Stable Sets for Symmetric, n-Person Cooperative Games.
Abstract
Stable sets and subsolutions are studied mainly for symmetric, n-person, characteristic-function form games (n;k) in which k-person coalitions are strongly vital, i.e., v(s) < or = v(k) dot (s/k) for k < or = s < or = n-1 and v(s) = 0 for all s < k. In the first part, two types (i.e., systematic and semi-symmetric) of stable sets are defined and their existence is investigated. Furthermore, symmetric stable sets are determined for some classes of (n;k) games. In the latter half, the production game presented by S. Hart, which is a kind of (n;k) game, is considered and his open questions are studied. Finally, subsolutions defined by A. Roth are analyzed.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1978
- Accession Number
- ADA066730
Entities
People
- Shiego Muto
Organizations
- Cornell University College of Engineering