, environment, and processes in which it operates.

The available data gains analytical value as it is tested against propositions. These propositions may support or refute "conventional wisdom"[9] and in some cases ultimately generate propositions for the following chapters. As such they provide a vehicle for analyzing the "system" of arms transfers to the Third World. Subsequently, the data are arranged and rearranged in a series of tables to demonstrate not only the gross figures but also to facilitate the evaluation of a series of propositions. This chapter is organized around five major propositions (with

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[7]SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers and SIPRI Yearbook 1976 (and previous yearbooks as required). SIPRI is a non-governmental, multi-national group (including Eastern European as well as Western members). Monitoring worldwide sources, they produce what is apparently a generally comprehensive, reliable, and unbiased record of major arms transfers.

[8]Also U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1965-1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975); and Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts (November 1975).

[9]Although some of the propositions may be viewed as "obvious" or "common knowledge," examination and reexamination of these propositions serves to put the data in perspective, relate the data to relevant analytical concepts, and ultimately to generate related propositions and possible alternative perspectives.

eleven subpropositions). These eleven latter propositions are all quotations taken from current literature on the arms trade. They were selected based upon their capability to frame and describe an overview of the Third World arms transfer system. As such, this chapter is primarily an attempt to answer the "who, when, what, where, and how much" questions.[10]

The Growth of Third World Arms Trade

Proposition 1: The post World War II international trade in conventional arms transfers to the Third World has developed within a predominantly bipolar environment.

Proposition 1A: "The international trade in conventional arms has flourished in recent years, with the United States playing a leading role."[11]

Proposition 1B: "The Egyptian-Soviet arms deal of September 1955 was probably the turning point in the postwar arms trade."[12]

Table 1 gives a summarized overview of the magnitude and growth of the post World War II arms transfers to

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[10]The subsequent chapters (III, IV, V) build upon the data developed in this chapter as they attempt to answer the "why, why not, and how" questions.

[11]United Nations Association of the United States of America, Controlling the International Arms Trade (New York: UNA-USA, 1976), p. 1.

[12]Geoffrey Kemp and John Sutton, Arms to Developing Countries (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), p. 5.

the Third World.[13]

TABLE 1

WORLD ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE THIRD WORLD, 1950-74*

Source	1950-54	1955-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	Total 1950-74
SIPRI	1828	5022	5390	8815	14734	(35789)
ACDA	----	----	----	21114	31021	N/A

*Data in U.S. $ millions at constant 1973 prices.

Both the SIPRI and the ACDA figures in Table 1 confirm the absolute growth of Third World arms transfers during the past twenty-five years. This trend is well illustrated by the fact that over 41 percent (14734/35789) of the SIPRI recorded arms transfers took place in the last 20 percent (5 years) of this twenty-five-year period. Additionally, the magnitude of the transfers have increased

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[13] SIPRI Yearbook 1976, pp. 250-53. Figures are computed in U.S. $ millions at constant 1973 prices. (See Appendixes A and B.) For the lower set of figures see U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1965-1974 (see Appendix C). Although the ACDA figures are also expressed in constant 1973 U.S. $ millions, they are consistently higher based at least partially upon the inclusion of infantry weapons, small arms, ammunitions, uniforms, and even equipment for defense industries (items excluded from the SIPRI data base--which is based upon known major weapons transfers). Although the two data bases' definitions of the "Third World" differ slightly, they are more similar than dissimilar--generally excluding NATO, Warsaw Pact, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. They both include a common set of 95 nations. (SIPRI includes Brunei and South Africa which are not in the ACDA set; while ACDA includes Albania, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, PRC, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Gambia, Lesotho, Malta, Mongolia, Portugal, Spain, Swaziland, and Yugoslavia--not in the SIPRI set.)

for each subsequent five-year period.

The discrepancies between the SIPRI and ACDA figures, based upon different sets of measurement criteria, are not as important as the trends they both illustrate. The data from both sets of figures demonstrate the significant growth that has occurred in the 1970s. While the ACDA figures show a 47 percent increase in the 1970-74 period as compared to the 1965-69 period, the SIPRI figures show an even more significant 67 percent increase in comparing the same periods. To the extent that these figures and the techniques utilized to obtain them are valid and reliable, the comparison of data bases indicates that a greater percentage of 1970 arms transfer increase can be categorized as major weapons (recalling SIPRI, unlike ACDA, excludes small arms, uniforms, etc. from its data base).

The data in Table 1 generally confirm that the Third World trade in conventional arms has "grown" significantly (or "flourished") during the past twenty-five years. Subsequently, the significance of the bipolar factor in the proposition (i.e., the role played by the United States and the Soviet Union) can be examined. Table 2 restructures the SIPRI data base to illustrate the magnitude of the individual nation's activities during the past twenty-five years.

It is apparent from Table 2 that the cumulative pattern of steadily increasing arms exports does not necessarily hold when analyzing all the exporting nations

TABLE 2

ARMS TRANSFER TO THE THIRD WORLD BY SUPPLIER NATIONS, 1950-74*
(in U.S. $ millions 1973 constant)

Supplier nation	1950-54	1955-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	Total 1950-74
USA	661	1611	1803	2703	4921	11699
UK	537	1094	748	997	1448	4824
France	118	443	420	584	1404	2969
USSR	281	777	1958	3791	5729	12536
Czechoslovakia	0	188	74	65	57	384
China	46	369	164	67	319	965
Netherlands	58	93	14	41	108	314
Germany (F.R.)	5	54	60	98	160	377
Italy	38	90	37	114	214	493
Japan	16	55	31	77	2	181
Canada	19	111	48	82	103	363
Sweden	28	49	1	1	10	89
Third World	16	22	18	57	258	371
Others	7	60	14	102	92	275
Total	1830	5016	5390	8779	14825	35840

*Derived from SIPRI Yearbook 1976, pp. 252-53. Includes weapons transfers to Vietnam. The period totals and subtotals differ slightly from the totals listed in Table 1. SIPRI warns in their tables that "items may not add up to totals owing to rounding." Additionally, it should be noted that SIPRI changed some individual entries in the 1976 Yearbook (from the 1975 yearbook) without changing all the appropriate subtotals. These limited discrepancies do not negate the analytical value of the SIPRI data base. (The totals listed above were derived from the individual entries.)

individually. Yet it is significant that the U.S. and the USSR (the two postwar leaders of the bipolar world) do follow the cumulative pattern. Related to this general trend of the domination of the two superpowers has been the gradual and sustained shift from the U.S. to the USSR as the number one supplier of major arms to the Third World.[14]

In spite of numerous sporadic increases of arms sales by many of the European nations, and even by the People's Republic of China and the Third World nations themselves, the two superpowers have accounted for an excess of two-thirds of the transfers to the Third World since 1960. Table 3 clearly demonstrates that the United States has been "playing a leading role" (as advanced by proposition 1A). Yet, as Tables 2 and 3 clearly demonstrate, the U.S. has not had a monopoly, nor even necessarily predominant position, in supplying arms to the Third World.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF MAJOR ARMS TRANSFERS TO THIRD WORLD
(derived from Table 2 data; SIPRI data base)

Supplier nation	1950-54	1955-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74
U.S.	36	32	33	31	33
USSR	15	15	36	43	39
Total	51	47	69	74	72

[14]These figures are derived from Table 2. If the NATO nations' sales are added to those of the U.S., the "West's" arms supplied far exceeds those of the communist states; yet the sustained growth of Soviet transfers during this period is significant. Increased arms purchased by the OPEC states in 1975-76 (from the U.S.) may modify this trend--at least for the short term.

Tables 2 and 3 also clearly demonstrate the accelerated shift of Soviet arms trade in the latter half of the 1950s, emphasized in proposition 1B. Table 3 illustrates the Soviet growth to leading supplier, but Table 2 also reflects the transitional use of Czechoslovakia during this period.[15]

Table 2 also shows the substantial roles that the United Kingdom and France have played in the Third World arms trade. France's trade has particularly increased in the 1970s. Other nations (i.e., China, Italy, Germany, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands) have accounted for significant, if lesser, portions of the arms trade. Finally, it is worth noting that the Third World nations themselves showed a sharp increase in the distribution (including redistribution) of major weapons in the 1970s.[16]

As we are now entering the second half of the 1970s, the comparable data base figures are naturally not as yet available. Yet, the current data demonstrate that arms transfers to the Third World are continuing at a high

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[15]See Sutton and Kemp, Arms to Developing Countries, p. 5, in a footnote discussing the sale of MIG aircraft to noncommunist Egypt in 1955, they state: "Although Czechoslovakia was the nominal signatory of the agreement of 1955--it is sometimes referred to as the Egyptian-Czech arms deal--there is no doubt that the Soviet Union fully approved of, and probably instigated, the agreement."

[16]Third World transfers include such apparent anomalies as the transfer of U.S. F-5 aircraft to Uganda--as a gift from Lybia in 1973. See SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, p. 89.

rate during the 1970s.[17]

Table 4 illustrates the continued acceleration of arms transfer activities by the two leading suppliers during the 1970s. Both nations experienced similar, if not symmetrical, growth patterns. The Soviet activity experienced a rapid increase in 1973, while maintaining that unprecedented high level in the two subsequent years. The United States, after a slight decrease in 1973, has experienced a rapid short-term growth in 1974, and again in 1975. The 1975 transfers of $1769 million worth of equipment established a post World War II record level.[18]

TABLE 4

VALUES OF MAJOR WEAPONS EXPORTS TO THE THIRD WORLD DURING THE 1970s (in U.S. $ millions, at constant 1973 prices)

Supplier nation	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
USA	962	916	958	885	1200	1769
USSR	836	1085	726	1542	1540	1652

Supplier-Recipient Relationship Patterns

Proposition 2: During the past twenty-five years dominant sole source supplier-recipient relationships have given

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[17]SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1976, pp. 252-53. See also U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975 (Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1976), p. 56.

[18]See Appendix B.

way to multiple supplier relationships for most Third World states.

Proposition 2A:

> In the postwar period that concactenation of factors involving bipolarity, stable hegemonic alliances under the leadership of the two major powers, an ideological locus of conflict and a zeitgeist of total war has given rise to: (1) narrowly oligopolistic supplier markets, both in terms of the absolute number of suppliers and the dominance of the market by two major powers; (2) the relative predominance of single client donor-recipient relationships and within-bloc acquisition patterns both for members of the major alliance blocs and for peripheral or nominally neutral nations; . . .[19]

Proposition 2B: "The tendency of a recipient nation to remain the client of a given arms-supplying country is countered by a desire on the part of developing nations to demonstrate independence and shop among an increasing number of sellers."[20]

In his systematic study of arms transfer patterns, Robert Harkavy concludes: "There has been a definite trend of late toward cross-bloc, multiple supplier relationships, in parallel with the breakdown of the loose bipolar arrangement of the early postwar period."[21] He found only nineteen states that had maintained sole source relationships with a

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[19]Harkavy, Arms Trade and International Systems, p. 11.

[20]John Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms to Developing Countries," Adelphi Papers #28 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), pp. 30-31.

[21]Harkavy, Arms Trade and International Systems, p. 130.

single supplier in the postwar period (to 1968).[22] Of these nineteen, eleven were small Middle East or African states that for colonial and other hegemonic reasons remained totally dependent upon the United Kingdom or France. Of the remaining eight states, four (Bolivia, Nicaragua, South Korea, and Liberia) relied solely upon the United States, and four (Afghanistan, Guinea, Yemen, and China) relied solely upon the USSR.

Subsequent to 1968 Bolivia has purchased aircraft from Brazil and Canada, and Nicaragua has obtained aircraft from Israel.[23] Even South Korea's total reliance upon the United States was at least broken in a minor way by the procurement of two HS748 transport aircraft from the United Kingdom in 1974.[24] This leaves only Liberia of the four Third World states previously determined to be solely dependent upon the United States. Liberia is unique in its historical ties with the U.S. and its minuscule military establishment.[25]

The four nations previously found to be solely dependent upon Soviet equipment have experienced a similar

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[22]See Appendix C.

[23]See SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, p. 107 and p. 102.

[24]SIPRI Yearbook 1975, p. 232.

[25]According to SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, pp. 78-79, Liberia's total major military hardware receipts have consisted of two World War II vintage C-47 cargo aircraft, fifteen World War II vintage M-3 tanks, three miscellaneous patrol boats, and two landing craft.

pattern. Guinea procured Alouette helicopters from France in 1972 and patrol boats from China in 1973.[26] China, although relying primarily on indigenous sources since its split with the USSR, has recently purchased helicopters from France and is reported to have ordered transport aircraft from Australia.[27] Yemen is reported to have purchased Augusta-Bell helicopters from Italy in 1963, as well as some light cargo aircraft from the U.S.A. in the early 1950s as "part of the Imam's private fleet."[27] Finally, Afghanistan, in its relatively unique landlocked position contiguous to the USSR, has maintained its sole reliance upon the USSR for major weapons.[29]

Possibly of more significance than the breakdown of the "sole" (single nation) supplier phenomenon is the tendency of Third World nations to procure weapons from both the "Western" bloc and communist states (primarily the USSR). Some states have vacillated as to which group is their primary source while others generally maintained a

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[26]SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, p. 77. SIPRI also lists the receipt of one Bell 47G helicopter from the U.S.A. in 1964.

[27]SIPRI Yearbook 1976, p. 210. Although China is now generally considered an industrialized nation with its own weapons development capability, it is cited here because of its previous sole dependence upon the USSR.

[28]SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, pp. 65-66.

[29]Ibid., p. 32. Afghanistan's weapons have included supersonic MIG-21 and SU-7 aircraft as well as air-to-air missiles. It is interesting to note that Afghanistan has received U.S. economic aid.

multiple supplier pattern, but with a single principal source on one side or the other. Harkavy's study designated twenty-eight Third World states as having various "cross-bloc patterns" as of 1968.[30] It is significant to note that the nations falling under one of the various "cross-bloc" categories include a significant number of Third World nations with relatively large military establishments (e.g., Iran, Cuba, Iraq, Syria, UAR [Egypt], Pakistan, Indonesia, India, Yugoslavia, Lybia).

During the 1970s there have been additional Third World states entering the "cross bloc" procurement categories. Cameroons, while continuing to rely upon French equipment, has also ordered patrol boats from China in 1975.[31] Zambia, still primarily dependent upon Western European sources, received light attack and trainer aircraft from Yugoslavia in 1971.[32] Along with the previously cited purchase of French helicopters by China, the recent orders of Russian MI-8 helicopters by Peru ranks as one of the more significant "cross bloc" procurements in recent years. After having received two of the helicopters as gifts from the USSR following the 1970 earthquake, the Peruvian government purchased six additional MI-8s in 1975

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[30]Reference Appendix C.

[31]SIPRI Yearbook 1976, p. 270.

[32]SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, p. 92.

with fourteen more ordered in 1976.[33] Although Soviet weapons had previously penetrated the Western hemisphere (Cuba in 1960), this marked the first sale to a noncommunist government in the Western hemisphere as well as a penetration of the South American continent.

Based upon the above examination of arms transfer patterns, it is reasonable to conclude that the Third World arms trade cannot be divided into either sole source or definitive bloc groupings. Although a large percentage of nations continue to rely predominantly on one supplier, there have been enough "cross-bloc" trades to preclude any rigid bipolar division of the Third World arms market. In addition to the numerous "neutral" Third World states, many states generally perceived as "allies" of the U.S. (e.g., CENTO members Iran and Pakistan, OAS member Peru) have purchased weapons from the USSR and China.[34] Conversely, the U.S. has supplied military weapons and training to Yugoslavia (a communist state that rejects Soviet hegemony), while China has also recently purchased Western military equipment.

The Financial Burden

Proposition 3: The growth in military expenditures in the

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[33] SIPRI Yearbook 1976, p. 279.

[34] Although Pakistan's procurement of Chinese arms in 1965 was initially precipitated by the U.S./U.K. arms embargo after the India-Pakistan conflict, Pakistan subsequently received arms from both the USSR and China while maintaining CENTO membership.

Third World has outstripped the growth in socioeconomic programs.

Proposition 3A: "The governments of developing countries in total devote as much public revenue to military programs as to education and health care combined."[35]

Proposition 3B: "These developing world totals conceal a considerable amount of variation among developing states."[36]

Proposition 3C: "The current scarcity of global resources underlines the urgency of curbing arms expenditures in the developing world, which have been increasing more rapidly than those in the developed world."[37]

Monetary figures take on additional meaning when they are put into a larger context. A recent study of world public expenditures by Ruth Sivard determined that in the year 1974, approximately 270 billion dollars were spent on military programs throughout the world (see Table 5).[38]

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[35]Ruth L. Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1976 (Leesburg, Va.: WMSE Publications, 1976), p. 5.

[36]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms; A Report to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 77.

[37]United Nations Association of the United States of America, Controlling the International Arms Trade, p. 4.

[38]Ruth Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1976, pp. 12, 20-21. See also ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1965-1974, p. 14, which calculates world military expenditures of 285 billion $ U.S. for the year 1974.

TABLE 5

WORLD PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, 1974
(in billion $ U.S.)

	1973		1974	
	Amt.	%	Amt.	%
Education	251	39	280	39
Military	244	37	270	37
Health	142	22	160	22
Foreign economic aid	11	2	15	2
International peace keeping	< 1	< 1	1	< 1

Even if one does not concur with some of the conclusions and implications of the Sivard study (e.g., that curtailed military expenditures could be directly transferred to equitable social programs),[39] there remains the reality that world military expenditures have reached a great magnitude. In the Third World these expenditures are usually translated to increased foreign arms purchases.

Sivard's study (see Table 6) also substantiates her proposition (3A) that military expenditures in the developing world exceeded public expenditures for education and health--at least for the year 1973 ($37,623 million as compared to $35,888 million).[40]

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[39] Ibid., p. 19.

[40] Data derived from Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, pp. 21-23. Study furnishes "detailed" data for 1973 only. It appears for purposes of this illustration that 1973 is a reasonably representative year, noting that at least the aggregate world percentages (Table 5) held constant in 1973 and 1974.

TABLE 6

A COMPARISON OF MILITARY (ME), EDUCATION (ED), AND HEALTH (HE) EXPENDITURES FOR THE "DEVELOPED" AND "DEVELOPING" WORLDS, AND FOR SELECTED THIRD WORLD GEOGRAPHIC AREAS FOR THE YEAR 1973 (in million U.S. $)

	ME	ED	HE	ED & HE
"Developed world"	206,799	223,645	133,829	357,474
"Developing world"	37,623	27,383	8,508	35,888
World total	244,422	251,028	142,337	393,362
Middle East	10,426	2,803	864	3,667
South Asia	2,838	1,659	670	2,329
Far East (excluding Japan)	16,291	9,544	2,443	11,987
Africa	2,532	3,653	990	4,653
Latin America	4,085	6,577	2,073	8,650

Using the above data (Tables 5 and 6) as measures, it appears that the concerns expressed in propositions 3A, B, and C are generally substantiated. Even though the world as a whole does spend more public funds on education and health care, the opposite is true for the "developing" world as a whole.[41] Table 6 illustrates that some Third World regions do provide more funds to education and health (e.g., Africa and Latin America), but one region (the Middle East) spent almost three times as much on military expenditures as on education and health care combined.

[41]The case to be made here is not that the "developed" world is necessarily doing a better job in restraining military expenditures, but that limited resources are required for multiple purposes. Whether one takes the pessimistic view of Dennis Meadows' The Limits of Growth (London: Chatto & Windus for Sussex University Press, 1973)

In order to further examine these general propositions, the growth of Third World military expenditures as well as arms transfers are viewed from an additional perspective. Table 7 compares the "developing" nations' military expenditures with their cumulative Gross National Products and also with the equivalent data for the "developed" world.[42]

TABLE 7

GROWTH IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME) AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS, 1960-74*

	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1960-74
Developing world (GNP)	2324	2995	4041	9360
Developing world (ME)	88	126	180	394
ME as percent of GNP	(3.8)	(4.2)	(4.5)	(4.2)
Developed world (GNP)	11601	15042	18721	45364
Developed world (ME)	846	1019	1029	2894
ME as percent of GNP	(7.6)	(6.8)	(5.5)	(6.4)

*Data derived from Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, p. 20. GNP and ME data are in billions 1973 U.S. dollars. Developing countries in the WMSE data included all Africa, Latin America, Asia (except Japan and Israel), and seven European states (Albania, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia). Although this grouping does not precisely equate to the "Third World" data base utilized by SIPRI, it is more similar than dissimilar.

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or a more optimistic view of world resources, e.g., B. Bruce-Briggs, "Against the Neo-Malthusians," Commentary (July 1974), there are finite limits to the world's resources that are available at any given time.

[42]Most of the caveats previously discussed relative to military expenditures data are probably appropriate when citing and comparing GNPs. Yet, it is felt that these data can be used to illustrate gross trends--subject to modification if and when more reliable and valid data become available.

As Table 7 so clearly illustrates, although the "developing" world expends a lower portion of its GNP on military expenditures than the "developed" world, the percentage has been on the increase during the past fifteen years. This increase contrasts to a relative decrease in military expending for the developed world. This relative growth in military expenditures is further substantiated by comparing the GNPs of the developing and developed world during these same periods. The GNP data from Table 6 demonstrate that the "developing" world's GNP generally maintained a comparable percentage: 20% (2324/11601) for 1960-64; 19.9% (2995/15042) for 1965-69; and 21.6% (4041/18721) for 1970-74.[43]

The aggregate military expenditure percentages for the developing world in Table 6 (3.8%, 4.2%, and 4.5%) also obscure some of the disproportionately high military expenditures in some Third World states. In 1973, for example, Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Yemen, Egypt, North Korea, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Israel all had military expenditures in excess of 10 percent of their GNPs.[44]

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[43]The significance of these comparative GNPs is not that they demonstrate any remarkable growth in the "developing" world, but that the relative growth in military expenditures cannot be categorically explained away by a differential growth in GNP as compared with the "developed" world.

[44]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1965-1974, p. 6.

Looking at the arms trade regionally also reveals some trends not readily visible in the aggregate data. Table 8 rearranges the SIPRI data base (previously used to construct Tables 1 and 2), dividing the Third World arms trade into recipient portions.

The dozen states of the Far East (excluding North and South Vietnam) were recipients of 18 percent (6391/35778) of the arms recorded in SIPRI data base (see Table 8). The Far East appears to have experienced a significant, if untypical, trend during the past twenty-five years. After leading the Third World in arms imports during the 1950s,[45] the area has experienced reversal and decline in arms transfers through the 1960s and the period from 1970 to 1974.

Vietnam data taken as a separate entity demonstrate the phenomenal build-up of armaments in that nation. Almost 90 percent (2992/3335) of the recorded weapons transfers took place in the last ten years (1965-74).

The total Far East pattern obviously relates to the trend in tensions in the total area. The Korean War and the initial tension between the two Chinas paralleled the

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[45]It is significant to note that this region's early imports would be even higher if China (PRC) were included during the 1950s. The USSR was giving the PRC extensive military aid in the 1950s. China was a weapons importing Third World developing nation during that period, even though China has subsequently become an arms exporter. This comment is not to criticize the SIPRI data base criteria, but to point out one of the many considerations that must be kept in mind in this data analysis.

TABLE 8

VALUE OF MAJOR WEAPONS IMPORTS BY THIRD WORLD REGIONS, 1950-75*
(in U.S. $ millions at 1973 constant prices)

Region	1950-54	1955-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1950-74 Amt.	1950-74 %
Far East (excluding Vietnam)	769	1562	1545	1443	1072	6391	18
Vietnam (North and South)	9	84	250	1206	1786	3335	9
South Asia	279	1174	800	1135	1429	4817	13
Middle East	253	1323	1309	3375	7263	13523	38
North Africa	0	21	107	389	599	1116	3
Sub-Sahara Africa	43	63	194	302	706	1308	4
South Africa	56	126	176	341	378	1077	3
Central America	60	64	535	57	200	916	3
South America	358	604	472	568	1293	3295	9
Period total	1827	5021	5388	8816	14726	35778	

*Derived from SIPRI Yearbook 1976, pp. 250-51. Refer to Appendix B for a reproduction of these pages. It must be remembered that period totals will differ slightly from Tables 1 and 2 due to rounding of individual entries. Additionally, the 1952 entry for Far East was changed (from 57) to 87 as previously listed in the SIPRI Yearbook 1975. The entry of 57 appears to be a typographical error as the remainder of the 1952 entries as well as the totals for 1952 remained unchanged between the two yearbooks. See SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, pp. vii-ix, for a precise listing of which states are included in each designated region.

substantial transfer of arms to the area in the 1950s. Obviously the two conflicts have not been fully resolved (and weapons transfers have not radically declined either), but the greatest growth moved to Southeast Asia, as illustrated by the expansion of the Vietnam activity in the late 1960s.

South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka), as a region, has experienced a sustained, if sometimes erratic, build-up during this period. The area has experienced sporadic conflicts in the form of border clashes between India and China, and India and Pakistan, including the recent conflict which resulted in the formation of the separate nation of Bangladesh. It has been stated: "The demand for weapons in the region has been dominated by the tensions arising from the process of decolonization."[46] Subsequently this area of the world has received 13 percent of the major weapons supplied to the Third World (see Table 8).

The Middle East alone accounted for 38 percent (13523/35778) of the Third World's major arms transfers during this period (see Table 8). This growth is not only significant in itself (from $253 million in 1950-54 to $7263 million in 1970-74), but by its substantial increase within the total percentage of major weapons going to all the Third World (from 14% in 1950-54 to over 49% in the

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[46]SIPRI, The Arms Trade in the Third World (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 179.

1970-74 period). This latter figure illustrates how the Middle East "arms race" has significantly exceeded the general growth rate for arms transfers for the Third World in general. As this table shows, other Third World areas (e.g., Vietnam, North Africa, Sub-Sahara Africa, and South Africa) have shown steadily increasing arms transfer patterns, but none of these patterns approach the magnitude of the Middle East growth.

Initially much of the activity can be attributed to the "Arab-Israeli conflict" and the breakdown of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration[47] with the subsequent activity of the USSR in supplying the Arab states. Yet, a new factor has significantly affected the area. As a recent Rand study stated: "By all odds the most important development in international arms transfers are the increased purchases by the oil producing countries of the Middle East."[48] This recent growth is reflected by the recent statement of Senator Kennedy: "Indeed, when one looks hard at the 'arms sales' problem, it turns out to be very largely a 'Persian Gulf' problem."[49]

North Africa (for which SIPRI includes only Algeria,

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[47]See Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms Traffic and Third World Conflicts," International Conciliation, No. 577 (March 1970): 45.

[48]James Digby, Precision Weapons (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1975), p. 24.

[49]Edward M. Kennedy, "The Persian Gulf: Arms Race or Arms Control?" Foreign Affairs, No. 42 (October 1975): 14.

Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia), as a region, grew from no recorded major arms imports in 1950-54 to $599 million in 1970-74 (see Table 8). This region (like South Asia) demonstrates the transition from European colonial domination to independence--along with its associated responsibilities as well as opportunities. Another factor is the involvement of this area in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Libya is reported to have loaned some of its substantial inventory of Mirage fighter aircraft to Egypt during the October 1973 war with Israel.[50]

The Sub-Sahara Africa region (in which the SIPRI data base includes thirty-one nations, excluding South Africa) accounted for less than 4 percent (1308/35778) of the recorded arms transfers during this twenty-five-year period (see Table 8), confirming what earlier analysis has described as the "arms walk."[51] Yet it is significant to note that 54 percent (706/1308) of the transfers transpired during the last five years of this period.

Here again the European colonial legacy and the area's transition to independent states was an apparent factor in initially precluding major arms imports by native governments. As decolonization and its associated conflicts have evolved (e.g., the Congo in 1960 to Angola in 1975),

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[50]SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, p. 68.

[51]John Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, Arms to Developing Countries, 1945-1965 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), pp. 30-31.

there has been a gradual but sustained growth in weapons procurements. At this time, as the Black African states challenge the legitimacy of the governments in Rhodesia and South Africa, the "arms walk" appears to be gaining speed. In 1970 Geoffrey Kemp summarized the situation well: "There was a time in the mid-1950s when many African politicians and leaders looked forward to the emergence of this continent as one of the first truly 'disarmed' areas in the world. . . . This no longer is the prevalent attitude in Africa."[52]

South Africa (the state) is singled out in SIPRI's data base as having received just over 3 percent of all the major Third World arms imports (see Table 8). It is significant to note that South Africa has absorbed a fairly consistent share of the market over the past twenty-five years (from a low of 2.5% in 1955-59 to a high of 3.8% in 1965-69), in spite of a United Nations arms embargo passed in 1963. "France, and to a lesser extent Britain and Italy, are generally regarded as the principal obstacles to the successful imposition of the arms embargo on South Africa."[53]

The ten relatively small states of Central America absorbed over 2.5 percent of all Third World imports during the twenty-five-year period, but particularly significant is

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[52]Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms Traffic and Third World Conflict," International Conciliation (May 1970), 59.

[53]Stanley and Pearton, The International Trade in Arms, p. 171.

the $535 million in the 1960-64 period, during the time of the Cuban build-up of Soviet weapons and the subsequent counter-reactions, which accounted for 60 percent of all arms imports recorded for all five periods. Subsequently Mexico and Costa Rica have demonstrated the ability to maintain security with small military and para-military forces.[54]

South America (in which SIPRI includes Trinidad and Tobago, as well as the continental states) received about 9 percent of the transfers (see Table 8). Unlike Central America, the magnitude of arms imports was not noticeably affected by the Cuban build-up in the early 1960s. In fact, total recorded imports decreased during this period. Apparently the counter-insurgency strategy with its emphasis on fighting guerrillas deemphasized major weapons procurements.

South America, in spite of its lack of any recent major international conflict and subsequent to U.S. legislation limiting arms exports to that area,[55] has shown a marked increase in major weapons procurements in the 1970s. Yet, the December 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho demonstrated an apparent desire within the Latin American nations to create "conditions which will make possible the effective

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[54]Kemp, "Arms Traffic and Third World Conflict," p. 65.

[55]See Luigi Einaudi et al. for a listing of "Principal Legislative Restrictions Affecting Arms Transfers and Military Relations as of 1972," in Arms Transfers to Latin America: Toward a Policy of Mutual Respect (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1973), pp. 71-73.

limitation of armaments."[56] There appears to be recognition of the potential dangers inherent in a regional arms race, even if they have not been able to agree on what to do about it.

Competitive Trading

Proposition 4: As the Third World states have emerged and gained awareness of their potential economic and geopolitical power, they have obtained more advanced (and less surplus) weapons.

Proposition 4A: "Not only has the volume of trade risen dramatically, but so has the proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems."[57]

Proposition 4B: "Indigenous arms production in the developing world is growing."[58]

Proposition 4C: "The big powers compete for the best customers, those with money, raw materials, large export markets and close connections with still other desirable clients."[59]

To initially put the quantitative and qualitative

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[56]United Nations Association of the United States of America, Controlling the International Arms Trade, p. 9.

[57]Ibid., p. 1.

[58]Sutton and Kemp, Arms to Developing Countries, p. 30.

[59]Robert Harkavy, "The Pariah State Syndrome as an Arms Control Dilemma" (paper presented at 1976 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2-5, 1976), p. 24.

advancement of the Third World's military into further perspective, the Sivard study on World Military and Social Expenditures yields some insight.[60] Table 9 compares the growth in developing world military expenditures (previously cited in Table 7) with the relative growth in size of the developing world's militaries.

TABLE 9

GROWTH IN "DEVELOPING" WORLD'S MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND TOTAL ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL

	1960	1965	1970	1974
Military expenditures (in billion 1973 U.S. $)	15	21	32	39
Armed forces (personnel in thousands)	8,669	9,814	11,323	12,332
ME/Personnel ratio (thousand $/AF person)	1.73	2.14	2.83	3.16

Table 9 reflects a sustained growth in military expenditures per armed forces personnel throughout the developing world. Although the $3,160 per soldier is still far below the average expenditure per NATO and Warsaw Pact soldier ($23,456 and $16,790 for 1973),[61] the table does illustrate a significant advancement in expenditures per military personnel during the past fifteen years. Again

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[60] Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, p. 20. The years 1960, 1965, 1970, and 1974 were arbitrarily chosen for Table 9 to illustrate the general trend. Refer to Appendix E for a review of data from all the years 1960 through 1974.

[61] Ibid., p. 24.

one must be cautious of analyzing aggregate data. The Sivard study notes that some Third World states (e.g., Israel at $31,748 and Saudi Arabia at $25,000) exceeded both the NATO and Warsaw Pact averages in 1973.[62] Additionally, these data demonstrate that the growth in Third World military expenditures cannot be accounted for solely by the relative growth in the number of personnel in uniform, as the many newly independent states emerged during the past twenty-five years.

Since some portion of the increased military expenditure is probably attributable to increased salaries and/or support services, the data as recorded in Table 9 do not necessarily translate into proof of increased roles of "sophisticated" or "advanced" weapons.[63] Yet, these data in combination with the previous Table 8 yield substantive evidence of the growing trend toward advanced and sophisticated weapons in the Third World.

Additional insight into the spread of advanced weapons can be obtained by examining the spread of specific weapons types. Ten years ago Sutton and Kemp noted the general significance of the jet fighter aircraft in the Third World:

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[62] Ibid., p. 26.

[63] For a discussion of the problems in classifying "sophisticated" and "offensive" (versus "unsophisticated" and "defensive") weapons, see Sutton and Kemp, Arms to Developing Countries, p. 32.

> The jet fighter tends to be both token and substance of a substantial aid programme. A nation may not be able to use tanks conveniently in the areas where it anticipates armed conflict, and if it has no sea coast it will not require a navy; but it will want jet fighters if its unfriendly, or even friendly, neighbour has them.[64]

SIPRI, in their Arms Trade Register in 1974, constructed a chart to update such analysis, demonstrating the spread of "super- and transonic" jet aircraft throughout the Third World.[65] From Israel's purchase of Mystere IV aircraft in 1955 through Zaire's recent order of Mirage 5 aircraft, supersonic fighters have been introduced to forty-one Third World states during the past twenty years. Table 10 summarizes the chronological spread of these aircraft (in accordance with the references SIPRI chart).

TABLE 10

SPREAD OF SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT THROUGHOUT THE THIRD WORLD

	1955-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74
Third World nations with supersonic aircraft	3	9	29	41

Table 10 illustrates the phenomenal spread of these weapons systems in the latter half of the 1960s--penetrating

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[64] John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms to Developing Countries," Adelphi Paper, No. 28 (1966): 8.

[65] SIPRI, The Arms Trade Registers, p. 168. Included in this chart are the Mystere IVA and the A-4 which, according to William Green, The World Guide to Combat Aircraft (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1967), are only capable of subsonic speed capabilities. Yet their inclusion does not significantly alter the chart.

all major regions of the Third World. Subsequently in the mid-1970s an advanced generation of jet aircraft (MIG-23, SU-17, F-14, F-15, Mirage F-1, etc.) are being introduced in the Third World. Table 11 compares introduction rates of the various supersonic aircraft that have been introduced.

Although the list in Table 11 may not be exhaustive of all supersonic aircraft introduced to the Third World and some of their "operational" (versus initial prototype production) dates may vary slightly from different sources, the data are representative of the growing trend in procurement of advanced fighter aircraft. The thirteen aircraft listed as operational in the developed world in the 1950s and 1960s were first exported to the Third World after an average of 5.2 years. This average includes the immediate export of the Mystere IVA and the early export of the Super Mystere to Israel in 1959, as well as the export of the RF-101 (basically a reconnaissance aircraft) to Taiwan in 1958. Additionally, the average introduction time is even longer if the four French aircraft (average of two years) are excluded. The USSR, USA, and UK averages for the selected aircraft from Table 11 are 6.7, 6.8, and 6.0, respectively.

Yet, regardless of which figure and sets of figures are utilized to best describe the trend in the 1950s and 1960s, they all (with the exception of French aircraft) contrast significantly with the pattern for the 1970s. The

TABLE 11

SELECTED SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT INTRODUCED TO THE THIRD WORLD*

Aircraft	Origin	Operational year	Third World export year	Time from operational to export
RF-101	USA	1954	1958	4
Mystere IVA**	France	1955	1955	0
A-4**	USA	1956	1968	12
Super Mystere	France	1957	1959	2
F-104	USA	1958	1967	9
SU-7B	USSR	1959	1967	8
MIG-21	USSR	1959	1962	3
Lightning	UK	1960	1966	6
F-4	USA	1961	1968	7
Mirage III	France	1961	1962	1
F-5	USA	1963	1965	2
SU-11	USSR	1966	1975	9
Mirage V	France	1968	1973	5
MIG-23	USSR	1971	1973	2
SU-17	USSR	1972	1972	0
Mirage F-1	France	1973	1975	2
F-14	USA	1974	1976	2
F-15	USA	1975	1976	1

*Data derived from SIPRI Yearbook 1976, pp. 67, 254-80; William Green, The World Guide to Combat Planes (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967); and Janes' All The World's Aircraft 1974-75 (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1974).

**Although the Mystere IVA and A-4 are generally considered subsonic, as previously noted, SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers lists them among the "Super and transonic" aircraft and they are included here for consistency.

MIG-23, SU-17, F-14, F-15, and Mirage 5 have all been exported to the Third World within a maximum of two years after they were first operational. Additionally, it appears that the trend is for subsequent advanced aircraft to be "on order" before they are operational.[66]

In addition to the early transfer of advanced fighter aircraft, there are a significant number of modern jet fighter aircraft being built in the Third World.[67] Included within the twenty countries reported to be developing or producing "indigenously designed major weapons" and the eighteen countries with "licensed production of major weapons," at least six of these countries are reportedly producing or scheduled to produce advanced fighter aircraft. India has been producing MIG-21 aircraft since 1970. Israel is producing a "Kfir" fighter reported developed from the Mirage. North Korea is reported to be scheduled to manufacture MIG-21s in 1978. Pakistan and South Africa are both reportedly scheduled for production of

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[66]The F-16 (as was the F-14) is on order by Iran. (According to Congressman Henry Waxman's article, "Arms Sales: Our Heads in the Sand," published in the Los Angeles Times, 16 September 1976, this proposed sale is for 160 aircraft.) Although the USSR generally does not publish its pending weapons transfers, there has been speculation that the MIG-25 "may yet be deployed to the Persian Gulf region" (see Alvin J. Cottrell, "Why Sell Arms to the Shah," Christian Science Monitor, 15 September 1976). The MIG-25 is reported to have flown out of Cairo West Airfield in 1971-72 flying reconnaissance flights over the Sinai and Israeli coastline and to have made regular overflights of Iran, according to Janes, All the World's Aircraft 1974-75, p. 502.

[67]See SIPRI Yearbook 1976, pp. 232-47.

the Mirage F-1, and Taiwan is manufacturing F-5s. In addition to these, a number of other countries (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia) are involved in the manufacture of other miscellaneous aircraft. Yet all these nations are to some extent dependent upon developed world resources and/or licensing for power plants and other components. Although most Third World states are capable of manufacturing small arms, advanced weapons can only be produced with the aid and support of a developed country.

Although the supersonic aircraft has been used as the primary example of the spread of advanced and sophisticated weapons, some of the same general competitive patterns exist for other weapons. The competition for equivalency among Third World rivals is illustrated by ship procurements in Latin America. "In 1958 Argentina and Brazil placed orders for aircraft carriers within weeks of each other" and ". . . in 1968, after Argentina ordered two submarines from the Federal Republic of Germany, Chile and Brazil countered by each ordering two British subs."[68]

Looking at the twelve "leading importers of major weapons" in the Third World gives some further insight into the arms trade.

Table 12 reflects the "competition" (multiple sources) among the leading arms importers within the Third World. It further reinforces the extent to which the

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[68]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms, p. 60.

TABLE 12

LEADING IMPORTERS OF MAJOR WEAPONS IN THE THIRD WORLD, 1965-75 (Imports in U.S. $ millions at constant 1973 prices)*

Country	Imports	Region	Sources (since 1950)
1. Iran	3220	Middle East	USA, UK, Canada, Italy, France, Netherlands, Germany, USSR
2. Egypt	3047	Middle East	Germany, UK, USA, Canada, USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, France, Belgium
3. Syria	2185	Middle East	Italy, France, UK, USA, USSR, Czechoslovakia
4. Israel	2118	Middle East	USA, France, Netherlands, Sweden, UK, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Japan
5. India	1901	South Asia	UK, France, USA, USSR, Canada, Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia
6. North Vietnam	1513	Southeast Asia	USSR, China
7. South Vietnam	1495	Southeast Asia	USA, France, Japan
8. South Africa	1061	South Africa	USA, UK, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Denmark, Israel
9. Iraq	1060	Middle East	UK, Canada, India, France, USSR, USA
10. Libya	1050	North Africa	UK, USA, France, Egypt, USSR
11. North Korea	644	Far East	USSR, China
12. Saudi Arabia	619	Middle East	UK, USA, France, Italy, Germany

*Data derived from SIPRI Yearbook 1976, pp. 139-40, 254-80; and SIPRI, Arms Trade Register, pp. 10-94.

Middle East statistically dominates (reference Table 8), as it accounts for six of the top twelve countries.[69] The competition for these leading customers has both economic and political components, with the relative values not mutually exclusive nor precisely definable. Yet, even before beginning an analysis of motives, Table 12 confirms the competitive (multiple source) nature of the Third World arms trade.

Restrictive Trading

Proposition 5: The United States, and other supplier nations, have historically demonstrated significant restraint in introducing new weapons systems to Third World areas.

Proposition 5A: ". . . , supplier state actions and policies on arms exports frequently take the forms of some mix of restrictive and promotional measures intended to support the external interests of that state as well as to reflect the views of groups within the state."[70]

Having considered the "proliferation of sophistication" (proposition 4A), "the indigenous production" (4B),

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[69] If the Vietnams (apparently no longer a significant importer) were removed and Libya (a state with Middle East "involvement") were added to the six "Middle East" states, 70 percent (or seven of the top ten) would be connected with the Middle East arms race.

[70] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms, pp. 25-26.

and the competition for "best customers" (4C), the idea of "restrictive measures" deserves some consideration. Although the competitive nature of the growing Third World arms trade is reflected in previous discussions (e.g., Tables 11 and 12), some of the restrictive considerations are also reflected.[71] Table 11 illustrates that the supplier nations have, at least until recently, deferred the export of newly developed weapons systems.

There have been numerous international proposals and attempts to regulate, embargo, or otherwise restrict the conventional arms trade.[72] Yet, the limited success these efforts have been generally dependent upon the sovereign actions of the major weapons supplying nations. This factor is particularly critical when the spread of advanced weapons is being considered. As such, this section looks at some recent historical patterns in the transfer of advanced military hardware to the Third World.

The Middle East as a region is illustrative of the "mix of restrictive and promotional measures" by supplier states. Historically, the 1950 Tripartite Declaration

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[71]These restrictions (or delays) in the exporting of advanced weapons systems need not necessarily reflect noble or altruistic motives on the part of the supplier nations. The point is that classes of weapons are not always automatically exported.

[72]For a good summary and discussion see U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms, Annex C ("History of International Efforts to Control Conventional Arms Transfers Since World War II"), pp. C3-C56.

stands out as an early postwar attempt by the Western powers to control the build-up of arms in the Third World. "From 1949 to the mid-1950s, a tripartite agreement among the major suppliers to the Middle East--the United States, Great Britain and France--effectively discouraged a major arms race in that trouble region."[73]

Although it has been said that restraints broke down when France agreed to sell Israel a substantial number of aircraft in 1954,[74] the subsequent entry of the USSR as a major supplier negated the others' ability to control arms imports. "Up to 1955, Britain supplied 95 per cent of all jet aircraft delivered to the area"; whereas: "By the end of 1965, approximately half of the jet aircraft introduced into the area since World War II were Soviet types, all delivered since 1955."[75] The subsequent acceleration of arms transfers to the Middle East (previously reflected in Tables 8 and 12) demonstrates the subsequent transition from restrictive to apparently more competitive arms transfers.

A subsequent look at the introduction of supersonic aircraft into the Middle East is illustrative of the acceleration once a restrictive threshold is passed.

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[73]United Nations Association of the United States of America, Controlling the International Arms Trade, p. 10.

[74]SIPRI, Arms Trade with the Third World, p. 211.

[75]Sutton and Kemp, Arms to Developing Countries, p. 9.

TABLE 13

INITIAL RECEIPT OF SUPERSONIC FIGHTER AIRCRAFT BY MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES*

Nation	Year	Supplier	Aircraft
Israel	1959	France	Super Mystere
Egypt	1962	USSR	MIG-21
Iraq	1963	USSR	MIG-21
Iran	1965	USA	F-5
Saudi Arabia	1966	UK	Lightning
Jordan	1967	USA	F-104
Syria	1967	USSR	MIG-21
Kuwait	1968	UK	Lightning
Lebanon	1968	France	Mirage III
Abu Dhabi	1973	France	Mirage V

*Data from SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, pp. 41-66.

Latin America is illustrative of the abortive unilateral attempt of a supplier to restrict the regional crossing of a weapons threshold.[76] The decision by the United States in the mid-1960s to restrict the sale of the "supersonic" F-5 to any Latin American state ultimately led to the purchase of the faster and more expensive Mirage aircraft from France by Peru in 1968.[77] Subsequently, this led to the procurement of supersonic Mirage aircraft by Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, and Venezuela in 1972-73 and

[76]Although the USSR had introduced the supersonic M-21 to Cuba in 1962, the threshold had not yet been crossed by the continental nation of South America.

[77]Luigi Einaudi et al., Arms Transfers to Latin America: Toward a Policy of Mutual Respect, p. 3.

an order for the UK/French supersonic Jaguar aircraft by Ecuador in 1974.[78] Recently Peru has announced plans to purchase SU-22 jet aircraft from the USSR, rejecting the U.S. offer of the slower F-5 aircraft which the U.S. has offered for export to the area.[79] This purchase not only reflects growing "cross-bloc" purchases, but it also means that a South American state is now going into its second generation of supersonic aircraft.

This mix of restrictive and competitive factors is also reflected in the breaking of the supersonic threshold in other areas of the Third World. Particularly noteworthy is the often parallel and often coetaneous procurement of such weapons by rival Third World countries.[80] (For example, the procurement of MIG-21s by North Korea in 1965 was reflected by the procurement of F-5s by South Korea in 1965; the procurement of MIG-21s by North Vietnam in 1966 was also followed by the procurement of F-5s by South Vietnam in 1967; Pakistan's receipt of the F-104 in 1962 was closely followed by India's 1963 receipt of its first MIG-21s; Algeria's 1965 acquisition of the MIG-21 in 1965 was followed by Morocco's acquisition of the F-5 in 1966; etc.) Implicit in this pattern there is an apparent mixture

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[78] SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, pp. 103-23.

[79] "Peru Buys Jets from Soviets at Bargain," Washington Post, 3 November 1976.

[80] SIPRI , Arms Trade Registers, pp. 10-12, 27-32, 33-40, 66-70.

of restrictive and competitive factors among the developed world's military suppliers--particularly between the USSR and the USA in those examples cited above.

On the restrictive side, the retirement of the B-47 strategic medium bomber without any exportation is a significant example of restraint. Although the United State's 1964 offer for the destruction of the "obsolescent" B-47s for a reciprocal number of outdated Soviet TU-16 Badgers is generally discussed in the context of superpower strategic arms control,[81] the ultimate fate of these aircraft had a direct impact upon the escalation of conventional armaments in the Third World. The Soviet TU-16s, "broadly comparable in both role and performance with the B-47,"[82] have been exported by the USSR to Egypt in 1961 (all reportedly lost in the 1967 war), to Indonesia in 1962, and Iraq in 1962 (one reported lost in the 1967 war).[83] Although the military value of the B-47 to most Third World countries is probably questionable from a cost-effective standpoint, the fact remains that they (unlike the TU-16) were retired without any exportation.[84] Certainly multi-engine "medium" jet

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[81]See Jeremy J. Stone, Containing the Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1966).

[82]Green, The World Guide to Combat Planes, Vol. 2, p. 63.

[83]SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, pp. 5, 43, 50.

[84]Although I am unaware of any documented efforts by any Third World countries to procure B-47s, they could have been proposed as an equivalent system (offsetting the Soviet TU-16s) for Israel or even Iran (versus their rivals, i.e., Egypt and Iraq).

bombers with their ability to carry large payloads for sustained flights signify the crossing of another conventional arms threshold.

The examples of restrictive transfers of advanced weapons, though significant, do not offset the apparent competitive nature of Third World arms transfers. The growing trends in accelerated sales of advanced weapons illustrates the apparent domination of the competitive trends. Yet, as proposition 5A noted, there is "some mix of restrictive and promotional measures."

Summary

In examining and developing the propositions in this chapter, the accelerated growth of the Third World arms trade has been confirmed. Yet, additional perspectives and insights have been illustrated and examined, including:

1. The major roles of the USA and USSR as arms suppliers to the Third World.
2. The significant, if lesser, role of other countries as alternate arms suppliers.
3. The changing postwar pattern in supplier-recipient relationships--including cross-bloc.
4. The growing financial burden associated with the procurement of modern weapons.
5. The variations among Third World states often concealed by aggregate data.

6. The growing sophistication in arms being obtained by the Third World.
7. The trend toward indigenous and licensed arms production within Third World countries.
8. The competition among supplier nations for the Third World arms market.
9. The apparent growing reluctance among supplier nations to delay and/or preclude the introduction of new advanced conventional weapons into the Third World.

CHAPTER III

ARMS TRANSFERS AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

This chapter analyzes the conventional arms trade from a rational-strategic perspective. This analysis starts out with the assumption that the United States supplies arms to foreign nations to facilitate and promote U.S. national interests. The first portion of the chapter identifies specific foreign policy objectives that have been associated with the arms transfer programs. The remainder of the chapter analyzes these objectives as they relate to conventional arms transfers.

Clarifying Objectives

Proposition 6: The United States formulates its arms transfer policies as a means of pursuing a hierarchy of a somewhat abstract, ambiguous, and interrelated foreign policy objectives--from which it must identify, clarify, and evaluate specific program objectives.

Proposition 6A: The "basic goals and objectives of U.S. foreign policy since 1945" include:

a. Survival: Avoid thermonuclear war

b. Self-determination: Contain the USSR, China, and Cuba

c. Welfare: Satisfy economic and special interest demands of the American People that have international demands.[1]

Proposition 6B:

> The basic elements of our foreign policy--which we believe will guide any Congress and Administration, whether Republican or Democrat--include these:
> a. To maintain our own strength and purpose as a nation.
> b. To maintain and continually revitalize our relations with allies and friendly countries . . . .
> c. To reduce the risk of war with our potential adversaries . . . .
> d. To discourage the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities . . . .
> e. To resolve international economic issues in a way which enhances economic and political stability, prosperity, and justice.[2]

Proposition 6C: ". . . arms transfer policy . . . is an element of foreign policy which involves an evaluation of U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests."[3]

Proposition 6A is extracted from a textbook concerned with the analysis and evaluation of foreign policy, while proposition 6B is derived from a statement by former Secretary of State Kissinger. Proposition 6C is

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[1]Synthesis of list proposed by William Coplin, Patrick J. McGowan, and Michael K. O'Leary, American Foreign Policy: An Introduction to Analysis and Evaluation (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1974), pp. 80-81.

[2]From statement by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, "Security Assistance and Foreign Policy," U.S. Department of State Bulletin (April 19, 1976), 501.

[3]James Michael (U.S. Department of State), in the Final Report of 1976 West Point Senior Conference on Arms Transfers (West Point, New York: United States Military Academy, June 1976), p. 45.

extracted from the summary of a multidiscipline (government, academic, industry, etc.) round table conference sponsored by the United States Military Academy. The first frames the overall thrust of postwar U.S. foreign policy objectives associated with arms transfers. The second is representative of arms transfer objectives--having been presented twice in statements before the Congress during recent hearings on the International Security Assistance Act of 1976.[4] This latter proposition is indicative of the broad complexity of the foreign policy considerations associated with arms transfers.

Throughout these propositions, as well as within the Department of Defense Military Assistance and Sales Manual,[5] there is the expressed concern for economic and political issues along with security objectives. Although terminology may differ (e.g., security can be included in references to "survival," "strategic interests," "discourage the spread of nuclear weapons," etc.), there is a set of foreign policy objectives that can be initially divided into national interest objectives (security, political

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[4]U.S. Congress, House, Hearings of the Committee on International Relations, International Security Assistance Act of 1976, 94th Cong., p. 6; and U.S. Congress, House, Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d sess., p. 68.

[5]See Appendix F, which is a copy of the portion of the manual on "Purposes of Security Assistance."

influence, and economic prosperity).[6]

Discussing "U.S. Interest in Third World Development," Robert Packenham states: "Although the concept of national interest [objectives] is ambiguous as a guide to policies, estimates of national interests still need to be made."[7] He goes on to state that the United States has "at least three main and rather distinct types of interests in Third World development," which are "military security," "economic stake," and "moral interest." Not only are broad policy objectives somewhat ambiguous and abstract, but they are also interrelated. As Richard Rosecrance states: "Throughout history states have typically aimed at material, ideological, and security goals," later adding that "these goals could be conceived as layers of an onion of objectives" with "security goals as the core of the onion."[8]

The attainment of these broad, somewhat abstract, ambiguous, and interrelated national interest objectives becomes the basis for the implementation of specific programs. As Holsti states: "It is the task of policymakers

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[6]This arbitrary division is not meant to infer that this is the only acceptable division, but that it is an analytically useful one. This triad of objectives is used as an organizational device for subsequent analysis.

[7]Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 327-31.

[8]Richard Rosecrance, International Relations: Peace or War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 320.

to rank and choose among conflicting objectives and determine which are feasible within a specific set of circumstances."[9] Throughout the postwar period arms transfers have been utilized as one of the means to obtain these objectives. Subsequently the analysis and evaluation of specific programs (e.g., arms transfers to Third World states) requires some clarification of objectives. Bernard Brodie has criticized most of the analytical work on arms control for the "persistent failure to clarify and analyze objectives."[10] This requirement is certainly applicable to the broader concept of arms transfer policy.

Although the broad national interest objectives of security, economic prosperity, and political influence have meaning, their ambiguity and abstract nature require further clarification and even the identification of more specific program objectives. Table 14 is an attempt to identify and clarify more specific program objectives (goals, purposes, considerations, etc.) attributed to arms transfers.[11] Four

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[9]K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 127.

[10]Bernard Brodie, "On Objectives of Arms Control," International Security (Summer 1976): 17.

[11]The precise definition of and distinction between such terms as objectives, goals, values, etc. can be a subject of controversy in itself. See Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 111, for such a discussion. The paper will primarily use the term objective, differentiating "program objectives" from "national interest objectives" when such differentiation is required for clarity.

TABLE 14

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES OF U.S. ARMS SALES

Source	Objectives		
	Security	Economic	Political
Kissinger[1]	Maintain our own strength Reduce risk of war Discourage spread of nuclear weapons	Enhance economic stability, prosperity, and justice	Maintain relations with allies Enhance political stability, prosperity, and justice
Gray[2]	Promote regional stability	Dispose of excess weapons Lengthen production runs	Gain influence; promote goodwill Promote local stability (or disorder)
Tahtinen[3]	Base rights Fostering self-defense Regional power balance	Balance of trade Need for oil	Bargaining chips Resist Soviet influence
Gelb[4]	Strategic balance Base/transit rights Allies' self-sufficiency Regional balances Deter nuclear spread	Standardization	General influence Human rights Internal security

TABLE 14--Continued

Source	Objectives		
	Security	Economic	Political
Consensus objectives	1. Strategic balance 2. Base rights 3. Allies' self-reliance 4. Regional balances 5. Deter nuclear spread	6. Balance of payments 7. Need for oil 8. Defense industries 9. Standardization	10. U.S. influence 11. Deter Soviet influence 12. Human rights 13. Internal stability

[1]Extracted from proposition 6B (Dr. Kissinger's statement in "Security Assistance and Foreign Policy").

[2]Derived from Colin S. Gray, "Traffic Control for the Arms Trade?" Foreign Policy, no. 6 (Spring 1972): 165.

[3]Derived from Dale R. Tahtinen, "Arms Traffic and U.S. Security" (paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference at Columbus, Ohio, October 28-30, 1976), pp. 6-9.

[4]Derived from Leslie Gelb, "Arms Sales," Foreign Policy, no. 25 (Winter 1976-77): 11-19.

sources were selected in an effort to produce a comprehensive (yet concise) summary. The first source is derived from a statement of a man who was recently involved in the formulation and implementation of policy, while the other three were derived from analytical studies of arms transfers. The primary criteria for selection was that these knowledgeable sources identified specific objectives.[12] The objectives were extracted, abstracted, or otherwise modified to give the entries in the table a generally standard format, but an effort was made to retain the author's original phraseology.[13]

Table 14 demonstrates a number of important considerations that must be kept in mind in analyzing arms transfer objectives. First, even among the more comprehensive analytical listings (i.e., Gray, Tahtinen, and Gelb) there are some differences as to specific objectives. Yet, upon closer examination of the table, there exists a general compatibility. The concepts are generally equivalent, even if the phraseology differs. Second, even if these objectives are still somewhat abstract, they certainly are more definitive than the higher level objectives. Third, many of these program objectives overlap within the broader

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[12]This should not be taken to infer that all these sources were totally supportive of arms sales. The articles varied in their support, policy criticisms, and recommendations.

[13]Hopefully the liberties taken do not significantly alter the general intent of the author.

national interest objective areas (e.g., base rights can be perceived as means for political influence and even economic advantage as well as security). In fact, all of the objectives can be perceived as means for security, if security is characterized as the nucleus of all national interest objectives.[14] Fourth, it must be kept in mind that all these objectives have both "ends" and "means" components, with the precise quantitative division very subjective. Although some objectives (e.g., security, survival) would generally be classified near the "ends" portion of the scale and some (e.g., base rights, standardization) near the "means" boundary, the relative rankings of many of the objectives are imprecise. Finally, it must be remembered that "arms transfer policy is but one component of a general foreign policy."[15] In fact, it has been stated that "arms transfers are an element of foreign policy which [may] relate differently in each case to other instruments of policy that enable the U.S. to pursue its various objectives."[16]

Yet these latter two considerations that limit the precise classification and quantitative measurement of

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[14]See Marshall D. Shulman, "Arms Control in an International Context," in Long and Rathjens, Arms, Defense Policy and Arms Control (New York: Norton and Company, 1976), p. 59.

[15]Arms Transfers, 1976 Senior Conference, Final Report (West Point, New York: United States Military Academy, 1976), p. 60.

[16]Ibid., p. 58.

objectives need not (and should not) preclude analysis and evaluation. As was noted in the previous chapter, there exists a significant quantity of data with which to measure the magnitude and trends in the arms trade. Additionally, as demonstrated in Table 14, there is a generally definitive set of objectives associated with arms transfers. The available data do facilitate meaningful analysis, even if mathematical "box-scoring"[17] for arms transfer policy may not yet be feasible. The remainder of this chapter is an attempt to "verbally box-score" arms transfer objectives.

The remainder of this chapter will analyze and evaluate the thirteen program objectives derived from Table 14. The analyses will utilize specific examples, with a concentrative upon the more recent developments. The warning by one of the panels at the West Point conference that "it makes no sense to assess the impact of U.S. arms transfers in the aggregate on American foreign policy"[18] is compatible with the "verbal box-scoring" analysis presented here. The emphasis is often upon the extreme and exceptional cases. Yet these cases provide the best opportunity to analyze pertinent considerations and ultimately

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[17]Harold Guetzkow, "Simulations in the Consolidation and Utilization of Knowledge and International Relations," in Theory and Research on the Causes of War, ed. Pruitt and Snyder (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 290-91. Guetzkow calls for "box-scoring" of foreign policy.

[18]Arms Transfers, Senior Conference (West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, 1976), p. 58.

formulate useful parameters and guidelines.

The Strategic Military Balance

Proposition 7: In today's interdependent global system, arms transfers are important considerations in the United States-Soviet strategic military balance.

Proposition 7A: "First and foremost, we have to remember that collective and regional security arrangements are, and will remain, a fundamental basis of U.S. national security policy."[19]

Proposition 7B:

> Now might be an appropriate time, after recognizing the decline of the containment model of international activity and the rise of more complex national behavior patterns, to change the categories of recipient states under assistance programs to various categories of friendly countries in need of American aid and willing to apply themselves to their own self-defense as they see that defense.[20]

Proposition 7C: "The United States should exercise greater restraint in its arms export policies. The long-range implications of arms sales for U.S. foreign policy and national security interests must be given greater weight."[21]

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[19]John F. Lehman, Jr. (former Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), from keynote address, Arms Transfers (West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, 1976), p. 13.

[20]Robert J. Pranger and Dale R. Tahtinen, Toward a Realistic Military Assistance Program (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1974), p. 31.

[21]United Nations Association of the United States of America, Controlling the International Arms Trade (New York: UNA of the USA, 1976), p. 13.

Noting that the postwar security assistance programs were built as instruments for cold war containment strategies, Pranger and Tahtinen state: "Promised were programs that would fill gaps in the United States defense establishment in such a fashion that foreign military forces could be measured by their capabilities internally and externally in relation to American forces, . . ."[22] They go on to note that "policies of assistance that seek to integrate indirect aid into overall American defense posture, without ever articulating clearly the limits of such aid, establish an image of a unified spectrum of conflict. . . ."

The varied weapons procurement motivations and the growing cross-bloc weapons acquisition patterns analyzed in the previous chapter tend to refute the existence of a "unified spectrum of conflict" in the Third World, particularly one based primarily upon the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. Third World states continue to utilize the U.S.-Soviet strategic confrontation as a means of weapons procurements, but they generally have their own parochial motivations. Pakistan, as a member of the semi-active Central Treaty Organization (originally designed as part of the communist "containment" network), is currently negotiating for the purchase of A-7 fighter bombers from the United States. In discussing this proposed sale, it has been pointed out that: "As is often the case in Pakistan,

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[22]Pranger and Tahtinen, Toward a Realistic Military Assistance Program, p. 4.

the crux of the matter is India, this country's traditional adversary."[23] Although Pakistan has virtually ignored its membership in the Central Treaty Organization for many years, the Pakistani government apparently is aware that it strengthens the rationale for military aid from the United States.

The important point here is not that Pakistan and other Third World nations do not have legitimate defense needs,[24] nor whether the importance of the U.S.-Soviet strategic confrontation has changed with the coming of détente. The important point is that all Third World arms sales cannot be categorically justified as "strengthening the free world." The specific rationale for military strengthening of Third World nations may differ substantially from that which is appropriate for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations.[25]

The U.S. cannot, and should not, ignore its security

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[23]William Borders, "Pakistan Wonders Whether Ties to U.S. Will Erode Under Carter," New York Times, 26 December 1976, p. 10.

[24]As the Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. IV-30, points out: "we are dealing with sovereign nations whose perception of their defense needs may not coincide with our own."

[25]Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze, Setting National Priorities (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 16. These authors note that the policies and alignments of such areas as Western Europe and Japan are of "direct concern to the United States," while most other areas are "of a different order." They do claim that Israel (and the Middle East) and the Caribbean do present "special interests" to the U.S.

interest in the Third World, but the rationale for arms transfers must generally be formulated relative to more specific objectives (usually in indirect relation to the strategic balance). That is, most Third World arms transfers must generally be judged as to their importance in securing regional stabilities, base rights, access to oil, human rights, etc.--while insuring the avoidance of adverse effects upon the strategic balance.

When evaluating the effects that arms transfers may have on the strategic balance, there exists at least three additional considerations which have a significant potential impact. These considerations include technology transfer, redistribution, and even depletions among U.S. military stockpiles.

Firstly, in transferring our more sophisticated armaments, one analyst speaks of "the unhappy dilemma of giving away technology to somewhat risky allies as a price for gaining influence in the international system."[26] As a former Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency states: "We must establish priorities and categories of weapons and technologies that we do not want to disseminate even among our treaty allies."[27]

Secondly, there is a need to consider sudden

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[26]Edward J. Laurance, "The Changing Nature of Conventional Arms Transfers," Arms Transfers (West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, 1976), p. 99.

[27]Laurance, Arms Transfers, p. 15.

political changes which might effect the ultimate disposition of U.S. weapons. As the United Nations Association of the United States of America observed: "Particularly in unstable Third World regions, a change of regime can convert an 'asset' to a 'liability' overnight."[28] The United States has experienced such events (e.g., Iraq in 1958 and Libya in 1969) and so have the Soviets (e.g., Indonesia in 1965 and Egypt in 1973), but the collapse of the South Vietnamese government demonstrates the potential magnitude. According to a Pentagon report, communist Vietnam took possession of "nearly 1,000 aircraft, more than the combined air forces of all other countries in Southeast Asia," and "enough ships to make the Vietnamese Navy second numerically only to that of China in the Far East."[29] The total cache was estimated to be worth $5 billion. The serviceability and the ultimate destination of most of these weapons are as yet unknown, but from the perspective of the broad strategic balance, these weapons have certainly become a potential liability.

Thirdly, there exists growing evidence that foreign

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[28]UNA of the USA, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race, p. 55.

[29]"How U.S. Arms Make Vietnam an Instant Power in Asia," U.S. News and World Report (November 22, 1976), 15. Although "the U.S. carefully refrained from providing its South Vietnamese allies with long-range combat planes or large naval vessels in order to keep their force a defensive one," the arms cache is reported to include: 73 F-5 and 115 A-37 jet aircraft; 719,000 of our modern M-16 combat rifles; 550 tanks; 1200 APCs; and 130,000 tons of U.S. ammunition.

sales have caused periodic drains and delays in the future deliveries of weapons to U.S. military forces. "In October 1973, U.S. units were stripped of a large portion of their tank inventory to replenish Israeli losses."[30] Not only have existing weapons been re-deployed from U.S. forces, but there is concern that U.S. weapons procurements may be competing with foreign sales commitments. As one report noted, new Spruance destroyers and F-14 aircraft are being built for Iran by Litton Industries and Grumman Aircraft respectively, while both companies are behind schedule on U.S. deliveries.[31] Although the significance of these foreign sales on the scheduling of United States' procurements is not clear, these factors must be considered in the transfer of weapons systems.

The previous discussion is not meant to preclude, or even deemphasize Third World arms sales as a factor in the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, but rather an emphasis on the need to define specific objectives and to evaluate all the factors is intended. The United States strategic confrontation is still a primary consideration. As Vladimir Petrov noted: "A common American view notwithstanding, Soviet-American détente does not signify the end of the adversary

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[30] Arms Transfers, p. 103. See also Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (New York: Dell, 1974) for an account of the decision to implement massive re-supply of Israel after the 1973 war, Chapter 17.

[31] John Hall, "U.S. Is Selling Abroad Weapons It Needs at Home," Baltimore News-American, 4 October 1976, p. 3.

relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R."[32] Yet the task of categorizing Third World military establishments as assets and liabilities has become more complex than it was in the earlier cold war period.

Even within this "adversary relationship," Walter Clemens has proposed that the Soviet's external behavior since the death of Stalin has generally been consonant with an identifiable hierarchy of values that places security of their elites and the Soviet state above "strengthening of Soviet influence in the international Communist movement and the Third World."[33] Speaking of the arms race between the United States and Russia, General George Brown (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) is reported to have recently stated: "Reducing the total destructive force on both sides of the line is a very desirable objective; the race for armed superiority has been costly and dangerous to both sides and to other nations as well."[34] Even within this adversary relationship, based upon the above considerations,

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[32]Vladimir Petrov, U.S.-Soviet Détente: Past and Future (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), p. 1. See also James Schlesinger, "The Evolution of American Policy Toward the Soviet Union," International Security (Summer 1976), 45-48; and Gerald Steibel, Détente: Promises and Pitfalls (New York: Crane, Russak, and Co., Inc., 1975).

[33]Walter C. Clemens, Jr., The Superpowers and Arms Control (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 4-5. Also see UNA of the USA, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race, p. 62.

[34]William T. Keogh, "CIA Faked Vietnam Data, General Says," Philadelphia Bulletin, 18 September 1976, p. A-22.

there appears to be some basis for exploring mutual benefits of limiting Third World arms transfers. As Leslie Gelb says: "That the United States and the Soviet Union persist in tying their futures to these disputes [local and regional] through military aid and sales--without even a hint of bilateral diplomacy--seems the height of foolishness."[35] In the meantime the U.S. will have to be very selective in its transfer of sophisticated weapons as a means of facilitating a favorable strategic balance.

Base Rights

Proposition 8: The negotiations for Third World base rights will require careful consideration of benefits, costs, and alternatives to excessive arms transfer.

Proposition 8A: "The decline of bipolarity has meant that a similar ideological stand is not enough to guarantee U.S. base rights."[36]

Proposition 8B: "The principal base-rights countries now place so many restrictions on American use that the whole policy of bases for aid requires review."[37]

Although the long-range capabilities of the ICBMs,

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[35]Leslie Gelb, "Arms Sales," Foreign Policy 25 (Winter 1976-77): 23. Although Mr. Gelb fails to take note of the apparent tacit restraints that have occurred and in spite of the problems of SALT and MBFR, his emphasis on the need for specific (if cautioned) diplomacy in this area deserves immediate consideration.

[36]Edward J. Laurance, "The Changing of Conventional Arms Transfers," Arms Transfers, p. 98.

[37]Gelb, "Arms Sales," p. 18.

B-52 bombers, and nuclear submarines have altered the strategic weapons requirements for foreign military bases in the Third World, there still exist other considerations for U.S. security. In discussing the "erosion of western base rights," Geoffrey Kemp states: "We need to resist the temptation to look at the new map of the world through our old northern, Anglo-Saxon eyes."[38] He adds that "because of our dependency on raw materials, particularly oil, we need to look at the strategic world from the perspective of the southern hemisphere, including both the Indian and the South Atlantic Oceans." Both the Soviet Union and the United States appear to concur with the need for base and/or transit facilities in the Third World areas.[39]

In retaining what are considered key strategically important bases, the U.S. is being asked to pay higher rents. Aware of "the base rights competition which is emerging," Third World states are requesting modern arms as part of base rights deals.[40] The current U.S. effort to negotiate the continued use of the Clark and Subic Bay, Philippines bases demonstrates this phenomenon. It is

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[38]Geoffrey Kemp, "The New Strategic Map," presented at the Senior Conference, Arms Transfers, p. 27. He notes that "the Soviet Union is increasingly dependent upon access to sea resources as well," p. 28.

[39]See Thomas Kent, "East and West Spar Over Tiny Pacific Isles," Christian Science Monitor, 5 October 1976, p. 12.

[40]Arms Transfers, p. 65.

reported that "the Philippines is asking the United States for several billion dollar's worth of military equipment as a price for the new agreement governing U.S. military bases in that country."[41] Although the U.S. places a high value on these bases, "since there are no comparable bases nearby available" and "they have taken on added importance in light of increased Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean," the U.S. has still been reluctant to meet the Philippines' terms. A figure of $1 billion in military aid over a five-year period was reportedly being offered.[42]

Some "First World" allied countries (e.g., Japan and NATO nations) and even some Third World allied states (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan) apparently covet the presence of U.S. forces as a security commitment, but other nations (e.g., Bahrain) have asked the United States to leave key bases.[43] Still others (e.g., Spain, Turkey, Greece) are apparently restricting usage--even after negotiating for and receiving substantial amounts of military aid.[44] These

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[41]"Marcos Deals for Billions in Arms," Chicago Tribune, 22 October 1976, p. 5.

[42]"Philippine Accord Said Non-Existent; Kissinger Accused," Washington Post, 6 December 1976, p. A2.

[43]"Anchors Away in Bahrain?" Christian Science Monitor, 29 December 1976, p. 3. Bahrain currently is "the only U.S. Naval command ashore between Subric Bay, in the Philippines, and the Mediterranean," and is located in the strategic Persian Gulf.

[44]"U.S.-Spanish Agreement on Bases' Use," Washington Post, 14 October 1976, p. A25. See also Leslie Gelb, "Arms Sales," p. 19. These three nations are particularly sensitive to involvement in Middle East contingencies.

latter three bases are each costing the United States an average of "between $200 million and $250 million a year over a four- to five-year period."[45]

The future negotiations for these foreign bases are going to have to take a much tougher look at benefits and costs (strategic and political as well as economic) in securing future base rights. As a U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report to Congress noted: "Once the supplier's armed forces begin to rely on the use of these facilities, the recipient may demand a higher price for continued access than would otherwise have been the case, either in terms of weapons transfers, rental payments, or related concessions."[46] Although the U.S. may not have any short-range alternative (other than hard bargaining), Geoffrey Kemp notes that there are alternatives for Western bases among the many islands around the world.[47] As he states: "One of the lucky features of geography is that most of those islands or rocks in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans are owned by Britain and France." In spite of the possible costs of building up new facilities, a certain number of such bases (e.g., Diego Garcia)[48] may become

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[45]"Marcos Deals for Billions in Arms," p. 2.

[46]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 46.

[47]Kemp, "The New Strategic Map," p. 37.

[48]UNA of the USA, Controlling the Conventional Arms, pp. 29-30, 37. This section calls for a withdrawal from Diego Garcia and the Indian Ocean along with a Soviet

necessary if the U.S. is going to have assured resupply, repair, and redeployment capabilities at key strategic points around the world.

Fostering Self-reliance

Proposition 9: U.S. security assistance and arms transfers can be utilized to foster self-reliance (ability to defend themselves without a requirement for U.S. combat troops) among Third World states.

Proposition 9A: "It was not and is not possible to attain that [defense] capability against the Soviet Union, but it is against regional adversaries."[49]

Proposition 9B: "Implementation of the Nixon Doctrine need not and should not mean the expensive replication of U.S.-style military establishments abroad."[50]

In considering "self-reliance" among nations, it is important to realize that nations cannot be totally self-sufficient. It is important to define and clarify the specific "self-sufficiency" goals being sought. Iran, one of the United States' major weapons recipients, "shares a 1,250 mile border with the Soviet Union and most Iranians

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withdrawal from Somalia, but the Soviets appear established in Somalia and have even been rumored to be building bases in Mozambique ("Report of Soviet Base Causes S. Africa Scare," Washington Post, 16 October 1976, p. 10).

[49]Gelb, "Arms Sales," p. 13.

[50]Guy J. Pauker et al., In Search of Self-Reliance: U.S. Security Assistance to the Third World Under the Nixon Doctrine (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1973), p. vi.

clearly regard that country as its most serious potential adversary," yet it "would not stand a chance" against a direct military confrontation with the Soviets.[51] The objective of helping Third World allies toward self-reliance in defense should not be totally distorted by the superpower strategic balance. At present Iran is said to be more fearful of threat from some of her other neighbors and/or potentially dissident internal forces (even if either might include "Soviet support").[52]

To the extent that arms transfers are designed to provide a nation with this type of regional defense self-sufficiency, the types and sophistication of the weapons must be carefully selected. Although such nations as Taiwan and Israel appear able to assimilate, maintain, and even co-produce advanced weapons as a means of precluding direct U.S. involvement,[53] similar programs in less technologically advanced countries may increase the potential of direct U.S. involvement. The previously cited congressional report on U.S. Arms Sales to Iran stated that "self-sufficiency [on the F-14 and other advanced system] is not obtainable in the foreseeable future," with dependency upon the U.S. "unavoidable until the mid-1980s."[54] The report

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[51]See U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 11.

[52]Ibid.

[53]See Gelb, "Arms Sales," pp. 13-14.

[54]U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, pp. 32-33.

goes on to estimate that support of these existing programs may bring 50,000 to 60,000 U.S. citizens to Iran by 1980. Critics of such arms sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia have claimed that "if war broke out, they [U.S. citizens] would become directly and heavily involved."[55]

Questions of defense sufficiency must consider the threat analysis perceived by the recipient country. Thus, "countries depending on the United States for military assistance should be schooled in techniques adequate for planning and organizing their own defense."[56] Yet an even more basic consideration is a reminder by Guy Pauker that "a self-reliant nation is one possessing a national will to depend as little as possible on external assistance in matters of national defense and internal security."[57] The Turkish military, with its conglomerate of less than the most advanced weapons generally available to NATO allies,[58] recently demonstrated the ability to conduct a highly successful military campaign in spite of the United States embargo.

Certainly it is generally in the United States' interest to have allied nations obtain defense self-reliance

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[55]Henry Waxman, "Arms Sales: Our Heads Are in the Sand," Los Angeles Times, 16 September 1976, p. II-7.

[56]Pranger and Tahtinen, Toward a Realistic Military Assistance Program, p. 48.

[57]Pauker, In Search of Self-Reliance, p. v.

[58]See SIPRI, The Arms Trade Registers, pp. 126-30 for an inventory of their major weapons through 1975.

at the lowest possible level of cost both to themselves and to the U.S. After each Middle East conflict, Israel has required more and more sophisticated arms. Subsequently what was a basically self-sufficient (economically as well as militarily) nation in the 1950s (and also after the 1967 war) has become a nearly bankrupt economy as a result of the 1973 war. According to the ACDA figures on world military expenditures, Israel spent close to 40 percent of its gross national product on military expenditures in 1973 and 1974.[59] Israel (now into indigenous weapons manufacturing with additional co-production of U.S. F-16 aircraft, M-60 tanks, missile patrol boats, etc. being requested)[60] is becoming more heavily dependent upon the United States for more advanced weapons technologies. Subsequently there has arisen a critical problem associated with the re-transfer of advanced U.S. technology as Israel manufactures advanced military equipment for export in an apparent effort to help finance their own weapons requirements.[61]

The promotion of self-sufficiency in South Korea

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[59]See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1965-1974, p. 33. Although this publication cautions against direct comparison of GNP and military expenditures, these figures should give a reasonably accurate estimate.

[60]William Beecher, "Israel Asks U.S. Funds to Build Its Own Tanks," Washington Star, 16 December 1976, p. 13.

[61]See Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Israel and the F-16 Dispute," Washington Post, 27 December 1976, p. A21.

must also be programmed against its immediate threat--deterring and/or defeating a North Korean invasion. Although there has been talk of a "weaponry gap" with the North, the South Korean "force improvement plan" is reported to have "a goal of achieving self-reliance on the ground against any attack that Communist North Korea might launch by itself--without assistance from either China or the Soviet Union."[62] Even though this program is expensive, it appears to be properly goal-oriented with weapons the South Korean military can assimilate. Although South Korea is reportedly "looking ahead" to the purchase of advanced F-16 aircraft, their current build-up includes the F-4 which is reported to be "capable of taking anything [MIG-21s] the North Koreans have at present."[63] As important as a viable South Korea may be to the Northeast Asian power balance, her self-sufficiency need not, and should not, require the latest sophisticated weapons. The current program appears to be adequate and effective.

A goal-oriented self-reliance military assistance program must therefore be based upon specific threats and the most efficient, least expensive means of deterring and/or defeating these threats. The dilemma of providing Israel with sufficient military hardware to insure her survival, while trying to keep down the overall level of

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[62]Sam Jameson, "Seoul Hikes Spending to Close Arms Gap," Los Angeles Times, 5 December 1976, p. I-1.

[63]Ibid.

weapons in the Middle East without offending friendly Arab states, is a potentially untenable problem with each subsequent escalation in weapons technologies. The Israeli self-reliance program is obviously unique and cannot, and should not, serve as a Third World self-reliance model. As the U.S. assists allied nations in local self-reliance military programs, emphasis must be placed upon appropriate weapons which the recipient nation can assimilate and maintain in its defense structure.[64]

Regional Power Balances

Proposition 10: The controlled transfer of arms facilitates regional balances and thereby adds to United States security.

Proposition 10A: "The massive transfer of armaments to potentially explosive regions of the Third World can exacerbate local tensions and increase the likelihood of armed conflict."[65]

Proposition 10B: "At the same time, there are certain arms sales programs, notably those to Israel [and others], which are necessary so that Israel [and other allied

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[64]This emphasis need not preclude "advanced" weapons, as opposed to overly "sophisticated" weapons (e.g., Leslie Gelb, in "Arms Sales," p. 19, notes: "The F-14 requires extensive use of American personnel for training and maintenance; the F-16 is relatively simple to maintain").

[65]Edward C. Luck, "Does the U.S. Have a Conventional Arms Sales Policy?" Arms Control Today 6 (May 1976): 1.

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

nations] can pursue peace from a position of strength and security."[66]

Proposition 10C:

> In this regard, it is instructive to note that while providing armaments to Third World countries may often be a positive short-term measure, it must be accompanied by diplomatic activity so that massive military assistance and/or large weapons sales do not become a standard long-term policy.[67]

Closely associated with the objective of making allied nations regionally self-reliant is the maintenance of regional balances in Third World areas. As was noted in the earlier discussion of self-reliance, each subsequent Middle East conflict has required subsequently more sophisticated and expensive weapons replenishments for Israel. Arab and Persian Gulf states have also sought and received equivalent weapons toward a regional balance.[68] Petrov points out that the sale of "advanced weapons to conservative Arab governments" (and Iran and Israel) gives the Soviets rationale for sending more advanced weapons to the other Arab states (i.e., Syria, Iraq, Libya, and previously Egypt).[69] The future maintenance of the Middle East

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[66]Derived from conventional arms control statement attributed to then Presidential candidate James Carter in Arms Control Today 6 (October 1976): 5.

[67]Melvin R. Laird, in "Foreword" of Dale R. Tahtinen, Arms in the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1974).

[68]See Tables 8, 12, and 13 in Chapter II for illustration of the Middle East/Persian Gulf arms build-up.

[69]Vladimir Petrov, U.S.-Soviet Détente: Past and Future, p. 36. The tables in Chapter II of this dissertation reflect the results of this area arms build-up.

military balance (or "balances") appears to be getting more and more difficult to contain--geographically and qualitatively.[70] Although the U.S. cannot unilaterally control the total arms input to the area, it seems particularly important that stronger efforts be made to stabilize the "nascent" (but "abounding") arms race that is evolving in the Persian Gulf.[71] The ultimate solution throughout the Middle East probably will be best solved by some kind of mutually beneficial conciliation among the Third World states themselves.

In other areas the regional balance forms of deterrence seemed to have had some stabilizing effects (e.g., Latin America, Africa, and South Asia). Latin America stands out as an area where United States' restraint (in spite of some sales penetration by Western Europe and even aircraft by the USSR)[72] has been a relatively effective damper on the competition for sophisticated arms.[73]

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[70]See Michael Parks, "Israel Fears Arms Influx Won't Offset Arab Troop Strength," Baltimore Sun, 6 November 1976, p. 2. Also see Dana A. Schmidt, "Israel Pressing for 250 F-16 Fighters," Christian Science Monitor, 10 December 1976, p. 4; and "Israel Seeking Aid for Arms Industry," New York Times, 19 December 1976, p. 9.

[71]U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, United States Arms Sales to the Persian Gulf, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 30. For consideration of a serious potential problem see Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "Saudies Suspect an Iran-U.S. Plot," Washington Post, 17 September 1976, p. 19D.

[72]Previously discussed in Chapter II, under proposition 5.

[73]See Tables 6 and 8 in Chapter II. Also see discussion under proposition 5 of the U.S. attempt to restrict, or at least delay, the spread of supersonic aircraft to Latin America.

Hopefully, U.S. political and economic influence and, more importantly, the stated reluctance of the Latin American governments themselves to get into an expensive arms race will temper the future acquisitions of any large amounts of highly sophisticated weapons.[74]

Sub-Sahara Africa, previously characterized by a low-level "arms walk,"[75] appears on the verge of evolving into a series of regional arms competitions fueled by Soviet arms.[76] Among those seeking U.S. arms to offset neighbors' Soviet arms are Kenya, Zaire, Sudan, Gabon, and the Camerouns. These regional competitions are in addition to the growing rivalry between the Black African states and South Africa.[77] Recently, Sudan, a "buffer state" between some Arab states (including "antagonistic" Libya) and a number of adjoining African states (including Uganda), has requested U.S. military aid.[78] The United States faces the challenge of aiding threatened nations to defend themselves against potential regional adversaries without allowing a

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[74]See "Latin American Initiatives," U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Arms (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. C-42-54.

[75]See Tables 6 and 8 of Chapter II.

[76]See Thomas B. Ross, "More African Nations Seek U.S. Weapons Aid," Chicago Sun Times, 8 September 1976, p. 4.

[77]South Africa has been able to accumulate an advanced weapons arsenal in spite of a qualified weapons embargo. See SIPRI, The Arms Trade Register, pp. 92-95.

[78]George Wilson, "Sudan Ruled Eligible for U.S. Arms," Washington Post, 17 November 1976, p. A1.

sophisticated arms escalation similar to the one that has engulfed the Middle East.

South Asia also demonstrates some interesting aspects of regional balance phenomena. In spite of the generally restrained U.S. arms sales to this area, including a complete embargo after the 1971 Bangladesh war, both India and Pakistan have sought modern U.S. aircraft.[79] During the past decade Pakistan has relied primarily upon China and France (and even the USSR) for its major combat weapons, while India has relied primarily upon the USSR.[80] The reluctance of the U.S. to sell arms to this area of tension and conflict certainly did not eliminate a substantial arms build-up,[81] but it may have ironically now given the United States more influence as an arms balancer than it otherwise might have possessed.

It appears that regional arms balancing can yield positive (stabilizing) effects at the more moderate and restrictive levels. Yet the long-range solution must be "locally generated" regional controls based upon mutual

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[79]William Borders, "Pakistan Wonders Whether Ties to U.S. Will Erode Under Carter," New York Times, 26 December 1976, p. 10; and "Pakistan Keeps Eye on U.S.," Christian Science Monitor, 28 December 1976, p. 4.

[80]See SIPRI, The Arms Trade Registers (1974), pp. 33-40.

[81]Refer to Tables 6, 8, and 12 of Chapter II.

restraint and benefits for recipients as well as suppliers.[82]

Discouraging Nuclear Proliferation

Proposition 11: The transfer of conventional weapons is a vehicle to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons proliferation.

Proposition 11A: "For many states, security assurances from nuclear powers are a prerequisite to their willingness to adhere to NPT [nuclear nonproliferation treaty] . . . ."[83]

Proposition 11B: ". . . the transfer of conventional arms as a nonproliferation strategy would be in tension with parallel efforts to control the global spread of conventional arms."[84]

Leslie Gelb notes that "there have been three recent instances of Kissinger's using arms sales to retard or prevent the spread of nuclear weapons: South Korea,

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[82]See Philip J. Farley, Statement before Subcommittee on Investigations, House Committee on International Relations, June 24, 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 27. Also see U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Arms, p. C-37 for discussion of "Arrangements Among Recipient States."

[83]Philip J. Farley, "Nuclear Proliferation," in Setting National Priorities, ed. Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 150.

[84]Lewis A. Dunn, Conventional Arms Transfers: A Nonproliferation Strategy? (New York: Hudson Institute, 1976), p. 18. Paper presented at International Studies Association Conference in Columbus, Ohio, October 28-30, 1976.

Pakistan, and Iran."[85] According to Gelb: "As a result of Kissinger's efforts, South Korea and Iran have opted for multinationally owned and run reprocessing plants rather than plants located in their own territory."

The ultimate outcome of Pakistan's quest for a nuclear processing plant is still uncertain. France "has announced for the foreseeable future France will stop exporting nuclear fuel reprocessing plants," but ". . . faced with India's acquisition of nuclear weapons technology based on peaceful Canadian technology, the Pakistani leader so far has insisted that he will go ahead with the French deal."[86] It appears that Pakistan's request to purchase A-7 aircraft from the United States is being considered in relation to how France and Pakistan consummate their nuclear fuel reprocessing plant agreement.[87]

Along with the threat of nuclear proliferation is the potential spread of sophisticated nuclear weapon delivery systems. Discussing the possible shipment of the 450-mile range Pershing missile to Israel, the UNA of the USA notes: "The Pershing would not be the first nuclear-capable missile in the Middle East, since Egypt and Syria

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[85] Gelb, "Arms Sales," pp. 11-12.

[86] Jim Browning, "France to Stop Nuclear Exports," Christian Science Monitor, 21 December 1976, p. 9.

[87] "Pakistan Keeps Eye on U.S.," Christian Science Monitor, 28 December 1976, p. 4. Also see Clyde W. Farsworth, "French-Pakistani Atom Deal Fading," New York Times, 12 November 1976, p. 4.

have already received Soviet supplied Scud (185 mile range) and Frog (45 mile range) missiles and the U.S. has delivered the Lance (70 mile range) to Israel."[88] The spread of nuclear-capable weapons (particularly missiles) can create increased tensions. Yet it is reported that "Israel has between 10 and 20 nuclear weapons ready and available for use" and "has plans for carrying them on American-made F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers."[89] Obviously a nuclear bomb could potentially be delivered without super-sophisticated weapons systems; still the spread of long-range weapons systems specifically designed for nuclear weapons should be avoided.

The cutoff, or threatened cutoff, of military aid (otherwise considered acceptable) seems to be a sound and viable form of leverage. What must be avoided is allowing Third World states to blackmail the United States into providing weapons to nations who threaten to go nuclear. Such a practice, which has been referred to as the "methadone theory"[90] by a member of the State Department, has serious long-term liabilities.

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[88]United Nations Association of the United States of America, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race, p. 59.

[89]"Spies Say Israel Builds Arsenal of Atomic Bombs," Baltimore News-American, 2 December 1976, p. 20. For a detailed discussion of potential nuclear contingencies in the Middle East see Robert J. Pranger and Dale R. Tahtinen, Nuclear Threat in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975).

[90]Phrase used in discussing Lewis Dunn paper (reference proposition 6B) at International Studies Association Conference in Columbus, Ohio, October 28-30, 1976.

Balance of Payments

Proposition 12: The favorable economic balance of payments benefits of arms sales must be kept in perspective.

Proposition 12A:

> In approaching the recent requests of the Gulf nations for massive amounts of arms, we have been guided . . . , in part by the need to shore up our balance of payments, and--as a kind of last-resort argument heard more in private than in public--by the belief that if we don't sell arms to the Gulf countries, some other country will.[91]

Proposition 12B: "Weapons production provides domestic employment, aids in helping to create a more favorable balance of trade, and may assist in opening foreign markets for non-military goods."[92]

During the 1960s through the first half of the 1970s the United States has been experiencing an unfavorable trend in its trade balance, with imports increasing and surpassing exports by billions of dollars.[93] At the same time the United States' foreign military sales orders have exceeded $10.8 billion in fiscal year 1974 and $9.5 billion in 1975, with a subsequently proposed sales of $9.7 billion

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[91]Edward M. Kennedy, "The Persian Gulf: Arms Race or Arms Control," Foreign Affairs 54 (October 1975): 18.

[92]Dale R. Tahtinen, Arms Transfers and U.S. National Security (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), p. 9. Paper presented at International Studies Association Conference in Columbus, Ohio, October 28-30, 1976.

[93]See International Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 58-67, 137.

for 1976.[94] From the standpoint of basic economics it is apparent that foreign military sales have become a significant, if not yet critical, factor in the United States' balance of trade. It should be kept in mind that these economic considerations and the switched emphasis to sales and away from grants started in the late 1950s and grew significantly throughout the 1960s. "In April 1962, . . . , the concept of foreign military sales was institutionalized through an Office of International Logistics Negotiations formed within the Defense Department."[95] Yet a significant change also occurred in the 1970s with the growth in Third World customers (reference Tables 8 and 12 in Chapter II).

According to a recent study by the United States Congressional Budget Office, The Effect of Foreign Military Sales on the U.S. Economy, a total five-year ban on United States foreign military sales would lower the current dollar GNP by $20 billion, lower employment by 350,000 jobs, and would result in a decrease in net exports of

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[94]Defense Security Assistance Agency (DOD), Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Program, Congressional Presentation Document (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1975), p. 110. Such sales are reported to have been only "$1.7 billion in 1971" in Mark R. Arnold, "U.S. Arms Sales Soar," National Observer, 10 April 1976, p. 1.

[95]David J. Louscher, "The Rise of Military Sales as a U.S. Foreign Assistance Instrument," Orbis 20 (Winter 1977): 951.

approximately $7.5 billion in the year 1981.[96]

The statistics cited above demonstrate the potential impact that foreign weapons sales can have on the United States' trade and economic prosperity. Yet, as Stanley and Pearton point out: "In a balance of payments crisis one is tempted to sell what one has and to do so quickly without consideration of the true costs entailed or of alternative policies."[97] Immediate economic considerations must be evaluated without losing sight of the long-range political and security considerations. "If the international arms market were a simple economic model obeying the traditional laws of supply and demand, it would be relatively easy to analyze."[98] Arms sales are much more complex and affect pertinent security variables that outweigh immediate economic rationales.

Even the macro-economic impact of weapons sales appears to warrant close monitoring. A congressional study on Budgetary Cost Savings to the Department of Defense

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[96]Congressional Budget Office, Staff Working Paper, The Effect of Foreign Military Sales on the U.S. Economy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 1, 21-26. "This analysis assumes no external or exogenous increases in exports occur to compensate for the loss in foreign sales due to the ban," and "the effect of lower net exports on international financial flows and the balance of payments is somewhat uncertain," p. 26. In 1974 the U.S. total GNP was estimated to be $1397 billion and total exports at $97.9 billion (International Economic Report of the President, 1975, pp. 61, 122).

[97]John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, The International Trade in Arms (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 159.

[98]Sutton and Kemp, "Arms to Developing Countries," p. 6.

Resulting from Foreign Military Sales after the study of 35 major weapons systems estimated "that only fifty percent of foreign military sales result in cost savings to the U.S." and "that on the average one dollar of sales result in fourteen cents savings to the U.S."[99] Even as a strict economic model the long-range cost of exporting modern high technology weapons must be considered along with the immediate financial benefits. The economic benefits and costs are certainly neither insignificant nor unimportant, but they must be considered within the total set of national interest objectives and the alternative means of obtaining them. As a former Deputy Director of ACDA noted: "Arms sales are not our priority long-term commercial interest."[100]

It must be remembered that "lost" sales to others, particularly to the United Kingdom and France, do not always mean the U.S. should or must compete. Certainly the political interest of the United States may be too important to let "commercial stakes" become the uppermost, or even a primary, consideration. Although a panel of leading analysts has observed "more often than not, political and economic considerations are complementary,"[101] the order of

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[99]Congressional Budget Office, Staff Working Paper, Budgetary Cost Savings to the Department of Defense Resulting from Foreign Military Sales (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. x.

[100]Philip J. Farley, Statement before Subcommittee on Investigations, House Committee on International Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 17.

[101]Arms Transfers, 1976 Senior Conference (West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, 1976), p. 65.

consideration must be continually kept in mind. Only after arms sales policies are formulated based upon the political-military ("why") factors ought the economic ("how") factors be considered.

Need for Oil and Other Resources

Proposition 13: Oil-rich Third World states are now able to utilize unprecedented politico-economic leverage in their requests for modern weapons systems.

Proposition 13A: "The real reasons ["to justify sales to so-called regional superpowers"] are to insure access to resources, particularly oil, and to have general political influence."[102]

Proposition 13B: "The primary American interest in the Persian Gulf area is to keep the oil flowing, presumably at the lowest possible cost."[103]

Proposition 13C: "Whether the use of the oil weapon in 1973 was effective in achieving all the Arab objectives is not an easy question to answer. . . .

Whether the United States was coerced by the oil embargo is more doubtful."[104]

When a country's "economic life and its defense

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[102]Gelb, "Arms Sales," p. 16.

[103]Dale R. Tahtinen, Arms in the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1974), p. 22.

[104]Klaus Knorr, "The Limits of Power," Daedalus 104 (Fall 1975): 230.

capability" is dependent upon a raw material requiring importation,

> the country in question will be interested in having:
> 1. secure external sources of supply,
> 2. adequate and appropriate means of payment for the imports it requires, and
> 3. secure transportation for the imports en route.[105]

The relative leverage available to the oil exporting states of the Third World was profoundly demonstrated by the OPEC oil embargo. "The jarring events of 1973 suggested that, though economic power properly defined might still have new importance, the vaunted economic power of Japan and Western Europe stood on feet of clay."[106] And certainly the United States' strategic security is linked to the well being of Japan and Western Europe. "Unless the Western industrial world radically changes its life style, oil supplies from the Persian Gulf will continue to be essential."[107] Although economic "countermeasures" may ultimately be available to the Western industrialized nations,[108] the impact of the 1973 oil embargo cannot be ignored.

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[105] Yuan-li Wu, Raw Material Supply in a Multipolar World (New York: Crane, Russak, and Company, 1973), p. 1.

[106] Knorr, "The Limits of Power," p. 231.

[107] Geoffrey Kemp, "The Diffusion of Power and the Security of Oil," Arms Transfers (West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, 1976), p. 77.

[108] See Hendrik S. Houthakker, The World Price of Oil: A Medium-term Analysis (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), pp. 29-37.

In his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, considering the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Iran, Undersecretary of State Philip Habib spoke of "geo-political realities" and pointed out that the nations of the Persian Gulf "produce 46.5 percent of the petroleum products consumed in the free world and some 58 percent of the oil imports of the major industrialized states."[109] During the 1970s, along with the growth in economic leverage of the OPEC oil exporting countries, there has been a significant growth in the arms procurements by many of these same countries--particularly in the Persian Gulf.[110] On the one hand, the linkage between such arms sales and the industrial nations' need for insured access to oil is apparent.[111] Yet, on the other hand, as Alvin Cottrell notes: "There are many complex historical and strategic factors to be considered in any assessment of U.S. decisions on arms transfers to the Middle East in general and the Persian Gulf in particular."[112] Cottrell also points out that it is

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[109]Philip Habib (Undersecretary of State), Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 16, 1976 (typed copy), pp. 2, 5.

[110]See Tables 8 and 12 and related discussion in Chapter II.

[111]See Leslie Gelb, "U.S. Aides Said to Ask for Pressure on Iran; But Kissinger Reported to Resist Threatening an Arms Cutoff Over the Price of Oil," New York Times, 11 November 1976, p. 8; and "U.S. May Link Arms, Oil Prices," New York Times, 14 November 1976, p. E2.

[112]Alvin J. Cottrell, "Why Sell Arms to the Shah," Christian Science Monitor, 15 September 1976, p. 35.

oversimplistic and historically inaccurate to totally attribute the Persian Gulf arms build-up to the 1973 oil embargo.

Additionally, while the real and perceived security needs of key Third World states (including their weapons requests) cannot be ignored, they must be put into perspective. In 1974 many of the OPEC oil exporting nations developed huge trade surpluses, led by Saudi Arabia and Iran.[113] Yet in 1977 one of these states (Iran) is reportedly "engaged in a sweeping reappraisal of its vast and controversial program of arms purchases from the United States, largely because of the uncertain outlook for oil revenues in the coming months."[114] There appears to now be some growing awareness by the government of Iran, in conjunction with U.S. recommendations to "defer plans," that an overly accelerated build-up of sophisticated military weapons will not insure national or regional stability. Such "self-reappraisal" if it leads to "moderation" in the procurement of sophisticated weapons is certainly more in line with the best interests of such states and ultimately in the best security interests of the United States and its allies.[115] In the short term the

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[113]It should be noted that in 1974 nine of the top ten developing nations (in terms of export values) were OPEC states (with Brazil in eighth place the only exception). See International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 29 (January 1976): 38-41.

[114]Eric Pace, "Iran Said to Review Arms Buying in U.S. Because of Oil Lag," New York Times, 9 February 1977, p. 11.

[115]Reference discussions under propositions 9 and 10.

United States may have had little leverage in the immediate aftermath of the oil profits windfalls after 1973 (and although policy alternatives may still be limited in dealing with oil-rich allies), there is a long-term need for further moderation in the accelerated spread of sophisticated weapons.

Strengthen Defense Industries

Proposition 14: United States security is dependent upon an economically prosperous defense industry.

Proposition 14A:

> Where domestic weapons demands are large, such as in the U.S. and Soviet Union, exports are less essential as a means of ensuring economical production runs. However, even in the U.S. and USSR the rising cost of modern weapons production in recent years has made it increasingly important to seek lower average costs through arms exports.[116]

Proposition 14B: "Grumman's [a major defense contractor's] future breaks on international business, . . . We've got to become less dependent on the U.S. Navy [DOD] and sell to a great many countries."[117]

Proposition 14C: "In the long run, dependence on foreign

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[116] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, A Report to the Congress, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 69.

[117] Quote attributed to Chairman of Grumman Corporation in Louis Kraar, "Grumman Still Flies for Navy, But It Is Selling the World," Fortune (February 1976), 79.

markets could be detrimental to the health of U.S. defense industries."[118]

According to the previously referenced congressional budget studies: "An $8 billion sales program will, on the average, generate $560 million in costs savings annually," but the study also concludes that: "not all foreign military sales result in cost savings."[119] The budget studies also found: "These savings are primarily from sales of recently developed 'high technology' systems--particularly new fighter aircraft and missiles" and that "for most sales--ships, ammunition, artillery, military equipment, and services for which R & D and other costs have already been absorbed--there appear to be little or no cost savings."[120] The ironic outcome here is that the weapons most potentially destabilizing and high in technology transfer are apparently those whose transfer is most immediately beneficial to United States' defense economics. Here again it is important to remember that United States' defense and security planning is more complex than an economic model.

Certainly the survival of key defense industries is

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[118]United Nations Association of the United States of America, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race (New York: UNA of the USA, 1976), p. 56.

[119]Congressional Budget Office, Budgetary Cost Savings to the Department of Defense Resulting from Foreign Military Sales, pp. ix, x.

[120]Congressional Budget Office, Foreign Military Sales and U.S. Weapons Costs, pp. vii, viii.

vital to the United States. The United States government saw fit to step in with a special act of Congress in 1971 to insure the survival of Lockheed which "dominates four major military markets in this country: airlift; antisubmarine warfare aircraft; strategic reconnaissance ["the nation's leading producer of 'spook' hardware"]; and submarine launched ballistic missiles."[121] The latter two categories, which probably make Lockheed a unique defense resource, have been limited to nonexistent applicability in Third World sales, while the former two, which have involved highly publicized cost overruns (e.g., the C-5 Transport) and "more than $20 million in bribes abroad in connection with the sale of aircraft [that] have shaken the governments of Japan and The Netherlands and caused lesser ripples in several other nations," are related to systems in which competitive aerospace industries apparently exist.

In spite of the Grumman Corporation being apparently "saved from a spectacular bankruptcy by the Shah of Iran,"[122] there is a requirement to consider whether the corporation's economic concerns best facilitate United States' objectives. It is reported that a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee was recently told "that the United States Defense Department had recommended in 1972 that Iran not be permitted

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[121]Robert Lindsey, "Lockheed Gets Off the Ground," New York Times, 17 October 1976, p. III-1.

[122]Louis Kraar, "Grumman Still Flies for the Navy," p. 79.

to purchase the F-14, which was then in the development stage."[123]

The apparent "commercial approach" of defense industries to foreign sales is demonstrated by the recent efforts of the Northrop Corporation to create foreign sales for the F-18L aircraft. According to one account, they were "trying to stampede the U.S. government into hasty approval of its efforts to sell Iran a jet fighter that is still on the drawing board."[124] Noting that the plane had not yet been approved for foreign sales, the report stated that a government source said: "They get Iran all hot to buy this plane and then if the Pentagon review of its eligibility is negative, we've got a diplomatic problem on our hands." Not only was the projected sale of the F-18 to Iran instigated without the approval of the Defense Department, but "Iran would be purchasing a weapons model that the Defense Department does not plan to buy for its own military services."[125] Additionally, it is reported that Iran would finance the development of this aircraft, "thus perhaps setting a precedent for a foreign country to influence weapons developments and foreign military sales programs in

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[123]Eric Pace, "Iran-Grumman Conflict Sharpens," New York Times, 1 October 1976, p. 2.

[124]Dan Griffin, "Northrop Sales Blitz in Iran Flouts U.S. Control Efforts," Washington Post, 11 October 1976, p. A8.

[125]John W. Finney, "Navy Aids Northrop in Bid to Sell Iran on New Jet Model," New York Times, 8 November 1976, p. 1. The F-18L is a "land-based version" of the U.S. Navy's F-18.

the United States." Although this may not be a "precedent," it is grounds for concern. Certainly it is not healthy for United States' defense planning or even the survival of a specific key defense industry to become dependent upon the future weapons procurement desires of Third World nations (even those who are wealthy). And certainly there is a need for some form of government control of sophisticated weapons sales.[126]

Weapons Standardization

Proposition 15: Weapons standardization programs can increase United States' capabilities without restricting political options.

Proposition 15A: "The need is for standardization of arms and equipment. Many different brand and country names in NATO make for wasted billions of dollars and combat inefficiency."[127]

Proposition 15B:

> A coordinated NATO arms sales policy, which allowed some specialization in arms production and export, would be consistent with the goal of arms standardization within the alliance and could provide additional leverage when dealing with the major oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf.[128]

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[126] See John Saar, "U.S. Firms Fighting to Sell Jets to Japan," Washington Post, 31 October 1976, p. E1; Vernon A. Guidry, Jr., "Arms Merchants to the World? Plane Firms Hope So," Washington Star, 29 November 1976, p. 1; and "Shah's Adviser Says Iran was Seller's Dream," Baltimore Sun, 28 September 1976, p. 6.

[127] Gelb, "Arms Sales," pp. 14-15.

[128] UNA of the USA, Controlling the International Arms Trade, pp. 10-11.

The United States and its major industrialized allies can financially benefit from the economies of scale associated with standardization of weapons systems--including co-production. As Gelb states: "The policy toward NATO allies and Japan is and should be virtually open-ended."[129] In spite of the significant "quid pro quo" obstacles that must be overcome in moving toward such standardization,[130] such an approach has highly positive economic benefits. "Cooperative development becomes even more imperative with NATO's cries for weapons standardization and with soaring costs of development."[131]

Yet the same approach does not possess the same broad rationale when applied to Third World sales. First of all, most Third World countries do not have the capability to manufacture the expensive high technology weapons. Second, there is the danger of loss of control when those Third World states capable of such development are under extreme pressure to pursue their national interests that may conflict with those of the United States. "U.S. arms manufacturers complain that Israel's weapons industry was created mainly with U.S. help and now is in a position to

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[129]Gelb, "Arms Sales," p. 14.

[130]See Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Hurdles Confront Standardization," Aviation Week (June 21, 1976), 14.

[131]Michael K. Burns, "Bonn's Arms Sales Policy in Dilemma," Baltimore Sun, 5 February 1977, p. 4.

compete for sales with American munition makers."[132] Furthermore, it has been stated that "Israel is willing to sell to almost anyone."[133]

Finally, there is another consideration in standardization as related to Third World transfers. The economic benefits of NATO specialization taken to the extreme (of eliminating competing capabilities among allies for particular weapons systems) might unacceptably reduce United States' options. It may be in the United States' total national interests objectives to have allies such as the United Kingdom and France sell weapons to certain areas (e.g., to Egypt and Africa?) and avoid the sometimes dilemma of choosing between the political liabilities of direct United States' sales and yielding to Soviet involvement.

The United States' ability to give additional military support to a Third World ally in a crisis is facilitated by compatibility of ammunition resupply and communication networks. Such standardization must be encouraged. What must be avoided is the potential tendency to replicate foreign militaries with United States high technology weapons where they are not appropriate and/or excessive to meet the primary threat.[134]

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[132]Dial Torgerson, "Israel Selling Millions in Arms to South Africa," Los Angeles Times, 6 February 1977, p. I-1.

[133]Ibid.

[134]See Guy J. Pauker, In Search of Self-Reliance (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1973), passim.

Political Influence

Proposition 16: Military sales traditionally give the country making them influence with the recipient based upon their future needs for training, spare parts, and other supports.

Proposition 16A: "As arms become more and more a buyer's market as the sources of supply multiply, so the amount of political influence--basically simply a product of indispensability--that can be purchased through arms sales must inevitably diminish."[135]

Proposition 16B: "The Military Assistance Training Program has been and is a low-cost, low-risk foreign policy instrument that has served the United States interest in interstate stability and has provided a valuable channel of communications and influence with a significant elite, especially in the Third World."[136]

Proposition 16C: "The United States cannot expect to retain influence with nations whose perceived defense needs we disregard."[137]

As reflected in the previous chapter (Tables 6 and 8 and associated discussions), the apparent volume of

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[135]John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, The International Trade in Arms (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 236-37.

[136]Ernest W. Lefever, "The Military Assistance Training Program," The Annals 424 (March 1976): 85.

[137]Henry Kissinger, "Security Assistance and Foreign Policy," U.S. Department of State Bulletin (April 19, 1976), 501.

weapons transfers required for the maintenance of some degree of political influence has varied in different areas (e.g., Africa and Latin America versus the Middle East). Ultimately the value of political influence is its worth in facilitating other objectives (e.g., insured access to oil, regional stability, etc.). Therefore the long-range cost of maintaining influence must be carefully evaluated. In establishing sufficiency criteria for military assistance, the determination must be made "at what level of arms can events be controlled in favor of American interests . . . ? And conversely, at what point will there develop instability for those interests, either because the level of arms is too low or too high?"[138] Ultimately "an ability ["to exert leverage over recipient actions"] can rarely be attributed exclusively to an arms supply dependency, but rather to a series of additional factors--including trade, economic aid, investment, treaty commitments, military strength, ideology, and geographic proximity--which collectively determine the patterns of influence among states."[139] This

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[138]Dale R. Tahtinen, Toward a Realistic Military Assistance Program (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1974), p. 48.

[139]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms, p. 51. Studies attempting to directly correlate arms sales with some political influence surrogate (e.g., U.N. voting) have generally produced other than conclusive results, in spite of the quality of their methodology. For example, see Edward J. Laurance, Arms and Influence in Latin America: 1961-1973 (Monterey, California: Navy Post Graduate School, 1976). Paper presented at the International Studies Association conference in Toronto, Canada, February 1976.

qualification stated, arms still remain an important tool in seeking political influence.

The United States' ability to influence events in the Middle East currently appears to be linked to a high level of arms transfers. Among the stakes here are access to oil (previously discussed under proposition 10) and a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict--both high priority foreign policy objectives. The reluctance of the United States (and the USSR) to substantially curtail arms sales to the Middle East is demonstrated in the arms transfer statistics (Tables 6, 8, and 12 of Chapter II). Although Third World recipients of modern arms become dependent upon the supplier nations for spare parts and other support, such relationships also create a "reverse influence."[140] As one of the round table discussion groups at the West Point conference on Arms Transfers noted: "Fear that an established 'ally' will leave the fold to assume a new role as a neutral, or semi-antagonistic nation has caused U.S. (and Soviet) decision makers to reconsider possible arms denial policies."[141] They go on to add: "In this sense, it is problematic who is influencing whom with arms transfers."

Arms sales have been successfully used to influence

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[140]U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of Foreign Assistance, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, S. Rept., 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 52. Also see John Picton, "Arms and the Shah," Toronto Globe and Mail, 4 December 1976, p. 9.

[141]Arms Transfers, p. 64.

conflict resolution. As Gelb points out: "The massive amount of arms Kissinger arranged to sell Israel and the security supporting assistance he provided for Egypt and Syria after the Yom Kippur war seem to have contributed to the first Arab-Israeli troop separation agreement and to the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli troop withdrawal agreement."[142] The subsequent utilization of arms transfers in influencing the ultimate settlement of this regional crisis will remain difficult. For, while the United States is committed "to preserve the security of Israel," at the same time "Egypt . . . wants American combat arms."[143] Additionally, "Pakistan's acceptance of a cease-fire in the 1965 conflict over Kashmir--following the United States' embargo of arms shipments to participants in the dispute--can be attributed partially to Pakistan's dependence on U.S. spare parts and ammunition."[144] Though such action cannot always bring a quick halt to hostilities (e.g., the recent conflict between Greece and Turkey), such embargoes ultimately will have some moderating influence. Even here, Turkey criticized the United States' embargo, citing the

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[142]Gelb, "Arms Sales," p. 18.

[143]See Geoffrey Kemp, "America's Billion-a-Month Arms Sales; Cost of Cutting Back," Christian Science Monitor, 22 December 1976, p. 23.

[144]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms, p. 46.

lack of spare parts for American-supplied military equipment.[145]

Yet, if the recipient nation's ability to assimilate weapons and raise regional weapons standards, along with the concept of "reverse influence," is considered, there exists strong rationale for limiting the sophistication of most Third World arms transfer programs. The problem appears not to be whether arms transfers can be used for positive influence, but how, where, and when they can be used. For example, the relatively low cost of training "more than 450,000 men and officers from 70 different friendly and allied countries around the world"[146] during the past twenty-five years has given the United States some significant vehicles for influence. The exposure of these foreign elites to Americans and United States' communities has created many permanent ties. These influence capabilities can be used to promote restraint (reference proposition 5), as well as assistance in meeting regional and strategic defense needs. As the Senate subcommittee report speculated: "Iran may, and has, purchased equipment from third countries, but it is very doubtful to most observers that Iran would have risked its U.S. relationship had the U.S., as a good friend, openly and

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[145] "Premier of Turkey Calls U.S. Embargo Threat to Strength," New York Times, 2 December 1976, p. 12.

[146] For an evaluation see Ernest W. Lefever, "The Military Assistance Training Program," The Annals 424 (March 1976): 85-95.

forthrightly given its unvarnished opinion on several of the proposed large-scale purchases."[147] Such advice apparently was recommended at some lower levels (see discussion under proposition 14), and it may become an important alternative as allied nations propose excessive arms purchases.

According to one of the leading contemporary arms sales analysts: "Political influence is most frequently cited as a rationale for arms sales."[148] This author subsequently questions this rationale based upon "the dozen coups in Latin America in the last decade" and what "the U.S. found out in Iraq in 1958 and in Libya in 1969." Although these events were counter to United States' political objectives, one would be hard-pressed to find any programs which obtain perfect results. As another leading analyst noted in discussing political influence: "As long as the proposed sales are not harmful for other reasons, it is hard to argue against them. Sales to Latin American nations rest on this rationale, and, with a few exceptions, the policy seems sensible."[149]

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[147]U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, 1976, p. 50.

[148]Anne Hessing Cahn, "America's Billion-a-Month Arms Sales," Christian Science Monitor, 22 December 1976, p. 23.

[149]Gelb, "Arms Sales," p. 19.

Resist Soviet Hegemony

Proposition 17: The United States must continue its program of weapons transfer to the Third World in order to moderate and/or offset Soviet influence.

Proposition 17A:

> . . . the United States, as the most powerful democratic force in the world, has a responsibility to provide assistance to countries that are resisting the influence of the Soviet Union or other regional states that may be threatening the existence of a state friendly to Washington.[150]

Proposition 17B:

> The USA and the USSR supply weapons primarily for political and military reasons: to secure military bases or a measure of influence over the policies of the recipient country (or at least to prevent the other side *from doing so*).[151]

The United States-Soviet strategic rivalry is an important factor in competing for influence among the Third World states. Yet, as the discussion under proposition 7 demonstrated, relative arms transfer cannot be directly equated to measurement of the strategic balance. Nor does it appear that influence, particularly long-term, can always be measured by the extent of arms sales. The following observation has been made: "As the Soviet Union discovered in Indonesia and Egypt and the United States may [?] have learned in Vietnam, South Korea, Greece, and

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[150]Dale R. Tahtinen, Arms Transfers and U.S. National Security, p. 79. Paper presented at International Studies Association conference in Columbus, Ohio, October 28-30, 1976.

[151]Frank Barnaby, Arms Uncontrolled (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 35-36.

Turkey, political influence gained through arms transfers may prove to be illusory or temporary."[152] On the other hand, the strategic importance of successfully keeping Korea, Turkey, and Greece free of Soviet hegemony and generally receptive to some United States' political influence is significantly different from the Vietnam experience. United States' European interests are not necessarily synonymous with Southeast Asian interest. Existing conditions in different states are also a factor that must be considered.

In spite of what "the Soviet Union discovered," it is reported: "the Soviet Union is continuing the supply of weapons, ammunitions, and spare parts to Egypt through third countries."[153] Nor are the Soviets content to limit their arms sales to existing customers. The previously mentioned sale of the sophisticated Sukhoi-22 jet fighter aircraft to Peru stands out as a new dimension in the Western hemisphere. "While no specific information was available on Soviet motives for offering such favorable [financial] terms, Soviet inroads into Latin America could bring strategic benefits."[154] Additionally, some allied

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[152]United Nations Association of the United States of America, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race, p. 55.

[153]Drew Middleton, "Soviet Arms to Cairo Reported Continuing," New York Times, 2 February 1977, p. 7.

[154]Don Oberdorfer, "Peru Buys Jets from Soviets at Bargain," Washington Post, 3 November 1976, p. A3. Also "Peru Praises Soviet Terms for Jet Sale," Baltimore Sun, 3 November 1976, p. 2.

Third World governments are not adverse to threatening to "switch" to the Soviets if their arms requests are not met. "The prime minister of Pakistan has warned that his country might break its military ties to the United States and seek closer relations with the Soviet Union if this country refuses to provide weapons to Pakistan."[155] Although such threats from Pakistan may not create (or even approach) a crisis, such actions by others (e.g., Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, etc.) could potentially create much more significant problems.

Here again (as in proposition 16) the important consideration is maintaining adequate influence in key countries without becoming overly subjected to "reverse influence." Such threats, potential or real, must not become the primary consideration in policy formulation. Neither must assisting friendly nations' resistance of foreign hegemony always be linked with an ideological crusade (i.e., containment). Tahtinen points out that "this [type of] commitment is of a moral variety, and the United States continues to provide weapons to certain countries when they are not able to buy [or otherwise obtain] such equipment themselves."[156] He cites the United States' relationship with Israel as a "typical [paramount?]

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[155]Harry S. Bradsher, "Pakistan Threatens to Switch to Soviet Arms," Washington Star, 18 November 1976, p. 9.

[156]Dale R. Tahtinen, Arms Transfers and U.S. National Security, p. 7.

example." Certainly the United States arms sales to Yugoslavia is a particularly significant example of United States efforts to lessen Soviet hegemony.[157]

Human Rights

Proposition 18: The United States has a moral commitment to advocate domestic human rights in nations receiving United States armaments.

Proposition 18A: "Arms transfers have proven to be an ineffective lever for encouraging repressive regimes to adopt domestic reforms."[158]

Proposition 18B: "Still, while human rights concerns often cannot be applied, they should not be ignored."[159]

Although "arms supply dependency" is only one of "a series of additional factors" affecting political influence (refer to discussion under proposition 16), and in spite of the perceived ineffectiveness of arms transfers in the adoption of domestic reforms (proposition 18A), the United States has begun to give additional consideration to human rights considerations in foreign arms transfer policies. Since 1974 a section of the Foreign Assistance Act has stated:

> . . . , the President shall substantially reduce or terminate security assistance to any government which

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[157]See "Why Yugoslavia Matters," Los Angeles Times, 9 November 1976, p. II-4.

[158]United Nations Association of the United States of America, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race, p. 56.

[159]Gelb, "Arms Sales," p. 14.

> engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges; or other flagrant denials of the rights of life, liberty, and security of the person.[160]

Chile appears to have become a primary test case for the implementation of this human rights section. In spite of the "delivery of 18 F-4 and 18 other lighter jet planes already contracted for by the Chilean Government," the United States "has cut off all military or security assistance to Chile, not only credits and loans but even cash sales."[161] Although Chile subsequently released "most prisoners held without charge," she has continued to receive United States criticism for continued human rights violations.[162] At the West Point Senior Conference on Arms Transfers, one panel stated that the special saliency of the human rights consideration in Chile "could probably be attributed to three factors: (1) Chile is not vital to U.S. security interests; (2) the U.S. was therefore presented a low-cost, low-risk propaganda opportunity; and (3) some U.S. policy makers felt a special responsibility for having contributed to the Chilean situation."[163] Some

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[160]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Legislation on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 74.

[161]Walter C. Clemens, "Chile's Dismay at U.S. Brush-off," Christian Science Monitor, 24 September 1976, p. 27.

[162]"U.S. Criticizes Chile," Washington Post, 2 December 1976, p. A40.

[163]Arms Transfers, 1976 Senior Conference, pp. 70-71.

of the same rationale (at least the first two) were no doubt primary considerations in terminating Uruguay's military aid.[164]

As important as the human rights considerations are, the West Point panel stated that "there was general consensus that issues like human rights should not be allowed to singularly dominate legislation concerning arms transfers."[165] Pertinent also are the concluding remarks of Walter Clemens subsequent to his interviews with Chilean scholars: "On balance, however, these students of world affairs are struck by the relentless propaganda campaign against Chile waged by the USSR and Cuba and by the [Soviet] arms buildup in neighboring Peru, whose leftist military government they feel is unpredictable."[166] In spite of these latter considerations and possible risks, this United States emphasis has great moral implications with potential for impact upon international relations throughout the world.

There exist reasons for concern in human rights violations in other nations receiving United States security assistance--including some strategically important

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[164]"Uruguay's Military Leaders Angry over Congressional Cutoff on Aid for Arms," New York Times, 5 October 1976, p. 13.

[165]Arms Transfers, 1976 Senior Conference, p. 71.

[166]Clemens, "Chile's Dismay at U.S. Brush-off," p. 27.

nations (Korea, Philippines, and Iran).[167] The regional balance, base rights, and insured access to oil are considerations that cannot be totally ignored--any more than human rights should be totally ignored. Noting the realities of this dilemma, Leslie Gelb, in advocating human rights considerations, has stated: "In most instances (the Philippines and South Korea, for example), there are bound to be overriding considerations, and only nations of lesser importance (like Chile and Ethiopia) will be denied."[168] Still, the United States can and should keep in mind its commitment to foster human rights and democratic institutions.[169]

Internal Stability and Prosperity

Proposition 19: The United States' interest in stability and peaceful change can be facilitated by arms transfers to the Third World.

Proposition 19A: "The support services and infrastructure which are often required in conjunction with arms acquisitions may, despite their added expense, bring

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[167]See Joseph C. Harsch, "Morality in Foreign Policy," Christian Science Monitor, 3 February 1977, p. 23.

[168]Gelb, "Arms Sales," p. 14.

[169]Certainly the denial of human rights in so-called "Communist liberated" countries may be more significant (e.g., see "Iron Hand in Vietnam," Christian Science Monitor, 20 December 1976), but this circumstance should not preclude the United States from continuing to advocate a positive human rights commitment in all nations.

significant economic benefits."[170]

Proposition 19B: "In countries in which the military is not in control, American assistance would tend to increase the likelihood of military intervention in the political process and decrease the stability of existing regimes."[171]

It is reasonable to assume that the United States has a significant interest in the internal stability and prosperity of nations that are strategic, economic, and/or political allies. Aspects of stability and prosperity can be, and have been, related to socioeconomic indicators (e.g., GNP growth, urbanization, literacy, industrialization, social mobility, etc.) and to political development (e.g., voting, interest articulation, party stability, military interventions, etc.).[172] Additionally, studies have correlated military assistance with instability in the

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[170]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms, p. 79.

[171]Edward T. Rowe, "Aid and Coups d'Etat: Aspects of the Impact of American Military Assistance Programs in the Less Developed Countries," International Studies Quarterly 18 (June 1974): 242.

[172]See Robert D. Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," World Politics 20 (1967): 83-110. Also see Thomas Brown, Statistical Indications of the Effects of Military Aid (Santa Monica: Rand, 1969); Luigi Einaudi, Arms Transfers to Latin America (Santa Monica: Rand, 1973); Charles Wolfe, Economic Impacts of Military Assistance (Santa Monica: Rand, 1971); and Robert W. Jackson, "Politicians in Uniform: Governments and Social Change in the Third World," American Political Science Review 70 (December 1976): 1078-97.

form of military intervention.[173] Yet most of the correlations, as well as the causal relationships, in these studies remain unclear and sometimes contradictory. In spite of the innate values most of the socioeconomic and political phenomena may have in their own right, ultimately a key consideration is whether a cooperative government exists. In arms transfers (whether United States or the Soviet Union is the principal supplier) there is a consideration as to whether or not the arms shipment facilitates (stabilizes or establishes) a government in power that cooperates with the supplier (or at least precludes the establishment of a hostile government).

The possession of relatively advanced weapons appears to give Third World governments a certain amount of national prestige and popular support by assuring the local population that any foreign threats (perceived or real) can be adequately met. "Thus, domestic confidence in the recipient regime as well as its popularity and stature can be raised by advantageous arms transactions."[174] The statistics in the previous chapter in part reflect the arms transfer efforts of the industrialized nations to stabilize friendly Third World governments.

Citing "possible answers" to "why do industrial

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[173]Again, see Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention," and Rowe (proposition 19B).

[174]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms, p. 55.

states transfer armaments?" Colin Gray includes: "to promote local/regional stability," but subsequently also includes: "to encourage disorder and a change in regime."[175] The United States' arms transfer policy has been, and should be, used primarily as a stabilizing tool. As former Secretary of State Kissinger has stated: "A mature conception of our interest in the world would obviously have to take into account the widespread interest in stability and peaceful change."[176]

Yet the United States must avoid automatically considering all revolutionary movements as either a communist or Soviet victory. As Hans Morgenthau states: "The main motivating force in the Third World is not western ideologies, of which Marxism is one, but indigenous nationalism."[177] He notes: "Anti-communist military dictatorships support Soviet foreign policies, and governments who proclaim 'socialism' and practice what they at least think are socialist domestic policies pursue foreign policy which is at least not necessarily hostile to the interests of the United States." The United States has a stake in "stability and peaceful change" and should give

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[175]Colin S. Gray, "Traffic Control for the Arms Trade," Foreign Policy, no. 6 (Spring 1972), 165.

[176]Henry A. Kissinger, "An Inquiry into the American National Interest," American Foreign Policy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), p. 92.

[177]Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Pathology of American Power," International Security 1 (Winter 1977): 16.

adequate support through arms transfers to responsible cooperative governments, but it must remain aware of the indigenous nationalism factor that permeates the Third World.

Additionally, from a very practical standpoint, foreign policy in all its components must avoid excessive arms transfers to the point that they preclude necessary adjustments and ultimately lead to some form of system overload. According to the data in a Senate study, the nation of Iran is demonstrating potential systems overload symptoms in assimilating its advanced equipment. In discussing the Iranian Air Force, the report speaks of "difficulties in recruiting trained personnel"; "slippages in nearly all major programs"; "poaching of lesser priority programs"; and subsequently concludes: "Other programs that must compete for limited human and financial resources will probably experience even greater problems."[178] So, in considering the positive effects of military programs in "the development of basic infrastructure--roads, water supply, electricity, parts, houses, communications,"[179] the nation's ability to absorb and assimilate these programs must be a primary consideration. As one West Point conference panel summary recommended: "In establishing major arms support relationships there is a need for a more

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[178]U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, S. Rept., 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 32.

[179]Ibid., p. 37.

thoughtful evaluation of the long-term implications. These include the sociopolitical impact on the recipient."[180]

The important point is that in stabilizing friendly governments with arms transfers there are multiple considerations. Although Iran is pointed to as an example of potential system overload, Iran is not a statistically typical weapons recipient (reference Table 12 in Chapter II). Yet it is often from the exceptional cases that considerations and guidelines are established.

Summary

In examining and evaluating the propositions of this chapter, some generally cumulative patterns have developed. Among the observations worth noting are the following:

1. Arms transfers are one of the many foreign policy tools available for the pursuit of national interest objectives.
2. The national interest objectives of security, economic prosperity, and political influence are interrelated, as well as being somewhat abstract and ambiguous.
3. More specific program objectives can be identified and specified within the broader national interest objectives.
4. All the program objectives appear to have

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[180] Arms Transfers, 1976 Senior Conference, p. 46.

legitimate capabilities to obtain positive national interest objectives.

5. Yet, all the program objectives also appear to have the potential to produce undesirable results if objectives are improperly "prioritized," taken out of context, over-emphasized, or otherwise inappropriately applied.
6. The environment (or environments) within which programs must be formulated and administered are sometimes subject to rapid and often unanticipated changes.

Based upon the above findings, it is important to consider all the objectives in context as they apply to specific regions and even specific nations. Additionally, the interrelationships of these objectives (some compatible and some incongruous) must be considered. Apparently there exists no universally applicable formula to calculate the advisability or most effective level of arms transfers and military aid.[181] Implicit in these findings is that both advocates and critics of arms transfer policy must refrain from eclectic analysis (or "freight-training") in their evaluations.

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[181]Still, within Chapter V a set of guidelines is developed.

CHAPTER IV

THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES

"Foreign policy analysis has been dominated by approaches that conceptualize the acting unit as a 'unitary rational actor,' but many of the more interesting studies of the past few years have pointed to several limitations and inadequacies of such models."[1] Significant among these studies are the organizational and bureaucratic politics models developed by Graham Allison and Morton Halperin.[2]

This chapter identifies the pertinent groups and evaluates the primary "bureaucratic/organizational

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[1]Ole Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively," in Structure of Decision, ed. Robert Axelrod (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 18.

[2]Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The American Political Science Review 63 (September 1969): 689-718, and The Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971); Morton Halperin, "Why Bureaucrats Play Games," Foreign Policy, no. 2 (Spring 1971): 70-90; Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in Theory and Policy in International Relations, ed. Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 40-79; and Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kantor, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1974).

variables"[3] that concern the formulation and implementation of arms transfer policy. As in the previous two chapters, a series of propositions is utilized to describe and analyze the organizational procedures. These processes will be analyzed and evaluated while maintaining a continued awareness of the rational-strategic objectives discussed in the previous chapter. As one analyst utilizing the bureaucratic politics model noted:

> The bureaucratic politics model does not [should not] throw out the external goals, which were the sole object of attention in many of the earlier analyses of foreign policy. Rather, the bureaucratic perspective broadens the goal perceptions beyond the narrow issues for debate, and thereby encompasses the full range of objectives--organizational, domestic, and international--for which the bureaucrats must fight.[4]

The addition of the bureaucratic perspective facilitates analysis of the total environment in which foreign policy is formulated.

Although the recent models developed by Allison,

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[3]In both Allison's 1969 APSR article and his book, Essence of Decision (1971), the "organizational" and "bureaucratic" models were presented as separate models. Yet in his subsequent article (co-authored with Morton Halperin), "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications" (1974), the pertinent organizational process variables (e.g., "organizational constraints," "standard operating procedures," "existing capabilities and processes," "menu of alternatives defined by organizations," etc.) are incorporated within the "bureaucratic politics" paradigm (see pp. 47, 49, and 55 in Tanter and Ullman). This chapter will apply a consolidated "bureaucratic paradigm" to include bureaucratic and organizational variables. This consolidation facilitates concentration upon the substance of the organizational roles in arms transfer policies.

[4]Jessica P. Einhorn, Expropriation Politics (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1974), p. 1.

Halperin, and others have significantly altered and expanded foreign policy analysis, some earlier works provide a very useful conceptual foundation for understanding the organizational and bureaucratic variables.[5] In his 1955 article discussing "decisions in an organizational context," Herbert Simon spoke of "approximate" rationality and "intendedly" rational.[6] From the writings of Simon came the concepts of "bounded rationality" and "satisfying behavior."[7] An understanding of these concepts is an essential foundation for bureaucratic analysis.

Additionally, Charles Lindblom's 1959 article, "The Science of Muddling Through," noted: "By the impossibility of doing otherwise, administrators often are reduced to deciding policy without clarifying objectives first."[8] In this article, Lindblom proposed a "Successive Limited Comparisons" (or "Branch") method to be contrasted with the "rational-comprehensive" (or "Root") method in the formulation of policy. Lindblom pointed out that in the "branch" method means and ends are not distinct, analysis is

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[5]James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., in Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1970), p. 313, note: "Thucydides [writing of the Peloponnesian War] was indeed an early decision-making theorist."

[6]Herbert A. Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics 69 (1955): 114.

[7]See Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, p. 332.

[8]Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Reviews (1959), 82.

drastically limited, and the test of "good" (or "rational") policy becomes the possibility of agreement on the policy itself (rather than the maximum attainment of the primary objectives).[9]

The important consideration is that political decision-making need not, and often cannot, follow a comprehensive value maximizing pattern. It must be remembered that decision-makers and the policy implementing organizations do not necessarily represent a unitary actor with specific and consistent goals. Allison pointed out that the purposeful actions or "choices" can also be analyzed as organizational "outputs" and bureaucratic "outcomes."[10] Policy choices (including outputs and outcomes) may be affected (if not effected) by incomplete information, standard operating procedures, political bargaining, organizational goals, personal goals, etc.

It has been stated that ". . . decision-making in international relations, though it deviates from rationality, approaches it more closely than does decision-making in other areas."[11] Yet, even from this perspective, it is important to remember that rationality becomes an element

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[9]Ibid., pp. 81-87.

[10]Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 690.

[11]Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Nonrationality in Models of the International System," in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 229.

to be discovered in the evaluation of foreign policy, not a given assumption.

Bureaucratic Variables

Proposition 20: Bureaucratic and organizational variables significantly affect the formulation and implementation of arms transfers as a foreign policy program.

Proposition 20A: "An action by one government, which looks to an outside observer like a deliberate and calculated attempt to influence the behavior of another government, in fact is likely to have emerged from the process of pulling and hauling . . ."[12]

Proposition 20B: "A glimpse at almost any one of the major problems confronting American society indicates that a reformulation and clarification of objectives, not better control and direction of the bureaucracy, is critical."[13]

Robert Axelrod, in his study Bureaucratic Decision-making in the Military Assistance Program, surveyed 25 officials from six agencies involved with the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and found: "There are stereotyped policy

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[12]Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1974), p. 312.

[13]Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (or Allison Wonderland)," Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972): 178.

positions for the various agencies involved in MAP."[14] Ninety-five of 104 codable responses relative to "pro-weapon" versus "anti-weapon" and "pro-grant" versus "pro-sales" could have been predicted based solely upon the individual's agency.[15] The study, in spite of its acknowledged limitations, demonstrates that different organizations have divergent bureaucratic interests and organizational goals which can significantly influence the policy-making and implementation processes.

Even from a psychological perspective, bureaucratic organizations can be classified as identifiable policy variables. As de Rivera stated: "An organization does not really perceive events or make decisions; that is done by the individuals in the organization. On the other hand, an organization does exist in its own right--it is not simply the sum total of the individuals in it--and it does act."[16]

The bureaucratic and organizational variables and the "bureaucratic paradigm" greatly enrich the conceptual tools available for the analysis of foreign policy. The previously cited studies empirically substantiate the importance of the bureaucratic/organizational variables. Yet,

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[14]Robert Axelrod, Bureaucratic Decisionmaking in the Military Assistance Program; Some Empirical Findings (Santa Monica: Rand, 1968), p. v.

[15]Ibid., pp. 16-19.

[16]Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968), p. 46.

Stephen Krasner has argued that the bureaucratic "vision" of foreign policy ". . . is misleading, dangerous and compelling: misleading because it obscures the power of the President, dangerous because it undermines the assumptions of democratic politics by relieving high officials of responsibilities; and compelling because it offers leaders an excuse for their failures and scholars an opportunity for innumerable reinterpretations and publications."[17] In commenting on Allison's analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Krasner states: "Neither bureaucratic interests nor organizational procedures explain the positions taken by members of the ExCom, the elimination of passivity and diplomacy, or the choice of a blockade instead of an airstrike."[18] Yet the bureaucratic paradigm need not be offered as either a comprehensive explanation or as a vehicle for explaining away bad foreign policy. Bureaucratic/organizational variables apparently can and do affect foreign policy. Thus, bureaucratic analysis must be used to increase our understanding of policy formulation and implementation--by both the academician and the decision-maker.

Stephen Kaplan's article, "U.S. Arms Transfers to Latin America, 1945-1974," provides a very coherent and lucid example of the value of integrating the bureaucratic

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[17]Krasner, "Are Bureaucrats Important?" p. 160.

[18]Ibid., p. 178. For an additional criticism pointing out the shortcomings of the bureaucratic model, see Amos Perlmutter, "The Presidential Political Center," World Politics 27 (October 1974): 87-106.

paradigm into a comprehensive analysis of arms transfer policy.[19] Although Kaplan concluded that the strategic perspective of the National Security Council (NSC) was the "variable having been of greatest significance to the transfer of arms to Latin America," he also concludes that: "The issue of arms transfers to Latin America has not been explained in terms of a single variable of great predictive value."[20] He provides a number of bureaucratic assumptions and hypotheses useful in constructing a more "interlocking and consistent explanation." Some of his assumptions and hypotheses are subsequently used to formulate propositions in this chapter.

Arms Transfer Processes

Proposition 21: The arms transfer phenomenon is governed by a complex set of statutes covering a set of diverse but interrelated programs.

Proposition 21A: "There is no consistent and manageable process through which all arms transfer decisions may be channeled."[21]

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[19]Stephen S. Kaplan, "U.S. Arms Transfers to Latin America, 1945-1974; Rational Strategy, Bureaucratic Politics, and Executive Parameters," International Studies Quarterly 19 (December 1975): 399-431.

[20]Ibid., p. 425.

[21]Chester A. Crocker et al., Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and Procedures; Report and Proposals (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1977), p. 28.

Proposition 21B:

> There is no way to judge with whom the bulk of these transactions are being concluded. Furthermore, there is no way to compare trends and levels of commercial arms transactions with transactions made through government channels. What this means is that it is impossible for either the executive or legislative branches of our government to see what the complete picture of U.S. arms transactions is.[22]

Proposition 21C:

> If this is our suggestion for beginning to grapple with the complexities of U.S. arms transfers, what about the adequacy of the system that does the evaluating? We discussed at some length the organization of the Executive Branch at the working level for processing arms exports and raising policy issues. We felt that this machinery was not the problem.[23]

The relative complexity of the generic "arms transfer" policy phenomenon is evidenced by the FY 1978 Security Assistance Program, which consists of "five major parts" or subprograms.[24]

> [1] The Military Assistance Program (MAP) by which defense articles and services are provided to eligible recipient governments on a grant basis . . . .
> [2] The International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program by which military training is provided to selected foreign personnel on a grant basis . . . . [This program does not include weapons.]
> [3] The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Financing Program by which loans and repayment guaranties are provided to eligible foreign governments on a fully reimbursable basis for the purchase of defense articles, military

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[22] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, International Security Assistance Act of 1976, Hearings, 94th Cong., H.R. 11963, 1976, p. 49 (from statement by Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder).

[23] Priscilla Clapp, in "Moderators' Summaries," Arms Transfers (West Point, New York: USMA, 1976), p. 44.

[24] U.S. Government, Congressional Presentation: Security Assistance Program FY 1978, Vol. 1 (undated [1977]), p. 1.

> training, and other defense services from the United States Government. . . . virtually all the financing to be extended in FY 1978 (except for the direct loan to Israel earmarked for waiver of payment) . . . .
> [4] The Security Supporting Assistance (SSA) Program by which economic assistance is provided, on a loan or grant basis, to selected foreign governments having unique security problems . . . .
> [5] Foreign Military Cash Sales procedures through which eligible foreign governments purchase, with their own financial resources, defense articles, military training, and other defense services from the United States Government . . . .

In addition to these five "programs" of security assistance, there also exists the "commercial sales" program--which involves transactions between private arms producers and foreign purchasers. "No U.S. Government expenditures are involved, although the Government oversees commercial sales through its licensing procedures and also monitors the construction of coproduction facilities."[25] Additionally, arms have been transferred under "Excess Defense Articles" and various equipment loans.

"The legislative basis for all forms of United States security assistance consists of four acts: the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, and the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976."[26] The different subprograms in turn require different procedures and requirements; e.g., MAP and credit

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[25]Chester A. Crocker, The Committee on United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policies and Procedures: Report and Proposals (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1977), p. 20.

[26]Ibid., p. 6.

sales are part of the congressional budget cycle, while FMS cash and commercial sales are not.[27] Throughout these procedures, though, there is direct and/or indirect involvement by the pertinent government executive agencies, the defense industries, and the Congress.

In developing the bureaucratic politics paradigm, Allison and Halperin state: "The interests that affect players' desired results can be characterized under four headings: national security interests, organizational interests, domestic interests, and personal interests."[28]

It seems reasonable to assume that the primary players' national security interests can be analyzed best from the rational-strategic perspective (as discussed in the previous chapter). It is in the area of organizational, domestic, and personal interests where a bureaucratic perspective is the more valuable. Subsequently, the remainder of this chapter examines the key players involved in the formulation and implementation of arms transfer policies, with emphasis on their parochial interests.

The parochial interests and subsequent bureaucratic processes are examined while discussing the roles,

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[27]For descriptions of the processes involved in various arms transfer programs, see Ibid., pp. 15-22; and M. T. Smith, U.S. Foreign Military Sales: Its Legal Requirements, Procedures, and Problems (Fletcher School, 1976). Also see "FMS: No More Giving It Away," Government Executive 8 (December 1976): 19-22.

[28]Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics," in Theory and Policy in International Relations, ed. Tanter and Ullman, p. 48.

responsibilities, and actions (both prescribed and observed) of the key players. This approach facilitates a balanced approach--emphasizing the substance of policy formulation as it develops. It notes both organizational strengths and weaknesses and provides the basis for some normative-prescriptive analyses.

State Department

Proposition 22: The State Department is the principal agency in formulating and evaluating arms transfer policies as a means of pursuing foreign policy objectives.

Proposition 22A:

> As a result of its diffuse responsibilities and the nonspecificity of national security, American ideals, and inter-bureaucratic priorities, the State Department:
> a. supports arms transfers insofar as they appear functional to one or more of its responsibilities;
> b. opposes arms transfers insofar as they appear dysfunctional to one or more of its responsibilities;
> c. is generally disposed to compromise positions regarding arms transfers.[29]

Proposition 22B: "Our strategy centers on the Secretary of State. The President must want him to be his preeminent foreign policy official."[30]

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[29]Stephen S. Kaplan, "U.S. Arms Transfers to Latin America," International Studies Quarterly 19 (December 1975): 405.

[30]I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 261.

Proposition 22C:

> The various Congressional acts and Presidential delegation of authority make the office of the Secretary of State responsible for military exports. Yet there seems to have been a lack of State Department sanctioned, well-defined foreign policy objectives to which officials throughout the government may refer when contemplating specific military sales to specific countries.[31]

There seems to be general agreement as to the State Department's primary responsibility for formulating arms transfer policies. The Department of State has been aware of this requirement: "Security assistance is an essential element of our overall foreign policy."[32] The Department of Defense is also aware of this responsibility:

> Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State is responsible for continuous supervision and general direction of Military Assistance Programs and Foreign Military Sales, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a program or a sale and, if so, the amount thereof.[33]

Recognition of the necessity for the State Department's primary policy planning role is a generally well-established phenomenon. As early as 1959 a special Presidential Committee, studying military assistance, recommended:

> The strengthening of the position of the State Department on the policy level of military assistance planning and an increased assurance of the conformity

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[31] M. T. Smith, U.S. Military Sales: Its Legal Requirements, Procedures, and Problems, p. 34; prepared for conference on Implications of the Military Build-Up in Non-Industrialized States, at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, May 6-8, 1976.

[32] Henry Kissinger, "Security Assistance and Foreign Policy," U.S. Department of State Bulletin (April 19, 1976), 501.

[33] See U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance Sales Manual (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 1977).

> of the Military Assistance Program to foreign policy . . .

and additionally called for improved long-range planning to ". . . include a comprehensive statement of United States objectives in each country . . ."[34]

Yet there remains concern that: "Until now [1977], United States policy on foreign military sales has been fragmented, shaped often by the differing and sometimes contradictory desires of the State Department, the Defense Department and the imprecise intentions of Congress."[35] Thus, again it is accentuated that "the process of foreign policy formulation extends far beyond the State Department . . ."[36] Still, coherent foreign policy must be centrally coordinated in its formulation and implementation. As such, the State Department remains both the statutory and preferred organization for maintaining this responsibility.

Within the Department of State the responsibility for directing and coordinating military assistance and sales has been clearly assigned.

> The Under Secretary for Security Assistance, by delegation, will provide policy direction and coordination of

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[34]The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Composite Report [Draper Committee] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 17, 1959), pp. 23, 109.

[35]David Binder, "Comprehensive U.S. Arms Sales Policy Seen as Means of Restraining Other Suppliers," New York Times, 8 March 1977, p. 8.

[36]David H. Davis, How the Bureaucracy Makes Foreign Policy (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972), p. 1.

> Security Assistance programs (security, supporting assistance, military assistance, including excess defense articles, and foreign military sales and loan programs).[37]

Furthermore, in the exercise of this responsibility, this office is tasked to: "Ensure that all Security Assistance programs are planned, developed, and implemented in furtherance of United States foreign policy and national security objectives."[38] Yet, the reality of this responsibility does not appear to be that clear-cut--with the political and even economic importance of arms transfers of primary importance to other offices and bureaus. According to one study: "In reality, the Under Secretary for Security Assistance has been excluded from the process, preempted by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.[39]

Furthermore, the regional bureaus which report to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and "advise PM [Political-Military Affairs Bureau] on the policy implications of programs and sales in their respective region," in their apparent concerns with maintaining favorable bilateral relations with "their" countries, reportedly, "tend to

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[37]U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs Manual Circular No. 627, dated October 4, 1972, p. 1 (received from State Department in May 1977).

[38]Ibid.

[39]Chester A. Crocker et al., The Committee on United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policies and Procedures: Report and Proposals (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1977), p. 9. See Appendix G for the Department of State organizational chart.

support requests for assistance and sales within their regions."[40] This tendency was also reflected in the West Point Senior Conference report: "At the present time, the 'regional' bureaucrats (at State and DOD) seem to have more access than their 'functional' counterparts in the Political/Military Bureaus."[41] It seems reasonable and proper that these "regional" bureaucrats be primarily concerned with "their" countries, but this concern need not manifest itself in an excessive pro-weapons position. For, regardless of the effects of the individual and organizational differences which may vary over time, the policy formulation must follow the direction established by the Office of the Secretary of State itself.

The dispersion of program responsibility within the Department of State appears to have allowed the parochial interests to become particularly significant. Although the Under Secretary for Security Assistance is charged with responsibility for directing and coordinating the security assistance programs, this office appears to not yet have evolved as the central coordinator and/or director of security assistance programs.[42] Within the State Department

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[40]Ibid., p. 8.

[41]Arms Transfers (West Point, New York: USMA, 1976), p. 72.

[42]It is significant to note that the principal executive witnesses in recent years have generally been from Politico-Military, regional bureaus, and/or the DOD, with very limited testimony by the Under Secretary for Security Assistance.

itself there is a need to insure the actual centralization of responsibility for direction in a specific office--whether it be the Under Secretary for Security Assistance or the Under Secretary for Political-Military Affairs. Coherent policy formulation requires specific responsibilities and central coordination.

The objective of formulating and coordinating arms transfer programs as a portion of the total foreign policy programs is an organizational interest of the State Department itself, as well as the United States as a whole. Still, the State Department appears to have thus far assumed this responsibility in a rather ambiguous and loose fashion. A more precise and coherent administration of the security assistance programs would benefit the parochial interests of the State Department as well as United States foreign policy interests.

But even after assigning and delegating specific responsibilities, the additional question has been raised as to whether a "comprehensive" arms transfer policy should, or even can, be formulated. As one panel at the West Point conference of analysts reported: "Because each situation is different, arms policy cannot be comprehensive. But, it should be coherent."[43] Subsequently, they added: "Existing procedures, by which arms transfer requests are staffed and finally approved under State Department auspices, are very

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[43]Ibid., p. 69.

adequate unless circumvented by the President or his Secretary of State."[44]

Keeping in mind that the State Department's office of Munitions Control receives a very large volume of licensing requests from arms exporting companies (reported to be "about 23,000 in 1975")[45] and recalling the volume and trends discussed in Chapter II, there certainly appears to be a need for a coherent and comprehensible (if not comprehensive in the "exhaustive" sense) set of policy guidelines. The transfer of weapons must certainly be administered as a foreign policy phenomenon (reference objectives in Chapter III) under State Department guidance. Apparently reflecting a change in outlook associated with the Carter administration, one State Department official has reportedly stated: "The main thing is to approach arms sales in a comprehensive fashion, and not piecemeal as in the past."[46]

It is significant to note that the Secretary of State as of January 1977, Cyrus Vance, was Vice-Chairman of the United Nations Association of the United States of America National Policy Panel on Conventional Arms Control,

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[44]Ibid., p. 71. The "circumvented" procedures have been reported in the Iranian arms sales programs.

[45]Smith, U.S. Foreign Military Sales: Its Legal Requirements, Procedures, and Problems, p. 13.

[46]David Binder, "Comprehensive U.S. Arms Sale Policy Seen as Means of Restraining Suppliers," New York Times, 8 March 1977, p. 8.

which recommended "the formulation and implementation of a coherent overall arms export policy."[47] Furthermore, Leslie Gelb (whose Foreign Policy article was utilized in identifying policy "objectives" in Chapter III) is now "the State Department official who is heading the review of arms sale policy."[48] Certainly these two new key State Department officials appear well versed on the objectives. They are now faced with the difficult task of converting conceptual theory into political programs.[49]

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Proposition 23: The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), acting as an "inhouse devil's advocate" in questioning the export of United States armaments, is moderating the spread of modern armaments.

Proposition 23A:

> The Director [of ACDA] is authorized and directed to prepare for the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of such government agencies, as the President may determine, recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy.[50]

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[47] UNA of the USA, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race, p. 68. It should be noted that Paul Warnke, the new Director of ACDA, was also a member of that panel.

[48] Binder, "Comprehensive U.S. Arms Sale Policy," p. 8.

[49] See also Bernard Gwertzman, "Carter is Studying Arms Sale Controls," New York Times, 25 April 1977, p. 11.

[50] U.S. Congress, Joint Committee Print, Committees on Foreign Relations, Legislation on Foreign Relations 1976, 94th Cong., 2d sess., p. 1324.

Proposition 23B:

> A greatly strengthened ACDA, with new independence and authority, and the full backing of the President, his Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as his national security advisor is needed to fill the policy vacuum that now exists and to translate Mr. Carter's good intentions into effective action.[51]

Proposition 23C: "Never before has the Agency [ACDA] had unimpeded access to the sensitive internal working documents of the Department of Defense. Hence our ability to influence arms control and defense policy is greatly enhanced. . . ."[52]

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, by its very name, as well as statutory function is responsible for preparing recommendations for "arms control" and "disarmament" policy. Although the Director of ACDA is to carry out his duties and responsibilities "under the direction of the Secretary of State,"[53] this agency's unique role warrants a separate discussion.

> The agency [ACDA] now regularly reviews proposed U.S. Government as well as commercial arms transfers, and renders its opinion as to whether such transfers are likely to contribute to arms races, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or

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[51]Thomas A. Halsted, "Another Chance for Arms Control," Arms Control Today 6 (December 1976): 2.

[52]John F. Lehman, Jr. (then Deputy Director of ACDA), in keynote address to Senior Conference, Arms Transfers (West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, 1976), p. 19.

[53]U.S. Congress, Joint Committee Print, Committees on Foreign Relations, Legislation on Foreign Relations, 1976, 94th Cong., 2d sess., p. 1322.

prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements.[54]

During 1976 "ACDA provided its specific views on the arms control implications of about 100 individual transfer cases a month, and monitored several hundred additional cases each month for possible negative arms control implications."[55]

Particularly significant is the controversy as to how this agency has and should carry out its prescribed functions. In comparing national security policy agencies, it has been said: "The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), in contrast, has been so weakened that it probably ought now to be viewed as an appendage to the State Department rather than an independent agency."[56] Developing this same line of criticism, Thomas Halsted argues that ACDA must be revived by: (1) becoming a platform for advocacy; (2) resuming the overall responsibility for all arms control negotiations; (3) expanding the permanent staff of arms controllers; (4) improving arms control impact statements; and (5) removing ACDA from the State Department building to a home of its own.[57]

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[54]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976 Annual Report, January 20, 1977, pp. 12-13.

[55]Ibid.

[56]Franklin A. Long, "Arms Control From the Perspective of the Nineteen-Seventies," in Arms, Defense Policy and Arms Control, eds. Long and Rathjens (New York: Norton, 1976), p. 9.

[57]Halsted, "Another Chance for Arms Control," pp. 1-4.

The authorized and prescribed role of a professional arms control and disarmament advocating agency certainly has merit. Subsequently, the need for a permanent professional staff with adequate support and resources follows. Yet the emphasis upon "independent agency" and a "home of its own" may be misguided. ACDA is an executive agency and, even with its function as advisor to the President, it should remain an element of a comprehensive, centrally formulated foreign policy. Being logistically located within the State Department, with ACDA directly participating in staff meetings and policy formulation would appear to outweigh the advantages of physical separation. Former Deputy Director of ACDA, John Lehman, supports this perspective in emphasizing the benefits of having ACDA retain its current position within the executive branch.[58] Being a de facto member of the State Department need not hinder the agency's role. Ultimately the impact of ACDA is dependent upon the attitude and procedures adopted by the President and his Secretary of State. Having direct access to those primarily responsible is a definite asset.

Department of Defense

Proposition 24: The Department of Defense (DOD), as the government's weapons authority and administrator of arms transfers, is the primary agency in the

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[58]See Arms Transfers (West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, 1976), pp. 18-19.

implementation of arms transfer policy.

Proposition 24A:

> The Defense Department perceives arms transfers to Latin America [and all the Third World] as an instrument to insure a greater degree of American military security and to maintain U.S. armed forces influence with its professional counterparts abroad.[59]

Proposition 24B: "Within the Department of Defense, we consider defense strategy, force structure and security assistance programs within a broad international context."[60]

Proposition 24C: "Too many officials in the Defense Department have roles in the procurement process. They are salesmen for particular programs as well as managers. The roles are not compatible."[61]

The Department of Defense's (DOD's) specific purpose, "to provide for the security of the United States,"[62] is a basically abstract goal with a complex set of subgoals. Comparing the DOD with other institutions, one organizational study stated: "The goal of the Department of Defense is even more complex: It is to provide for the common

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[59]Kaplan, "U.S. Arms Transfers to Latin America," p. 405.

[60]Robert Ellsworth (former Deputy Secretary of Defense), "Justifying Military Sales," Aviation Week and Space Technology (April 19, 1976), 11.

[61]J. Ronald Fox, Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 460.

[62]"The Organization of Department of Defense," Commander's Digest 18 (July 31, 1975): 2.

defense."[63] The fulfillment of this somewhat abstract goal creates a complex assortment of subgoals and alternative programs. Analyzing the major military tasks as they relate to security policies, Andrew Goodpaster noted: "It is the unending responsibility of our military establishment to build, train, control and (should it ever be necessary) to utilize this force in combat operations."[64]

Considering the primary national security tasks of the DOD, there exists a primary organizational interest in the creation and support of advanced weapons programs to maintain a strong military posture. This emphasis is reflected in the 1977 Annual Defense Department Report, which states:

> Specifically, our major defense programs seek to ensure the military capability of the United States, in concert with its allies, to:
> - Maintain a strategic balance with the Soviet Union;
> - Maintain conventional combat forces which enable us credibly to deter, and if necessary, to defend against a conventional attack in Europe and which are sufficient to meet the most likely threat to our security and that of our allies elsewhere;
> - Maintain naval forces adequate to deter attacks on sea lines of communications, project forces ashore and keep essential sea lanes open;
> - Achieve a more stable environment through negotiation of equitable arms control measures.[65]

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[63]William A. Lucas and Raymond H. Dawson, The Organizational Politics of Defense (Pittsburg: International Studies Association, 1974), p. 12.

[64]Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Educational Aspects of Civil-Military Relations," in Civil-Military Relations, eds. Goodpaster and Samuel J. Huntington (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), p. 41.

[65]Donald H. Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1977, p. 11.

The first three objectives can easily be translated into development of new weapons programs and an adequate network of bases worldwide, particularly if the latter objective ("equitable arms control measures") is not obtainable.[66] Certainly the rationality of deterrence requires highly effective and nonvulnerable weapons systems. Still, the foreign policy objectives discussed in the previous chapter are not incompatible with these program goals--in fact a comparison with the "security" objectives produces significant similarities.

The area of arms transfers is certainly an area where Defense, as well as State, has some very important parochial interests. In seeking to fulfill its primary organizational interests, it logically follows that Defense and the individual branches are primarily interested in arms transfers as they affect the military power balance, facilitate U.S. base rights, strengthen allied military establishments, and facilitate the development and availability of modern weapons. As organizational interests, the fostering of human rights, Third World political development, and even balance of payments considerations tend to become secondary. They are not necessarily viewed

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[66] Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. xliv., in prologue to book, notes: "Official doctrine in each service came to hold that meaningful arms control treaties were in the interest of the United States and the world community." Yet, it seems reasonable to assume that military strength and weapons advancement are priority organizational considerations within both the DOD and the individual services.

as insignificant or unimportant considerations. They may be considered as very important, but they are primarily an organizational interest of some other group (i.e., State, AID, and Treasury).

Considering future weapons development and availability, Defense is well aware of the significant potential procurement cost saving available when certain weapons systems are made available for foreign sales.[67] As such, the individual services have a potential stake in which weapons systems are exported.[68]

The DOD has an additional parochial interest in the formulation and approval of arms transfer programs as the ultimate implementer of the programs. After they are approved for whatever strategic, economic, political, or combination of reasons, the DOD must implement these programs. From one perspective increased programs facilitate bureaucratic growth within the DOD, but they also create

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[67] The Budgetary Cost Savings to the Department of Defense Resulting from Foreign Military Sales, study by the Congressional Budget Office, May 24, 1975, estimated an annual budget savings of $560 million on the current arms export mix of $8 billion.

[68] For example, see John Saar, "U.S. Firms Fighting to Sell Jets to Japan," Washington Post, 31 October 1976, p. E1; and John W. Finney, "Navy Aids Northrop in Bid to Sell Iran on New Jet Model," New York Times, 11 November 1976, p. 1. For a discussion of the organizational interests in the development of weapons systems, see Graham T. Allison and Frederic A. Morris, "Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons," in Arms, Defense Policy and Arms Control, eds. Long and Rathjens, pp. 99-129.

new responsibilities--particularly in the logistics and training areas.[69]

Foreign weapons transfers, with the potential for becoming both assets and liabilities for the United States defense posture (reference discussion in Chapter III), have become significant variables in defense planning. Although the Secretary of State is responsible for the "continuous supervision and general direction" of Military Assistance Programs and Foreign Military Sales, the Secretary of Defense has primary responsibility for:

> (1) Determination of military end item requirements;
> (2) Procurement of military equipment in a manner that permits its integration with service programs;
> (3) Supervision of end-items used by the recipient country in the case of equipment provided under MAP;
> (4) Movement and delivery of military end items; and
> (5) Within the Department of Defense, the performance of any other functions with respect to providing Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales.[70]

Having primary responsibility relative to administering arms transfer programs is the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). "The purpose of the DSAA is to direct, administer, and supervise the execution of approved

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[69]An introduction into the magnitude and complexity of the task is reflected in the manuals specifically written to cover foreign military sales (e.g., DOD Manual 5105.38M, USAF/AFM 400-3, Army/FM 38-8, U.S. Navy/FMS Customer Supply System Guide, etc.). Recently these manuals have had a difficult time responding to all the current arms export legislation and executive branch policy guidance.

[70]U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance and Sales Manual (5105.38M) (Washington, D.C.: Defense Security Assistance Agency, 1976), Part I, p. B-1 (change 8, dated 1 March 1976).

security assistance plans and programs, such as military assistance and foreign military sales."[71] The Director of DSAA (usually a lieutenant general/vice admiral) is also Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA--an organization which has been referred to as DOD's Little State Department).[72] This organizational setup appears to reflect DOD's awareness of the significant foreign policy implications of arms transfers.

"DSAA handles all the 'back end' problems of implementation, leaving the 'front end' problem of purchasing policies to ASD/ISA."[73] This back end role requires DSAA to monitor the status of arms negotiations, deliveries, and payments. "Consequently, the executive branch and Congress turn to DSAA for information and technical advice in all but the most sensitive transfer agreements."[74]

Fox, in his study, Arming America, states: "Most Army, Navy, and Air Force officers consider acquisition of new and more advanced arms a primary strategic goal."[75]

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[71]"The Organization of Department of Defense," Commander's Digest 18 (July 31, 1975): 13.

[72]Smith, U.S. Foreign Military Sales: Its Legal Requirements, Procedures, and Problems, p. 24.

[73]Crocker et al., Conventional Arms Transfer Policies and Procedures: Report and Proposals, p. 10.

[74]Ibid.

[75]J. Ronald Fox, Arming America (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 451.

But his study also found that within the military ethic: "It is the responsibility of military leaders to be sure that their services are prepared to fight and to win"; rather than ". . . dishonest and greedy men who manipulate Government funds for their own gains."[76] The procurement of the most effective military weapon for the U.S. and its strategic allies will, and should, remain a primary strategic goal within the Department of Defense's combat commands. As Roger Hilsman observed: "It seems reasonable to expect that anyone, civilian or soldier, who is given responsibility for a nation's security would become preoccupied with the power aspects of policy problems."[77] Subsequently adding: "It not only seems inevitable that both military and civilian officials will come to put the power aspects of problems central in their concern, but desirable." Yet those serving in many policy and planning positions within the DOD (e.g., ISA, DSAA) must also maintain a broad foreign policy perspective. It is significant to note that ISA became the early "nucleus" of the SALT process.[78] And as Destler reports: "It was not the White House staff or State's Seventh Floor which pressed hardest for reversal of our Vietnam escalation in 1968. Rather it was the Defense

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[76]Ibid.

[77]Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 55.

[78]See John Newhouse, Cold Dawn (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973), p. 120.

Department's 'little foreign office.'"[79]

Reflecting this requirement for a broad foreign policy perspective, Professor Edward Laurance of the Naval Postgraduate School says: "The new [international] situation results in new demands on the military officer assigned to MAAGS [Military Assistance Advisory Groups] and other security assistance groups in recipient countries."[80] Concerned with the political importance of arms transfers, he writes: "Hopefully this article has made it clear that this is one type of job which clearly can be classified as politico-military." Still, Laurance and other arms sales analysts report the MAAGS "were more inclined to act as a brake on arms transfers than to act as promoters," and "while there are problems with the MAAG effort, MAAG functions are critical and must be continued."[81] Further, former Deputy Director of ACDA, Philip Farley, testified before Congress:

> The U.S. has its arms pitchmen, in industry and government. But many MAAG officers and other military and technical experts have a commendable record of pointing out alternative weapons choices which have greater

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[79]Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy, pp. 290-291.

[80]Edward J. Laurance, "The Changing Nature of Conventional Arms Transfers," Arms Transfers (West Point, New York: USMA, 1976), p. 105. See also Robert J. LaSala, "Military Advisors and Human Rights: Are We Our Brother's Keeper?" Army (August 1977), 8, who notes that the military advisors are "on the front lines" on the issue of human rights policy.

[81]Arms Transfers, pp. 71, 73.

> adaptability, simpler maintenance, less training requirements, lower initial or lifetime costs.[82]

As was noted in Chapter III, effective regional defense capacity and local stability are not necessarily facilitated by large transfers of sophisticated weapons.

The 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act requires the phase-out of all military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) by September 30, 1977, unless subsequently authorized by Congress on a case-by-case basis.[83] Based upon their "commendable record" cited above and the beneficial function they serve, it is hoped that the program (or an equivalent substitute) will remain. In their 1974 study, Pranger and Tahtinen advocated a "reorientation" of the MAAGs with success measured in program reductions.[84] Professor Laurance, also advocating "reform of the MAAGs," points out: "Those who would do away with MAAGs, or any group with a similar mission, would do well to read any of the several accounts of the 'Merchants of Death' era."[85] Although his wording may be slightly

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[82]Philip J. Farley, Statement before House Committee on International Relations, June 24, 1975 (typed copy), p. 17.

[83]UNA of the USA, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race, p. 64.

[84]Robert J. Pranger and Dale R. Tahtinen, Toward a Realistic Military Assistance Program (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1974), pp. 41-45.

[85]Edward J. Laurance, "The Changing Nature of Conventional Arms Transfers," Arms Transfers, p. 107. The fiscal year 1978 Congressional Presentation document, Security Assistance Program, lists proposed Defense Field

dramatic, the point that U.S. arms transfers should remain under government controls monitored by government personnel is effectively made.

It is clear that the DOD has important roles to play in determining and implementing arms transfer policy. The DOD must consider all weapons transfers from a strategic military perspective and it also has the best expertise to administer the transfer programs. But, additionally, those officials serving in ISA, DSAA, other policy formulating organizations, and/or military advisors to ambassadors need to maintain a special awareness of all the potential political, economic, and strategic implications associated with arms transfers. The political and economic awareness advocated here is not to usurp the primary policy direction assigned to the State Department, but to facilitate a coherent program--coherent in its implementation as well as its formulation.

Other Executive Agencies

Proposition 25: A number of additional executive branch agencies have secondary or ancillary effects upon arms transfer policy formulation.

Proposition 25A: "AID [Agency for International Development] opposes arms transfers to Latin America [and other Third World areas] insofar as they appear to

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Offices (DEFOs) and Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs) as well as Defense Attache Offices as means of overseas program management where MAAGs are terminated.

impose a burden on economic development."[86]

Proposition 25B: "Treasury is now a regular ally to Defense proposals for larger arms sales."[87]

Proposition 25C: "The Commerce Department also plays a minor role in arms transfers. It is only involved in commercial sales of items not on the Munitions Control List and of less than $7 million in value."[88]

The balance of payments economics effects of weapons sales previously discussed under propositions 12 and 14, by their basic arithmetics, create a valid concern within the Treasury and Commerce Departments. Although the political caveat that "arms sales are more than just plain business" remains valid, the financial realities of the world arms trade cannot be ignored. Fiscal problems should not be a basis for advocating foreign weapons sales. Still, once decisions are made to transfer arms for strategic and/or political reasons, the fiscal effects should not be ignored.

It also follows that AID, with a responsibility for insuring socioeconomic development in nations receiving United States foreign aid, has a valid interest in aspects of arms transfer policies. There is some evidence that

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[86]Kaplan, "U.S. Arms Transfers to Latin America," p. 405.

[87]Ibid., p. 427.

[88]Crocker et al., The Committee on United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policies and Procedures: Report and Proposals, p. 12.

lack of bureaucratic coordination has been a major factor in lessening the overall effectiveness of foreign assistance.[89] Certainly the objectives (e.g., "human rights" and "Internal Stability and Prosperity") discussed under propositions 18 and 19 require awareness of AID concerns and programs.

Realization of these interests is reflected in Executive Order 11501 (Administration of Foreign Military Sales), which states:

> In carrying out the function delegated to them under this order, the Secretaries of State and Defense shall consult with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on matters pertaining to their responsibilities.[90]

Much of the required interagency coordination appears to be handled by the Security Assistance Program Review Committee.

> It is chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance and includes representatives from PM, DOD, the NSC, OMB, the Agency for International Development (AID), the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Treasury Department.[91]

Although this committee has no legal authority to formulate

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[89]See Abraham F. Lowenthal, "United States Policy Toward Latin America: Liberal, Radical, and Bureaucratic Perspectives," Latin American Research Review 8 (1973): 3-21.

[90]U.S. Congress, Joint Committee Print, Committees on International Relations, Legislation on Foreign Relations 1976, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 271.

[91]Crocker et al., Conventional Arms Transfer Policies and Procedures: Report and Proposals, p. 9.

arms transfer policy, it has the potential to provide the very necessary coordination function in reviewing security assistance proposals. Thus, the State Department has an established vehicle for coordinating arms transfers throughout the executive branch of the government.

Yet there seems to be little evidence that the Security Assistance Program Review Committee has been fully utilized.[92] As it has evolved, chaired by the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, it does not appear to have had a significant impact in coordinating the direction of security assistance programs among the pertinent agencies. Certainly such an interagency function is required for the establishment and maintenance of coherent and comprehensible foreign policy programs.

Whether it is this specific committee or another group, the executive branch requires a centralized authoritative inter-agency group to coordinate the direction and formulation of arms transfer programs. Such a committee accommodates various perspectives and considerations and provides a vehicle for organizational and other parochial interests to be expressed, examined, related, and accommodated (and/or modified, or even rejected) within the broad spectrum of total foreign policy considerations.

Giving increased emphasis to such a coordinating

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[92]In the summer of 1977 the SAPRC has been renamed the Arms Export Control Board. See "New Policy Review Board Set Up," Armed Forces Journal International (August 1977), 22.

committee does not, and should not, mean that the relative roles of State and Defense will necessarily be reduced. Additional coordination in fact probably means that their program requirements might grow and become more difficult. But this additional coordination also means that the policy and program goals will become more coherent and comprehensible, facilitating better consideration and evaluation of all pertinent national interest objectives.

The President/NSC

Proposition 26: The President and his National Security Council staff must take the lead in identifying arms transfer objectives and the establishment of specific procedures and guidelines.

Proposition 26A:

> It is unlikely, in the absence of radical change, that the Defense Department will reflect these divergencies in any analyses it might undertake. The same can be said of the Arms Control Agency and the Department of State. More of the burden must fall where responsibilities are broader--in the White House and on the National Security Council staff, in particular.[93]

Proposition 26B: "The important foreign policy and arms control implications of U.S. arms exports require that the locus of decision-making remain at the highest levels of the State Department and White House."[94]

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[93]George W. Rathjens, "Changing Perspectives on Arms Control," in Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control, eds. Rathjens and Long (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 213.

[94]UNA of the USA, Controlling the International Arms Trade, p. 16.

Proposition 26C:

> The most serious weakness in the present decision-making policy process is the unfortunate tendency of the President or his senior advisors to "short-circuit" the bureaucracy which is responsible for evaluating arms requests.[95]

Proposition C, as compared to A and B above, appears to advocate a divergent, almost contradictory perspective toward the role of the President and his NSC staff in the formulation of arms transfer policy. Yet, upon closer examination, the propositions (A, B, and C) are potentially compatible. On the one hand, the President has to assume the "responsibilities" and become the "locus of decision-making," but in so doing he must utilize the bureaucratic expertise available to him.

Whether one favors the "multiple advocacy" model of Alexander George,[96] or the "State-Centered Organizational Strategy" of Destler,[97] or any hybrid model, the President must first insure adequate consideration of alternatives and the pertinent effects (both long-and short-term) associated with each of the policies advocated. Secondly, he must insure that the implementation of the policy will best

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[95] Arms Transfers, p. 59.

[96] Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review 66 (September 1972): 751.

[97] See Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy, pp. 254-94.

facilitate foreign policy objectives.[98] What should be avoided is the case whereby the President and/or his chief advisors formulate "ad hoc" policy without considering or seeking the advice of the bureaucratic expertise (reportedly the case in the unprecedented sale of large amounts of sophisticated weapons to Iran),[99] while also precluding bureaucratic routinization of arms transfers in a manner inconsistent with program objectives. Such unmonitored routinization could potentially manifest itself in either excessive transfers or the preclusion of desired arms transfer options.

The President and his immediate staff must insure that programs are subject to meaningful review. As such, the concerns of all pertinent agencies should be considered. Groups will continue to have their organizational, domestic, and personal interests--including the President and immediate staff. The policy must be formulated and implemented with the various parochial needs identified, considered, integrated, and/or modified, but ultimately subservient to total national interests.

Yet it is important to remember that Presidents also have domestic and personal interests. Certainly there

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[98]Obviously, the President cannot foresee nor control all external variables, but he still must become the ultimate judge of foreign policy decisions--utilizing the best available sources.

[99]See U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, Staff Report, 95th Cong., 2d sess., July 1976, p. 41.

is linkage in the formulation of the Nixon Doctrine with its increased emphasis upon weapons transfers (versus utilizing U.S. troops) and the growing domestic opposition to U.S. boys fighting and dying in Asian jungles.[100] Earlier, the Kennedy administration leadership had taken a personal interest in counter-insurgency warfare.[101] Currently among President Carter's interests is his campaign commitments to reduce the volume of U.S. arms transfers. This commitment, even if somewhat qualified, in his "arms export ground rules,"[102] has become a significant variable in the formulation of current arms transfer programs.

The actual NSC (and/or principal advisors) structure the President institutes has and will vary. As Destler noted: "No single organizational scheme, whatever its built-in flexibility, can fully accommodate the differing personalities and priorities of different Presidents and administrators."[103] Within his chosen structure and working with his chosen key advisors, the President must become the "ultimate decider," the "ultimate coordinator,"

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[100]See Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s.

[101]See Laurel A. Mayer and Ronald Stupak, "The Evolution of Flexible Response in the Post-Vietnam Era," Air University Review (November/December 1975), 14-18.

[102]See "Carter Sets Export Ground Rules," Aviation Week and Space Digest (May 23, 1977), 17.

[103]Destler, Bureaucrats, Presidents, and Foreign Policy, p. 10.

and the "ultimate persuader" in the formulation of foreign policy.[104] President Carter's initial formulation of arms transfer policy apparently will be based upon an "inter-agency" Presidential Review Memorandum 12, worked out under the direction of Leslie Gelb, director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.[105] It has been further reported that a Presidential Review Committee headed by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has discussed this inter-agency paper and "made its recommendations known to Mr. Carter."[106]

Congress

Proposition 27: The Congress fulfills a critical role in the formulation of United States arms transfer policy.

Proposition 27A: "Until recently, Congress had little authority over the vast majority of U.S. arms exports."[107]

Proposition 27B:

> Interviews with nearly two dozen members of Congress indicate they believe that changes of the last six years in Congress and the law make a continuing struggle with the Presidency over the formulation of foreign policy nearly certain--even if there is a new

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[104] See Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 18-21.

[105] Bernard Gwertzman, "Carter is Studying Arms Sale Controls," New York Times, 25 April 1977, p. 11.

[106] Ibid. See also "Carter Sets Arms Export Ground Rules," Aviation Week and Space Technology (May 23, 1977), 17.

[107] UNA of the USA, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race, p. 63.

> Secretary of State or a Democratic administration next year.[108]

Proposition 27C: "Congress is essentially a political institution"; ". . . a conservative organization." "Congress is much as Congress was . . . . On arms control, as on many other subjects, the direct role that Congress can be expected to play will therefore be limited."[109]

Proposition 27D:

> The real power of Congress in disapproving arms transfers [and effecting policy formulation] lies not in the concurrent resolution procedure [of the Arms Export Control Act], . . . but in the informal consultation process which begins before the 36(b) [section of Act] report is sent.[110]

Reflecting Congressional frustration regarding its lack of legislative control over the growing arms trade, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 included an amendment by Senator Nelson requiring the President

1) to report the total amount of government-to-government sales each quarter and
2) to submit all proposed government-to-government sales of more than $25 million to Congress, which can prevent the sale if both Houses pass resolutions within 20 calendar days.[111]

Then, in 1976, Congress passed (and President Ford

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[108]Leslie H. Gelb, "Congress Likely to Press Its Role in Foreign Policy," New York Times, 19 April 1976, p. 1.

[109]Les Aspin (Congressman), "The Defense Budget and Foreign Policy," in Arms Defense Policy and Arms Control, eds. Long and Rathjens, p. 173.

[110]Crocker et al., Conventional Arms Transfer Policies and Procedures: Report and Proposals, p. 14.

[111]UNA of the USA, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race, p. 63.

signed) the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Export Act which further defined its prerogatives regarding arms transfers. This act:

(1) requires the phase-out of military assistance programs (MAPs) and military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) by September 30, 1977, unless subsequently authorized by Congress on a case-by-case basis,

(2) expresses the sense of Congress that future arms sales should not exceed the current level,

(3) requires all non-NATO military sales of $25 million or more to be handled through government-to-government rather than commercial channels,

(4) calls on the President to submit to Congress an annual country-by-country justification, including an arms control impact statement, of the government-to-government arms sales program,

(5) expands reporting procedures on both commercial and governmental military exports, including agents' fees and political contributions,

(6) limits the President's authority to draw on Department of Defense stocks for military assistance programs unless he certifies that such a transfer is important to U.S. security, and

(7) disallows military and economic assistance to countries either supplying or receiving nuclear enrichment or reprocessing equipment without

appropriate international safeguards.[112]

Congress may lack the required expertise to totally formulate comprehensive arms transfer policy (i.e., "Congress is neither organized nor specialized to be a policy formulating rival")[113] and congressional politics may limit their individual perspectives (e.g., "Members of the Congress have a wider spectrum of goals, not the least of which is re-election. . . . Members of Congress are seldom rewarded for looking beyond local needs to a national goal that most people do not understand, especially if the result is a loss of local jobs").[114]

The continuing program development of the F-18 fighter aircraft is a specific example of how personal domestic interests of key congressmen can significantly affect future arms transfers programs. It has been reported that ". . . the F-18 had been set to be effectively shelved in the budget for the fiscal year 1979," but a congressional campaign reportedly led by Speaker of the House O'Neill and Senators Kennedy and Brooke (all from Massachusetts where the aircraft's engines would be manufactured and "would mean 5,000 to 6,000 jobs") had brought pressure to retain

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[112]Ibid., p. 64.

[113]Hargrove, The Power of the Modern Presidency, p. 160.

[114]Fox, Arming America, p. 452.

F-18 development in the Defense budget.[115] This "controversial and expensive Navy fighter plane program it had planned to drop" was reportedly being developed by Northrop Corporation with a modified version strictly for foreign sales (reference discussion under proposition 14). Noting that Iran is reported to be the initial customer being considered, it is particularly ironic that Senator Kennedy would bring pressure on the Defense Department for continuation of the program.[116] In fairness to the Massachusetts legislators, it should be noted that congressmen from California and Missouri whose districts would also receive employment benefits were also reported "among the congressmen spearheading production of the F-18." The significance here is not to single out these particular legislators, but to demonstrate the potential significance of parochial interests and their ultimate affects on programs.

The recent hearings on foreign assistance to various countries (e.g., Greece and Turkey, Chile and Peru, or Israel and the Arab states) give evidence of the diverse parochial interests represented in the Congress.[117] In

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[115]Bernard Wienraub, "Congress Pressure Keeps F-18 Jet Alive Despite Navy Doubts," New York Times, 21 June 1977, pp. 1, 14.

[116]See Edward M. Kennedy, "The Persian Gulf: Arms Race or Arms Control?" Foreign Affairs, no. 42 (October 1975), p. 14 (also see discussion under proposition 3).

[117]See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, International Security Assistance, Hearings, before Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International

questioning program proposals one can find support for increases, decreases, and/or the termination of specific programs. And yet running through this dialogue there appears to be a concerted effort in the Congress to obtain a better understanding of the program itself. Noteworthy is the Congress' recent actions increasing ACDA's FY 1978 budget and calling for an expanded public information program by that agency.[118]

A review of the FY 1978 Congressional Presentation document on the Security Assistance Program reflects the increased oversight role assumed by the Congress through the previously cited legislation. In addition to definitive breakdowns of the various programs (by region, by country, by specific hardware, etc.), the presentation also includes a brief justification and description of the program, arms control impact statements, human rights considerations, and proposed overseas management of the programs for each recipient nation.[119] Congress is not (and should not be) the primary foreign policy formulating branch of government. Yet, "in time, Presidential policies require support for

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Relations, International Security Assistance Act of 1976, Hearings, on H.R. 11963, 94th Cong., 1976; U.S. Congress, House, International Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976; also additional hearings listed in bibliography.

[118]See Katherine Johnson, "Arms Control Statement Criticized," Aviation Week and Space Technology (May 16, 1977), 14-15.

[119]See Security Assistance Program, FY 1978 (Congressional Presentation document), Vol. 1, undated [1977].

programs to be enacted into law and sustained by appointments."[120] The recent arms transfer legislation passed by the Congress certainly establishes a set of definitive parameters in which the executive branch must formulate and implement arms transfers--subject to not only budget constraints but also potential congressional vetoes of specific transfers.[121] The Congress has assumed an active and effective "limit-setting"[122] role in these foreign policy programs. Utilizing its specialized subcommittee (with staff specialists), Congress has passed the rather definitive arms transfer legislation previously cited.

"Although [these] recent changes in security legislation have increased the strength of congressional review, to date this has had little practical effect in weakening presidential control over the arms transfer process."[123] Yet, this expanded role of congressional "oversight" is in itself significant. Under this recent legislation Congress now has the opportunity to examine, question, and even veto all major arms transfers. The significance and effectiveness

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[120]Erwin C. Hargrove, The Power of the Modern Presidency (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1974), p. 158.

[121]For a critical discussion of the concept of the congressional veto power see John R. Boulton, The Legislative Veto: Unseparating the Powers (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977).

[122]See Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs, p. 82, for a discussion of the limit-setting role of Congress.

[123]Crocker et al., Conventional Arms Transfer Policies and Procedures, p. 7.

of the Congress in the formulation of arms transfer policy cannot be measured nor evaluated by a box-scoring of foreign sales rejections. This increased role of Congress need not frustrate the executive branch. The Congress can also be used as an asset in building program guidance and support.

It seems reasonable to assume that the Congress and the executive are in general agreement in the requirement to pursue the national objectives discussed in Chapter III--even if there may be some disagreement on how best to achieve them. Both branches of government, therefore, can and do benefit from cooperative efforts and candid discussions. One positive example of such cooperation is the informal consultation process worked out to review proposed arms transfers cited in proposition 27D.

> Under the procedure established between the executive and the legislative branches, Congress has 20 days to review the intended sales after "informal notification"--during which the details are to be kept confidential--and 30 days more after "formal notification" to deliberate on the sales openly.[124]

Both branches have a significant and necessary role to play in foreign policy under the Constitution. As Hargrove says:

> In the final analysis the best balance between the President and Congress comes when each respects the other. . . . We need congressional politicians who will not frustrate the efforts of such Presidents for political ends of their own but will realize that the best politics is open discussion, debate, and resolution

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[124]David Binder, "Carter Authorizes $2 Billion in Sales of Arms Abroad," New York Times, 30 March 1977, p. 7.

of disagreement, which permits the President to lead but requires him to lead democratically.[125]

Nongovernment Actors

Proposition 28: Nongovernment actors have significant secondary roles in the formulation of arms transfer policy.

Proposition 28A:

> Profit incentives for commercial [weapons] firms; and such incentives as base rights acquisitions, balance of payments, domestic employment, and foreign influence at the government-to-government level, create a favorable atmosphere in which suppliers attempt to whet buyer appetites.[126]

Proposition 28B: "Extragovernmental observers and analysts of the arms transfer process [e.g., Academia and the Media] have little substantive influence in the daily decision-making process."[127]

Proposition 28C: "The state remains the basic frame of reference in the economics as well as the politics of the manufacture and sale of weapons."[128]

Hilsman states: "Beyond producers' groups and minority organizations, there are few lobbies in the field of foreign affairs."[129] Yet the existing and potential

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[125] Hargrove, Power of the Modern Presidency, p. 174.

[126] Arms Transfers, p. 67.

[127] Crocker et al., Conventional Arms Transfer Policies and Procedures, p. 13.

[128] Stanley and Pearton, The International Trade in Arms, p. 123.

[129] Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs, p. 71.

impact of these groups is a significant factor.

> Northrup, for instance, has made headlines both in the U.S. and at the Farnborough Air Show in Britain last Fall, trying to stir up third country interest in buying, among other things, a 'land-based version' of the still undeveloped Navy F-18 fighter--on which it is subcontractor to McDonnell-Douglas.[130]

Additionally, the Israeli lobby appears to be a good example of a politically effective minority organization.[131]

The potential economic benefits to American defense industries are significant.[132] With the United States utilizing arms transfers as a major foreign policy program, healthy defense industries become a foreign policy requirement. Yet, as some technologically underdeveloped nations (e.g., Iran and Saudi Arabia) experienced an oil profits windfall, and other nations sought to strengthen their military requirements (real and perceived), defense industries (European and Soviet as well as American) have competed for the sale of new equipment. Although United States commercial sales representatives are said to "play an active role in arranging commercial sales and sometimes government-to-government sales," it has also been reported: "the facts indicate that CSRs [U.S. Commercial Sales Representatives], when compared with their European counterparts,

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[130]"FMS: No More Giving It Away," Government Executive 8 (December 1976): 19. See also discussion of defense industries under proposition 14.

[131]See Henry L. Trewhitt, "Ford Defends Sale of Arms to Israel," Baltimore Sun, 16 October 1976, p. 4.

[132]Reference discussion in Chapter III, under propositions 12 and 14.

receive minimal assistance from the U.S. Government in promoting their weapons systems."[133]

Although American industries should have an opportunity to compete for foreign weapons sales that the United States government has determined facilitate our national interests, some lost sales to Western European allies on balance may be advantageous to United States' long-term interests. Or at least some such sales need not be considered a major setback. First, the United States' prosperity has a stake in a healthy Western Europe. Second, the United States defense industry's prosperity should not become dependent upon Third World arms purchases. Third, it is sometimes politically beneficial to the United States that Third World states have alternate suppliers other than the USSR and/or China, when the United States is unable to supply their needs. Subsequently, General Fish, head of the Defense Department's DSAA "doesn't buy the argument of some contractors, that, 'If the U.S. doesn't sell the hardware, someone else will."[134] He reportedly added that the Pentagon is not concerned when Western allies "share the load," but is if the supplier becomes a communist state and not a Western ally.

"Nothing at all can be exported without a license,

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[133]Crocker et al., Conventional Arms Transfer Policies and Procedures, p. 12. Also see Robert Hotz, "Changing Export Patterns," Aviation Week and Space Digest (June 6, 1977), 37.

[134]"FMS: No More Giving It Away," p. 22.

. . .; and Government has an elaborate system for reviewing requests."[135] Yet these procedures have not precluded unclassified "brochuremanship" presentations by private industries to potential foreign customers without the State Department's prior approval.[136] The current administration is reportedly proposing a stringent requirement that American arms sellers should obtain State Department approval before even approaching a foreign country, for "the Administration wants to prevent a country from being persuaded to buy an item from a salesman when the United States Government would not regard the sale as a good idea."[137] However elaborate, or simple, the procedures may become, they must insure that U.S. arms transfer proposals be initially judged by the government as to their compatibility with United States national interests. Then, after this is established, the government can assist defense industries in competing for contracts. Most Third World foreign military sales today become government-to-government anyway. The United States cannot insure the survival of all individual American aerospace and ship industries and these industries should not become financially dependent upon increasing foreign sales. Still, the government can and should encourage the

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[135]Ibid., p. 20.

[136]See "State Dept. Plans Tighter Control," Aviation Week and Space Technology (January 17, 1977), 26.

[137]"Carter is Studying Arms Sale Controls," New York Times, 25 April 1977, p. 11.

allocation of foreign weapons procurements to United States industries when such procurements are felt strategically and politically beneficial.

Defense industries cannot be allowed to promote arms sales as a normal international business market. Therefore, the U.S. government must consult with the industries and keep them abreast of existing and pending program trends. Maintaining the correct balance in this relationship is difficult, but necessary.

The role of academia and the media may have "little substantive influence in the daily decision-making process" (proposition 28B), but this study also noted:

> They do, however, provide an outside perspective through submissions in journals and published reports, personal contact with decisionmakers, and testimony before Congress. . . . Their views appear especially valuable when the transfer process is undergoing extensive review . . .[138]

Certainly there has been a significant number of studies and analyses of United States arms transfer policies and programs in recent years.[139] And certainly the arms transfer policies and programs have been undergoing extensive review--fulfilling the second criteria cited above. Facilitating the consideration of these "outside perspectives" has been government's tendency to tap prominent academics and media people for key policy-making

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[138]Crocker et al., Conventional Arms Transfer Policies and Procedures, p. 13.

[139]Reference bibliography of this paper.

positions. This tendency might be best personified by Leslie Gelb, the present Under Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (he recently was a correspondent for the New York Times in addition to publishing articles in some of the country's most prominent political science journals).

In addition to their normal academic journals, academics have analyzed and critiqued arms transfer programs while working with the Rand Corporation, the Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, and in other "think tank" environments. It appears that academics need not fear the "simple dilemma" of standing aside and thereby risking irrelevance or joining the establishment and risking corruption.[140] Academics, scholars, and/or intellectuals have assumed various roles in and out of government--including the so-called "in-and-outers."[141]

Turning to the media: "It is no accident that the press, which includes television, is often referred to as the 'fourth branch of government.'"[142] Most large American newspapers (coast-to-coast) have informed correspondents stationed throughout Washington, D.C. and the world

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[140]See Harold L. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1967), p. viii.

[141]See Robert L. Rothstein, Planning, Prediction and Policymaking in Foreign Affairs (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1972), p. 16.

[142]Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs, p. 109.

reporting on foreign policy programs--including arms transfers.[143] Additionally, television has played a significant role in informing the American public of some of the controversial aspects of the world's arms trade. For example, on August 27, 1976, CBS News presented a prime time (8 p.m.) television special called "The Selling of the F-14," analyzing and criticizing the controversial sale of eighty of these highly sophisticated fighter aircraft to Iran.[144]

Although such news media coverage may come long after a specific transfer has been formulated, it still appears that the media has played a significant role in calling for the reexamination of United States arms transfer programs and policies. In fulfilling this informative and powerful role the media must maintain a constant effort to separate its "news page" reporting from its editorial columns.[145] Both of these media services are important, but in the final analysis the government must play the primary role in the evaluation, formulation, and implementation of arms transfer programs.

Summary

In developing and evaluating the propositions in

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[143]Reference the bibliography of this paper, as well as the footnotes in Chapter III.

[144]CBS News, CBS Reports: The Selling of the F-14 (presented on the CBS television network on August 27, 1976, 8 p.m.).

[145]See Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs, pp. 114-15.

this chapter, the significance of the organizational interests and bureaucratic processes become apparent. The formulation and implementation of arms transfer policy and programs are significantly affected by a number of parochial interests--both actual and potential. Prominent among the findings were:

1. The State Department is assigned the primary responsibility for the central direction and coordination of arms transfer programs, but the department thus far appears to have assumed the responsibility in a rather loose and ambiguous fashion. There appears to be a renewed effort to institute increased coordination.
2. The Department of Defense is responsible for implementing transfer programs. Defense primarily has parochial interests in weapons transfers as they affect strategic power balances, base rights, and weapons development programs. Still there is an apparent growth in foreign policy awareness within DOD.
3. In addition to the above two departments, a number of other executive organizations (i.e., ACDA, AID, Treasury, Commerce) have parochial interests and objectives which must be considered as policies and programs are formulated and implemented. It appears that a more regularized and comprehensive coordination vehicle must be established (such as a

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strengthened Security Assistance Program Review Committee(Arms Export Control Board).

4. The President with his key advisors (regardless of the formal scheme he institutes) must orient and set the policy as it pertains to foreign policy objectives.
5. Congress, with its diverse parochial interests, does not have the organization nor capability to implement and administer specific programs. Yet it does have the power to review, fund, and establish program parameters. Congress is taking a more active role.
6. United States foreign policy requires a healthy defense industry for a viable arms transfer option. Industries have a parochial interest in increased sales, but sales and even "brochuremanship" practices in the Third World must be controlled by the government.
7. Some other nongovernment groups (e.g., academia, the media, and some ethnic lobbies) can affect the thrust of arms transfer programs.

The generic "arms transfer" phenomenon consists of a somewhat complex set of programs, with generally adequate, but sometimes confusing and dissimilar procedures and requirements. The shortcomings and problems (existing and potential) discussed above are not cited to condemn the

security assistance programs as they have developed, but to provide an improved basis for coherent and comprehensive policy formulation and implementation. Certainly the international system's changing requirements and the diverse United States interests to be considered necessitate comprehensive program reviews on a regular basis.

Successful formulation and implementation of arms transfer programs therefore require the coordination and/or support of a number of governmental and nongovernmental groups with specific parochial interests. The leadership in these groups must maintain an awareness of national interests and objectives. Particularly the top governmental leaders must frame their perspective around both long- and short-term foreign policy objectives, insuring broad considerations and adequate coordination.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Chapters II, III, and IV respectively have examined Third World arms transfers as a developing phenomenon, as they relate to United States foreign policy objectives, and finally as a program formulation and implementation process.[1] From all three perspectives it is apparent that explaining the Third World arms trade is not a simple process of isolating a few quantifiable variables. Yet the absence of neat statistical explanations need not preclude significant policy analysis. This chapter, drawing upon the previous chapters, establishes organization, program, and policy guidelines.

The Third World arms transfer patterns and processes have experienced some significant changes during the postwar period (reference Chapter II). The system has grown under the domination of the two postwar superpowers--the United States and the USSR (reference Tables 2, 3, and 4). The "cold war" rivalry was no doubt an important factor, but there are other variables which must be considered in explaining the patterns of arms transfers. Regional

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[1]Generally utilizing the systemic, strategic, and political perspectives.

conflicts and increased tensions are reflected in regional arms importing patterns (reference Table 8). The postwar demise of the European colonial empires either created or gave new sovereignty to a majority of the Third World nation states of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

The decision by the USSR in 1955 to supply weapons to these emerging "non-communist" states (initially Egypt) certainly added a new dimension to the arms trade and terminated the real value of the Tripartite- (U.S., U.K., France) type agreements. Certainly the total arms transfers since 1955 have accelerated significantly under U.S.-USSR domination (reference Tables 1 and 2), but a large number of other European and Asian nations and even Third World states have been significantly active arms suppliers (reference Table 2).

Additionally, changing procurement patterns in the postwar period have been particularly significant in the development of the Third World arms transfers. First, the predominance of sole source supplier-recipient relationships has broken down during this period (reference discussion under proposition 2). Not only have Third World nations sought alternative sources of supply, but there has also been an increasing tendency to establish cross-bloc supplier relationships. Second, there has been a growth in arms "sales" as compared to military "aid" as many Third World states have obtained the economic ability to purchase the most sophisticated weapons the technologically developed

world has to offer. These changes have significantly decreased the control and even the leverage available to the suppliers--including the U.S. and USSR who remain in a competitive power struggle. Third, there has been a growing trend toward the transfer of more modern and sophisticated weapons (reference Tables 10 and 11).

In this environment, United States' attempts to impose unilateral restraints have had only limited success, and have even been counter-productive (reference discussion under proposition 5). Ultimately, the control and moderation of Third World arms transfers will require some agreement and coordination among all the major suppliers, but also some change in perspective and priorities among many of the recipient nations.

From the rational-strategic perspective (Chapter III), the objectives and considerations pertinent in justifying and evaluating Third World arms transfers do not lend themselves to quantitative measurements. Probably even more significant from a goal-oriented policy program formulation perspective are: (1) the potential and existing incompatibilities in the achievement of many desired objectives; and (2) the subsequent difficulty of integrating these factors into a standard formula that accommodates or at least properly considers all these objectives (let alone the subsequent difficulty in implementing specific programs). The "balance of payments" and the other economic considerations generally lend themselves to precise measurements and

statistical evaluations, but the strategic and political considerations which are the more important considerations of arms transfers as a foreign policy program cannot yet be measured with such precision (see discussion under proposition 19).

Yet, the analysis demonstrated that there does exist a rather definitive set of foreign policy objectives associated with arms transfers (reference Table 14).[2] The establishment of a specific set of program objectives, even if their attainment cannot be fully measured by precise statistics, still provides a basis for evaluating the coherence of arms transfer policy.

Examining the thirteen specific program objectives, it became apparent that the arms transfer program has the potential to facilitate both positive and negative effects relative to United States national interest objectives. That is, all the individual objectives taken individually are positive goals, but they also have the potential to produce undesirable results if objectives are improperly "freight-trained," overemphasized, or otherwise improperly applied. Although the policy-making apparatus can never have perfectly rational knowledge of all effects, it is still important and possible that all these effects be considered.

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[2]This is not proposed as the only possible list or even the best list, but it is proposed as the type of list required to objectively evaluate arms transfer programs in a coherent and comprehensive manner.

Finally, from a bureaucratic processes perspective (Chapter IV), it is apparent that United States arms transfer policy formulation is a complex process with many significant parochial interests and organizational procedures that can significantly affect policy formulation and implementation.

The parochial interests of the various "players" certainly cause them to select and otherwise emphasize particular foreign policy objectives, while deemphasizing or even excluding other considerations. Additionally, domestic and bureaucratic interests, unrelated or even detrimental to foreign policy objectives, may become important factors.

Having acknowledged the importance of the bureaucratic processes in policy formulation and implementation, it is important to state that arms transfer programs cannot be fully explained simply as organizational "outputs" and/or bureaucratic "outcomes." There is significant evidence reflecting changing arms transfer patterns linked to strategic, economic, and political considerations associated with external factors (e.g., the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, etc.). It is important to maintain an awareness of how parochial interests can substantially modify and even potentially pervert program objectives, but it is even more important to initially examine and evaluate program objectives before attempting to define policy explanations as outputs and outcomes.

The remainder of the chapter will discuss a series of propositions associated with organizational, program, and policy guidelines. Drawing upon the analysis of the previous chapters, a series of normative-prescriptive guidelines are offered. The guidelines offered here are not a detailed program manual or set of directives--obviously not the intent of this study. Yet the guidelines are specific enough to form a framework upon which to formulate specific organizational procedures.

Organizational Guidelines

Recommendation 1: The organizational apparatus responsible for coordinating and controlling arms transfer policy and programs must be established with specific responsibilities and delegated authority evolving from the President and/or his immediate advisors.

Recommendation 1A: The responsibility for security assistance policy should remain within the Department of State, with clear and specific designation of internal responsibilities.

Recommendation 1B: The Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance office should be eliminated or provided with adequate staff expertise to make and coordinate policy.

Recommendation 1C: The Arms Export Control Board (which replaced the SAPRC) needs to become and/or remain involved in security assistance policy formulation as well as review.

Recommendation 1D: Congress needs to define its "limit-setting" role based upon clearly defined objectives.

The position of Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance was established in 1972. During the intervening five-year period, this office has just not assumed and/or been assigned the necessary authority to coordinate security assistance programs. A report noting that President Carter "will personally rule on major arms sales" also reported ". . . he will delegate more authority to Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance Lucy W. Benson."[3]

It seems reasonable that the President must utilize this position or specifically assign authority and responsibility for coordination to another office, such as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs or the Director of Politico-Military Affairs. As Pranger and Tahtinen noted in the study on military assistance: "Policy control problems are the result of not assigning control responsibilities in the first place or of neglecting those already established."[4] It seems reasonable to assume that politico-military affairs, regional bureaus (in State), along with Defense will continue to generate and administer

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[3]Cecil Brownlow, "Export Curb, NATO Goal Clash," Aviation Week and Space Digest (May 30, 1977), 13.

[4]Pranger and Tahtinen, Toward A Realistic Military Assistance Program, p. 45.

specific programs, but centralized coordination responsibility must become more clear cut.

A portion of centralized coordination and direction is the requirement for inputs and coordination of all the pertinent government agencies. Whether it is a beefed-up Arms Export Control Board or a new Conventional Arms Transfer Review Board,[5] there does appear to be a need for a more definitive interagency coordination group.

It is apparent that Congress has assumed a greater interest and more active role in arms transfer programs (reference discussion under proposition 27). Congress has acquired the staffs and resources to study, question, and evaluate program recommendations--even establish policy guidelines. Fulfillment of this responsibility would not necessarily be facilitated by a reorganized and/or expanded staff. Ultimately it is better mutual understanding and evaluation of objectives that counts. As such, key congressional committees must fulfill their "limit-setting" role by not only requiring specific justifications from the executive branch, but also by keeping national interests and their own regional interests in proper perspective. Just as they must objectively question proposed transfers, they must also not frustrate the executive agencies in their efforts to terminate weapons programs felt to be excessive and/or nonessential.

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[5]See Crocker et al., Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and Procedures, p. 42.

The government structure should be organized (and subsequently reorganized) to best accommodate functional requirements, but policies are not necessarily improved by emphasis on reorganization schemes (i.e., those discussed above, moving ACDA out of the State Department, eliminating MAAGs, etc.). To the extent that programs are not properly coordinated and objective-oriented, there should probably be more concern that responsibilities are not clearly assigned and objectives may not be clearly defined. Ultimately substance must predominate over form.[6]

Program Guidelines

Recommendation 2: The formulation and implementation of coherent and comprehensible arms transfer programs requires the specific identification and coordinated consideration of all pertinent foreign policy objectives.

Recommendation 2A: Pursuit of its national interests requires that the United States define security assistance program objectives in clear and specific terms.[7]

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[6]The Carter administration in August 1977 replaced SAPRC with the Arms Export Control Board, headed by the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (Ms. Benson) with the Director of Politico-Military Affairs (Mr. Gelb) as deputy chairman and five standing subcommittees headed by various offices from State, DOD, and ACDA (see "New Policy Review Board Set Up," Armed Forces Journal International [August 1977], 22). It appears that this reorganization will improve coordination and policy review, but there is still some question as to who is responsible for policy and program formulation.

[7]See Pranger and Tahtinen, Toward A Realistic Military Assistance Program, p. 9, for a similar recommendation.

Recommendation 2B: Making the objectives of specific programs clear to the Congress and the implementing bureaucracy provides a basis for program "management by objectives."[8]

Recommendation 2C: Military items, both goods and/or technology (as reflected on the "Munitions List"), should be transferred on a government-to-government basis.[9]

Recommendations 2A and 2B do not call for a reorganization or even necessarily a major reorientation of arms transfers. Again, they primarily call for greater definition and coordination of objectives. To moderate or otherwise control parochial interests, the national interest objectives must be clearly articulated and understood "within the national security bureaucracy."

The United States may be interested in obtaining base rights, creating regional defense self-sufficiency, or even just maintaining a friendly relationship. These are legitimate objectives for the United States. The important thing is that the rationale be appropriate for and compatible with that particular recipient country's security needs (even if some are a little more perceived than real) and not detrimental to United States interests. Clear and

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[8]See Leslie H. Gelb, "Arms Sales," p. 21, for a similar recommendation.

[9]See Crocker et al., Conventional Arms Transfer Policies and Procedures, p. 41, for a similar recommendation.

candid rationales provide the specificity required to properly administer and ultimately evaluate programs.

What must be avoided is blanket rhetorical justifications, such as "it's in our national interest." Such rationales have a tendency to subordinate national interests to parochial interests. Weapons proposals must be formulated, evaluated, coordinated, and administered in relation to specific goals from the point of initial consideration to the delivery and even future maintenance of the equipment. Again the cited objectives must be specific and appropriate to specific program proposals, not eclectic "freight-training" of rationales to justify business as usual routines.

Recommendation 2C reflects the requirement to continuously review the munitions list, but more important, it emphasizes the need for standardized government control of foreign weapons sales. Weapons sales are not just plain business (reference discussions under propositions 14 and 28).

Program administration must incorporate standardized procedures to insure consideration of all pertinent factors as they affect (and effect) United States interests. Not only must the justification for the proposed arms transfers be specific, but all pertinent considerations must be specifically addressed. As such, impact statements for each of the major program objectives should be required--noting both positive and negative impacts. Each pertinent agency

should be tasked with preparing these statements (e.g., DOD for strategic balance, regional military threats; State for human rights and political considerations; AID for recipient economic development; Treasury for balance of payments; ACDA for arms control; etc.).[10] These statements need not (and should not) be long, but they must be specific. They must not become standardized rhetoric or they become counter-productive. Documented concise justifications will provide a basis for comprehensive evaluations, decision-making, coordination, and ultimately re-evaluations and re-orientations as required.

Such a procedure cannot insure perfect information or guarantee infallible decision-making, but it can keep program objectives at the forefront in program management.

Policy Guidelines

Recommendation 3: The United States must formulate policy guidelines based upon the pursuit of specified objectives at the least cost to itself and its allies.

Recommendation 3A: Security assistance should be utilized in assisting developing states to facilitate a stable and secure environment in which to pursue economic and political development.[11]

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[10]There are existing requirements for most of these impact-type statements today, but many (particularly some of the earlier examples) need to be more specific.

[11]See Crocker et al., Conventional Arms Transfer Policies and Procedures, p. 33, for a discussion of similar recommendation.

Recommendation 3B: The United States has and must continue to employ certain unilateral restraints as to both the quality and quantity of its arms exports.[12]

Recommendation 3C: The United States must work with both arms exporters and importers in establishing meaningful arms control agreements (even if workable agreements with specific language about the lethality and sophistication of weapons, offensive versus defensive, etc. are "easier to advocate than apply").[13]

The importance of recommendation 3A is that arms transfer guidelines must be formulated for positive reasons--emphasizing the objectives of the program. Recalling the thirteen objectives (reference Table 14), there were positive strategic, economic, and political outcomes associated with security assistance.

It is also important to recall that more plentiful transfers of more advanced weapons were not necessarily the best strategy for furthering United States policy objectives. So qualitative and quantitative restrictions (recommendation 3B) are, have been, and ought to be a critical part of United States arms transfer policy in practice. Neither the United States nor the USSR have exported ICBMs or nuclear submarines to the Third World, but more significant has been the United States' apparent

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[12]See UNA of the USA, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race, p. 65, for a similar recommendation.

[13]See discussion by Leslie Gelb, "Arms Transfers," p. 4.

restraint in transferring medium jet bombers (in spite of Soviet exports of Badgers to Asia and the Middle East) and delaying transfers of many other advanced weapons.

Yet, what must be avoided is overly paternalistic restrictions. The restrictions in military transfers to Latin America in the 1960s reflect the potential problems. Not only were they ultimately counter-productive in that they ultimately led to greater purchases of European and even Soviet aircraft, but they were perceived as paternalistic discrimination against one particular group of nations (which had a long historical friendship with the United States, at that). The effect of the restriction on weapons exports to Latin America certainly has caused difficulties in U.S.-Latin American relationships. Yet this concern for the current difficulties in U.S.-Latin American relations may ultimately be rectified in the long-term outcome to the benefit of both the United States and the peoples of Latin America.[14] That is, there are risks in denying weapons transfers, but there are also risks in allowing excessive weapons transfers (reference Chapter III). Subsequently, it follows there are potential U.S. benefits in denying particular weapons transfers just as there are significant benefits in allowing, or even encouraging, some selected weapons transfers.

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[14]Certainly the "human rights" and economic well-being of peoples must be included (even if not always the overriding considerations) in our foreign policy formulations.

Arms transfer policies are marked by multiple considerations and pose dilemmas requiring significant "trade-offs." Ultimately arms transfer decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis; yet the U.S. government must formulate and implement programs based upon a comprehensive and comprehensible set of policy guidelines. No comprehensive cause-effect equation as to when increased, decreased, and/or terminated arms transfers, under a given circumstance, will facilitate given objectives (e.g., improving human rights) has yet been developed, nor is it probable that such a comprehensive equation is on the horizon. Yet this handicap need not (and generally has not) preclude the United States from formulation of meaningful policy guidelines.

Setting total program limitations based upon a monetary figure appears to be one of the most obvious and reasonable guidelines, but it presents potential difficulties. There is always the possibility of a very legitimate request for small arms having to be denied after the maximum allowable figure is reached. Still, ceilings are a viable tool for insuring moderation, critical evaluations, and comprehensive program planning. Such dollar volume ceilings, therefore, if used as guidelines, can be a useful management device. But they must not become the primary program measure (either as an arbitrary maximum or a quota that must be filled). President Carter's administration is reportedly approaching the quantitative restrictions thusly:

"The dollar volume (in constant Fiscal 1976 dollars) of new commitments . . . in Fiscal 1978 will be reduced from the Fiscal 1977 total."[15]

On the qualitative side, there has been a significant acceleration in the export of new weapons to the Third World (reference Tables 11 and 13). This trend is regrettable, not only because such transfers appear to be of very questionable benefit to United States military and strategic position, but they also appear not to be the type of weapons that will best fulfill most Third World security requirements. For example, in the area of fighter aircraft the F-14s, 15s, and 16s may be much more advanced and prestigious, but aircraft such as the F-5 or even the A-37 are much less expensive, easier to maintain, and consequently may be a much more efficient means of obtaining self-sufficiency and regional security. President Carter's reported qualitative restrictions include: coproduction restrictions; restrictions against sale prior to operational deployment in the U.S.; "The U.S. will not be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly developed, advanced weapon systems which would create a new or significantly higher combat capability"; and "Development or significant modification of advanced weapon systems solely for export will not be permitted."[16] As policy guidelines,

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[15]"Carter Sets Arms Export Ground Rules," Aviation Week and Space Technology (May 23, 1977), 17.

[16]Ibid.

these appear sound.[17] These guidelines may face a critical test in the future disposition of the F-18 aircraft (proposed to be dropped by Navy/DOD, being designed with an export version by Northrup; and recently retained in the budget because of congressional pressure). Although President Carter has denied thus far proposed sales to Iran, export discussions on this land-based aircraft which the U.S. military does not plan to purchase have been authorized for Canada, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, France, Australia, and Japan.[18]

While setting operational policy guidelines, the United States should also pursue specific multilateral restraints (recommendation 3C). It is clear from the analysis that Third World arms transfers cannot be unilaterally controlled by the United States--nor even by the United States and its allies. Not only have the USSR and China become more active suppliers, but so have the Third World states themselves, as they have accumulated more weapons and/or resources to produce more weapons.

Ultimately the solution to moderating the spread of modern conventional weapons must include the recipients,

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[17]With the possible exception of some exports to Iran and Israel, all these guidelines were generally applicable to most U.S. arms transfers to the Third World throughout the postwar period (except to NATO, Australia, or when U.S. troops were engaged in combat).

[18]Cecil Brownlow, "White House Authorizes F-18L Export Discussions," Aviation Week and Space Technology (June 27, 1977), 22.

but in the meantime the United States should pursue multilateral limitation agreements among the major supplying nations. Most important is the need for specific workable agreements. These agreements will not be easy to negotiate, but they certainly have the potential for significant long-range benefits. United States policy must, therefore, pursue a two-track process. Foreign security assistance programs must emphasize management by specific objectives, while seeking meaningful multilateral limitations on the spread of armaments--particularly the more advanced sophisticated weapons.

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APPENDIX A

Values of arms trade

Values of exports of major weapons to regions listed in table 6F.1: by supplier, 1950–75[a]

Country	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
USA	91	109	103	73	285	305	330	346	381	249	545	300
USSR	25	43	28	176	9	66	148	256	196	111	165	391
UK	96	64	46	165	166	175	198	180	358	183	196	185
France	3	3	1	41	70	70	123	70	131	49	37	38
Canada	14	4	1	•	–	1	39	4	5	62	11	16
China	23	23	–	–	–	–	–	5	231	133	125	–
Czechoslovakia	–	–	–	–	–	43	58	6	23	58	45	5
FR Germany	•	•	–	1	4	7	9	5	7	26	23	5
Italy	7	29	–	2	–	2	31	29	28	•	7	–
Japan	–	–	–	1	15	–	9	11	23	12	–	11
Netherlands	35	14	6	2	1	85	1	2	1	4	1	2
Sweden	•	1	16	5	6	6	6	–	37	•	1	•
Other indus. West	–	–	–	7	•	5	•	–	–	–	1	2
Other indus. East	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	•	29	24	•	–
Third world	–	–	–	15	1	1	3	5	11	2	3	2
Total[b] (incl Viet-Nam)	294	289	201	488	556	765	957	919	1 461	920	1 159	957

[a] The values include licensed production.
[b] Items may not add up to totals owing to rounding.
• < $1 mn.

Source: SIPRI worksheets. Information on individual countries and arms transactions is available on request.

Values of arms trade

US $ mn. at constant (1973) prices

1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
281	393	284	413	393	367	576	954	962	916	958	885	1 200	1 769
786	329	287	408	608	1 013	892	870	836	1 085	726	1 542	1 540	1 652
95	135	137	203	148	155	225	266	142	300	283	242	481	503
92	148	105	74	107	52	220	131	156	211	269	411	357	477
2	10	9	14	9	9	36	14	28	42	30	3	•	5
–	–	39	7	36	13	4	7	17	81	120	21	80	48
5	12	7	3	6	9	30	17	24	11	10	1	11	5
2	10	20	10	64	3	8	13	1	19	37	2	101	118
•	15	15	5	1	16	51	41	33	32	39	4	106	65
18	1	1	5	9	23	38	2	•	•	–	–	2	–
2	•	9	17	1	–	4	19	7	26	20	30	25	32
–	–	–	–	1	–	–	•	–	–	4	1	5	16
1	2	•	23	18	45	6	8	3	37	10	16	9	10
8	•	–	•	–	1	–	1	–	4	–	13	–	2
8	3	2	3	19	12	7	16	6	11	14	16	211	141
1 302	1 058	914	1 192	1 553	1 885	2 059	2 126	2 247	2 835	2 673	2 909	4 070	4 843

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1976.

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APPENDIX B

Values of arms trade

Values of imports of major weapons by third world countries: by region, 1950–75[a]

Region		1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
Far East (excl Viet-Nam)	A	147	152	57	209	174	222	227	211	506	346	583	153
	B[c]	–	–	148	163	178	209	268	312	385	370	382	328
South Asia	A	44	20	19	92	104	108	176	254	488	148	205	221
	B	–	–	56	69	100	147	226	235	254	263	241	178
Middle East	A	35	55	12	70	81	186	350	300	249	238	123	150
	B	–	–	51	81	140	197	233	265	252	212	240	250
North Africa	A	–	–	–	–	–	–	6	5	4	6	9	12
	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6	7	12	17
Sub-Saharan Africa	A	–	5	4	16	18	12	1	1	3	46	27	43
	B	–	–	–	11	10	10	7	13	16	24	31	38
South Africa	A	8	–	16	15	17	15	54	22	18	17	4	3
	B	–	–	11	13	23	25	25	25	23	13	11	31
Central America	A	6	5	27	12	10	18	15	6	11	14	45	162
	B	–	–	12	14	16	12	12	13	18	48	92	105
South America	A	54	52	35	73	144	195	118	112	134	45	139	156
	B	–	–	92	100	113	128	141	121	110	117	111	96
Total (excl Viet-Nam)	A	294	289	201	488	547	755	947	912	1 413	911	1 135	900
	B	–	–	364	456	588	730	915	988	1 064	1 054	1 121	1 041
Viet-Nam	A	–	–	–	–	9	9	11	7	48	9	24	56
	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	17	17	20	29	39	38
Total[b]	A	294	289	201	488	556	765	957	919	1 461	920	1 159	957
	B	–	–	366	460	593	737	932	1 004	1 083	1 083	1 160	1 079

[a] The values include licensed production.
[b] Items may not add up to totals because of rounding. Figures are rounded to nearest 10.
[c] Five-year moving averages are calculated from the year arms imports began, as a more stable measure of the trend in arms imports than the often erratic year-to-year figures.

Source: SIPRI worksheets. Information on individual countries and arms transactions is available on request.

US $ mn. at constant (1973) prices. A = yearly figures. B = five-year moving averages

1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	Total[b]
272	237	300	260	380	152	203	448	207	320	124	231	190	489	6 850
309	244	290	286	259	289	278	266	260	266	214	270	–	–	–
144	169	61	163	299	207	227	239	229	381	313	221	285	136	4 953
160	152	167	180	192	228	241	257	278	277	286	267	–	–	–
439	301	296	337	336	813	962	927	1 118	1 350	831	1 704	2 260	2 696	16 219
262	305	342	417	549	675	831	1 033	1 035	1 181	1 437	1 753	–	–	–
30	26	30	62	93	103	64	67	92	94	128	111	174	582	1 698
21	32	48	63	70	78	84	84	89	98	120	218	–	–	–
36	36	52	72	71	62	42	55	95	102	68	142	299	177	1 481
39	48	53	59	60	60	65	71	72	87	135	148	–	–	–
12	118	39	142	70	60	34	35	59	53	28	28	210	137	1 213
35	63	76	86	69	68	52	48	40	39	74	90	–	–	–
228	74	26	14	16	13	6	8	4	36	27	43	90	105	1 035
107	101	72	29	15	11	9	13	16	24	35	55	–	–	–
83	55	39	84	106	98	159	121	113	170	237	367	406	482	3 777
94	83	73	76	97	114	119	132	160	182	226	300	–	–	–
1 245	1 015	844	1 135	1 372	1 507	1 697	1 898	1 916	2 502	1 738	2 711	3 769	4 788	37 281
1 028	1 028	1 122	1 175	1 311	1 522	1 678	1 877	1 923	2 126	2 500	3 074	–	–	–
57	43	70	57	181	378	362	228	331	333	917	63	142	15	3 350
50	57	82	146	210	241	296	326	434	374	357	294	–	–	–
1 302	1 058	914	1 192	1 553	1 885	2 059	2 126	2 247	2 835	2 673	2 909	4 070	4 843	48 632
1 078	1 085	1 284	1 320	1 521	1 763	1 974	2 230	2 385	2 527	2 884	3 395	–	–	–

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1976.

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APPENDIX C

ARMS TRANSFERS BY GROUP AND REGION BY YEAR
(Millions of dollars)

YEAR	EXPORTS		IMPORTS	
	Current dollars	Constant dollars	Current dollars	Constant dollars
WORLD TOTALS[a]				
1965	3815	5315	3815	5315
1966	4455	6310	4455	6310
1967	5055	6630	5054	6630
1968	5305	6690	5304	6690
1969	5850	7040	5850	7040
1970	5855	6680	5855	6680
1971	6355	6940	6355	6940
1972	8725	9210	8725	9210
1973	9555	9555	9555	9555
1974	9230	8365	9230	8365
DEVELOPED				
1965	3581	4986	1677	2336
1966	4458	6039	1468	1985
1967	4859	6340	1648	2163
1968	5116	6455	1644	2062
1969	5676	6833	1953	2352
1970	5624	6423	1662	1898
1971	6080	6639	1655	1807
1972	8258	8725	2072	2189
1973	9238	9238	1899	1899
1974	8765	7948	2600	2357
DEVELOPING				
1965	235	328	2139	2978
1966	205	275	3192	4327
1967	196	258	3406	4470
1968	194	244	3673	4633
1969	175	211	3898	4686
1970	230	263	4196	4793
1971	281	307	4712	5145
1972	459	484	6650	7018
1973	317	317	8054	8054
1974	463	420	6629	6011
OTHER EUROPEAN				
1965	126	176	151	210
1966	49	66	187	185
1967	6	8	195	255
1968	31	39	149	213
1969	14	17	119	143
1970	24	28	167	191
1971	84	92	189	206
1972	96	101	307	324
1973	70	70	193	193
1974	91	82	223	202

YEAR	EXPORTS		IMPORTS	
	Current dollars	Constant dollars	Current dollars	Constant dollars
NATO EUROPE				
1965	390	543	629	874
1966	515	697	700	949
1967	285	374	812	1066
1968	501	632	967	1221
1969	574	691	1234	1485
1970	509	581	1016	1160
1971	518	565	1224	1334
1972	1221	1289	1242	1312
1973	1092	1092	868	868
1974	1466	1330	1275	1156
NEAR EAST				
1965	6	8	285	397
1966	3	4	314	426
1967	8	10	556	729
1968	13	16	628	787
1969	12	14	825	993
1970	6	7	1252	1480
1971	2	2	1174	1284
1972	11	12	1368	1444
1973	31	31	4068	4068
1974	80	72	2998	2717
AFRICA				
1965	0	0	182	253
1966	0	0	227	308
1967	5	7	139	182
1968	0	0	122	154
1969	2	2	139	167
1970	0	0	224	257
1971	1	1	265	290
1972	4	4	386	408
1973	0	0	341	341
1974	2	2	476	384
EUROPE				
1965	2138	2972	1594	2222
1966	2563	3445	1548	2093
1967	2561	3361	1739	2282
1968	2335	2950	1737	2192
1969	1973	2378	1974	2374
1970	2332	2665	1804	2060
1971	2525	2758	2014	2221
1972	3980	4207	2578	2722
1973	4172	4172	1566	1566
1974	4531	4111	2818	2555

a) Totals do not add due to rounding.

Source: U.S. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1965-1974, p. 54.

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APPENDIX D

Postwar Donor-Recipient Patterns (to 1968), by Suppliers

Supplier	United States	United Kingdom	France	USSR
Sole	Bolivia Nicaragua South Korea Liberia	Malawi Gambia Abu Dhabi Bahrain Muscat and Oman	Togo Upper Volta Senegal Gabon Chad Central African Republic	Afghan Guinea Yemen China
Predominant (multiple-bloc pattern)	Colombia Argentina Brazil Chile Peru Dominican Republic Panama Rwanda Thailand Philippines South Vietnam All NATO Japan New Zealand Australia Spain	Rhodesia Zambia Kenya Kuwait	Dahomey Cameroon Niger Malagasy	North Korea North Vietnam Mali All Warsaw Pact
Predominant (cross-bloc pattern)	Iran Ethiopia	Ceylon	None	Cuba Iraq Syria UAR Algeria Cyprus Somalia
Multiple Supplier (within West bloc)		Multiple Supplier (within Soviet bloc)	Multiple Supplier (cross-bloc)	
Venezuela Israel Jordan Lebanon Saudi Arabia Tunisia Zaire South Africa Ivory Coast Singapore Sweden Switzerland	None		Pakistan Indonesia Cambodia Morocco Mauritania Tanzania Yugoslavia Nigeria Ghana Uganda	Burma India Laos South Yemen Libya Congo Sudan Finland

Source: Robert Harkavy, The Arms Trade and the International System, p. 116.

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APPENDIX E

MILITARY AND SOCIAL TRENDS

World, Developed,[1] and Developing[2] Countries, 1960-1974

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
GNP															
billion US $															
World	1,507	1,588	1,695	1,746	1,895	2,149	2,324	2,478	2,660	2,844	3,251	3,587	4,045	4,832	5,472
Developed	1,227	1,309	1,401	1,421	1,542	1,761	1,916	2,049	2,226	2,429	2,671	2,946	3,325	3,976	4,390
Developing	280	279	294	325	353	388	408	429	454	515	580	641	720	856	1,082
billion 1973 US $															
World	2,542	2,627	2,770	2,901	3,085	3,256	3,441	3,572	3,790	3,978	4,159	4,325	4,529	4,832	4,817
Developed	2,109	2,169	2,318	2,417	2,568	2,711	2,866	2,961	3,172	3,312	3,439	3,562	3,730	3,976	4,014
Developing	433	458	452	484	517	545	575	591	618	666	720	763	799	856	903
GNP per capita															
US $															
World	508	526	551	553	590	636	696	729	773	824	904	979	1,084	1,271	1,414
Developed	1,400	1,472	1,557	1,585	1,671	1,887	2,032	2,155	2,319	2,507	2,737	2,991	3,345	3,968	4,337
Developing	134	131	135	146	154	168	170	175	181	201	221	239	263	306	382
(1973 US $															
World	857	870	900	920	960	994	1,030	1,050	1,094	1,127	1,157	1,180	1,214	1,271	1,270
Developed	2,408	2,464	2,576	2,644	2,782	2,906	3,039	3,135	3,304	3,418	3,524	3,618	3,753	3,968	3,974
Developing	207	206	208	218	226	233	240	241	247	260	275	285	292	306	315
Population															
millions															
World	2,965	3,019	3,078	3,155	3,214	3,275	3,339	3,401	3,466	3,531	3,598	3,664	3,732	3,802	3,871
Developed	876	888	900	914	923	933	943	951	960	969	976	985	994	1,002	1,010
Developing	2,089	2,130	2,178	2,241	2,291	2,342	2,396	2,450	2,506	2,562	2,622	2,679	2,738	2,800	2,861
Foreign Economic Aid															
billion US $															
World	5.4	6.0	6.2	6.6	6.8	6.7	7.1	7.6	7.7	8.4	8.8	9.6	10.7	11.5	15.2
Developed	5.3	5.8	6.0	6.4	6.6	6.5	6.8	7.5	7.5	8.1	8.0	8.6	9.6	10.4	12.3
Developing	.1	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.3	.3	.2	.3	.8	1.0	1.1	1.1	2.9
Military Expenditures															
billion US $															
World	107	114	126	132	132	138	155	173	187	196	202	209	224	244	270
Developed	97	104	114	119	118	121	137	154	166	173	175	178	190	207	222
Developing	10	10	11	13	14	17	18	19	21	23	27	31	34	37	48
billion 1973 US $															
World	169	177	192	200	196	197	214	237	247	250	242	235	243	244	242
Developed	154	161	175	180	176	176	191	211	220	221	210	203	208	207	203
Developing	15	16	17	20	20	21	23	26	27	29	32	35	37	37	39
Armed Forces															
Thousands															
World	18,580	18,960	19,525	19,441	19,771	19,525	19,883	20,640	21,404	21,618	21,462	21,672	21,266	21,586	21,899
Developed	8,851	10,056	10,400	10,018	9,981	9,811	10,132	10,503	10,600	10,628	10,139	9,839	9,553	9,506	9,566
Developing	8,699	8,904	9,125	9,423	9,790	9,714	9,751	10,337	10,804	10,990	11,323	11,833	11,813	12,080	12,332
Physicians															
Thousands															
World	1,669	1,723	1,780	1,838	1,912	1,977	2,039	2,145	2,178	2,253	2,330	2,399	2,504	2,606	2,700[4]
Developed	1,227	1,265	1,303	1,342	1,396	1,428	1,473	1,564	1,564	1,610	1,670	1,711	1,787	1,862	1,920[4]
Developing	442	458	477	494	517	549	566	581	611	643	660	688	717	744	780[4]
Teachers															
Thousands															
World	14,569	15,139	15,917	16,716	17,676	18,614	19,321	20,121	20,999	21,924	22,808	23,726	24,651	25,790	27,000[4]
Developed	6,695	6,933	7,176	7,460	7,739	8,028	8,206	8,394	8,683	8,883	8,909	9,164	9,403	9,624	9,900[4]
Developing	7,874	8,206	8,741	9,256	9,937	10,586	11,115	11,727	12,316	13,041	13,899	14,562	15,248	16,166	17,100[4]

1. Developed countries, 28 in number, are those identified by an asterisk in Tables II and III. They include the countries found in North America, most of Europe, Oceania, Israel, and Japan.
2. Developing countries, 104 in number, are the countries listed in Latin America, seven in Europe (Albania, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia), Asia except Israel and Japan, all of Africa.
3. Values expressed in 1973 prices and converted to dollars at 1973 exchange rates.
4. Projected.

Source: Ruth Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1976, p. 20.

APPENDIX F

1. Purposes of Security Assistance

Since World War II, the United States has been assisting friendly foreign countries in establishing and maintaining adequate defensive postures, consistent with their economic stability and growth, to maintain internal security and resist external aggression. Its reason for furnishing such assistance is based upon the tenet that the security and economic well-being of friendly foreign countries is essential to the security of the United States. This principle is inherent to the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and more recently, the Nixon Doctrine. Assistance is rendered in a variety of ways, including the provision through sale or grant of defense articles and services, and the making of financial and commodity grants.

Source: Military Assistance and Sales Manual (DOD 5105.38M), Part I, p. A-1 (dated 15 January 1977).

APPENDIX G

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



* A separate agency with the director reporting directly to the Secretary and serving as principal adviser to the Secretary and the President on Arms Control and Disarmament.

JUNE 1975

Source: 1976 U.S. Department of State phone directory.

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