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
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31 May 1978

THE FUTURE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS SYSTEM IN JAPAN

by

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International Fellow - Japan

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The objective of this study is to develop the impact of changing trends in political, social, financial and technological environments on the future Reserve Components System of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) in

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ITEM 20. ABSTRACT (Continued)

order to recommend some alternative courses of action to improve the current GSDF reserve system. This essay concludes that a new role for the reserve components, besides the traditional role in a post-mobilization phase, is necessary to lighten the heavy burden on active components in peacetime and that a new approach to manpower acquisition will be required to meet the challenges of Japan's complex social structure. Additionally, it argues that some other improvements relative to Active/Reserve mix ratio, affiliation programs and mobilization authority will be necessary to increase readiness in the Total Force structure.

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(6) THE FUTURE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS SYSTEM IN JAPAN

by

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LIMITS ON SCOPE

The concepts presented in this essay are applicable to the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force reserve components, but may not apply to other services or other country's reserve components systems. Additionally, while they may be valid under peacetime conditions in fully developed democratic nations, they may not hold true for other social systems. The data used in this essay were obtained from previous studies and not originally collected or analyzed by the author.

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INTRODUCTION

Generally speaking, the mission of the GSDF reserve components system is to provide trained units and qualified individuals for active duty in the armed force in time of war or national emergency, and at such other time as national security requires. While this has been the traditional mission of the GSDF reserve components system, that mission has been under more continuous pressure to change than ever before in our history. This pressure has many causes: unstable political arrangements, tighter economic/financial conditions, more complex and diverse social structures, and dynamic changes in military technology,among others.

The mission and utilization of a nation's military force is determined by its history and environment. As the Reserve Components System does not exist by itself but in interaction with the Active Components System under the Total Force concept, environmental conditions will impact not only on the Active Components System but on the Reserve Components System as well. The Reserve Components System, as part of the national security structure, has already been changed to keep up with the times, and will require continual attention to meet the many challenges of the future. Improvement of the Reserve Components System, in my opinion, can be one of the most effective ways to maintain and improve the military force in the future.

While there are many environmental factors which impact on the military force, the political, social, financial and technological environments must be considered the primary ones. It is important, then, to assess the changing trends of these environmental factors in the foreseeable future and to develop the impact they will have on the Reserve Components.

The Reserve Components System consists of many subsystems such as role/mission, force structure, readiness and mobilization. Figure-1 shows a general description of the Reserve Components System developed in this study.



Figure-1 Reserve Components System

By incorporating the impact of the key environmental factors on each of these subsystems, I hope to identify some alternative courses of action to achieve and maintain an effective Reserve Components System.

The approach of this study will be to assess the environmental changes surrounding the national defense structure and identify the impact of these changes on the Active and Reserve Components Systems. Additionally, since in my opinion the Reseve Components System of the US Army is one of the best organized in the free world, I shall compare it with the current situation and future requirements of the GSDF reserve. Hopefully, this approach will develop some alternative courses of action to improve the current GSDF reserve system.

I NEW MILITARY SYSTEM IN JAPAN UNDER CHANGING ENVIRONMENTS

The Japanese Imperial military system was disestablished by the occupation policy of the Allied Powers in 1945 at the end of World War II. When the Korean War broke out and US armed forces were rushed to the Korean peninsula in 1950, Japan was still under this occupation rule. General MacArther, who had just been appointed the supreme commander of the United Nations Forces, and the Japanese government decided to establish a 75,000-man National Police Reserve(NPR) to reinforce the police force with the task of preserving domestic order. This was the birth of a new military system in Japan.

In 1951, the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Japan-US Mutual Co-operation and Security Treaty were sighed. In 1952, the NPR was renamed the National Security Force and the Coastal Security Force was organized. The Defense Agency as we know it today was instituted in 1954 with the forces under its command reorganized as the Ground Self-Defense Force(GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force(MSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Force(ASDF).

The basic policies for national defense were adopted in 1957 and the First Defense Buildup Plan was launched in 1958.[1] The defense force buildup program had been carried out through a series of plans: the First Defense Buildup Plan(1958-1960), the Second Defense Buildup Plan(1962-1966), and the Third Defense Buildup Plan(1967-1971). The programs

under these plans were satisfactorily implemented on schedule in spite of the lack of national concensus on security issues. During this period, the basic framework of the new military system in Japan was established.

International structure

The international structure during the 1950's was characterized by East-West confrontation and called "The Cold War structure". In the 1960's, Sino-Soviet conflict increased in visibility but the international structure, specifically in Northeast Asia, remained one of "The Bipolar structure", because US-Sino relation was not improved through the Vietnam War. Development of Japanese defense capability in this period depended on the stability of the conservative party in power, and on the high rate of economic growth under the political, economic and military umbrella provided by the United States.

In early 1970's, a new international structure called "The Tripolar structure" was brought in Northeast Asia by a series of political and military movements such as the termination of the Vietnam War, rapprochment of US-Sino relation, drastic expansion of Soviet military capability and a steady decrease in deployed US strength in this area. Additionally, changes in the international economic environment

strongly influenced the development of our new military system during this period. The Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (1972-1976) was not satisfactorily implemented because of unanticipated economic events coming in the aftermath of "The 1973 Oil Crisis" and of the political crisis which followed.[2]

There is little possibility of the Sino-Soviet confrontation being resolved, although relations may be partially improved. However, Japan-Sino relations will be improved dramatically in the next decade by the negotiations over "The Treaty of Peace and Friendship". The friction caused by unbalanced trade with the United States and other western nations will acceralate this movement. On the other hand, because of Japan's growing relationship with China, no progress can be expected towards any agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union; that relationship will deteriorate to some extent.

The Japan-US Mutual Co-operation and Security Treaty has been one of the most important pillars of our national security and many negotiations have been held mainly through the Security Consultative Committee and Group. However, exchange of views concerning strategic and tactical co-operation on the exective -level activities have never been conducted between the two nations. The stress, however, has been the result of political and economic considerations in the treaty, not the military aspects. In order to plug

this communication gap, the Subcommittee on Defense Coeperation (SDC) was organized as a subordinate organ of the Security Consultative Committee(SCC) in 1976.[3]

Domestic political structure

Japan has an emperor, on top of a democratic institution, as the symbol of the State and the unity of the people. The Diet is the highest organ of State power and the sole legislative body. It consists of the Lower House of Representative with 511 seats and the House of Councillors with 252 seats, very similar to the Senate and House of Representatives in the United States.

The conservative, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has monopolized power in Japan for more than a quarter century, while The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) has been their major opposition party, sometimes with the help of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and other opposition parties. They represent two opposite poles in most political issues, particularly in foreign and security policies. JSP and JCP has asserted that Japan can not maintain any military forces, not even for "Self Defense" purposes, and should abolish the Japan-US Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty. The political confrontation between the ruling party and opposition parties has brought a succession of barren debate over national defense issues.

Both LDP and JSP has, however, been losing their backing of public opinion since the early 1970's. Moderate parties such as the Komeito, Democratic Socialist Party and New Liberalist Club have increased their share of seats in the Diet.[4] Election results showed that the people prefered more moderate parties to either the conservative or radical ones. The current share of seats in the Lower House of Representatives is:conservative LDP 49.9%, moderate neutral parties 21.7% and radical parties JSP & JCP 27.0% (1.4% vacant seats).

Generally speaking, the political structure in Japan has been multipolarized through the 1970's but public concern over national defense requirement has grown steadily, reflecting a series of international strains such as the 1973 oil crisis, MIG 25 incident in 1975, coastal fishing problem related to the Kurile islands seized by Soviet Union and Senkaku islands violated by PRC, withdrawthal of US ground force from Korea, and the drastic Soviet naval expansion in the Pacific.

In the next decade, the LDP will have to seek the cooperation of the other moderate neutral parties in order to conduct the day-by-day business of the Diet. More compromises will be needed in all political aspects but on the other hand, it will be relatively easier than in the 1970's

to develop national concensus on defense issues.

Economic environment

The Japanese economy, which ranks third in size after the United States and Soviet Union, now holds the comparatively high share of 7% in world trade.[5] It experienced, as did other advanced industrial nations, a prolonged and severe recession after the 1973 oil crisis. It followed a path of steady recovery supported by aggressive export push, which piled up a $ 17 billion trade surplus in 1977, after recession reached bottom in 1975.[6] However, it is confronted again with protectionist backlash in the United States and Europe, competition from other Asian economically booming nations, and with the pain of the abrupt appreciation of the Japanese "YEN".

Although Japanese labor costs are already rising well above those of Britain as measured by current exchange rates, they still lag behind those of other advanced industrial nations. On the other hand, land prices have also spiraled in recent years by increased regional development projects and the mounting demand for better residential environments.

More balanced allocation of resources between productive capability, social investment and consumption will be achieved in the next decade but it will be difficult to maintain

an increasing growth in economy. It will be an era of slow growth characterized by rising personnel costs and spiralling land prices. As far as industry development is concerned, it seems sure to move from "Resource consumption industry" such as automobile, steel and shipbuilding to "Knowledge intensive industry" such as computor and technical machinery.[7]

Social structure

In spite of efforts which have been made by the government, there is still a great diversity of opinion among the Japanese people on national security issues. This diversity is based not only on the rejection or allergy derived from the bitter experience in World War II, but on the peace and economic progress which people have been enjoying for more than 30 years since the end of the war, sheltered by the US military unbrella and flattered by the mass media which has strongly influenced public opinion. The social structure in Japan has been changing rapidly throughout this period. The major social phenomena of this period might be seen as rising individualism, diversity in measure of values, and apathy toward political issues. This tendency may be seen elswhere in the world but it is especially pronounced in Japan.

Another important change which should be pointed out is the age distribution of Japan's population during the 1970's.

There will be a 13% decrease in the productive-age population (age group 15 to 29) during the 1970's. No other nations have ever experienced such an irregular change in the distribution in only a decade.[8]

In the next decade, the problem of rising individualism, diversity in measure of values and apathy toward political issues will complicate the current social structure more and more. The distorted distribution of population will bring higher wages for a younger labor force and unemployment among older people at the same time.

Military technology

Epoch-making progress of science and technology after the World War II has largely contributed to the elevation of the welfare and quality of social life and to the miraculous development of Japan's economy. However, the development of military technology has not been enough to meet the demand of Self-Defense Force modernization. Investment in military research and development has been only 1% of defense expenditure.[9] The ratio of defense production to overall industrial production has remained at the 0.4% level since 1967.

The major weapon systems, including their training systems for the Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Air Self-Defense Force, have been produced through foreign licensing agreements because of interoperability, common characteristics of combat

doctrine and technological difficulties. On the other hand, research, development and production of weapon systems for land combat have been mainly conducted by the Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) and domestic military industry, because these systems must be suitable to our particular terrain and land combat doctrine. In any event, the urgency to launch the research, development and production systems in Japan to meet the urgent need to equip the GSDF as soon as possible, made it impossible to consider the essential elements of interoperability, trainability of equipment, training simulators, and other devices for the GSDF.

In the next decade, military technology and the industrial base which have been developed in Japan since the 1960's will make it possible to develop more sophisticated "Second Generation weapon systems" and more sophisticated training devices. These weapon systems will be easy to operate, efficient in the saving of manpower in field combat, but difficult to maintain because of their sophistication. Training devices such as training simulators, battle games supported by computor and other progressive instructional materials, will be able to shorten training time for soldiers. On the other hand, it is also true that the progress in military technology will make our weapons systems obsolete more rapidly. Outmoded weapons systems in our inventory occasionaly could be a big obstacle to modernizing operational capability of the force because of difficulty and cost in replacing them with new systems.

II IMPACT OF CHANGING ENVIRONMENTS ON THE GSDF ACTIVE COMPONENTS SYSTEM

Role/Mission

The roles of the GSDF active components system is broad. They are to cope with Direct Aggression; i.e., invasion by other military forces, and to cope with Indirect Aggression or large scale internal disturbances caused by agitation or intervention of one or more foreign countries. In addition to these primary missions of national defense in war time, the GSDF has various peacetime missions which contribute to the stability of the public welfare. They are to cope with disturbance at the local governer's requests, to rescue and relieve natural disasters, and to assist in community activities.

Since 1973, the GSDF has dispatched units on more than 400 disaster rescue and relief operations each year involving a total of 80,000 man-days. Additionally, the GSDF has undertaken more than 200 civil engineering works, such as road construction and preparing land sites for schools and parks, at the request of local governments. The size of these operations are expanding every year.[10]

According to the result of the latest public opinion survey on defense issues, 78% of the people think that the Self-Defense Forces has been most useful in rescue and relief operation and cooperation with community programs.

As for future directions, 38% favor continuing rescue and relief operations, and 34% opt for maintaining the national security as their first priority.[11]

Both public opinion and the moderate neutral political parties as well agree that the role of Self-Defense Forces in peacetime should be emphasized. Thus, in the next decade, the peacetime roles such as anti-disaster rescue and relief can be expected to be emphasized in both political and social affairs.

Although operations such as disaster rescue and civil engineering works generally fall in line with the training of the GSDF units, it is also true that they have been one of the biggest burdens detracting from the combat training mission which is the primary role of the GSDF. The shortage of manpower and combat oriented training time in the GSDF will be one of the most serious issues Japan faces in the future.

Military strategy

The Tripolar power structure with US, PRC and USSR and various bilateral security arrangements have kept a certain equilibrium in Northeast Asia. Japan has favored this kind of equilibrium rather than the Bipolar power structure which has existed on the NATO front. All of Japan's defense policies are based on this equilibrium. Thus, Japan will try to preserve these arrangements and will resist anything which could destroy them.

With its broad industrial base and advanced technology which can produce even nuclear warheads and delivery systems, Japan is potentially a great military power. Additionally, if Japan expended only 3% of her GNP (current defense expenditure: 0.9%), she could build the third military super power in the world within several years. However, this would cause deep suspision and anxiety among other nations, particularly our Asian neighbors. Besides, Japan can keep the equilibrium of a Tripolar power structure within her current non-nuclear policy.

As in the past, Japan will depend on US deterrent power against nuclear threat under the Japan-US Security Treaty. The international structure mentioned above has presumably reduced the possibility of large scale aggression against Japan. Therefore, Japan has tried to maintain a minimum force structure to cope with limited and small-scale surprise aggression with conventional weapons. This force structure should be capable of becoming the nucleus of a strengthened structure at the required time.[12] However, if a larger aggression should occur, it would be very difficult to mobilize all of Japan's national military potential in a short period of time. One of the most effective ways to reduce the risk and insure rapid mobilization capability would be the development and maintenance of an effective reserve components system developed under a new concept.

Force structure

The GSDF personnel quota has been maintained at 180,000 since 1973; however actual strength currently approved is 155,000 (Fill ratio:86%). They are organized into 13 small divisions (1 Mechanized Inf. and 12 Inf.) with a strength of 7,000 to 9,000, and several separate brigades. Two to four of these divisions are deployed in five army security regions depending on topographic features of the land and on admnistrative expediency.[13]

In the past defense plans, the defense of the Northern Army region, Hokkaido, and the Western Army region, Kyushu, have been strongly emphasized because of strategic and geo-political considerations. However, Soviet expansion in naval and air capability, and the reduction of US military presense in Northeast Asia, will require Japan to rearrange her deployment of the GSDF units. The stress of defense should be put not only on the Northern and Western fronts but on the Central front, Shinetsu region, as well. Presently, there are few operational units deployed in this region. To cope with aggressive attacks at the heart of Japan -Tokyo- it might be required to deploy at least two divisions in this region. However, it will be difficult to organize these two divisions within the existing personnel quota of the GSDF.

Large numbers of combat unit have been created at the sacrifice of various service support units through a series of defense buildup plans since 1969. In the next decade, extensive augmentation of the GSDF active manpower will be limited by political and fiscal constraints, limitation of recruitment, and difficulty of training facility acquisition as mentioned above. Thus, the creation of these combat units will be made more difficult. As a result, the imbalance between combat and suppot capabilities will be so severe that overall defense capability will remain lower than desired. To improve this imbalance, combat service support capability will be required in the reserve components system.

Readiness

Maintaining required military manpower in all-volunteer environment is one of the most difficult problem for any nation's armed forces. The Japanese GSDF is notexception.[14] Recruitment and retention of personnel will be difficult in the future because of changes in Japan's social structure such as the changing distribution of population, a varied and changing value system, and apathy toward political affairs. Furthermore, the future unstable political environment will make it more difficult to gain approval in the Diet to strengthen the peacetime active force.

Current manpower status in the active GSDF shows 98.3% fill ratio (Actual strength/TOA strength x 100%) in officer categories, 98.8% in NCO strength and 69.9% of privates. Approximate 25,000 vacancies exist in the active GSDF in the rank of private, presenting a serious problem for maintenance of manpower readiness. By our own measure, the GSDF considers that any unit in which strength is reduced below 85% of TOA strength through combat loss, cannot sustain itself in combat without augmentation. 15% of TOA strength is one of the indices to estimate the initial combat loss in which augmentation is required.[15] These two requirements, to fill up 25,000 vacancies and to replace 22,000 (15%of TOA) initial combat loss, have to be satisfied by personnel trained through the reserve components system.

The cost to achieve even a slight improvement in the performance of weapons systems has risen geometrically in recent years. It is also true that this slight difference of performance could be decisive factor on the combat field. Coping with the progress of military technology and with the equipments of potential enemies, the relatively old equipment in our inventory should be replaced more frequently by modernized ones. A High-Low mix concept is one of the ways to harmonize quality or quantity problem on weapon system, but it has certain limitations. The reserve components system traditionally has absorbed these relatively old weapon systems from the active components system.

In the future, military technology will make it possible to build the weapon systems which are sophisticated but simplier to operate by soldiers in combat field. However, it also will be more difficult to maintain such sophisticated weapon systems in a combat environment. The rquirement to maintain weapon systems in peacetime is relatively small but will drastically increase in wartime. Therefore, a lot of service support capability must be available in the reserve components system.

Progress in military technology impacts not only on the performance of weapon systems themselves, but on the development of sophisticsted training devices. Training simulators, war gaming techniques supported by computors, and well developed audio-visual instruction materials sre required in order that the soldiers of both active andreserve components system can be trained effectively in a short period of time.

III THE GSDF RESERVE COMPONENTS SYSTEM

Current situation

Before moving into a discussion of the Reserve Components System in the future, we should first review the current situation of the Reserve Components System in comparison with the GSDF active components system and/or with the US reserve components system.

Role/Mission

The missions of the GSDF active and reserve components are shown in Table-1. While the GSDF active components have several missions in both wartime and peacetime, the mission of the GSDF reserve components is strictly limited to wartime utilization. The peacetime roles of the active components, such as anti-disaster rescue operation and other operations to assist community activities, have been one of the heavieat hindrances to combat training which is the primary mission of the active components. This tension will increase in the future.

Force structure

The force structure of the GSDF active and reserve components is summarized in Table-2. The GSDF reserve force

UTILIZATION	STATUS	MISSION	
		ACTIVE GSDF	GSDF RESERVE
MILITARY USE	WAR STATUS	-To cope with Direct Aggression* (* Invasion by other military force)	To provide qualified individuals for Active GSDF in the time of war Three major utilization - Fill up vacancies of Active GSDF - Organize Security Units in rear area - Replace Initial Combat Loss
	NATIONAL EMERGENCY STATUS	-To cope with Indirect Aggression** (** Domestic disturbance suggested and supported by other nations)	None
NON MILITARY USE	NON WAR STATUS	-To cope with Civil Disturbance*** (*** Requested by local government -To rescue and relieve natural disaster -To assist community activities**** (**** Disposal of unexploded bombs and mines, civil engineering construction works, cooperation for civilian athletic meeting, etc)	None

Indirect aggression refers to large scale internal disturbances or uprising caused by agitation or intervention of one or more foreign countries.

Table-1 Role/Mission of the GSDF active and reserve components

is comprised of individuals, not units. Consequently, such a simple individual reserve system will not be able to meet the challenges of the complex social structure and the requirement for hasty mobilization in the future.

On the other hand, the Active/Reserve mix ratio (strength of reserve personnel/ strength of active personnel) can be one of the indices to evaluate the force structure of the Reserve Components System. The Active/Reserve mix ratios in other armed forces under all-volunteer environment are US:0.75, UK:0.97, Canada:0.53, Australia:0.88 and Japan:0.22.

In partial conscription environments, the ratios are relatively large sas follows; France:1.21, Italy:2.52 and FRG:3.09.[16] Thus, the Active/Reserve mix ratio in the GSDF is particularly small in comparison with the ratio in nations with all-volunteer armies.

		ACTIVE GSDF	GSDF RESERVE
FORCE LEVEL	PERSONNEL STRENGTH	TOA STRENGTH 180,000 persons ACTUAL STRENGTH 154,805 persons (FY1977) FILL RATIO 86.0%	TOA STRENGTH 39,000 persons ACTUAL STRENGTH 38,776 persons (FY1976) FILL RATIO 99.4%
	UNITS	12 Infantry Divisions 1 Mechanized Infantry Division 12 Separate Brigades 8 Antiaircraft Artillery Groups	None
ORGANIZATION		Units are organized into 5 Regional Armies	Individual reservist (Not organized)

Table-2 Force structure of the GSDF

Readiness

(1) Manpower

The manpower status of both the GSDF active and reserve components is shown in Table-3. Since the fill ratio of the private class soldier in the active components is only 69.9%, it is clear that augmentation in this rank will be required

ACTIVE GSDF (FY1977)

	TOA STRENGTH	ACTUAL STRENGTH	FILL RATIO
OFFICER	21,979	21,603	98.3%
W.OFFICER & SERGEANT	79,449	78,498	98.8%
PRIVATE	78,572	54,704	69.6%
TOTAL	180,000	154,805	86.0%

GSDF RESERVE (FY1976)

	TOA STRENGTH	ACTUAL STRENGTH	FILL RATIO	AVERAGE AGE
OFFICER	1,815	1,702	93.8%	51.6
W.OFFICER & SERGEANT	14,462	13,574	93.9%	38.1
PRIVATE	22,723	23,500	103.4%	27.2
TOTAL	39,000	38,776	99.4%	32.1

Table-3 Manpower status of the GSDF

in wartime. However, the number of private class soldiers in the GSDF reserve is limited since only 23,000 can be afforded to fill up the vacancies in the active components. Furthermore, the average age of this rank is more than 27 years, since the source of recruiting for the reservist is limited to those personnel with prior service experience as shown in Table-4.

As shown in Table-5, the ratio of those competing for enlistment as active private class soldier (male) is approximately twice the requirement, but the applicants is not always equal to the eligibility standard. Thus recruiting private class personnel for the active components is still one of Japan's biggest problem.

On the other hand, the retention ratio for the reserve components is relatively high; 74% in private class, as shown in Table-6. According to the latest public opinion survey, many young people who cannot be in the full-time service, could perform part-time service. If recruitment for the GSDF reservist were extended to all young people including those with no prior experience of the service, it would be easier to recruit reservist than to recruit active personnel.

	ACTIVE GSDF	GSDF RESERVE
SOURCE OF RECRUITING	- No Draft - Any person (more than 18 and less than 25 years old) can apply ACTIVE GSDF	- Only GSDF retirees (less than 37 years old and more than 1 year TIS) can apply RESERVE
MANDATORY TERM IN SERVICE	- 2 years(General) - 3 years(General & Specialist) - No mandatory term staying in RESERVE	- 3 years

Table-4 Source of recruitment

ACTIVE GSDF (FY1976)

	APPLICANTS	RATIO OF COMPETITION	ACCEPTED PERSONNEL
PRIVATE (Male)	32,171	2.1	15,161
PRIVATE (Female)	1,809	8.1	223

Table-5 Annual recruitment of the active personnel.

GSDF RESERVE (FY1976)

	RETIREES	ELIGIBLE PERSONNEL	APPLICANTS	RETENTION RATIO	ACCEPTED PERSONNEL
OFFICER (O_3,O-2,O-1)	997	989	762	76.9%	562
W.OFFICER & SERGEANT	1,553	1,516	1,207	79.6%	1,161
PRIVATE	13,058	11,334	8,369	73.8%	7,213
TOTAL	15,608	13,849	10,338	74.6%	8,936

Table--6 Annual recruitment of the GSDF reserve

(2) Equipment

Because the reserve force is not organized into units, the GSDF reserve components is limited to individual small arms as shown in Table-7. On the other hand, the active components equipment includes both outmoded and modernized weapon systems.

CATEGORY	ACTIVE GSDF	GSDF RESERVE
FIREARM	M1964 Rifle	M1964 Rifle
TANK	M1961 Tank M 1974 Tank	None
A P C	M 1960 APC M 1973 APC	None
FIELD ARTILLERY	M 1 (US) 155mm H Towed M 1975 Multi Rocket 130mm M 1975 155mm H SP	None
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY	M 42 (US) 40mm SP L 90 (M1968) 35mm SP (RDT&E)	None
ANTI TANK MISSILE	M 1964 Light Missile R-1500m TOW (US) R-3000m (RDT&E) R-4000m	None
ENGINEER EQUIPMENT	M4A2 (US) Floating Bridge M 1975 MOFAB	None

Table-7 Authorized equipments for the GSDF reserve components

While this is also true for most nations, it is particularly so in Japan because she has kept "the arms export ban policy". Unit cost of weapon systems is incredibly high because of the small production amount.[17] Outmoded weapon systems in the active components inventory have been a big obstacle to modernizing the operational capability of the force because of difficulty and cost to replace them. The High-Low mix concept is one of the ways to satisfy the quality/quantity problem on weapon systems, but it has certain limitations. The GSDF reserve, if it had organized units, could function to absorb the relatively old weapon systems for their training, and thus help balance the quality/quantity problem.

(3) Training

Mandatory training time and proficiency levels for the GSDF reservist in peacetime are shown in Table-8 in comparison with the US reserve components.[18] It must be obvious that 5 days annual training is not enough for the individual reservist to maintain his own skill level.[19]

Currently, the GSDF reservists are called annually to one of the closest active combat units and trained by a temporary training team. Training assistant groups for the reserve components are not authorized as shown in Table-9. Thus, even if the GSDF reserve were organized into troop program units,

it would be difficult for them to maintain company-level proficiency because of a shortage of time and training range, and lack of any training assistance.

(a) MANDATORY TRAINING (IN PEACETIME)

ARNG & USAR (USA)				GSDF RESERVE (JAPAN)	
CATEGORY			REQUIREMENT	CATEGORY	REQUIREMENT
READY RESERVE	SELECTED RESERVE (TROOP PROGRAM UNIT)		-Inactive Duty Training, IDT 48 paid training assemblies Prevalent system: MUTA-4's -Annual Training, AT Approximately 2 weeks/year	None	None
	INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (USAR only)	ANNUAL TRAINING	- Prevalent system: MUTA-4's	Individual Reservist	AT 5 days/year
		REINFORCEMENT	•USAR School •Reinforcement Training Units	None	None
		MOBILIZATION DESIGNATION	-Premobilization experience and training	None	None
STANDBY RESERVE (USAR only)			None	None	None
RETIRED RESERVE			None	None	None

(b) TRAINING PROFICIENCY (IN PEACETIME)

	ARNG & USAR (USA)	GSDF RESERVE (JAPAN)
EXPECTED TRAINING PROFICIENCY	TROOP PROGRAM UNIT - Company level proficiency - FORSCOM objective: Company C-2 Battalion C-3 - Retested every 3 years	Individual Reservist - Individual training to maintain his own skill level

Table-8 Mandatory training and Training Proficiency

In order to strengthen training for the GSDF reserve, it will be necessary to provide various kinds of training such as weekly, monthly, quartery and annual. In this way more training options will be available to provide more reservists with training to satisfy needs.



Table-9 Training assistance system

Mobilization

The mobilization authority and spectrum of the GSDF reserve are summarized in Table-10 in comparison with the US reserve components system.

The prime minister does not have the authority to mobilize the GSDF reserve in peacetime. He can mobilize them only in wartime if that war is congressionally declared. The partial and full mobilization of the reserve are planned and programed but not the expansion of the GSDF reserve

beyond the existing force.

Since the mobilization authority of the prime minister is limited, even if the congress approved the expansion it would take at least 6 months following mobilization to deliver the first soldier to the active units. The current mobilization system can only fill the vacancies of the active units and replace the initial combat loss by the individual reserve.

<table>
<tr><td></td><td colspan="3">ARNG & USAR (USA)</td><td>GSDP RESERVE (JAPAN)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">AUTHORITY</td><td colspan="3">- With congressionally declared war and national emergency
-- 1 million members of the Ready Reserve for not more than 24 months
-- Any unit/members of ARNG or USAR for the duration of war or national emergency and 6 months thereafter</td><td>- Prime Minister has authority to order to active duty in existing approved force structure of GSDP RESERVE for the duration of the war and national emergency
all individual reservists</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">- Without congressionally declared war and national emergency
-- 50,000 members of the Selected Reserve for up to 90 days</td><td>- Not authorized</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="5">SPECTRUM</td><td>CONDITION</td><td>PURPOSE</td><td>TYPE</td><td>STATUS</td></tr>
<tr><td>SELECTIVE</td><td>Force tailored to meet contingencies other than external threats</td><td rowspan="3">DELIBERATE / ACCELERATE</td><td>- Not authorized</td></tr>
<tr><td>PARTIAL</td><td>To meet part or all of contingency or operational war plan</td><td rowspan="2">- programed and Planned</td></tr>
<tr><td>FULL</td><td>All units in existing approved force structure</td></tr>
<tr><td>TOTAL</td><td>Units beyond existing approved force structure</td><td>IMMEDIATE</td><td>- Expansion of GSDP RESERVE beyond existing force structure is not programed</td></tr>
<tr><td>MOBILIZATION</td><td colspan="3">EXERCISE MOBEX 76, (Done)
MOBEX 78 & 79 (Planned)</td><td>None</td></tr>
</table>

Table-10 Authority and spectrum of Mobilization

IV RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The following are recommendations, growing out of my study, to change the GSDF reserve components system and thus improve readiness and capability to meet Japan's future defense requirements.

Role/Mission

1 Recommend that, in addition to the traditional wartime mission, the GSDF reserves share a portion of the mission of the active components to respond to disaster and community welfare programs, and thus lighten the heavy burden on the active components and establish a foundation of more extensive military-civil cooperation.

Force structure

2 Recommend that the combat service support capability be developed and increased in the reserve components system in order to maintain the sophisticated weapon systems required in wartime.

3 Recommend that the GSDF reserve components strength be increased to 125,000. The current authorized strength of the GSDF reserve components (39,000) is too small to achieve even their traditional mission. In the post-mobilization phase,

at least 25,000 personnel will be needed to fill the vacancies of the active components, 22,000 (15% of the active strength) to replace initial combat losses, approximately 50,000 (1,000 per prefectural region) to organize the 50 regional security units, and 28,000 to create and deploy the combat units needed to meet new challenges at the Central front under the future strategic environment. Total required strength of the GSDF reserve components is approximately 125,000 with an Active/Reserve mix ratio of 0.7 . This is the same as the average level among the nations under an all-volunteer environment (the authorized active components strength remains at the current level; 180,000). While it will be difficult politically and fiscally to expand the authorized strength of the active components in the future, the gradual expansion of the reserve components system under this new concept should be more acceptable to the public.

4 Recommend the establishment of separate reserve categories. It will be very difficult to maintain the current individual reserve system in the future under the complex political and social environments. Additionally, it will be difficult to improve its readiness to meet the requirements of future military strategy within a single individual reserve category. The establishment of various reserve categories, such as the Selected Reserve units and Individual Ready Reserve in the US reserve components system, will increase Japan's capability to meet mobilization requirements of the future.

Readiness

5 Recommend expansion of the GSDF reserve recruitment to include non-prior service young people. In order to keep the average age of reservists young and to meet recruiting problems more effectively, the source for recruiting the GSDF reservist should be expanded to all young people, not only those who have prior service experience.

6 Recommend that the GSDF reserve units, when organized, be equiped with the weapon systems shifted from the active components. This will make it possible to solve the equipment regeneration problem and harmonize the High-Low mix problem under the Total Force concept.

On the other hand, in the post-mobilization phase when the reserve components participate in combat operations, the logistic line will be linked with the US logistic assistance line. Thus, it will be possible to equip and train a portion of the reserve components with US weapon systems.

7 Recommend expansion of Reserve Components training. Reserve units and individual reservists should be provided with various kinds of training. Although this system will require more complex administration, it will be the best way to achieve the extensive training needed to meet the complex social structure of the future.

8 Recommend introduction of sophisticated training devices and materials. In order to shorten the training time and to achieve extensive training, it will be necessary for both active and reserve components to introduce sophisticated training devices such as training simulators, war gaming technique supported by computors, and audio-visual instructual materials.

9 Recommend development of Training Assistance and Advisory groups and an affiliation program to support the training of the reserve components.

Mobilization

10 Recommend that the prime minister be granted authority to mobilize a limited strength of the reserve components quickly without congressional approval to provide urgent response in national emergency, and authority to mobilize a portion of the reserve components even in peacetime with congressional approval.

To implement this mobilization effectively, the function of the Prefectural Liaison Office (PLO) will be expanded. Also, the Prefectural Engineer Detachments scattered throughout the country will be utilized as a mobilization support bases.

CONCLUSION

The political, social financial and technological environments surrounding the new Japanese military system have changed continuously since 1950. The GSDF active components system have been improved, expanded and reorganized from time to time through a series of defense buildup plans to meet the changing environments.

The role and basic configulation of the GSDF reserve components , however, have been left as they were born in 1954, a quarter of a century ago, although the authorized strength has expanded, the pay and benefits for the reservist improved, and the administrative support augmented. The role of the GSDF reserve components system is limited to wartime utilization such as filling up the vacancies in the active components system, replacing initial combat losses and organizing the regional security force. The GSDF reservelists are not organized into unit and only equiped with individual small firearm in peacetime. Only those who have been in the active service for more than one year are eligible for the GSDF reserves. Mandatory training is limited to 5 days a year with required training proficiency of maintaining individual skill level. Training assistance and aivisory groups are organized temporarily in active components units during the annual training of the reservists. Only two persons, charged with responsibility for the admini-

strative work for the reservist, are authorized in each Prefectural Liaison Office. As for mobilization of the reserve components, because the role of the reserve components is limited to wartime utilization, the prime minister does not have autyority to mobilize them in peacetime. He always needs congressional approval to mobilize them regardless of their size or period of time.

The current GSDF reserve components system is generally so obsolete that it cannot meet any of the challenges presented by the future changing environments. While ten recommendations to improve this system are detailed in part IV of this paper, they can be summarized into three major concepts.

First, a new role for the reserve components in peacetime should be developed in order to assume some of the burden currently carried by the active components, and to promote readiness of the reserve components themselves.

Secondly, reserve components categories, such as organized reserve units and individual reserve, and training packages appropriate to their needs for readiness, should be developed. These categories would provide Japan with the military flexibility needed to meet the challenges of the complex social structure of the future.

Thirdly, mobilization authority for the reserve components system and the chain of command, including an extensive training assistance system, should be clearly established

for both wartime and peacetime utilization.

Without a doubt, modernization of the reserve components system as mentioned above could be one of the most effective ways to strengthen the readiness of the Ground Self-Defense Force in the future.

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