Equilibrium Strategies in Voting Games.

Abstract

A voting game G = (N,W) is defined here as a strong and proper simple game. N is a finite set of voters (players) and W is a collection of subset of N called winning coalition. A winning coalition w is a subset of N which can guarantee a victory on any issue if all the members in w cooperate. A coalition which is not winning is called a losing coalition. The problem is to find an optimal strategy for each party when each one has the same total financial resources.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 01, 1978
Accession Number
ADA066997

Entities

People

  • Mohammed Rabie

Organizations

  • Cornell University College of Engineering

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Applied Mathematics
  • Engineering
  • Guarantees
  • Industrial Engineering
  • Integrals
  • Interdisciplinary Science
  • Mathematics
  • New York
  • Operations Research
  • Probability
  • Schools
  • Symmetry
  • Systems Engineering
  • Systems Science
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Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Educational Psychology
  • Game Theory.
  • Graph Algorithms and Convex Optimization.