AD-A061 752 ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER ALEXANDRIA VA F/G 5/4
THE NATIONALIST HEGIRA, RETREAT AND MOBILIZATION UNDER KUOMINTA--ETC(U)
MAY 78 A G YOUNG

UNCLASSIFIED NL

1 OF 1
AD
A061752



END
DATE
FILMED
2-79
DDC

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION N / 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle): The Nationalist Hegira, Retreat and Mobilization Under Kuomintang Rule In China, 1937-1939.	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED: Final Report, 9 May 1978
	6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s): Alan Gayland Young	8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s): Final rept.
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS: Student, HQDA, MILPERCEN(DAPC-OPP-E), 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS: 64p.
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS: HQDA, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPP-E, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332	12. REPORT DATE: 9 May 1978 / 13. NUMBER OF PAGES: 62
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(if different from Controlling Office)	15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report): Unclassified / 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

LEVEL II

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

DDC DEC 1 1978

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Master's Thesis, Cornell University

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

CHINA, 1937-1939; NATIONALIST CHINA, 1937-1939; CHINA; KUOMINTANG RULE; JAPANESE INVASION OF CHINA, 1937-1939; NATIONALIST CHINESE GOVERNMENT; CHINESE ARMY, 1937-1939; NATIONALIST CHINESE RETREAT FROM JAPANESE INVASION

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

In China, between 1937 and 1939, the Nationalist government and its people were fleeing before the Japanese invasion. A common view held by many historians is that the Chinese people were unaware of or indifferent to the rule of the Nationalist government. However, it is the contention of this paper that the people mobilized in the Yangtze River Valley and southeastern provinces were both aware of and responsive to the Kuomintang and provincial governments' leadership during the crisis.

391 191

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

BLOCK 20.

The military was ordered to defend Shanghai while the key elements of the population necessary for the Chinese war effort were withdrawn. Industry, government agencies and universities were then evacuated from central and southern China westward away from the Japanese. As the military fought a delaying action the Central government moved and reestablished its capital several times; evacuations were planned and priorities were established to determine which elements of the nation would receive transportation resources to enable them to move west.

It was the National and provincial governments which organized people in central and southeastern China during the Japanese invasion.

LEVEL II (2)

The Nationalist Hegira, Retreat and Mobilization Under Kuomintang Rule in China, 1937 - 1939

Alan G. Young, Captain
HQDA, MILPERCEN (DAPC-OPP-E)
200 Stovall Street
Alexandria, VA 22332

Final Report 9 May 1978

A thesis submitted to Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

THE NATIONALIST HEGIRA, RETREAT AND MOBILIZATION UNDER KUOMINTANG RULE IN CHINA, 1937 - 1939

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

of Cornell University

in Partial Fulfillment for the Degree of

Master of Arts

by

Alan Gayland Young

May 1978

ABSTRACT

In China, between 1937 and 1939, the Nationalist government and its people were fleeing before the Japanese invasion. A common view held by many historians is that the Chinese people were unaware of or undifferent to the rule of the Nationalist government. However, it is the contention of this paper that the people mobilized in the Yangtze River Valley and southeastern provinces were both aware of and responsive to the Kuomintang and provincial governments' leadership during the crisis.

The military was ordered to defend Shanghai while the key elements of the population necessary for the Chinese war effort were withdrawn. Industry, government agencies and universities were then evacuated from central and southern China westward away from the Japanese. As the military fought a delaying action, the Central government moved and reestablished its capital several times; evacuations were planned and priorities were established to determine which elements of the nation would receive transportation resources to enable them to move west.

It was the National and provincial governments which organized people in central and southeastern China during the Japanese invasion.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Alan Gayland Young was born October 23, 1951, at Fort Monroe, Virginia. After living in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Denver, Colorado and Pueblo, Colorado, he moved with his family to Joliet, Illinois. On September 4, 1971, while attending Loyola University of Chicago on a four year Army ROTC scholarship, he married Jennifer Ann Edburg. In June 1973 he received his BA in history, was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army and was awarded a Department of the Army Fellowship. He then attended Parachute School at Fort Benning, Georgia and the Armor Officer Basic and Motor Officer courses at Fort Knox, Kentucky. His first unit assignment was at Fort Carson, Colorado, where he served as Tank Platoon Leader, Company Executive Officer, and Battalion Staff Officer. His daughter, Carolyn Ann, was born February 1, 1976. In June 1976, he began the Asian Studies Masters of Arts program at Cornell University. After one year of intensive study of Chinese (FALCON) he completed the courses required for the Master's program. On July 7, 1977, his son, Alan Gayland, Junior, was born. Presently a Captain, he will attend the Armor Officer Advanced Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky, upon graduation.

To my wife

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I sincerely thank my chairman, Professor Sherman G. Cochran, for his patient guidance in the preparation of this thesis. Without his course, History 694, I could not have completed this thesis within one semester.

I must also acknowledge my History 694 classmates for all their help in critiquing my first draft. My special thanks to Owen Matsunaga and Nina Kwan for their extensive editing of my first draft.

I wish to thank Professors Mozingo and McCoy not only for kindly consenting to read this thesis, but also for all the guidance they have given me in my studies here.

Finally, I thank my wife for the patience, and encouragement, she has shown during the preparation and typing of this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ii

DEDICATION. iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. iv

INTRODUCTION. 1

I. THE MILITARY AND ITS DEFENSE OF THE RETREAT . . 4

II. THE KMT'S ORGANIZATION OF THE RETREAT 15

The Government and Its Employees. 17

Industry and Its Workers. 24

The Students. 33

The Refugees. 39

III. CHEKIANG, A PROVINCIAL CASE 46

CONCLUSION. 51

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 53

INTRODUCTION

hegira: a journey especially when undertaken to seek refuge away from a dangerous or undesirable environment (the Hegira, flight of Muhammad from Mecca in A. D. 622)[1]

The above definition accurately describes the situation of the Nationalists in Central China during the Japanese invasion between 1937 and 1939.[2] A government and its people were fleeing before an aggressive invader who wanted to dominate the productive portions of a poor country. To the Japanese, this was a logical step after the annexation of Manchukuo in 1932 and the occupation of North China in the summer of 1937. But the Chinese Central government was determined to resist this ultimate violation of China's sovereignty and began to mobilize the nation at Shanghai in August 1937.

Chalmers Johnson in Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, states that the Chinese Communists, utilizing the feelings of nationalism created by the Japanese invasion,

---

[1] Websters Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1967.

[2] This paper will use the Chinese word for Nationalists, Kuomintang or abbreviated KMT, interchangeably. As the KMT was the only party in the national government, Central government also refers to the Nationalists and the KMT.

effectively led the Chinese people in their resistance to the Japanese. This was in contrast with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government which "rule[d] a people indifferent to or unaware of government."[3] This interpretation leaves the impression that any portion of the "war-energized" Chinese population (as Johnson calls it)[4] not under Communist leadership would have been indifferent to or unaware of rule by a government. It is the contention of this paper however, that such an interpretation fails to explain the reactions of the "war-energized" people who retreated up the Yangtze River between 1937 and 1939. On the contrary, my findings suggest that these people were aware of and responsive to the initiatives taken by the Kuomintang and provincial governments. To understand the event it is necessary to recognize the importance of these governmental initiatives, for the government organized and led the resistance against the Japanese and the retreat westward from the lower Yangtze River Valley and southeast China.

The military was ordered to defend Shanghai to cover the withdrawal of essential elements of the population

---

[3]Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937 - 1945 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 7 and 20.

[4]Ibid., p. ix.

necessary for the Chinese war effort. Then industry, government workers and offices, and universities were evacuated from all parts, especially central and southern China, westward away from the Japanese. As the military fought a delaying action, the Central government moved and reestablished its capital several times, evacuations were planned, and priorities were established to determine which elements of the nation received transportation resources to move west.

The provincial governments moved their capitals out of the reach of the Japanese, mobilized their provincial armies, assisted in the evacuation of industry, and reestablished their educational systems in safer locations. They supported and contributed to the efforts of the Central Government to mobilize the nation for war.

This paper will first examine the military's role in protecting the retreat beginning with the battle of Shanghai. Secondly, those elements that made up the retreat will be analyzed. It will be demonstrated that there was order established by the Nationalist government in this movement of millions of people. Chekiang's provincial government will show in detail the degree of administration and management achieved in some provinces. Finally, the conclusion of this paper will be summarized.

I. THE MILITARY AND ITS DEFENSE OF THE RETREAT

In August of 1937 the Nationalist government had made the decision to defend Shanghai to the best of its ability. The role of the military was to cover the forthcoming retreat and to buy time so that elements of the population could be withdrawn from Shanghai. The decision ordering the armies to stand and fight, although later criticized because of its consequences, was startling not only to the Japanese, but also to Westerners. The Japanese had expected to accomplish the occupation of the lower Yangtze River Valley in a short campaign.

China's first task, when war broke out, was to complete the military mobilization that Chiang Kai-shek had begun in 1925 with the mounting of the Northern Expedition. From 1925 to 1937, Chiang shaped and molded selected elements of the Central Army into an effective fighting force. The provincial forces were also mobilized to prepare for the upcoming clash.

In the period preceding the attack on Shanghai, the Japanese had made rapid progress in their occupation of North China. The Japanese Army had used an incident near the Marco Polo Bridge (Lukouch'iao) on July 7, 1937, as a pretext to finish the occupation of northern China. The

collapse of Chinese resistance enabled the Japanese to keep their precise timetable for the occupation. The Japanese advanced along the three major rail lines running out of Tientsin. They occupied Peking by the end of July, Paot'ou, the capital of Suiyuan on October 6, and Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi on November 9, 1937. By the end of 1937, the Japanese had advanced along the Peiping - Hankow rail line to within a few miles of the Yellow River and as far as T'ai-an in Shantung.

The Chinese army showed weaknesses in North China that were characteristic of warlord campaigns. The military lacked the resolve to fight a pitched battle because of its leaders' indecisiveness and refusal to cooperate with each other. The troops that Japan faced in North China did not have the characteristics of the new national armies. They lacked the training, equipment, discipline, and leadership that the elite Central Armies had. When Japan, on August 13, 1937, sent its troops into Shanghai, it found that it was facing a different kind of army, one well-trained, highly disciplined and determined to fight.

Four reasons are commonly given for the stand at Shanghai. First, without a strong defense of Shanghai, the nation's capital at Nanking would be vulnerable to a quick thrust up the Yangtze River Valley. Second, a large proportion of China's infant industrial base was concentrated in the

Shanghai region. Third, by taking a stand at Shanghai, the Japanese would be forced to withdraw troops from North China, thereby reducing the pressure on North China. Finally, Shanghai was firmly in the Nationalist government's control. A defense in the Yangtze River valley would mean that the military campaign would take place in areas under the most complete control of the Nationalists. The government was certain of the loyalty of the army units and of the population in these areas.[1]

The strategy chosen was to make the war precisely the type Japan wanted to avoid, a prolonged war of attrition. The Chinese would take advantage of their huge manpower, large geographical area, and the nature of China's topography, to bog down the Japanese in a hopeless, protracted war.

Shaping the course of events in 1937 and 1938 was Chiang Kai-shek's hope to force the Western powers to intervene. He made the decision, though tactically unsound, to bring the war as close as possible to the foreign settlements in Shanghai and Nanking. It was Chiang's hope that a dramatic demonstration of the Chinese people's will to fight would encourage the Western powers to intervene on

---

[1]These four reasons are drawn from varied sources. The second reason is from F.F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, p. 106; the fourth reason is advanced by Theodore White in Thunder Out of China, p. 51. The first and third reasons are drawn from newspaper correspondents and journalists who wrote at the time. There was no one single dominant factor influencing Chiang's decision to fight at Shanghai. The decision, like most major decisions was based on many reasons.

China's behalf, or at least on their nationals' behalf.[2]

There were three major battles in this period of retreat: Shanghai - Nanking (August - December 1937), T'aierchuang - Hsuchow (March - June 1938), and the siege of Hankow (June - October 1938).

The fiercest fighting was at Shanghai - Nanking. The Japanese attacked with 200,000 troops supported by air and sea. The Chinese deployed the majority of their crack, German trained troops. These Central Army troops were joined by provincial armies bringing the total to 450,000 defenders.[3]

These troops were led by officers who had been trained in the new Chinese military academies and instilled with a sense of nationalism that had never been shown before. Chiang Kai-shek's approach to building a powerful modern army had been to train and educate a reliable and efficient officer corps. The Central Military Academy, Whampoa, was the key to training competent officers who were loyal to their nation, party, and the Chinese revolution.[4] Additionally, an extensive network of specialized technical

---

[2]Barbara W. Tuchman, Stillwell and the American Experience in China, 1911 - 1945 (New York: Macmillan, 1971), p. 222.

[3]Tsao Chu-jen and Shu Tsung-chiao, Pictorial History of China's War of Resistance (Shanghai, 1946), p. 120.

[4]F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924 - 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 83.

schools had been set up to "develop, test, and train men in new military tactics and procedures."[5] Finally, German advisers had been hired to develop the Chinese military organization and train the new armies.

The warlord armies of the Republican period (1912 - 1949) were generally opposite in nature. James Sheridan, in China in Disintegration, characterizes almost all the warlord armies as loyal to a single commander who changed sides almost at will. The armies lived off the population, taking what they wanted. Undisciplined, the warlord armies would frequently loot and pillage the countryside they passed through.[6] These warlord armies were not capable of standing up to the well trained and equipped Japanese army.

In the initial stages of the conflict, the Chinese armies almost drove the Japanese off the coast. Only the Japanese navy, with its heavy guns invulnerable to Chinese counter measures, prevented the Japanese troops from being driven back into the sea. The Chinese lacked heavy artillery, effective air support, and large stocks of supplies. What the Chinese army lacked in equipment it made up in determination. Four Chinese battalions who were surrounded

---

[5]Ibid., p. 85.

[6]James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration, The Republican Era in Chinese History 1912 - 1949 (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 87 - 92.

at Hsiao nan chiang by the Japanese, held to the last man, their commanders dying while leading a bayonet charge. They inflicted no less than 1,300 Japanese casualties.[7]

According to foreign military observers, the Chinese showed originality in operations, efficiency, and bravery under fire. "The Chinese carried out a marvelously organized retreat from Chapei, taking full equipment with them."[8] "The Chinese staked everything on personal courage, machine guns, hand grenades, rifles and hand-to-hand combat."[9]

The Chinese decision to stand and fight resulted in severe losses. Left for months in their defensive positions, China's best trained units were decimated by Japanese artillery, naval fire, and aircraft bombing. The majority of wounded in Chinese hospitals were casualties from bombing and shelling. Because the Chinese did not practice the Western policy of unit rotation, units held their positions until they were destroyed by enemy fire. Casualties were heavy but there was no shortage of replacements.

The new troops pouring into Shanghai were full of enthusiasm and fired with the spirit of "National Salvation,"

---

[7] "Four Battalions die to a man," North China Herald, (Shanghai) November 17, 1937, p. 266.

[8] "Foreign Observers View Shanghai Fight," New York Times, October 29, 1937, p. 2. (Here after abbreviated NYT).

[9] Ibid.

but, they were lacking in experience and training.[10] These replacements during their training had been instilled with a spirit of national defense. A major goal of the short period of training was to indoctrinate the soldiers with loyalty to the country, the government, and Chiang Kai-shek.

The Chinese held Shanghai for three months and then were forced to retreat when the Japanese outflanked the Chinese lines with an amphibious landing at Hangchow Bay. During the defense of Shanghai, the Central Army suffered sixty percent casualties and the Japanese lost over forty thousand men.[11]

Although the Chinese had well prepared defensive positions between Nanking and Shanghai, the Chinese generals were too inexperienced to organize a defense. The decision was made to defend the city walls of Nanking, an appropriate decision for the nineteenth century, but Nanking was indefensible against modern weaponry. Additionally, the Chinese generals were not able to reorganize their divisions in the face of the rapid Japanese advance on Nanking. The will of the armies to resist was gone. Even when crack divisions such as the 88th attempted to drive the fleeing troops back to their defensive positions, not even they could stop the

---

[10] Evan Fordyce Carlson, Twin Stars of China (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1940), p. 16.

[11] Liu, A Military History, p. 198.

retreat.[12] Nanking fell on December 13, 1937 and the Chinese again suffered tremendous losses.

The next major battle took place farther to the north where the Japanese were attempting to drive west along the Lunghai rail line. They were resuming the offensive after their hopes of Chinese surrender had died. The Japanese had hoped the Chinese government would fold when Nanking fell. Taierhchuang, located north of Hsuchow in Shantung province, was the site of China's first major victory. In the spring of 1938, the Chinese delivered a stunning blow to the attacking Japanese Army, inflicting thirty thousand casualties.[13] When the Japanese tried to avenge this defeat, the Chinese successfully conducted a delaying action to new lines of defense. This battle lasted six months until the Japanese turned their attention to Hankow.

During the fighting at Shanghai and Nanking China's elite army units had lost sixty percent of their strength and ten percent of their officer corps.[14] But the government had organized an extensive recruit training program that by spring of 1938 had produced 500,000 new soldiers. The new recruits had replenished the divisions taking

---

[12]"Japanese Capture China's Capital," North China Herald, (Shanghai) December 22, 1937. (Here after abbreviated NCH).

[13]Liu, A Military History, p. 200.

[14]Tuchman, Stillwell, p. 224.

part in the battle of Taierhchuang and displayed surprisingly high morale and ability in the fighting.[15]

The defense of Hsuchow - Taierhchuang and the resulting new respect for the Chinese as an adversary delayed the Japanese advance long enough to allow a firm defensive line to be established at Hankow. The defense of Hankow allowed the Chinese government to set up a temporary capital. Some industry was re-established in the area while the remainder of the migrants continued their trek westward. The year-long defense of Hankow until October 25, 1938, enabled the Chinese to evacuate their central provinces to the west. Sometime near the end of the Hankow period, the Chinese army completed a major change that had begun with the defense of north China. The majority of soldiers initially joining General Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese had been killed. Most army units, including provincial units, had been replenished several times with recruits trained by the government. They were indoctrinated with a national spirit, and had a sense of loyalty to General Chiang. This turnover of manpower marked the end of the regional character of the provincial armies.[16]

The Yangtze River valley was not the only scene of

---

[15]F. Tillman Durdin, "Eight Divisions on Move," NYT, April 15, 1938, p. 3.

[16]NYT, October 3, 1938, p. 7.

Chinese resistance. In the southeast provinces there was a major movement under way to resist the Japanese advance. General Ch'en Ch'eng, the Chairman of Honan and Commander of the Peiping-Hankow Railway Defenses, was organizing the entire population of Honan and sending every male between 21 and 35 into military training. Two hours daily for two months, two to three million men would be available for training. However, Honan only had one million rifles for use by the new defense corps.[17]

The southern provinces were not as well prepared as Chekiang to defend their territory. In 1939, Canton fell with surprisingly little resistance. Madame Chiang Kai-shek explained that General Yu Han-mou had failed to position his troops properly because of the inferiority of his staff officers and troops.[18]

The remainder of the Japanese advances were drives to secure the major railways and to isolate the Nationalist government. Generally speaking, after the fall of Hankow, there were no major shifts in the front lines through 1938 except an invasion of Kwangsi from the coast.

Thus, though suffering heavy casualties, the Chinese army accomplished its mission. It gave the Chinese govern-

---

[17]F. Tillman Durdin, "Walked Retreat Across River," NYT, February 23, 1938, p. 16.

[18]James McHugh, unnumbered chapter of unpublished book, p. 25. Found in box 14, folder 1 in the Cornell University Manuscript Archives.

ment time to evacuate industry, schools, and most of the population from the occupied areas. The provincial forces were responsive to the National government's control. In some cases the provincial armies were absorbed into the Central Army because of the nature of the replacement system. The war completed the process Chiang Kai-shek had begun in 1925, the mobilization of China's armies under Nationalist control.

II. THE KMT'S ORGANIZATION OF THE RETREAT

The Kuomintang set priorities on which portions of the population would receive allocations of scarce resources to help evacuate critical personnel and equipment. Government personnel and offices, industry and its workers, and students and their universities were first in priority to move to safer locations. The remainder of the refugees were left to make the move much more on their own. However, even they received limited aid from the national and provincial governments. The government directed their move westward, implementing evacuation plans and moving the refugees as the Japanese threatened.

The priority groups were usually identifiable in the mass of people who migrated westward. But, sometimes all groups were mixed in the evacuation. For example, with the military, the wounded soldiers became part of the refugees in the withdrawal. During a move, groups of students and teachers became separated from each other, and mixed in with the flow of refugees. The industrial workers were perhaps the easiest group to identify, but they were also the smallest. They generally moved in well-defined groups,

under the care of government officials. Many government officials, workers, and clerks were discharged and then became part of the refugees.

There have been many attempts to estimate the size of the population which migrated to the West: a figure of thirty million seems to be a conservative estimate.[1] This figure includes the migration from the coastal areas of the Southeastern and Southern provinces. This very large number of people created complex problems for the government. Because the government was not prepared for the coming of the war, there was initial confusion and disorganization while Chinese leaders strived to meet the challenges of coping with the complexities of the "begin." The following sections discuss the makeup of these thirty million people, and seek to illuminate the effectiveness of the government in organizing the retreat.

---

[1]Abend Hallet, Chaos in Asia (New York: Ives Washburn, 1939) p. 54. There are no records indicating how many people moved westward. Carlson in Twin Stars of China estimates 40 million refugees (p. 295). White in Thunder Out of China, estimates 3 to 25 million, not including the movement of populations in from the coastal regions of the Southeast provinces.

The Government and Its Employees

When the battle at Shanghai began, the National government began to evacuate key offices and personnel to the west. Because available transportation was limited, only those segments of the bureaucracy vital to the continuance of the war effort could be evacuated by official means.

The government provided direction, gave the orders, and did the planning for the evacuation to Western China. Its role was to evacuate successfully all those elements necessary to insure survival in the war with the Japanese. The government had the responsibility for coordinating the efforts of the military, the industrial sector, the students, and the general population. It was the national government's planning that evacuated industry from Nanking, Shanghai and Hankow. It was through government intervention and planning that the universities were moved to the west. Without an effective government, the Chinese could not have accomplished what they did. It is impossible to make a movement of this scale without effective coordination. Although the Chinese government was later criticized for its incompetency, inefficiency, and corruption, it is difficult to deny that this government was at least partially effective during 1937 - 1939. From the time it left Nanking, to its arrival and establishment in Chungking, the government had to evacuate its own offices and, at the same time, provide uninterrupted services to the nation.

In August 1937, the capital at Nanking was preparing for war. Women and children had begun their evacuation. The capital and all other buildings with brightly colored roofs were painted drab gray. Buses were repainted from white to olive drab.[2] Although the evacuation was not conducted as efficiently as the Chinese would have preferred, still, the evacuation followed the original plans. In November, as the Japanese approached from the west, the evacuation of government ministries to the interior began in earnest. The government began to move its ministries to Hankow, Chungking, Changsha, and other interior cities. Chungking had been designated to become the national capital at a later date, but Hankow was designated to serve as the immediate, temporary capital. Hankow was chosen because of its superior communications with Hongkong and Canton which enabled the country to maintain trade and obtain supplies from the outside world. As the ministries moved to the interior, skeleton staffs, consisting of the ministers and their highest subordinates, stayed in Nanking with Chiang Kai-shek until the week before Nanking's fall.

When the decision was made to move the ministries, the government undertook a major personnel change. For two reasons, the government discharged a vast number of employees, supplying only enough money for the employees to reach their

---

[2] NYT, August 4, 1937, p. 7.

homes. The first reason was the government's shortage of revenue, so the discharges were an economy measure. Secondly, the government's shortage of transportation meant it was impossible to transport all of its workers. All government departments except the military bureaus retained about one-fifth of their prewar staff. For the most part these discharged government officials joined the exodus moving to the west. They hoped that when the capital was reestablished, they would be able to get their old jobs back.[3]

Other parts of the population were leaving Nanking. Five thousand wounded were evacuated to Hankow and other interior points. The Central Red Cross Hospital, transferred along with the American Mission Hospital, to the interior. At the Foreign Office, the archives and essential furnishings were packed, but a shortage of transportation prevented everything from being evacuated. The archives and government equipment leaving for Hankow were evacuated by steamer, railroad, buses, and trucks. The evacuation vehicles were over-loaded with government employees, their families, and their belongings. Often, employees had to abandon their families since the government would only provide transportation for the employees themselves. Families then struggled west without their household head. On November 19, an executive of the Foreign Ministry told

---

[3]F. Tillman Durdin, "Nanking Scatters Ministries Inland As Foe Presses On," NYT, November 17, 1937, p. 1.

F. Tillman Durdin, "We are leaving ninety percent of our things; there are simply no facilities for taking more."[4]

The Peiping art treasures, stored in a new museum in Nanking, were evacuated to the west. Fourteen thousand out of fifteen thousand cases of palace art treasures were transported to Chungking and Paochi. The remaining thousand cases were left behind to fall into the hands of the Japanese.[5]

The national government was successfully relocated at Hankow after the fall of Nanking. Services were expanded, defenses were prepared, and plans were completed for a future evacuation. The Hankow government immediately began organizing the flow of refugees to the western provinces.

For example, in the Yangtze River, there were fifty areas of dangerous rapids all within 350 nautical miles. In the fall of 1938, the Ministry of Communications instructed the Bureau of Navigation to organize towing stations. With fifty towing stations operating during a twenty-six month period, towing service was rendered 1,258 times to steamers, and 62,426 times to junks.[6]

From Hankow, the government directed the operations of a nation. It insured a stable monetary supply, managed the

---

[4] Durdin, "Grim Throngs Quit Nanking as Troops Move to Front," NYT, November 19, 1937, p. 1.

[5] "Peiping Art Treasures Are Safe in Two Cities," NYT, January 7, 1938, p. 11.

[6] Chinese Ministry of Education, China Handbook, 1937 - 43. (New York, 1943) p. 253.

reestablishment of industry, arranged foreign loans with which it could carry on the war and support its currency, and directed the fighting of its armies.

The evacuation of Hankow was much more orderly than that of Nanking. By mid-June, the government had ordered the families of officials and nonessential state employees to depart. By early July, the evacuation of women and children was well underway. A special technical corps in charge of publicity, transportation, fire fighting, first aid, entertainment, engineering, and espionage had been established. The majority of the population, including organizations of students, farmers, labor, women, merchants and cultural groups was mobilized. Each organization was assigned tasks to accomplish in support of government plans. This mobilization placed the civilian population under the direct control of the government. By late October, the majority of the civilian population had been evacuated from Hankow. After 15,000 rickshaw pullers left with their families, the remaining civilian officials had to evacuate on foot with the aid of thousands of human bearers. Essential utilities continued operating until the Japanese arrived. For example, the main generating plant was not evacuated until two days prior to the Japanese occupation of the city.

In Chungking, the government immediately began to organize the city, to prepare for the tremendous increase in

population, industry, and educational institutions. The problems faced were tremendous. The 1927 population of Chungking was 208,294. By 1939, the population exceeded 550,000. The municipal limits by 1940, were three times larger than the municipality before the expansion.[7] There was a huge refugee population to care for; industry had to be settled and reestablished as fast as possible; the military front had to be stabilized; and to complicate matters, the Japanese began bombing heavily in 1939.

The first air raids in the spring of 1939, forced the government to evacuate the civilian population. During the evacuation, nearly one-and-a-half million people were moved to the countryside surrounding Chungking.[8] Nearly all motor vehicles were mobilized to evacuate the civilian population. Government officials, lacking their official cars, were using rickshaws to get around town during the evacuation. Major changes were made in the appearance of the city. Tremendous numbers of new buildings were erected to house the population, new universities, and new industries. In April of 1939, the Public Works Bureau began constructing fire lanes. More than 9,600 old buildings and houses were torn down to create fire lanes which contained the fires

---

[7] Ibid. p. 793.

[8] Durdin, "Chungking's Toll of Dead Rising", NYT, May 8, 1939, p. 4.

caused by Japanese fire bombing.[9]

In the Southeast provinces, the provincial government officials and employees were also undergoing their own evacuation. All of the provincial capitals were either occupied by the Japanese, or were not suitable for carrying on government affairs within the city limits because of bombing and warfare.

Intensive organization was taking place in the Southeast province. Defenses were meticulously planned and built indicating that the governments took their role seriously. Means were found to keep the economy functioning as normally as possible. Provincial industries were moved away from areas threatened with invasion and reestablished in remote areas or sent further west out of the province. Education up to and including some colleges were reestablished out of harms way. Governmental offices were dispersed throughout the provinces to avoid creating easily identifiable targets. (Chekiang will be presented as a detailed illustration in section III.)

Both the national government and the provincial governments continued to function efficiently in the national emergency. The bureaucracy mobilized the many segments of the population and exerted control throughout the retreat.

---

[9]China Handbook, p. 805.

Industry and Its Workers

One of the more dramatic stories of the retreat was the movement of China's industry from the coastal provinces to the interior. The movement of Chinese industry to the west was essential if China intended to save her industrial base. Limited though it was, this industry was needed to maintain an effective war effort. Virtually all of the industry sustaining the national government during the war was moved inland from the coast. Very little industrial development had taken place in the interior prior to 1937. The government succeeded in moving whole factories, large stocks of finished goods, pieces of equipment, and its skilled labor force to the western provinces.

There were great obstacles facing the movement of all this personnel and equipment. Perhaps the most serious obstacle was the lack of adequate transportation facilities. China lacked a developed rail network, especially in the west. With few trucks and even fewer mechanical powered ships, industrial equipment had to be loaded primarily by hand and moved by junk, cart, truck and many other makeshift means. Sometimes an individual factory or piece of equipment was reestablished and put into production several times before arriving at its final destination. The skilled labor necessary to operate the machinery was given equal priority in the evacuation. Without the workers, the

government could not expect to quickly resume production.

The evacuation of China's industry began at Shanghai. A large proportion of the nation's industry was concentrated within the Shanghai region. This was a major reason the government decided to defend Shanghai.[10] For example, out of the approximately 200 electrical manufacturing factories in China in 1937, 159 were located in the Shanghai area, approximately three-fourths of the total.[11] The Nationalist government began the evacuation of factories and industry at the outbreak of war. The director in charge of the evacuation was the Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr. Wong Wen-hao. Wong made several critical decisions about priorities in the movement of types of industry. He concentrated on moving heavy industry and the arsenals. From Shanghai, China salvaged less than ten percent of her textile capacity, little more than forty percent of her machine shops and heavy industry, and more than eighty percent of the capacity of its obsolescent military arsenals.[12] Approximately one-hundred million Chinese dollars worth of industrial equipment was moved west from Shanghai.[13]

---

[10]F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956) p. 155.

[11]Ibid., p. 154.

[12]Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York: William Sloane, 1946), p. 650.

[13]Johannes Ahlers, "China Finances Her War," Asia, 38 (June 1938), p. 366.

In spite of the tenacious defense of Shanghai by the Chinese army, the evacuation of industry was difficult to carry out. The removal of industrial plants from Shanghai began late, because, businessmen were reluctant to move their plants, and the government was slow in making decisions of what to move and how. Shanghai Machine Works, for example, one of the finest machine shops in the country, did not begin its move up Soochow Creek until two weeks after the fighting began. The company's machinery was loaded into row boats, covered with leaves and branches for camouflage from air attack, and moved up the river to the Yangtze. From the Yangtze, the equipment was evacuated to the west.[14]

Other equipment, that had a lower priority or was more difficult to move, was first moved into the International Settlement. Later, this equipment was transported to Kwangsi, Hunan, or Kiangsi province by ship, railroad, and truck. The evacuation succeeded in moving only 14,000 tons of equipment before the fall of Shanghai.[15]

The evacuation of financial capital was another major story. At the beginning of the war, the Chinese banks moved their gold bullion and silver reserves into the International Settlement. From there, the banks succeeded in

---

[14] White, Thunder, p. 56.

[15] Ibid.

evacuating over 100 million dollars to Hongkong.[16] After the majority of capital was safely removed from Shanghai, the head offices of all government and private financial institutions were moved to Nanking. By the end of October 1937, the Central Bank of China, the Bank of China, Bank of Communications, and the Agricultural and Industrial Bank of China had moved their head offices to Nanking. The only financial institutions left in Shanghai were the Consolidated Tax Bureau, and the Inspectorate General of Customs.[17]

When the industrial equipment from the Shanghai-Nanking area was moved, it was sent to the Wuhan cities. There, a major industrial center was established with the new equipment from the east. Approximately one-third of the refugee factories were reestablished at Hankow, while the remainder continued their march to the west.[18]

The Yufeng textile mill, one of China's greatest textile mills, was moved from the Yellow River to Szechwan. The mill was moved non-stop to the west through Hankow. In February, 8,000 tons of machinery were sent by railway to Hankow. The machinery was then loaded onto river steamers and moved up river where it was again repackaged onto 380 native junks.

---

[16] "Chinese Ship Gold, Silver to Hongkong for Safety", NYT, July 16, 1937, p. 11.

[17] NYT, October 17, 1937, p. 39.

[18] China Handbook, p. 436.

The junks laden with the heavy equipment, moved up the gorges of the Yangtze to Szechwan. One-hundred twenty of the boats sank in the gorges, however, the crews from the junks recovered all but twenty-one boats and moved on. The convoy arrived in Chungking in April 1939. Soon, the company was reestablished and was training Szechwanese peasant women to tend the rusting spindles.[19]

When the Japanese launched their offensive against Hankow, a major effort was again made to move industry farther to the west. The dismantling, loading and unloading of machinery was accomplished with auto-jacks and manpower. Plants were loaded piece-meal onto river junks. Workshops, complete with all their machines, drive shafts, power plants and even the roofs, were also loaded onto the junks. In some cases, six to twelve junks were joined by heavy wooden beams to provide sufficient bouyancy and floor space for the machinery.[20] Coolies, by the hundreds and thousands, hauled blocks of steel weighing up to twenty tons. During the last week of Hankow's existence, Hankow's power plant was moved to Szechwan. Its eighteen ton turbine was finally loaded aboard a steamer on October 23, 1938, two days before the Japanese entered the city. Because there were no cranes available that could lift more than sixteen tons, the turbine

---

19 White, Thunder, p. 57.

20 "China's Industries Fight On," Business Week, May 20, 1939, pp. 22-4.

had been loaded by hand. Much of the machinery could not be carried on the tiny river steamers, so the Chinese lashed the heavy machinery to pontoons. They then floated the pontoons, tied them to the steamers and sent everything through the rapids of the Yangtze.[21] Some of the heavier machinery such as the two blast furnaces at Hanyehping were blown up. A total of forty-one percent of the 516 factories in the Wuhan area were moved to the interior of China. Twelve percent of the remaining factories were destroyed by the Chinese.[22]

Szechwan was a hodgepodge of strange adaptations to local conditions. Steel factories were built with bamboo beams, blast furnaces were supplied by coal carried in hand baskets, and copper refineries consumed copper coins collected from the peasantry.[23] Steel factories in Chungking produced 100 - 150 tons of iron and steel from scrap iron collected in Hankow. Hankow had been stripped of all iron to include sewer covers, radiators, stoves, awning frames and doorknobs.[24]

In April of 1939, Western correspondents were taken on

---

[21] White, Thunder, p. 57.

[22] China Handbook, p. 436.

[23] White, Thunder, p. 57.

[24] Haldore Hanson, "Chiang Kai-shek's Army," Asia 39 (June 1939) p. 361.

an industrial tour of Chungking. They were shown a medium sized steel plant that manufactured many products from ship anchors to steel rails. It had two electric steel furnaces, extensive iron and steel casting sections, and well-equipped machine shops. The factory's traveling cranes were built and designed in Chungking. A new two-and-a-half million dollar steel plant was being built with a thirty-ton blast furnace, ten ton open hearth and ten inch rolling mill. The correspondents were shown a vegetable oil cracking plant which utilized vegetable oil and rape seed to produce 30,000 gallons of gasoline a month. Although not visited, the reporters were told of the military arsenals at Nanking, Hanwang, Kung-hsian and Taiyuan, which had been moved into the interior and consolidated into three arsenals. The Chungking arsenal produced machine gun parts, trench mortars and hand grenades. Other plants the newspaper reporters were shown included silk weaving, cotton spinning, and electric equipment factories. At that time, there were thousands of workers in the area, clearing additional industrial sites.[25]

Throughout the west, communications, trade and banking were established for the first time. New radio stations and thousands of miles of telephone cables were installed. Through tung oil and tea exports, new trading companies were

---

[25] P. Tillman Durdin, "China Can't Buy Planes Here Now," NYT, April 16, 1939, p. 30.

established to obtain foreign capital for the national government.[26] The vitality of Chinese commerce was reflected in the number of registrations at the Bureau of Trade Marks in Chungking. By 1939, 1,185 trademarks were listed, 349 of which belonged to foreign merchants.[27]

Branches of the Central Mint were established by November 1939, in Chungking, Chengtu, Lanchow, and Kweilin. They turned out millions of copper and nickel coins. In 1938, ninety branch offices of Chinese banks were established in the southwest and western provinces to include twenty-four branches in Szechwan, thirteen in Hunan, eleven in Yunnan, nine in Fukien, seven in Kwangsi and six in Kwangtung.[28]

Western China was not the only area which developed new industry. Unoccupied southern China also had a sizeable amount of refugee industry. In Kiangsi province, almost every city and town had new banking facilities, expanded trade, newly established factories, and expanded old factories. Kweilin was constructing important railways, and in southern Kiangsi, new mines were being developed. Coastal spinning and weaving factories, machine factories, alcohol

---

[26] "China's Industries Fight On," p. 24.

[27] Ibid., p. 27.

[28] Ibid.

factories, paper manufacturies, a cement factory and an electrical equipment plant were relocated in Hunan. However, the central government insured the majority of resources were moved to the less vulnerable west. Of the 448 private factories that moved into free China, 121 reestablished themselves in Hunan, twenty-three in Kwangsi, and twenty-three in all the other southern provinces. Two-hundred fifty-four moved to Szechwan.[29]

In the early 1930s the Nationalist government began to form production cooperatives. By the time of the Japanese invasion, western and southwestern China industrial cooperatives consisted of small groups of workers who cooperated in the production of essential consumer products. The industrial cooperatives in west China (excluding Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Hunan) numbered 336 with 4,598 members. The cooperatives' activities included spinning and weaving, production of food stuffs, chemicals, metals, printing, civil engineering, leather tannery, pottery, paper manufacturing, radio parts, and small generator works. In Hunan, by November 1940, the industrial cooperatives numbered 12,660 with 387,000 members. They produced paper, manufactured sugar, made handicrafts, spun cloth, and wove ramie. These industrial cooperatives obtained small loans of capital, and used old skills and outdated machines, providing essential

---

[29] Nanking Theological Seminar, The Great Migration and the Church Behind the Lines (Shanghai, 1941) p. 6.

local products that otherwise would not have been available to the civilian population.[30]

White, in Thunder Out of China, estimates that 400 major factories with over 200,000 tons of equipment were moved in this retreat.[31] The arrival of industry, banks, skilled workers, and tradesmen in China's west produced a remarkable transformation. Before 1937, Western China had almost no major industry with the exception of some small mining operations. By 1939 it was the center of unoccupied China's industry. This extraordinary effort enabled the Nationalist government to continue the war. Without this small, secure industrial base, China could not have produced weapons and ammunition for its armies, maintained modern communications or sustained a wartime economy; China would not have been able to resist the Japanese.

The Students

When hostilities began in July, 1937 the educational establishment of China began its move inland away from the Japanese. Out of China's 108 institutions of higher learning, ninety-four were either forced to move inland or close down.[32] By fall of 1939, the educational system was again

---

[30] Ibid., p. 7.

[31] White, Thunder, p. 56.

[32] Ibid., p. 650.

functioning. There were 40,000 students enrolled in refugee colleges as compared with the 32,000 registered during the last academic year before the war.[33] Three major learning centers were established, Chungking, Chengtu and Kunming. The four great universities of the north, Peking National, Tsinghua, Yen-ching, and Nankai were attacked by the Japanese when they invaded Northern China. Fortunately, the students were on summer vacation and many were away from the area.

The Ministry of Education called for the students to appear at two rendezvous points. The plan was to found two united universities, at Sian and at Changsha. From Sian, the students of two colleges were sent by railway to begin their move to southern Shensi. The students traveled in box cars while the professors, traveling in second class wagons, formulated the new university's curriculum. When the students and faculty arrived at the end of the railway, they marched 180 miles over the Tsin-ling mountains under leadership of their deans. The 1,500 men and women were divided into three sections of five hundred each. Each unit was preceeded by a police section, foraging squad, and communications squad.

When the main body arrived at the night's encampment, the foraging squads distributed the food they collected.

---

[33] Ibid. p. 59.

The local authorities boarded the students in stables and farm houses. The engineering students set up their radios to catch the evening broadcast and displayed the news on posters for the students behind them. Upon arrival in central Shensi, the students and faculty quickly organized the University of National Revolt.[34]

On November 1, 1937, Changsha Temporary University opened. However, because of the rapid evacuation of Peiping and Tientsin, professors lacked their classroom notes, students had no books or clothes and the consolidated library had a very limited collection of books. When Nanking fell, the University moved to Kunming in Yunnan Province.

Some of the students stayed behind to serve with the army or to support patriotic causes. However, the majority chose to make the long trip to Yunnan. A small group of students and faculty (less than 300) walked 1,000 miles in sixty-eight days through wild, lawless territory. The majority of the faculty and students traveled by train and ship.[35]

When the new Southwestern University opened, it administered entrance exams which included questions of "define society. . . state. . . nation. . . Define capitalism. . .

---

[34] Ibid.

[35] John Israel, "Southwest Associated University: Survival As An Ultimate Value." Prepared for Columbia Modern China Seminar, Fall 1975, p. 15.

socialism. . . imperialism. . . Define colony. . . semi-colonial country."[36]

These questions are evidence of the political concerns of the academic elite.

The students found their academic performance was hampered by primitive living conditions. Many of the students were domiciled in an old abandoned theater where they lived four, six or eight to a room. They sought to study in a library with limited seating, rather than in their crowded, dimly lit rooms. Worst of all, their food rations were meager and many students experienced hunger for the first time.

When the Japanese attacked Shanghai, the Chinese army gave the universities in the area enough time to evacuate to the west. One example of this evacuation process was the move of the National Chekiang University in Hangchow. From before the Japanese invasion, the government had planned to move the university inland. Approximately three to four-hundred students, faculty and their families were organized and sent as a group to the west. Prior to moving, the students prepared for the evacuation and studied diligently during air raids at Hangchow. In November, after the Japanese broke through the defense lines of Shanghai, the

---

[36]Anna Louise Strong, "China Moves Inland," Asia, 38 (June 1938) p. 58.

university finally packed up its books, disassembled its chemistry and physics laboratories, and moved towards Kiangsi province.

The majority of the students and faculty traveled by steamboat and junk, while some others took the overland route. The flow of refugees and wounded soldiers, and the disorganization of the retreat, disrupted plans to make an orderly move to Kiangsi. The university broke up into small groups which worked their way to the west. When they reached Shangtien in February, 1938, they rebuilt and refurnished some abandoned buildings and began classes.

Sixty percent of the student body was without financial support because they were separated from their families on the coast and were unable to pay their fees. The Ministry of Education granted student loans that were to be repaid two years after the war. The students were given work to earn this support, which resulted in bringing the students to the countryside. The hydraulic engineering department built flood control dikes, the university operated a village school, and agriculture students established cooperatives to help the government resettle refugees. The students established a local newspaper and the university medical service provided medical care to the country people. In addition, the medical service conducted a health education program for the peasants.[37]

---

[37]Franz Michael, "University on the March: National Chekiang University, Hangchow," Asia 39 (Jan. 1939) p. 33-35.

Most of the universities did not have a surplus of time to mobilize their evacuation. The students at Sun Yat-sen University in Canton were poling boats with the college library on board when the Japanese entered the city. The northern universities had to leave their books and equipment because of the rapid Japanese invasion.

Not all of the schools of China moved to the West. In the southeast provinces, many colleges and secondary schools remained in new locations, but within the province of their origin.[38]

The significance of this intellectual mobilization was not only the continued education of those who would assume future leadership roles. The move also brought university students into contact with the majority of the population of China for the first time. Students had assumed a role which urged national resistance against the Japanese. Now they had the opportunity to personally implement their convictions. Some students chose military service in order to fight the aggressors personally. Others chose to work in the villages, trying to mobilize the population in support of the war effort. However, the majority of students continued their studies at the newly established universities. Most of the students had never traveled outside the cities and therefore had no idea of rural conditions. They saw

---

[38]Nanking Theological Seminary, The Great Migration, p. 5.

for the first time how the majority of the nation was living, and although most were repelled by rural conditions, some did contribute to the national war effort by providing leadership and direction to the war effort in the countryside.

The Refugees

By far the largest group, yet the most difficult to analyze was the mass of people who migrated westward. The refugees can be broadly classified as consisting of peasants, laborers, shop keepers and craftsmen, but it included people from all walks of life.

The migration began with the attack on Shanghai. By the time the Japanese entered Shanghai, the commercial center was empty. The factory districts were evacuated, burned, or bombed out. Ten to sixteen million people from the Shanghai - Nanking region moved west in sedan chairs, rickshaws, horse drawn carriages, donkeys, mules, handcarts, wheelbarrows, on foot, in sailboats, in junks and sanpans.[39]

On December 22, 1937, thirty thousand refugees jammed Chungshou gate in Nanking anxious to leave. Everyone was heading towards Hankow. One newspaper report said only

---

[39]Strong, "China Moves Inland," p. 369.

200,000 remained in Nanking on November 22, 1937, out of a population of one million.[40] Even after Nanking was restored to order, the population was only one-half of what it had been before the war. Where there were 12,000 stores, shops and eating houses, now there was only 2,500.[41] The flood of refugees into the city of Hankow quickly depleted the city of food and medical supplies. The government moved the refugees to rural districts where food was cheaper and employment was available. Each of the forty-eight counties of Hopei were asked to subsidize five thousand refugees and find work for them. The YMCA and YWCA operated camps that tried to educate and find jobs for refugees. The old provincial guilds cared for the refugees from the guilds' home provinces. Groups of workers and students operated a liaison service to train the non-native provincial armies. They interpreted provincial dialects, provided medical service, entertained and did propaganda work.[42] As the refugees passed along the roadside, government authorities sought to provide the immediate necessities of rice and shelter, but they insisted on keeping the flow

---

[40]F. Tillman Durdin, "Chinese Admit Retreat," NYT, November 22, 1937, p. 12.

[41]"Nanking population one half before war," NYT, March 12, 1939, p. 36.

[42]Strong, "China Moves Inland," p. 370.

moving west. They were heartily assisted "by local officials and residents who regarded the immigrants somewhat as a horde of devouring locusts who, if once allowed to settle down, would eat up all the crops."[43] Relatives, friends, and friends of relatives, had their hospitality taxed to the limit from their temporary visitors. Immigrants found employment, established business for themselves, or were employed by government relief projects.

The refugees suffered terrible hardships. Frequently bombed and strafed by Japanese aircraft, suffering from a lack of food and shelter, and uncertain of the future, they continued to press westward. In February of 1938, the Central Emergency Relief Commission estimated that of the ten million refugees it had dealt with, five million were destitute and near starvation. The other five million were able to support themselves or find accomodations with relatives and friends.[44] One year later, relief workers estimated that no less than two million refugees died from malnutrition, exposure, cholera, cold, dysentery and malaria.[45]

---

[43]Nanking Theological Seminary, The Great Migration, p. 2.

[44]F. Tillman Durdin, "Five Million Chinese Starving in Flight," NYT, February 10, 1938, p. 12.

[45]Hallet Abend, "Millions in China Wander Homeless," NYT, March 22, 1939, p. 11.

The government tried to normalize conditions in Hankow as much as possible. Some supplies reached the city from the outside world. When non-military supplies arrived in town, the newspapers carried advertisements advertising sun glasses, American cigarettes, novels, magazines, Himrod's asthma cure, rouge, razor blades, veterinary supplies, yeast tablets, and biscuits. All these items sold at premium prices.

The attitude of the population in Hankow impressed many correspondents and military observers. John Gunther, correspondent to the New York Times, reported in May 1938, "There's very little defeatism in Hankow now. The behavior of the people during the air raids shows it sharply. The people laugh at the raiders or else get mad."[46] One American naval attache reported there were no signs of despair or of breaking up, but the people were indifferent to the suffering around them.[47]

In the southeast provinces, population increases in the interior cities were not due to increases of migrants from outside the southeast provinces. The majority of the increase was attributed to the movement of the population from occupied and immediately threatened areas to inland

---

[46] NYT, May 5, 1938, p. 12.

[47] Letter, James McHugh to Commander J. M. Creighton, June 7, 1938, Cornell University, Archives, Box 9, File 1.

cities.[48] For example, the population of the interior city of Yenping, Fukien province, doubled rising from a prewar figure of twenty thousand to forty thousand. The border town of Kwangtseh, at the head waters of the Min River also doubled in size, going from three thousand to six thousand due to a large increase in boat people. Other immigrants reaching Kwantseh, were employed in five new factories. The new construction additionally attracted a large number of carpenters and masons. Yuanling, in western Hunan, went from a population of ten thousand to two-hundred thousand.[49] Ningsia province was prepared to accept one million war refugees. Plans were made to utilize the refugees for constructing highways and mining of coal.

The evacuation of the major cities was dramatic. Only one quarter of the population of Hangchow remained in February of 1938. The population was reduced from 600,000 to 125,000.[50] Almost the entire population of Canton evacuated the city. Of the original population of fifteen million, by March 1939, not more than 25,000 inhabitants remained (the figure of 25,000 does not include people in

---

[48]Nanking Theological Seminary, The Great Migration, p. 5.

[49]Ibid., p. 4.

[50]"Japanese Resume March of Soochow," NYT, February 2, 1938, p. 3.

refugee camps outside of the city limits).[51] This almost total evacuation of Canton can be ascribed to the terrible bombing in 1938 and to the efforts of the government to evacuate the city.

Upon arriving at Chungking, the refugees experienced great difficulty coping with living conditions. When the flow of refugees threatened to overwhelm the city, the Chungking authorities would not allow any more landings of refugees in the city. Thousands were required to land several hundred miles south of the city and move inland on food. The tremendous expansion of Chungking created heavy pressures on the city. In December of 1937, there was no housing available, because all housing had been taken by earlier refugees. Even the shops were rented out at night. The shops would do business in the day and rent out their quarters at night and the homeless refugees were forced to walk the streets during the day. There was a tremendous food shortage and authorities urged all refugees going to Szechwan to bring their own food supplies. Transportation into Chungking from Hankow was almost impossible to find. Trains and river boats were booked two months in advance and airplanes, for those who could afford them, had reser-

---

[51] Hallet Abend, "Japan Reviving Canton Business," NYT, March 17, 1939, p. 10.

vations as much as one month in advance. Even after arrival in Chungking, the refugees found themselves subjected to intense air attacks and were forced to evacuate the city.[52]

---

[52]"Refugees Choke Chungking," NCH, December 29, 1937, p. 486.

III. CHEKIANG, A PROVINCIAL CASE

Chekiang province in 1938 is a good example of the situation in the Southeast provinces; the government was strong, vigorous, and effective. The government had organized to a high degree the defenses, trade and communications of the province in spite of Japanese occupation of Chekiang's major city, Hanchow.[1]

The province of Chekiang best illustrates the organization of the Southeast provinces. The provincial authorities maintained close communications with the Central government at Hankow and referred to the government for authority and direction. Assuming that the Japanese would eventually invade the province, they had collected over 160,000 regular troops. In addition, they had a strong irregular army. The government made a decision to arm the people; it assumed the people had a will to fight rather than to submit to invasion. This arming of the people indicated the confidence the government had in its ability to retain the people's allegiance.

The task of recruiting and training a standing army of

---

[1] Elizabeth Chambers, "Chekiang is Ready for Japan," Asia, 38 (October, 1938), 612 - 14. This article is the source of this section. The reliability of the information is corroborated in an Editor's note prefacing the article.

guerrillas was entrusted to a group of "special commissioners" who were military men with wide experience. Each reported directly to the provincial government and had nine hsien in his jurisdiction. Thirty-thousand men were recruited every month to attend a three month guerrilla training course. They were then sent back to their village armed to serve in the village militia. Ten percent of each month's group of men was retained for further training and eventual service in the regular army. This ten percent was known as the tzu wei tui (self-protection corps). By October 1938, there were already fifty thousand trained men in the self-protection corps. The goal of the program was to train 100,000 men to resist the Japanese if they invaded Chekiang.

In the immediate vicinity of Ningpo, the pre-war coastal capital of Chekiang, railway tracks had been torn up to make Ningpo as inaccessible as possible; trenches and pill-boxes were constructed facing enemy avenues of approach; the province's highway network was in a state of good repair. Food was cached, ammunition dumps were created, the population was drilled in practice maneuvers, water storage facilities were created, and defensive positions were all prepared in exceptional detail. The regular army was received with friendliness and goodwill, because of its good behavior. Hospitals were set up in advance, small ones in the countryside, larger ones at the important population

centers. Nurses were trained and medical equipment was gathered. The government's defense plan included the civilian populations' role,

> . . . according to the plan, if the Japanese should break through the regular army's line, the town folk and country people are to burn their villages and flee to the hills where the supplies of food and water are stored. At night the self-protection corps will come into play, making nightly raids upon Japanese garrisons and lines of communications, laying mines, tearing up roads and then disappearing by day into the hills. It sounds perhaps a little oversimplified, but its importance lies in the fact that it reflects the resolution of the people themselves to take part in armed resistance.[2]

The government's offices were dispersed throughout the province. In order to avoid attack and to preserve mobility, no one town or city housed many governmental offices.

The provincial authorities also controlled trade within the province. They closed Chekiang's coastal ports to deceive the Japanese about the effectiveness of the Japanese blockade. Only three ships made the Ningpo to Shanghai run. They were controlled by detailed regulations that permitted only one vessel to enter the port each day. One British ship and two Chinese ships, with German and Italian papers, carried on this limited trade. By using these methods, the provincial authorities hoped to prevent the

---

[2] Ibid., p. 613.

Japanese from completely cutting off all trade with Shanghai.

Because of the slowing of trade, the province had an abundance of wealth. Market places overflowed with produce that normally went to Shanghai. Large stores of consumer goods were found in the market place produced by the local village industries. The authorities were trying to gain access to the world market to dispose of excess tea, silk, wood, and oil. Smugglers used the intricate network of small canals that lace the lower Yangtze valley to carry on a limited trade with Shanghai. For example, certain filatures were working at top capacity with the silk that was steadily flowing into the city. Chekiang also supplied arms and ammunition to Shanghai area irregulars. The location of the guerrilla headquarters for operations from Shanghai to Sungking was located in Chekiang, with orders communicated by radio.[3]

The government raised revenue by means of taxes and control of exports. For example, the rolled tobacco monopoly consisted of a tax of fifty percent on the wholesale price of a package of cigarettes. A combine of wood oil exporters had been organized to secure a portion of these sales revenues. The provincial authorities, through the combine, bought wood oil from peasant producers for thirty-nine dollars and sold it at forty-five.

---

[3]Ibid., p. 614.

All transportation was controlled by the government. Bus service was cheap and popular. The flow of traffic on one lane roads was controlled by telephone between signalling stations. Rickshaw carts and carrying porters were organized to supplement truck and bus service.

The organization of Chekiang by the provincial government demonstrates the high degree of control that could be found in many places of unoccupied China.

CONCLUSION

The findings in this study suggest that the Kuomintang and provincial governments of the Yangtze River Valley and southeast played a more prominent role in organizing and leading the Nationalist hegira than has been previously supposed. Chalmers Johnson's interpretation of the Sino - Japanese War (1937 - 1945), as noted in the introduction, shows that the Communist Party, by contrast with the Kuomintang,

> . . . offered to meet the needs of the people for leadership in organizing resistance to the invader and in alleviating war induced anarchy in the rural areas.[1]

But it has been shown that during the hegira of 1937 - 1939, the Kuomintang and provincial governments along the Yangtze River Valley and in the southeast, offered leadership and organization too.

The evidence shows it was the government's effective organization and leadership that enabled the Chinese in central and southeastern China to cope with the Japanese invasion. The military carried out the government's orders to cover the retreat and thereby bought the time needed to

---

[1]Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, p. 7.

save the strategically important elements of the population. The government not only planned and executed the retreat, with all of its complexities, but also maintained uninterrupted services to the nation while moving its own offices. The government insured critical industrial resources were saved and reestablished in safer western locations. The country's educational system was relocated and funded by the government. Finally the millions of people fleeing from the Japanese were given assistance and direction by the various governments involved.

The maintenance of defense, communications, and an economy shows that the governments of the Yangtze River Valley and the southeastern provinces organized and led the resistance of the Chinese to the Japanese invasion from 1937 to 1939. However, the KMT failed to continue the leadership and organization they had implemented to move the population to the West. After reestablishing itself, the KMT ceased to meet the needs of its mobilized followers, resulting in the second "hegira" to Taiwan in 1949.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahlers, Johannes. "China Finances Her War." Asia 38 (June 1938): 365 - 368.

Bisson, T.A. Japan in China. New York: Macmillan, 1938.

Buck, Pearl S. "Free China Gets to Work; New Industrial Cooperatives Can Supply An Economic Base for Prolonged Resistance and for Reconstruction After the War." Asia 39 (April 1939): 199-202.

_____. "Thanks to Japan; China Moving Westward Into Interior." Asia 38 (May 1938): 279-81.

Carlson, Evan Fordyce. Twin Stars of China. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1940.

Chambers, Elizabeth. "Chekiang Is Ready for Japan." Asia 38 (October 1938): 612 - 14.

Chen, Jack. "Young China's United Front." Asia 38 (July 1938): 414 - 416.

"China's Industries Fight On." Business Week, May 20, 1939.

"China's War Strength." Current History (November, 1937): 103.

Chinese Ministry of Education. China Handbook, 1937 - 1943. New York: 1943.

Clubb, C. Edmund. 20th Century China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.

Cornell University Archives. James McHugh Collection.

Eastman, Lloyd E. The Abortive Revolution, China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927 - 1937. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974.

Ekvall, Robert B. "The Bombing of Chungking." Asia 39 (August 1939): 471 - 473.

Hallet, Abend. Chaos in Asia. New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1939.

Hanson, Haldore. "Chiang Kai-shek's Army." Asia 39 (June 1939): 360 - 2.

_____. "China Has an Army." Review of Reviews 96 (July 1937): 54 - 55.

Israel, John. "Southwest Associated University: Survival As An Ultimate Value." Prepared for Columbia Modern China Seminar, Fall 1975.

_____. Student Nationalism in China, 1927 - 1937. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966.

_____, and Klein, Donald W. Rebels and Bureaucrats, China's December 9ers. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1976.

Kapp, Robert A. Szechwan and the Chinese Republic, Provincial Militarism and Central Power, 1911 - 1938. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

Liu, F. F. A Modern History of Modern China, 1924 - 1949. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956.

Michael, Franz. "University On the March: National Chekiang University, Hangchow." Asia, 39 (January 1939). 32 - 35.

Nanking Theological Seminary. The Great Migration and the Church Behind the Lines. Shanghai: 1941.

New York Times, July 1, 1937 - December 31, 1939.

North China Herald. (Shanghai), July 1, 1937 - December 31, 1938.

Peck, Graham. Two Kinds of Time. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950.

Sheridan, James E. China in Disintegration, The Republican Era in Chinese History 1912 - 1949. New York: The Free Press, 1975.

Skinner, G. William. "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China." The Journal of Asian Studies, 3 parts in Vol XXIV; no. 1, November 1964; no. 2, February 1965; no. 3, May 1965.

Smedley, Agnes. "China's Wounded." Nation 147 (November 5, 1938): 477 - 479.

Strong, Anna Louise. "China Moves Inland." Asia 38 (June 1938): 369 - 72.

_____. "The Chinese Spirit Goes Up." Asia 38 (July 1938): 425 - 428.

Tiltman, Hessell H. "Behind Two Fronts: Shanghai - Tokyo." Asia 38 (March 1938): 154 - 157.

Tsao Chu-jen, and Shu Tsung-chiao. Pictorial History of China's War of Resistance. Shanghai: 1946.

Tuchman, Barbara W. Stillwell and the American Experience In China, 1911 - 1945. New York: MacMillan, 1971.

White, Theodore H., and Jacoby, Annalee. Thunder Cut of China. New York: Sloane, 1961.

Young, Arther N. China and the Helping Hand 1937 - 1945. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963.