On a Simple Resource-Allocation Game.

Abstract

A player is offered a finite set of numbers, one after another, each drawn at random from a known distribution. The player may choose a number when offered (not knowing the future choices) and thereby stop the game, whose value becomes the magnitude of the chosen number. The strategy by which the player decides how to choose a number to maximize the value of the game, is presented, and the game is generalized to the case in which it continues until the player has made n choices (the value of the game then being the sum of the n numbers chosen). (Author)

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 29, 1978
Accession Number
ADA065263

Entities

People

  • Alan A. Grometstein

Organizations

  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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  • Weapons Technologies

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Fields of Study

  • Economics

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  • Ballistic Missile Meteorology
  • Game Theory.
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